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Sen and Sensibility
Abstract
In The idea of justice (2009), Amartya Sen builds on his previous work on capabilities to develop a theory of comparative justice which he contrasts to the contractarian approach. The theory has two parts: the proper materials of justice (capabilities); and, a procedure for assessing those materials. The procedure that Sen advocates is one of open impartial deliberation operationalised through Adam Smith's impartial spectator, which he contends is superior to contractarian view operationalised by Rawls’ original position. In this paper we argue that Sen's open impartiality is too open and defend a more bounded version as more workable regardless of the operationalising device used. Moreover, we demonstrate that Sen's own arguments against thepossibility of agreement, though aimed at the contractarian tradition, undermine his own attempts to generate a contentful account of justice by driving a wedge between the materials and procedures. Sen's attempt to provide an alternative approach to political philosophy, we conclude, fails.
... First" of" all," Sen" blames" Rawls" for" interpreting" Smith's" concept" of" the" impartial" spectator" as" an" "ideal" observer"" (IJ:" 136)." This" reading" leads" Rawls" to" advocate" the" famous" device" of" a" veil" of" ignorance" in" the" original" position" in" order" to" guarantee" impartiality" (see" for" instance" Kandil" 2010"&"2013,"Clare"and"Horn"2010."In"the"original"position,"the"participants"to"public"reasoning" are"said"to"be"ideal"observers"because"they"ignore"their"identities"and,"thus,"cannot"defend"their" own" interests" while" discussing" principles" of" justice" or," in" other" words," because" they" are" impartial." According" to" Sen," this" interpretation" is" not" faithful" to" Smith's" view" of" the" impartial" spectator" which" would" not" represent" an" ideal" spectator," but" real$ spectators" with" their" own" identities."Smith,"he"says,""requires"the"impartial"spectator"to"[...]"see"what"the"issues"would"look" like"with"'the"eyes"of"other"people',"from$the$perspective$of$'real$spectators'$-$from$both$far$and$ near""(Ibid.,"underlined"by"us)."" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 9" " Second," Sen" criticizes" Rawls" for" "misattributing" ideas" to" Smith," taking" him" to" be" mainly" a" utilitarian"" (Baujard," Gilardone," Salles," forthcoming) 20 ." ...
... "Note"that"in"this"section"of"the"Preface"entitled""What"kind"of"a"theory?","Sen"exposes"explicitly"the"first" three"requirements."However,"the"fourth"is"implicitly"contained"in"the"second"one." 16 "As"a"result,"commentators"tend"to"focus"on"that"specific"issue,"independently"from"the"others"(see"Clare" &"Horn"2010;"FormanQBarzilai"2010;"Fleischacker"2011"and"Shapiro,"2011."As"we"are"going"to"show,"this" is"not"representative"of"the"influence"that"Sen"grants"to"Smith." 17 " Sen" usually" uses" this" expression" of" "focal" group"" (2009:" 123," 126," 128," 133," 138," 139," 145Q150)" to" designate" the" group" which" has" to" take" a" collective" decision." ...
This paper aims at questioning what Sen (2009) presents as a theory of justice derived from Smith’s idea of the “impartial spectator”. Sen’s tribute to Smith’s pioneering concept of the impartial spectator already gave rise to a set of criticisms that we divide in two kinds: 1) Sen’s reading is unfaithful with regard to the original Smithian concept (Forman-Barzilai, 2010; Gilardone, 2010; Bruni, 2011; Alean, 2014; Shapiro, 2011; Ege, Igersheim & Le Chapelain, 2012) and 2) Sen’s reading is a weak point of his theory of justice (Shapiro, 2011; Ege, Igersheim & Le Chapelain, 2012). In the paper, we try to address both kinds of criticism. Firstly, we shed a new light on Sen’s reading of Smith and provide a path of reconciliation between Sen’s analysis and Smith’s one. For us, Sen’s impartial spectator is somewhat reminiscent of another figure from Smith’s moral philosophy: “the man without”. Secondly, we show that, in Smith’s analysis, “the man without” is pointless without his genuine concept of the impartial spectator, called “the man within”. We conclude by arguing that Smith’s “man within” could constitute the missing piece in Sen’s analysis of the process which must lead public reasoning towards more justice. Introducing a missing touch of Smith could thus strengthen Sen’s idea of open impartiality in public reasoning for challenging Rawls’ contractualist theory of justice.
This paper offers a history of the capability approach from its origins to its more recent development. Sen himself refused to be defined as the capability theorist and despite this analysis, we will come to understand that Sen played an essential role in this history because he pioneered the approach, but that his role has probably been overestimated by the available literature. Two further ‘main characters’ provided a relevant contribution to the origins and development of the capability approach, namely Walsh and Nussbaum. Finally, this paper considers the two main groups that have developed since the capability approach, the capability approach centred perspective and the capability approach heuristic value perspective, in order to show how they follow these three main characters in their own development of the capability approach.
This article extends the capabilities conception of individuals developed by Davis, understanding capabilities as relationships. I first introduced the main concepts that are useful for this extension, namely those of agency and capabilities. Then, I showed that agency refers to a rational and responsible exercise of capabilities through Ricoeurs analysis of Sens earlier works. I successively developed the concept of capabilities as relationships through the distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships: in this framework, self-scrutiny and relationality, respectively, become the leading capabilities of these two relationships. From this extension of the capabilities conception of the individual, two concepts arise with a certain strength, namely those of responsibility and relationality. This extension of the capabilities conception of the individual in economics also in terms of interpersonal relationships emphasises that this social conception of the individual is characterised by relationality. Thanks to responsibility and relationality, the capabilities conception of the individual might be applied in fields such as contemporary civil economy and ecological economics.
JEL Classifications: B31, B410, B59, Z13
Socioeconomic inequality among men and women is a major hindrance in ensuring equal advancement for all human being to live a dignified life. Minority status of women further exacerbates inequalities faced by women belonging to small ethnic groups. The chapter explores gender inequality across three small ethnic minorities' groups in Bangladesh. Applying Nussbaum's capability approach to analyze the situation of women with different social and ethnic identities, this chapter unpacks the three-fold barriers experienced by women belonging to minorities groups – first, as minority group, second as women and third as minority women. Lack of awareness, perceiving their “present state” as destiny, social and local norms and patriarchal way of thinking force these women to live with identity of secondary citizens.
The purpose of this study is to assess the concept of justice from the views of
John Rawls and Amartya Sen. From the Ancient Greeks to the present many thinkers have
developed a variety of justice theories.
In the first and second parts of this study, the views of justice important
philosophers from Antiquity to 20. century were examined.
The third part of the study one of the most important political philosophers in
the twenty century, John Rawls‟, understanding of the justice, in which the question of
„how the basic political and social institutions that govern a fair society should be‟ is tried
to be answered is explained. For this purpose, in this part of the study examines Rawls‟
perception of “justice of fairness” that he wants to stick to pragmatist ethics in his work
entitled A Theoria of Justice which claims justice to be the touchstone of anything ethical
and political. Justice, for Rawls is seen as equality and Rawls concentrated on the
distribution of primary goods.
The fourth part of the study examines the concept of justice in Amartya Sen.
Sen is one of the most important public intellectuals of our age who was published a major
book, The Idea of Justice, in 2009. Sen invites us to engage in public reasoning in pursuit
of justice. Justice, for Sen, is the elimination of unambiguous inequalities in capabilities.
Further, it requires equal access to basic capabilitites, such as health care, educational
services. The fifth and the last part of this research is to compare the perspectives of
justice of John Rawls and Amartya Sen. In this chapter is to determine similarities and
differences in the perspectives of justice of both thinkers. As a result of the study revealed
that there are differences rather than similarities among Rawls‟ and Sen‟s in the views of
justice.
Key Words : Justice, John Rawls, Amartya Sen.
Amartya Sen: A Global View To Justice - ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to assess the concept of justice from the view of Amartya Sen. Sen is one of the most important public intellectuals of our age who was published a major book, The Idea of Justice, in 2009. Sen invites us to engage in public reasoning in pursuit of justice. Justice, for Sen, is the elimination of unambiguous inequalities in capabilities. Further, justice according to Sen it requires equal access to basic capabilitites, such as health care, educational services.
Keywords: Amartya Sen, capability, justice.
Socioeconomic inequality among men and women is a major hindrance in ensuring equal advancement for all human being to live a dignified life. Minority status of women further exacerbates inequalities faced by women belonging to small ethnic groups. The chapter explores gender inequality across three small ethnic minorities' groups in Bangladesh. Applying Nussbaum's capability approach to analyze the situation of women with different social and ethnic identities, this chapter unpacks the three-fold barriers experienced by women belonging to minorities groups – first, as minority group, second as women and third as minority women. Lack of awareness, perceiving their “present state” as destiny, social and local norms and patriarchal way of thinking force these women to live with identity of secondary citizens.
This paper aims to clarify the status of capability in Sen’s idea of justice. Sen’s name is so widely associated with the concept of capability that commentators often assume that his contribution to the study of justice amounts to a capability theory, albeit underdeveloped. We argue that such a reading is misleading. Taking Sen’s reticence about operationalization seriously, we show that his contribution is inconsistent with a capability theory. Instead, we defend the idea that the capability approach plays a heuristic role: capability is a step in his argument against alternative materials, but is not meant as a definitive end. Sen defends a critical perspective primarily to encourage public reasoning and respect for agency as regards the definition of what should count in the evaluation of social states.
In this 1989 book Rorty argues that thinkers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein have enabled societies to see themselves as historical contingencies, rather than as expressions of underlying, ahistorical human nature or as realizations of suprahistorical goals. This ironic perspective on the human condition is valuable on a private level, although it cannot advance the social or political goals of liberalism. In fact Rorty believes that it is literature not philosophy that can do this, by promoting a genuine sense of human solidarity. A truly liberal culture, acutely aware of its own historical contingency, would fuse the private, individual freedom of the ironic, philosophical perspective with the public project of human solidarity as it is engendered through the insights and sensibilities of great writers. The book has a characteristically wide range of reference from philosophy through social theory to literary criticism. It confirms Rorty's status as a uniquely subtle theorist, whose writing will prove absorbing to academic and nonacademic readers alike.
Amartya Sen revisits the issues tackled in his previous seminal work, ‘On Economic Inequality’, first published in 1973 and expanded in 1997, and provides new analyses and insights in this crucial area. The book brings together and develops some of the most important themes of Sen's work over the last decade. He notes that the difference between virtually all contemporary ethical approaches to social arrangements lies not in whether they all demand equality of something, but in what sort of equality they propound. Any claim to equality must take account of the diversity of human beings and their characteristics. Sen argues that we should be concerned with people's capabilities rather than either their resources or their welfare. He also looks at some types of inequalities that have not yet been studied as systematically as inequalities of class and wealth have been. These include, inter alia, the important issue of gender inequality.
Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance.
- W Sellars
Sellars, W. 1963. Science, Perception and Reality. New York: The Humanities Press.