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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 227
Ehimika Adebayo Ifidon
Nigeria’s Policy of Non-Alignment and Voting in
the United Nations General Assembly, 1960-1965
Abstract
Two traditions of analysis exist with regard to the nature and
expression of non-alignment in Nigeria’s foreign policy between
1960 and 1965. The tradition that dates from the early 1960s
concludes that Nigeria’s foreign policy towards the Cold War
was independent and non-aligned, and the post-war tradition is
that Nigeria was ‘aligned’. Both traditions adduce as evidence
for their opposing verdicts Nigeria’s voting pattern in the United
Nations General Assembly between 1960 and 1965. Yet no
thoroughgoing quantitative analysis of Nigeria’s pattern of
voting in the General Assembly, both in individual and relative
terms, has been undertaken. But can the same piece of evidence
at the same time support such opposing conclusions? This paper
responds to this problematic by first reviewing Nigeria’s policy
toward the United Nations, and analysing the pattern of
Nigeria’s voting on Cold War issues in the General Assembly. It
employed the Lijphart method of computing Indices of
Agreement of roll-call votes, taking account of abstentions, and
arranged these indices in matrices anchored on groups of
possibly caucusing states. The result is that the coincidence of
Nigeria’s pattern of voting was minimal with those of the
superpowers, but highly related to the voting patterns of the
‘radical’ African states and putative non-aligned states. This
strengthens the conclusion that Nigeria acted as the
administration said it would: independent and not routinely
identifying with either of the superpowers.
228 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
Introduction
In several instances of important East-West issues Lagos
supported the West. Nowhere was this more visible than at the
United Nations.1
On Cold War issues involving East-West tensions, Nigeria has
pursued quite an independent line. It has voted as frequently with
the Soviet group as with the West, or it has abstained.2
Whenever the question of Nigeria’s non-alignment
between 1960 and 1965 is raised, the response is usually
acclamatory. Nigeria during this period was ‘aligned’. This
verdict is presumably the outcome of analysis that proceeds
from an indication of how the world of the early 1960s was
intensely bipolar and characterized by antagonistic blocs
(led by the Soviet Union and the United States), and how
Nigeria was anti-Communist and consequently anti-Soviet
Union (and anti-East) and pro-United States (and pro-
West). In the end, Nigeria had more in friendly and
aggregate relations with the West than with the East; it is
the unbalanced pattern of relations with the blocs, believing
that a policy based on non-alignment mandated equal
relations with East and West, that has led to the verdict of
‘aligned’ for Nigeria between 1960 and 1965. This kind of
analysis runs through works on Nigeria’s foreign policy
published after the civil war.
Idang’s Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign
Policy, the earliest of these works, argues that while “the
term non-alignment was often used” by the Balewa
administration to describe “its approach to extra-African
relations, few of its actions were consonant with and
predicated upon this official policy”,3 non-alignment being
merely “a smokescreen for adherence to pro-Western
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 229
positions”.4 Even though Nigeria officially adopted non-
alignment in 1960, for Ajibola, “in practice, the Nigerian
policy of non-alignment was decidedly pro-West”,5 or “in
reality pro-West”,6 then for Okolo, “subsequent actions of
the Nigerian government under Sir Abubakar showed
obvious western learning”,7 and then for Aluko, “Nigeria’s
policy of non-alignment exhibited a great deal of partiality
in favour of the United States (and the rest of the Western
powers) but against the USSR”.8
But the verdict that Nigeria was ‘aligned’ did not
have to be explicitly announced to make the point. It is
usually enough to merely state that while Nigeria’s
relations with the Western bloc were friendly, warm, or
generally positive, with the Eastern bloc they were hostile,
cold, or generally negative. Thus, it has been claimed that
Nigeria “identified more with Western interests, while
relations with Eastern Europe were slow and cautious”,9
that the Balewa administration “preferred to deal almost
exclusively with the West and to keep the Soviets and their
allies at a safe distance”,10 and that Balewa’s “more
favorable view of the West than the East … resulted in
Balewa’s Nigeria having diplomatic relationships with
Eastern bloc countries that were clearly not as robust as
Nigeria’s relationships with Western bloc countries”.11 For
these analyses, to be non-aligned is to be equidistant, and
since Nigeria’s relations with East and West were
perceived to exhibit a tilt in favour of the West, Nigeria
was ‘aligned’. This explains the rather hasty conclusion
that there is “hardly any doubt that Sir Abubakar’s
government (1960-1966) did not practice the policy of non-
alignment it publicly declared”.12 If this has been the
pattern of analysis, then the closing declaration by
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Akinyemi to the effect that “The consensus among
Nigerian scholars now is that the 1960-66 foreign policy
was politically and economically aligned”13 will be
justified.
But it is only possible to speak of such justification
if attention is focused on the limited group described as
“Nigerian scholars”, for there was an earlier pattern of
analysis by scholars who were not Nigerians that reached a
different and incompatible verdict. Thus, Anglin argues the
point that “Non-alignment is not neutralism; and if the
Nigerian government, after careful consideration of the
merits of a particular question, leans to one side or the
other, there is no need always to assume that it does so
because it has succumbed to some sinister outside
pressure”.14 Coleman admits that “direct relationships
between Nigeria and countries of the Eastern bloc have
been marked by a coolness and restraint on the part of the
Nigerian government that is all the more pointed because of
its sharp contrast to the more relaxed and extensive
relations she has with Western countries”. Yet, as far as
non-alignment was concerned, “Sir Abubakar’s
government has favoured a policy of independence”.15
Phillips Jr. summarizes what can be considered the position
of the early scholars of Nigeria’s non-alignment between
1960 and 1965: “Nigeria’s policy of non-alignment is a
pragmatic one, with a strong tendency to give the Western
bloc the benefit of any doubt except on questions of
colonialism”.16
The two traditions of analysis differ not only in
terms of their verdicts, but also in terms of their
interpretation of the concept of non-alignment, and the
method of operationalizing it. For the earlier tradition, non-
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 231
alignment was a policy of independent action in the context
of the mutually exclusive drive for influence by the
antagonistic power blocs, and the status of a state was
determined on the basis of its interest irrespective of which
bloc that interest coincided with. The latter adopted a
neutralist interpretation of non-alignment measuring it by
how much a state related with a power bloc, the ideal being
an equilibrium.
The distinction between the earlier and latter
traditions of analysis on the basis of Nigerian versus non-
Nigerian scholarship is not real. Although the earlier
tradition was anchored on non-Nigerian scholars, it is
unlikely that Akinyemi focused on “Nigerian scholars” in
his declaration of closure recognizing that there existed an
opposing tradition. Some non-Nigerian scholars also
thought Nigeria under the Balewa administration was
‘aligned’. Stremlau, for example, thought that Nigeria’s
non-alignment was economically meaningless and had
“little political content”;17 and Wright has pointed out that
Nigeria’s relations with the power blocs “displayed little
balance”, and that its “relations with the socialist bloc were
cool”.18 And very importantly, not all Nigerian scholars
thought Nigeria under the Balewa administration was
‘aligned’.
Writing in 1981, in the midst of an outpouring of
works that concluded that Nigeria under the Balewa
administration was ‘aligned’, Ojo’s contribution was an
anomaly. It not only updated the tradition of analysis that
dates from the early 1960s, but also criticized the post-war
tradition. It did not fail to recognize the fact that “virtually
all writers and commentators on Nigeria’s non-aligned
policy seem agreed that … the Balewa government failed
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to live up to this essentially prescriptive policy”. Its
criticism that all these writers “have imputed their own
conceptions of what non-alignment meant or ought to mean
– equidistance between the Eastern and Western blocs”19
rather than what the government meant by it implied that
they have been unhistorical and called into question the
validity of their verdict. The equidistance conception of
non-alignment, to be valid, would have mandated “the
dismantling of both the economic infra- and political super-
structures and the building of new ones that are neither East
nor West or the establishment of equality in the scope and
quality of relations with both the East and West on all
major values”, neither of which was feasible. There were
methodological problems too, one of which he described as
the “theoretical and practical problems of quantification
and yardstick of measuring quality of relations”.20 If, for
Nigeria, “non-alignment meant asserting its right of
independence of thought and political action; the right to
judge issues on their individual merits”,21 then Nigeria’s
“actions indicate independence of thought and action vis-à-
vis the Western powers. Relations with the Soviet bloc
affirm this independence”.22
Ojo’s criticism was three-pronged: the tradition’s
conception of non-alignment, its method of analysis and the
verdict. But he did not question the evidential basis of the
verdict, or problematize the question of evidence in the
study of Nigeria’s non-alignment between 1960 and 1965.
This paper addresses this problem, and since the two
opposing traditions, as indicated by the two opening
statements, adduce roll-call votes by Nigeria in the United
Nations General Assembly as supportive evidence, it
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 233
specifically analyses Nigeria’s voting statistically
indicating what conclusions it could sustain.
Analysis of Nigeria’s Non-Alignment and the
Correlation between Evidence and Conclusion
Upon what kind and magnitude of evidence has the
claim that Nigeria was ‘aligned’ or non-aligned between
1960 and 1965 been erected? What has been the nature of
the correlation between evidence and verdict? Even though
the post-war tradition of analysis, in reaching the verdict of
‘aligned’, stuck to a notion of non-alignment not advertised
by the Balewa administration, there was familiarity with
the government’s conception, and it was sometimes the
starting-point of analysis. Thus, Idang acknowledged the
fact that Balewa told the House that “his government would
adopt an independent stance on all cold war issues”, and
“would reserve its freedom of action at all times”.23 This
was how the administration conceived of non-alignment,
and to prove that it was not non-aligned evidence must be
provided that it was not independent in its actions and
decisions, and that it did not pursue Nigeria’s interests but
that of one or the other super-power.
When Idang identified “inconsistency between
professed policy and overt international behaviour”, that is,
that the government was not faithful to the principle of non-
alignment, the proof he provided included the defence
agreement with Britain, imposition of restrictions on travel
to the Soviet Union and on the importation of Communist
literature, discouragement of trade with and aid from the
Soviet bloc, and proposal to sit the two Chinas in the
United Nations.24 Like Idang, Aluko understood Nigeria’s
non-alignment as connoting self-interestedness. However,
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when he intended to say that Nigeria had not been non-
aligned, he stated that “it remained partial to the Western
powers”. What is the link between a self-interested and an
impartial policy? Expectedly, the framework for his
contribution was unjustifiably neutralist: “while the Balewa
Government remained very close to the Western powers,
especially Britain and the United States, it maintained a
cool and often hostile attitude to the Communist powers”.
And the kind of evidence selected reflected the framework:
the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement as an anti-
Communist weapon by origin in 1958, no limit placed on
the staff of the British and American missions but staff of
the Soviet mission limited to ten, the government did not
consider recognizing Communist China or Mongolia,
NATO was given the concession to use a secret radio
frequency and there was a ban on Communist literature. In
addition, “on most cold war issues such as the Berlin crisis
of 1961, the American nuclear testing of early 1962 and the
Congo… conflict (1960-65), and the Vietnam conflict,
Nigeria under Balewa had given support to the Western
powers”.25
This has been the stock of evidence available and
recycled without any further processing by works
belonging to the post-war tradition of analysis. Even then
such evidence is deemed beyond error that mere
restatement of the unbalanced and partial nature of
Nigeria’s relations with East and West is considered
enough; it is left for the reader to deduce the premises.26
But the same stock of evidence was available to the writers
of the early 1960s,27 but was not considered relevant in
determining whether Nigeria was non-aligned or not
(largely because of the freedom-of-action notion of non-
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 235
alignment they subscribed to). Much of what became
evidence against Nigeria’s non-alignment was constituted
from the political criticisms of the government’s foreign
policy in the House.28 For the earlier tradition, it has been
enough merely to show that the decisions and actions of the
government, whatever bloc they coincided with, were self-
interested. Thus, for example, while it is typical to explain
Nigeria’s non-attendance of the Belgrade conference of
non-aligned states by referring to “the underlying American
nervousness about non-alignment as a foreign policy
principle in the early 1960s”,29 or as an action “designed to
convince the West that Nigeria could be relied on”,30
Coleman sees it as a consequence of Balewa’s opposition
to blocs in general.31
An important source of evidential support for the
two traditions is Nigeria’s conduct in the United Nations,
particularly its voting on Cold War issues in the General
Assembly. While for the earlier tradition, roll-call voting by
Nigeria on Cold War issues between 1960 and 1965
indicates that Nigeria was non-aligned, for the post-war
tradition, the same voting indicates that Nigeria was
‘aligned’. “On almost all cold war issues”, Aluko has
declared, “Nigeria sided with the United States against the
USSR”.32 The place where the adherents of this tradition
claim Nigeria demonstrated its pro-Westernism and anti-
Sovietism is the United Nations. Thus, Stremlau asserts,
Nigeria “usually supported Western positions in the United
Nations”,33 while Idang claims that “with respect to a good
many issues in the UN, the Balewa government either
remained aloof or adopted an essentially moderate and pro-
West position”.34
236 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
Asobie’s analysis of Nigeria’s non-alignment under
the Balewa administration is somewhat peculiar. His
critique of Olatunji Ojo’s criticism of the post-war tradition
of analysis is his point of entry into the debate. By insisting
that the conception of non-alignment appropriate for the
analysis of Nigeria’s non-alignment should be that
enunciated by the administration, proponents of the
historical approach, including Ojo, are adjudged to have
“fallen prey to the trap of basing their analysis of the
behaviour of a state on the declarations of its decision-
makers”.35 He adds that for writers of both tradition, the
“indices of measurement of the application of the doctrine
of non-alignment are often not provided”, hoping to
address this flaw by identifying “the precise role which
Nigeria has played in the non-aligned movement”.36
Asobie would seem to be suggesting that a more
rational methodological approach is to foist on an
administration a conception not intended by it. This was the
practice Ojo criticized, for the notion of neutrality or
equidistance as defining non-alignment was rejected by the
administration. As for measurement, the very notion of
equidistance contains a measuring mechanism; hence to be
pro-West is to be ‘aligned’. Ojo did not fail to provide a
measure of Nigeria’s subscription to non-alignment. He
demonstrated that contrary to the charge of pro-
Westernism, Nigeria was neither routinely pro-West nor
anti-East.37
But was membership of the non-aligned movement
a better indicator of a country’s non-aligned status? If the
essence of non-alignment is the conservation of newly won
sovereignty in the face of a new kind of imperialism,
demonstrated by the capacity for independent and self-
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interested action, was non-alignment more realizable within
the framework of the non-aligned movement? Before the
non-aligned movement, were there no non-aligned states?
These questions are pertinent because of the temptation to
conclude that all the states that belonged to the non-aligned
movement were non-aligned, and those states, like Nigeria,
that only joined after the Belgrade conference of 1961 were
until then not non-aligned. Asobie in fact asserts that
Nigeria unequivocally rejected non-alignment in 1960
(presumably since the word ‘non-alignment’ was not used
by Balewa), and its “rejection of non-alignment as a foreign
policy doctrine was matched by, and reflected in its anti-
pathy towards the non-aligned movement”; and that
Balewa in 1960 “maintained that Nigeria would not join the
non-aligned group at all”.38
True, when Balewa first presented the outline of the
intended foreign policy of his administration, no mention
was made of the word ‘non-alignment’. He said that
Nigeria “shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone; so far
as it is possible the policy on each occasion will be selected
with proper independent objectivity in Nigeria’s national
interest”. That he was referring to Nigeria’s attitude
towards the Cold War is clear from the next sentence in
that address which is that “We consider it wrong for the
Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of
routine with any of the power blocs”.39 In his address at the
United Nations General Assembly on 7 October 1960 on
Nigeria’s admission as a member, Balewa stated that “we
shall not forget our old friends … but nevertheless we do
not intend to align ourselves as a matter of routine with any
of the power blocs”.40 But in early September 1961, as the
conference of non-aligned countries was under way in
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Belgrade, Jaja Wachukwu, the foreign affairs minister,
explicitly equated the notion of an independent foreign
policy with regard to the Cold War with non-alignment:
The Government reserves her freedom of
action at all times to determine every policy
in the best interests of Nigeria. This
government will not associate itself as a
matter of routine; that is what is called non-
alignment.41
This equation was already understood by the House
members that partook in the April 1960 debates on foreign
policy.
Asobie’s claim that Balewa stated in 1960 that
Nigeria would not join the non-aligned group is of course
anachronous. In 1960, there was no non-aligned group
properly so-called, Balewa could not therefore have
opposed Nigeria’s membership of the group. What Balewa
said during the first day of the debate on foreign policy on
24 November 1960, and which Asobie has improperly used
in his analysis, is that Nigeria was averse to joining any
bloc: “Nigeria as a country will not join either the Western
or the Eastern, or any other bloc”.42
The interpretation of non-alignment in terms of the
capacity for independent action has been assailed: “To
begin with, the notion of non-alignment as independence is
ambiguous. The idea of independence of political action is
difficult to operationalize; in our increasingly
interdependent world, it is practically difficult to assess
degrees of national independence”. Instead Assisi
constructs a definition for non-alignment: “a policy posture
which aims at preventing the outbreak of war by building a
framework for peace”.43 If the idealistic nature of his
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conception of non-alignment is not already in evidence, he
makes this clearer in a further definition.
We may therefore define non-alignment as a
new approach to the conduct of international
relations which rejects force, balance of
power, and spheres of influence as the basis
of international order and seeks to institute
negotiation, cooperation and peaceful co-
existence as the dominant mode of inter-
state interaction.
Non alignment was of course a function of the Cold War, a
consequence of bipolarity not a reaction or movement
against it. But this is not all. Asobie also brought in the
question of independent action, albeit through the back
door. Thus, he adds that non-alignment “presents an
aspiration to act independently in international politics”,
having also argued that “while neutrals make prior
commitment to behave in a certain manner in the event of
conflicts, non-aligned countries allow their policies to be
determined by the merits of each case”.44 But this was
Balewa’s conception too, a conception that was
summarized as the first of the five criteria for membership
of the non-aligned movement,45 and theorized as the
essence of non-alignment.46
In spite of the apparent independence and neutrality
of Asobie’s analysis, he belongs to the equidistance school
of non-alignment and therefore to the post-war tradition of
analysis. To set the stage, he notes that “Communism was
branded an ‘evil’ and dreaded as much in Lagos as in
London and Washington”. On the other hand, owing to
similarity of worldviews, “a special relationship developed
at this period between the Nigerian government and the
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governments of the United Kingdom and the United States
in particular, and the Western countries in general”.47
Consequently, just as “British influence showed in most of
Nigeria’s decisions on external issues”,48 between 1960 and
1963, Nigeria “took its cue in global diplomacy from the
position adopted on major issues by the United States”.
This conclusion is not particularly different from that
reached by Idang or Aluko; but Asobie, unlike them, seems
to present a hard piece of evidence. He claims that Nigerian
diplomats in the United Nations were instructed by their
principles to follow the lead of the United Kingdom and
United States on Cold War issues; that is, quoting Simeon
Adebo, Nigeria’s permanent representative at the United
Nations between 1962 and 1967, to “take their cue from
Great Britain and the U.S. on vital Cold War issues”. Still
referring to the unreferenced testimony of Adebo, Nigerian
diplomats were directed to “vote along with” the two
Western powers or to abstain, but not to go against a
Western position. Apparently carrying out the above
directive, “most of the Nigerian abstention votes were cast
on resolutions favoured by the West, but on which
Nigeria’s previous stand did not coincide with the position
adopted by the leading Western powers”.49
But could the same Adebo have written that no
country expected “automatic support of its point of view”
from Nigeria: “We would examine each case as it arose and
take a position on it in the light of the merits as we saw
them”50 And to some of his “ill-informed countrymen …
who seem to think that the country became non-aligned
only yesterday”, he declared that Nigeria was “among the
most ardent and highly respected spokesmen for the cause
in my time”.51 It has equally been asserted that one place
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where Nigeria demonstrated its independence in foreign
affairs was in the United Nations General Assembly, and
that its voting record on Cold War issues testify to this.52
Contrary to Ojo’s claim that “Nigeria tried to impress the
U.S.S.R. (and thereby incurred Western wrath) by
maintaining absolute neutrality on cold war issues of no
real concern to its national interests”,53 and in line with
Adebo’s statement, Coleman has observed that Nigeria’s
diplomats in the United Nations in the early 1960s were
motivated by a desire to “dramatize their independence, to
demonstrate their determination not to be guided by
prejudices inherited from their historic tie with Britain and
the West”.54 To this extent, “Nigeria has voted against the
United States’ position a number of times in the United
Nations”,55 and by another analysis, “voted more often with
the USSR than with the USA”.56
Analysis of Nigeria’s Voting on East-West Issues in the
UN General Assembly, 1960-1965
There is no facet of the foreign policy of Nigeria
under the Balewa administration that has not come under
intense criticism. Just as its policy toward the Cold War
powers has been condemned as unbalanced, and its Africa
policy as characterized by a “lack of vision”,57 so also has
its policy toward the United Nations been described as
unrealistic. Balewa had expressed “belief in the principles
of the United Nations”,58 committed Nigeria to directing its
“energies and influence to helping to reach solutions which
will contribute to the peace of the nations and well-being of
mankind”,59 and considered the organization as “the only
effective machinery for world peace”, arguing that the
founders of the United Nations did not intend that it should
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be factionalized along political and ideological lines
thereby obscuring “the main objective of securing peace
among the nations and stability in the world at large”.60 He
did not think that the United Nations was perfectly
structured in spite of agreeing with its general objective.
Hence he called for the removal of the veto, “review of the
structure and position of the Security Council” and
inclusion of all states in the United Nations.61
Yet, the understanding by Nigeria of the raison
d’etre of the United Nations has been described as
“romantic”. The Nigerian government is said to have
harboured “an idealist’s notion of the structure of the
United Nations as a political entity”. To demonstrate how
much premium was placed on the United Nations, Adebo is
claimed to have recalled that Nigeria’s leaders regarded it
as “the most prestigious international forum of them all”.62
Even though Nigeria’s leaders believed in the United
Nations, and it was indeed the most prestigious
international organization, Adebo’s statement has been
used out of context.63 If Nigerians were so idealistic about
the purpose and structure of the United Nations, no wonder
they were shocked that it “existed as a patchwork of blocs
of states”.64 And even though Asobie observed that
Nigeria’s faith in the United Nations reflected its
“preference for multilateralism against bilateralism”, and,
generally speaking, “a more effective approach, a safer
road to the survival and development of small and weak
states”, he still went on to explain Nigeria’s commitment as
“a dimension of ideological empathy between Nigeria and
the leading Western powers at the United Nations”.65 In the
end, he perceived a “contradiction between Nigerian
leaders’ image of the UN system and the real nature and
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structure of the organization”.66 But Idang already blazed a
trail of such ill-fitting analysis.
Perhaps the most conspicuous defect of
Nigeria’s UN policy was her idealistic and
utopian conception of the organization and
its functions. By insisting that all
international issues be judged by their moral
correctness …, and by adhering to a
dogmatic and optimistic interpretation of the
UN Charter which they took at face value,
… Balewa and his colleagues not only
greatly exaggerated the role of the United
Nations … in world politics, but tended to
ignore national power and interests as
factors in inter-state relations.67
There is nothing in the statements by Balewa of Nigeria’s
attitude towards the United Nations that could have
warranted the kind of criticism by Asobie and Idang of
Nigeria’s policy. Nigeria, Balewa’s statements implied,
would use the United Nations to advance its interests in
spite of the imperfections of the organization.
For a country like Nigeria, the focus on the United
Nations invariably meant focus on the General Assembly.
The General Assembly represents the largest assembly of
states, and provides the greatest opportunity for diplomatic
engagements. Yet, it was a subordinate organ of the United
Nations, the Security Council constituting its essence and
power house. Article 12(1) of the Charter certainly restricts
the authority of the General Assembly to intervene in any
way in a dispute already before the Security Council.
Article 10 and Article 11(1 and 2) specify that the General
Assembly can only make recommendations to the states,
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whether members or not, and to the Security Council in
respect of matters that relate to the powers and functions of
United Nations organs, and to generate principles for the
maintenance of peace and security. It would thus appear
that the General Assembly has limited utility as a
dependable diplomatic forum, being limited to the making
of non-binding resolutions only and not law. This view
would apply to the very early years of the United Nations.
Since the Uniting for Peace resolution of 3 November
1950,68 that was a response to an emerging regime of
deadlocks in the Security Council described as “lack of
unanimity of the permanent members”, and consequent
failure “to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security”, the
profile of the General Assembly has improved
tremendously, transcending its primary utility as a
consensus-building forum.69 It would be an exaggeration,
however, to conclude that because of the enhanced
influence of its resolutions, in terms of degree of
compliance and political effect, the General Assembly has
become “the predominant political body of the world
organization”.70
One thing is certain, General Assembly debates did
become a test of popularity between contending positions
or states and confirmed what states were the opinion
leaders. This was even more so during the Cold War when
issues easily took on an East/West conflict pattern. The two
super-powers, having crippled the functioning of the
Security Council with their veto power, sought to achieve a
dominant position in the General Assembly, whatever the
status of its resolutions. It is thus correct to argue that “the
main factor in world politics and, by reflection, UN voting
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was the conflict between the two global blocs each led by a
super-power”.71 The African states, including Nigeria,
could not be unperturbed by the worldwide struggle for
power and domination, and its manifestation in the General
Assembly, since it was “a perpetual threat to their newly-
acquired independence”.72 The result was the adoption of
non-alignment as a foreign policy strategy toward the Cold
War. The behaviour of a non-aligned state in the General
Assembly, particularly its voting behaviour, is thus an
important measure of either its alignment or non-alignment.
It is therefore understandable why the two traditions of
analysis of Nigeria’s non-alignment have suggested that an
analysis of Nigeria’s voting behaviour with regard to Cold
War issues in the General Assembly will confirm the
correctness of their respective positions.
A cursory analysis of the pattern of Nigeria’s voting
on Cold War issues in the General Assembly between 1960
and 1965 negates the claim that Nigeria was pro-West or
anti-East, whether as a consequence of Nigeria’s
ideological affinity with the West, or a directive to
Nigeria’s diplomats to follow the lead of Britain. As Table
1 shows, Nigeria’s voting coincided more with that of the
Soviet Union than with the United States for all the East-
West issues considered by David Kay, the percentage of
coincidence of voting between Nigeria and the Soviet
Union was 25.53, and 10.64 between Nigeria and the
United States. Abstentions, accounting for 63.83% of total
voting on East-West issues for the entire period, would
seem to be the most dominant voting behaviour of Nigeria.
246 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
Table 1: Voting by Nigeria on Selected East-West
Issues, 15th-18th, and 20th-22nd
Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly
Coincided
with
15th
16th
17th-18th
20th-22nd
Soviet Union
3
1
-
8
United States
2
3
-
-
Abstained
2
9
10
9
Absent
2
-
-
1
Source: David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United
Nations, 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970), Appendices G-J.
The point must be made that Nigeria did not vote
for or with the Soviet Union or the United States since
there was no alliance on voting decisions particularly
between Nigeria and the Soviet Union. That Nigeria’s
voting corresponded with that of the Soviet Union or
United States was therefore coincidental. The claim that
“the Soviet bloc invariably supported the Afro-Asians on
colonial issues, and in return was sometimes supported on
cold war questions”73 implies that vote trading certainly
cannot apply to the Nigeria/Soviet Union voting
coincidence. Rather than being a reciprocal process, it has
been argued that it was Soviet policy to “associate itself
with proposals and statements of the African states,
especially when these issues are of vital interest to
Africa”.74
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 247
Table 1 does not however indicate relative voting,
or situate Nigeria’s voting pattern within a regional or
associational framework, that is, indicating how peculiar or
typical Nigeria’s voting behaviour was. Moreover, the
number of East-West issues that constitute the data base of
the table, fifty, appears too large and calls into question the
extent to which they were Cold War issues. For a deeper
analysis, twelve issues (see Appendix) have been selected
that seem to be most expressive of the Cold War rivalry
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The
choice of statistical method is informed by the possibility
of integrating all the voting options (that is, yes, no, and
abstain) in the analysis, but more by a capacity to be
generative and heuristic. Even though the Rice Index of
Cohesion does not consider abstentions in measuring
strength of cohesion, this is not a fatal limitation as it is
usually claimed.75 Abstention, from the perspective of the
analysis of voting alignment with either of two poles, is an
indication of non-agreement, but may be not disagreement.
The critical weakness of the Rice Index of Cohesion in the
analysis of voting behaviour in the General Assembly is the
fact that it is not generative, that is, it already presupposes
the existence of voting groups even before analysis: “In this
method, the existence of a group made up of certain
predetermined individual members must be postulated
before the tests of cohesion and likeness can be applied”.76
Lijphart’s method not only incorporates abstention
in the calculation of indices, but also does not presume the
existence of voting groups; it helps rather to detect voting
groups. The formula for the Index of Agreement (AI)
between two countries is:
248 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
AI =
t
gf 2
1
x 100%
where f stands for the number of votes on which the two
countries both voted in favour or against, g for the number
of votes on which one voted yes or no while the other
abstained, and t for the total number of votes in which the
two states participated.77 By arranging the indices in a
matrix, clusters of closely related indices indicate the
existence of a caucusing group.
Table 2 has Nigeria and countries that were known
to be in the Western bloc. From the Indices of Agreement
in the second to the fourth column, it is clear by the
closeness of the indices that these countries are either
members of a bloc or a caucusing group. The indices in the
Table 2: Indices of Agreement of Nigeria and the
Western Bloc
Nigeria
Belgium
Australia
Canada
United
Kingdom
USA
USA
45.45
91.67
95.83
91.67
95.83
U.K
45.45
87.50
100.00
95.83
Canada
50.00
83.33
95.83
Australia
36.36
87.50
Belgium
45.45
Nigeria
first column, the column that contains the indices for the
strength of association between Nigeria and these countries,
are certainly anomalous, ranging from 36.36% to 50.00
(compared with 83.33% to 100%). The conclusion simply
is that Nigeria did not belong in this group, that is, Nigeria
was not pro-West. Table 3 contains Nigeria with some
countries of the Eastern bloc. As
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 249
Table 3: Indices of Agreement of Nigeria and the
Eastern Bloc
Nigeria
Cuba
Romania
Hungary
Ukrainian
SSR
Soviet
Union
Soviet Union
59.09
95.83
100.00
100.00
100.00
Ukrainian SSR
59.09
95.83
100.00
100.00
Hungary
59.09
95.83
100.00
Romania
59.09
95.83
Cuba
63.64
Nigeria
in Table 2, Nigeria here is out of place, indices of voting
agreement ranging from 59.09% to 63.64% compared with
95.83% to 100% for the members of the bloc. But in
comparative terms, and as already clear in Table 1, the
indices for Nigeria and the Eastern bloc countries were
higher than for Nigeria and the Western bloc countries,
with mean indices of 60% and 44.54%, respectively.
Conclusion: Nigeria’s voting coincided more with the
Eastern bloc than with the Western bloc.
Ghana in the early 1960s was Nigeria’s counter-
image. While it (with the other radicals) was claimed to be
‘radical’ and truly non-aligned, Nigeria was ‘conservative’
and ‘aligned’ (like its fellow ‘conservatives’). Tables 4 and
5 test these claims. In Table 4, Nigeria is put in a group
Table 4: Indices of Agreement of Nigeria and the
‘Radical’ African Group
Nigeria
Egypt
(UAR)
Mali
Morocco
Guinea
Ghana
Ghana
90.91
100.00
93.75
91.67
83.33
Guinea
72.73
83.33
93.75
91.67
Morocco
81.82
91.67
87.50
Mali
81.25
93.75
Egypt
(UAR)
90.91
Nigeria
250 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
of ‘radical’ states, and in Table 5 in a group of
‘conservative’ states. Among the radical states, Nigeria did
not look out of place. The mean index for Nigeria is
83.52%, much lower than the highest of 91.93% for Ghana
and Egypt, but not too far from Guinea’s 84.96% and
Morocco’s 88.87%. The voting patterns of Nigeria, Ghana
and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) were very close with
an Index of Agreement of 90.91%. From Table 5, Nigeria
would not also appear to be
Table 5: Indices of Agreement of Nigeria and the
‘Moderate’ African Group
Nigeria
Somalia
Central
African
Republic
Senegal
Ethiopia
Liberia
Liberia
68.18
79.17
87.50
79.17
62.50
Ethiopia
90.91
83.33
66.67
83.33
Senegal
90.91
83.33
75.00
Central African
Republic
72.73
75.00
Somalia
90.91
Nigeria
anomalous in the group of ‘moderate’ or ‘conservative’
African states. Its mean index of 82.73% is not much
higher than the 82.35% for Somalia and Senegal, or even
the least for the group, 75.38% for the Central African
Republic. Like Ghana and Egypt, Nigeria also had a closely
similar voting pattern to Ethiopia, Senegal and Somalia, an
index of 90.91%. Conclusion: Nigeria’s voting pattern on
Cold War issues was not peculiar. If the voting pattern of
the ‘radical’ states “is a part of a larger subgroup rather
than a distinct faction”,78 and if “a trend since 1960 toward
greater unity” among African states on non-African issues
in the United Nations was discernible,79 Nigeria’s voting
pattern was typical of African voting.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 251
Table 6 would seem to confirm this. It has been
claimed that Nigeria usually abstained
when it could not vote for the position of the United States.
How different from the patterns of abstention of other
countries was Nigeria’s pattern? The indices in Table 6
relate to co-abstentions, not considering situations where a
state either voted yes or no while the other abstained. The
highest Index of Agreement of 54.55% was recorded by
Ethiopia/Ghana, Egypt/Ghana and Ethiopia/Egypt,
followed by Nigeria/Egypt, Nigeria/Ghana,
Nigeria/Ethiopia and Nigeria/Somalia with 54.55%. Of the
twelve roll-call votes considered, Nigeria, Ghana and Egypt
each had seven abstentions. It would not therefore appear
that the Nigerian practice of abstaining was peculiar.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 252
Table 6: Indices of Agreement on Abstentions of Selected Members of
African and Non-Aligned Groups
Nigeria
Indonesia
Yugoslavia
India
Somalia
Senegal
Ethiopia
Liberia
Egypt
Morocco
Guinea
Ghana
Ghana
54.55
45.45
41.67
33.33
41.67
41.67
58.33
16.67
58.33
41.67
25.00
Guinea
27.27
18.18
25.00
08.33
16.67
25.00
25.00
00.00
25.00
25.00
Morocco
45.45
27.27
25.00
16.67
33.33
41.67
41.67
16.67
41.67
Egypt
54.55
45.45
45.45
33.33
41.67
41.67
58.33
16.67
Liberia
18.18
09.09
00.00
08.33
16.67
16.67
16.67
Ethiopia
54.55
45.45
41.67
33.33
41.67
41.67
Senegal
45.45
27.27
25.00
16.67
33.33
Somalia
54.55
27.27
25.00
25.00
India
27.27
27.27
25.00
Yugoslavia
36.36
36.36
Indonesia
36.36
Nigeria
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 253
When Nigeria was put in the group of putative non-
aligned states to test whether its voting pattern was similar
to theirs, Nigeria, by the Indices of Agreement actually
belonged to the group. Even though with India and
Indonesia, it had a low of 77.27%, with Yugoslavia, the
United Arab Republic and Ghana, it had appreciably high
indices. Ghana and Egypt had the highest mean index of
93.11, but Nigeria’s 83.64% is 0.8% higher than that of
India, and 4.32% lower than that of Yugoslavia (see Table
7).
Table 7: Indices of Agreement of Nigeria and the Non-
Aligned Group
Nigeria
Ghana
Egypt
(UAR)
Indonesia
Yugoslavia
India
India
77.27
87.50
87.50
86.36
79.17
Yugoslavia
81.82
91.67
91.67
95.45
Indonesia
77.27
95.45
95.45
Egypt (UAR)
90.91
100.00
Ghana
90.91
Nigeria
Conclusion
When the pattern of Nigeria’s voting in the United
Nations General Assembly was adduced as evidence for the
two opposing verdicts of ‘aligned’ and non-aligned, it was
an invitation to check the voting records and find out where
Nigeria’s voting inclined. The verdicts could be said to be
claims to knowledge to be validated by reference to extant
evidence. However, it would appear that previous studies of
Nigeria’s non-alignment under the Balewa administration
have reached these verdicts without an analysis of Nigeria’s
voting behaviour. Even if references have been made to
specific Cold War issues in which Nigeria’s conduct
254 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
appeared independent, a complete picture has been
impossible because a thorough statistical analysis for the
entire period had not been undertaken.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it would be
difficult to sustain the views that on Cold War issues
Nigeria was pro-West, anti-East, or anti-West and pro-East,
or abstained rather than voted with the East. Even for
Britain that was said to have so influenced Nigeria’s
international behaviour, and that was always consulted with
by Balewa before he could take any foreign policy
decision, the Index of Agreement is 45.45%. But this figure
does not give the complete picture since a partial agreement
by the Lijphart method scores a half point. The true picture
is that of the twelve Cold War issues considered, Nigeria’s
voting coincided with that of Britain as was with the United
States only once, but with the Soviet Union three times;
and with Ghana that was thought to have a completely
different international behaviour, nine times. Yet, such a
statistical analysis can only indicate patterns in behaviour,
and cannot explain why Nigeria or the other states voted
the way they did.
It has already been mentioned that there is hardly
any aspect of the foreign policy of the Balewa
administration that has not been understated or devalued.
Scholarship, and every scholarship worthy of its name,
should be critical, requires that inferences are drawn on the
basis of relevant and commensurate premises. It should be
possible, at least for analytical purposes, to make a
distinction between correctly identifying an object and
explaining it, between first ascertaining what Nigeria’s
conduct in the United Nations between 1960 and 1965 was
like and then explaining it. To confirm that an object has
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 255
been correctly apprehended, it is useful to inquire into the
nature of similar objects. For example, that Nigeria viewed
the United Nations “as an instrument of promoting
international peace and security and as a generator of
pressures for decolonization” has been explained by
reference to the exclusion from participation in the conduct
of external affairs during the colonial period and the
consequent negligible experience of Nigeria’s leaders in
foreign affairs, and the “moralistic and legitimist
interpretation of international politics” by Balewa.80 Could
Nigerians have participated in foreign policy making
during the colonial period? Was Balewa’s conception of
international politics moralistic and legitimist? Is there a fit
between the explanandum and the explanans?
If these factors made Nigeria to hold an idealistic
view of the United Nations, could the same factors explain
why other African states held the same view? Considered
from this perspective, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) was even more idealistic for it openly expressed the
belief that the United Nations is “an important instrument”
not only for the maintenance of international peace and
security, but also for economic and social development, and
the “desire to strengthen and support” it.81 If Nigeria’s view
of the United Nations was a consequence of empathy with
the West, could the OAU’s position be so explained? To
properly characterize Nigeria’s international behaviour
between 1960 and 1965, and render an appropriate
explanation, it might be helpful to know what other African
states at the same level of visibility as Nigeria did. That has
been the general orientation of this paper.
256 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
Appendix
Title of Selected United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions
on East-West Issues, 15th-17th and 20th Sessions
GA Res. No.
Title
Date
1493(XV)
Representation of China in
the United Nations
8 October
1960
1577(XV)
Suspension of Nuclear and
Thermo-Nuclear Tests
20 December
1960
1590(XV)
United Nations Operation
in the Congo
20 December
1960
1599(XV)
The Situation in the
Republic of the Congo
15 April
1961
1616(XV)
Complaint by the
Revolutionary Government
of Cuba regarding the
various Plans of aggression
and Acts of Intervention
being Executed by the
Government of the United
States of America against
the Republic of Cuba,
constituting a Manifest
Violation of its Territorial
Integrity, Sovereignty and
Independence, and a clear
Threat to International
Peace and Security
21 April
1961
1653(XVI)
Declaration on the
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 257
Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear and Thermo-
Nuclear Weapons
24 November
1961
1668(XVI)
Representation of China in
the United Nations
15 December
1961
1740(XVI)
The Korean Question
20 December
1961
1741(XVI)
Question of Hungary
20 December
1961
1857(XVII)
Question of Hungary
20 December
1962
1964(XVIII)
The Korean Question
13 December
1963
2132(XX)
The Korean Question
21 December
1965
Endnotes
1 Oye Ogunbadejo, “Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960-87”, African
Affairs, 97(346), 1988, 87.
2 James S. Coleman, “The Foreign Policy of Nigeria”, in Foreign
Policies in a World of Change,
edited by Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (Plainview,
NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1963), 397.
3 Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy,
1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), 130.
4 Ibid., 49.
5 William A. Ajibola, Foreign Policy and Public Opinion (Ibadan:
Ibadan University Press, 1978), 18.
6 Ibrahim A. Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy
Making: Nigeria after the Second Republic (Atlantic Highlands,
NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), 7.
258 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
7 Julius E. Okolo, “Morality and Realism in Nigerian Foreign
Policy”, World Affairs, 151(2), 1988, 74.
8 Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 104.
9 Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1999), 172.
10 Amechi Okolo, “Nigeria and the Superpowers”, in Nigeria Since
Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years, Vol. X: International
Relations, edited by A.B. Akinyemi, S.O. Agbi and A.O. Otubanjo
(Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989), 56.
11 Ufot B. Inamete, Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria
(Salinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2001), 22.
12 G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, “The Fundamentals of
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations”, in
Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, edited
by G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (Ibadan: University Press,
1986), 2.
13 A. Bolaji Akinyemi, “Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy”, in
Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-79,
edited by Oyeleye Oyediran (London: Macmillan, 1979), 150.
14 Douglas G. Anglin, “Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and
Economic Alignment”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 2(2),
1964, 263.
15 Coleman, “The Foreign Policy of Nigeria,” 399.
16 Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign
Policy (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 107.
17 John S. Stremlau, “The Fundamentals of Nigerian Foreign Policy”,
Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 11 (1/2), 1981, 48.
18 Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 150.
19 O.J.B. Ojo, “Continuity and Change in Nigeria’s Non-Aligned
Foreign Policy”, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 7 (1
and 2), 1981, 31.
20 Ibid., 32.
21 Ibid., 34.
22 Ibid., 39.
23 Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 7.
24 Ibid., 130.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 259
25 Olajide Aluko, “Nigerian Foreign Policy”, in The Foreign Policies
of African States, edited by Olajide Aluko (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1977), 173.
26 In this regard, see Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 172 and Hakeem I. Tijani,
“Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Nigeria’s Foundation of a Non-
Neutralist Foreign Policy”, in Nigeria in Global Politics:
Twentieth Century and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Professor
Olajide Aluko, edited by Olayiwola Abegunrin and Olusoji
Akomolafe (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006), 139.
27 See Phillips, Jr., Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, 101-
102.
28 See Federation of Nigeria House of Representatives, Debates,
hereafter HR Debates (Lagos: Federal Government Printer), for 27
and 28 March 1962, and 3 and 14 April 1962.
29 Oye Ogunbadejo, “Nigeria and the Soviet Union, 1960-1985”, in
Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, edited
by G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, 253.
30 Julius E. Emeka and Winston E. Langley, “The Changing Nigerian
Foreign Policy”, World Affairs, 135(4), 1973, 318.
31 “The Foreign Policy of Nigeria”, 397.
32 Olajide Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria, 1957-1970: A Study in Inter-
African Discord (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 222,
n.168.
33 “The Fundamentals of Nigerian Foreign Policy”, 48.
34 Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 134.
35 H. Assisi Asobie, “Nigeria and the Non-Aligned Movement”, in
Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, edited
by G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, 141.
36 Ibid., 142.
37 See Ojo, “Continuity and Change in Nigeria’s Non-Aligned
Foreign Policy”, 37-39.
38 Asobie, “Nigeria and the Non-Aligned Movement”, 145.
39 HR Debates, 20 August 1960, 289.
40 Federal Nigeria, September/October 1960, 13.
41 Ibid., 4 September 1961, 336-337.
42 Ibid., 24 November 1960, 196.
43 Asobie, “Nigeria and the Non-Aligned Movement”, 143.
260 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
44 Ibid., 144.
45 See the criteria for membership of the non-aligned movement in
Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant, ed., The Third World
without Super-Powers: The Collected Documents of the Non-
Aligned Countries, Vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications,
1978), xxxi.
46 See the analysis of non-alignment in Abdul A. Said, The African
Phenomenon (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1968); and Margaret
Legum, “Africa and Non-Alignment”, in Non-Alignment, edited by
J.W. Burton (New York: J.H. Heinemann, 1966).
47 Humphrey Assisi-Asobie, “Nigeria and the United Nations”, in
The United Nations System: The Policies of Member States, edited
by Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons, and John E. Trent (Tokyo:
United Nations University Press, 1995), 332-333.
48 Tunde Babawale, “From Timidity to Interventionism: Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy in West Africa, 1960-1989”, Zast: Zeitschnift fur
Afrika Studien, No. 7/8, 1990, 26.
49 Assisi-Asobie, “Nigeria and the United Nations”, 333.
50 Simeon Ola Adebo, Our International Years (Ibadan: Spectrum
Books, 1988), 38-39.
51 Ibid., 38.
52 Coleman, “Foreign Policy of Nigeria”, 380.
53 Olatunji J.B. Ojo, “Nigerian-Soviet Relations: Retrospect and
Prospect”, African Studies Review, 19 (3), 1976, 53.
54 “Foreign Policy of Nigeria”, 399.
55 Phillips, Jr., Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, 105.
56 Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (London:
Macmillan, 1976), 19.
57 A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian
Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), 200.
58 HR Debates, 20 August 1960, 289.
59 Ibid., 290.
60 Abubakar T. Balewa, “Nigeria Looks Ahead”, Foreign Affairs, 41
(1), 1962, 139.
61 Ibid., 140.
62 Assisi-Asobie, “Nigeria and the United Nations”, 330.
63 The description was meant to summarize Adebo’s impression of
the United Nations not that of Nigeria’s leaders: “How would I
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9 261
have known then that in two or three years, it would be my task to
join in similar appeals to a larger and more difficult press in the
most prestigious international forum of them all”: Our
International Years, 24-25.
64 Assisi-Asobie, “Nigeria and the United Nations”, 330.
65 Ibid., 332.
66 Ibid., 333.
67 Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 134.
68 See Uniting for Peace, GA Res. 377, UN GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
20, UN Doc. A/1775 (1950), 10.
69 Donald A. Wells, The United Nations: States vs International
Laws (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 20.
70 Gabriella R. Lande, “The Changing Effectiveness of General
Assembly Resolutions”, Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law, Vol. 58, 1964, 162.
71 Steven Holloway, “Forty Years of United Nations General
Assembly Voting”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 23(2),
1990, 280.
72 Muhammad Hallaj, “Afro-Asian Politics in the United Nations”,
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1966, 78.
73 Stevens, Soviet Union and Black Africa, 19.
74 Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1963), 185.
75 See Leroy N. Rieselbach, “Quantitative Techniques for Studying
Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly”, International
Organization, 14 (2), 1960, 296.
76 Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 228.
77 Arend Lijphart, “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General
Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal”, The American Political
Science Review, 57 (4), 1963, 910.
78 Hallaj, “Afro-Asian Politics in the United Nations”, 139.
79 Thomas Hovet, Jr., “The Role of Africa in the United Nations”,
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 354, 1964, 127.
80 Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 131.
81 Organization of African Unity, Resolutions adopted by the First
Conference of Independent African Heads of State and
262 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/jhds.v8i1.9
Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 22 to 25 May
1963, CIAS/Plen. 2/Rev. 2-C. See also Wellington W. Nyangoni,
Africa in the United Nations System (Rutherford, NJ: Associated
University Presses, 1985), 196.
