From Honesty–Humility to fair behavior – Benevolence or a (blind) fairness norm?

Abstract

Recent research has identified trait Honesty-Humility as a vital determinant of a variety of
cooperative, fair, or pro-social behaviors. However, it is less clear what drives the link between
Honesty-Humility and the tendency to exhibit fair behavior which we first demonstrate in a metaanalysis
of prior work using the dictator game. To close this gap, we test two potential explanations,
namely benevolence versus an internalized (blind) fairness norm. In a fairness paradigm, we
implemented an unfair situation in which participants and their hypothetical counterparts received
asymmetric rewards for the same performance in a quiz. The asymmetry was either to the
participants' advantage or disadvantage, manipulated experimentally. Finally, participants were
empowered to redistribute all rewards at will. In line with the benevolence account, individuals high in
Honesty-Humility established a fair distribution if they themselves were advantaged (thus making sure
they do not exploit others) whereas they refrained from rectifying the asymmetry (by taking points
from the other) if they were disadvantaged. Vice versa, the pattern cannot be accommodated by the
idea of a (blind) fairness norm which would have implied that individuals high in Honesty-Humility
establish an equal distribution irrespective of who is advantaged.

Full text

From Honesty-Humility to fair behavior – benevolence or a (blind) fairness norm?
Benjamin E. Hilbig1, Isabel Thielmann1, Johanna Wührl2, and Ingo Zettler3
1University of Koblenz-Landau
2University of Jena
3University of Copenhagen
This article has been published in Personality and Individual Differences. This accepted
manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. This version might
not exactly replicate the official version published in the journal.
The published version of this article is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.02.017.
Please cite as:
Hilbig, B. E., Thielmann, I., Wührl, J. & Zettler, I. (2015). From Honesty-Humility to fair behavior
– benevolence or a (blind) fairness norm? Personality and Individual Differences, 80, 91-95.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 2
Abstract
Recent research has identified trait Honesty-Humility as a vital determinant of a variety
of cooperative, fair, or pro-social behaviors. However, it is less clear what drives the link
between Honesty-Humility and the tendency to exhibit fair behavior which we first demonstrate
in a meta-analysis of prior work using the dictator game. To close this gap, we test two potential
explanations, namely benevolence versus an internalized (blind) fairness norm. In a fairness
paradigm, we implemented an unfair situation in which participants and their hypothetical
counterparts received asymmetric rewards for the same performance in a quiz. The asymmetry
was either to the participants’ advantage or disadvantage, manipulated experimentally. Finally,
participants were empowered to redistribute all rewards at will. In line with the benevolence
account, individuals high in Honesty-Humility established a fair distribution if they themselves
were advantaged (thus making sure they do not exploit others) whereas they refrained from
rectifying the asymmetry (by taking points from the other) if they were disadvantaged. Vice
versa, the pattern cannot be accommodated by the idea of a (blind) fairness norm which would
have implied that individuals high in Honesty-Humility establish an equal distribution
irrespective of who is advantaged.
Keywords: Honesty-Humility, fairness, pro-social, benevolence, HEXACO model, social norm

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 3
Cooperation represents a key aspect of social behavior, fostering benefits of groups rather
than individual agents (cf. Sullivan, Snyder, & Sullivan, 2008). A basic ingredient of individuals’
inclination to cooperate is fairness (e.g., Arneson, 1982; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), which – in
distributive terms – denotes “the concern for how money or goods are distributed among
individuals” (Kamas & Preston, 2012, p. 538). Understanding individual differences in fairness
hence provides important insights into interpersonal as well as societal functioning.
Correspondingly, many studies have investigated the relation between fairness and basic
personality traits (e.g., Ben-Ner, Kong, & Putterman, 2004; Kurzban & Houser, 2001).
In recent years, research relying on the HEXACO Model of Personality (comprising the
traits Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and
Openness to Experience; e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004) has provided a fruitful
approach and a more fine-grained understanding of the traits influencing fairness. The HEXACO
model has emerged from lexical studies across various languages, essentially representing a
variant and extension of the classical Big Five framework (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1985): Beyond
factors that are equivalent across the two frameworks (Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and
Openness), the HEXACO model encompasses variants of Emotionality (i.e., Neuroticism) and
Agreeableness (see Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 2014, for a recent review). In addition – and most
prominently – the model proposes a sixth basic factor termed Honesty-Humility, specifically
capturing individual differences in fairness.
Essentially, Honesty-Humility represents “the tendency to be fair and genuine in dealing
with others, in the sense of cooperating with others even when one might exploit them without
suffering retaliation” (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156). As such, high levels of Honesty-Humility
stand for sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance, and modesty whereas low levels imply dishonesty,

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 4
unfairness, greed, and pretentiousness. In line with this theoretical conceptualization, Honesty-
Humility relates negatively to crime, delinquency (e.g., Dunlop, Morrison, Koenig, & Silcox,
2012; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2014), and counterproductive work behavior (e.g., Marcus, Lee,
& Ashton, 2007) but positively to integrity (Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, 2008)
and fairness-related behaviors such pro-social distribution decisions (Ackermann, Fleiß, &
Murphy, in press; Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014).
In particular, several studies (Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; Hilbig,
Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013; Hilbig & Zettler, 2009; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014; Thielmann,
Hilbig, & Niedtfeld, 2014) have linked Honesty-Humility to fair behavior in the dictator game
(for a recent review see Zhao & Smillie, in press). In this paradigm, an individual is asked to
divide an endowment at will between herself and an unknown other. Across studies, individuals
high in Honesty-Humility gave more, thus refraining from abusing their power to exploit the
other. Summarizing these findings in a meta-analysis (N = 1231), the sample-size weighted
average correlation (cf. Field, 2001) between Honesty-Humility and dictator game giving was r
= .29 and thus a medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1988).
Although these findings clearly demonstrate that individuals high in Honesty-Humility
behave more pro-socially, the conclusions are merely relative. That is, such a positive association
does not necessarily imply that individuals high in Honesty-Humility are also more inclined
toward fair behavior in absolute terms – in the sense of sharing equally which most people (i.e.,
more than 80%) perceive to be the fair solution in the dictator game (Mellers, Haselhuhn,
Tetlock, Silva, & Isen, 2010). To test this more directly, we re-analyzed the data referred to
above, testing whether individuals high in Honesty-Humility are actually more likely to share
equally in this game. Indeed, amongst individuals high in Honesty-Humility (i.e., those with

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 5
values larger or equal to the median), 64.4% chose the equal split, whereas only 34.6% of their
counterparts low in Honesty-Humility did so, OR = 3.42, 95% CI [2.71, 4.33], χ²(1) = 109.48, p
< .001.
1
This finding clearly indicates that high levels of Honesty-Humility are not only related
to more pro-sociality or non-exploitation in relative terms, but also to more fairness in absolute
terms.
However, although extant evidence linking Honesty-Humility to fair behavior is
consistent, it remains unclear why individuals with high levels of Honesty-Humility are more
inclined towards fair behavior. Specifically, the empirical picture allows for two alternative
explanations. First, the HEXACO theory suggests that this pattern is essentially due to
benevolence. That is, Honesty-Humility is conceptualized in terms of non-exploitation, implying
that individuals high in Honesty-Humility should be motivated to avoid having an edge over
others (i.e., receiving more for similar input compared to others), but not mind the opposite. In
simple terms, they may share equally in the dictator game due to their benevolent nature –
placing high importance on justice for others, without insisting on justice for themselves.
Alternatively, extant evidence could also be accounted for by an internalized (“blind”)
fairness norm (i.e., a general preference for equality) in individuals high in Honesty-Humility. In
terms of equity sensitivity (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985, 1987), individuals high in
Honesty-Humility might generally prefer equivalent input-outcome-ratios both for others and
themselves and thus insist that no-one is under- or over-rewarded. In simple terms, they may
share equally in the dictator game because this is the social fairness norm (Mellers et al., 2010),
thus placing high importance on justice for both others and themselves.
1
Regressing the dictator game allocation (equal split: yes vs. no) on the (continuous) Honesty-Humility
scores in a logistic regression analysis yielded similar results, OR = 2.90, 95% CI [2.36, 3.55], p < .001.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 6
The purpose of the present study was to disentangle these two explanations. The
benevolence account implies a mechanism that may be summarized as “I need to ensure I do not
get more than others; I should not take advantage of others” in individuals high in Honesty-
Humility. The fairness norm account, by contrast, implies “I need to ensure we all get the same
(for similar input)”. So, to tease the two apart, we used a fairness paradigm in which participants
were asked to re-distribute points that they – and a hypothetical other – earned through exerting
(cognitive) effort in a quiz. Establishing an unfair situation, there were asymmetric rewards in
the form of different gains (points earned) for the same number of correct solutions. Thus, the
same effort and success in the quiz came with different outcomes. This asymmetry was either in
favor of the participant (advantage-self) or in favor of the hypothetical other (advantage-other).
Finally, participants could redistribute all points at will between themselves and the other. That
is, participants were empowered to give points to or take points from the other and thus to
increase or reduce the asymmetry (or leave it unaltered).
This fairness paradigm allows for disentangling benevolence from an internalized
fairness norm as the two make incompatible predictions: According to benevolence – and the
HEXACO theory – individuals high in Honesty-Humility should use their redistribution-power
to reduce asymmetry only if they themselves are in the advantageous position. That is, if
participants get more points than the other for the same performance in the quiz, those high in
Honesty-Humility should give points to the other to reduce this unfairness. However, if
participants actually get fewer points in the quiz than the other, those high in Honesty-Humility
should refrain from taking points from the other due to their unwillingness to abuse their power
over the final distribution of points. Participants’ final share should therefore be lower for
individuals with high levels of Honesty-Humility, irrespective of the direction of asymmetry. In

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 7
statistical terms, the benevolence account would thus essentially imply a main effect of Honesty-
Humility on the final share.
By contrast, according to an internalized fairness norm, individuals high in Honesty-
Humility should be motivated to establish fairness in general, that is, an equal split (e.g.,
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). Hence, they should not only
give points to the other if they themselves are profiting from the asymmetry, but also take points
from the other if the other is in the advantageous position. In other words, the fairness norm
account predicts that the final distribution is always fair for individuals high in Honesty-Humility
– no matter who was initially advantaged. In turn, the fairness norm account would imply an
interaction between Honesty-Humility and the direction of asymmetry (advantage-self vs.
advantage-other) in predicting the final share. Specifically, it would predict that individuals high
in Honesty-Humility decrease their final share if they are initially advantaged but also increase
their final share if they are initially disadvantaged.
Method
Materials
To measure Honesty-Humility, we used the German version (Moshagen, Hilbig, &
Zettler, 2014) of the 60-item HEXACO Personality Inventory Revised (HEXACO-60; Ashton &
Lee, 2009). For each of the six HEXACO dimensions, the inventory contains 10 items to be
answered on a five-point Likert-type scale. Sample items for Honesty-Humility are “Having a lot
of money is not especially important to me” and “I would never accept a bribe, even if it were
very large”. In our study, Cronbach’s α for Honesty-Humility was .79.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 8
As introduced above, individuals’ redistribution decision in a fairness paradigm
2
(that is,
the final distribution of points in this paradigm) served as the main dependent variable – to
differentiate between benevolence and internalized fairness norm. The fairness paradigm was
designed to measure participants’ willingness to rectify an existing asymmetry in input-outcome-
ratio, depending on the direction and the degree of the asymmetry. In the paradigm, participants
are coupled with an unknown other.
3
Both earn points by taking a quiz (15 multiple choice tasks
with four response options each) on verbal and mathematical skills (similar to the 10-Minute-
Test; cf. Hilbig, Heydasch, & Zettler, 2014). As an exemplary task consider: “Which of the
following fractions is smallest: 2/4, 2/5, 1/3, or 3/8?”. For each correct answer in the quiz,
participants (and the other) earned points. To ensure that solving the tasks was strenuous to some
extent – thus eliciting a feeling of earning the points – we speeded the quiz with a limit of five
minutes. Supporting the suitability of this time limit, participants in an independent lab-based
pre-study (N = 63, 30 female, aged 18-27, M = 20.4, SD = 1.8 years) solved M = 8.8 (59%) tasks
(SD = 2.8) correctly and only three participants (< 5% of the sample) were able to solve 14 or all
15 tasks, despite substantial monetary incentives (1.00€ for each task solved, thus up to 15.00€ in
five minutes). Also, in this pre-study, performance in the quiz was unrelated to the six HEXACO
factors (as assessed via the German HEXACO-60), all |r| < .15.
2
The fairness paradigm is structurally similar to a variant of the dictator game in which dictators earn
their endowment (Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002). However, contrary to the standard dictator game,
both individuals earn an endowment and, more importantly there is asymmetry in the earnings (different
payoff for the same effort or success).
3
Note that the paradigm was completely hypothetical in nature, meaning that participants were asked to
imagine both the other person and the points earned and to be distributed. Thus the points did not convert
to actual monetary stakes.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 9
Following the quiz, participants learned how many tasks they had solved correctly and
how many points this earned them. They also learned about the number of correct solutions
given by the hypothetical other which was always the same as the participants’. As sketched
above, this performance was then translated into hypothetical payoffs (points) asymmetrically.
Specifically, participants received either more (advantage-self) or less (advantage-other) points
than the other for the same number of correct responses. In addition, we varied the degree of
asymmetry, such that one individual’s points were either doubled (moderate asymmetry) or
quadrupled (severe asymmetry) as compared to her counterpart’s points. For illustration, Table 1
displays example payoffs (assuming 10 correct solutions) for the four experimental conditions to
which participants were randomly assigned.
Finally, participants were given the power to redistribute all the points between
themselves and the other. That is, they could reduce the asymmetry by either giving points to the
other or taking points from the other. As dependent measure, we used participants’ relative
outcome, that is, the ratio of (i) a participant’s own points after the redistribution to (ii) the sum
of all points earned by both individuals. The relative outcome hence mirrors a participant’s final
share. For the sake of simplicity, we subtracted 0.5 from this proportion so that a value of 0
mirrors establishment of an equal split (i.e., no asymmetry left after redistribution). Any value
larger than 0 indicates that participants gained beyond the equal split through their redistribution
choice; any value smaller than 0 indicates the opposite (the other came off better than implied by
the equal split). Note that, by implication, the same value of the relative outcome implies
different redistribution choices across the two conditions. For example, a value of 0 indicates
giving in the advantage-self condition, but taking in the advantage-other condition.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 10
Procedure and Participants
The study was run online in close adherence to common standards for Internet-based
experimenting (Reips, 2002). After providing informed consent and demographic information,
participants completed the HEXACO-60. Next, they worked on the quiz in which they (and the
other) earned the points. After the quiz, participants received information on their own and the
other’s earnings and decided on the final distribution of points by giving, taking, or leaving the
points untouched. As a manipulation check, we finally asked participants about the strenuousness
of the quiz and further assessed the seriousness of participation.
Participants were recruited from a community sample via mailing lists and social
networks. Out of 185 participants who started the study, N = 146 (82 female, aged 18-62, M =
25.3, SD = 8.4) completed all tasks and were thus considered in the analyses.
4
The majority
(72.6%) of participants were students, 15.8% were employees. Participants were almost equally
distributed across the experimental conditions, with n = 72 in the advantage-self (n = 36
moderate and n = 36 severe) and n = 74 in the advantage-other (n = 36 moderate and n = 38
severe) condition.
Results
As intended by the chosen time limit – and supporting the “earning character” of the
fairness paradigm – participants perceived the quiz to be moderately strenuous (M = 2.89, SD =
0.83, on a 5-point Likert-type scale). On average, they solved 8 out of 15 tasks (SD = 3.0) which
4
As indicated by a post-hoc power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007),
this sample size yielded a high statistical power to detect small-to-medium sized (f² = .10) main effects (in
case of two predictors in total, 1-β = .99) as well as small-to-medium sized interaction effects (1-β = .93;
significant increase in explained variance when adding an interaction term) in a multiple linear regression.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 11
is highly similar to the performance observed in the incentivized pilot study summarized above.
In turn, participants and others earned a total of 67.7 points (SD = 28.5). In the redistribution of
these points, 42% of participants took points from the other (on average 19.2 points, SD = 13.2),
31% gave points to the other (on average 14.8 points, SD = 8.9), and 27% left the distribution
untouched. A majority of 51% of participants established an equal split, 32% advantaged
themselves, and 17% advantaged the other. Correspondingly, after the redistribution, participants
had 35.7 points on average (SD = 18.6) whereas the other had 31.9 points on average (SD =
17.9).
For the relative outcome (i.e., the final proportion of participant’s points), Table 2
provides the means and standard deviations for all four experimental conditions. As can be seen
(in a column-wise comparison), the relative outcome was larger when participants themselves
profited from the asymmetry (M = 0.12, SD = 0.13) – as compared to the condition in which they
were disadvantaged (M = -0.05, SD = 0.15). In particular, in the advantage-self condition,
participants were less willing to shift towards the equal split. This main effect was confirmed by
a 2 (advantage: self vs. other) by 2 (degree of asymmetry: moderate vs. severe) ANOVA with
F(1, 142) = 47.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. In contrast, the severity of asymmetry (row-wise
comparison in Table 2) did not influence participants’ relative outcome, F(1, 142) < 1, p = .658,
ηp2 < .01. That is, participants were as willing to establish the equal distribution if the asymmetry
was moderate (M = 0.04, SD = 0.14) as compared to when the asymmetry was severe (M = 0.03,
SD = 0.18). Finally, there was no interaction between the direction and the degree of asymmetry
(F < 1). For this reason – and given that our main question refers to the effect of who is
advantaged (i.e., self vs. other), not how severely someone is advantaged, on the redistribution
decision – we discarded the severity-factor in the following analyses.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 12
To test the main hypotheses, we regressed the direction of asymmetry (dummy coded),
Honesty-Humility, and their interaction on the relative outcome. First off, this analysis revealed a
(positive) main effect of the direction of asymmetry, indicating a larger relative outcome in the
advantage-self condition than in the advantage-other condition, β = .52, p < .001. Furthermore –
in line with the benevolence account – we found a (negative) main effect of Honesty-Humility
on the relative outcome, β = -.24, p = .013. That is, high levels of Honesty-Humility were
generally associated with smaller values in the relative outcome, irrespective of the direction of
asymmetry. However, in contrast to the predictions of the fairness norm account, there was no
interaction between Honesty-Humility and the direction of asymmetry, β = -.06, p = .529.
5
The
results were comparable when controlling for the remaining HEXACO dimensions in a multiple
regression analysis.
6
As can be seen in Figure 1, individuals low in Honesty-Humility left the
asymmetry untouched whenever they benefited from it but strongly reduced the asymmetry (took
points from the other) whenever it disadvantaged them. By contrast, their counterparts high in
Honesty-Humility reduced the asymmetry especially whenever they originally profited from it
(gave points to the other), but did not establish a full equal split whenever they were initially
disadvantaged.
Discussion
Fairness represents a vital aspect of interpersonal and societal functioning. Regarding
individual differences in fairness and traits driving fair behavior, recent developments point to
5
Moreover, this interaction did not depend on the severity of asymmetry as indicated by a non-significant
three-way-interaction between Honesty-Humility, direction, and severity of asymmetry, β = .02, p = .895.
6
The corresponding regression coefficients were β = .00 (Emotionality), β = .08 (Extraversion), β = -.08
(Agreeableness), β = .11 (Conscientiousness), and β = -.09 (Openness), all p > .19.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 13
Honesty-Humility as a vital basic trait dimension (cf. Ashton et al., 2014). In line with its
theoretical conceptualization, past research has consistently linked Honesty-Humility to fairness-
related and pro-social behaviors. Notably – as indicated by our re-analysis of existent findings on
economic behavior – Honesty-Humility is not only associated with pro-sociality in relative
terms, but also with an inclination to establish fairness (i.e., equality) in absolute terms.
However, different explanations may account for why these individuals show such a strong
tendency to establish fairness. First, the HEXACO theory primarily suggests that benevolence
drives these effects in that individuals high in Honesty-Humility avoid exploiting others.
However, prior evidence cannot rule out an internalized (blind) fairness norm (i.e., a general
preference for equality) in these individuals.
To tease the two explanations apart, the present study assessed participants’ willingness to
rectify an initial asymmetry in rewards, that is, unfair outcomes following a demanding task.
Specifically, it was tested whether individuals differ in their willingness to redistribute outcomes
conditional upon (a) whether they themselves or the other profited from the asymmetric
distribution of rewards and (b) their individual level of Honesty-Humility. In line with the
benevolence account, our results show that individuals high in Honesty-Humility reduce an
asymmetry and establish an equal split if and only if they themselves are the ones profiting from
the unfairness. If, in turn, it is to their disadvantage, they do not alter the asymmetric distribution
as strongly and mostly refrain from taking points from the other (even though this would actually
result in a more fair distribution). These results corroborate the non-exploitation aspect of
Honesty-Humility as the motivating force behind fair behavior, but are incompatible with the
alternative notion of a general (blind) fairness norm. Of course, we cannot claim that
benevolence is the only explanation that might account for the observed pattern of results.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 14
However, among the two accounts that we derived from the extant literature, the data exclusively
supports one (benevolence) and contradicts the other (blind fairness norm). In turn, our findings
support the conceptualization of Honesty-Humility in the HEXACO model, demonstrating that
individuals with high factor levels do not take advantage of their power even if they themselves
are in a disadvantageous position.
Extending prior research, our study is the first specifically designed to test why individuals
with high levels in Honesty-Humility are inclined towards fair behavior. We hence provide a
first toehold towards explaining the consistently observed link between Honesty-Humility and
fairness-related behaviors. However, as a limitation, our findings are based on a hypothetical
scenario without actual stakes, thus potentially limiting the conclusiveness of results due to
socially desirable responding. Arguably, fairness is socially desirable (Hoffman, McCabe,
Shachat, & Smith, 1994) as are high levels of Honesty-Humility (Hilbig, Glöckner, et al., 2014).
Nonetheless, as indicated by recent research, the relation between Honesty-Humility and non-
exploitation seems to be equivalent in hypothetical scenarios vs. real decisions with actual stakes
(Hilbig et al., 2015).
In conclusion, the present study provides first evidence that the willingness to establish
fairness shown by individuals high in Honesty-Humility can be traced back to benevolence and a
reluctance to take advantage of others’ inferiority, but not to a general preference for equality in
terms of adherence to a “blind” fairness norm. Given that Honesty-Humility explains a variety of
socially relevant behaviors such as crime, delinquency, and cooperation (e.g., Hilbig, Glöckner,
et al., 2014; Van Gelder & De Vries, 2014), it is important to understand these behavioral
tendencies, shedding light on the “black box” between Honesty-Humility and pro-social
behavior.

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 15
Acknowledgements
The work reported herein was supported by a grant to the first author from the Baden-
Württemberg Foundation (Germany).

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 16
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BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 21
Tables
Table 1. Exemplary Initial Allocation of Points for a Participant with 10 Correct Solutions in the
Quiz, Separated by Experimental Condition.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the Final Proportion of Participants’ Points on All
Points (i.e., Relative Outcome) Separated for the Four Experimental Conditions.
Advantage-self
Advantage-other
Degree of asymmetry
n
M
SD
n
M
SD
Moderate
36
0.11
0.12
36
-0.03
0.13
Severe
36
0.12
0.15
38
-0.06
0.16
Note. A value of 0 indicates the equal split; values larger than 0 indicate that the final distribution
was beneficial for the participant relative to the other (and vice versa for values below 0).
Advantage-self
Advantage-other
Degree of asymmetry
Own points
Others’ points
Own points
Others’ points
Moderate
40
20
20
40
Severe
80
20
20
80

BENEVOLENCE OR (BLIND) FAIRNESS NORM 22
Figures
Figure 1. Relation between relative outcome and Honesty-Humility (centered on the sample
mean) separated for advantage-self (left) and advantage-other condition (right). The dotted line
indicates the equal split distribution; the dashed line indicates the initial distribution prior to the
redistribution choice. Confidence bands represent the 95% confidence intervals.