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Security in Cloud Computing: Opportunities and Challenges

  • COMSATS Institue of Information Technology, Abbottabad, Pakistan

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The cloud computing exhibits, remarkable potential to provide cost effective, easy to manage, elastic, and powerful resources on the fly, over the Internet. The cloud computing, upsurges the capabilities of the hardware resources by optimal and shared utilization. The above mentioned features encourage the organizations and individual users to shift their applications and services to the cloud. Even the critical infrastructure, for example, power generation and distribution plants are being migrated to the cloud computing paradigm. However, the services provided by third-party cloud service providers entail additional security threats. The migration of user’s assets (data, applications etc.) outside the administrative control in a shared environment where numerous users are collocated escalates the security concerns. This survey details the security issues that arise due to the very nature of cloud computing. Moreover, the survey presents the recent solutions presented in the literature to counter the security issues. Furthermore, a brief view of security vulnerabilities in the mobile cloud computing are also highlighted. In the end, the discussion on the open issues and future research directions is also presented.
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Security in cloud computing: Opportunities and challenges
Mazhar Ali
, Samee U. Khan
, Athanasios V. Vasilakos
North Dakota State University, USA
Kuwait University, Kuwait
COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad, Pakistan
article info
Article history:
Received 5 September 2014
Received in revised form 28 January 2015
Accepted 29 January 2015
Available online 7 February 2015
Cloud computing
Web services
The cloud computing exhibits, remarkable potential to provide cost effective, easy to man-
age, elastic, and powerful resources on the fly, over the Internet. The cloud computing,
upsurges the capabilities of the hardware resources by optimal and shared utilization.
The above mentioned features encourage the organizations and individual users to shift
their applications and services to the cloud. Even the critical infrastructure, for example,
power generation and distribution plants are being migrated to the cloud computing
paradigm. However, the services provided by third-party cloud service providers entail
additional security threats. The migration of user’s assets (data, applications, etc.) outside
the administrative control in a shared environment where numerous users are collocated
escalates the security concerns. This survey details the security issues that arise due to the
very nature of cloud computing. Moreover, the survey presents the recent solutions pre-
sented in the literature to counter the security issues. Furthermore, a brief view of security
vulnerabilities in the mobile cloud computing are also highlighted. In the end, the discus-
sion on the open issues and future research directions is also presented.
Ó2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since its inception, the cloud computing paradigm has gained the widespread popularity in the industry and academia
[88]. The economical, scalable, expedient, ubiquitous, and on-demand access to shared resources are some of the character-
istics of the cloud that have resulted in shifting the business processes to the cloud [25,2]. The cloud computing attracts the
attention of research community due to its potential to provide tremendous benefits to the industry and the community
[9,88]. The resources are provided to the users and released based on demands from the pool of shared resources [4]. The
on-demand resource provisioning ensures the optimal resource allocation and is also cost effective [78]. The consumers
(individuals and business organizations) no longer need to invest heavily in the information technology (IT) infrastructure
[4]. Customers use resources provided by the cloud and pay according to the use. On the other hand, cloud providers can
re-use resources as soon as they are released by a particular user resulting in improved resource utilization [78]. Ease of
use is yet another advantage being offered by the cloud computing because it does not require the customers to possess
extraordinary expertise pertaining to the cloud specific technologies [5]. The management of the technology and services
has moved from user to the service provider’s end [5].
0020-0255/Ó2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: (M. Ali), (S.U. Khan), (A.V. Vasilakos).
Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Information Sciences
journal homepage:
The cloud computing provides virtualized resources to the customers using various technologies, for example, Web ser-
vices, virtualization, and multi-tenancy. The cloud services are delivered to the customer through the Internet [25]. The Web
applications are used to access and manage cloud resources that makes Web applications an important component of the
cloud computing [70]. The customers’ processes are executed in virtualized environment that in turn utilize the physical
resources [35]. Multiple virtual processes of various users are allocated to same physical machines that are segregated
logically. This gives rise to a multi-tenant environment in the cloud. Despite the provided advantages, the cloud computing
is not exclusive of risks with security being the key risk [57].
Security is one of the biggest obstacles that hamper the widespread adoption of cloud computing [28]. Several business
and research organization are reluctant in completely trusting the cloud computing to shift digital assets to the third-party
service providers [57]. The conventional IT infrastructure keeps the digital assets in the administrative domain of the
organizations. All of the processing, movement, and management of data/application are performed within the organization-
al administrative domain. On the other hand, organizations do not enjoy administrative control of cloud services and
infrastructure [52]. The security measures taken by the cloud service providers (CSP) are generally transparent to the
organizations. The presence of large numbers of users that are not related to the organizations, aggravate the concerns
further [57]. The users might be trusted by the CSP but they may not be of trust to each other. The aforementioned reasons
keep the customers under uncertainties about their digital assets located at the cloud resulting in reluctance to adopt cloud
computing [57].
There are various studies in the literature discussing the security issues of the cloud computing. The authors in [85,101]
presented reviews on the security issues of the cloud computing. However, the aforesaid studies are limited to the discussion
of security issues only and the security solutions are not discussed. Ref. [71] reviewed the security issues at different levels of
cloud computing. The security solutions have also been presented in [71]. However, the future discussion has not been dis-
cussed comprehensively and overview of the cloud technology is missing. The authors in [1] presented a comprehensive
study of privacy preservation in the cloud with focus only on e-health clouds. Moreover, the study in [1] is limited in scope
to the privacy only. Ref. [121] reviewed the security and privacy challenges in the cloud computing and discussed the
defense strategies for the existing vulnerabilities. However, the discussion of the security issues in [121] was centered on
confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, and privacy-preservability with little discussion on the technologies
causing the vulnerability origination. The authors in [74] elaborated the security issues in the cloud along with the approach-
es that can be employed to tackle the vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the discussion on future research directions is lacking in
the survey. Likewise, the work in [39] detailed the security issues in the cloud computing in depth with brief discussion on
current and latest security solutions. The work in [18] surveyed the popular security models of cloud computing, such as
cube model, multi-tenancy model, and risk assessment model. Moreover, the authors of [18] have discussed the security
risks of cloud computing. However, the risks are discussed from the perspective of different stack holders, like customers,
government, and service providers. Security issues from the technological and operational point of view were not in the
scope of the aforesaid study. Similarly, the strategies to relieve the security issues are discussed in terms of ‘‘what’’ compo-
nents and processes should be secured and evaluated. ‘‘How’’ the security objectives are achieved in current research is not
elaborated. Similarly, the article [104] describes the security issues in cloud computing and associated security solutions.
However, the discussion is more focused on the privacy part of cloud security. Moreover, there is no discussion on future
research directions. Our survey differs significantly from the aforesaid surveys in terms of its extensiveness, comprehensive
discussion on security issues in cloud computing, and emphasizes on latest security solutions presented in the literature. We
also provide the tabulated comparisons of the presented techniques. Moreover, we briefly discuss the security issues pertain-
ing to mobile cloud computing and generic strategies that can lead to solutions. The contributions of this survey with respect
to the aforesaid surveys are presented in Table 1. The ’’U’’ and ’’ ’’ denote whether the domain specified in the column has
been discussed in the survey or not.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2provides the architectural framework of the cloud
computing. The security issues in the cloud computing paradigm are detailed in Section 3whereas the existing solutions
in the contemporary literature are presented in Section 4. Section 5highlights the security concerns in the mobile cloud com-
puting (MCC). Section 6discusses the techniques and open issues and Section 7concludes the survey.
Table 1
Contributions of this study with respect to the discussed surveys.
Work Cloud overview Security issues Counter measures Open issues
[85] UU
[101] UU
[71] UU
[1] Privacy only UU
[121] UUU Privacy only
[74] UU
[39] UU
[18] UU
This survey UUU U
358 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
2. Cloud computing architectural framework
Cloud computing integrates various computing technologies to provide services to the end users. To understand the secu-
rity issues pertaining to the cloud computing, it is important to briefly introduce the concepts that contribute to the cloud
computing. The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) definition [69] of cloud computing is widely accept-
ed [28]. The NIST definition considers the cloud computing as a threefold model of service provisioning (Fig. 1), comprising
of: (a) essential characteristics, (b) service models, and (c) deployment models. The cloud computing concepts in the light of
NIST definition are presented below.
2.1. Essential characteristics
2.1.1. On-demand self-service
Customers can request and manage the services from the cloud without any human interaction with the CSP. The provi-
sion of the services and the associated resources is accomplished as and when required. This is usually done through Web
services and management interfaces [28].
2.1.2. Broad network access
The services and the customer’s applications and data present on the cloud must be accessible to the customers using the
standard mechanisms and protocols. The characteristic further demands that the availability of services should support
heterogeneous thin or thick environment (for example, mobile phones, laptops, workstations, tablets). Broad network access
is sometimes referred to as ubiquitous network access in the literature [28].
2.1.3. Resource pooling
The cloud’s resources are shared among multiple customers by pooling in a multi-tenant environment. The customers are
transparent about the location of the resources. There is a mapping between physical and virtual resources provided to the
2.1.4. Rapid elasticity
The resources can be rapidly and elastically scaled as per customer’s demands. The customer has a view of unlimited
resources that can be purchased as needed in a pay-as-you-go manner.
2.1.5. Measured service
The scaling of resources up and down is performed dynamically and the usage of services is metered and reported to the
customer and CSP. The metering also helps the optimization of resource usage automatically while the users are charged in a
pay-as-you-use manner.
2.1.6. Multi-tenancy
The NIST defines the above mentioned five characteristics of the cloud computing. However, the Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA) adds multi-tenancy as an important characteristic of the cloud computing (although not an essential characteristic)
Fig. 1. NIST definition of cloud computing.
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 359
[21]. Multi-tenancy is the property that enables the use of a single resource by multiple customers that may or may not
belong to the same organization. Multi-tenancy results in optimal use of resources and different customers are segregated
2.2. Service models
The NIST divides the services provided by the cloud computing into three categories, namely: (a) software as a service
(SaaS), (b) platform as a service (PaaS), and (c) infrastructure as a service (IaaS). The cloud service model is referred to as
SPI (software, platform, and infrastructure).
2.2.1. SaaS
The SaaS enables the customers to use CSP’s applications, running on the cloud infrastructure, through the Internet. The
thin client interface can be used to access the applications such as web browser. The SaaS does not provide the facility to
create an application or software. The SaaS only provides software through Internet making it a model to distribute the soft-
ware through Web. The customers pay for the usage and do not own the software [96].
2.2.2. PaaS
The applications that are owned by the customer need a frame work where they can be executed and managed. This
includes integrated development environments (IDE), operating systems, and platform layer resources (run time engine that
executes the applications). The aforementioned services are provided as PaaS. The PaaS does not provide customers with the
control over the underlying cloud infrastructure but only on the applications that are moved to the cloud.
2.2.3. IaaS
The IaaS refers to the hardware infrastructure provided by the CSP including the network, storage, memory, processor,
and various other computing resources. The resources are provided in the form of virtualized systems accessible through
Internet. The CSP has a control over the underlying resources [39].
2.3. Deployment models
There are four models that can be used to deploy a cloud computing infrastructure, namely: (a) private cloud, (b) public
cloud, (c) community cloud, and (d) hybrid cloud.
2.3.1. Private cloud
The cloud that is run and managed only for a single organization is the private cloud. The organization may or may not
own the physical infrastructure and can be managed by the organization itself or by a third party. Similarly, private cloud
may or may not be located at organization’s geographical site. However, whatever the case may be, private cloud is for
the use of only single organization and the resources are not utilized by any other customer.
2.3.2. Public cloud
The cloud’s physical infrastructure is owned by the CSP and is open to general public and organizations. The resources are
shared among all the customers. The customers pay the cloud owner according to the services and resources they use. The
physical infrastructure is located off-site to the customers and is managed by the CSP.
2.3.3. Community cloud
The community cloud is shared by a number of organizations and/or customers forming a community. Generally, the
community shares common interests, such as the mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations.
The community cloud may be managed by any of the organizations in the community or a third party. Similarly, it may
be located on premise or off-premise.
2.3.4. Hybrid cloud
The hybrid cloud is the mix of two or more clouds (public, private, or community). All of the participating clouds retain
their status of a unique entity, but share standardized or proprietary technology.
3. Cloud security challenges
The characteristics and models of the cloud computing presented in previous section offer improved, optimized, and low
cost services to the customers. The above given models providing the mentioned characteristics are implemented using var-
ious technologies, for example virtualization and multi-tenancy. The technologies along with the cloud service and deploy-
ment models introduce cloud specific security risks and vulnerabilities in addition to shared risks with the conventional IT
infrastructure [87]. The security risks in cloud may differ from the risks of conventional IT infrastructure either in nature or
360 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
intensity or both. Resource pooling allows the use of same pool by multiple users through multi-tenancy and virtualization
technologies. Although, the technologies introduce rapid elasticity and optimal management of resources, they also intro-
duce certain risks in the system. Multi-tenancy leads to the risks of data visibility to other users and trace of operations.
On-demand self-service characteristic is provided to the customers by means of Web based management interfaces that
causes the probability of unauthorized access to the management interface higher than the traditional systems [28]. Similar-
ly, virtualized environment introduces its own set of risks and vulnerabilities that includes malicious cooperation between
virtual machines (VM) and VM escape. Likewise, from the cloud service model view point, the service models are dependent
on each other. The SaaS applications are built and deployed over the PaaS and the PaaS is dependent on the underlying IaaS.
This operational dependency of the service models on each other brings in the security dependency also. For example, if an
attacker succeeds to take control of IaaS, the result will be a compromised PaaS that is utilizing IaaS. A compromised PaaS
can lead to compromised SaaS. In short, any compromised service model gives access to other layer of the service model. The
private cloud deployment model inherits the same set of vulnerabilities as possessed by the conventional IT infrastructure.
The reason being the private cloud is meant for the use of a single organization. The public, community, and hybrid clouds
possess more cloud specific vulnerabilities and risks due to presence of users from different origins and administrative con-
trol of a third party [15]. The presence of multi-tenants using virtualized resources that may correspond to same physical
resources introduces many security concerns. The perfect segregation of numerous tenants and allocated resources is a com-
plex task and needs much higher level of security. In the following discussion we present the security challenges being faced
by the cloud computing. There are numerous works that look upon the cloud security challenges from service model per-
spective. In this paper we detail the challenges based on three abstract domains, namely, (a) architectural issues, (b) com-
munication issues, and (c) contractual and legal issues. Some of the technologies in cloud computing do not affect any
particular service model. Instead more than one models become affected, such as, virtualization that can affect both the IaaS
and PaaS. Therefore, we look at the challenges at abstract level irrespective of the service model. The taxonomy of the secu-
rity challenges in the cloud computing is depicted in Fig. 2.
3.1. Challenges at communication level
The cloud services are normally available to the customers through the Internet [125]. Standard Internet protocols and
mechanisms are used for communication between the customers and the cloud [101]. The communication process results
in transmission of either data/information or applications between the customer and the cloud. Moreover, there exists com-
munication within cloud between VMs. We divide the cloud communication into two categories, namely: (a) communica-
tion external to the cloud (between customers and cloud) and (b) communication internal to the cloud (communication
occurring within cloud infrastructure).
Fig. 2. Cloud security challenges.
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 361
The external communication of cloud is similar as any other communication over the Internet. Therefore the challenges
faced by the cloud due to Internet characteristic are same as the challenges of conventional IT communication [30]. These
challenges include denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, eavesdropping, IP-spoofing based flooding, and masquerading
[94,62]. The solutions to these challenges are also the same as employed conventionally, such as, Secure Socket Layer
(SSL), Internet Security Protocol (IPSec), cryptographic algorithms, intrusion detection and prevention systems, traffic clean-
ing, and digital certificates [94,43]. As these challenges and solutions are inherent from conventional IT infrastructure, we do
not detail them in this study. We focus on internal cloud communication that generates cloud specific challenges because of
cloud specific characteristics and technologies.
3.1.1. Shared communication infrastructure
Resource pooling not only results in sharing of computational and storage resources but also sanctions the sharing of
network infrastructure components [28]. The sharing of network components provides attacker the window of cross-tenant
attack [39]. The vulnerability stems from the resource pooling characteristic of the cloud computing and affects the IaaS
service model of the cloud. Due to the fact that it is hard to distinguish between a legal vulnerability scan of network and
attacker activity, usually such scans are not allowed by the service providers. Similarly, the IP-based segregation of network
portions are not applied as network resources are dynamically provisioned and released and cannot be associated to
particular set of users.
The users on the cloud are usually granted with the super-user access for the purpose of managing their VMs [12]. The
access capability empowers the malicious user to acquire system IP or MAC addresses and make malicious use of IaaS net-
work interfaces. The malicious user with super-user access to the real network components may launch attacks, such as,
sniffing and spoofing over the real network.
3.1.2. Virtual network
In cloud computing systems, the communication takes place not only on real networks but virtualized networks also play
an important role in communication. Virtual network is a logical network built over a physical network [116]. The virtual
networks are responsible for communication between VMs. The software-based network components, such as bridges,
routers, and software-based network configurations, support the networking of VMs over the same host. The virtualized
networks are able to generate the following security challenges in the cloud environment.
Security and protection mechanisms over the physical network are not able to monitor the traffic over virtualized
network. This becomes a serious challenge as malicious activities of the VMs go beyond the monitoring of security tools.
Intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms usually depend on the traffic patterns and activities to judge the anomalies
and detect the possibility of the attack. Virtualized network poses a hindrance to the goal of such preventive measures [47].
The virtualized network is shared among multiple VMs that causes the possibility of certain attacks, such as, Denial of
Service (DoS), spoofing and sniffing of virtual network. The traffic rates can be monitored for malicious purposes. The cryp-
tographic keys become vulnerable to leakage, in case of malicious sniffing and spoofing of virtual network [33]. The data in
transit belonging to users can suffer from costly breaches due to risks presented in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.2.
3.1.3. Security misconfigurations
Security configurations of the cloud network infrastructure are of significant importance in providing secure cloud ser-
vices to the user [24]. Misconfigurations can radically compromise the security of customers, applications, and the whole
system [26]. Customers outsource their applications and data to the cloud with the trust that their assets are secure within
the cloud environment. A small misconfiguration can breach the security of the system. The configurations need to be well in
place not only at the time of cloud infrastructure development, deployment, and operations but subsequent changes in the
cloud network should also keep the configuration consistent with the security policies [24]. One of the most common
misconfiguration occur when administrators select such a configuration tool that they are familiar with but not necessarily
covers all the security requirements [24]. The migration of VMs, data, and applications across multiple physical nodes,
changes in traffic patterns, and topology can generate the requirement of varied security policies [66]. In such a scenario,
the configuration of the cloud should dynamically be managed to ensure the security of the cloud. Likewise, any weakness
in session configurations and protocol configurations can be exploited for session hijacking and to gain user sensitive data
3.2. Challenges at architectural level
3.2.1. Virtualization issues
Virtualization is one of the strategic components of the cloud. Virtualization allows the use of same physical resources by
multiple customers. A separate VM is instantiated for each user that virtually provides a complete operating machine to the
user [74]. Several VMs can be mapped to the same physical resources allowing the resource pooling in multi-tenant envi-
ronment. A VM monitor (VMM) or hypervisor is the module that manages the VMs and permits various operating systems
to run simultaneously on the same physical system [74]. Nevertheless, virtualization also introduces security challenges to
the cloud users and infrastructure [83]. We discuss the security issues related to virtualization below.
362 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 VM image sharing. A VM image is used to instantiate VMs. A user can create his/her own VM image or can use an
image from the shared image repository [39]. The users are allowed to upload and download images from the repository
(for example Amazons image repository) [39]. Sharing of VM images in the image repositories is a common practice and
can evolve as a serious threat if it is used in malicious manner [47]. A malicious user can investigate the code of the image
to look for probable attack point. On the other hand, a malicious user can upload an image that contains a malware [47]. The
VM instantiated through the infected VM image will become source of introducing malware in the cloud computing system.
Moreover, an infected VM can be used to monitor the activities and data of other users resulting in privacy breach. Likewise,
if the image is not properly cleaned, it can expose some confidential information of the user [39]. VM isolation. VMs running on the same physical hardware need to be isolated from each other. Although logical iso-
lation is present between different VMS, the access to same physical resources can lead to data breach and cross-VM attacks.
Isolation is not only needed on storage devices but memory and computational hardware also needs fine grained isolation of
VMs [33,101]. VM escape. VM escape is a situation in which a malicious user or VM escapes from the control of VMM or hypervisor
[97]. A VMM is a software component that manages all the VMs and their access to the hardware. The VM escape situation
can provide attacker access to other VMs or can bring the VMM down [47]. A successful VM escape attack can provide access
to the computing and storage hardware. The IaaS service model is affected that can in turn effect other service models [73]. VM migration. The VM migration is the process of relocating a VM to another physical machine without shutting
down the VM [128]. The VM migration is carried out for a number of reasons, such as load balancing, fault tolerance, and
maintenance [39,20]. During the migration phase, the contents of the VM are exposed to the network that might lead to data
privacy and integrity concerns. Besides data, the code of VM also becomes vulnerable to attackers during migration [128,47].
The migration module can be compromised by an attacker to relocate the VM to a compromised server or under the control
of compromised VMM. The VM migration is a crucial phase and needs to be carried out in a secured manner [39]. VM rollback. Virtualization allows the rollback of a VM to some previous state whenever it is needed. The rollback
feature provides flexibility to the user. However, rollback also raises security concerns [90]. For example, the rollback can
enable the security credentials that were previously disabled [39]. Moreover, the rollback can also render the VM to a vul-
nerability that was previously patched [116]. Furthermore, the rollback can revert the VM to previous security policies and
configuration errors [39]. Hypervisor issues. The key module of virtualization is hypervisor or VMM. The VMs management and isolation is the
responsibility of the VMM. Generating and managing virtual resources, is yet another function performed by the VMM. A
VMM may affect the execution of VMs running on the host system [106]. A compromised VMM can put all the VMs that
are managed by the victim VMM under attacker’s control [102]. The metadata of the VMs, kept by the VMM, may also be
exposed to an attacker if the attacker takes control of a VMM [128,102]. A VMM can provide larger attack vector due to more
entry points and interconnection complexities [102]. There are many reported bugs in the VMM that let the attacker to take
control of the VMM or bypass security restrictions. For example, vulnerabilities in the Xen, Microsoft Virtual PC, and Micro-
soft Virtual Server can be abused by attackers to gain privileged rights [102]. VM sprawl. VM sprawl is a situation where a number of VMs on the host system is continuously increasing and most
of the already instantiated VMs are in idle state [80]. The VM sprawl causes the resources of the host machine to be wasted
on large scale [97].
3.2.2. Data/storage issues
The cloud computing model does not deliver users with full control over data. Distinct to conventional computing model,
the cloud computing permits the service providers to exercise control to manage servers and data. The user enjoys certain
level of control only on the VMs [114]. The lack of control over the data results in greater data security risks than the con-
ventional computing model. Moreover, the characteristics of cloud computing like multi-tenancy and virtualization also
come up with the possibilities of attacks different than the conventional computing model. Below we provide an overview
of the security challenges faced by the data in cloud computing environment. Data privacy and integrity. Although the cloud computing ensures the cost economy and also relieves the users from
infrastructure management activities, it also entails security issues. The data in the cloud is much more vulnerable to risks in
terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in comparison to the conventional computing model [110]. The ever
increasing number of users and applications leads to enhanced security risks. In a shared environment, the security strength
of the cloud equals the security strength of its weakest entity [93]. Not only the malicious entity collocated with the victim
data, but also any non-malicious but unsecure entity can result in breach of data. A successful attack on a single entity will
result in unauthorized access to the data of all the users. Violation of integrity may also result from multi-tenant nature of
the cloud. Employee of SaaS providers, having access to information may also act as a potential risk [39].
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 363
Besides the data at rest, the data being processed also comes across security risks [99]. Due to virtualization physical
resources are shared among multiple tenants. This eventually may allow malicious users (sharing computing resources)
to launch attacks on the data of other users while in processing phase [39,65]. Moreover, if the data backup process is out-
sourced to a third party by the CSP, risks boundary is also broadened [39].
The cryptographic key generation and management for cloud computing paradigm is also not standardized [47]. Absence
of secure and standard key management techniques for the cloud does not allow the standard cryptographic mechanisms to
scale well to the cloud computing model [47]. Therefore, domain of cryptography also enhances the potential risks to the
data. Data recovery vulnerability. Due to resource pooling and elasticity characteristics, the cloud ensures dynamic and on-
demand resource provisioning to the users. The resource allocated to a particular user may be assigned to the other user at
some later point of time. In case of memory and storage resources, a malicious user can employ data recovery techniques to
obtain the data of previous users [10,28]. The authors in [10] were able to recover Amazon machine images files 98 % of the
times. The data recovery vulnerability can pose major threats to the sensitive user data [17]. Improper media sanitization. The issue is related to the destruction of physical storage media due to a number of rea-
sons, for example, (a) the disk needs to be changed, (b) the data no longer needs to be there, and (c) termination of service
[47]. If the CSP does not sanitize the devices properly, the data can be exposed to risks [107]. Sometimes, the multi-tenancy
also contributes to the risk of device sanitization. At the end of the device life cycle, it may not be possible to destroy it as it is
in use of some tenants [28]. Data backup. The data backup is also an important issue that needs to be dealt carefully. A regular data backup is
needed at the CSP side to ensure the availability and recovery of data in case of intentional and accidental disasters. More-
over, the backup storage also needs to be protected against unauthorized access and tampering [101].
3.2.3. Web application and application programming interface (API) security
As discussed in Section 1, services and applications to the cloud users are provided through the Internet [16]. In fact, it is
one of the essential requirements for a cloud application to be utilized and managed over the Web [127]. The application
provided by the CSP is always located at the cloud with users accessing it ubiquitously. One of the important characteristics
of cloud applications is that they are not bonded with specific users [101]. Different users may access the same application
possibly at the same time. The cloud applications inherit the same vulnerabilities as traditional Web applications and
technology. However, the traditional security solutions are not adequate for the cloud computing environment because
the vulnerabilities in web application in cloud can prove to be far more devastating than the traditional Web applications.
Co-location of multiple users, their data, and other resources makes it much greater issue. The top ten risks in the web appli-
cations have been identified by Open Web Application Security Project in 2013 to be the following [75].
Injection (SQL, OS, and LDAP)
Broken Authentication and Session Management
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Insecure Direct Object References
Security Misconfiguration
Sensitive Data Exposure
Missing Function Level Access Control
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Using Known Vulnerable Components
Invalidated Redirects and Forwards
The development, management, and use of Web applications must take into consideration the above given risks to safe-
guard the web applications and users resources. The user and the services in the cloud are bridged by the APIs. The security
of APIs highly influences the security and availability of the cloud services [126]. The secure APIs ensure the protected and
non-malicious use of the cloud services [11]. An API can be thought of a user guide that describes the details about the CSPs
cloud architecture and features. The users build or extend the services using the APIs [126]. The CSPs usually publish their
APIs to market the features of their cloud. At one hand, the publishing of APIs helps the users to know the details about the
components and functions of the cloud. On the other hand, the cloud architecture to some extent is exposed to the attackers
[126]. Therefore, insecure APIs can be troublesome for both the cloud and the users. The vulnerabilities of APIs include weak
credentials, insufficient authorization and input-data validation. Moreover, the frequent updates of APIs may introduce
security holes in the applications [14].
3.2.4. Identity management and access control
In a cloud environment, the confidentiality and integrity of data and services is also linked with the identity management
and access control. It is exceptionally important to keep track of the user’s identity and controlling unauthorized access to
364 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
the information [61]. The issue of identity management and access control becomes more complex in a cloud environment
due to the fact that the owner and resources are in different administrative domains and organization’s authentication and
authorization may not be exported to the cloud in the existing form [47]. Moreover, unlike the traditional IT setup, the cloud
may deal with users of different organization with different authentication and authorization frameworks, at the same time
and with the same physical resources [61]. The use of separate authentication and authorization systems for internal orga-
nization and cloud may give rise to complex situations over time [47]. The cloud services are elastic and dynamic, the IP
addresses are frequently reassigned, the services are started or re-started over shorter periods of time, pay-as-you-use
feature allows the users to join and leave cloud frequently. All these characteristics demand that conventional identity man-
agement and access control systems are not enough for the cloud environment [14]. A cloud needs a dynamic, fine-grained,
and strict access control mechanisms to control unauthorized operations within the cloud [50]. Moreover, there is need of
some control of organizations over identity management system to quickly update the access control policies in case of new-
ly joining and leaving employees [101]. The are many issues that can arise in cloud due to weak identity management and
access control, for example, denial of service by account lock-out, weak credential reset mechanisms, insufficient authoriza-
tion checks, cross domain authentication, insufficient logging and monitoring possibilities, weakness of eXtensible Access
Control Markupup Language (XACML) messages, and XML wrapping attacks.
3.3. Challenges at contractual and legal levels
Adopting the cloud computing, results in moving the organizations data and applications to the administrative control of
CSP. This brings many issues to the front, for instance, performance assurance, regulatory laws compliance, geographic juris-
dictions, monitoring of contract enforcement, etc. The aforesaid problems are related to the service level agreement (SLA),
legalities, and physical locations of the data.
3.3.1. Service level agreements
The SLA is a document that specifies the terms and conditions between the user and CSP. The SLA also indicates (a) mini-
mum performance level that CSP has to provide, (b) counteractive actions, and (c) consequences in case of breach of the
agreement between user and CSP [5]. The users must be very clear about security requirements for their assets and all
the requirement should be thoroughly agreed upon in the SLA. In case of ambiguities, it is harder to claim the loss at a
CSP. For example, if a CSP sub-contracts any service to a third party then in case of a problem it becomes hard to claim
at CSP. Accountability of a sub-contractor is often inadequate [3]. Likewise, monitoring of contract enforcement becomes
an issue because the users cannot totally rely on statistics provided by the CSP. In such a case of conflict between the CSP
and user statistics, evaluation of statistics and determination of responsibility also becomes an issue [33]. Moreover, the con-
tracts are pre-defined and non-negotiable that results in CSP friendly agreements [3]. Furthermore, audit about the security
provided by the CSP is harder to carryout and even agree upon in SLAs. For instance, it is difficult to measure that logical
segregation of different organizational data is provided to the level as promised in the SLA. A third party audit may put
the data of other organizations (that do not agree upon the audit conducting third party) to risk [3]. Enforcement of
regulatory laws, such as Health and Human Services Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and
Sarbanes-Oxely also becomes an issue [68].
3.3.2. Legal issues
Besides the technical issues presented in the preceding discussion, legal issues pertaining to the cloud computing also
arise due to presence of CSP resources in geographically different and sometimes conflicting legal jurisdictions [40]. If the
data of the user is migrated to a location having different laws, it becomes difficult for the user to configure the security
policies to comply with the new legal jurisdictions. Sometime, the data may be present in more than one location having
different laws about digital security. Moreover, in case of a dispute the issue of jurisdiction arises as to which laws would
be applicable [123,33,3]. The E-discovery poses another security issue. The E-discovery refers to an issue that arises when
the hardware of the CSP gets seized for investigations related to particular customer according to the laws of geographic
location. Such a case, results in risk of privacy breach of other users [89,33].
4. Security solutions in literature
In this section, we discuss various approaches proposed in the literature to counter the security issues discussed in Sec-
tion 3. The discussed approaches are proposed to counter either one or multiple security issues. In each category, before
going into the details of the counter measures, we describe the recommendations specified by the CSA in that particular
4.1. Counter measures for communication issues
To secure the communication and network, the CSA guidelines [21] recommend the use of a combination of virtual LANs,
IDS, IPS, and firewalls to protect the data in transit. The guidelines also focus on leakage of customers data due to a virtual
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 365
network and the use of same underlying infrastructure. The CSA recommends the use of aforementioned tools with strict
access management policies. Use of virtual devices and conventional physical devices with close-fitting assimilation with
the hypervisor is endorsed by the CSA to ensure visibility and monitoring of traffic over the virtual network.
Advanced cloud protection system (ACPS) is proposed in [67] that aim at providing greater security to the cloud
resources. The ACPS provides various security services to the CSP resources including network against attacks on user and
CSP data. The cross tenant attacks are also neutralized by constant monitoring of the VMs running at host platform.
Additionally, the ACPS also provides auditability for the actions of VMs. The ACPS is divided into multiple modules located
at the host platform. The interceptor module is responsible for detecting any suspicious activities at the host. The detected
suspicious activities are recorded by the warning recorder module and are stored in the warning pool. The assessment of
recorded activities is performed by the evaluator. An increase in rate of warning generations is treated as a security threat
that activates the actuator module for reaction according to the security policies. The ACPS computes the checksums for cri-
tical infrastructure including the network at the setup time. The state of the infrastructure is asynchronously determined by
re-computing checksum for the scrutinized objects. In case of anomalies the warnings are sent to the evaluator. The periodic
checksum verification also keeps the cloud entry points under constant monitoring. To prevent the attacks on network
infrastructure, the ACPS utilizes the method presented in [84] where network probing is detected by using IP tables and
warnings are recorded in the warning pool. In addition to securing network and other critical infrastructure, the ACPS pro-
vides security against malicious VMs and data attacks. One of the important features of the ACPS is that it remains transpar-
ent to the VMs and remains undetectable. The interceptor module does not block any system call to prevent itself being
detected. However, if the attack activity is confirmed then the action is taken. Allowing the initial system call to be executed
neutralizes the timing attacks for detection of any monitoring system. The ACPS prototype was implemented on Eucalyptus
and OpenECP that are open source cloud systems.
A security tool for the cloud computing, called CyberGuarder proposed in [59] provides virtual network security through
the deployment of virtual network devices. Moreover, virtual network isolation is introduced by utilizing layer-two tunnel
Virtual Private Network (VPN) between virtual bridges. The data is transmitted between VMs in peer-to-peer (P2P) manner
without transiting through the central server. However, the metadata is stored on the central node for optimized traffic
between the VMMs. The software ports are designed to monitor the network traffic. Conventional network security systems
like Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are adaptively deployed into the virtual network for security of applications running on
the virtual network. Additionally, the CyberGuarder also provide VM security through the integrity verification of applica-
tions and by monitoring of system calls invoked by the applications. The experimental results showed a 10% overhead in
performance due to Cyberguarder and 5% increase in the energy consumption.
Wu et al. [116] proposed a virtual network model that safeguards the virtual networks against sniffing and spoofing
attacks. The Xen hypervisor is used to demonstrate the proposed model. The proposed model utilizes both the bridge and
route modes of Xen hypervisor for virtual network configuration. In bridge mode the Xen attaches the VM directly to the
virtual Ethernet bridge. The bridge in turn connects to the physical network. The route mode creates a P2P link between
the VM and the domain 0 (the VM management domain). The proposed model is divided into three layers, namely: (a) rout-
ing, (b) firewall, and (c) shared network layer. The routing layer establishes a dedicated logical channel between virtual and
physical network. Each channel is assigned a unique logical ID that is used to monitor the source of packets originating from
the shared network. The firewall layer is responsible for safeguarding against the spoofing attacks from the shared network.
This layer guarantees that any virtual interface connected to a shared virtual network does not communicate with any other
virtual shared network. The monitoring is performed based on the logical IDs assigned by the routing layer. Secondly, fire-
wall layer does not allow the packets to update the routing table. All such packets are discarded. The shared network layer
prohibits the communication between VMs belonging to different virtual network channels.
He et al. presented a cloud network security solution in [42] by implementing a novel tree-rule firewall. The authors
demonstrated that the conventionally used listed-rule firewalls are prone to security issues of shadowed rule, swapping
positions, and redundant rules. Moreover, the listed-rule firewalls decrease performance due to sequential rule searching
and arrangement of bigger rules after the smaller rules. To remove the aforementioned problems, the authors proposed
the tree-rule firewall that arranges rules in the form of a tree instead of list. The scheme compares the first attribute of
the packet header at the root nodes of the tree and on matching node search proceeds to next level of tree. The next level
will check for the next attribute and the process continues till the firewall reaches the specified security policy for the given
attributes. The tree structure for the proposed technique is shown in Fig. 3. The sequence of attributes can be decided accord-
ing to the requirements of the system. For example in Fig. 3, the source IP can be at root with the destination IP at leaf nodes.
Authors in [72] presented a technique named DCPortalsNg for isolation of virtual networks for various VMs. The present-
ed technique follows Software-Defined Network (SDN) methodology for isolating virtual network. The DCPortalsNg interacts
with the open stack through a neutron plugin and obtains all of the required virtual network information. The DCPortalsNg
then builds its own data of mapping networks to tenant and tenants to network. Subsequently, a unique identifier is assigned
to each of the VMs. For network isolation, the concept of packet rewriting is used that opens the original packet and extracts
source and destination addresses from the packet. The packets destined for the same network are further processed while
other are discarded. In case of a valid transmission, the OpenFlow message is sent to the appropriate virtual switch to rewrite
the packet with destination/source IP addresses replaced with identifiers. Moreover, the MAC addresses are replaced by the
MAC addresses of the physical host. This avoids the cross tenant attack on the virtual network. The traffic is controlled by
366 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
MAC addresses only in the presented technique. The presented technique also prevents the cross VM denial of service (DoS)
Xing et al. [120] proposed a system called SnortFlow for intrusion prevention within cloud environment. The
SnortFlow utilizes the features of Snort and OpenFlow systems. The prototype of SnortFlow is built and tested over
Xen-based cloud. The suspicious traffic is collected by the component called snortFlow demon. The alert is pushed into
alert interpreter that analyzes the generated alert and invokes the rules generator. The rules generator develops the
rules for the suspect traffic and forwards them to the openflow device. The openflow device reconfigures the network
according to the developed rules. The evaluation of SnortFlow exhibited good performance in terms of traffic analysis
and prevention against intrusion.
Table 2 presents a summary of the schemes that are presented as countermeasure for communication issues. The
Table provides salient security features provided by the scheme and the technique used to provide the security measures.
Moreover, it also highlights the scalability of the presented work.
Fig. 3. Design of tree-rule firewall using IP address and port ranges [69].
Table 2
Comparison of techniques countering communication issues in cloud.
Work Proposed scheme Security features Basic theory Scalability
[67] Architecture for monitoring integrity of VM and
infrastructure components
Secures network and other
Avoids cross VM attacks
Auditability of VM actions
Computation of integrity checksum Moderate
[59] Application for virtual network security Secures virtual network
Secures VM
VM and network isolation
Layer-2 tunnel VPN
Virtual IDS
VM Integrity verification
System call monitoring
[116] Model for virtual network security Secures virtual network against
sniffing and spoofing
Combine bridge and route mod-
es of Xen hypervisor
Firewall component to safeguard
routing table
Logical IDs assigned to channels
[42] Cloud network security Eliminates shadowed and
redundant firewall rules
Non sequential firewall rule
Tree based rules data structure
Non sequential search to
improve performance
[72] Application for virtual network security Isolates virtual network for
every VM
Safeguards against cross tenant
DoS attack
Packet rewriting
[120] Application for intrusion prevention Safeguards against intrusions A mix of snort and OpenFlow
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 367
4.2. Counter measures for architectural issues
4.2.1. Virtualization
The VM images are entities that require high security and integrity as they specify the initial state of the VM. Moreover,
the VM images are mostly used by various and unrelated users. Therefore, the security of VM images makes the basis for the
security of the whole cloud computing system. The CSA recommends the following major measures [21] to safeguard the
cloud computing system against the vulnerabilities introduced by virtualization.
The implementers should secure each virtualized OS in each of the guest VMs.
Built in security measures should be adopted for virtualized OS.
Third party security technology should be used to cut down dependency on the CSP.
The VMs at rest should be encrypted.
Security vulnerability assessment tools should cover the virtualized environment.
VM images at rest should be patched with the latest fixes as soon as required. Moreover, the protection mechanism
should be in place until VMs are patched.
Virtualization aware security tools should be implemented and used in the cloud computing environment.
Wie et al. [113] proposed Mirage, an image management system for the cloud environment. The Mirage provides a four-
fold security to the VM images. The publishing and retrieval of the VM images is regulated by an access control framework.
The filters are applied to the images both at publishing at retrieval time to detect and remove the unwanted information. A
tracking mechanism is utilized to keep track of an image both in terms of auditability of actions and derivation. Moreover,
maintenance of repository is also provided by the Mirage. The access control is provided at check-in and checkout times.
Publishing, retrieving, and modification of VM images require proper permissions. The filters remove any leftover private
information, malware, and pirated software from the image. Maintenance services execute periodic running of malware
detection tools for the images in the repository and discovering vulnerabilities and patches. The prototype of the system
revealed better security results.
In [51], the authors proposed encrypted virtual disk images in cloud (EVDIC) that exploits encryption to secure the VM
images on the disk. The image encryption module encrypts an image whenever a VM is terminated. The EVDIC uses
advanced encryption standard (AES) with a key size of 256 bits. The key is generated by key management server (a third
party that is not a part of the cloud) through the password of the user. The encrypted image is then stored on the disk. During
retrieval, the image decrypt module interacts with the key management server to retrieve the decryption key and decrypts
the image for loading into a VM. The EVDIC also stores integrity information for the VM images. Therefore, it provides con-
fidentiality and integrity services to the VM images. Moreover, any sensitive data loaded into the image is also protected by
the proposed scheme. The authors integrated the EVDIC with OpenStack to reveal the successful interoperation.
To mitigate the vulnerabilities in VMs by patching fixes, Schwarzkopf et al. [90] proposed an approach that checks for the
outdated software and vulnerabilities in the VM images. The proposed scheme handles both live and dormant virtual
machines. Two modules work in the proposed scheme, namely: (a) update checker and (b) Online penetration suite
(OPS). The update checker keeps the record of all of the software being used by VMs in the cloud setup, the version numbers,
the update releases, etc. The VM at the time of registration is checked for software and record is kept that is matched against
installed and available packages. The matching results in detection of any obsolete software. All of the information about
software packages and the VMs is stored at the central database. Besides checking at the registration time, the update check-
er is invoked periodically to scan the VMs. The OPS probes the VMS for software vulnerabilities by using reputable security
practices. The results of the update checker and OPS are generated in the form of report to inform both the user of VM and
the system administrator. The advantage of the scheme is that the user can keep the VMS up-to-date and administrators can
have a check that outdated software does not run on their system. However, the process of updating VMs is a manual pro-
cess. The proposed technique is implemented on Xen grid engine and image creation station.
The ImageElves is another technique proposed in [48] targeted at providing updated software installs, and patches for the
VMs in the cloud. The basic working of ImageElves resembles the technique presented in [90] in that it keeps record of all the
software running on the VMs. It checks for the updates of the installed software and identifies the VMs (both dormant and
running) that need to be updated. The difference in both techniques, however, is that ImageElves automatically updates the
VMs. The ImageElves groups the similar VMs into classes and applies updates to those classes. The update is first installed on
a single VM of the class and the image of update is created alongside. In case of successful update, the image is applied to all
other VMs of that particular class. The process reduces the time consumption of each VM for proper functioning after
updates and roll backing in case of errors. The ImageElves works both on the running and dormant VM images.
An Offline Patching Scheme (OPS-offline) is introduced in [27] to identify and rectify images with outdated software and
malware vulnerabilities. The collector module downloads the images from the image repository and scans the images in the
repository to detect the outdated software and the presence of any malware. The patcher module runs after the collector to
patch the rectified vulnerabilities. The scheme works only on dormant images in the image repository. The OPS-offline is
implemented on OpenStack Glance image repository. Table 3 presents the comparative summary of the presented schemes
for VM image security.
368 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
A VM needs to be protected against attacks not only in repository but also needs to be secured during execution time. The
authors in [58] proposed an architecture that provides a secure runtime virtualization environment to a VM. The proposed
architecture assumes management domain (Dom0) of Xen virtualization structure to be untrusted alongside conventional
attackers. The mechanism to handle untrusted Dom0 amplifies the security level of the runtime environment of a VM.
The security mechanism proposed in [58] prohibits any memory access from Dom0 to DomU (user domain) using foreign
mapping. Any memory access to the DomU is allowed after the grant of permissions by the DomU. Moreover, all the memory
accesses from Dom0 to DomU are continuously monitored by the hypervisor. If the memory pages and vCPU contain private
information of DomU, the hypervisor make sure that they are encrypted. Therefore, the Dom0 has only encrypted view of
confidential memory regions. The hypervisor checks the integrity of the DomU state after every management function
executed by the Dom0. The restart of VM is only allowed if the integrity checks are valid. The proposed architecture provides
confidentiality, integrity, and availability services for VMs during execution phase.
The idea of decoupling the security and VM management to protect the runtime environment of the VM is utilized in
CloudVisor [129]. A CloudVisor is a light weight security module that works beneath VMM using nested virtualization. A
CloudVisor provides privacy and integrity to the VM resources (CPU, memory, and I/O devices) during execution. All the con-
trol transitions between VMM and VMs are intercepted by the CloudVisor to perform security operations. For example, the
CloudVisor may hide the general purpose registers (by encrypting) from the VMM, while exposing only the necessary ones. A
CloudVisor also monitors the address translation to enforce memory isolation. A VMM is prohibited to overwrite the extend-
ed page table for any VM in case of a mismatch between the page ownership and the page table. Moreover, in case of afore-
said mismatch it encrypts the contents of the page table. The encryption is performed over the virtual disk owned by a VM to
protect its contents. The encryption and decryption is performed for every disk I/O by a VM. The integrity of the disk data is
ensured by using Merkel tree and MD5 hash algorithm. The integrity of CloudVisor is also ensured using Trusted Platform
Module (TPM).
The encryption and integrity checks have also been used in [118] to provide a secure runtime environment to the VMs in a
cloud environment. The proposed scheme in [118], named HyperCoffer, also separates the security from the tasks of VM
management as was proposed in [129]. The HyperCoffer trusts only the processor chip and considers everything else as
the untrusted components. The HyperCo_er involves both the hardware and software to protect VMs in execution. The
secure processor technology is used to encrypt memory data. The Address Independent Seed Encryption (AISE) and Merkle
tree are used for encryption and integrity checking, respectively. To avoid cross VM attacks on data in cache, each cache line
is tagged with a unique VM identifier Like CloudVisor, the HyperCoffer also secures the control transitions between VMM
and VMs through encryption and integrity functions and exposes only the necessary information to VMM or other VM.
The control transitions are monitored and secured by the software portion called VM-shim that works between the hyper-
visor and VMs. The encryption and decryption on disk and network I/O is also performed by the VM-shim. Besides privacy
and integrity, the HyperCoffer also provides security against VM rollback by using logging and auditing. The proposed model
is implemented and tested on QEMU full-system emulator.
The authors in [46] proposed CloudSec that monitors the VMs physical memory externally by using VM Introspection
(VMI) technique. The CloudSec reenacts and screens the vigorously changing kernel data structures to detect and prevent
against kernel data rootkits. Upon launching of a VM, the Cloud Sec identifies the memory layout of the VMs hardware
by inspecting the control registers of the VMs CPU. Afterwards, the CloudSec requests for Kernel Structure Definition
(KSD) through the hypervisor (a hypervisor is assumed to be a trusted entity in the CloudSec). After the specification of
Table 3
Comparison of presented techniques for securing VM images.
Work Proposed scheme Handled
Privacy Integrity Access
Scalability Other features
[113] Mirage, a VM image
management system
Dormant UU U U High Auditability
[51] EVDIC, for VM
image’s privacy and
Dormant UU U Dormant
Medium -
[90] A scheme for patch
management for VM
UHigh Reports CSP
about vulnerable
[48] ImageElves, for
patch management
for VM images
ULow Automatic
updating of
[27] OPS-offline, for
patch management
for VM images
Dormant U U Low Automatic
updating of
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 369
KSD, the CloudSec maps the physical memory bytes (obtained through hypervisor) to the KSD that generates the operating
system (OS) view of the live VM. Afterwards, the memory access and time based triggers are installed by the CloudSec on the
memory pages that need to be monitored. The generated OS view is used by the defense modules of the CloudSec. In case of
access request for the monitored memory page, the defense module halts the execution of the VM, loads the required pages
to KSD and evaluates the KSD for security in the new state.
Another VMI based technique to monitor the execution of VM externally, called exterior, is proposed in [31]. Exterior is a
dual VM architecture that launches a Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) for executing a guest virtual machine (GVM). The SVM
executes the kernel that is similar to the kernel of GVM. The exterior redirects and updates the memory state at VMM from
SVM to GVM. This result in the modification of the GVM and gives the effect that program is being run in the GVM. All the
programs can be run entirely exterior to the OS. The kernel data rootkit attacks and intrusions are detected by introspection
of code in the SVM. In case any hidden malicious process or device driver is detected, it is removed from the GVM. The
inspection utility is used in the SVM to introspect the code of GVM.
In a cloud environment, VMs are migrated between different physical locations and cloud facilities due to various factors,
such as, load balancing, physical machine failures, energy savings, and hardware/software up gradations. The VM migration
poses different security issues as discussed in Section 3.2 and, therefore, requires high security considerations. In the follow-
ing we present techniques presented in the literature that handle VM migration. A comparative analysis of the schemes to
provide secure execution of VMs is presented in Table 4.
Aslam et al. [9] presented a VM migration technique that allows VM migration only if the destination platform is secure
up to the user defined level. The proposed technique rests on the foundations of trusted computing. A Trust Assurance Level
(TAL) is introduced that specifies the trust level of the cloud platform. The TAL is computed using the credentials of the TPM
and additionally the Trust Token credential that is proposed by the authors. The TPM credentials measure the trust level of
hardware while Trust Token specifies the trust level of the software stack. The user specifies the required TAL (least, low,
average, normal, high) during the VM launch process. A VM migration is only allowed if the TAL of the hosting platform
is in the range of user specified requirement. The process can also be applied at the time of VM launch to guarantee the
TAL of hosted platform. The authors assume Platform Trust Assurance Authority (PTAA) as a third party for trust certification.
The proposed technique also lets the user to audit the TAL of the platform after VM migration to assure that his requirements
are met.
The trusted computing technology has also been used by authors in [109] for secure intra-cloud migration of VMs. The
authors not only ensure the integrity of the destination platform but also secure the migrating contents on the communi-
cation channel. The authors used a Virtual TPM (vTPM) bound with a VM that certifies the integrity of the VM. The vTPM
is also migrated along with the VM to ensure the integrity of the VM during the migration process. Property based remote
attestation is used to verify the integrity and security conditions of the remote host before migration. Afterwards, the source
and destination hosts established a tunnel trusted channel by mutual authentication and establishment of a session key. The
transfer of VM and vTPM is carried on the established trusted channel. The same channel can be used for transfer of multiple
VMs. The cryptographic mechanisms are used to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and freshness of the transmitted data.
Authors in [22] also utilized trusted computing for secure VM-vTPM migration. The security for migration is provided by
using the key hierarchy of vTPM in [22].
Table 4
Comparison of techniques dealing with VM security during execution.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory Privacy Integrity Kernel
Scalability Other features
[33] Secure runtime environment for VM Cryptography
Access control
UU Low Availability
[129] CloudVisor, Secure runtime
environment for VM
Decoupling of security and
VM management tasks
Nested virtualization
Trusted computing
UU High Security of
Cloudvisor itself
[118] HyperCoffer, Secure runtime
environment for VM
Decoupling of security and
VM management tasks
Trusted computing
UU High Security against VM
[46] CloudSec, an approach to detect and
prevent memory based kernel
Bridging of semantic gap
between external and inter-
nal VMI
Construction of KSD
-- ULow Live migration of
VM in
certain situations
[31] Exterior, A dual VM architecture to
secure VM execution
Use of dual-VM for program
U-ULow Intrusion
Removal of
malicious code
370 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
The authors in [7] used multiple basic theories to propose a framework for secure live migration of VMs and to provide
other security services, such as, privacy and integrity. The trusted computing is used for attestation and integrity verification
of source and destination platforms. The attestation and integrity verification ensure that the VM is not migrated to a com-
promised host. The framework proposed in [7] also used role based access control policies to ensure security against VM
hopping and useless migrations. The encryption and digital signature are used to protect data confidentiality and integrity
during the VM transmission. A per-VM firewall (IP-table rules) is also implemented to control the communication of VM
with other components. The proposed framework also introduced the host based firewall and intrusion detection system
to provide network security for the overall host platform. The proposed framework was implemented on Xen hypervisor.
The authors in [105] proposed a framework that migrate not only the VM but the security context is also migrated to the
destination host. The proposed framework migrates both the static and dynamic security contexts to ensure the same secu-
rity status for a VM on the destination host as was present at the source. The migration of a VM is coordinated by the migra-
tion manager module that ensures the migration of all of the relevant information (VM state and security context state) to
the destination. At first, the security context manager module migrates the static security context state, followed by the
migration of VM state information by the VM state migrator module. The final phase is the migration of the dynamic security
context to the destination host by the security context migrator. The proposed framework provides the same level of privacy
and integrity at the destination as that of source host. However, it is not clear that how the information is secured during
communication from source to destination. Table 5 presents the summarized properties of the discussed schemes dealing
with the VM migration.
Hypervisor or VMM is software that essentially manages and controls the virtualization in a cloud computing system. The
prime status of the VMM also makes it a key target for attacks. A compromised hypervisor can subvert the whole system.
Therefore, the security of the hypervisor needs distinctive focus. In the following, we detail some of the solutions in the lit-
erature that aim at securing the hypervisor.
Zhang et al. [130] presented a framework named HyperCheck to ensure a secure execution of the hypervisor. The Hyper-
Check is a hardware assisted framework that uses the CPU system management mode (SMM) of x86 architecture for viewing
the CPU and memory state of the machine. The SMM resides in the BIOS and is made inaccessible from other CPU modes. The
SMM module reads and verifies the contents of the CPU registers of the protected hypervisor. The CR3 and IDTR registers are
focused primarily as they play central role in rootkit detection. The PCI network card is utilized to read the physical memory.
The driver for the PIC network card is handled in the SMM module to avoid any attack. The memory contents and the results
of CPU registers verification are sent to a separate machine called monitor machine (that acts as a trusted third party). The
analysis module on the monitor machine analyses the memory contents based on the linearity, stability, and perpetuity
properties. Moreover, the complete snapshot is compared with the initial snapshot of the hypervisor. In case of any malicious
activities, human operators are notified. The transmission of the contents to the monitor machine is performed through
secure connection. The key for transmission is managed by the monitor machine. The HyperCheck was implemented both
for open and closed source BIOS. The proposed framework showed detection and defense capabilities against rootkit, code
and data integrity, DoS, and evasion attacks.
The large code base of the hypervisors broadens the attack surface of the hypervisors. The larger the code, the greater the
number of points, that can be used to attack the hypervisor. The situation aggravates with the fact that the hypervisor runs in
privileged mode. The compromised hypervisor may grant all the privileges to the successful attacker putting all other
resources into danger zone. The authors in [115] utilized the principle of least privilege to reduce the attack surface of hyper-
visor and to ensure the security of other system components and resources. The proposed scheme divides the hypervisor
(KVM was used to implement a proof-of-concept prototype) into two major components. The de-privileged DeHype compo-
nent, that is decoupled from the OS and is executed in the user mode. The dependency decoupling is performed by dividing
the code of the hypervisor into smaller modules. The modules that require little or no interaction with the OS are moved to
de-privileged DeHype. The portions that require host OS for functionalities, were replaced by the user-mode equivalents.
Table 5
Comparison of techniques for secure VM Migration.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory Privacy Integrity Scalability Other features
[9] Secure and trust preserving VM
migration mechanism
Trusted computing
Remote auditing
UU Medium Novel credentials for trust level
[109] Protocol for vTPM based VM
Trusted computing
Remote auditing
Tunneled communication
UU Medium Data freshness
[22] Protocol for VM-vTPM migration Trusted Computing UU Medium Migration initiation
[7] Framework for secure live VM
Trusted computing
Role based access control
UU Medium Security against
VM hopping
Useless migrations
[105] Framework for security context and
VM migration
Migration of security context to
ensure security
UU High -
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 371
Moreover, the portions of the code that were not possible to move to user-mode, were kept privileged in a separate module
called HypeLet. The aforementioned strategy resulted in movement of approximately 93% of the hypervisor code into user
mode causing the reduction of hypervisor attack surface. The DeHype greatly reduces the risk of system subversion as most
of the hypervisor code does not have privileges. Even the compromised hypervisor will not let the attacker take full control of
the system. Moreover, the data leakage to the user space from the kernel space is avoided as the calls in DeHype are executed
as a user space function call.
The authors in [111] adopted a similar approach to reduce the attack surface by providing an isolated runtime environ-
ment for hypervisor execution. The proposed scheme called HyperLock provides an isolated address space than the host OS
and with the limited instruction set. The proposed strategy restricts the hypervisor to obtain direct access of the host system.
Any access to the host system is regulated and mediated by the HyperLock. Moreover, the authors in [111] proposed hyper-
visor shadowing technique to further safeguard the VMs running on the host system. Shadow hypervisors are created and
each of the VMs is paired with a separate shadow hypervisor. Therefore, a compromised hypervisor will only affect the
paired VM keeping the other VMs on the host secure. The HyperLock also removes the Quick EMUlator (QEMU, a user
program of KVM hypervisor) from the trusted computing base greatly reducing the attack surface. The prototype was imple-
mented with KVM hypervisor.
Pan et al. [76] also reduce the trusted computing base and restrict the functionality of hypervisor in root mode for secur-
ing the hypervisor and running VMs. The proposed methodology makes use of the hardware extensions for virtualization in
modern processors. The authors also divide the functionality of hypervisor into sub modules, namely: (a) Guestvisor and (b)
Splitvisor. The Guestvisor runs in non-root mode excluding it from trusted computing base. The Splitvisor executes in root
mode and is responsible for isolating multiple Guestvisors. The Guestvisor emulates the hardware for the VMs. The users can
add and exclude functions (a hypervisor code is split into small functions) from the Guestvisor so as to avoid vulnerabilities
due to unwanted functions.
The authors in [102] presented a design that does not reduce the hypervisor attack surface. Instead, it eliminates the
hypervisor attack surface completely. The authors claim to implement a prototype in which multiple VMs can be run with
the hypervisor. The management of the resources is accomplished either by the extended hardware capabilities or by the
tiny system management software. The system named NoHype [102] is based on the following key ideas, (a) pre-allocation
of the memory and cores, (b) use of virtualized I/O devices only, (c) system discovery process at the boot time of VM OS, and
(d) avoiding indirections. The pre-allocation of resources eliminates the need of hypervisor to dynamically manage them.
The use of virtualized I/O devices eliminates the need of emulating them. The modern hardware capabilities are used in
NoHype to isolate the resources of multiple VMs from each other, for example, the hardware paging mechanism in modern
processors. The guest OS is marginally modified to check for available system configuration and resources. This scan is only
allowed at the boot up time with a temporary hypervisor so as to avoid any attack from user by executing malicious code.
After the scan the temporary hypervisor is disabled. The indirections are avoided because of the dedicated cores and the
hardware for the guest VM. The NoHype removes the hypervisor layer altogether, still providing the multitenant architecture
by running VMs. The proposed strategy relies on the hardware capabilities to ensure isolation between VMs. Table 6 presents
a comparative analysis of the detailed techniques for hypervisor security.
Besides the techniques presented in Table 1–6, we briefly go through some techniques handling different aspects of vir-
tualization security, in the following text. The authors in [119] proposed a methodology to defend against the VM rollback
Table 6
Comparison of presented strategies for secure hypervisor.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory VM
Scalability Other feature(s)
[130] HyperCheck, a hardware assisted
integrity monitor
Hypervisor state monitoring
through third party
Secure transmission of VMM
Low Data and code integrity
Security against Rootkit DoS,
and evasion attacks
[115] DeHype, a technique to reduce
hypervisor attack surface
Least privilege principle
Dependency decoupling
between VMM and host OS
Reduction of TCB
UMedium Prevents data leakage from kernel
to user space
[111] HyperLock, for isolating hypervisor
from host OS
Shadow hypervisor for every VM
Controlled access to host system
Reduction of TCB
UMedium Exclusion of QEMU from
[76] SplitVisor, for reducing root mode
Reduced functionality in root
Modern hardware virtualization
Reduction of TCB
UMedium -
[102] NoHype, for virtualization without
Elimination of hypervisor
Pre-allocation of Resources
Use of virtualized I/O only
No indirections
Medium -
372 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
attack by secure logging and auditing of VM operations (suspend, resume, migration). At the start of each operation the hash
of the VM snapshot is calculated over its registers, memory contents, and image disk. The hash value at each state is subse-
quently used for later activation of the snapshot. A similar mechanism of logging and auditing to protect against the VM roll-
back is also used in [118]. Ref. [100] provides a mechanism (HyperShot) for secure snapshots of a VM by ensuring the
integrity of the snapshots. The HyperShot uses TPM-based attestation, digital signature, trusted initialization of hypervisor
to ensure the integrity of the snapshot and the hypervisor. To protect the private information from leakage due to rollback
phenomenon, the authors in [32] proposed SPARC. The SPARC is secure check pointing mechanism that allows the users to
exclude those processes and terminal applications from being check pointed that process the private information. By avoid-
ing the check pointing of confidential information, the SPARC essentially reduces the life time of private information. The
authors in [44] also proposed a strategy named Privacy-Preserving Checkpointing (PPC) for exclusion of confidential infor-
mation from check points.
The PPC tracks the confidential information by information flow analysis and at time of snapshot, removes the confiden-
tial information. The authors of [77] leveraged the execution path analysis for introducing resilience in the cloud computing
system. Execution path analysis allows the hypervisor to trace the VM state and avoid the VM to reach a faulty state. The
proposed technique (CloRExPa) in [77] keeps track of execution and analyzes system behavior through meditation.
4.2.2. Data/storage security solutions
The following major recommendations of the CSA [21] are presented regarding the data security and key management.
The key management should be performed by either the organizations/users themselves or by a trusted cryptographic
service from a credible source.
The best practices regarding the key management and encryption products from reliable sources should be used.
It is recommended to use off-the-shelf-technology where possible.
The key scope should be maintained at the individual or group level.
The use of standard algorithms is recommended and proprietary encryption algorithms are discouraged.
Wei et al. [114] presented SecCloud, a storage security protocol that not only secures the user data uploaded into the
cloud but also secures the computations performed on the user data. The SecCloud uses encryption for achieving the storage
security. The bilinear pairing (with cyclic additive and multiplicative groups) is used to generate keys for the user, cloud, and
a trusted third party. The user gets the storage space from the CSP to store data. The data (divided into m number of mes-
sages) is signed by the trusted third party (called the verification agency). The data along with the verifiable signatures is
sent to the cloud by encrypting with the session key. The session key is calculated through Bilinear Deffie-Hellman both
by the user and the cloud. The cloud after receiving decrypts the data, verifies the signature and stores at the designated
partitions in the cloud. The computational security is ensured against partial computation and use of invalid data to save
computational cost. It also verifies that data is stored at the correct partitions in the cloud. For the computation security
the SecCloud utilizes Merkle hash tree. The computational results are verified by the verifying agency by rebuilding the Mer-
kle tree. To reduce the computational redundancy, the verifier does not build the whole tree but uses probabilistic sampling.
The author in [98] used a combination of established and specialized procedures besides additional proposed steps to
secure the data in the cloud. The proposed scheme allows the user to rate the requirement of confidentiality, availability,
and integrity between values of one to ten (1–10). The values are used to determine Sensitivity Rating (SR) of the user data.
Based on the SR value, the data is allotted space in one of the three proposed partitions in the cloud. The proposed partitions
are public, private, and limited access partitions. The SR value above eight assigns data to limited access partition and below
value three to public partition. The data is encrypted with 128-bit SSL encryption and MAC is appended afterwards. An index
is also prepared and encrypted to employ searching capabilities over encrypted data. The data and index are sent to the cloud
where they are stored depending on the SR value. The download is allowed based on user authentication that is carried out
cooperatively by data owner and the cloud. The data in the public partition needs no authentication. The data is transmitted
over SSL in both the directions.
To ensure the quality of the cloud storage, integrity and availability of data in the cloud, authors in [110] proposed effec-
tual methodology that supports on-demand data correctness verification. The proposed methodology conducts the verifica-
tion of the cloud data correctness without explicit knowledge of the whole data. The erasure correcting code and
homomorphic tokens are used for the aforesaid purpose. The homomorphic token are pre-computed by the user and data
is fragmented and stored redundantly across the cloud servers. To verify data correctness, a challenge containing random
data blocks indices is transmitted to the cloud. The cloud computes the response and sends back to the user where decision
is made based on the comparison of received result with the pre-computed tokens. Additionally, the proposed scheme per-
forms error localization by detecting the misbehaving server. Moreover, insertion, deletion, modification, and appending of
data blocks is supported in the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme secures the cloud storage against integrity attacks,
Byzantine failures, and server colluding attacks. The authors in [60] utilized the concept of proxy re-encryption in addition to
erasure correcting codes to provide resident and forwarding data security.
The File Assured Deletion (FADE) protocol that furnishes key management along with the data privacy and integrity is
proposed in [103]. The FADE is a light weight protocol that uses both the symmetric and asymmetric encryption. The
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 373
symmetric keys are protected by using Shamirs (k;nÞscheme to ample the trust level in the key. The FADE works with a
group of key managers (KM) that act as a trusted third party. The data key (KÞis used to encrypt a file Fof the client. Another
symmetric key S is used to encrypt K. The public/private key pair generated by KMs is represented by (e
Þand is used to
encrypt S. A policy file Ppostulates the policies under which access to the file is valid. In order to upload the data, a user
requests the KM to generate a key pair by sending P. The KM generates public/private key pair associated with the Pand
transmits public part to the user. The user encrypts the file with randomly generated Kand encrypts Kwith Sthat is further
encrypted with the public key generated by the KM. The MAC is also calculated with the integrity key. The whole encrypted
package is stored at the cloud along with the P. For decryption all the data is downloaded from the cloud and Sis sent to the
KM for decryption through blinded RSA. Upon decryption of S other keys and subsequently Fis decrypted. The FADE also
supports policy renewal and revocation. Upon the expiration of the policy the KM deletes the corresponding keys and P
through secure overwriting that makes the data inaccessible and therefore assuredly deleted. The working of FADE is depict-
ed in Fig. 4.
The encryption of data before outsourcing to the cloud ensures the privacy of the data but poses certain restriction.
The restrictions are specific to the situations where data is to be shared among the group and/or requires forwarding.
Such an environment is accompanied with frequent user revocations that require the re-encryption of data with changed
keys for avoiding data leakage to the revoked user. Liu et al. [64] proposed a time based proxy re-encryption combined
with Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) to support secure data sharing in group along with the fine grained access con-
trol. The proposed scheme (TimePRE) ensures that data is securely forwarded to the group users and deals with the user
revocation. Unlike other proxy re-encryption schemes, the TimePRE does not require the data owner to be online for
user revocation and generation of new re-encryption keys. The TimePRE associates the time period with every user
and upon expiration of the time period the user is automatically revoked by the CSP. A pre-shared master key between
the data owner and the CSP allows the CSP to generate the re-encryption keys. The access control is ensured by use of
ABE that identifies user by set of attributes rather than identity. The ABE in TimePRE uses eligible time periods for a user
along with other attributes to identify a user. The proposed scheme ensures privacy and availability of the data within
the group. However, it does not focus on the data integrity. Table 7 presents the comparison of the methodologies pre-
sented in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.3. Security solutions for cloud applications and APIs
The cloud applications and APIs on the SaaS and PaaS layers require special security attention to have secure development
and execution life cycle. The cloud security alliance [21] recommends that the security to the cloud applications and APIs
must be provided without any assumption about the external environment. The following are the focal recommendations
by the CSA with respect to cloud applications and APIs.
Security and privacy requirements (both functional and regulatory) should be defined in accordance to the needs of the
cloud development and deployment. The defined requirements should also be in the order based on the impact and
The risks and attack vectors specific to the cloud computing must be explored and assimilated into the security require-
ments. The risk models and attack models should be continuously built and maintained.
The secure software development life cycle and software architecture should be developed and maintained.
The re-useable software components that are known to alleviate the known security and breach scenarios should be used.
Fig. 4. System architecture of FADE protocol [103].
374 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
Regular penetration testing for web applications should be carried out.
Manual tests must be carried out periodically to ensure secure session management of web applications.
To protect the cloud applications from unauthorized access, the authors in [91] proposed the use of Diameter-AAA
protocol. The diameter-AAA employs network based access control to filter the illegitimate access request to the cloud
applications. All the requests, initially received by the network access server, are forwarded to the diameter server. The
server checks for the authentication and authorization parameters and based on the results the access is granted or denied
for the requested application. Besides authentication and authorization the diameter protocol also provides the accounting
services within the cloud.
Alowolodu et al. [6] proposed the use of TPM and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to provide a secure platform for appli-
cation execution in the cloud. The keys are generated by using ECC and are stored in the TPM configuration registers. The
integrity of the platform is ensured before moving any application to it. The proposed methodology also recommends the
use of encryption while moving applications between platforms. The integrity of the application is checked at the destination
platform before launching.
The authors in [45] proposed the provision of Security as a Service (SECaaS) in the cloud environment. The SECaaS rec-
ommends the security services provided by different clouds and an in dependent cloud (manager cloud) that keeps track
of these services. The user specifies the security requirements to the manager cloud that identifies the cloud(s) providing
those services. The user application is then registered with the security providing clouds that provide security services.
The SECaaS works at all levels (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) and secures the services.
Ref. [117] proposed an API management platform for the cloud that provides access control architecture for the cloud
APIs. The access control in the proposed platform is based on the OAuth (Open Authorization) that is token based access con-
trol mechanism. The token based access control uses tokens instead of user credentials in order to access the resources. The
applications can use token on behalf of the user. In the proposed scheme, the API provider registers and publishes the API
with the API management platform and obtains a key for validating the tokens. An API consumer requests for access token
from the API management platform that is granted along with a key after validating the request. Both the keys, issued to API
provider and consumer, are the private keys. The consumer calls the API by using the token signed with its private key. The
provider sends the token to the API management platform for validation. If valid, the access is granted to the consumer.
Table 8 presents the summary of the presented techniques.
Table 7
Comparison of techniques presented for secure cloud storage.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory Privacy Integrity Availability Scalability Other feature(s)
[114] SecCloud, a protocol for
storage security and
Bilinear pairing
Trusted third party
Signature verification
UU Medium Computational audit
[98] A scheme for security of
resident data
SSL symmetric encryption UU U Low Access control
Searchable encryption
[110] A methodology for security
of resident data
Erasure correcting Code
Data redundancy
UU Medium Secure against
Byzantine Failures
Server colluding
[103] FADE, a protocol for data
privacy and integrity
Trusted third party
Assured deletion
Threshold secret sharing
UU High Access Control
Assured deletion
[64] TimePRE, a scheme for
secure data sharing in cloud
Proxy re-encryption
Attribute based encryption
UMedium Access control
Table 8
Comparison of strategies proposed for security of cloud applications and APIs.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory Security features Scalability
[91] Access control for cloud applications Diameter protocol Authentication
[6] Scheme for ensuring application integrity in cloud Trusted platform module
Elliptic curve cryptography
Application integrity
Platform integrity
[45] Security as a service for cloud applications Security as a service in clouds As offered by security service by clouds Low
[117] API management platform for secure cloud APIs Token based open
Access control Medium
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 375
4.2.4. Identity management and access control
Access control and identity management in cloud environment is highly needed to make the cloud computing adopted by
the community, according to CSA. The CSA recommends the following key points for access control and identity
Open standard federations, for example, SAML and OAuth, should be preferred if possible.
The source of the attributes should be as close to master source as possible.
The attributes should be validated at master source or as close as possible.
All characteristics of the entities should have an identified trust level.
Bi-directional trust should be ensured for secure relationship and transactions.
The services should have import/export function into standards such as XACML and OASIS.
The Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) has been employed to provide access control in the cloud environment that speci-
fies and enforces the access control policies cryptographically. The ABE was introduced in [92] and associates the encrypted
messages using the attributes and decryption can be performed by users possessing those attributes. Attribute Set Based
Encryption (ASBE) [13], an extension of the ABE, categorizes user attributes into a recursive set based arrangement and
allows users to enforce dynamic constraints on how those attributes mutually fulfills access control policy. The authors in
[108] extended the ASBE to present Hierarchical Attribute-Set-Based Encryption (HASBE) that utilizes hierarchical user
structure. The HASBE assumes a hierarchy of users with trusted authority as root level authority. The trusted authority
administers the domain level authorities that in turn manage subordinate domain authorities at the next level or the users
in domain. The domain is trusted by the sub domain authorities or users in a similar fashion as in the certification authority’s
hierarchy. The trusted authority generates and distributes the system parameters and root master key to the domain autho-
rities. The keys are generated using bilinear multiplicative groups. The system parameter includes the parameters to gener-
ate the groups. The public/private keys issued to the users by the domain authorities are hierarchical tree structures with
each element being an attribute or set of attributes. The access control is also defined as a hierarchical tree structure. The
data is encrypted with the data encryption key. The data encryption key is protected with the HASBE using the access
key structure that specifies the access control policies and attributes. An expiration time is added to the access key structure
for user revocation purposes. The access for decryption is granted to the users satisfying the attributes and policies in the
access key structure. The HASBE ensures access control only for the cloud data. Fig. 5 represents the system model for HASBE.
Ruj et al. [86] proposed a decentralized approach for authentication and controlling access to the cloud storage. The pro-
posed scheme in [86] makes use of ABE and the Attribute Based Signature (ABS) for access control and anonymous authen-
tication, respectively. The anonymous authentication allows the user authentication without revealing the user identity. The
signature is computed and verified based on the attributes that eliminates the requirement of identity for authentication.
The scheme also makes use of a trusted third party that issues tokens to the users. The users present the tokens to the
Key Distribution Center (KDC). The KDC issues the encryption/decryption and signing keys based on bilinear pairing. The
user encrypts the data, signs, and transmits it to the cloud. The cloud verifies the signature that is attribute based and stores
the data in case of valid user. The user revocation is dealt by changing the encryption parameters of all such data that has
attributes similar to that of the revoked user.
The authors in [122] proposed Role Based Multi-tenancy Access Control (RB-MTAC) scheme that combines identity
management and role based access control. The scheme requires the users to register with the cloud and obtain unique
ID. The user sets the password during registration process. To enter the cloud, a user has to pass through identity manage-
ment module that identifies the user on the basis of registered identity credentials. After identity verification the user is
directed to the role assignment module that connects to the RB-MTAC database and assigns roles to the user based on
registered role information. All the resources are accessed by the user through the RB-MTAC module that maintains the
access control lists for resources.
Fig. 5. System model for HASBE [108].
376 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
The authors in [19] presented a digital identity management system named Simple Privacy-preserving Identity-Manage-
ment for Cloud Environment (SPICE). The SPICE exploits the concept of group signature and randomization for providing the
anonymous authentication (to prove user authenticity without revealing identity), delegatable authentication, unlinkability
(CSPs are unable to link the transactions of the same user), accountability, and user centric access control. Moreover, the
SPICE provides the aforementioned properties with only a single registration. The user registers with a trusted party called
the registrar and obtains a single credential for all the services provided by the CSP. The user generates an authentication
certificate from the obtained credentials. As different CSPs require different attributes to authenticate, the user can generate
different version of authentication certificate from the same credential. The group signatures are used over the certificates
for authentication. The SPICE extends the Waters signature [112] and Groth-Sahai proof system [34] for group signature. The
group signature authenticates the user by ensuring that the signature is from a valid user of the group with the need of the
identity. Randomization is applied to the signatures for providing unlinkability. Randomization is also used to hide the attri-
butes that are not required by any particular CSP.
Dhungana et al. [23] presented an identity management framework for the cloud networking infrastructure that is
centered on User Managed Access (UMA) protocol. The infrastructure in the proposed scheme is seen as the Authorization
Manager (AM). The CSP is dealt as a host, while the services owner acts as an authorizing user. The services are controlled by
the AM. The requesting users’ identities are also managed by the AM. Any request to the services is mediated by the AM that
can grant or deny resource according to the access control policies. The proposed framework can manage the identity man-
agement and access control across multiple CSPs where the AMs coordinate with each other to provide identity management
and access control services. The highlights of presented techniques are tabulated in Table 9.
4.2.5. Contractual and legal level solutions
There is a calamitous need of standardized procedures for SLA management with security perspective to assuage the
security issues related to SLA and geographic legalities. The (web services agreement) ws-agreement [8] defines the syntax
and semantics of publicizing the competences of the service providers and to create the template based agreements, and to
monitor the agreement acquiescence. The ws-agreement mainly captures the agreement based on quality of service. The
security constraints are not semantically netted for risk quantification in ws-agreement. Hale and Gamble [36] extended
the ws-agreement to propose a framework, SecAgreement that articulates the security parameters and services for provision
in the SLA. The SecAgreement extends the template of the ws-agreement to incorporate security constraints and metrics into
the terms of SLA. The extended template also integrates the elements that quantify the risks of using specific cloud services.
The authors in [36] also proposed an algorithm that sorts the services based on the risk they incur for customer. Based on the
extensions in ws-agreement the users can quantify the risk of using the services of any CSP and opt for the cloud services that
fulfill the security requirements.
In a cloud environment, the user assets are exposed to extreme risk in case of violation of security SLA or cancelation of
any of the security services. The authors in [37] proposed a method react to the SLA violations (pertaining to the security) or
service cancelation to reduce the security risks in post violation/cancelation environment. The methodology is centered on
an algorithm that performs risk-aware renegotiation. The algorithm utilizes the risk weighted services of [36] to determine a
service with the minimum risk that fulfills the organizational need. The algorithm performs the renegotiation and scrutinizes
the obtainable services at runtime as a replacement to the canceled or problematic service. The algorithm updates the risk
evaluation according to the changes in the SLA. The algorithm is capable of negotiating cloud federations to lower the risk
and ensure optimal fulfillment of customer’s security needs.
Rak et al. [79] delineated the SPECS, an architecture to provide the SLA-based security as a service. The proposed archi-
tecture divides and focuses on three stages of the SLA life cycle, namely: (a) negotiation, (b) enforcement, and (c) monitoring.
The employed approach includes security parameters in the SLA to let the end user judge the security offerings and require-
ments. The attachment of security parameters with the SLA also makes it mandatory for the CSP to provide explicit security.
The SPECS articulates the architecture only and makes use of established work to carry out the phases of the SLA life cycle.
For example, the SPEC recommends the use of ws-agreement or SecAgreement during negotiation phase. During the enforce-
ment phase, the SPEC recommends the enforcement either by activating parameters at system startup time or by monitoring
and reporting. Likewise, for monitoring the m-OSAIC-based framework can be used in monitoring phase.
Ref. [38] built a compliance vocabulary and used ontologies to automate the process of negotiation and selection of better
security parameters for the SLA. The vocabulary is populated with the set of SLA security terms and the associated security
controls that fulfill the corresponding security requirements. The SLA security terms are selected from various standard
documents, for instance, NIST, the common criteria, the CSA, etc. The vocabulary is represented as an XML schema. The
vocabulary allows the organizations to compare the security services of different CSPs at a glance. The scheme in [38] also
built an ontology that is used to provide automated selection and negotiation. The ontologies used the concept of service
matchmaking to differentiate between different offerings. The scheme is compatible with current SLA frame works, for
instance, ws-agreement. The presented research in context of legal and contractual issues is summarized in Table 10.
The vendors having data centers at various geographic locations usually migrate the user data and application between
locations. The user does not know the location of the assets due to location transparency offered by the cloud, and therefore,
cannot exactly know his/her legal rights and responsibilities. Moreover, there might be some locations that are unwanted by
the user. Although nothing can be done by the user or the CSP about the laws of the land but user can be given the option
during SLA negotiation to mark places that he does not want to migrate his/her assets. This way compliance with the laws
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 377
can be managed in more effective manner. Moreover, the users and the CSP must have mutual understanding about the roles
and responsibilities of each other. Similar recommendations are made by the CSA to deal with the legal issues regarding
cloud computing.
5. Security issues in MCC
A ubiquitous access to the cloud computing allows the mobile devices to connect and use the traditional cloud computing
services. However, unlike the normal computing machines, the mobile devices are resource constrained [55]. The precincts
of low processing power, less storage capacity, limited energy, and capricious internet connectivity does not allow compute
and storage mandating applications to run on mobile devices [29]. The aforementioned limitations served as motivation for a
new computing paradigm called MCC that enhances the abilities of mobile devices by moving the storage and compute
intensive tasks of mobile to the cloud [56,82]. The mobile devices can now execute heavy compute and storage intensive
processes by using the computation and storage services of the cloud. The MCC paradigm enables the users to access and
manage their applications and data through the mobile device without the need to move to traditional computing machines
[81]. However, like the traditional cloud computing, the MCC also faces the security issues that in fact prove to be a hurdle in
its widespread adoption. This section provides a brief discussion on the security issues having roots in the MCC paradigm and
general approach to deal them.
The MCC has its foundations in the traditional cloud computing, therefore, all the security issues discussed in Section 3
become inherited to the MCC. However, resource scarcity in the mobile devices does not permit the adoption of security
solutions proposed for the regular cloud. It is noteworthy that the security solutions that are to be executed at the cloud
end will remain the same. The security solutions at the client end (mobile device) need lighter versions that mobile devices
are capable to run [54]. The major security issues in the MCC are: (a) mobile application security, (b) user privacy, (c)
authentication, and (d) data security.
Table 9
Identity management and access control strategies comparison.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory Security features Scalability
[108] HASBE, access control scheme for cloud Attribute set based encryption
Trust hierarchy
Access control for cloud
User revocation
[86] Decentralized access control for cloud storage Bilinear pairing
Attribute based encryption
Attribute based signature
User authentication
Access control for cloud
[122] Role based access control scheme Role based access control Access control for cloud resources Low
[19] SPICE, identity management framework Anonymous and delegatable
Access control
Group signatures
[23] Identity management framework User managed access protocol Identity management
Access control
Table 10
Comparison of techniques countering contractual and legal issues in the cloud.
Work Proposed scheme Basic theory Negotiation Enforcement Monitoring
[36] SecAgreement, security risk calculation at cloud Embedding security parameters
into SLA
Risk quantification
[37] A framework for reacting to change in security
environment at runtime
Risk quantification
[79] SPECS, SLA-based approach to security as a service Embedding security
parameters into SL
[38] A solution for embedding security controls in cloud SLA Compliance
378 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
5.1. Mobile application security
Like traditional computing devices, the mobile devices are also prone to vulnerabilities of malicious code. The malicious
code can be in the form of Trojan horse, virus, and worm and can cause the compromise of mobile application running at the
mobile device. The traditional security software like antivirus and IDS are not possible to run continuously on the mobile
device [41]. The compromised security application or the device may result in compromised identity as well [54]. The basic
concept of offloading computation can also be used to run heavy security programs on the cloud that provide malicious code
and intrusion detection on the mobile device [124].
5.2. User privacy
The mobile device can be the source of user location leakage especially due to location based services [63,81]. The afore-
said is the serious privacy issue and leads to even worse situation if a foe knows the user whereabouts [41]. The concept of
location cloaking can be used to preserve user location privacy by concealing the user exact geographic position [49].
5.3. Authentication
Authentication is another issue on resource constrained mobile devices. With limited abilities of text input, passwords are
usually used for authentication purposes in the MCC that can be vulnerable to theft over time [41]. Dynamic credential
generation can be used for secure authentication. The credential generation can be offloaded to a trusted third party due
to low processing power of the mobile device [54].
5.4. Data security
Due to low processing power of mobile devices, computation intensive encryption algorithms with large keys are not
feasible to be run at the mobile device [53]. The MCC requires the form of encryption that requires least storage, processing
and communication overhead [95]. Alternatively, the compute intensive tasks of encryption/decryption can be moved to
trusted third party for securing the user data [53].
6. Discussion and open issues
The discussion on the security issues presented in the preceding sections elaborates that the cloud not only retains the
orthodox security concerns but also entails the novel issues arising due to the use of new technologies and practices. The
issues of web services and applications, communication and network, data privacy, etc. are the conventional issues that were
present in the respective technologies even before the appearance of the cloud computing paradigm. The issues that arise
due to virtualization, multi tenancy, and shared resource pool are novel issues. Moreover, certain orthodox issues become
even more sensitive and critical when dealt in the cloud environment. For example, data security becomes more critical
and difficult to deal with because of the absence of administrative control of the data owner. The colocation of various orga-
nizations data and applications adds more to the severity.
Section 4has also witnessed that academia and research community is actively pursuing the security issues and several
security solutions have been developed. At the communication level, the physical network infrastructure retains more of the
conventional issues and solutions. However, the virtual network needs more attention. Although virtual devices have been
proposed to secure the virtual network, a comprehensive strategy to monitor the traffic on the virtual network is needed to
avoid malicious flow of information. The packet rewriting seems to be an effective approach in this regard. Nevertheless, a
stringent methodology is required for traffic monitoring that creates a balance between privacy and monitoring. With
regards to traffic on virtual network, the privacy and monitoring become contradicting requirements. The VM image protec-
tion techniques also need to be comprehensive in nature for dealing with all required aspects of VM image life cycle. Table 3
indicates that none of the presented technique fulfills all the tabulated security requirements. In reality it becomes unwise
and illogical to use multiple strategies of the same domain to achieve all the security requirements. The same can be
observed from other presented domains. It can also be observed that trusted computing can form a good basis of providing
secure and trusted platforms because of the fact that it secures the platform right from the boot time and keep on monitoring
the states periodically. Moreover, the temper proof key management makes trusted computing a good candidate for provid-
ing a comprehensive security solution in cloud computing.
Despite of intensive research efforts by the research community, there still are open issues that need to be addressed for
providing a secure cloud environment. The first and the foremost need is to develop a comprehensive and integrated security
solution that encompasses most of the major security requirements in the cloud environment. The research activities mostly
focus on the specific issue and try to resolve that issue or in most encouraging scenario few related issues may be the target
of the researchers. The specific issue scenario results in development of multiple solutions catering various security needs. In
reality it is not wise and feasible to deploy the number of security tools equivalent or near to the number of security
requirements. Deployment and configuration of large number of security solutions itself may be risky. A more integrated
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383 379
solution will result in easy management of the security tool. At the least level, there is a need to harmonize different security
solutions to produce the desired security level.
Shared pool of resources creates a need of a trustworthy access control system that can avoid the unauthorized access to
the resources. The dynamism of the resources and heterogeneity of the services makes access control system to be more
complex. Likewise, identity management is also a key issue in the cloud computing paradigm. The process of mapping
the organizational identities to the cloud and the time it takes to translate the changes of the identities into the cloud is
a crucial factor affecting the security in general and access control in particular. Moreover, future efforts to integrate
assurance and auditing tool to ensure policy acquiescence among different involved entities are direly needed.
Multi tenancy being an essential characteristics of cloud computing is used to optimize resource utilization. However,
multi tenancy also poses threats to the cloud computing system. Security and privacy for the multi tenancy is one of the
grave challenge for the cloud computing. Research endeavors in this respect to find the solutions for multi tenancy security
issues is highly desirable. Currently, there exists little work in solving multi tenancy issues.
The issues of SLA and incorporation of legal aspects into the SLA are still unsettled. The issue of auditing, whether service
level is met as was promised in SLA or not, needs to be explored. Run time assurance mechanism to ensure that services are
delivered as per requirement is also an important open research area. The current audit, based on the statistics provided by
the CSP itself might not be a satisfactory option for many. Moreover, the pricing of the service usage is also totally dependent
on the CSP calculations.
More focus is required to ensure the privacy during computations. Not all the operations can be performed over the data
in encrypted form. Most of the operations require the plain form of data during computations. The memory locations within
the processors and outside used for storing data temporarily may be the target of attack. Therefore, a broad framework that
ensures privacy while performing computations is the need for security. Moreover, the data recovery vulnerability must be
focused in the same perspective.
The customers due to many reasons may want to migrate the digital assets to some other cloud. However, migration to a
different cloud is not an easy task. There is a need of standardized formats and protocols that can help the customers to
migrate their data/applications to a different cloud.
The cloud computing also needs security against insider threats. In this context identification of indicators for insider
attacks in the cloud environment is an open area of research. Although there are many such indicators for conventional sys-
tem and they are still applicable to the cloud environment, the identification of cloud based indicators of insider threats will
increase the potential of securing the cloud systems. Similarly, the differentiation between a normal and malicious user
within the cloud is another area of possible research. The insider attacks can be avoided to an extent by having definite
criteria of judging a normal and malicious behavior.
Lastly, it is worthy to mention that although the security solutions provide advantage to both the users and CSPs, they
also introduce computational and cost overhead. From the user perspective, the overhead can potentially over throw the
economic and computational benefits provided by the cloud. Quantifying the trade-offs between the security overheads
and cloud advantages is another important area. Moreover, there is a need to find security solutions that create a balance
between the security requirements and performance. The work in these areas will greatly help the users to perform
quantitative and technical analysis and make better decisions before shifting to the cloud.
7. Conclusions
Despite several advantages offered by the cloud computing, it also fosters security concerns that hamper the fast rate
adoption of the cloud computing. All of the users whether individual or organization should be well aware of the security
threats existing in the cloud. Comprehending the security threats and counter measures will help organizations to carry
out the cost benefit analysis and will urge them to shift to the cloud. As the cloud computing utilizes many traditional along
with novel technologies, it possesses conventional as well as unique security issues. Virtualization and multi-tenancy per-
mits various users (possibly from different origins) to utilize same physical resource. The aforesaid technologies generate
cloud specific security threats that need to be understood and dealt keeping in view novel characteristics of cloud. Likewise,
virtual networks raise some unique security concerns in addition to the concerns faced by conventional physical networks.
The absence of impeccable isolation between virtual machines necessitates the development of specific methodologies
capable of delineations that can prove to be equivalent of physical isolation. The geographical spread of cloud computing
introduces various legal issues pertaining to users’ assets and the laws under which they are governed. The identity man-
agement and access control over the organization’s digital resources also takes distinctive forms in cloud computing due
to lack of administrative control of owner organization.
This survey presented the security issues that arise due to the shared, virtualized, and public nature of the cloud comput-
ing paradigm. Subsequently, the counter measures presented in the literature are presented. The tabulated analysis of the
presented techniques highlighted the scope of security services provided by the reviewed techniques. Tabulated analysis will
greatly help the readers to compare and analyze the pros and cons of the research endeavors. Due to increased use of smart-
phones and mobile devices, the MCC has also taken off. We briefly discuss the security concerns of the MCC. The discussion of
the presented technique has led ways to highlight some open issues to motivate the research community and academia to
focus on the subject.
380 M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 305 (2015) 357–383
This research was in part supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, CNS 1229316.
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... The cloud computing system can be divided into two parts: front end and back end [8]. They're both connected by a network, which is usually the Internet. ...
... The cloud computing model is gaining popularity in industry and academia. Cost-effective, scalable, fast, comprehensive, and on-demand access to shared resources are some of the characteristics of the cloud that have led to the migration of cloud-based business processes [8] to improve work efficiency, different departments are distributed on different servers distributed in different places. One of the major obstacles to the widespread adoption of cloud computing is security. ...
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Cloud computing was developed by internet service providers to handle a high number of customers and elastic services. Over time, cloud computing has evolved into the most popular technology, with widespread adoption and use by a variety of businesses. As a result of this adoption, many businesses now store and analyze data in the cloud. This paper defines cloud computing, its architecture, and the trust mechanisms that assure cloud computing's confidentiality, integrity, and reputation. 1 Introduction Cloud computing, as it's well known as "the cloud," is a modern processing technique that allows computers to process data through the internet. It's a form of computing that allows for scalability and elasticity. Customers get these functionalities through various internet-based services. Cloud computing, per the National Institute of Science and Technology, is a paradigm for providing on-demand network access to a shared pool of programmable resources that may be delivered and removed rapidly with minimal administration effort or involvement from service providers (NIST). Cloud computing creates a flexible online environment that allows for an increase in work volume without affecting the framework's implementation [1]. Cloud computing incorporates many of today's technologies in a web service-based infrastructure paradigm to provide business flexibility, increased scalability, simplified management, and on-demand resource availability. The end consumers don't need to know about the in-house technologies, hence this is a black box service. Cloud technology has a rapid deployment strategy, minimal startup investment , payment system, consumption, and sharing of shared resources, which are all elements that large enterprises use to convert their business applications into virtual apps [17]. Institutions can pay a usage charge to select Cloud Service Providers to receive the functionality of a system without having to buy hardware or software licenses or pay for maintenance. As a result, the cloud model is a significantly more cost-effective way to obtain and consume IT services [2]. The remainder of this work is divided into the following sections: characteristics of cloud computing, functional aspects of cloud computing, the architecture of cloud computing, security issues in cloud computing, application of cloud computing , research areas of cloud computing, research directions for the next generation in cloud computing, security aspect in cloud computing, usage of trust mechanisms in cloud computing, trust management, and finally trust-based access control. 2 characteristics of the cloud Cloud computing features are explored in this section. • On-demand service; The cloud is a massive collection of resources and services that you may access whenever you need them for a fee. • Ubiquitous network access; Cloud services are accessible from anywhere using common terminals such as mobile phones, laptops, and personal digital assistants. • Simple to use; the cloud provider offers web-based interfaces that are easier to use than application software interfaces, allowing customers to quickly access cloud services. • Business model; Cloud is a business model since services or resources are paid for as they are used. • Location-independent resource pooling; Pooling of resources regardless of location is utilized to serve numerous customers with varying physical and virtual needs using a multitenant architecture. 3 Functıonal aspects of cloud computıng Users should ideally obtain their computing platform or IT infrastructure from the cloud and then run their apps within it. As a result, cloud computing gives consumers' transparent access to hardware, software, and data resources. The cloud offers three primary functions.
... Capability can scale out the service individually rather than scaling out the entire application like the entire virtual machine network functions are decomposed as it were into separate services move to a cloud-native to a container-based environment, and frankly, the core networks for 5g are intended to be cloud native and deployed as micro services in this container. [3] Fig. 1 Monolithic Architecture In this containerized infrastructure, just like modern web applications are deployed, and for a containerized infrastructure, the de facto industry de facto is Kubernetes. Kubernetes is awesome, but it also has some drawbacks and some limitations, as it were when it comes to the service provider, and 5g Kubernetes was designed for web applications for HTTP protocols. ...
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Cloud native architecture and specifically it relates to 5g technology it's awesome user's get more bandwidth get more speed there's a better user experience there's ultralow latency and so there's all these great things that come with 5g and service providers specifically are enabling their large customers with the capabilities with the promise of 5g but in order to do that need to look at having a common architecture defined from the core of network all the way out to the far edge of network and that common architecture is going to allow for faster deployments greater efficiencies reduced operational costs so a lot of benefits to that and the success of 5g capabilities with respect to that common architecture that starts with the infrastructure itself and the infrastructure needs to be cloud cloud-native container-based infrastructure this is going to support the service-based architectures that are defined in the specifications for 5g right service providers want to be able to do is deliver individual capabilities as separate services and in order to do that need the cloud that's offered in the cloud user have got to move to cloud native architectures in order to achieve that.
... Cloud migration connotes that the organization will lose the right to manage information security. Data is the foundation for the existence of an organization, and the loss of control over data results in larger protection dangers than the common inner information systems [2]. Cloud computing is network-based surroundings that specialize in sharing computation resources. ...
In recent years, progressively data proprietors have embraced cloud storage service, by which they will subcontract their data to the cloud server to significantly reduce the local storage overhead, due to the rapid growth in the cloud computing market and development. Cloud computing is the delivery of hosting services that are provided to clients over the web. It is quite common, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that may be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. Sensitive information on the cloud is developing unexpectedly and bringing up several challenges and massive security concerns of the modern-day world. The cloud data and services reside in massively scalable data centers and may be accessed ubiquitously. Some issues concern in accessing this data is the security and confidentiality of consumer data in phrases of its location, relocation, availability, and security. Numerous users are surfing the Cloud for various purposes, therefore, they have highly safe and protracted services. The long run of the cloud, especially in expanding the range of applications, involves away the deeper degree of privacy, and authentication. Because of the safety concern associated with cloud computing, this paper presents a Computer Security System for Cloud Computing by employing a simple data protection model where data is encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) technique before it is launched to the cloud, thus ensuring data confidentiality and security which is implemented with packet tracer.
... It is possible to lower energy consumption by using a combination of load balancers and schedulers, as well as a combination of the two. By implementing comprehensive security policies, an organization's security culture and cloud security solutions, organizations may ensure the quality of their cloud data security [12]. While talking about company's cloud-based systems and data as well as its infrastructure, cloud security is a comprehensive set of measures. ...
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Computing operations such as databases, networks, hardware, programs, analytics, and so on are all part of the cloud computing service. As such, it may serve as an option to in-house hardware and software. However, dynamic consolidation of VMs is required to improve power consumption, load balance, the frequency of migrations , Quality of Service (QoS), and the rate at which SLA violations are addressed, all of which contribute to better resource use. VM technology has quickly become a pillar of data centers and cluster systems because to its utility in partitioning, consolidating, and moving workloads. VM placement is another thing that affects the quality of consolidation. It is important to design a system that improves energy efficiency by allocating resources to applications in a smart way while still meeting QoS requirements for applications. Moreover, the security of information that is being processed during the migration process is also one of the important tasks. Hence, in this paper, review and analysis based on parameters and metrics for the VM migration under the influence of energy optimization, consolidation, and security have been investigated in a wider manner. Moreover, some open issues that are still prevalent in the current field have also been highlighted.
... A growing number of people and businesses are eager to transfer their data to cloud computing platforms due to its endless storage and processing resources, low costs, and ease of use [76][77][78][79]. It is necessary to encrypt data prior to outsourcing it to the cloud in order to protect user privacy and maintain search capabilities [80][81][82]. ...
Due to the proliferation of cryptocurrencies and decentralized apps, blockchain has recently sparked widespread attention and worry. It functions as a database and is used to keep track of a huge number of entries in a time-ordered fashion for use in data-heavy applications. It is proposed in such a scenario that search engines be used to retrieve the data stored in a blockchain and then analysed for various reasons. However, there hasn't been any comprehensive study of blockchain search engines yet, and the field is still in its infancy. Both the present state of blockchain search engine development and its potential in the Internet of Things (IoT) space are examined in this article. The paper's primary focus, from a research standpoint, is on the categorization of blockchain search engine techniques and a comparison of their relative performance. Current search works connected to IoT domains are introduced with the future potential of blockchain search engines in this space. The remainder of the paper provides a history of blockchain technology. Then, the search necessities are laid down, such as the basic rules of categorization. We then provide a problem analysis of blockchain search in IoT domains and a comprehensive overview of previous work in this area. We conclude with a discussion of the difficulties inherent in blockchain-based searches and an outlook for future research initiatives in IoT-related fields.
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To support a large number of users and elastic services, the internet service providers designed cloud computing. Over the years cloud computing has evolved to become the most preferred technology gaining a lot of adoption and employed by several organizations. This adoption has led to many companies' using the cloud for storage and processing of data. This paper explain what cloud computing is, cloud computing architecture and its areas of application.
This research is mainly focused on the adoption of cloud computing in the information technology (IT) industry of a developing country, Pakistan by using the theoretical lens of technology acceptance model (TAM) and Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). Cloud computing, being one of the latest technologies in the field of IT, has been recently adopted by organizations around the globe, although developing nations have recently started using this technology in their supply chain processes. This study involved the employees of IT industry working in the capital city of Pakistan, i.e. Islamabad. Sample respondents consisted of 213 employees of the IT based organization. Data was collected online by employing structured questionnaires based on past literature. The results revealed that there exists a positive and significant relationship between perceived security, argument advantage, source credibility and perceived usefulness. Additionally, the outcome of the study supported the significant relationships between perceived usefulness and attitude towards adoption of cloud computing, perceived usefulness and intention to adopt cloud computing, and attitude towards cloud computing and intention to adopt cloud computing. The research study has managerial and practical implications. It is one of first of its kind that explores some of the factors leading to adoption of cloud computing in of IT companies in Pakistan.
The study aimed at exploring the critical enablers to the development and usage of information security governance frameworks for cloud computing in Uganda. The study was motivated by the continuous information security governance challenges in the Public Cloud. The theoretical frameworks that underpinned this study included; Contingency management theory, the Risk Management framework, the Technological Organisational and Environmental (TOE) model and the Information Security Governance model. This study adopted a quantitative research approach to obtain data through a survey. Five key factors for information security governance were identified: a) Technological factors: flexibility, scalability, availability, agility, data protection governance, trust of cloud, data source, maintenance, data retention and policy. b) Organisation: size and structure of the organisation, top management support. c) Environmental factors: governance and regulation, marketing, vendor, resource availability, obsoleteness. d) Individual: user resistance, attitude, skills, belief and learnability. e) Risk management and control factors: risk assessment, disaster recovery, access and authorisation control, monitoring, auditing, and process risk control. The study contributes to theory and practice in information security. The developed framework and its accompanying model helped to inform public departments, organisational top management and information security strategies to avoid excessive information risks and potential regulatory compliance failures in public cloud. The study was inclined on subjective information security, which alone may not fully address all information security problems in a public cloud. Therefore, it is recommendable that future research studies on objective security in public cloud.
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Increasing complexity in and interconnectivity between technologies and systems (e.g., cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT), fog and edge computing) can complicate data processing and security requirements. Thus, in this paper we review existing literature survey articles focusing on cloud, fog and edge computing platforms and infrastructures. We then present the result of a systematic survey of existing literature surveys. Our research uses the PRISMA methodology and grounded theory to guide the review process, along with grounded theory for the classification of identified issues. The issues together with research trends and future research recommendations are then discussed, with the objective of informing future research agenda.
Conference Paper
Over the years, developments in the ICT industry have opened doors to countless cybercrimes. Numerous tools and security solutions are available in the market to deter such cyber threats, but even with such comprehensive efforts, e-crime is growing each passing day exponentially. Although technology has revolutionized the way organizations work today, wider utilization of technology leads to more and more security vulnerability possibilities. Enhancing access and improving connectivity to harness Digital Transformation is a priority. Hence, this research paper’s key focus is to address the security threats that arise from current and emerging technology, modern and cutting-edge cybersecurity threat mitigation strategies that need attention and the opportunities that lie in the cyber landscape. The paper will help all those already digitally transformed or shifting their offline business models to digital and connecting people and devices over the internet by providing them with requisite insights into cybersecurity.
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Computing applications and data are growing so rapidly that increasingly larger servers and data centre are needed for fast processing within the required time. A fundamental shift in the way Information Technology (IT) and computing services are being delivered and purchased results in the development of cloud computing. The out of control cost of power in terms of electricity generation, personnel hardware and limited spaces in data centers have encouraged a significant number of enterprises to move more infrastructures into a third party provided Cloud. However, Cloud computing requires that organizations trust that a service provider’s platforms are secured and provide a sufficient level of integrity for the client’s data. Elliptical curve cryptography (ECC) is a public key encryption technique based on elliptic curve theory that can be used to create faster, smaller, and more efficient cryptographic keys. An important factor is the key strength, i.e. the difficulty in breaking the key and retrieving the plain text. In this paper, we proposed Elliptic Curve Cryptography scheme as a secure tool to model a Secured platform for the Cloud Application
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The cloud computing paradigm emerged shortly after the introduction of the 'invisible' grid concepts but it has taken only a few years for cloud computing to gain enormous momentum within industry and academia alike. However, providing adequate interoperability and security support by those complex distributed systems is of primary importance for the wide adoption of cloud computing by the end users. This paper gives an overview of the main cloud interoperability and security issues and challenges. Existing and proposed solutions are also presented with particular attention to the security as a service approach. Some of the available directions for future work are also discussed.
Conference Paper
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The dynamic and elastic nature of cloud computing introduces new security challenges when it comes to maintaining consistent security configurations. This is emphasized by the fact that virtual machines are abruptly migrated between physical hosts, in the same or even in different data centers under different security policies. If security is not correctly enforced at the destination locations, and not properly updated in the source locations, security of the migrating virtual machine as well as the co-located machines can be compromised. In this paper, we intend to tackle this problem, specifically for intrusion detec-tion/prevention and VPN/IPsec as main security mechanisms. More precisely, we propose a systematic verification approach to check the compliance of security configurations. To this end, we first elaborate on two properties, namely intrusion monitoring configuration preservation and VPN/IPsec protection configuration preservation. Then, we derive a set of formulas that compare security configurations before and after migration. This allows reasoning on whether the aforemen-tioned security properties hold. To this end, we encode these formulas as constraint satisfaction problems. The obtained constraints are then submitted to a constraint solver, namely Sugar, in order to verify the properties and to pinpoint potential misconfiguration problems.
Cloud computing paradigm has recently gained tremendous momentum. It has been found very promising for significant cost reduction and the increased operating efficiencies in computing. However, security and privacy issues pose as the key roadblock to its rapid adoption. In this chapter, the authors present the security and privacy challenges in Cloud computing environments and discuss how they are related to various delivery and deployment models, and are exacerbated by the unique aspects of Clouds. The authors also propose a comprehensive security framework for Cloud computing environments and discuss various approaches to address the challenges, existing solutions and future work needed to provide a trustworthy Cloud computing environment.
Significant research and development efforts in both industry and academia aim to improve the cloud's security and privacy. The author discusses related challenges, opportunities, and solutions.