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Assessing Pathways to Success: Need for Reform and Governance Capacities in Asia
Abstract
Why are some Asian countries successful in increasing their GDP, raising their populations’ living standards, protecting the environment, and establishing a high-quality democracy? Why are other countries in the same region mired in underdevelopment; with their population suffering from abject poverty, repression, and environmental destruction? Is there a recipe for success, or do success and failure stand at the end of individual and highly contingent pathways, representing experiences that cannot be replicated or serve as object lessons for others? This report compares the developmental pathways of eight very different Asian economies, by relating their modes of governance to developmental outcomes. The sample consists of longstanding democracies (India, Japan), young democracies (South Korea, Indonesia), one-party autocracies (China, Vietnam), and “electoral autocracies” (Malaysia, Singapore).
... Southeast Asian countries are diverse in many ways which prevents them from being generalized as a similar or simplified model of polity and governance (Hill, 2014). Croissant (Göbel & Maslow, 2013;Shair-Rosenfield, Marks, & Hooghe, 2014). ...
... Indonesia has been behind Malaysia in applying its national innovation system (Degelsegger et al., 2014;Göbel & Maslow, 2013). ...
... I retrieve the documents mainly from relevant official websites of key Malaysian and Indonesian 5 Policy & Governance Review | January 2022 also continued being resilient, albeit at a slow pace, in coping with the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. The two countries are characterized as middle-income economies in the Southeast Asian region, which are comparable in political and economic stances(Göbel & Maslow, 2013;Shair-Rosenfield et al., 2014). The working mechanism of national innovation systems deals with these empirical situations. ...
Promising industrial profiles of Southeast Asian emerging economies have met their developmental limits in the face of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. However, following the crisis, they have not been successful in upscaling the technological competitiveness of their industries. By applying the national innovation system approach originally developed in advanced western economies as an institutional mechanism of policy innovation in light of developmentalism, I seek to explain these persistent developmental limits in Malaysia and Indonesia. My qualitative research examines literature discussing policy coordination mechanisms in innovation policies and policy documents containing coordination mechanisms involving firms, universities, and government agencies; then, how these issues implicate innovation policies in the two countries. I employ a comparative institutional analysis between them focusing on institutional characteristics of the national innovation systems, specifically their institutional obstacles occurring within development paths amidst prevailing political environments. I suggest that persistent developmental limits in Malaysia and Indonesia result from systemic failures of achieving developmental aims regardless of their politico-administrative regimes. Existing institutional frameworks of the national innovation systems, entrenched in the socio-economic prevalence of the two countries, have not fit the nations’ developmental aims pursued upon innovation upgrading.
There is a widespread concern that, in some parts of the world, governments are unable to exercise effective authority. When governments fail, more sinister forces thrive: warlords, arms smugglers, narcotics enterprises, kidnap gangs, terrorist networks, armed militias. Why do governments fail? This book explores an old idea that has returned to prominence: that authority, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness is closely related to the ways in which governments are financed. It matters that governments tax their citizens rather than live from oil revenues and foreign aid, and it matters how they tax them. Taxation stimulates demands for representation, and an effective revenue authority is the central pillar of state capacity. Using case studies from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, this book presents and evaluates these arguments, updates theories derived from European history in the light of conditions in contemporary poorer countries, and draws conclusions for policy-makers. © Cambridge University Press 2008 and Cambridge University Press 2009.
Recent work by Carles Boix and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson has focused on the role of inequality and distributive conflict in transitions to and from democratic rule. We assess these claims through causal process observation, using an original qualitative dataset on democratic transitions and reversions during the “third wave” from 1980 to 2000. We show that distributive conflict, a key causal mechanism in these theories, is present in just over half of all transition cases. Against theoretical expectations, a substantial number of these transitions occur in countries with high levels of inequality. Less than a third of all reversions are driven by distributive conflicts between elites and masses. We suggest a variety of alternative causal pathways to both transitions and reversions.
Trotz des offensichtlichen (wenn auch unklaren) Zusammenhangs zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und der Persistenz autokratischer Regime wurde bisher kaum untersucht, wie sich Innovationsprozesse auf die Stabilität autokratischer Regime auswirken – und umgekehrt. Dieser Beitrag widmet sich dieser Frage, indem er Literatur zu autoritärer Konsolidierung mit den Erkenntnissen der Innovations- und der Wissenschafts- und Technologieforschung verknüpft. Das Argument lautet, dass Innovationsprozesse gesellschaftliche, ökonomische und politische Dynamiken in Gang bringen, die das Regime zur stetigen Verbesserung seiner Institutionen und seiner Einbettung in die Gesellschaft zwingen. Diese Konsolidierung autokratischer Herrschaft verbessert wiederum die Bedingungen für weitere Innovationsprozesse. Ein Vergleich der Entwicklungen Chinas und Myanmars zeigt, dass diese Strategie die Legitimität eines Regimes erhöhen kann, aber hohe Risiken für die Regimeeliten birgt. Aus diesem Grund entscheiden sich einige Regime stattdessen für die Aufrechterhaltung ihrer Herrschaft durch Repression.
In comparative politics, an established finding--that economic development fosters democratic performance--has recently come under challenge. We counter this challenge with a dynamic pooled time series analysis of a major, but neglected data set from 131 nations. The final generalized least squares-autoregressive moving averages estimates (N = 2,096) appear robust and indicate strong economic development effects, dependent in part on the nation's position in the world system. For the first time, rather hard evidence is offered on the causal relationship between economics and democracy. According to Granger tests, economic development "causes" democracy, but democracy does not "cause" economic development. Overall, the various tests would seem to advance sharply the modeling of democratic performance.
Arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators. While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights. The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not. The main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output. These views are summarized in turn.
This book explains how postwar Japan managed to achieve a highly egalitarian form of capitalism despite meager social spending. Estevez-Abe develops an institutional, rational-choice model to solve this puzzle. She shows how Japan's electoral system generated incentives that led political actors to protect various groups that lost out in market competition. She explains how Japan's postwar welfare state relied upon various alternatives to orthodox social spending programs. The initial postwar success of Japan's political economy has given way to periods of crisis and reform. This book follows this story up to the present day. Estevez-Abe shows how the current electoral system renders obsolete the old form of social protection. She argues that institutionally Japan now resembles Britain and predicts that Japan's welfare system will also come to resemble Britain's. Japan thus faces a more market-oriented society and less equality. © Margarita Estévez-Abe 2008 and Cambridge University Press, 2009.
This study surveys the small but growing field of entrepreneurship and conflict in developing countries, which is also the topic of this special issue of the Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship. We review recent contributions on how mass violent conflict such as civil war affects productive entrepreneurship and we discuss the contributions to this special issue. Furthermore, we define entrepreneurship and violent conflict and indicate how they may affect each other. We find that violent conflict has diverse impacts on entrepreneurs, firms and their investment and production processes, and that there are many ways to overcome the legacies of fighting. In fact, the post-war peace dividendand, more generally, the reconstruction of markets and economies critically depends on public policies promoting entrepreneurship. Résumé Cette étude examine l'entrepreneuriat et les conflits dans les pays en développement, un champ d’études restreint, mais grandissant, qui est aussi le thème de cette édition spéciale du Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship. L'article passe en revue des études récentes examinant la façon dont les conflits violents tels que les guerres civiles affectent l'entrepreneuriat productif pour ensuite discuter des contributions de cette édition spéciale. De plus, les auteurs définissent l'entrepreneuriat et les conflits violents, et ils expliquent la façon dont ceux-ci peuvent s'affecter l'un et l'autre. L’étude révèle que les conflits violents ont divers impacts sur les entrepreneurs, les entreprises et leurs processus d'investissement et de production et qu'il y a plusieurs façons possibles pour surmonter les difficultés engendrées par les conflits. En fait, les dividendes d'après-guerre et de façon plus générale, la reconstruction des marchés et des économies dépendent des politiques publiques promouvant l'entrepreneuriat.
This election year may tempt both critics of the Bush administration and hard-liners within it to attack U.S. policy on China. That would be a mistake, however, for engaging Beijing has worked well. Economic growth in China has spurred political liberalization, legal reform, opening of the media, and popular activism. The Bush administration--and those who aspire to replace it--should not let electoral tactics jeopardize sound policy. With respect to China, that means staying the course.
Why has the literature on Asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in Korea? How can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in Korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999? Politics is central to the answer. In this book the author makes two arguments. First, both Korea and the Philippines experienced significant corruption throughout the post-independence era. Second, political - not economic - considerations dominated policy making in both countries. Focusing on the exchange of favors for bribes between state and business, the author argues that politics drove policy choices, that bureaucrats were not autonomous from political interference in setting policy, and that business and political elites wrestled with each other over who would reap the rents to be had. Even in Korea, corruption was far greater than the conventional wisdom allows.
Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) 14-33
It is necessary to begin by saying a few words about three minimal conditions that must obtain before there can be any possibility of speaking of democratic consolidation. First, in a modern polity, free and authoritative elections cannot be held, winners cannot exercise the monopoly of legitimate force, and citizens cannot effectively have their rights protected by a rule of law unless a state exists. In some parts of the world, conflicts about the authority and domain of the polis and the identities and loyalties of the demos are so intense that no state exists. No state, no democracy.
Second, democracy cannot be thought of as consolidated until a democratic transition has been brought to completion. A necessary but by no means sufficient condition for the completion of a democratic transition is the holding of free and contested elections (on the basis of broadly inclusive voter eligibility) that meet the seven institutional requirements for elections in a polyarchy that Robert A. Dahl has set forth. Such elections are not sufficient, however, to complete a democratic transition. In many cases (e.g., Chile as of 1996) in which free and contested elections have been held, the government resulting from elections like these lacks the de jure as well as de facto power to determine policy in many significant areas because the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are still decisively constrained by an interlocking set of "reserve domains," military "prerogatives," or "authoritarian enclaves."
Third, no regime should be called a democracy unless its rulers govern democratically. If freely elected executives (no matter what the magnitude of their majority) infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies.
In sum, when we talk about the consolidation of democracy, we are not dealing with liberalized nondemocratic regimes, or with pseudo-democracies, or with hybrid democracies where some democratic institutions coexist with nondemocratic institutions outside the control of the democratic state. Only democracies can become consolidated democracies.
Let us now turn to examining how, and when, new political systems that meet the three minimal conditions of "stateness," a completed democratic transition, and a government that rules democratically can be considered consolidated democracies.
In most cases after a democratic transition is completed, there are still many tasks that need to be accomplished, conditions that must be established, and attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before democracy can be regarded as consolidated. What, then, are the characteristics of a consolidated democracy? Many scholars, in advancing definitions of consolidated democracy, enumerate all the regime characteristics that would improve the overall quality of democracy. We favor, instead, a narrower definition of democratic consolidation, but one that nonetheless combines behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions. Essentially, by a "consolidated democracy" we mean a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, "the only game in town."
Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to secede from the state. When this situation obtains, the behavior of the newly elected government that has emerged from the democratic transition is no longer dominated by the problem of how to avoid democratic breakdown. (Exceptionally, the democratic process can be used to achieve secession, creating separate states that can be democracies.) Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures. Constitutionally, democracy becomes the only game in town when all of the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict within the state will be resolved according to established norms, and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly. In short, with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even...
In recent years,new types of nondemocratic government have come to the fore,notably competitive authoritarianism.Such regimes, though not democratic,feature arenas of contestation in which opposition forces can challenge,and even oust,authoritarian incumbents.
Recent studies appear to show that democracy has no robust association with economic growth. Yet all such work assumes that the causal effect of democracy can be measured by a country's regime status in a particular year (T), which is correlated with its growth performance in a subsequent period (T+l). The authors argue that democracy must be understood as a stock, rather than a level, measure. That is, a country's growth performance is affected by the number of years it has been democratic, in addition to the degree of democracy experienced during that period. In this fashion, democracy is reconceptualized as a historical, rather than a contemporary, variable—with the assumption that long-run historical patterns may help scholars to understand present trends. The authors speculate that these secular-historical influences operate through four causal pathways, each of which may be understood as a type of capital: physical capital, human capital, social capital, and political capital. This argument is tested in a crosscountry analysis and is shown to be robust in a wide variety of specifications and formats.
Degradation of China's environment has become increasingly severe over the past two decades - alarmingly so, by some estimates. The high-growth, resource-intensive development strategy China has pursued, coupled with the norms and institutional relationships designed to support this development strategy, have no doubt played a critical role in the deteriorating quality of the environment. Economic decentralization has given officials at the provincial level and below the means and incentives to develop their local economies. The pervasive emphasis on development, consumerism and profit in government proclamations and throughout society has further provided local governments with the justification to intervene against regulations - such as environmental protection - deemed unfavourable to growth. But, as the central government's recent measures indicate, there is another factor at play as well. Although China has worked for more than a quarter of a century developing policies, promulgating laws and building an extensive institutional apparatus to address environmental problems, shortcomings within this system of environmental protection are also responsible for the country's ecological woes. Specifically, China's environmental protection apparatus has suffered from two lingering problems: insufficient authority and lack of co-ordination between institutional actors. Whether the administrative reforms of the 1998 National People's Congress will dramatically alter these problems remains to be seen. The following review of the organization of environmental protection, within the context of the larger Chinese state, sheds some light on the complexity of environmental management in China.
Democratization in Korea since 1987 has led to the gradual establishment of a diverse set of institutional arrangements—competitive electoral systems, local autonomy, freedom of the press, and freedom of association—that facilitate the articulation of diffuse environmental interests in policy–making processes. Yet, as illustrated by the cases of the Youngwol Dam project and the Wichon Industrial Complex, the policy–making system is still unsettled by numerous environmental protests and by difficulties in resolving distributional conflicts among different groups and communities. To resolve these difficulties, Korea needs to overcome some adverse legacies from its authoritarian era and to develop multiple channels and mechanisms for citizen participation in policy–making and for conflict resolution among different groups and communities. The experience of Korea illustrates the complex dynamics between democratization and environmental policy–making.
SUMMARY Episodes of sickness have adverse economic consequences at both household and individual level, especially for the poorer. Prolonged or severe sickness imposes strains on the household economy and can jeopardise its viability. Drawing on empirical evidence, this article examines the costs of sickness, including loss of income and expenditure on treatment, outlines under what conditions sickness makes poor households poorer still, and presents implications for research and policy.
ResuméPauvreté et maladie: le coût élevé de la maladie
Les périodes de maladie ont des effets adverses dans le domaine économique à la fois au niveau des familles et des individus, tout particulièrement dans les catégories les plus pauvres. Des périodes de longue maladie, ou do maladie grave, ont pour conséquence un stress important sur l'économie des familles et met en danger sa viabilité. Prenant appui sur des évidences empiriques, cet article examine le côut de la maladie y compris la perte de revenu et les dépenses encourues lors des périodes de traitment. Il met en evidence les conditions dans lesquelles la maladie a pour effet un appauvrissement des familles déjà démunies, et présente les conséquences de ces résultats pour la recherche et la politique á suivre.
ResumenPobreza y enfermedad. Los altos costos de la mala salud
Los episodios de enfermedad tienen consecuencias económicas adversas tanto a nivel del hogar como individual, especialmente entre los más desposeídos. Las enfermedades severas o prolongadas imponen tensiones en el hogar, pudiendo amenazar su viabilidad. Este artículo, basado en evidencia empírica, examina los costos de la enfermedad, incluyendo pérdidas de ingreso y gastos de tratamiento, señala las condiciones bajo las cuales la enfermedad deteriora aùn más a los hogares desposeídos y presenta sugerencias para la investigación y el diseño de políticas.
The good governance agenda is unrealistically long and growing longer over time. Among the multitude of governance reforms that “must be done” to encourage development and reduce poverty, there is little guidance about what's essential and what's not, what should come first and what should follow, what can be achieved in the short term and what can only be achieved over the longer term, what is feasible and what is not. If more attention is given to sorting out these questions, “good enough governance” may become a more realistic goal for many countries faced with the goal of reducing poverty. Working toward good enough governance means accepting a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what's working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation seriously; and grounding action in the contextual realities of each country.
This article analyses the effects of political regimes over state capacity or the quality of government (QoG): Do democratic states perform better than authoritarian ones? Previous studies point to a nonlinear relationship between democracy and government quality. It is argued here that QoG is a function of both forces of supply (leaders who have the power to make reforms) and demand (citizens' desire for mid- to long-term investments over short-term needs), the latter of which is a function of economic development. In democratic states, leaders have stronger incentives to improve QoG after a certain degree of wealth is reached, while in poorer countries they have little incentive for long-term bureaucratic investments. Thus it is predicted that the relationship between democracy and QoG is conditional, based on economic development. With over 125 countries in the sample, this hypothesis is tested using time-series panel data and spatial models, and strong empirical support is found.
In this issue of the Journal of Politics, Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Shrank (hereafter KS) offer a sweeping critique of the exisiting literature on governance and growth. They argue that perceptions-based crosscountry measures of governance, and in particular those we have constructed in our ongoing work i , are fatally flawed. They also produce empirical evidence which they claim shows that perceptions of governance are driven by short-term growth performance. Finally they argue that there is little convincing evidence that good governance spurs growth. In our response we show that these claims are unsubstantiated. We first show that their claims of biases in perceptions-based measures of governance are speculative and, to the extent that they are falsifiable, do not withstand empirical scrutiny. We next show that the empirical evidence in support of their claim that governance perceptions respond to short-run growth is both statistically fragile and conceptually flawed. Finally we dismiss their empirical work on the effects of governance on growth, which we argue is far removed from the best-practice frontier in crosscountry growth empirics. We instead briefly describe the rich body of recent work in the economics literature that has documented a sizeable long-run effect of governance on growth.
The risks of falling into the Middle Income Trap have increasingly become a focus of discussions on the long-term economic and social development prospects of developing countries. These risks, and how to minimize them, are being debated at the highest levels of policy making in some of the fastest growing emerging economies, even while these countries remain a source of envy to the rest of the world. The term Middle Income Trap is by now also being widely used in economic literature as well as business-oriented media. We draw satisfaction from the fact that some of our previous writings (Gill and Kharas, 2008; Kohli et al. 2009) (co-authored with other colleagues) seem to have helped popularize this term. At the same time, we realize that some have interpreted and used the term quite differently from what we had in mind when we first introduced the term Middle Income Trap in our writings and presentations. This article offers our perspective as to what the Middle Income Trap is, why so many countries fall into it, and the key challenges involved in avoiding the trap. With policy makers as its primary audience, the article is deliberately short in length and straightforward in language.
This paper suggests major factors in country differences in income distribution largely overlooked in the literature on inequality and development. They concern the extent of economic dualism, as proxied macroeconomically by the relative labour productivity of non-agricultural sectors vs. agriculture and related variables. The result is robust with respect to both the composition of the sample, the observation period and inclusion of country fixed effects, in marked contrast to what happens when the analysis is limited to more traditional variables, like GDP per capita or average level of schooling.
Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator—a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.
Incl. abstract and bibl. references Are the Millennium Development Goals just a string of global wish lists? Are they simply a distraction or gimmick? This contribution argues that there is more to the enveloping global exercise of the MDGs than meets the eye. Despite its alarming and terminal weaknesses with regard to theory, method and scope, and notwithstanding its multitude of errors of commission and omission, the MDG phenomenon carries the potential for distorting meaningful intellectual and research agendas, and could function as the catalyst and vehicle for a fundamental realignment of the political economy of development at the global level. The question is whether this realignment will be of a benign character that reflects the emancipatory aspirations so readily evoked in the Millennium Declaration.
It is often maintained that democracy is a luxury which comes at a price in terms of subsequent slower increases in national living standards. However, various recent cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth. Using a new measure of democracy, which is based upon the number of years that a country can be regarded as a democracy, the robustness of this relationship is examined. Both direct and indirect effects of lack of democratic liberties are analysed. Our main conclusion is that the relationship between democracy and economic growth is not robust. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
There are many well developed theories which explain why governments redistribute income. There are very few theories, however, which can explain why this redistribution often takes an inefficient form. In this paper we develop a theory of why redistribution is made inefficiently. Inefficient redistribution makes staying in or entering a group relatively more attractive than efficient methods of redistribution. The form of redistribution is therefore a tool to sustain political power in situations where; (1) the political influence of a group depends on its size, and (2) political institutions cannot credibly commit to future policy. We argue that the mechanism we propose may account for the choice of inefficient redistritive policies in agriculture, trade and the labor market.
Recent cross-section studies have demonstrated a strong link between measures of corruption, bureaucratic quality, property rights, and other institutional variables, and economic growth. In this paper we build on previous research and present some empirical evidence on the direction of causality between institutional measures and growth. It appears that the poorer the country, and the longer the wait, the higher the influence of institutional quality on economic growth. However, we also show the existence of reverse causality. Indeed, it appears that economic growth also causes institutional quality. Copyright 2000 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
The article engages with the literature on the ‘East Asian welfare model’ by using Esping-Andersen's ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ approach to analyze social policy in the region. It describes the main features of a productivist world of welfare capitalism that stands alongside Esping-Andersen's conservative, liberal and social democratic worlds. It then shows that Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are all part of this world, though they divide into sub-groups within it. To account for productivist welfare capitalism in East Asia, the article focuses particularly on bureaucratic politics at the unit level, and on a range of key shaping factors at the system level. It closes by considering the implications of East Asian experience for comparative social policy analysis.
Is the welfare state withering away, or will it survive currentglobalization trends? Recent literature framing this academic debatehas extolled the resilience of this institution, despite the pressuresof international market integration. These studies have reverseddoomsday scenarios from the 1980s and 1990s that contemplated theultimate demise of the welfare state. Yet trends in welfare spending indeveloped and developing countries have diverged. During the pastquarter century, globalization penetrated both groups. However, whilethe more developed countries were expanding resources devoted to thisform of safety net, the average share of gross domestic product (GDP)allocated in a sample of fty-three less-developed countries (LDCs)began much lower and fell lower still (see Figure 1). My analysis goesbeyond existing studies by providing an original model of thedeterminants of welfare spending in LDCs. I focus on how globalizationcan affect rich and poor countries differently and present a model thatincludes a new measure of labor strength.
Sustainable Governance Indicators
- Bertelsmann Stiftung
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- Andrew. -Japan Dewit
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The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in Korea: Korean Workers in the Face of Global Capitalism
- Hagen Koo
Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability.? www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml
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- Robert I Rotberg
The Future of Nuclear Power in Asia
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Salt of the Earth: The Political Origins of Peasant Protest and Communist Revolution in China
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