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GRM PAPER
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
GRM PAPERS
Regional Disorder and New
Geo-economic Order: Saudi Security
Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
September 2014
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
© Gulf Research Centre Cambridge 2014
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior written permission of the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.
is paper is part of a series which brings together views on Gulf political, economic, security and other issues as
presented at the annual Gulf Research Meeting. e views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone
and do not necessarily state or reect the opinions or position of the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.
is paper was presented at a workshop titled
“Saudi Arabia and the Arab Uprisings: National,
Regional and Global Responses”
organized as part of the
Gulf Research Meeting (GRM) 2013
in Cambridge, UK,
by the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.
GRM PAPER
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
1
The Arab uprisings which started in early 2011 from the Maghreb to the
Mashreq have rightfully provoked an incredible burgeoning of research
projects and fuelled existing ones with new energy. Among the issues the
so-called “Arab Spring”1 has put the focus on is the question of its impact on the
six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).2 Here, narrowing the focus
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the international research community faced two
1. While this expression has been widely used to describe the events occurring within the Arab
World for more than two years, it is sometimes seen as controversial. For such arguments, see:
Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, “Al-rabī‘ al-‘Arabī: wijhāt nazar min al-Khalīj al-‘Arabī” [e Arab
Spring: A View Point from the Arabian Gulf], Al-mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, no. 391 (September
2011): 117-128. Being a reference to the Spring of the People, that is the European Revolutions
of 1848, it is ideologically loaded. Interestingly enough, in the French frame of reference, the
term ‘Arab Spring’ was coined by Jacques Benoist-Méchin in 1959 (Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Un
printemps arabe, Paris: Albin Michel, 1959). ere, it evoked the Arab grandeur, as the author
witnessed it, especially in Saudi Arabia. is paper uses the more neutral term “Arab uprisings,”
which concurs with the title of the workshop at the 2013 Gulf Research Meeting, “Saudi Arabia
and the Arab Uprisings: National, Regional and Global Responses” where a draft paper of the
work was presented.
2. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Introduction
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
main questions. First, would the wave of Arab uprisings submerge the Kingdom or
stop on its shores? Second, it appeared that Saudi Arabia had proven rather resilient
to the regional disturbances, but how could one analyze its response to the ambient
disorder? is paper aims at answering the latter question.
An in-depth understanding of Saudi Arabia’s reaction to recent regional events
calls for an examination of their impact on its security issues and interests. Indeed,
Saudi foreign and security policies have always been interlinked to such a point
that some argue they are merged,3 especially since the Iranian Islamic Revolution of
1979 and the consolidation of the “regional security complex.”4 e Arab uprisings,
which came as an accelerated evolution of this regional context, are all the more
likely to redene Saudi security strategies as broader geo-economic factors also push
the Kingdom to rethink its strategic stance. e theme explored in this paper is
that the evolving strategic environment faced by Saudi Arabia presents new security
challenges as well as a window of opportunity to adopt more assertive foreign and
security policies. is provides one with a grid of analysis for Saudi initiatives, helping
in turn to analyze and assess the impact of these new dynamics on the regional
balance of power and global issues.
First, this paper looks at the security implications of the regional turmoil and
shows that the Arab revolts are pressuring Saudi Arabia into adopting a new strategic
stance. en, it shows how recent events within the Arab world combined with
broader geo-economic considerations explain the Kingdom’s growing assertiveness.
Finally, the paper oers an outlook on the regional and global repercussions that
these renewed Saudi strategies towards its security challenges could have.
Regional Turmoil: New Security Challenges and Opportunities
e Arab uprisings deeply impacted global security5 issues and presented new risks
for the whole of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. From the Saudi
perspective, these uprisings were a matter of concern from many angles, including
3. Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy,” Orbis (Winter 2013): 5.
4. is concept was theorized by Barry Buzan as follows: “A group of states whose primary security
concerns link together suciently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be con-
sidered apart from one another.” See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fears (Boulder: Lynne Rien-
ner, 1991), 190. ere is a high degree of interdependence (both negative and positive) between
the members of these regional systems, which “spend most of their time and eort worrying about
each other and not other states.” See Gregory Gause, e International Relations of the Persian Gulf
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.
5. is concept takes into account all relevant factors threatening peace, stability, prosperity, devel-
opment, and security. It encompasses national security and meets all risks and threats that could
undermine the state and nation’s life.
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GRM PAPER
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
the security angle. Yet, these events also opened a window of opportunity for Saudi
Arabia to take a new regional lead, as shown by the country’s recent initiatives.
Confronted with new security challenges and opportunities, Saudi Arabia appears
to have adopted more assertive policies. is new approach needs to be assessed,
including whether it should be read as a hegemonic move, a defensive move, or some
variation in between.
Revived Risks and reats in an Unstable Environment
e current turmoil within the Arab world has been characterized as “the most severe
test for the Kingdom since its creation.”6 e Arab uprisings indeed challenge Saudi
Arabia on several levels, as they put pressure on its internal stability, national security,
and interests in the region. It is important to explore this multi-layered impact and
to underline the interdependence of all risks in order to understand just how burning
an issue this regional unrest is for Riyadh.
e unrest in Tunisia and Egypt from early 2011 onwards led many observers to
talk of a domino eect which could overthrow other regional regimes that appeared
as deeply rooted as these two. In Riyadh, the possibility of an unstoppable wave of
revolts raised genuine concern. is fear seemed reasonable given the demographic
challenges and social circumstances in the Kingdom: “a disproportionally young,
literate, and informed population – in short, the drivers of the revolutions elsewhere
in the Arab world,”7 high underemployment, and an increasing gap between rulers
and people’s aspirations.
e immediate threat to internal stability came from the revolt that started in
neighboring Bahrain on February 14, 2011. Despite the aforementioned similarities
between Tunisia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, there were still vast dierences, especially
in terms of wealth distribution, which kept the risk of a Saudi uprising at bay. e
possibilities of a contagious spillover were altogether much stronger, however, with
the outbreak of protests in Bahrain. In view of their common monarchical system,
there was an instant fear of the galvanizing eect these could have on oppositional
politics in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Bahraini uprisings and the eect it had,
especially on the Kingdom’s Shia population in the Eastern province,8 revived fears
6. Bruce Riedel, “Revolution in Riyadh,” Memorandum, Washington, Brookings Saban Center,
January 2013.
7. Fatima Ayub, Introduction, in “What Does the Gulf ink about the Arab Awakening?” Gulf
Analysis, London, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), April 2013, 2.
8. In addition to three major petitions calling for reform published by Saudi activists. See Ahmed
Al Omran, “Saudi Arabia: A New Mobilization,” in “What Does the Gulf ink about the Arab
Awakening?” 5-8. e rst Saudi “Day of Anger” occurred on March 11, 2011 and there have
been regular demonstrations in the Eastern Province ever since.
3
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
that Saudi Arabia’s regional rival Iran could take advantage of the discontented Shia
populations within the Gulf monarchies to weaken the GCC’s internal stability and
gain greater power on the regional stage. is concern was voiced in April 2011
when the GCC meeting in Riyadh criticized “agrant Iranian interference and
provocations aimed at sowing discord and destruction” among them. Time did not
soothe their fears, as evident from the 33rd GCC Supreme Council Meeting held
in December 2013, during which the GCC urged Iran to immediately stop these
provocations and refrain from policies and acts which increase tension or threaten
regional security and stability. e linkage of events within the GCC to Iranian policy
highlights how interrelated the risks faced by Saudi Arabia are today. Meanwhile, in
terms of overall internal stability, the regime was able to quiet popular unrest through
vast investments in social infrastructure and the nancing of religious institutions.9
Moreover, it can be argued that most Saudi citizens, unlike Tunisians and Egyptians,
have no intention of overthrowing their regime.10 While many of them sharply
criticize political disenfranchisement, corruption, and state abuse, they seem to go by
the idiom “better the devil you know (than the devil you don’t).”11
Another Saudi concern is that the Arab uprisings are likely to threaten national
security by allowing violent groups to unleash terror in the MENA region. In this
regard, it may be noted that political unrest and instability have given way to extremist
armed groups in the Libyan and Syrian crises. ese issues are, however, left aside
in this paper as they do not represent immediate territorial threats to Saudi Arabia
– although this could change in the short term considering how the ongoing Syrian
conict threatens to spill over into Iraq and worsen the situation there.
From the Saudi perspective, the main risks lie on its Southern border, that
is, in Yemen. Yemen has often been described as the Saudi “soft spot” because the
Kingdom always had complicated relations with the Yemenis, before and after the
unication of their two states in 1990. e possible threats coming from there have
certainly not reduced. In fact, “the political vacuum in Yemen continues to weaken
Saudi counter-terrorism endeavours.”12 While these have been successful in the
Kingdom itself, members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who ed
9. is comes as the achievement of a cooptation process which began about ten years ago. See
Stéphane Lacroix, Les islamistes saoudiens, une insurrection manquée (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 2010).
10. ere are some exceptions to this, as shown by slogans on the walls calling for the “Fall of the
House of Saud” in Qatif, for example.
11. Jean-François Seznec, “La révolte arabe et le vide géopolitique en Arabie saoudite,” Outre-Terre,
no. 29 (2011): 492.
12. Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of
Security,” Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, 2:2 (December 2012): 152.
4
GRM PAPER
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
Saudi Arabia found a safe haven in Yemen. is represents a direct challenge to
Saudi national security, just as the militarized Houthi movement in north Yemen,
which is seen as having taken advantage of the inability of the Yemeni government
to maintain territorial integrity.13 Although uprisings in Yemen revived the Saudi
distress, Saudi Arabia managed to diminish the threats coming from its southern
border by facilitating the political transition and deploying consolidated security
systems there. It is also important to remember that terrorism and violent extremism
are hardly a new challenge to Saudi stability – it dates back to the struggles between
Ibn Saud and extremist factions in the tribal forces or Ikhwan that began in the
1920s.
While Yemen is the most important direct threat at the moment, the greatest
challenge to Saudi security today actually comes from the political transitions in the
MENA region and the shifts in dynamics and alignments that the Arab uprisings
allowed. In this regard, Saudi Arabia was particularly concerned about the stance of
post-Mubarak Egypt. In the rst months after the overthrow of the regime, there
were signs that the new leaders might want to re-evaluate the terms of the 1979 peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel. is bore the seeds of a possible revived Arab-Israeli
war and hence threatened regional security and stability. For now, the sequence of
events has pushed this possibility into the background.
Another aspect of the evolving Egyptian stance which a great source of
concern for Saudi Arabia was their restoration of diplomatic relations with Iran. A
rapprochement between revolutionary Iran and post-Mubarak Egypt presented the
risk of dramatic change in the regional dynamics against Saudi strategic interests.
While such reconciliation could have a great impact on the whole region, recent
developments in Egypt again make this quite unlikely. e continued regional
turmoil makes it dicult to foresee how events will evolve, and it is in fact safe
to say that the main security issue posed to Saudi Arabia by the Arab uprisings
comes from the regional political vacuum it has provoked. e Saudis fear that this
vacuum could be lled by their regional adversaries. In this respect, the Kingdom’s
greatest security challenge would be the consolidation of a new geopolitical ensemble
bringing together Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, within which Sunnis would be
excluded from power. But it can also be argued that this regional political vacuum
could precisely be lled by Saudi Arabia.
13. An illustration of this occurred in January and February 2014: the ghting in Yemen allowed
Houthis to expand their control over some northern areas.
5
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
Opening a Window onto New Regional Assertive Policies
While Saudi activism was evident prior to this (a key moment here being the US-led
invasion of Iraq, as will be discussed later on), the Arab uprisings accelerated a shift
of the Saudi leaders towards more assertive foreign and security policies. In a context
where the long-established regional actors – namely, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – are
isolated or unable to take on their traditional role due to domestic constraints, Saudi
Arabia seems to want to enhance its status at the head of the regional order. e
Kingdom recently reasserted its position of prominence and leadership both within
the sub-regional context of the Arabian Peninsula through the GCC and within the
broader MENA region.
e GCC was created in February 1981, leaving Iran, Iraq, and the two Yemeni
states on the outside. On paper, it formalized the union of six equal states. But it has
been argued that in reality, it ocialized Saudi sovereignty over most its neighbors,
as proved by the location of its headquarters in Riyadh. is Saudi pre-eminence has
been regularly challenged ever since, mostly by Qatar and the UAE but also, to a lesser
extent, or more quietly, by Oman. Now, the beginning of the Arab uprisings and the
regional unrest have somewhat reduced this opposition.14 In fact, the reassertion of
Saudi leadership within the GCC can be seen as one of the most important changes
brought about by recent events.15 Here, it may be noted that the preference Saudi
Arabia has shown for the GCC rather than the Arab League as a frame for its foreign
and security policies reects a certain suspicion towards the latter because of its
vulnerability to Iranian inuence through three members: Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.
What has sometimes been described as the Saudi rediscovery of the instrumentalist
utility of the GCC to project its inuence on the regional stage has taken various
forms within the sub-regional complex of the Peninsula.
e most important Saudi initiative pointing to a new assertiveness and a will
to assume a revived regional leadership role was the sending of troops to Bahrain
on March 14, 2011. is intervention sent a clear signal that the Saudi-led GCC
would not tolerate any event or movement threatening the regional status quo and
the stability and security of the region. It has been read as the clearest sign of an
evolution in the strategic stance of the Kingdom because it rarely used to adopt a
14. is was particularly true in the two rst years of the so-called “Arab Spring” – with notable
exception of Qatar, which will be assessed later on. However, the end of 2013 witnessed events
undermining this statement. e Omani sponsoring US-Iran talks without telling any of their
neighbors including Saudi Arabia can be mentioned as well as the Omani criticism against the
Gulf union concept of the Saudis, voiced by Yusuf Bin Alawi at the Manama Dialogue.
15. Mehran Kamrava, “e Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution,” Orbis (Winter
2012): 98.
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GRM PAPER
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
hard power approach before. Another less dramatic, soft power initiative was the
aforementioned political mediation between the Yemeni government and opposition
that the Kingdom undertook, yet again “under the informal clout of the GCC.”16
Finally, and still within the framework of the GCC, the Kingdom’s ability to be
so assertive relied on its riyal politik – that is, the use of oil money as a foreign
policy tool. As has been argued, in the context of the Arab uprisings and within the
Gulf region, it mostly ensured that no direct contestation of the status quo came to
threaten regional stability – as shown by the Saudi-dominated GCC pledge of $20
billion in nancial aid to Bahrain and Oman.
Apart from these GCC initiatives, Saudi Arabia used its riyal politik in the
broader MENA region. While the $1.4 billion aid to Jordan also aimed at preserving
the status quo, aid to Egypt and Syria might be seen in a dierent way. ere, nancial
and logistic support was given to certain movements whose political views concurred
with the specic interests of the Kingdom. e same interests drove other eorts
such as creating a unied Syrian opposition front. In this regard, the election of Nofal
Al-Dawālibi, a Syrian-Saudi based in Riyadh, as the head of the Unied Syrian
National Council came as a sign that these eorts were ecient. In this regard, one
can underline the specic activism of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi intelligence
chief and former ambassador to the US (1983-2005), which underlined the Saudi
shift to a more assertive foreign policy.17
e New Saudi Strategic Stance: Hegemonic or Defensive?
ere is no consensus amidst the Gulf research community on how one should read
the redenition of the Kingdom’s strategic stance on the regional stage: should it be
seen as a hegemonic or a defensive move? We will present arguments on both sides
before trying to formulate an opinion on evolving Saudi foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia’s reaction to regional events, using both soft power and hard
power, reected an evolution of its foreign policy from a “consensual pattern” to a
“confrontational assertive” one.18 is has been interpreted as a hegemonic move
16. Marco Pinfari, “Nothing but Failure? e Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as
Mediators in Middle Eastern Conicts,” Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, London
School of Economics (LSE), March 2009, 17.
17. On Saudi assertiveness, see Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Arabia Shifts to More Activist Foreign Pol-
icy Doctrine” (op-ed), Al Monitor, October 17, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-
nals/2013/10/saudi-shifts-foreign-policy-doctrine.html (accessed February 22, 2014); Moham-
med Bin Nawaf Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud [Saudi Ambassador to the UK], “Saudi Arabia Will Go
It Alone” (op-ed), e New York Times, December 18, 2013.
18. Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, “Hegemonic or Defensive? Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy in the
Era of the Arab Spring,” ORIENT, no. IV (2012): 14.
7
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
because Saudi Arabia took the lead and somehow imposed its prominence in the
revived GCC to undertake a ‘counterattack’ against the regional turmoil. Of all
Saudi endeavors, its intervention in Bahrain, under the banner of the GCC, was
interpreted as the main proof that Saudi Arabia was willing to go to any length to
impose a counter-revolutionist agenda in the sub-regional complex of the Peninsula.
According to this perception of Saudi Arabia as an aspirant hegemon, not only did
the Kingdom try to prevent political change within the GCC but it tried to contain
the ‘democratic surge’ by expanding the axis of counter-revolution within the broader
MENA region. is idea was echoed in the proposition that GCC membership be
extended to the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies, “against all geographic logic.”19
Other scholars have argued that Saudi Arabia has never aimed at becoming a
regional hegemon while its increasing international weight and domestic capabilities
allowed it. Hence, its current assertive foreign policy should be read as a defensive
move. In this context, Saudi Arabia has regularly been described as a ‘risk-averse
player’ in the regional and international arena because it usually avoids open
confrontation with its adversaries and rather tries to accommodate them. Another
important pattern of the Saudi foreign policy is that it is mostly driven by the felt
necessity of preserving the stability of the regime. e riyal politik appears as a
combination of these two points, Saudi Arabia using its wealth as an “accommodating
instrument” to shape the external environment to secure its internal one. In order to
protect its domestic status quo, the Kingdom tries to secure the regional status quo.
is is as a priority in its foreign policy. According to some observers, its shifting
policies should thus be seen as a defensive reaction and not as an attempt to rise as a
regional hegemon. In fact, “the promotion of a revolutionary rhetoric and emerging
democratic regimes in the region are perceived as an existential threat in Riyadh.”20
Saudi Arabia’s active foreign policy could thus be seen as a survival strategy. is
was also put forward as one of the factors contributing to the Saudi decision to use
hard power, particularly in Bahrain. e hard approach was used when Saudi Arabia
decided that the developments in a specic country were too direct a threat to the
Peninsula’s political landscape including its own internal security. In other words, it
was “merely” aimed at securing the Kingdom’s interests rather than expanding them.
Suspicions of an Iranian inuence in the events in Yemen in 2009 and in events in
Bahrain from 2011 onwards as well as the possibility that Iran might take advantage
of the current turmoil in the MENA region arguably further legitimized this new
19. Alain Gresh, “Séisme géopolitique au Proche-Orient,” Le Monde diplomatique, no. 693 (Decem-
ber 2011): 8.
20. Stéphane Lacroix, “L’Arabie Saoudite au dé du printemps arabe,” in “Les monarchies du Golfe
face au printemps arabe,” Les dossiers du CERI, Paris, Sciences Po, September 2011.
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Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
assertiveness. is “defensive rather than hegemonic” pattern of action points to the
“highly developed encirclement syndrome”21 which resulted in the merger of Saudi
foreign and security policies. is is a good starting point to try and formulate a
balanced analysis of the evolving Saudi stance.
A country’s foreign policy is dened by external circumstances and the capacity of
an internal system to address them according to its specic characteristics.22 Within the
context of the Arab uprisings, Saudi foreign policy is linked to its perception of its own
regime’s survival and regional rivalries. e increasing polarization of its geopolitical
environment represents a real challenge for a country which has traditionally opted
for a quiet, behind-the-scenes approach as a political resource. While the regional
turmoil has forced the idea of change into their domestic environment – as seen in
the regime’s response through some rather cosmetic reforms these past two years
–, it appears that Saudi Arabia aims at securing a sub-regional status quo to buy
itself some time and witness change through “evolution, not revolution.” Hence the
eorts to keep revolutionary frenzy at bay. It has to be stressed that “this is consistent
with GCC ruling families’ track record of pursuing pragmatic strategies of survival,
designed to manage the transformational shifts in their domestic and international
circumstances in recent decades.”23 In fact, the shared interests of the GCC members,
which are to survive the revolutionary forces threatening them and to resist a
supposed “comeback” of Iran as a regional power allows a reading of current events
as a combination of the hegemonic and the defensive patterns. Hence, it could be
argued that Saudi Arabia is not imposing its hegemonic view on its neighbors but is
leading an alliance of “consenting monarchies” against too dramatic a change.
In view of the current “Arab Shifting Sands of Politics,”24 the Gulf countries
have adopted common assertive foreign policies as a collective survival strategy.
Interestingly enough, the fact that Saudi Arabia took the lead in this revived
“hegemonic cooperation” might be a sign of change in the articulation of its foreign
and security policies. While the consensual foreign policy was merged with security
policy through accommodating policies toward the regional protector that the US is,
21. David Long and Sebastian Maisel, e Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville, University Press of
Florida, 2010), 144-146.
22. Frédéric Charillon, “La diplomatie saoudienne à l’épreuve de la turbulence,” Etudes, no. 400
(2004): 154.
23. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “e GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power,” Oc-
casional Paper No. 6, Doha, Center for International and Regional Studies, 2010, 6.
24. Elham Manea, “Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring and the Regional Context,” ORIENT, no. IV
(2012): 8.
9
Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
it has indeed been argued that “no one can guarantee Saudi Arabia’s future stability
in a time of turmoil.”25 It has to be stressed that, in itself, the regrouping of the GCC
may open a new era in international relations of the Middle East – assuming it lasts,
which is very much open to discussion. Taking this one step further, could it be that
Saudi Arabia sees the GCC and the new collective confrontational pattern adopted
as a viable security strategy and an alternative guarantee to the “guardian angel” role
of the US?
In order to test this hypothesis, we need to explore two other issues. First, will
the geo-economic trends, associated with a perceived shift in traditional alliances and
interests, strengthen the new strategic stance of Saudi Arabia and the GCC? Second,
how will this possible GCC “hegemonic cooperation” work within what has been
labeled as the ‘Arab Gulf Moment’ and what will be the consequences in the regional
and international arena?
Security and Geo-economics in the Gulf Region: Evolving
Paradigms
As was discussed, it seems that the regional context and the combination of strategic
challenges and opportunities it presents might have pushed Saudi Arabia to take
further control of its security and stability. Its assertiveness not only translates into
evolving foreign and security policies but also into what appears to be a new Saudi
security strategy. We will now study the impact of global geo-economic trends on
Saudi security issues and the strategy developed to address them. Moving on to
this broader focus, we will see that new dynamics there also point to an increasing
independence – or empowerment – of Saudi Arabia and of the other GCC countries.
We will rst go through the security challenges faced by Saudi Arabia in view of
the uncertainty about the future US position towards the Gulf region. en, we will
point out the opportunities that the evolving global geo-economic context presents
for Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries to adopt more assertive security
strategies. Having assessed this change in traditional paradigms, we will explore the
scope of new possibilities it opens up for Saudi Arabia and its partners.
Uncertain Future of Traditional Logics and Partnerships
e “oil for security” pact between the US and the Gulf countries is not the only
paradigm dening the regional security complex. However, it is enough of a factor
25. Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Stability in a Time of Change,” Washington, Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), April 2011, 2.
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Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
for sub-regional security issues to be impacted by any US repositioning. Today,
evolutions with regard to both the ‘security’ and ‘oil’ ends of this pact are issues of
great concern for the GCC countries and particularly for Saudi Arabia. Economic
imperatives and other factors may lead the US to re-evaluate its presence in the Gulf.
Moreover, the challenge to traditional logics this represents emerges in a context
of growing mistrust between KSA and the US that the Arab uprisings heightened.
As one should always refrain from “reading too much in too little,” we will try and
oer balanced hypotheses of what can be expected regarding the changing Saudi-US
partnership.
As a result of the global recession, all Western countries instituted major cutbacks
in their security budgets. A study published by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) in April 2013 shows that these budgets have decreased
in the US, Europe, Australia, Canada, and Japan. In fact, 2012 witnessed the rst
decline in global military spending since 1998. In the case of the US, cutbacks were
linked to the economic crisis and other factors such as the end of military operations
in Iraq and withdrawal of its armed forces from Afghanistan. e US, thus forced
to rationalize its defense spending, may also have to re-evaluate its military presence
in the Gulf. Concern about this prospect grew stronger when the Department of
Defense (DoD) announced a shift in focus towards the Asia-Pacic region. e
US eorts to become as independent as possible from foreign sources of oil supply
further put a question mark on the strategic priority it would give to the Gulf region
in the future and the relevance of its role in the “oil for security” pact with the Gulf
monarchies. ese dynamics raise important security challenges for the GCC,
particularly for Saudi Arabia. Having relied on the US military umbrella to ensure
its security, especially since the collapse of the monarchical state in Iran in 1979,
Saudi Arabia is concerned that it could become increasingly vulnerable to the Iranian
threat because of what it perceives as a lesser US commitment to preserving stability
and security in the region. While this may be rather unlikely in the near future, it
can be argued that those fears on the part of the Kingdom have a lot to do with the
growing mistrust between Saudi Arabia and the US.
e Saudi-US relationship took a hit subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, as 15 of
the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens. Besides, Saudi leaders, along with other GCC
leaders, see the US as having handed Iraq to Iran on a platter in 2003 – although
they see this not so much as perdy as an act of political naiveté.26 Today, it can be
argued that these tensions and suspicions have been revived in light of the Arab
uprisings. Saudi Arabia was critical of the US for its support to the Egyptian uprising
26. Bernard Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” Washington, CSIS, February
2013, 5.
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Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:
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Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
and what the Saudi regime perceived as treason towards their long-time ally Hosni
Mubarak. And as the US voiced concern over human rights violations in Bahrain
and elsewhere, “half-hearted as they may be,”27 Saudi Arabia appears to have decided
that their traditional US ally cannot be fully counted on: “the US isn’t exactly the god
that failed, but its divine powers are certainly suspect in Riyadh.”28 e dierences
between the US and the Kingdom may in fact be growing rather than shrinking, as
the two sides are taking or have taken dierent positions “on basically every issue of
strategic importance and concern at the moment.”29 While this further questions the
Saudi perception of the US as a reliable guarantor of its security, this relationship is
still regarded as very valuable on both sides.
In spite of the aforementioned tensions, Saudi Arabia and the US do cooperate
to create more eective forces to deal with Iran, al-Qaeda and instability in Yemen.
e Gulf remains a vital American national security interest and Saudi Arabia is very
important in this regard.30 us, the alleged tensions in Saudi-US relations lately may
just mean that a page is indeed turning in the security paradigms of the Gulf region
and a new chapter of greater Saudi autonomy and empowerment is opening. is may
precisely be what the US wants – which in turn reactivates the suspicions of Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf countries. Former US defense secretary Leon Panetta’s speech
at the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies Research (ECSSR) in Abu Dhabi in
April 2013 is rather telling in this regard. While praising the relationships between
the US and the Gulf countries, he was quick to add that they are evolving. He also
voiced the US hope that “the GCC can play an important role in the future providing
security for this region.”31 While Saudi fears that a reduction of US interest in the
region might translate into increased security risks are understandable, the Kingdom
and the GCC have the means to tackle these challenges – new global dynamics
present them with emerging opportunities to shape new security paradigms as they
want, through their procurement strategies.
27. Mark Lander, “Amid Unrest in Bahrain, U.S. Tends a Friendship,” International Herald Tribune,
June 11, 2011, 5, quoted in Mehran Kemrava, “e Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counter-
revolution,” 98.
28. David Ignatius, “Saudi Arabia Expands its Power as US Inuence Diminishes,” e Washington
Post, November 18, 2011.
29. Abdulaziz Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?” Arab News, March 29, 2013.
30. Anthony Cordesman, “Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Dierent Nation,”
Washington, CSIS, February 2011; Cordesman, “Saudi Stability in a Time of Change,” 4; Riedel,
“Revolution in Riyadh.”
31. Elizabeth Dickinson, “US Looks to Allies to Secure the Arabian Gulf,” e National, April 24,
2013.
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Emerging Opportunities for a Rising Assertiveness
e Western economic downturn and the emergence of new international actors
have turned the Gulf region into an even more important ‘magnet’ for defense
manufacturers and the national economies they contribute to. While the GCC
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, indeed remain some of the world’s biggest
spenders in this area, a change in their procurement strategies is to be noted. In fact,
current global geo-economic trends oer them an opportunity to move forward into
new foreign and security dynamics.
Cutbacks in Western security budgets, especially in the US, might represent
one of the current security challenges of the Gulf region but it also pushes both
governments and defense manufacturers to look for opportunities to protect their
defense industrial base. As this is only possible through the export market, the Gulf
has become an even more important magnet than before. is is true for traditional
powers which have been present in the region for a long time, that is the US and
European Union (EU) members – particularly France and the United Kingdom
(UK) – but it is also true for emergent powers: today, the BRICs,32 having experienced
remarkable economic growth for a decade, have started to focus on their interests
in the region, adding complexity to the regional competition. e export race for
the Gulf market comes as no surprise since the GCC states are some of the only
countries which have increased the share of military spending in their economies
between 2003-2009 and 2009-2012. In 2012 alone, Saudi defense spending has
increased by 12 percent, to $56.7 billion.33 However, it is important to underline
that the Kingdom is likely to make changes in the logics of its military expenditure
– the old practice mainly consisted in keeping its head down and relying on the US
military umbrella, secured by the oil ow and regular investments in the American
military-industrial complex.
Until recently, Gulf monarchies hardly expressed their own views on their security
challenges. Western actors thus tended to interpret them through the lens of their
own interests and “defense manufacturers were able to sell virtually what they wanted
in the Gulf region, often taking advantage of, and proting from, their clients’ lack
of knowledge.”34 Moreover, because of a deciency in indigenous military-industrial
32. is acronym points to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and they have all (except
for Brazil) tried and developed their commercial and strategic relations with the Gulf countries
in the recent decades.
33. Edouard Pimlin, “Baisse des dépenses militaires mondiales en 2012, une première depuis 1998,”
Le Monde, April 15, 2013.
34. Nadim Hasbani, “e Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States,” Defense and
Security Analysis 22, no. 1 (March 2006): 81.
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production capabilities, the Gulf defense market was mostly characterized by imports
of o-the-shelf products and platforms. Now, the Gulf countries increasingly express
specic needs and demand technologies and competencies that will enable them
to take independent control of their own security. Moving away from the “oil for
security” paradigm, they have shifted their focus to “sustainable and mission-oriented
procurement and force development, rather than the ‘glitter factor’ competition to buy
the most advanced weapons system possible regardless of mission priority and the
ability to operate and sustain an integrated mix of systems and forces in combat.”35
is has to be linked to the new generation of military personnel which has reached
senior command and has been educated at universities and military colleges in the
West. “ese new decision-makers are aware of the needs of their respective states
as well as the range of equipment available. ey also know, above all, how they
can prot by playing the competition o one against another.”36 To put it another
way, while Saudi Arabia mostly used to ensure its security and stability by throwing
money to get a deal with Western countries and more particularly the US, when the
latter were the main shapers of regional security strategies, the new geo-economic
order allows the Saudis to move forward into new dynamics where their incredible
economic weight is utilized to shape not only new foreign and security policies but
also a security strategy of their own.
Global geo-economic trends and the regional turmoil both push Saudi Arabia
to have more assertive policies and organize a specic security strategy. It has
been argued, for example, that the Saudis are planning to spend their money more
aggressively as a regional power broker – by roughly doubling its armed forces over
the next 10 years, which is a signal of the country’s condence. Moreover, this will
allow Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies to enhance their international status
by rescuing struggling Western economies through the use of their sovereign wealth
funds. is could represent a bargaining chip in the organization of new security
strategies, along what has been described as “a new dynamic in the middlepower
and superpower relations.”37 While Saudi Arabia still regards its relationship with
the US as valuable, it has been argued that it is no longer seen as a guarantor of its
security. Assuming Saudi Arabia has room for maneuver in this respect – which
is in fact questionable, we would like to go through the dierent options the new
context presents in terms of security strategies. e concepts of “perception and
35. Anthony Cordesman, “Securing the Gulf: Key reats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation,”
Washington, CSIS, February 2013, 48.
36. Hasbani, “e Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States,” 81.
37. Al Tamamy, “Hegemonic or Defensive?” 17.
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misperception”38 really come in handy when studying the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi
fears that their traditional ally the US can no longer be fully counted on might indeed
seem unrealistic – just as their existential concern about the “Iranian threat.” However,
these (mis)perceptions do impact the decision-making processes. In the face of the
multiple security challenges they experience today, both real and perceived, it is thus
important to review some of the possible strategies they could adopt to address them.
A Scope of Possibilities to Explore
It appears that there are three dierent paths Saudi Arabia could choose. First, it
could decide that it still needs to bet on the US and, to a lesser extent, European
powers such as France and the UK, as its ultimate security guarantors. Second, it
could decide that its best interests lie in a diversication of partnerships beyond the
traditional Western allies to increase its security. ird, Saudi Arabia could push its
regional initiatives further and, as a leader of the revived GCC, guide its members
into the development of an integrated regional system. ese dierent options are
not mutually exclusive.
While their views diverge on several regional issues, especially in light of the
Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia and the US still have too many common security
interests to seriously consider jeopardizing this relationship.39 One could argue that
their partnership would only become more pragmatic than before. Indeed, the “oil for
security” pact already represents a “marriage of convenience” which is regularly
criticized by some observers on both sides. From the Saudi perspective, it is a decisive
means of “omnibalancing” between Iran and its regional security and political
ambitions on the one hand, and their own and the US interests on the other.
According to Steven David, omnibalancing “incorporates the need of leaders to
appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external
threats in order to survive in power.”40 is practical Saudi-US alliance should then
be reorganized in coherence with the new Saudi self-condence that has been noted
in its procurement strategies. On the other hand, it is possible to suggest that the
continued disagreements between the two regarding several issues could at some
point become too dramatic for their relations to be restored to an even keel. As some
have argued, their ties are changing to such an extent that “the GCC states have no
38. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1976).
39. e renewal of the Quincy agreement in 2005, in the middle of an alleged trust crisis, is a good
sign of this.
40. Steven R. David, “Explaining ird World Alignment,” World Politics 43, no. 2 (January 1991):
236.
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choice but to act on their own and without consideration of US interests and
concerns.”41 e GCC states and particularly Saudi Arabia have been critical of the
US stance on the continuing Syrian crisis and the Iranian nuclear program. Of the
two, the latter represents the real “red line” in the eyes of Saudi Arabia. e view of
some observers that the US could, down the road, decide it is better o with Iran as
an eligible partner to protect the security of the strategic Gulf region only adds to
these fears. Such a development would be Saudi Arabia’s worst nightmare come true.
In fact, such fears may prompt the Kingdom to look for other partners for its security
strategy.
e idea of multi-balancing alliances is not new. It has represented a pattern
of Saudi foreign policy for a long time: while the US was acknowledged as the only
power capable of providing an ultimate security guarantee, “there has always been a
Saudi desire to establish and enhance ties with other global powers.”42 Today, as the
very idea of the US as a guarantor of Saudi security is challenged, the relevance of
creating new security ties with other powers seems to be rising. ese new partnerships
would be in line with increasing political and economic relations and accelerating
interdependencies between the Gulf and Asian states such as India, China, South
Korea, and also Russia.43 Recent defense contracts and security agreements have
pointed towards this option as a viable new security strategy. In this respect, the
fact that a pragmatic foreign policy with emphasis on non-intervention and state
sovereignty is especially attractive to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states is worth
mentioning.44
However, there are several obstacles to adopting this strategy. First, Saudi
Arabia may buy its security systems and products from a new set of partners, these
partners seem unwilling and unlikely to oer security guarantees as reliable as the
Western ones.45 Second, tensions have appeared between some of these alternative
41. Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?”
42. Gerd Nonneman, “Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy: ‘Omnibalancing’ and
‘Relative Autonomy’ in Multiple Environments,” in Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy,
Society, Foreign Aairs, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (London: Hurst, 2005), 328 and 334.
43. Ulrichsen, “e GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power”; Al Tamamy, “Hegem-
onic or Defensive?” 14-15.
44. is remark particularly describes emerging partnerships with China. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen
argues that “e diering experience of trade negotiations with the EU and those with Asian
states raises the possibility of global realignments between compatible groups of states sharing
a skeptic view of international criticism focusing on Western-centric norms” (“e GCC States
and the Shifting Balance of Global Power,” 18-19).
45. On this specic issue, one can nevertheless underline that Saudi Arabia arguably has “an instant
deterrent ready in the form of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal that [it is] widely believed to have
helped nance” (Ignatius, “Saudi Arabia Expands its Power as US Inuence Diminishes.”)
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partners and Saudi Arabia in light of the Arab uprisings. is is particularly true
with China and Russia, as the Kingdom has strongly criticized their position in the
Syrian crisis. Hence, Saudi repositioning of its security strategy may remain limited
due to these factors.
Since it appears that “no one can guarantee Saudi Arabia’s future stability in
a time of turmoil,” Saudi Arabia may, in fact, decide that its best option is to guide
the GCC members towards an integrated regional system. As has been pointed out
in the rst part of this paper, the GCC members share many security interests and
Saudi Arabia would not be imposing its hegemonic view on the Arabian Peninsula
but rather helping the “regrouping” of compliant monarchies within the GCC against
immediate security challenges and too dramatic changes. e idea of this “hegemonic
cooperation” would be consistent with the increasing coherence of the GCC as a
collective power – as shown by their defense agreements and joint exercises, which
will be discussed later on. is cooperation relies mostly on their felt existential need
to contain the Iranian threat. However, on this specic issue, their deterrence power
is questionable and it has been noted that “the GCC will always nd itself dependent
on external defense assistance.”46 Hence, while a greater degree of integration within
the GCC and an increased alignment in terms of foreign and security policies seems
adequate, this option probably has to be combined, in the short term, with the other
two. Since this “hegemonic cooperation” in the making under an assertive Saudi
leadership is one of the most important changes brought about by recent events to
the GCC states’ collective foreign policy, we will assess it further.
New Saudi Security Strategies: Regional and Global
Implications
e new security strategies of Saudi Arabia are linked to three intermingled factors: the
increasing polarization within its geopolitical environment, its decreasing condence
in the US commitment towards the region, and its growing self-condence in its
domestic capabilities.47 While it has been argued that Saudi Arabia is not pursuing
a hegemonic agenda through this new assertive stance, it could be organizing a
“hegemonic cooperation” under its lead to become stronger and more resilient in
the face of adversity and have better chances of securing the regional status quo.
We will examine how this “hegemonic cooperation” and its security prospects are
articulated with the “Arab Gulf Moment,” an idea which needs to be dened. en,
we will go through regional antagonisms and rivalries which are likely to jeopardize
46. J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Help, 1986), 147.
47. Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring,” 148.
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this cooperation. Finally, we will try and assess the consequences of the new Saudi
security strategies on the broader region, and internationally.
Prospects of a Saudi-led “Hegemonic Cooperation” within the Arab Gulf
Moment
e “Arab Gulf Moment” is an expression pointing to the idea of a new era when
the Arab Gulf States are able to “reshape the geo-economics and geo-politics of the
region, and to set in motion a process for the Gulfanization of the Arab world.”48
In fact, they even have the means to have their voice heard on the international
stage and to possibly restructure international paradigms at a broader level. In this
context, is the Saudi-led “hegemonic cooperation”, through the GCC, viable and
could it be the most relevant response to their common security challenges? We will
rst see that both the Saudi initiatives and the global positive attitude towards the
GCC make a case for this “hegemonic cooperation.” We will then further explore the
security prospects of the GCC. Finally, we will try and assess the feasibility of such
a security entity.
e condence Saudi Arabia has shown recently as a leader of the GCC
“hegemonic cooperation” may strike a promising note for this regional entity. For
instance, the Saudi idea that the GCC should be turned into a “single entity” shows
that it wants to take institutionalization a step further. However, it is dicult to
evaluate the potential of such a project. e relevance of the GCC “hegemonic
cooperation” may be better seen through its alliances with an increasing number of
other international organizations. ere are many workshops and research projects
today about the relations between the EU and the GCC. Also to be noted are the talks
about a new impulse in cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the GCC. eir partnership was greatly enhanced in 2011, in light of
the NATO intervention in Libya. is could allow further institutionalization of
the security alliance between the West and the GCC members.49 Furthermore, this
48. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, “Contemporary Sociopolitical Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment,” Research
Paper No. 11, LSE Kuwait Programme, Center for the Study of Global Governance, September
2010, 1. “[e six Arab Gulf States] are taking the lead, inuencing events, assuming greater
nancial responsibilities, projecting socioeconomic condence, and becoming increasingly con-
scious of their newly acquired status as a regional power that far transcends the rest of the Arab
countries.” Although he includes Saudi Arabia in the Arab Gulf States (AGS) system, Abdulla
singles it out, arguing that socio-political issues he discusses are applicable to it but more relevant
to the smaller AGS (11).
49. Isabelle François, NATO and the Arab Spring, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University, October 2011, “Transatlantic Current”, no. 1, 2, quoted in Mohammad-Reza
Djalili and Clément erme, “Iraniens et Saoudiens à l’épreuve des révoltes arabes,” Politique
étrangère, no. 1 (2012): 114. On the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and its developments,
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cooperation agreement would send a clear message to Iran. One could argue that this
renewed cooperation would also prove that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC
countries need not entirely rely on themselves to ensure their security and stability.
But it can also point to the fact that security is arguably the best way for the GCC to
develop further cooperation towards becoming a “single entity” since the monetary
union project is still blocked today.
e “collective GCC survival strategy” which is unfolding today under the
leadership of Saudi Arabia could rely on a certain number of previous initiatives and
cooperation eorts in this domain. e GCC plans for military cooperation have
included the establishment of a Military Committee, which rst met in September
1981, the creation of the ‘Peninsula Shield’ joint strike force, formed in 1984, mutual
defense agreements, and an increasing number of joint exercises. Finally, the idea of
further cooperation in the area of arms acquisition has been raised from the time
of the establishment of the GCC. e GCC, it has been argued, has the potential
to become a far more eective security structure, improving every aspect of Arab
Gulf state security and that this would not require a sacrice of sovereignty. It does,
however, “require the Arab Gulf nations to act upon what they have already said they
should do. (…) ere is no future in relying on deterrence and defense by declaration,
conference, or Diwaniya.”50 Recent actions, such as the “‘Belt of Cooperation’ air
space monitoring network” and the 2004 agreement on intelligence-sharing, as well
as declarations of the GCC countries show that the will to build a more united entity
is real. Yet, this consolidation, while eective, would need a “large set of friends.”
Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries are wealthy and this allows them to
buy highly sophisticated weapons and invest in integrated systems and rationalized
capabilities in line with new procurement strategies, as suggested by some analysts.
However, there remain obstacles to their possible attempt at self-defense such as
“the small base of indigenous manpower and serious training problems, the intensive
competition for skilled manpower, and the lack of combat experience.”51 Some
observers have even argued that this “lack of quantitative and qualitative trained
human resources to operate and maintain the new, technologically advanced
equipment eectively”52 might be the reason why Jordan and Morocco were invited
to ‘join the club’ in 2011. Indeed, these two countries have professionally trained
see Jean-Loup Samaan, NATO in the Gulf: Partnership Without a Cause? Roma, NATO Defense
College, October 2012 and Matteo Legrenzi, “NATO in the Gulf: Who is Doing Whom a Fa-
vor?” Middle East Policy 14, no. 1(2007): 69-75.
50. Cordesman, “Securing the Gulf,” iii.
51. Peterson, Defending Arabia, 177.
52. Hasbani, “e Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States,” 76.
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armed forces, with combat experience and could give the guarantee the GCC lacks.
e fact that this decision to invite these two countries was purely53 Saudi points to
another potential obstacle: dierent outlooks and policy goals among the six GCC
member states and the associated and continuing regional antagonisms and rivalries.
Continued Regional Antagonisms and Rivalries
While the need to consolidate the GCC in the face of revived threats is felt by
all six member countries, there is likely to be a lack of unanimity on the issue of
Saudi leadership of the bloc. One must not overlook the potential crises which could
arise from the rivalry for regional inuence between Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well
as with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Recent signs also seem to question the
viability of the aforementioned “hegemonic cooperation.”
ere is a history of antagonisms and rivalries among the GCC countries
especially between Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf States. In terms of
military forces, one can underline the continuing tension between Saudi Arabia and
Oman linked to the fact that the latter is regularly acknowledged as the only GCC
state which represents a real competitor for the Saudi armed forces. is is probably
the reason why Saudi Arabia did not support the proposition of Sultan Qaboos
when, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he advised that an army of 100,000
men be constituted to reduce the GCC dependency on foreign forces. As has been
noted, besides Saudi Arabia, only Oman would have been able to oer sucient
manpower, which would have weakened the Saudi leadership. Today, Oman’s search
for an enhanced role in the GCC and desire to prevent Saudi domination of the bloc
are to be noted. Yusuf Bin Alawi’s statement against the Saudi proposal to move from
cooperation to union at the 2013 Manama Dialogue is telling.
ere is also a history of border disputes between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Qatar which recently led to some discussion on border revisions. In this regard and in
others, the main alleged rival to Saudi Arabia is Qatar which, like Oman, resists any
Saudi eort to lead the GCC. For this purpose, it has been using the Doha-based Al
Jazeera network to increase its status and sometime criticize its neighbor indirectly.
In the beginning of the 1990s, it also took advantage of a border dispute to seriously
question the leadership of Saudi Arabia. While the Arab uprisings and the resulting
regional turmoil had apparently soothed these antagonisms at rst, the subsequent
unfolding of events is possibly reviving them. It is thought that these rivalries and
53. Saudi Arabia arguably wants to rely more on itself or on the GCC for its security. is project is
necessarily middle to long term because of the mentioned obstacles; so relying on friendly Sunni
monarchies in the meantime seems a fair idea, concurring with the suspicions with regard to the
US.
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the reluctance of some smaller states towards accepting a Saudi dominance have
sharply limited the eectiveness of the GCC, its military integration, and its level
of interoperability. Nevertheless, the current crisis situation and the serious security
challenges it presents might annul these obstacles. e GCC seems to have the
capacity to rise from the ashes of crises.
e GCC was created in reaction to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and its
Peninsula Shield “collective defense force” was established after Iran went on the
oensive in the Iran-Iraq War. While there was initial talk of a broader cooperation
project for the Gulf region – that is, with Iran and Iraq, it appears that the threat the
six Arab Gulf States perceived was coming from the other two states made them wary
of such wider cooperation. Indeed, there was arguably little progression in the GCC
from the time it was created in 1981 until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which lends
weight to the idea that the GCC is kept together by the shared security challenges of
its member states. While sporadic initiatives were taken, mostly through declarations,
it was not until the 1990s that anything was done to inject new energy in it. Today,
there are growing pressures for unity – although the idea was distinctively voiced
by Saudi Arabia. Iran’s actions, political upheavals in the region, and the threat of
terrorism and internal extremists encourage the GCC countries to build up their
military capabilities and further consolidate their regional entity. One could suggest
that the revived GCC will only last as long as the regional turmoil. Beyond the
fact that this disorder is unfortunately unlikely to come to a close soon, it can also
be argued that this may provide chances to really launch the GCC as a durable
and viable entity. Initiatives to reinvigorate the GCC were indeed taken before the
Arab uprisings, in the wake of the global economic crisis, the impact of which the
GCC members did not feel as much as the rest of the world and which, on the
contrary, helped enhance their international status. One should resist the temptation
of formulating prophetic analyses on what will happen in the long run. e current
initiatives to revive the GCC might fall at like a failed soué or it may be “here
to stay and ourish for a long time to come.”54 Should the GCC stand, the Saudi
attempts to take on a leadership mantle may, however, be challenged.
While the Iranian threat and, to a lesser extent, the Iraqi threat, come as cement
for the GCC55 and encourage the revival of its security initiatives, the “democratic
threat” that has been put forward by many analysts is arguably less ecient. It has
54. Abdulla, “Contemporary Sociopolitical Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment,” 32.
55. Even the Iranian issue as cement for the GCC might be questioned today, as shown by recent
developments on this matter such as the aforementioned Omani sponsoring of US-Iran talks but
also the alleged negotiations between Iran and the UAE to settle their dispute on the status of
three islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb).
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been noted that before the beginning of the Arab uprisings, other GCC countries
had gone further than Saudi Arabia in terms of political liberalization.56 is
liberalization should not yet be overestimated. Indeed, it has been noted that “the
prevailing political stagnation associated with entrenched Gulf monarchies may yet
prove to be the Achilles heel of the Gulf moment in history.”57 Recent events tend
to show that as long as an immediate Iranian threat is perceived, the priority will
remain on securing the status quo by all means judged necessary. Another important
reality threatening a continued Saudi leadership of the GCC – and the cohesion
of the whole entity – is the growing rivalry with Qatar and, to a lesser extent, with
the UAE and Oman. ese countries are unlikely to be content to let Saudi Arabia
take a GCC leadership role in regional aairs, “especially once the dust of the Arab
Spring is settled.” Dierences in their respective positioning towards the Arab
uprisings58 indeed question the viability of the Saudi leadership within the hegemonic
cooperation of the GCC. In reality, this is linked to “the continuing relevance of
state-centric approaches as the dominant frame of reference in the GCC states
[which leads to] myriad cross-cutting obstacles to regional and global governance.”59
Finally, we would like to study the crucial impact the new Saudi assertiveness is
likely to have on the reshaping of the MENA region, for this could lead to additional
security challenges at both regional and global levels.
Evolving Paradigms of the Regional Chessboard and Global Security Impact
e Saudi security initiatives mentioned in this paper may represent new challenges
for the region and its balance of power. e new assertive confrontational pattern
of Saudi security policy is often deemed to be mainly defensive. However, these
endeavors might in fact generate more instability and insecurity within the broader
56. Olivier Da Lage, “L’Arabie et ses voisins : la revanche des vassaux,” Outre-Terre, no. 14 (2006):
302 – “Saudi Arabia, which largely contributed to put an end of Kuwaiti and Bahraini experiences
of parliamentary systems in 1975-1976, had to witness throughout the 1990s the proliferation of
elected assemblies in its neighboring countries.” For example, Da Lage points to the reestablish-
ment of the parliamentary system in Kuwait in 1992, the rst municipal elections in Qatar in
1999 as well as the municipal and legislative elections in Bahrain in 2002.
57. Abdulla, “Contemporary Sociopolitical Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment,” 3.
58. Kemrava, “e Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution,” 104: “Already, the [Qatari
and Emirati] involvement in the Libyan civil war on the side of the rebels, and their invest-
ments in Tunisia and Egypt, signal their intentions to remain very much involved in the political
economy of North Africa. Similarly, Oman is unlikely to fundamentally reorient its doggedly in-
dependent foreign policy toward Saudi preferences, even though the GCC promised the sultanate
$10 billion over ten years.”
59. Abdullah Baabood, “Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign Policy, with Spe-
cial Reference to the EU,” in Gerd Nonneman, Analyzing Middle Eastern Foreign Policies (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2005), 148.
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MENA region. is would impact the positioning of numerous actors on the global
chessboard. In this respect, there are three important – and interlinked – issues we
would like to explore: the Syrian crisis, the widened sectarian divide between Sunnis
and Shia, and the question of Egypt.
In Syria, uprisings which appear to have begun in a similar way as elsewhere in
the Arab world have inexorably deteriorated into civil war. is crisis comes as a great
security challenge for the entire region, because of the devastating consequences it
could have on it. It has been noted that “every day that the Assad regime is able
to survive, the chances increase of a dangerous spillover eect in neighboring
countries including Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and the inuence of the extremist
elements within the Syrian revolution grows.”60 e crisis also had consequences on
the eroding relationship between the Gulf and the West, as has been pointed out,
especially with regard to the issue of lifting the arms embargo and of supporting the
armed resistance. Syria has also become an arena in which Saudi Arabia is waging
a proxy war against Iran, with the support of most GCC countries which agree that
“Iran represents a mortal enemy and is to be resisted on all fronts.”61 is is one area,
however, where Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, while opposed to one another
on dierent issues, adopt the same stance.62
It is not our intention to further discuss the role of Saudi Arabia and other
countries in the Syrian humanitarian crisis but it can be pointed out that what has
been labeled as the “New Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran accelerates the
polarization of the regional environment and could, for example, harden the Saudi
position towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia could want to “secure
Pakistan and Afghanistan on its side” to counterbalance the perceived “Iranian
support to Shi‘ite unrest in its backyard, particularly in Bahrain.”63 In addition,
it is important to underline a related issue: the Syrian crisis widened a sectarian
divide between the Sunnis and the Shia that the new assertive confrontational Saudi
security strategy might somehow be fuelling.64
e danger of increasing sectarian tensions inherent in the continuing Syrian
crisis has been repeatedly mentioned. It is a threat not only to the security and
stability of the MENA region but also a global security challenge because of all the
60. Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?”
61. Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” 5.
62. However, they do not agree on whom to sup¬port, which could keep the Syrian op¬position
divided and weak.
63. Ahmed Rashid, “How US Intends to End War with Taliban,” Financial Times, April 18, 2011.
64. On this matter, see Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring
at Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
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Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
other places where this dramatic example could fuel pre-existing sectarian divides.
e most fertile soil in this regard is Iraq. Hence, the recent events there sadly come
as no real surprise: after four months of demonstrations in Sunni areas of this Shia-
majority country, a huge wave of violence began at the end of April 2013 when
security forces moved against Sunni anti-government protesters near the northern
Sunni Arab town of Hawijah, provoking an ever-increasing death toll. While it seems
clear that this revived Iraqi unrest is linked to the situation in Syria, it was argued in
2011 that “Saudi and GCC intervention in Bahrain and the deployment of Saudi
security forces is almost certain to create added tension between KSA’s dominant
Sunni puritans and its Shi’ites.”65 is was likely to have an impact not only on the
security of the Eastern Province where most of the 1.1-2 million of the population
that are Shia live but also on the broader regional security since it would arguably
contribute to a mounting antagonism between Sunni and Shia communities.
e revived sectarian divide between the Sunnis and the Shia can be considered
as one of Saudi Arabia’s main future security challenges. is is acknowledged in
recommendations made by Saudi scholars that, alongside the pursuing of a more
representative foreign policy decision-making process, Riyadh should continue
“domestic reforms that target education, enhance the rule of law, assimilate minorities
in a comprehensive national framework, and increase the number and the role of
elected institutions.”66 is issue is very tricky to address in the sub-regional context
of the Arabian Peninsula for any security challenge involving Shia falls, in the Saudi
and broader GCC rhetoric, under the assumption that Iran is using the Shia to revive
its regional hegemony.
Another issue that became a huge source of concern for Saudi Arabia was
the hypothetical restoration of diplomatic ties between post-Mubarak Egypt and
Iran. If this had materialized in the form of a real alliance, it would have impacted
the traditional regional paradigms and would have antagonized Saudi Arabia on
the regional stage. In this context, three geopolitical issues must be mentioned.
e most obvious one is the antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which
needs no further development. e second one is the mutual resentment between
Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. ere are historical67 as well as practical
65. Cordesman, “Saudi Stability in a Time of Change,” 15.
66. Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring,” 154 (here, stressed by the author).
67. Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” 5-6: “Riyadh will never forgive the
Muslim Brotherhood for what it considers to be a dual betrayal. First, members of the Brother-
hood were welcomed and employed in the Kingdom during Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s and Haz
al-Assad’s brutal and successive repression of the movement. But the Brothers responded by
educating and mobilizing two generations of radicalized Saudi subjects, called the Sahwis, who
sought to end Saudi rule. Second, the Brotherhood betrayed the Saudis by siding with Saddam
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reasons – both competing ideologically on the same terrain, namely the politics of
Islam – for this animosity. e nal one, which has also been mentioned, is the rivalry
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar for regional inuence. In the context of Egypt,
this latter issue translated into the support of dierent political movements, Saudi
Arabia supporting the Salas and Qatar the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, what was
at stake in the uncertain future stance of the “New Egypt,” beyond the – unlikely
– possibility of a renewed Arab-Israeli war, was the emergence of a new regional
alliance which would isolate Saudi Arabia. e purely theoretical hypothesis of a
geopolitical triangle between the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Qatar would in fact
have dramatic consequences on global security paradigms. e recent developments
in Egypt might have put an end to such Saudi concerns, at least for now. In fact,
observers reading regional events through the prism “Saudi Arabia vs Qatar” may
be tempted to say that the latter lost its “advantage” in Egypt. e same observers
also ought to mention recent Saudi eorts to take the lead in Syria and Qatar’s
acquiescence to let the Saudis do so.
e impact of the change in Qatari leadership is a question of great interest.
Indeed, “the transition was initially interpreted as recognition of failure in Egypt
and Syria.” However, while having “ceded place to Saudi Arabia as the main Arab
power guiding the Syrian opposition abroad and funding and arming rebel groups
inside Syria,”68 it appears that Qatar has not voiced its last say in terms of supporting
Islamist groups. Less than a year into the reign of Tamim bin Hamad Al-ani, it
might be too soon to determine the future course of Qatari foreign policy – and
whether the dierent policies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well as the competition
between the two could translate into local tensions between their respective clients.
Conclusion
While it has sometimes been considered that the shock wave of the Arab uprisings
somehow stopped at the shores of Saudi Arabia, this paper shows that reality is
slightly dierent. e regional turmoil combined with global economic trends and
the strategic positioning of international actors at the regional level, impacts Saudi
security issues and might push the Kingdom to re-evaluate its foreign and security
policies. ere may be three options under consideration: a continued reliance on the
West as ultimate security guarantor, a diversication of partnerships looking East,
and the development of an integrated regional security system.
Hussein in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait.”
68. e two quotes are from Andrew Hammond, “Qatar’s Leadership in Transition: Like Father,
Like Son,” Policy Brief, London, ECFR, February 2014, 1 and 8.
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Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
Although the GCC has indeed consolidated in the face of the Arab uprisings, the
solidity and viability of this “hegemonic cooperation” under the revived leadership of
Saudi Arabia can be questioned. e situation in the region remains in ux, making it
dicult today to predict how the regional security paradigms might evolve. Among
other things, this depends on the development of the crises in Egypt and Syria, on
the future fallout of numerous antagonisms and rivalries within the GCC, especially
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and on the Saudi capability to change “through
evolution, not revolution.” Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Saudi endeavors
may in fact generate more insecurity and instability even as it tries to secure the
regional status quo to protect the stability of its regime. is paper aimed to draw a
picture of the complex background for future regional security games.
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Emma Soubrier
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge
About the Author
Emma Soubrier is a French Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Auvergne Uni-
versity and attached to the Strategic Research Institute (IRSEM), Paris. She has
been acquiring expertise on Middle Eastern issues since 2008, thanks to research,
eld experience, and a good command of Arabic. During her Master’s degree in In-
ternational Relations at the Sorbonne University in Paris, she lived for a year in the
Middle East. In addition, she worked for a year and a half for the French Ministry of
Defense, which allowed her to specialize in defense and security issues.
Ms. Soubrier graduated with honours as her class’s valedictorian from her Mas-
ter’s program in 2011. Her research projects include “e British Commitment to
the Iraq War, at the Crossroads of New Global Issues,” “International Law and the
Palestinian Question” and “e Civil Resistance to the War during the War of Leba-
non.” Her Ph.D. dissertation focuses on the evolving defense policies and procure-
ment strategies of the Gulf countries. is research is co-funded by the French Min-
istry of Defense and the company Airbus Defence & Space (ex Cassidian), where she
works as a Junior Analyst. In 2013, Ms. Soubrier was one of the Young Strategists
selected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Johns Hop-
kins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
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www.grc.net
