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Brain Bisection and Mechanisms of Consciousness
Abstract
During the past decade we have been engaged in studies in which the brain is surgically divided down the middle into right and left halves. The behavioral performances of cats and monkeys following brain bisection have led to the conclusion that each of the surgically separated hemispheres must sense, perceive, learn, and remember quite independently of the other hemisphere [Sperry, 1961a, 1961b; 1964a, 1964b].
... In June 1964 he gave the 33rd James Arthur lecture on the evolution of the human brain, entitled "Problems outstanding in the evolution of brain function, " at the American Museum of Natural History in New York (Sperry, 1964). In September 1964 he spoke about "Brain bisection and mechanisms of consciousness" at the Study Week on Brain and Conscious Experience, organized in Vatican City in Rome by the Pontifical Academy of Science, to which Sperry was elected in 1978 (Sperry, 1965a). In 1965 he lectured on "Mind, Brain and Humanistic Values" in one of the Monday Lectures on New Views on the Nature of Man, organized by John Platt at Sperry's alma mater, the University of Chicago (Sperry, 1965b). ...
... For adaptive and complex reactions consciousness may not be necessary, but when it comes to learning that involves memory, conscious centers become a tremendous asset. This reasoning favors the view that consciousness may have a real operational value, that it is more than merely an overtone, a by-product epiphenomenon, or a metaphysical parallel of the objective process (Sperry, 1965a). ...
This paper describes the scientific figure of Roger Sperry as a maverick researcher, an original thinker who arrived at definitive notions about the working of the brain mostly by distancing himself from the prevalent views of his peers. After solving the riddle of the functions of the corpus callosum, he won a Nobel prize in physiology or medicine for identifying the different cognitive abilities of the disconnected right and left hemispheres of the human brain. He could have won another Nobel prize for his work on the prenatal formation of behavioral neuronal networks and their growth and development after birth. In the last part of his life, he fought a courageous but inconclusive battle for demonstrating that mental and spiritual factors can direct brain activity and behavior without violating the laws of orthodox neurophysiology. Some nodal points in his scientific career and some sources of inspirations for his thinking are identified and discussed within the historical background of the neurosciences of the twentieth century.
... Many researchers have replicated Sperry's experiments to study the patterns of split-brain and lateralization of functions. According to the experiments conducted by an American neuropsychologist, the anatomical substrate of interhemispheric interaction consists of numerous brain commissures that form a commissural system [32,33]. ...
Purpose of Review
To review the functional morphology of the corpus callosum. The corpus callosum is the largest connection between the cerebral hemispheres. The left hemisphere is responsible for abstract logical thinking in right-handers, while the right hemisphere is responsible for figurative and artistic information processing (this view is too schematic and not quite true, although it has exerted a considerable influence on the media and common sense knowledge). This article presents the evolution of views on the functional role of the corpus callosum and its formation at various stages of ontogenesis. It also discusses anomalies and disorders of interhemispheric interactions that are usually mediated by this commissure.
Recent Findings
The age and anatomical features of the corpus callosum require special attention. The article emphasizes the necessity of multidirectional studies of the corpus callosum.
Summary
Information on the clinical and anatomical characteristics of the corpus callosum will be valuable not only for morphologists but also for neurologists, neurosurgeons, psychiatrists, speech pathologists, etc. This will provide a broader perspective on many topical issues in neurology and psychiatry.
... In certain abnormal cases, however, a single brain can contain several minds, which may or may not be aware of each other's existence (Georgiev, 2017). For example, in splitbrain patients who had their corpus callosum surgically severed in order to treat refractory epilepsy, each of the two cortical hemispheres hosts a separate mind that could communicate individually and control a half of the body apparently unaware of the other mind in the opposite hemisphere (Gazzaniga et al., 1962;Sperry, 1966;Gazzaniga & Sperry, 1967;Sperry, 1982;Gazzaniga, 2002;Wolman, 2012). In psychiatric disease, such as dissociative identity disorder (also known as multiple personality disorder) a single brain may contain a number of different minds that take control over the body in succession (Gillig, 2009). ...
The brain is composed of electrically excitable neuronal networks regulated by the activity of voltage-gated ion channels. Further portraying the molecular composition of the brain, however, will not reveal anything remotely reminiscent of a feeling, a sensation or a conscious experience. In classical physics, addressing the mind-brain problem is a formidable task because no physical mechanism is able to explain how the brain generates the unobservable, inner psychological world of conscious experiences and how in turn those conscious experiences steer the underlying brain processes toward desired behavior. Yet, this setback does not establish that consciousness is non-physical. Modern quantum physics affirms the interplay between two types of physical entities in Hilbert space: unobservable quantum states, which are vectors describing what exists in the physical world, and quantum observables, which are operators describing what can be observed in quantum measurements. Quantum no-go theorems further provide a framework for studying quantum brain dynamics, which has to be governed by a physically admissible Hamiltonian. Comprising consciousness of unobservable quantum information integrated in quantum brain states explains the origin of the inner privacy of conscious experiences and revisits the dynamic timescale of conscious processes to picosecond conformational transitions of neural biomolecules. The observable brain is then an objective construction created from classical bits of information, which are bound by Holevo's theorem, and obtained through the measurement of quantum brain observables. Thus, quantum information theory clarifies the distinction between the unobservable mind and the observable brain, and supports a solid physical foundation for consciousness research.
... В экспериментах с «расщепленным мозгом» (перерезкой большой комиссуры мозга по медицинским показаниям), которые проводились в 1960-е гг. Р. Сперри и его младшим коллегой М. Газзанигой (Sperry, 1966;Gazzaniga, 1967 и мн. др.), при латерализованном предъявлении стимула (ощупывание предмета с закрытыми глазами одной рукой, восприятие визуального стимула только в правом или левом поле зрения, подача сигнала только к правому или левому уху) был обнаружен ряд феноменов, проясняющих участие правого и левого полушарий в обеспечении функции речи. ...
We measured spoken word recognition time for different lists of Russian adjectives. Thesaurus of adjectives is smaller than thesauri of nouns and verbs, making it more convenient for experimentation. 40 words were presented to a listener in a single experiment lasting about 90 s. In hundreds of trials we invariably observed robust ordering from the most quickly recognized word to the “slowest” one. The spoken word recognition process looks like a sweep in a space of words. We conjecture that this reflects cortical representation of the thesaurus of words, which are arranged into semantically close groups. Inside the group the words are ordered so that their meaning gradually changes along the list of words. Our experiments with words are in line with experimental studies of travelling waves in the cortex and their theoretical description. We believe that the retrieval of words from the cortical memory is mediated by the cortical travelling waves.
... In certain abnormal cases, however, a single brain can contain several minds, which may or may not be aware of each other's existence (Georgiev, 2017). For example, in splitbrain patients who had their corpus callosum surgically severed in order to treat refractory epilepsy, each of the two cortical hemispheres hosts a separate mind that could communicate individually and control a half of the body apparently unaware of the other mind in the opposite hemisphere (Gazzaniga et al., 1962;Sperry, 1966;Gazzaniga & Sperry, 1967;Sperry, 1982;Gazzaniga, 2002;Wolman, 2012). In psychiatric disease, such as dissociative identity disorder (also known as multiple personality disorder) a single brain may contain a number of different minds that take control over the body in succession (Gillig, 2009). ...
The brain is composed of electrically excitable neuronal networks regulated by the activity of voltage-gated ion channels. Further portraying the molecular composition of the brain, however, will not reveal anything remotely reminiscent of a feeling, a sensation or a conscious experience. In classical physics, addressing the mind–brain problem is a formidable task because no physical mechanism is able to explain how the brain generates the unobservable, inner psychological world of conscious experiences and how in turn those conscious experiences steer the underlying brain processes toward desired behavior. Yet, this setback does not establish that consciousness is non-physical. Modern quantum physics affirms the interplay between two types of physical entities in Hilbert space: unobservable quantum states, which are vectors describing what exists in the physical world, and quantum observables, which are operators describing what can be observed in quantum measurements. Quantum no-go theorems further provide a framework for studying quantum brain dynamics, which has to be governed by a physically admissible Hamiltonian. Comprising consciousness of unobservable quantum information integrated in quantum brain states explains the origin of the inner privacy of conscious experiences and revisits the dynamic timescale of conscious processes to picosecond conformational transitions of neural biomolecules. The observable brain is then an objective construction created from classical bits of information, which are bound by Holevo's theorem, and obtained through the measurement of quantum brain observables. Thus, quantum information theory clarifies the distinction between the unobservable mind and the observable brain, and supports a solid physical foundation for consciousness research.
... The potential for motor recovery after stroke has been repeatedly shown to, at least in part, depend on the preservation of neural infrastructure, particularly, the corticospinal tract (Boyd et al., 2017;Feng et al., 2015;Milot & Cramer, 2008;Stinear et al., 2007). Fortunately, owing to its inherent structural and functional redundancy, the nervous system has the tremendous capability to adapt to a variety of physical and environmental stressors, including neural structure agenesis (Milner & Jeeves, 1979), tissue resections (Gazzaniga, 1995;Sperry, 1965), and even injuries (Sörös, Teasell, Hanley, & Spence, 2017). Our premise is that accessing functional 'detour circuits' in the brain, such as those with efferent routes through the contralesional corticospinal system (contralesional hemisphere and ipsilateral tracts), allows for such adaptability after stroke. ...
Background:
The extraordinary advances in technology such as body-worn sensors, health information technologies, technological advances in neuroimaging, and computational approaches to predictive modelling using biomarkers offers considerable promise to literally transform our thinking, our approach to the problem, and the design of future clinical trials about arm and hand rehabilitation after stroke.
Objective:
To provide a focused review that considers the past, present and future of arm and hand rehabilitation in stroke.
Method:
We organized this perspective into three parts: 1) Past- we summarize the past decade of the clinical trial enterprise in neurorehabilitation, 2) Present- we provide a brief review of three research areas where mechanistic studies that rely on uniquely human neural circuits provide a basis for promising intervention tools, and 3) Future-we highlight three unique research domains that are likely to provide the biggest impact on the future of post-stroke arm and hand recovery.
Results:
The past has not been a complete failure- in particular, the EXCITE RCT put arm and hand rehabilitation on the map. Unfortunately, the majority of clinical trials that followed were based on an immature science of neurorehabilitation. We got drawn in by the seductive preclinical animal model work which suggested that dose and intensity of task-oriented training was the most important ingredient for fostering recovery in humans. While dose, and intensity are clearly important, they are of little value unless the stroke survivor is engaged, motivated, and the neural infrastructure provides enough resource to allow the recovery process. Recently, we noticed an increase in mechanistic and theory-driven studies, findings from which will not only advance our understanding of critical brain-behavior mechanisms, but will provide a more mature science moving into the future.
Conclusions:
The good news is that there is evidence that we learned from the past and have invented a future that appears to be much more exciting and promising than the past.
... After Broca, the left hemisphere came to be considered superior because it was responsible for the intellectual, civilized activities predominant in white European males, while the right one was thought to dominate in women, criminals, Indians, blacks, madmen, and homosexuals (Harrington, 1987). Cerebral self-help best-sellers reproduced and exploited the right-brain boom that emerged during the 1960's in the context of counterculture movements, but also spurred by researches into the split brain (Bogen, 1973;Gazzaniga, 1973;Sperry, 1965). In this connection, Joseph Bogen, the famous neurophysiologist and specialist in split brain research, retrieved the figure of Arthur Wigan, reprinted The Duality of Mind, and even described his thinking as "neowiganism" (Bogen, 1971(Bogen, , 1985. ...
... The basic distinction was identified in the late 1960's and early 1970's. (Gazzaniga, 1970;Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978;Sperry, 1966Sperry, , 1968Sperry, , 1982 With various complexities and partial exceptions the essential differences have continued to hold up. (Chelbus, Mikl, Brazdil, Pazourkova, Krupa & Rektor, 2007;Corballis, 2002;Hellige, 1998;McGilchrist, 2009;Springer & Deutsch, 1998: Vigneau, et al 2011 Although, McGilchrist, 2009 interprets the hemisphere difference, based on new evidence, as rather different. ...
ABSTRACT
This article proposes that human self-consciousness came into existence through the transcendence of previously constructed but separate analog and digital codes, primarily located in the right and left hemisphere. This concept of transcendence is modeled on the sudden insight of Helen Keller. This insight, starting with the ability to name things, gives rise to a qualitatively unique human self-consciousness. It initiated human language and brought about the first human experiences of the past, the future, awareness of death, moral responsibility, and other distinctly human experiences. After a discussion of analog and digital codes in support of this interpretation, it is proposed that the self-conscious insight took place about 50,000 years ago in the brain of an early primitive human. The work of Tomasello and of Bickerton is used to identify necessary mental abilities that preceded the capacity for self-consciousness and
language. Other relevant theorists treated include McGilchrist & Jaynes.
... Differential hemispheric specialization for emotion dates back to Goldstein (1939), who reported "catastrophic reaction" in patients with left hemisphere lesions whereas patients with right hemisphere lesions were indifferent or euphoric. Others had recognized that each hemisphere is capable of independent mental processes (Sperry, 1966), and different styles of processing (Levy, 1969), where the left hemisphere processes analytically and the right hemisphere processes holistically. Prior to the Valence Model, researchers investigating hemispheric specialization viewed the left hemisphere as inhibitory to the emotional and arousal processes of the right hemisphere (Tucker, 1981). ...
Background: It has been evidenced that the outcome of a CVA patient differs as a function of the cerebral hemisphere that is damaged by the stroke, especially in terms of emotional changes. In contrast, the Bi-Hemispheric Model of Emotion posits that each hemisphere has its own emotional specialization. The current experiment tested the competing predictions of the two theoretical perspectives in a mixed sample of left cerebrovascular accident (LCVA) patients and right cerebrovascular accident (RCVA) patients using a Dichotic Listening task and the Affective Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AAVLT). Heart Rate (HR) and Pulse Oxygen Saturation (SpO2) were recorded as sympathetic measures. It was expected that the predictions of the Bi-Hemispheric Model would be supported. A series of mixed design ANOVAs were used to analyze the data. Material/Methods: Participants consisted of 21 patients grouped into either post-acute status left cerebrovascular accident (LCVA) or right cerebrovascular accident (RCVA). Tests included the The Dichotic Listening test, The Affective Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AAVLT), HR and Sp02 measurement using a Fingertip Pulse Oximeter and the Mood Assessment Scale for depression. Results: Results revealed that both groups exhibited decreased auditory detection abilities in the ear contralateral to CVA location. Additionally, CVA patients recalled significantly more positive words than negative or neutral words and exhibited a significant learning curve. LCVA patients exhibited a recency effect, while RCVA patients exhibited a heigh tened primacy effect. Findings from the HR and Sp02 measures suggested a parasympathetic response to emotionally neutral information as well as an impaired sympathetic response to emotionally negative information in RCVA patients. Conclusions: The results lend partial support to the hypothesis drawn from the Bi-Hemispheric Model of Emotion, as evidenced by the diametrically opposite effects in these groups, which reflects opposing cerebral processes.
... If the activity is mainly limited to one hemisphere, it is called cerebral lateralisation. Research studies show that the right and left hemispheres of the brain have distinctly different functions that are not readily interchangeable (Sperry, 1966). The left hemisphere processes input in sequential and analytical manner, is time sensitive, generate the spoken language, does arithmetic operations, recognise words and numbers (as words), active in constructing false memories, better at arousing attention to deal with outside stimuli. ...
When setting up assessments, additional viewpoints that need to be considered by viewing from the standpoint of educational neuroscience are discussed in this article. Learner assessment performed in any teaching-learning environment should produce valid and lasting outcomes. The validity of assessment indicates that the results generated represent the learner characteristics reliably using any strengths and weaknesses. The lasting feature of assessment entails that the results are associated with learner characteristics rather the environmental factors. When learner characteristics are identified in this manner, appropriate measures can be taken to improve on any weaknesses identified while at the same time relying or staying motivated on the strengths. It is imperative that educators make use of the findings from the emerging field of educational neuroscience to design and construct assessment producing valid and lasting outcomes. In educational neuroscience, how the human brain and related structures engage in learning processes is studied. By incorporating this useful information into teaching-learning processes, learners can be put on a path to creating useful, lasting memories, across disciplinary boundaries, to lead them to higher levels of human development yielding wisdom and consciousness. When assessments produce valid and lasting outcomes, they essentially become fair for all types of learners including the gifted learners who demonstrate right cerebral hemisphere oriented visual-spatial characteristics that include higher sensitivities such as emotional sensitivity. Keywords: educational neuroscience. learner assessment, the validity of assessment, fairness of assessment, lasting value of assessment, higher-order learning, transfer of learning
... 3. For early papers on split-brain research, see Sperry (1964 Sperry ( , 1966), Gazzaniga (1967) and LeDoux (1978). Gazzaniga (2000) provides a more recent overview. ...
I argue that if minds supervene on the intrinsic physical properties of things like brains, then typical human brains host many minds at once. Support comes from science-nonfiction realities that, unlike split-brain cases, have received little direct attention from philosophers. One of these realities is that some patients are functioning (albeit impaired) and phenomenally conscious by all medical and commonsense accounts despite the fact that they have undergone a hemispherectomy: an entire brain hemisphere has been fully detached. Another is the Wada test, in which a patient has each hemisphere anesthetized, one after the other, while the other hemisphere is awake and functioning—again, phenomenally conscious by any standard. I will argue that hemispherectomies, Wada tests, and related procedures each present cases in which the minds that exist after the detachment (or anesthetization) of a hemisphere are surviving minds which must be associated with the surviving (or un-anesthetized) hemisphere. I will argue that such surviving minds existed before the medical procedure, instantiated by the then-intact hemisphere that was due to survive the loss of its complementary hemisphere. If so, then the typical subject has at least three minds: a “left hemisphere mind”, a “right hemisphere mind”, and a “whole brain mind”. But the argument generalizes to cases in which smaller portions of the brain are lost, yielding a great number of additional minds, some overlapping. Some important ethical implications are raised and briefly examined.
This paper provides an insight into the neurologic phenomenon of Brain hemispheric dominance in which one hemisphere tends to be dominant over the other, leading to a greater consistency in utilising certain functions. The right and left hemispheres of the brain are structurally similar but significantly unlike in their functions. Based on the dominant hemisphere, a person can be right brained or left brained; and whole brained if both the hemispheres work about equally. This paper delineates the functional differences between the two brain hemispheres based on evidences from brain research. It also provides an understanding of the emergence of the Nobel Prize winning Brain dominance theory, the various models that bring about further distinctions between the brain hemispheres and the implications of the theory in Education.
This book puts forward a mechanistic account of subjective experience based on a review of the current cognitive neuroscience literature on conscious perception, attention, and metacognition. It is argued that current empirical studies are often misinterpreted. An undue focus has been placed on perceptual capacity rather than subjective experience per se. Null findings are often overemphasized despite the limited sensitivity of the methods used. A synthesis is proposed to combine the advantages and intuitions of both global and local theories of consciousness. This will be discussed in the context of our understanding of the sense of agency, emotion, rationality, culture, philosophical theories, and clinical applications. Taking insights from both physiology and current research in artificial intelligence, the resulting view directly addresses the qualitative nature of subjective experience.
A brief review of the history of the science of consciousness suggests that since the 1990s, important studies from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have been sidelined, to make room for rather speculative metaphysical and physics-centric theorizing. Some arguments are given in favor of restoring this balance. These include some considerations about the longevity and growth for the field, for meaningful scientific progress in the longer term. From a philosophy of science perspective, it is also unclear if foundational principles can be derived without a solid grasp of the basic empirical facts. This justifies why the book will be mostly focused on empirical studies, and the resulting theory should be compatible with the language of cognitive neuroscience.
Notre thèse explore deux anomalies quant aux théories sur les interactions hydriques transfrontalières. Le lac Victoria, où toutes les conditions matérielles, économiques et environnementales sont données pour les conflits, et pourtant la coopération s’impose. Et le fleuve Uruguay, où un régime institutionnel solide existait et les conditions environnementales étaient optimales, et pourtant la coopération fût brisée et le conflit éclata. Pour élucider l’énigme de ces cas, au lieu de sonder les aspects politiques et institutionnels des bassins, comme font certaines approches, ou ceux physiques, comme en font d’autres, nous proposons une autre voie. Notre démarche consiste à porter le regard vers ce qui donne naissance aux actions des agents en interaction avec leur milieu, à savoir la nature humaine et le fonctionnement du cerveau. Afin de conduire cette enquête, nous nous appuyions sur trois axes. Le premier est celui des entretiens que nous avons réalisés dans les bassins étudiés. Le deuxième est la sociologie de Gabriel Tarde, laquelle invite à une continuation actualisée d’un projet de recherche du social permettant l’intégration des développements scientifiques biologiques, évolutifs et cognitifs. Le troisième axe est celui des neurosciences, lesquelles confirment plusieurs intuitions tardiennes, et permettent de mieux cerner les aspects référant à la nature humaine dans son interaction avec la société et l’environnement. Notre enquête montre alors comment les dynamiques du conflit et de la coopération convergent dans la conscience, en tant que la clé qui, par-delà toute situation environnementale donnée, permet aux humains d’actualiser d’innombrables potentialités.
Kostas Tampakis - George Ν. Vlahakis Introduction - The Power Of Names 11 POETRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Pauline Choay-Lescar Geopoetry In Walt Whitman’s Leaves Of Grass 15 Simone Palmieri A Survey On The Functionality Of Metrical-Rhyming Structures In Italian Advertising . . . . . . 25 Marion Simonin The Fourth State Of Material By Leonard Gaspar. A Poetry To Stich Up? 41 Io Stephanidou Scientific Fragments Of Emily Dickinson’s Poetry In Art: A Comment On Janet Malcolm’s Cut Up Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Kostas Tampakis “To Leave Parnassus And Climb The Rugged Mountain Of Science”– Theodoros Orphanidis, Poetry And Science In Nineteenth Century Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Maria Terdimou Zero And Infinity In Modern Greek Poetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PROSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Constantin Canavas The Affective Narrative Of The Lunar Distance. Science And Literature In The Cosmicomics By Italo Calvino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Evangelia Chordaki Hidden Paths – Unconventional Practices. A Her-Story Of Circulation Of Medical Knowledge In The Late Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Manolis Kartsonakis The Leading Approach To The Scientific Revolution Through Literature Forms: Reports, Dialogues And Letters Within Copernicus’, Kepler’s And Galileo’s Works . . . . . . . . . 111 Gianna Katsiampoura Science And Scientists In Crime Stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Constantinos Morfakis - Katerina Vlantoni Science, Technology And Society, Searching For The Enemy Of The People . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Roula Tsitouri Exploring Aphasia: Samuel Beckett’s Late Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Michael Wainwright On What Matters For African Americans: W. E. B. Du Bois’s The Souls Of The Black Folk In The Light Of Derek Parfit’s Reasons And Persons 149 Anne-Gaëlle Weber Scholarly Uses Of Literature At The End Of The 18th Century And In The 19th Century . . . . . . 157 George N. Vlahakis Mesmerism In Nineeteenth–Century Greek Popular Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Integrasi aktiviti muzikal dalam matematik merupakan strategi pengajaran guru yang berfokuskan kepada penguasaan kandungan pembelajaran dalam kalangan murid. Di antara aktiviti muzikal dalam pembelajaran matematik adalah melibatkan pendedahan murid kepada elemen muzik seperti pic, tempo dan irama. Integrasi aktiviti muzikal dalam pembelajaran matematik di Malaysia mula ditekankan sejak Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia menyarankan guru-guru agar mengaplikasikan gaya pembelajaran abad ke-21 dalam bilik darjah. Perbincangan ini akan menganalisis literatur-literatur secara ekstensif berkaitan aktiviti-aktiviti muzikal yang diguna pakai dalam pengajaran dan pembelajaran matematik. Analisis akan membincangkan kaedah-kaedah, aktiviti-aktiviti muzikal yang digunakan dan impak aktiviti muzikal dalam pembelajaran matematik murid. Integrasi aktivti muzikal dalam matematik adalah seperti mengira detik lagu, nyanyian, berdikir, bermain instrumen dan mencipta lagu. Manakala impak bagi aktiviti pembelajaran integrasi ini adalah pencapaian, menyediakan situasi pembelajaran yang menarik, fokus, membina ingatan, menangani keresahan pembelajaran dan menguatkan konsep matematik murid. Akhir sekali, perbincangan akan turut mengemukakan cadangan bagi penyelidikan pada masa akan datang.
There is a need to distinguish two questions in the philosophy of persons. One of these is the factual question of identity. This is the question of the conditions of personal identity over time. The other is the first person question of survival. This can be expressed as, "Under which circumstances should I consider a person at another time to be my survivor, who 1 have reason to care about just as much if he were me?" This second question does not presuppose that the survivor is numerically identical with her predecessor and is the question considered in this thesis. Answering this question requires us to resolve the tension in our concept of a person between, on the one hand, the view of persons as purely physical beings, no more than the sum of their particular parts, bound to the here and now, and on the other hand, as somehow transcendent, beings who exist beyond the here and now. The conception built upon is that offered by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Two errors in Parfit's account are explained and amendments suggested. The first is Parfit's explanation of the unity of a mental life over time in terms of connectedness and continuity between individual, independent thoughts, and secondly his account of connectedness and continuity itself. I suggest that psychological connectedness and continuity must be between persons-at-a-time, not individual thoughts, and that a unified mental life over time is not just a product of enough connections, as Parfit argues, but is determined by the kind of connectedness there is.
Wilder Penfield is justly famous for his contributions to our understanding of epilepsy and of the structure-function relationship of the brain. His theory on the relationship of the brain and mind is less well known. Based on the effects of the electrical stimulation of the cortex in conscious patients, Penfield believed that consciousness and mind are functions of what he referred to as the centrencephalic integrating system. This functional system comprised bidirectional pathways between the upper brainstem, the thalami, and the cerebral cortex of both hemispheres, and was the physical substrate from which memory, perception, initiative, will, and judgment arose. It was the source of the stream of consciousness and the physical basis of mind. This paper reviews how Penfield arrived at this conception of the mind-brain relationship. Although Penfield ultimately felt that he had failed in his attempt to unify brain and mind, his work shed new light on the relationship of memory to the mesial temporal structures and to the temporal cortex; and his association of consciousness and the brainstem preceded the conceptualization of the reticular activating system by a generation. In these, as in so many aspects of neurobiology, Penfield was prescient.
The article analyzes the question of personal identity. Using the example of Wiggins’s
case («operation»), the author criticizes the model of personality proposed by John
Locke. The question of the importance of personal identity for survival is raised,
the problem itself is viewed as a relation of degree to which identity is not all-ornothing. In the conclusion author made claim about the need to create a new model
of personality, as well as a new ethics, based on it
This book explores a neglected philosophical question: How do groups of interacting
minds relate to singular minds? Could several of us, by organizing ourselves the right
way, constitute a single conscious mind that contains our minds as parts? And could each
of us have been, all along, a group of mental parts in close cooperation? Scientific
progress seems to be slowly revealing that all the different physical objects around us are,
at root, just a matter of the right parts put together in the right ways: How far could the
same be true of minds? This book argues that we are too used to seeing the mind as an
indivisible unity and that understanding our place in nature requires being willing to see
minds as composite systems, simultaneously one conscious whole and many conscious
parts.
In thinking through the implications of such a shift of perspective, the book relates the
question of mental combination to a range of different theories of the mind (in particular
panpsychism, functionalism, and Neo-Lockeanism about personal identity) and identifies,
clarifies, and addresses a wide array of philosophical objections (concerning personal
identity, the unity of consciousness, the privacy of experience, and other issues) that have
been raised against the idea of composite minds. The result is an account of the
metaphysics of composition and consciousness that can illuminate many different debates
in philosophy of mind, concerning split brains, collective intentionality, and the
combination problem, among others.
With the emergence of a wealth of research-based information in the field of educational neuroscience, educators are now able to make more evidence-based decisions in the important area of curriculum design and construction. By viewing from the perspective of educational neuroscience, we can give a more meaningful and lasting purpose of leading to human development with enhanced consciousness or wisdom as the goal of a curriculum. We can better decide on the essential contents of a curriculum that is carried out within a limited time, using the emerging and validating information. Knowledge of educational neuroscience can also be used effectively for instructional design or conveying important messages to learners in the learning support material provided. Further, educators can be better directed in forming appropriate assessment so that learners are prepared for active and deep engagements in the teaching-learning process developing the skills of independence and discovery learning. Educational practitioners, as well as policy-makers, can also promote inclusive practices by directing, designing and constructing a curriculum appropriately especially taking into consideration the characteristics of right cerebral hemispheric oriented visual-spatial or gifted learners. Overall, education professionals can be benefited immensely to take more informed decisions in the process of curriculum design and construction by embracing emerging educational neuroscience principles.
The most difficult, but crucial, aspect of higher brain function concerns ‘centrencephalic1 regulations, from inside the brain. They can change how cortical cells associate sensory information, how different sectors of cortical tissue, including the two hemispheres, interact and complement each other in psychological function, and how efferent influences from cortex and basal ganglia impinge on final common path motoneurones of stem and cord. We must understand these facilitatory and organizing processes if we are to explain the arousal of consciousness, selective attention, intentional movement, motiviation and a variety of active memory functions. Here the experimental virtues of the split-brain preparation meet advances in knowledge of anatomy, physiology and pharmacology of the interneuronal networks and nuclei of the core of the brain, and their upward projections through the thalamus, basal ganglia and limbic system. Findings in this area, and comparisons to lower vertebrates in which cortical processes are less dominant, will help us dispel obscurity in our conception of the emotional, purposeful and aware states of our minds. They have immense importance for comprehending disorders of human motivation and emotion and of cognitive processes as well. They help balance what may be a rationalist bias to treat concrete or factual, environmentally-driven behaviour, memory, awareness and reasoning as belonging to a separate computational level of processing that might be carried out autonomously in the neocortex.
This chapter explores how our brains and minds are split. The two brain hemispheres balance details and wholes, and our minds balance emotions and thinking. Emotions are primarily regulated by the limbic system of the brain. Though we would like to think that as “civilized” human beings we primarily live our lives with logic and reason, the truth is that our emotions are omnipresent and are integral to our sense of who we are. Our language, and the ways in which we think, also play major roles in how we experience the self.
The first time I read anything by William James was in an undergraduate philosophy course, where we were assigned selections from Pragmatism (James, 1907). He was never incorporated into my general psychology courses, but in time I did elect to take a history course and then read Boring (1950) to learn something about James as an historical figure. I had, of course, heard of him by way of the popular media and soon undertook to read his The Varieties of Religious Experience (James, 1928), which was then and still is prominently displayed on the popular bookshelves. By the time I was completing my undergraduate education, I had the impression of James as a remarkably insightful person, a man who was marvelously in touch with the human condition, but whose impact on the theoretical models then being advanced in psychology (circa 1953) was amazingly absent.
Wer hätte nicht gelegentlich Schwierigkeiten links und rechts zu unterscheiden, wie unser Freund aus Kindertagen, Pooh der Bär. Den Kleinen hilft man mit allerlei Tricks, links und rechts zu lernen — der Daumen mit der kleinen Narbe ist rechts. Im alten Preußen banden sich Soldaten ein Strohbündel ans rechte Bein, um beim strengen Exerzieren bloß die Richtung nicht zu verwechseln. Besonders schwer können Tiere links und rechts lernen. Pawlow versuchte vergeblich, Hunde auf einen Ton von links bzw. rechts differentiell zu konditionieren. Die Links-Rechts-Diskriminationsschwierigkeit hängt vermutlich mit der äußerlichen Symmetrie des Körpers zusammen. Aus evolutionstheoretischer Sicht scheint diese äußerliche Symmetrie für eine biasfreie Bewegung in der räumlichen Umgebung besonders wichtig zu sein. Die körperliche Symmetrie ist jedoch nur oberflächlich und dort auch nicht vollkommen. Bei genauer Betrachtung fallen einige Abweichungen auf, so wird beispielsweise auf der linken Gesichtshälfte mehr Ausdruck gezeigt als auf der rechten.
For several years I have been concerned with a certain aspect of consciousness, i.e. the ability of self-reference by recognising self-attributions or photographs of oneself. In the following I shall present some results of attempts to test for this capacity in both hemispheres of ‘split-brain’ patients. In doing so, I shall include some observations made in preliminary tests with only one subject (NG), who has been described as one of the patients most representative of the disconnection syndrome (Sperry et al., 1969). I think that these observations illustrate the difficulties in testing commissurotomy patients, which in turn tells something about the hemisphere functions in these patients.
The object of this chapter is to serve as an introduction to the part of the text devoted to structure and function of cerebral commissures in the mammal. It will attempt to give a brief review of some of the work to date and to outline some of the problem areas which face workers in this field today. For fuller treatment of some aspects of the subject the papers of Berlucchi (1972) and Doty and Negrâo (1973) are recommended.
This chapter discusses the psychology of body image as an example of the phenomenological attempt to overcome dualistic notions of body and mind. The chapter: (a) outlines the history and concepts of the psychology of body image, (b) surveys the evolution of neurological and neuropsychological theories and research on body image, and (c) introduces the phenomenological concepts of the lived body, lived space, and the personal world. We begin with an introduction to the phenomenological approach in psychology.
In a book focusing mostly on emotion-related problems and psychological disorders, a chapter on humor seems a singularly happy choice, but humor, like most emotion-related behaviors, is a complex affair. While the emotion of joy may be the fundamental emotion expressed by laughter, the emotions of anger, contempt, and fear may also be couched in laughter. Levine shows how humor and laughter can both cure and kill. He demonstrates that humor and psychopathology are generally antipodal and that psychiatric patients typically perform poorly on tests of humor appreciation. He shows how people’s failure to appreciate a joke or a cartoon can furnish leads as to the nature of their problems, whether they be minor or pathological. He presents evidence for a relationship between certain types of response to humor and specific psychological disorders. He also shows how people can use humor and laughter for amusement or aggression.
My task in this chapter is to relate the conscious experience of remembering to the physical and chemical mechanisms of brain cells involved in memory formation. No one will deny, to be sure, that such an enterprise is ultimately necessary. It is, however, clear that with currently available information the best that can be accomplished is to lay the groundwork for, or to outline the various directions of an approach to this problem. The present effort, then, is an attempt to bridge the gap, by providing a specific, testable neurobiological mechanism of consciousness that may be applied at each level of analysis involved in the study of the chemistry of memory.
The relationship between consciousness and the brain, never absent from the pages of the philosophical and psychological literature, has become the topic of particularly active discussion in recent decades. It has been the subject not only of individual investigations but also of complete major international symposia, attended by the leading representatives of psychology, neurology, and physiology1; eminent neurophysiologists, morphologists, and clinicians return to it time and time again.
Among that rapidly developing group of sciences of the nervous system which we now call the neurosciences, a special place is occupied by neuropsychology. Its roots go back through the centuries, yet at the same time it can be regarded as the youngest, the most recently founded, branch of neuroscience.
A central notion in research on individual differences in hemispheric specialization is that some people emphasize one hemisphere’s cognitive processes as a general mode of functioning. We begin this chapter by considering this construct of a lateralized cognitive style, and the methodological and theoretical problems it has raised. If the construct is to be scientifically useful, it must be supported by empirical assessment of cognitive performance — or at least cognitive strategy. For the neuropsychological approach to contribute uniquely to personality research, it will be important to relate the psychological traits to physiological measures of brain activity. In addition, an important observational method is self-report: given the appropriate questionnaire, we argue that most people can describe their cognitive and emotional functioning in ways that are meaningful to neuropsychological constructs of personality. We present preliminary data on the O’Connell Cognitive and Affective Style Scale (OCASS), a self-report scale designed to assess cognitive and emotional dimensions of self-control.
Adalbert Fröhlich bewirbt sich mit den allerbesten Referenzen für die Stelle des Verkaufsleiters bei Big-Blue-Computers Europa. Er ist konsterniert über einen völlig neuen psychologischen Eignungstest mit allerlei Bildchen von halb lächelnden, halb zornigen Gesichtern.
Information engineering has grown out of the need to understand — and to contrive — systems concerned primarily with the determination of form. In processes of communication and control such as printing, telephony or automation, what matters is how the form of one activity or state of affairs determines the form of another, without explicit regard to the energy involved. Questions of energetics — the determination of force by force — are the complementary province of physics. Some physical balance-sheet must apply to any information-engineering transaction; but the information engineer normally takes this for granted, having assured himself that the energy supply is more than adequate for his purposes (and/or having restricted his purposes to respect the limitations imposed by energetic considerations).
Two positions on the mind–body problem are here compared: materialism, which is here taken to mean the thesis that mind plays no part in the determination of behavior so that, for all the good it does us, we might just as well have evolved as insentient automata, and interactionism, which is here taken as its contradictory.
It is argued that materialism is more consonant with scientific knowledge and practice, interactionism with common sense and morality, hence, which we favor must depend for the time being on our personal philosophical bias. However, the suggestion is made in conclusion that if the parapsychological evidence were ever to gain general scientific credence the balance of plausibility might tilt decisively in favor of interactionism.
I would like today to consider the matter of imagery in the light of functional hemispheric asymmetry of the brain. It is becoming very clear that the notion of cerebral hemispheric asymmetry is becoming a part of the basic belief system of modern psychological thought. In 1864, Broca showed that the faculty of articulate language is localized in the left hemisphere of the brain. With the left hemisphere controlling speech, and the use of the right hand, two of man’s most distinguishing features, it is no surprise that the left hemisphere became known as the dominant hemisphere, and the right one, the minor hemisphere. But only a year after Broca’s discovery, the English neurologist, J. Hughlings Jackson, began to develop what I have called the dual dominance model (Bakan, 1971). This model allows that just as the left hemisphere is dominant for speech, so may the right hemisphere be dominant for other functions. Jackson suggested, in fact, that perception may be localized in the right hemisphere. His program was formulated specifically in 1874 when he wrote:
That the nervous system is double physically is evident enough.... I wish to show that it is double in function also, and further in what way it is double in function ... the posterior lobe on the right side ... is the chief seat of the revival of images.... The patient (with a right posterior lesion) would have difficulty in recognizing things; he would have difficulty in relating what had occurred, not from a lack of words, but from a prior inability to revive images of persons, objects, and places of which the words are the symbols. (Jackson, 1958)
The left cerebral hemisphere is associated with organizing and categorizing information into discrete temporal units. It also controls the sequencing of finger, hand, arm, and articulatory movements, and the perception and verbal labeling of material that can be coded linguistically or within a linear and sequential time frame.KeywordsCorpus CallosumCerebral HemisphereMemory CenterAngular GyrusMemory BankThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
There is a curious ambiguity in the neuroanatomist’s attitude toward the cerebral cortex, the most respected and at the same time the most neglected piece of the human brain. We have learned from the localizationists that the cerebral cortex is responsible for the highest psychic functions, but we do not know what to make of this in view of the stupendous cerebral cortex of a cow, which most nonspecialists can hardly distinguish from that of man. We have also learned that on the surface of the cerebral cortex innumerable “areas ” can be distinguished, each devoted to a very special function, but generations of experimental psychologists have piled up evidence to the effect that it does not matter which part of the cortex of a rat is ablated, — the behavior of the animal in their hands is reduced to a degree that depends on the amount, not on the localization of, the tissue destroyed. Some say that the structure of the cerebral cortex is complex beyond description, too complex ever to be understood by the human mind, which, after all, possesses no more complex instrument that the cortex itself to perform the analysis. Others approach the physiology of the cerebral cortex with the same strategy that has been useful in the study of the frog’s eye, only to discover that the cortex of the monkey is somewhat simpler than the retina of the frog.
Adult albino rats, previously overtrained on a brightness and a pattern discrimination habit, sustained bilateral lesions to the brainstem reticular formation and were subsequently tested for retention. Those groups receiving lesions to the basolateral mesencephalic reticular formation or to the paramedial portion of the reticular formation at either the dimesencephalic juncture, mes-metencephalic juncture, or rostral pontine levels exhibited significant losses in retention of the pattern habit. Lesions destroying either the dorsomedial mesencephalic reticular formation or brainstem areas dorsal, lateral, or ventral to the reticular formation failed to produce significant retention deficits on either habit. Similar findings were obtained in connection with the retention of a nonvisual (kinesthetic) discrimination habit.
The most difficult, but crucial, aspect of higher brain function concerns ‘centrencephalic’ regulations, from inside the brain. They can change how cortical cells associate sensory information, how different sectors of cortical tissue, including the two hemispheres, interact and complement each other in psychological function, and how efferent influences from cortex and basal ganglia impinge on final common path motoneurones of stem and cord. We must understand these facilitatory and organizing processes if we are to explain the arousal of consciousness, selective attention, intentional movement, motiviation and a variety of active memory functions. Here the experimental virtues of the split-brain preparation meet advances in knowledge of anatomy, physiology and pharmacology of the interneuronal networks and nuclei of the core of the brain, and their upward projections through the thalamus, basal ganglia and limbic system. Findings in this area, and comparisons to lower vertebrates in which cortical processes are less dominant, will help us dispel obscurity in our conception of the emotional, purposeful and aware states of our minds. They have immense importance for comprehending disorders of human motivation and emotion and of cognitive processes as well. They help balance what may be a rationalist bias to treat concrete or factual, environmentally-driven behaviour, memory, awareness and reasoning as belonging to a separate computational level of processing that might be carried out autonomously in the neocortex.
A variety of basic somatosensory tests carried out on a patient with surgical section of the cerebral commissures revealed a marked separation of somesthetic effects from right and left extremities and from right and left sides of the trunk. Predominantly contralateral projection of somesthesis was evident; the presence of any ipsilateral representation at all four regions below the neck remained questionable. Bilateral projection was indicated in results from the face and the top and back of the head with equal representation on both sides. Comparatively little functional impairment was the rule when the sensory and motor output involved the same hemisphere, but severe impairment and complete incapacity were evident when right-left cross integration was required. These and similar results in the present case suggest that in the absence of cerebral damage during infancy, transcallosal interaction is of critical importance for utilization of ipsilateral somesthetic data particularly when the left extremities participate in activities involving the symbolic functions of the dominant hemisphere.
It has been possible in studies of callosum-sectioned cats and monkeys in recent years to obtain consistent demonstration of a variety of interhemispheric integrational functions mediated by the corpus callosum.(1,2) These animal findings stand in marked contrast to the apparent lack of corresponding functional deficits produced by similar surgery in human patients.(3-9) The general picture of callosal functions based on the animal studies tends to be supported in current early testing of a 48-year-old male war veteran with recent complete section of the corpus callosum, anterior and hippocampal commissures.
The great cerebral commissure
- R W Sperry
- RW Sperry
Problems Outstanding in the Evolution of Brain Function
- R W Sperry