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Traits Have Evolved to Function the Way They Do Because of a Past Advantage
Abstract
Talk of the functions of objects (i.e., what the function of X is, or what X is for) is common throughout biology, indeed in many areas of science, as well as in our everyday understanding of objects in the world. This talk of what things are for, or the purpose for which they function, is the subject-matter of the field of teleology. There is widespread disagreement among philosophers and scientists about how we should understand functions. The main debate is between those who would base teleological functions on history and evolutionary selection of the thing in question (the selectionist view) and those who would base function on the actual causal role the thing plays (the systematic view). This chapter will describe the various approaches to functions, and defend a selectionist answer, that biological traits have evolved to function the way they do because of a past advantage. The paper will also discuss the counterarguments from the systematic view, and show how they fail to account for some major constraints on explaining functions, such as normativity.
... 'Malfunction' has, of course, deep roots in philosophy of biology as well, for naturally evolving organisms are also error-prone. Any adequate theory of the evolutionary source of a (teleological) function has to account for the possibility of malfunction (Perlman, 2010, p. 54). Whether any insights from philosophy of technology about function and malfunction can be extrapolated to philosophy of biology remains an open question, on which we remain neutral here. ...
... Whether any insights from philosophy of technology about function and malfunction can be extrapolated to philosophy of biology remains an open question, on which we remain neutral here. The debate about the nature of biological function between the Selectionist, who relates it to the history and evolutionary selection of the system concerned, and the Systematicist, who relates it to the actual causal role it plays for the system, remains unsettled (Perlman, 2010, p. 53). The ensuing discussion focuses on the analysis of errors in computational systems. ...
The phenomenon of digital computation is explained (often differently) in computer science, computer engineering and more broadly in cognitive science. Although the semantics and implications of malfunctions have received attention in the philosophy of biology and philosophy of technology, errors in computational systems remain of interest only to computer science. Miscomputation has not gotten the philosophical attention it deserves. Our paper fills this gap by offering a taxonomy of miscomputations. This taxonomy is underpinned by a conceptual analysis of the design and implementation of conventional computational systems at various levels of abstraction. It shows that ‘malfunction’ as it is typically used in the philosophy of artefacts only represents one type of miscomputation
... 53 In this context the current trait works in a given way because it was affected by the function that provided selective advantage at least in the past. 54 Ubiquities of religious components working as in-group markers and support for social cohesion can fit that adaptationist criterion. ...
Two main scientific approaches have renewed in the last decade the scientific study of religion: the cognitive and the adaptationist. The former is focused on proximate causes, the latter is looking for ultimate causes of religious beliefs and behaviours. Both approaches are useful and promising. However, in both cases, various important aspects and contexts associated with the origin, acquisition, and transmission of religious beliefs have been neglected. The present paper offers an approach that conjoins both models after reviewing several critical issues, to highlight a distinction between cognitive conditions and structures, on one side; and developments or applications, on the other. As a result greater attention needs to be paid to religious functions and their cultural framework to better understand religion and to explain some current processes, like massive secularization in several areas.
... In most cases, the agents are organisms, and their agenda is to increase their inclusive fitness 7 I am bracketing several debates here, whose importance for scientific practice can be exaggerated. In short, functional ascription can be indeterminate and change over time, while the presence of a trait can be explained in several different ways, all of which will be incomplete (see, e.g., Tinbergen 1963;Mayr 1997;Cuthill 2009;Perlman 2009). The research described is connected, but not equivalent, to any of Lewens' (2009) ''seven types of adaptationism''. ...
There have been periodic claims that evolutionary biology needs urgent reform, and this article tries to account for the volume and persistence of this discontent. It is argued that a few inescapable properties of the field make it prone to criticisms of predictable kinds, whether or not the criticisms have any merit. For example, the variety of living things and the complexity of evolution make it easy to generate data that seem revolutionary (e.g. exceptions to well-established generalizations, or neglected factors in evolution), and lead to disappointment with existing explanatory frameworks (with their high levels of abstraction, and limited predictive power). It is then argued that special discontent stems from misunderstandings and dislike of one well-known but atypical research programme: the study of adaptive function, in the tradition of behavioural ecology. To achieve its goals, this research needs distinct tools, often including imaginary agency, and a partial description of the evolutionary process. This invites mistaken charges of narrowness and oversimplification (which come, not least, from researchers in other subfields), and these chime with anxieties about human agency and overall purpose. The article ends by discussing several ways in which calls to reform evolutionary biology actively hinder progress in the field.
... Although there are a number of objections to SF (Ananth 2017;Perlman 2010), it is worth noting that it says very little about biological features as evolved featuresthe same omission in most PHJs. Given this omission, the pressing objection from an EM perspective is that SF is unable to distinguish genuine functions from accidental side effects. ...
Defenders of evolutionary medicine claim that medical professionals and public health officials would do well to consider the role of evolutionary biology with respect to the teaching, research, and judgments pertaining to medical theory and practice. An integral part of their argument is that the human body should be understood as a bundle of evolutionary compromises. Such an appreciation, which includes a proper understanding of biological function and physiological homeostasis, would provide a crucial perspective regarding the understanding and securing of human health needs currently lacking in the medical arena.
... I am bracketing several debates here, whose importance for scientific practice can be exaggerated. In short, functional ascription can be indeterminate and change over time, while the presence of a trait can be explained in several different ways, all of which will be incomplete (see, e.g.,Tinbergen 1963;Mayr 1997;Cuthill 2009;Perlman 2009). The research described is connected, but not equivalent, to any of Lewens' (2009) ''seven types of adaptationism''. ...
There have been periodic claims that evolutionary biology needs urgent reform, and this article tries to account for the volume and persistence of this discontent. It is argued that a few inescapable properties of the field make it prone to criticisms of predictable kinds, whether or not the criticisms have any merit. For example, the variety of living things and the complexity of evolution make it easy to generate data that seem revolutionary (e.g. exceptions to well-established generalizations, or neglected factors in evolution), and lead to disappointment with existing explanatory frameworks (with their high levels of abstraction, and limited predictive power). It is then argued that special discontent stems from misunderstandings and dislike of one well-known but atypical research programme: the study of adaptive function, in the tradition of behavioural ecology. To achieve its goals, this research needs distinct tools, often including imaginary agency, and a partial description of the evolutionary process. This invites mistaken charges of narrowness and oversimplification (which come, not least, from researchers in other subfields), and these chime with anxieties about human agency and overall purpose. The article ends by discussing several ways in which calls to reform evolutionary biology actively hinder progress in the field.
... Although there are a number of objections to SF (Ananth 2017;Perlman 2010), it is worth noting that it says very little about biological features as evolved featuresthe same omission in most PHJs. Given this omission, the pressing objection from an EM perspective is that SF is unable to distinguish genuine functions from accidental side effects. ...
Defenders of evolutionary medicine claim that medical professionals and public health officials would do well to consider the role of evolutionary biology with respect to the teaching, research, and judgments pertaining to medical theory and practice. An integral part of their argument is that the human body should be understood as a bundle of evolutionary compromises. Such an appreciation, which includes a proper understanding of biological function and physiological homeostasis, would provide a crucial perspective regarding the understanding and securing of human health needs currently lacking in the medical arena.
... In the case of silent neural activities, the causal relation from internal activity to electromagnetic effects on the skin has no biological function. That is, the presence of this causal relation in the organism's ancestors never played any role in their reproductive success (Perlman, 2010). By contrast, in the case of the eel stunning its prey electrically, as well as in the case of neural activities that eventuate in muscular movements, the causal relation from internal activity to effects at the organism's boundary involves a history of natural selection, and qualifies as behavior according to (3). ...
Skinner (1938) uma vez definiu comportamento como um certo subconjunto de atividades do organismo – aquelas que envolvem intercâmbio com o mundo exterior. Neste artigo reexamino e reformulo a definição de Skinner para tornar mais explícito o quadro conceitual subjacente. Esse quadro resulta ser parcialmente morfológico e apoiado em conceitos biológicos de organismo e adaptação. Proponho uma reformulação da definição de Skinner numa perspectiva semelhante e ressalto a importância da pele, não apenas na vida de um organismo, mas na definição de seu comportamento. Palavras-chave: definição, comportamento, ambiente, organismo, fronteira.
... Looking for possible past benefit seems appropriate (Ayala and Arp 2010). However, it can be assumed that some features are potentially functional even when they fail to realize their functions in contemporary environments (Perlman 2010). ...
Scholars employing an evolutionary approach to the
study of religion and religious beliefs search for ultimate explanations
of the origin, propagation, and persistence of religious beliefs. This
quest often pairs in debate two opposing perspectives: the adaptationist
and “by-product” explanations of religion and religious beliefs. The
majority of scholars prefer the by-product approach, which is agnostic
and even doubtful of the usefulness of religious beliefs. Despite this
pervasive negativity, it seems unwarranted to deny the great usefulness
of religious beliefs—particularly concerning their past utility. Instead,
adaptationist explanations of religion and religious beliefs must be
re-established as interesting and useful approaches to the study of
religious beliefs.
The main misunderstanding of the etiological conception of the concept
of function is to confuse the latter with the concept of adaptation. The explanations
by natural selection do not justify functional imputations: they explain the configuration
of an organic structure by considerations that include references to the
functional performance of this structure. That's why the best way of characterizing
them, is to say that they are design explanations. But, for the correct formulation of the
idea of design, it will be necessary to adopt a conception of the functional imputations
that could avoid the difficulties of the etiological conception. For this it will be
necessary to resort to the systemic conception of function.
The main misunderstanding of the etiological conception of the concept of function is to confuse this notion with the concept of adaptation. The explanations by natural selection do not justify function attributions: They explain the configuration of an organic structure by considerations that, among other elements, also include references to the functional performance of this structure. That is why, the best manner of characterizing them is to say that they are design explanations. However, for a correct formulation of the idea of design, it will be necessary to adopt a conception of the function attributions that could avoid the difficulties of the etiological conception. For this, it will be necessary to think of functions as causal roles.
This chapter examines Ernst Mayr’s distinction between ultimate and proximate causes. I first critically reconstruct the terminology and point out inconsistencies. I then discuss known objections to Mayr by Richard C. Francis and André Ariew. I show that despite its inconsistencies Mayr’s account can be easily defended against Francis’s objection that ultimate explanations are just functional explanations. Defending Mayr against Ariew’s objection is also possible, since Ariew’s argument relies on a false dichotomy between dynamical and statistical explanations. This chapter concludes with a discussion of why I nevertheless reject Mayr’s terminology. The primary problem is that it collapses into a naive account of explanatory relativity that is incompatible with reasoning in biology.
How easy is it to construct life and consciousness from the building blocks of reality? Some philosophers seem to think both are pretty easy, whilst others take consciousness to be difficult but life to be no problem. In this paper I question whether we should in fact think this, could life after all be difficult to construct? I contend that the answer to this, much like the answer to how hard consciousness is to construct, largely depends on the nature of life and the building blocks of reality. I will show that many of the considerations as to whether consciousness is hard to construct can be paralleled when thinking about the construction of life, and that given one prominent definition of life, it does in fact seem difficult to construct. I will conclude by offering a few suggestions for future research, and suggest that philosophers should be more hesitant in their affirmation that life is easy to construct.
Every time we work on this Yearbook, we are focused on making at least a small step
forward to gradual elaboration of a megaevolutionary paradigm which is designed to create
a united scientific field for cross-disciplinary studies.
The present volume is the seventh issue of the ‘Evolution’ Yearbook series. Our
Yearbooks are designed to present to its readers the widest possible spectrum of subjects
and issues: from universal evolutionism to the analysis of particular evolutionary regularities
in the development of biological, abiotic, and social systems, culture, cognition, language,
etc. The main objective of our Yearbook is the creation of a unified interdisciplinary
field of research, within which scientists specializing in different disciplines could
work within the framework of unified or similar paradigms, using common terminology
and searching for common rules, tendencies and regularities. Global evolution (in connection
with the Big History) becomes the main subject of our Yearbook. We strive to arrange
each issue in such a way that the line from cosmic evolution to the human future is evident.
The title of this issue Evolutionary Aspects: Stars, Primates, and Religion is fully
justified. The volume consists of three sections: ‘Megaevolution and Cosmic Evolution’;
‘Biosocial and Social Evolution’; ‘Reviews and Notes’.
This Yearbook will be useful both for those who study interdisciplinary macroproblems
and for specialists working in focused directions, as well as for those who are interested
in evolutionary issues of Cosmology, Biology, History, Anthropology, Economics
and other areas of study. More than that, this edition will challenge and excite your vision
of your own life and the new discoveries going on around us.
Religious beliefs can be explained in two different ways, cognitive and adaptationist. Each of them is another kind of explanation, one is proximate and the other ultimate. Each of them provides the other with a specific status for religious beliefs, such as by-product or adaptation. However, there is no clarity of how cognition itself could be religiously biased and how the religious/theistic approach could work as a default cognitive mode, as Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) suggests. I would like to criticize cognitive assumptions in the study of religion and show how adaptationist accounts are preferable. I specifically focus on the functional context of religious components, the social and psychological applications. I suggest how discussing about a cognitive basis does not matter in these fields and the cognitive account cannot explain the ubiquity of religious components that lie in their function, rather than the alleged connection with cognition.
This paper aims to deal with some problems underlying contemporary reflections on philosophy of biology, particularly the definition of living being and the idea of biological function. I warn about the danger of taking for granted imprecise scientific information and biased theoretical models. I defend the analysis of the relationship between unity and multiplicity as key features of the living being, which highlights the distinctive individuality of the organism. Finally, I introduce the constitutional paradigm as a new approach to the study of the living being, a frame which takes, as its starting point, the living being as «structuring reality».
La filosofía de la biología se presenta como una disciplina que se ramificó desde la filosofía de la ciencia, y sin ser de fácil definición por su amplio espectro de intereses, suele explicarse clasificando los distintos tópicos que aborda. Una de las cuestiones centrales tematizada por esta disciplina se pregunta sobre qué caracteriza a los sistemas vivos. Planteamientos mecanicistas y vitalistas, y más recientemente, teorías sistémicas como las organizacionales, han tratado de hallar los principios que den razón del orden que caracteriza a los organismos. De hecho, los planteamientos sistémicos han surgido como reacción a posiciones anteriores, buscando un nivel que aúne en un mismo marco explicativo el determinismo que parece caracterizar el orden y la unidad funcional de lo biológico con un indeterminismo que, característico de toda ciencia después de Heisenberg, intente dar cuenta del elevado grado de indeterminación de las características funcionales de los seres vivos con respecto a sus estructuras. La organización de este capítulo responde a un análisis de esta síntesis buscada por los planteamientos sistémicos, análisis que pretende entender las causas de aquella tensión entre determinismo e indeterminismo –entre el reduccionismo y la emergencia, y las nociones sistémicas y las explicaciones mereológicas–, tensión que, como veremos, no ha conseguido aportar mucho a la pregunta originaria sobre qué es un ser vivo.
The main misunderstanding of the etiological conception of the concept of function is to confuse the later with the concept of adaptation. The explanations by natural selection do not justify functional imputations: they explain the configuration of an organic structure by considerations that include references to the functional performance of this structure. That's why the best way of characterizing them, is to say that they are design explanations. But, for correct formulation of the idea of design, it will be necessary to adopt a conception of the functional imputations that could avoid the difficulties of the etiological conception. For this it will be necessary to resort to the systemic conception of function.
Despite their divergent metaphysical assumptions, Reformed and evolutionary epistemologists have converged on the notion of proper basicality. Where Reformed epistemologists appeal to God, who has designed the mind in such a way that it successfully aims at the truth, evolutionary epistemologists appeal to natural selection as a mechanism that favors truth-preserving cognitive capacities. This paper investigates whether Reformed and evolutionary epistemological accounts of theistic belief are compatible. We will argue that their chief incompatibility lies in the noetic effects of sin and what may be termed the noetic effects of evolution, systematic tendencies wherein human cognitive faculties go awry. We propose a reconceptualization of the noetic effects of sin to mitigate this tension.
"Biosemantics" was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984). There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term "biosemantics" has usually been applied only to the theory of mental representation. Let me first characterize a more general class of theories called "teleological theories of mental content" of which biosemantics is an example. Then I will discuss the details that distinguish biosemantics from other naturalistic teleological theories.
In explaining aspects of the natural world, including the aspects of mind, scientists have frequently used the concept of function. But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.
In explaining aspects of the natural world, including the aspects of mind, scientists have frequently used the concept of function. But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.
Applications to biological systems of Robert Cummins’s notion of ‘function’ from his classic paper ‘Functional Analysis’ (Cummins 1975) and of my notion ‘proper function’ from Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (LTOBC) (Millikan 1984) are discussed and compared. Neither notion is fully determinate in its application to life forms, always cutting decisively between ‘functions’ of the designated kind and ‘mere effects’. Nor do we need a notion of function in biology that is fully deter-minate in this way. The dimensions of indeterminacy for both concepts are explored.
Since the 1980s, philosophers of mind have increasingly looked to biology, and biological functions, to supply a stable basis for mental content. Philosophy of mind has long been in need of naturalizing, to free it from what was the metaphysical approach to the mind that has dominated philosophy since at least Descartes. The central issues were the mind–body problem, freedom of the will, and the nature of ideas. Even among metaphysical problems, these are notoriously vague and seemingly insoluble. Moreover, they cut off the mind from the brain and the physical world in a way that increasingly clashed with the ever-increasing reach of science.
Philosophers have long believed that biology is richly endowed with functional categories. The idea has been that a heart counts as a heart because it is for pumping blood and eyes count as eyes because they are for seeing, and so on. More generally, on the traditional view, the traits of organisms are often classified into types at least in part on the basis of their biological function. This view, which extends as far back as Aristotle, has long been entrenched in contemporary philosophy of biology (see e.g. Beckner 1959: 112–18). Indeed, it is still the accepted wisdom in philosophy more generally.
There are two subpopulations of functional explanation roaming the earth: teleological explanation, and functional analysis. The two are in competition. In this chapter, I hope to help select the latter, and nudge the former to a well-deserved extinction. Teleology is the idea that some things can and should be explained by appeal to their purpose or goal or function. It is, for example, the idea that one can explain why rocks fall and fire rises by appeal to the fact that the goal of matter is to go to its natural place, and that this is down for rocks and up for fire.
Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm theoretical ground and rebuts externalist, holist, and naturalist threats to its position.
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The components of living systems strike us as functional-as for the sake of certain ends—and as endowed with specific norms of performance. The mammalian eye, for example, has the function of perceiving and processing light, and possession of this property tempts us to claim that token eyes are supposed to perceive and process light. That is, we tend to evaluate the performance of token eyes against the norm described in the attributed functional property. Hence the norms of nature.
What, then, are the norms of nature? Whence do they arise? Out of what natural properties or relations are they constituted? In Norms of Nature, Paul Sheldon Davies argues against the prevailing view that natural norms are constituted out of some form of historical success—usually success in natural selection. He defends the view that functions are nothing more than effects that contribute to the exercise of some more general systemic capacity. Natural functions exist insofar as the components of natural systems contribute to the exercise of systemic capacities. This is so irrespective of the system's history. Even if the mammalian eye had never been selected for, it would have the function of perceiving and processing light, because those are the effects that contribute to the exercise of the visual system. The systemic approach to conceptualizing natural norms, claims Davies, is superior to the historical approach in several important ways. Especially significant is that it helps us understand how the attribution of functions within the life sciences coheres with the methods and ontology of the natural sciences generally.
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How can one think about a thing, think something false about it, and still be thinking about that thing at all? If a concept is applied to something outside its meaning, how are we to say it does not mean that thing as well? The problem of misrepresentation is one of the central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here, Mark Perlman criticizes the way all contemporary theories of mental representation seek to account for misrepresentation, concluding that it cannot be explained naturistically. Specifically, Perlman evaluates and criticizes the theories of mental content proposed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, Block, Harman and others, as well as examining verificationist approaches to meaning of Quine, Davidson and Stich.
The book goes much further than criticism, however: Perlman formulates a naturalistic theory of representation that reluctantly accepts the unfortunate conclusion that there is no misrepresentation. He adds a pragmatic theory of content, which explains apparent misrepresentation as concept change. Mental representations can be good or bad in specific contexts and for specific purposes, but their correctness is not a matter of truth and falsity. The pragmatic approach to mental content has implications for epistemology, theories of truth, metaphysics, psychology, and AI (specifically connectionist networks).
Readership: One of the most thorough examinations of mental representation and meaning holism available, this book should be read by everyone interested in the mind and how ideas can have meaning. It crosses boundaries from philosophy into psychology, linguistics, AI and cognitive science.
There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ (or ‘Cummins function’) concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ (or ‘evolutionary function’) concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.
This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology.
This chapter addresses some factors to consider in the further development of theories of teleofunctions. It recommends the things that should be avoided in the theories of teleofunctions: don't draw a hard line between natural functions and functions of artifacts, don't let teleofunctional theories neglect contexts, don't make designer's intentions essential to artifact function, and don't let theories of teleology spiral out of control into definitional oblivion. It allows different facets of functionality in both fields, biological and artificial functionality. This chapter suggests that the various notions of “function” has different strengths and weaknesses, and will be appropriate in explaining different things.
The notion of function is not all there is to teleology, although it is sometimes treated as though it were. Function is not even the central, or paradigm, teleological concept. But it is interesting and important; and it is still not as well understood as it should be, considering the amount of serious scholarship devoted to it during the last decade or two. Let us hope this justifies my excursion into these murky waters.
Realism and anti-realism an argument for anti-realism of belief belief and representation the teleological theory of representation the possibility of error universal rationality naturalized epistemology naturalized realism inferential processes relativism, history and scepticism.
In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a "proper function", and that a normative notion is not ahistorical.
A series of explanatory hypotheses are examined under the assumption that the logical structure of function attributions is dependent on the methodological constraints which these hypotheses conform to. Two theses are argued for: (1) Given these methodological constraints, if something has the function of doing Y , then normally it is the only kind of thing that can do Y in that kind of system. (2) What distinguishes function attributions from causal attribution is not that function attributions explain the etiology Of the causally efficacious object, as Wright has suggested. The distinction lies rather in that the object's having the effect, which is attributed to it as its function, must figure in the explanation of why it does what it does to achieve that effect.
The ultimate source of explanation in biology is the principle of natural selection. Natural selection means differential reproduction of genes and gene combinations. It is a mechanistic process which accounts for the existence in living organisms of end-directed structures and processes. It is argued that teleological explanations in biology are not only acceptable but indeed indispensable. There are at least three categories of biological phenomena where teleological explanations are appropriate.
This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.
Wright's article did not answer all the questions philosophers have asked about functions, but it did answer some of them, and it showed the way forward to answering more. Much of the literature since 1973 has, in effect, engaged in the refinement of Wright's original idea. Many writers do not think of themselves as doing this; indeed, several have actively resisted this interpretation., Nonetheless, since 1973 there has been a convergence towards a view of functions which has Wright's idea at its core., I think of this trend as an example of real progress in philosophy.
Biological functions are dispositions or effects a trait has which explain the recent maintenance of the trait under natural selection. This is the "modem history" approach to functions. The approach is historical because to ascribe a function is to make a claim about the past, but the relevant past is the recent past; modem history rather than ancient. The modem history view is not new. It is a point upon which much of the functions literature has been converging for the best part of two decades, and there are implicit or partial statements of the view to be found in many writers. This paper aims to make the position entirely explicit, to show how it emerges from the work of other authors, and to claim that it is the right approach to biological functions. Adopting a modem history position does not solve all the philosophical problems about functions. It deals with a family of questions concerning time and explanation, but there are other difficulties which are quite distinct. The most important of these concern the extent to which functional characterization requires a commitment to some form of adaptationism (Gould and Lewontin 1978). These issues will not be addressed here. Further, as many writers note, "function" is a highly ambiguous term. It is used in a variety of scientific and philosophical theories, several domains of everyday discourse, and there is probably even a plurality of senses current within biology. This paper is concerned with one core biological sense of the term, which is associated with a particular kind of explanation. In this sense a function has some link to an explanation of why the functionally characterized thing exists, in the form it does. Cummins (1975) argued that functions are properly associated with a different explanatory project, that of explaining how a component in a larger system contributes to the system exhibiting some more complex capacity. Following Millikan (1989b) I suggest that both kinds of functions should be recognized,
The etiological approach to 'proper functions' in biology can be strengthened by relating it to Robert Cummins' general treatment of function ascription. The proper functions of a biological trait are the functions it is assigned in a Cummins- style functional explanation of the fitness of ancestors. These functions figure in selective explanations of the trait. It is also argued that some recent etiological theories include inaccurate accounts of selective explanation in biology. Finally, a generalization of the notion of selective explanation allows an analysis of the proper functions of human artifacts.
I defend the historical definition of "function" originally given in my Lan- guage, Thought and Other Biological Categories (1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of "function". A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of "func- tion" fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions. Several years ago I laid down a notion that I dubbed "proper function" (Millikan 1984a) which I have since relied on in writing on diverse sub- jects. I have never paused to compare this notion with other descriptions of "function" in the literature, or to defend it against alternatives. That may seem a large oversight, amounting even to irresponsibility, and I wish to take this opportunity to remedy it. It does not seem to be so much the details of the definition of "proper function" that need defense as its basic form or general plan, which looks to the history of an item to determine its function rather than to the item's present properties or dispositions. At any rate, it is this historical turn in the definition that I propose to defend. To understand this defense, you will not need to know the details of the definition I have given. Let me just say this much about it. The definition of "proper function" is recursive. Putting things very roughly, for an item A to have a function F as a "proper function", it is necessary (and close to sufficient) that one of these two conditions should hold. (1) A originated as a "reproduction" (to give one example, as a copy, or a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the properties reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists because (causally historically because) of this or these performances. (2) A originated as the product of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had performance of F as a proper function and that, under those circumstances, normally causes F to be performed by means of producing an item like A. Items that fall under condition (2) have "derived proper functions", functions derived from the functions of
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In this paper, I try to develop an account of functions which might be of use to a biologist engaged in classifying and explaining natural phenomena. The most pressing difficulty facing such an account is the need to reconcile the normativity of function statements with their explanatory force. I consider two familiar accounts of function statements, offered by Andrew Woodfield (an ‘Actual Capacity Theorist’) and Larry Wright (a ‘Historical Theorist’). I examine both accounts in search of the strongest possible formulation of each type of theory. I fail to find a formulation of the ACT which is completely immune from counterexamples, but I do find a satisfactory formulation of the HT. In particular, I argue that the HT should incorporate a point central to the ACT that functions involve a means/end relationship between two devices. I then consider functional explanations: I argue that an ACT which holds that function statements are intrinsically explanatory cannot offer a satisfactory account. The account offered by Woodfield, who rejects this assumption, is adequate, though less attractive than the account suggested by the HT. I conclude by considering how the HT can account for functional norms.
