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THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF
GREEK SECURITY POLICY: IS THERE A
NEED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL?
Dr. Andrew N. Liaropoulos
Abstract
This article examines the institutional challenges that
Greek security policy is facing and offers some
suggestions regarding the mechanisms that are needed
for a more effective security and crisis management
policy. The inefficiency of Greek security policy derives
among other things from the fact that the existing
institutional structures are inadequate and poorly
organized. The prospect of introducing a new institutional
body, the National Security Council, will also be
examined in order to demonstrate that such an institution
although helpful should not be treated as a panacea.
Introduction
This article aims to analyse the deficiencies in Greek
security policy and demonstrate that Greece falls short of
advancing its institutions and coordination policy to
adequately face the new security challenges in a rapidly
changing international environment. The analysis will initially
26
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
refer to the security challenges and priorities that Greece is
facing in the 21st century and identify the main factors that
shape its security policy. Afterwards, the article will focus on
the institutional factor, exhibit its inefficiency and examine
the possibility of introducing a new institutional body, the
National Security Council (NSC).
The Greek Security Context
The end of the Cold War has brought considerable changes
in the international landscape, added new items in the global
security agenda and altered old ones. Along with every other
member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), Greece had to reformulate its
foreign and defence policy priorities and adjust to the new
security needs presented by an unstable and fluid
international environment. Nevertheless, a closer look at the
security context that emerged after the end of the Cold War,
demonstrates that Greece’s ‘readjustment’ is rather unique
and complex, since it combines elements of both change
and continuity.1
On the one hand, Athens had to adjust to the new
security environment that emerged after the end of the Cold
War. Being part of the Balkan peninsular and the Eastern
Mediterranean, Greece is geographically located in an
unstable zone. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia,
political instability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM), the future status of Kosovo and
Albanian nationalism clearly highlight the magnitude of the
stakes that the new regional environment has brought
about.2 Greece, integrated into key Western institutions (EU
and NATO), looks toward the Balkans, across the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean to areas, where security threats are
becoming more complex.3 The world has entered a new era
1 For an account on Greek security policy after the Cold War see selectively
Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Greek Security Policy after the
Cold War,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol.21, no.3 (2000), pp.95-
115; Thanos Dokos, “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting” in
Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds),
Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.42-68
and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “The Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy
Today,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.5, no.3 (2005),
pp.327-346.
2 Stephen Larrabee, “Greece’s Balkan Policy in a New Strategic Era,”
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.5, no.3 (2005), pp.405-
425.
3 Ian O. Lesser, “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment,” Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, vol.5, no.3 (2005), pp.347-363.
27
A. N. Liaropoulos: Greek Security Policy …
where ‘new security threats’ like the proliferation of mass
destruction, international terrorism, trans-national crime,
drug trafficking, religious extremism, migration and
environmental pollution can not be addressed effectively on
a purely national basis, but demand bilateral and multilateral
cooperation, like intelligence sharing and police
cooperation.4 Greece’s two year-term (2005-2006) as a
member of the United Nations Security Council vividly
demonstrate its commitment to respond to global challenges
and broaden its security agenda.
On the other hand, Athens had to deal with ‘traditional’
threats as well. For most European countries, the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union triggered a profound
change in their security policies. Greece has been the
exception to this rule, because for decades Greek security
policy considerations have been dominated by the threat
from Ankara, not that posed by Moscow.5 In the post-Cold
War era, Turkey still remains the main security concern for
Athens.6
Over the 1990s, Greece and Turkey have witnessed
several bilateral crises. In 1994, Greece and Cyprus
declared a Joint Defence Doctrine (JDD), which is a
defensive initiative with two military objectives: (a) reducing
Cyprus’ vulnerability and increasing the cost of any offensive
move; (b) preventing any territorial change through the use
of force.7 In this context, any attack against the Republic of
Cyprus would constitute a casus belli for Greece. Since
October 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial
waters width of up to 12 nautical miles, the Turkish National
Assembly publicized a Resolution of no legal authority,
stating that such an extension by Greece would be
considered a casus belli. Other examples of tension
between the two countries are the violations of Greek
airspace by Turkish aircrafts and the challenges to the
sovereignty status of Aegean islets.8 In addition, the
4 Fotios Moustakis, “Soft Security Threats in the New Europe: The Case of
the Balkan Region,” European Security, vol.13, no.1 (2004), pp.139-156.
5 Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Democratic Peace and the
European Security Community: The Paradox of Greece and Turkey,”
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol.13, no.1 (2002), p.82.
6 Dimitris Keridis and Dimitris Triantafyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations
in the Era of Globalization (Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2001); Mustafa
Aydin and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Turkish-Greek Relations: Escaping from
the Security Dilemma in the Aegean (New York: Frank Cass Publishers,
2002).
7 Dokos, “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting”, 67.
8 Indicative of the tension that is created during the dogfights between
Greek and Turkish fighter jets is the incident that occurred on March 23,
28
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
deployment of the surface to air missiles S-300 in Cyprus,
which put into question the JDD, the Imia/Kardak Crisis in
1996, which introduced the ‘grey zones’ in the Greek-Turkish
agenda and the way Greek actors of dubious official
legitimacy handled the Öcalan Affair, exhibit that
occasionally the level of tension between the two countries
can be high.9
For many years, Greece relied mainly on international
law, international agreements and the mediating role of the
United States regarding Greek-Turkish relations. This
strategy proved rather ineffective in the past. Over the last
years Athens has made a U-turn in its foreign policy by
initiating a rapprochement policy towards Turkey (the so
called ‘earthquake diplomacy’) and relying more on its
relations with the EU, but also placed emphasis on internal
balancing by reforming its armed forces. The latter creates
the need for costly armament projects that constitute a
serious economic burden for the Greek economy. 10
After the EU Summit of Helsinki in December 1999,
Greece has initiated a long-term strategy of stabilising its
relations with Turkey by accepting the granting of EU
candidate status to Turkey and endorsing the opening of
accession negotiations between Turkey and the Union.
Although this might seem as a rational decision in terms of
strategic perspective, it is important to point out that in
common with NATO and the U.S in the past, the EU can not
provide Greece with credible security guarantees.11 The
current rapprochement between Athens and Ankara remains
fragile, since neither country has shifted the agenda from
‘low’ to high’ politics. As a result and despite the various
Confidence Building Measures, there is no progress on any
2006, when a Greek and a Turkish F-16 collided about 15 miles south-
southeast of the island of Karpathos and the Greek pilot Costas Iliakis
was killed.
9 In the 1980s and mid 1990s Turkey has been conducting military
operations in its south-eastern region with the Kurdistan’s Worker Party
(PKK) with thousand of casualties for both sides. In the past Turkey has
accused Greece for allegedly supporting Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK,
by training Kurdish fighters and financing its operations. As a result the
capture of Öcalan in Kenya caused a great diplomatic crisis among
Greece and Turkey.
10 Christos Kollias, George Manolas and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou,
“Military Expenditure and Government Debt in Greece: Some
Preliminary Empirical Findings,” Defense and Peace Economics, vol.15,
no.2 (2004), pp.189-197.
11 Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest
for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap,” Security
Dialogue, vol.34, no.3 (2003), pp.301-314.
29
A. N. Liaropoulos: Greek Security Policy …
of the issues related to the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus
problem remains unresolved.
To conclude, the challenge for the Greek policy-makers
after the end of the Cold War was to formulate a security
policy that would be in accordance with Greece’s obligations
as a member of the EU and NATO and its geopolitical
context and at the same time promote its traditional national
interests.
Greek Security Policy: The Defining Factors
In an attempt to further interpret Greece’s security policy,
certain factors can be identified. In every policy making
system there are various political, cultural, institutional and
psychological factors that influence the policy-making
process. These factors are both endogenous and
exogenous and reflect recent but also long-standing trends
in a country’s security policy. The progressive
Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy, the continued
uncertainty that characterises the Greek-Turkish relations,
the dominant role of personalities in the decision making
process and the lack of an institutional body that would
provide long-term assessment on a broad range of security
issues and assist/coordinate the crisis management
mechanisms, are the dominant factors that shape Greek
security policy.
Participation in the EU and more particularly in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has inevitably
expanded the portfolio of Greece’s foreign policy. Rather
than dealing exclusively with so-called ‘national issues’,
Greece now has a broadened policy agenda, both
geographically (Latin America, Asia, Africa) and thematically
(‘low politics issues’, trade, environment, technology, peace
keeping operations etc). The process of ‘Europeanization’, -
meaning the adaptation to European norms and practices -
has also forced Greek foreign policy to adopt a new style for
conducting policy, one that is more compatible with the
European model.12 Mainly after 1996, Greece shifted from a
rhetorical, symbolic and nationalistic style to a more
pragmatic and issue-oriented one. Participation in the EU
12 On the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy see selectively:
Panayotis Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece’s Foreign Policy:
Progress and Problems” in Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds),
Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp.359-
372; Stelios Stavridis, “The Europeanization of Greek foreign policy: A
literature review,” Policy Paper, Hellenic Centre for European Studies
(EKEM), March 2004.
30
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
has forced Greece to abandon its ‘hellenocentric’ approach
to foreign policy and diplomacy, understand the importance
of building alliances and has legitimized the concepts of
negotiations and compromise. Europeanization has also had
an impact on policy-making structures. For instance, the
1998 reforms within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed on
the one hand to create a new structure that would deal
successfully with low politics issues, given the thematic and
geographic broadening of Greece’s foreign policy, and on
the other hand to improve its performance by establishing
new structures like the Centre for Policy Analysis and
Planning (CPAP) and the Permanent Crisis Management
Units (PCMUs). 13
As mentioned above, Turkey still poses the main threat
against Greece. Since 1974, the perception that Turkey
constitutes a potential military threat has been reflected not
only on public opinion, but also on the political leadership.
Despite differences in style and rhetoric, both of the major
parties in Greece have shown remarkable continuity in their
national security agenda.14 In all the recent policy choices
(the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey’s EU
accession), both major political parties have adopted more
or less the same approach. Both the Pan-Hellenic Socialist
Movement and the New Democracy party favour the current
rapprochement, and support Turkey’s EU candidacy, but
surprisingly enough neither has developed an alternative
policy for moving from ‘low’ to ‘high politics’ issues or dealing
with the Cyprus problem in the post Annan Plan period. This
continuity might offer a consensus, but at the same time the
lack of adaptability and alternative scenarios turns out to be
counterproductive. The decision makers seem reluctant to
apply alternative scenarios and question the rationale behind
certain issues. Echoing Byron Theodoropoulos, there are a
number of questions worth asking. Does the Greek air
defence really need an air-space of 10 miles? What benefits
does Greece expect from extending her territorial waters to
12 nautical miles? Does the Aegean continental shelf have
any significance?15
Such questions are rarely addressed in the various
institutions in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Defence. An important characteristic and a cause
13 Law 2594/1998.
14 Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security
Providers,”, p.303.
15 Byron Theodoropoulos, “Greek-Turkish Relations: A New Era?” in
Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds),
Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.313.
31
A. N. Liaropoulos: Greek Security Policy …
of Greece’s diplomatic inefficiency is the limited role of
institutions and bureaucratic structures in the policy
outcomes. The reason is not so much the lack of a
constitutional framework or the absence of legally
established organs, but the fact that the existing institutions
offer little to the actual policy-making process. The
institutions are weak, ineffective and operate in a loose
manner.16 They rarely submit alternative policy scenarios to
the political leadership, but rather view their role as that of
implementing policy choices already made by the political
leadership.
The main institutional bodies responsible for foreign and
defence policy - the Cabinet and the Governmental Council
on Foreign and Defence Matters (GCFDM) - do not produce
alternative policies. They hardly ever meet and when they
do, they implement and legitimize the choices already made
by the Prime Minister and a small group of Ministers.
Despite the fact that a number of initiatives were undertaken
in recent years - such as the creation of a Foreign Policy
Council (FPC)17 and the establishment PCMUs - Greece still
lacks the proper coordination policy to face the challenges of
an unstable regional and international environment. The
FPC consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, members of
all Greek parties represented in Parliament and a number of
experts. The Council aims to reach a consensus in foreign
policy issues and offer ‘continuity and consistency’. The sole
role of the Foreign Policy Council is to offer advice on
foreign policy issues and not coordinate the other bodies or
get involved in the crisis management field. The jury is still
out as to whether the establishment of a new institutional
body is enough to cover this inefficiency on its own.
The inefficiency of the institutions places individuals, the
Prime Minister and Ministers, at the centre of the policy-
making process. The record shows that the major political
choices on security policy (Greek-Turkish rapprochement
and support of Turkey’s EU accession), were taken and
implemented by the Prime Minister and a small group of
16 Panayotis Ioakimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece:
Personalities versus Institutions,” in Stelios Stavridis, et al, The Foreign
Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant
Countries in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.144-9.
17 The Foreign Policy Council consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
members of all Greek parties represented in Parliament and a number of
experts. The Council aims to reach a consensus in foreign policy issues
and offer ‘continuity and consistency’. The sole role of the Foreign Policy
Council is to offer advice on foreign policy issues and not coordinate the
other bodies or get involved in the crisis management field.
32
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
Ministers and not by collective bodies.18 The record is even
more marked and worrying in the crisis management field.
The Imia crisis, the S-300 crisis and the Öcalan case
demonstrated that the leaders were averse to submitting
their authority to any institutional discipline or collective body
of policy-making and instead formed small ad-hoc groups
that they could control. In a political system, in which leading
policy makers operate without a strong and effective
institutional framework, failures will inevitably occur.
As a result, any major effort to reform the security policy
should have a strong institutional element and aim to provide
institutional discipline to the leader’s decision-making
process. All factors analysed above are important and under
constant play, but the institutional factor is one that is both
susceptible to change and able to influence all the others.
The introduction of a new institution or better coordination of
the existing ones will take advantage of the positive
developments that the ‘Europeanization’ brought about and
counterbalance the negative developments deriving from the
dominant role of personalities. The establishment of a body
that will function as a policy oriented think-tank would
challenge well established beliefs rooted in both society and
the ruling elite and provide a better understanding of the new
security environment.
The Institutional Dimension of Greek Security Policy
In a parliamentary democracy such as Greece, decisions are
reached in a collective manner. In particular, the main
institutions responsible for the security policy are two: the
Cabinet and the GCFDM (an ad hoc Council, a smaller
Cabinet), both chaired by the Prime Minister. Although both
institutions have the right to deal with foreign and defence
issues, the former has entrusted expanded responsibilities to
the latter and therefore the GCFDM is the main instrument
responsible for the national security policy. It is composed of
the Prime Minister (Chair), the ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Defence, Finance, Interior, Development, National Economy,
Environment and the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Depending on the issue at stake other ministers and the
Chief of the National Defence General Staff may also
participate. The GCFDM is responsible for shaping the
national defence and national security policy, reaching
decisions about foreign policy and defence matters, deciding
18 Ioakimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece”, pp.149-54.
33
A. N. Liaropoulos: Greek Security Policy …
about the structure of the armed forces, the promotion of
high-rank officers and defence procurement issues, setting
the country in a state of partial or total mobilisation of its
means and resources and finally organising a crisis
management body.19
The ad hoc creation of a crisis management body within
the GCFDM is a paradox. The latter lacks the proper
physical infrastructure, a support mechanism that would
coordinate the crisis management strategy and provide
alternative scenarios. The physical infrastructure that is
needed to monitor the evaluation of crises in real time, the
gathering of officials and experts that are scattered in
various ministries and organisations is a time consuming
and complex task that can not be accomplished on an ad
hoc basis.20 Despite repeated pledges for the creation of a
Secretariat, the GCFDM still lacks one, thus coordination in
both times of peace and especially crisis can only be limited;
it depends on the respective Ministers’ ad hoc institutional
cooperation.21
During a crisis, the GCFDM must coordinate the existing
instruments in the ministries of foreign affairs and defence,
like the CPAP and the PCMUs, both in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, as well as the Strategic Studies Directorate
(SSD), which is a civilian crisis management unit in the
Ministry of Defence. The CPAP and the PCMUs are not
directly involved in the policy making process, but are rather
more academically oriented. Indeed despite its name the
latter is not a crisis management instrument, since its
responsibility is to conduct simulations and prepare the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs response in a crisis situation.
Therefore the PCMUs have only an advisory role and they
do not actually ‘manage’ the crisis.22 The issue of
coordination gets even more complicated if we take under
consideration that most crises involve more than just the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The GCFDM (or
any other institution) should also be able to coordinate the
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Hellenic, the
19 For a detailed analysis of the structure and role of the Governmental
Council on Foreign and Defence Matters see George Papastamkos,
Vasilios Gikas and Petros Liacouras, National and European Security
and Crisis Management (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoula, 2002), pp.42-47,
146-155 (in Greek).
20 Ioannis Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council in Greece,”
Defensor Pacis, Issue 17 (2005), pp.168-169.
21 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security
and Crisis Management, p.81.
22 Ibid, 52.
34
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
Coast Guard (for which the Ministry of Mercantile Marine is
responsible) and the Ministry of Press and Mass Media.
As a result of the above, the GCFDM is unable to
actually provide critical advice to the nation’s leadership
during a period of crisis. Surprisingly, the members of the
GCFDM who are responsible for reaching decisions about
the crisis management strategy are unaware of crisis
management principles, rules of engagements, the military
jargon and technical details involving military operations.
The fact that decision-makers should participate in crisis-
management simulations and exercises, a common practice
in other countries, does not seem to apply in the Greek
case.
Low-intensity conflicts that took place the last decade
demonstrate vividly the inability of Greek security and crisis
management mechanisms. The Imia/Kardak Crisis was
(mis)handled not by the GCFDM as it should be, but by a
small ad hoc group, where the Prime Minister and the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Defence monopolized
the decision making process and made no use of the
relevant institutional bodies. More striking is the fact that this
idiosyncratic team could not establish a channel of
communication with the Turkish side; the negotiations
regarding the settlement of the crisis were actually achieved
through the involvement of the USA.23 The Öcalan case was
again managed by an ad hoc team, consisting of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior, the
Secretary of the Cabinet (working as a link to the Prime
Minister) and the Director of the NIS. The Greek government
denied providing asylum to the Kurdish guerrilla leader,
since that would have added unwanted tension in Greek-
Turkish relations. The decision to send the PKK leader in
Kenya, where a large number of US intelligence officers
where placed after the terrorist attacks that took place in the
U.S Embassy, was wrong both in political and operational
terms.24
Based on the above, the need for a new institution that
will be able to coordinate the existing bodies scattered in
various ministries, offer sound and timely advice on a wide
23 For a detailed account on Greece’s crisis management strategy during
the Imia/Kardak Crisis see Efstathios Fakiolas and Panayiotis Mavrides,
“Strategy of Crisis Management and the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: The
Case of the Imia Islets,” in Christodoulos Yiallourides and Panayiotis
Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War (New
York: Aristide Caratzas Publishers, 2001), pp.205-238.
24 On the Öcalan case see Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas,
Shaping National Strategy and Crisis Management (Athens: Defence
Analyses Institute, 2004), pp.85-87 (in Greek).
35
A. N. Liaropoulos: Greek Security Policy …
range of issues, establish a strict crisis management
mechanism, and oversee each step of the policy-making and
crisis management policy is worth examining.
National Security Council: The Missing Element?
Establishing an institution like the NSC would provide better
coordination of the existing institutions (Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior etc), assist the
crisis management mechanism and contribute in shaping
Greek security policy. The idea for creating a NSC is not
new in Greece. Indeed, the NSC existed on paper during the
period 1986-1996. There was a resolution by the Cabinet in
1986 referring to its creation, but in practice it was never
established and in 1996 it was abolished. Diplomatic
mishandlings, and the recent establishment of new
institutions within the MFA and MoD as mentioned above,
gave new momentum to an already existing idea. The
present legal framework allows for the creation of a
coordinative and consultative body within the GCFDM.25 The
proposals about the establishment of a National Security
Council outline an institution of coordinative and consultative
nature that will assist the GCFDM and will come under the
Prime Minister’s power.26
The establishment of a NSC is needed in order to
provide a detailed evaluation of threats to national security,
to assist the leadership in shaping the national foreign and
defence policy, to draft scenarios concerning possible
threats, to coordinate the activities of other crisis
management bodies and offer a synthesis of the views
expresses by the various ministries and committees and
finally to function as a leadership training centre.27
Based on the international practise, the NSC reports to
and is controlled by the head of the state. Keeping in mind
that the NSC in its original form is designed to serve the
presidential model, certain legislative reforms will have to be
adopted to ensure on the one hand that the Prime Minister
will be at the centre of the process and on the other hand
25 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security
and Crisis Management, p.46.
26 Regarding the proposals for the establishment of a Greek National
Security Council see selectively: Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras,
National and European Security and Crisis Management, pp.155-171;
Dokos and Tsakonas, Shaping National Strategy and Crisis
Management, 94-108; Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council
in Greece,”, pp.165-186.
27 Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council in Greece,”, pp.170-172.
36
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
that the government will not lose its collective action ability.
Therefore, uncritically applying the ‘NSC model’ that is used
in the US’s governmental system is not an option.28
A critical issue is the (competitive) relation between the
GCFDM and the NSC in times of both crisis and peace. The
parallel activation of the NSC should not undermine the
ability of the GCFDM to make decisions, but rather provide
flexibility by coordinating the various parts and offer
alternative policies. Therefore a critical link between the
decisive instrument (GCFDM and Prime Minister) and the
consultative one (NSC) should be established. This role can
only be undertaken by the National Security Advisor (NSA).29
The latter should basically ensure the intermediate role of
the NSC - among the various decentralized units and the
GCFDM.30 The National Security Advisor should preserve
the NSC from turning into a hyper-institution that will end up
being stiff and causing rivalry among its various parts.
The synthesis of the NSC should be similar to that of the
GCFPD, but also broader. Apart from the Prime Minister
(chairing) and the ministers that already participate in the
GCFPD, actors like the NSA, the Director of the NIS and the
Chief of the Hellenic Defence General Staff should also
participate. The National Security Council should be staffed
by military personnel, diplomats, higher officers from other
services, specialists and technocrats. Having a ‘mixed’ staff
will allow the NSC to develop a military/civil culture that will
allow it to reach broader consensus, gain flexibility, cope
with by-ministerial antagonism and understand better the
complex international environment.
Although there is no agreement on its exact structure,
the majority of analysts suggest that the Greek NSC should
consist of the following: (a) the Secretariat that will be
responsible for the administrative support, (b) the Strategic
Analysis & Planning Centre that will analyse all aspects that
are related to the national security policy, (c) the Crisis
Management Centre that will coordinate the efforts of all the
other bodies, centres and services and assist the leadership
during a crisis,31 (d) the Intelligence Unit that will evaluate
28 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security
and Crisis Management, pp.166-168.
29 Steven Redd, “The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision
Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.46, no.3 (2002), pp.335-364.
30 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras 2002, p.47; Dokos and Tsakonas
2004, p.98.
31 The prime responsibilities of a Crisis Management Centre should be
technical support, information fusion, data base management, indicators
and warning analysis, and development of doctrine and procedures on
crises. It should have close links with appropriate operational elements
37
A. N. Liaropoulos: Greek Security Policy …
and combine the information provided by the ministries and
other crisis management bodies, and (e) the Political
Communication Unit that will be responsible for public
diplomacy and perception management.32
Key to the success of the NSC is to create a small,
coherent and flexible unit that will assist the Prime Minister
and the GCFDM and not replace them. Nevertheless,
without the sufficient political will, the NSC might actually
produce new problems. In particular, the Prime Minister
might manipulate the NSC. The prospect of turning the NSC
into an instrument that will mainly serve the Prime Minister is
obviously a negative prospect within a parliamentary
democracy. In addition, balancing the technocratic and
political character of the council poses another great
challenge. Institutional rivalry between the NSA and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the tendency of the
former to become a hyper-minister with increased powers,
should also be taken under consideration.33 Turf wars
between the NIS and the Intelligence Unit about the
intelligence product, or tension between the Crisis
Management Centre and other bodies that are scattered in
the ministries might also occur.
Conclusions
The review of the Greek security policy illustrates the
deficiencies of its institutional dimension. This inefficiency
derives not only from the fact that the existing structures are
inadequate and poorly organized, but also from the fact that
the current political culture does not favour a strict and
effective institutional framework that will assist the decision
makers and even control the outcomes of the policy-making
process. Indicative of the above is the fact that the Greek
political leadership was reluctant to use the available
institutions during recent crises. The NSC, as every
bureaucratic institution will have problems regarding its
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Intelligence
Community.
32 For more details on the structure of the proposed National Security
Council see selectively: Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National
and European Security and Crisis Management, pp.161-164; Dokos and
Tsakonas, Shaping National Strategy and Crisis Management, pp.99-
107 and Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council in Greece,”,
pp.173-185.
33 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security
and Crisis Management, pp.129-134.
38
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 3 (9) 2008.
organization, role and coordination policy but then again the
planners of such an institution will have the benefit of
learning from others that have introduced similar bodies in
their policy-making structure. As a result, it can be argued
that the missing element is not only the establishment of a
new institution, but also the need to accompany the
establishment of such an institution with the proper political
culture. Therefore, adding simply a new institution is not the
solution. A new institutional body like the NSC might provide
flexibility and better coordination, but it will not solve
problems that are inherent to the Greek political system, like
the dominant role of the Prime Minister, or the reluctance of
the political elite to receive advice.
Simply establishing the NSC or a similar institution
should not be seen as a panacea for Greek security policy,
but rather as the first necessary step towards a more
organized and effective national security policy. Creating an
instrument that will adjust to the current institutional
framework, make the most of the existing apparatus and
confront its endogenous shortcomings is probably a rational
action that can be taken. Building an institutional system of
policy-making will contribute in ‘shaping’ a political culture
that will allow old and new institutions to function
synergistically, that will aim for systematic and rigorous
decision-making and that will be willing to receive advice and
examine alternative policy scenarios.
