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Cannabis policy reform in Europe: Bottom up rather than top down

Authors:

Abstract

With the regulation of recreational cannabis markets in Uruguay and the US states of Colorado and Washington in 2013, and – in November 2014 – the approval of cannabis regulation ballots in the states of Oregon and Alaska, a breakthrough in conventional cannabis policy is emerging. The current policy trend towards legal regulation of the cannabis market is increasingly seen as a more promising model for protecting people's health and safety and has changed the drug policy landscape and the terms of the debate. The prohibitive model has failed to show any sustained impact in reducing the market, while imposing heavy burdens upon criminal justice systems; producing profoundly negative social and public health impacts; and creating criminal markets supporting organised crime, violence and corruption. While in the Americas cannabis policy reform is taking off, Europe seems to be lagging behind. That is to say, in European nations at the level of national governments – where denial of the changing policy landscape and inertia to act upon calls for change reigns. At the local level, however, disenchantment with the current cannabis regime gives rise to new ideas. In several countries in Eu rope, local and regional authorities are looking at regulation, either pressured by grassroots movements – in particular the Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs) – or due to the involvement of criminal groups and public disorder. This briefing will give an overview of recent developments in Europe.
transnational institute
1
Transnational Institute
Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies No. 28
December 2014
With the regulation of recreational cannabis
markets in Uruguay and the US states of
Colorado and Wash ington in 2013, and – in
November 2014 – the approval of cannabis
regulation bal lots in the states of Oregon
and Alaska, a breakthrough in conventional
cannabis policy is emerging. e current
policy trend towards legal regulation of the
cannabis market is increasingly seen as a
more prom ising model for protecting peoples
health and safety and has changed the drug
policy landscape and the terms of the debate.
e prohibitive model has failed to show any
sustained impact in reducing the market,
while imposing heavy burdens upon criminal
justice systems; producing profoundly
negative social and public health impacts;
and creating criminal markets supporting
organised crime, violence and corruption.
While in the Americas cannabis policy
reform is taking o, Europe seems to be
lagging behind. at is to say, in European
nations at the level of national governments
– where denial of the changing policy
landscape and inertia to act upon calls for
change reigns. At the local level, however,
disenchantment with the current cannabis
regime gives rise to new ideas. In several
countries in Eu rope, local and regional
authorities are looking at regulation, either
pressured by grassroots movements – in
particular the Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs) –
or due to the involve ment of criminal groups
and public disorder. is brieng will give an
overview of recent developments in Europe.
In the Nether lands, municipalities want to
regulate the supply of coeeshops currently
not allowed. In Copen hagen (Denmark),
and Berlin, Frankfurt-am-Main, Hamburg
and Cologne (Ger many), local au thorities
pro mote coeeshop-like dispen saries with a
regu lated supply. In Spain and Swit zer land
Cannabis policy reform in Europe
Bottom up rather than top down
Tom Blickman1
Keypoints
• While in the Americas cannabis policy
reform is taking off, national governments
in Europe are in a state of denial about the
changing policy landscape and suffer from
inertia in acting upon calls for change from
local authorities.
• Local authorities are con fronted with a
range of problems that, in the end, cannot
be solved without some kind of a regu lated
and trans parent supply chain of recreational
cannabis.
• Increasingly, local and regional
authorities, and grassroots movements –
centred around the Can na bis Social Club
movement in Europe – are advocating
change, and various initiatives are under way.
• European cities and regions that want
reform should follow the example set by their
predecessors when they con stituted Euro pean
Cities on Drug Policy (ECDP), advocating
a more pragmatic, less prohibitionist drug
policy and initiating a set of innovative harm
reduction measures
• Such a network provides opportunities
to ex change experiences and best practices as
well as fund raising and sharing human and
financial resources needed for policy change.
• While the ECDP is now defunct after
achieving its goals, it is time for an ECDP
2.0 to do the same for the regula tion of the
recreational cannabis market in Europe.
• As happened with harm-reduction,
sooner or later the cannabis reform pressure
building up from local levels will have
to lead to legislative reforms at national
levels, and the EU policy framework –and
ultimately also the UN conventions – have to
accommodate the policy trend towards legal
regulation.
2 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
re gional and local authorities want to allow
Cannabis Social Clubs, while in Belgium,
Por tugal, France and the UK campaigns for
CSCs are gaining momentum.
e European Union (EU) lacks competence
to embark upon can na bis pol icy reform,
which falls under the remit of member
states.2 Neverthe less, European law builds on
the three UN drug control conven tions that
restricts cannabis exclusively to medical and
scientic purposes and obliges member states
to adopt measures to establish recreational
cannabis as punishable oences – either
penal or administrative. Although outright
criminalization of the recreational use is
exempted and the obligations are sub ject
to constitu tional limitations of a country,
when it comes to cultivation, pro duction,
distribution, im port and export, possession
or any other action for recreational purposes,
options – other than non-enforcement of in-
fractions – are very limited. Moreover, EU
mem ber states have agreed to cooperate and
to take the most ap pro priate measures against
cannabis culti vation for recrea tional use –
including obligations to prohibit such acts.3
e current legal and political straitjacket
in Europe is extremely dicult to reconcile
with the request of local authorities to
eectively regulate the supply of can na-
bis for recreational use as an alternative to
the negative consequences of the current
restrictive arrangements. It would mean that
European states would have to violate the
UN conventions, just as Uruguay and the
federal US govern ment have done. is is
not impossible, but would require political
will to do so. As in the US, dierent policies
regarding personal use and pos session for
per sonal use al ready exist in Europe, from
de jure decriminalisation in Portugal and
the Czech Republic to full prohibition in
Sweden, as well as intermediate de facto
decrimi nalisation in countries such as
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Switzerland, Ger many and Spain. e ques-
tion is why this could not be extended to
regulating cul tivation practices. If this is
possible in a federal state like the US, why
should that not be possible in the European
Union?
EU member states are also committed to
the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 and the
related EU Action Plan Con cerning Drugs
2013-2016, which do not foresee any kind
of change regarding canna bis.4 How ever, the
door to reform is not completely closed, since
there is some room for manoeuvre for “en-
couraging an active political dis course and
analysis of develop ments and challenges of
drugs at EU and inter national levels.5 One
of the initiatives in the previous EU Drugs
Strategy (2005-2012) was the commission
of a report to look at the drug market “as if
it were a licit market”, which resulted in A
report on global illicit drugs market, published
in 2009 as a contribution to the 10-year
UNGASS review at the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs.6
e report noted that “[e]nforce ment of
drug prohibi tions has caused substantial
unintended harms; many were pre dictable”,
concluding that “[t]he challenge for the next
ten years will be to nd a constructive way of
building on these lessons so that the positive
bene ts of policy interventions are increased
and the negatives ones averted.” at could
include look ing at regulation of cannabis
markets as local administrations and well-
organized grassroots move ments have put
forward various regulation proposals, as well
as guide lines for good practices for collec tive
can nabis growing.
Whereas cannabis policies are considered to
be relatively liberal in Europe in comparison
to other parts of the world, cannabis-related
oences are increasing. According to the 2014
European Drug Report:
Since about 2000, many countries have
reduced the severity of penalties applied
for simple use or pos ses sion oences.
More generally, European discussions on
cannabis control have tended to focus on
target ing drug supply and tracking rather
than use. In contradiction to this, however,
the overall num ber of pos session and
use oences related to cannabis has been
steadily increasing for nearly a decade.7
According to the report, more than one
million drug use or possession oences
were reported in Europe in 2012, a 17 per
cent increase compared to 2006. More than
three-quarters of the reported drug o ences
in volve cannabis. Even in the Netherlands,
oen seen as the most liberal country when
3Transnational Institute
canna bis is con cerned, the amount of oences
related to cannabis possession is signicant.
In 2012, there were 4,594 recorded oences;
71 per cent of which concerned pos session
of ve grams cannabis or less – the threshold
quantity for can nabis to be purchased in
coee shops.8 at amounts to nine oences
per day. Never the less, the risk of being
caught in the Netherlands is relatively low,
since detection of possession is generally the
result of non-targeted detection rather than
targeted control.
Going backwards … to go forward?
e leniency towards cannabis in
traditionally tolerant European countries
such as the Nether lands and Denmark has
been declining in the past decade with the
rise of liberal-conservative govern ments.
e original public health focus of those
tolerant policies, separating the cannabis
market from the hard-drugs market – heroin
in particular – that had been progressively
implemented in the 1970s, has been re placed
by a security-oriented focus, in an eort
to ght the growing involvement of crime
groups in the unregulated supply-side of the
market and the public disorder of cannabis
tourism.
The Netherlands
e prob lems with the Dutch coeeshop
model are rooted in the paradox that at the
front-door, the sale and possession of small
quantities are not prose cuted, while at the
back-door supply (cultivation and trade) is
still fully crimi nal ised. e contradiction
was clear from the outset, with the 1976
amend ment to the Opium Act establishing
the policy of distinguishing between drugs
involving unacceptable risks (hard drugs,
such as heroin) and cannabis products (so
drugs). Amidst the legislative revision, the
government was even prepared to legalise
cannabis, according to a govern ment
document:
e use of cannabis products and the
possession of them for personal use should
be re moved as soon as possible from the
domain of criminal justice. However,
this can not be realized as yet, as it would
bring us into conict with our treaty
obligations. e Gov ern ment shall explore
in in ternational consultations whether it
is feasible that agree ments as the Single
Convention be amended in a way that
nations will be free to insti tute, at their
discretion, a separate regime for cannabis
products.9
Both the Minister of Justice, Dries van Agt,
and the Health Minister, Irene Vorrink,
wanted to go beyond decriminalising
cannabis: “We wanted to fully legalize
cannabis and regulate all other drugs,” Van
Agt said years later. International pressure
made the government decide dier ently.10
Around 1995 a new Dutch government again
considered regulating the back-door supply
of cannabis.11 e stated policy would have
allowed municipalities to experiment with
the supply of locally cultivated cannabis to
bona de coeeshops if the mayor, the local
chief pub lic prose cutor and the head of
police all agreed and received the backing
of the national prosecutors gen eral oce.12
is would have ex tended the ex pe diency
principle in Dutch criminal law used to
allow regulated sales in coee shops to the
cultivation and supply for the coeeshops.13
ese proposed reforms were nipped in
the bud by the French President Jacques
Chirac, who also ques tioned EU drug policy
‘harmonization’ in an eort to rein in the
lenient poli cies of the Netherlands.14 As a
result, future national drug policies became
subject to the rule of ad hering to the lowest
common de nomi na tor within the European
Union. is means that reform-ad verse
countries are able to obstruct pro gress
towards more liberal cannabis poli cies in the
consensus-ori ented policy process, based on
the restrictive UN drug control conventions
that have been incorpo rated in European
legislation.
As the most liberal country in the diverse EU
cannabis policy landscape, the drive towards
‘har mo ni za tion has had serious implications
for the Netherlands. Policy makers developed
a ‘wait-and-see’ atti tude: any progress would
depend on willingness for change abroad. In
the meantime, the Netherlands saw no other
option than to ‘muddle on’ with its im perfect
co ee shop system, main taining the status
quo as a transitional situation on the road to
4 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
regula tion, and continuing a give-and-take
policy in the inter national arena.15 To mollify
the French, penal ties for large-scale organized
illicit cultivation were increased, and the limit
for sales in co ee shops was lowered from 30
to ve grams.
e reluctance of the Dutch government
to engage in cannabis policy reform was
again apparent in 2000, when a slim ma-
jority in the Dutch parliament adopted a
motion to regulate the backdoor, which the
government re fused to implement. On the
other hand, successive Dutch governments
succeeded in ensuring that the EU’s 2004
Council Framework Decision on drug
tracking – resulting from the European
harmonization process – would not commit
to changing Dutch policy on coeeshops and
the possession of small amounts of drugs
for personal use. e Framework Decision
only requires legislative action and does not
intervene in enforcement and prosecution
policies. e established principles of
subsidiarity in the Treaties (to not regulate
at EU level what is nationally possible)
and proportionality (against any excessive
response to a particular problem) were
respected.16
e Framework Decision is mainly
focused on the harmonisation of legislative
instruments against drug tracking to
strengthen cooperation between the judicial
authorities and law enforcement agen-
cies. Over the years, however, it has led to
stricter legislative action in the Netherlands
through an array of new instruments in the
Opium Act, such as increases in penalties
for cannabis oences at the supply side –
commercial growing or selling of cannabis
– and for participation in a criminal
organisation. e over all eect was a
tightening of policies, in particular regarding
the supply of cannabis, and probably was the
basis for stronger law enforcement action
by a special unit (the Taskforce Tackling
Organized Hemp growing) against illicit
cultivation. e European Commission
specically expressed its concerns regard ing
the problem of the supply of coeeshops by
criminal networks.17
In contrast, growing support for a system
of legal cannabis regu lation has emerged
among the popula tion. One poll showed
that 54 per cent are in favour of regulating
cannabis sup ply.18 A December 2013 poll
showed that 65 per cent of the Dutch are
in favour of regulating canna bis pro duc-
tion like Uruguay.19 Even among the voters
of the conser vative-liberal party VVD – the
party of the current minister of Secu rity and
Justice Ivo Opstelten – a signicant majority
(65 per cent) supports regulation. If political
parties took seri ously the views of those who
voted for them at the September 2012 general
elec tions, there would be an over whelming
majority in favour of regulating can nabis
sup ply: 129 out of 150 seats in the House of
Representatives.
Nevertheless, current government policies
focus on further restriction. While the
nationwide introduc tion of the cannabis pass
has failed, the residence criterion (tourist
ban) remains. Increased street dealing was
re ported in southern municipalities adopting
such restric tions. e Justice minister still in-
sists on main taining the residence criterion,
although a pro visional opt-out was included
in the measure for munici palities to decide
whether they would enforce the rule. Most
munici palities are not enforcing this rule,
except for some in the south.20 A recent
survey found that 85 per cent did not enforce
the residence criterion.21
A report evaluating the residence and private
club criterion concluded that “in the munici-
palities where coeeshops remain o-limits
to non-residents, even tually the drugs
tourists also largely disappear from the illegal
cannabis market.”22 Hailed as a success by the
government, it chose to ignore disquieting
im pacts of the illegal cannabis market, such
as the eect on the separa tion of the markets
between canna bis and more hazardous drugs,
since street dealers tend to oer more than
just cannabis. More over, there are serious
indications that a new group of socially
vulnerable street dealers are initi ated in to
more seri ous crime:
e shi in supply has had consequences
for adolescents and young adults in certain
lower class neigh bour hoods who were
attracted by the lucrative and ourishing
sale of cannabis outside the coeeshops.
Previous research […] into the drugs
runners in Maastricht showed that, in
the underprivileged neigh bour hoods
5Transnational Institute
where many drugs runners grow up, these
runners very much look up to the older
and already criminal young sters as role
models, because they have money and
status.
Around 1500 coeeshops existed in the mid-
1990s, of which 617 were le in 103 of the
415 municipali ties in 2012.23 Since demand
for cannabis did not change, the re maining
co ee shops have become big ger, causing
problems with the permitted on-site stock of
500 grams being far exceeded by daily sales.
Judges are increasingly showing their unease
with such policies in their sen tencing, either
ruling in ad mis si bility or issuing non-punitive
sentences. In July 2014, a case was dismissed
by an Appeal Court because the coee-
shops had co-operated with the police, the
local council and the tax oce, which knew
and accepted that the coee shops had far
more than the per mitted amount in stock.24
Another Appeal Court ruled accordingly and
found the prosecution case in admissible. e
number of cases in which transgressors were
found guilty without imposing penalties in-
creased from 15 in 2011 to 25 in 2012, and 45
in 2013.25
A subsequent blow against current
policies was the verdict in October 2014
of a Groningen court in a case against two
cannabis growers who were cultivating
overtly, reported their income to the tax
authori ties and paid their electricity bills.
e court criticised the government policy
that criminalises can nabis production while
allowing its sale in coeeshops. In its ruling
the court found the growers guilty but,
again, no punishment was ap plied. "Given
that the sale of so drugs in coee shops is
toler ated, this means that these coee shops
must supply them selves and so cultivation
must be done to satisfy these demands," the
court found. "e law does not state how
this supply should be done."26 e ruling is
potentially ground break ing; it might open
up the back door of the coeeshops, but an
appeal is expected.
In 2013 and 2014, the distance between
restrictive government policies and the de-
sire of local munici pa li ties to regulate the
backdoor of the coeeshops increased.
Municipalities are worried about the health
eects of unregulated cannabis, the massive
diversion of police resources to dismantle
illicit culti vation sites and increasing criminal
activities. ey called upon Justice minister
Opstelten to allow for pilot pro jects with
regulated supply to coeeshops. Despite the
fact that two-thirds of the major munici pal
councils back regu lated canna bis cultiva-
tion,27 minister Opstel ten rejected all of the
25 submissions to experi ment with regulated
cultivation in December 2013.
In response, the 25 may ors signed the
manifesto Joint Regulation again re questing
permits to ex peri ment with regulated can-
nabis production.28e nationwide intro -
duc tion of certied and regu lated pro duction
is the solution that addresses the health
of users and community safety and tack-
les organ ised crime,” the manifesto reads.
It goes on to say that the current regime
“undermines the fabric of Dutch society.
e manifesto is now signed by 56 munici-
palities. One of the initiators, Heerlen mayor
Paul Depla, argues that: “Our so drug policy
leaves the coee shops depend ent on crimi-
nal organisa tions for supply. So, ordinary
people become an instrument of crimi nal
g a n g s .” 29 A survey showed 58 per cent of local
ocials favouring regu lation of licit cannabis
cultivation.30 Remarka bly, 53 per cent of local
VVD o cials agreed, thus opposing their
own minister. In June 2014, Depla announced
that he would initiate an experi ment with
regulated cann abis cultivation and issue a
license.
Even in the governing coalition
disagreements are rising. Some sena-
tors of the Labour party, VVD's coali tion
partner, said the entire strategy needs to
be overhauled and urged to regu late and
certify the cul tivation for coee shops. ey
proposed to set up a commission to look into
a pilot for regu lated can nabis culti vation,31
but the motion was defeated with support
of the opposition. In Novem ber 2014, the
Amsterdam City Coun cil also called for
licensed cannabis production.32 One-third of
the coeeshops in the Nether lands are lo cated
in Amsterdam, so political support from the
capital for regulated can nabis is fundamental,
in particular because the local VVD is part of
the city administra tion.
According to Opstelten the current UN drug
con ventions do not allow for culti vation of
6 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
cannabis for recreational use. But even if they
did, his position is clear: “It is not allowed,
and even if it is allowed I don’t want it”. He
commissioned a study to determine whether
under the UN drug control conventions
it was possible to legally regulate cannabis
cultivation or tolerate it by giving it the
lowest possible en force ment priority – the
enforce ment regime under which coeeshops
currently operate. Although the study
concluded those options were not possible,
it also found that policies tolerating the
coeeshops were in contra vention of the UN
treaties as well, leaving Opstelten in a dicult
position in which he has to both agree and
disagree with the report.33
While there is more room for manoeuvre in
the international arena due to the legalization
of cannabis in Uruguay and certain states of
the US, e Netherlands is not taking the
opportunity to move forward on regulating
the supply side of the cannabis trade. Since
the US has ocially announced it will not
harass governments that regulate cannabis
anymore,34 one would think that the Dutch
would jump at the prospect to nally take
the step that would achieve the original goal
of the 1976 policy shi to allow cannabis,
especially now that the bottom-up pressure
from local authorities to do so is increasing.
Denmark
From 1969 to 2004, possession of up to
ten grams of cannabis for personal use
was not prosecuted in Den mark, with law
enforcement turning a blind eye towards
small-scale cannabis sales. Since the liberal-
conservative government came into power
in 2001, cannabis policy has been tightened.
In its 2003 action plan, e Fight against
Drugs, the distinction between seller and
buyer was explicitly removed.35 In 2004
possession of can na bis for personal use was
‘re-criminalised’, with an obligatory ne of
€70, which was quad ru pled in 2007. e
new ‘zero tole rance’ policy replaced passive
policing of street-level retail sales and the
reluctant ac ceptance of cannabis markets that
had been part of an overall harm reduction
strategy. e new law, intended to counter the
‘normal isation’ of cannabis with a stronger
en forcement deterrent, was followed by a
police crack down on Christianias open can-
na bis retail-market, known as ‘pusher street’,36
and the approxi mately 100 ‘hash-clubs’ –
clubs selling cannabis or Dutch-style coee-
shops pro vid ing a social space as well – in the
rest of Copen hagen.37
e results are striking: with the disruption
of the large and stable cannabis market
in Copen hagen, new actors on the black
market used violence and gained a foothold
geo graphically as well as nancially,
according to one study.38 Street dealing
emerged all over Copenhagen and the
market-related violence of criminal gangs
disputing control over selling points
increased; including fatal shootings. e
police crackdown disrupted established
hierarchies among crimi nal groups and
spurred renewed competition. In the ve-
year period aer the crackdown in 2004
there were more homicides and attempted
homi cides in Denmark than in any ve-
year period in the previous 20 years. In the
Copenhagen area 19 shoot ings were linked
to the cannabis market, while such episodes
were unknown prior to the crack down.39 e
Copenhagen cannabis market is estimated
to be worth around €200 million (1.5 billion
Danish kroner) per year, and is now largely
controlled by criminal gangs.40
In reaction to the failure of repressive control
of the cannabis market, the Copen hagen
City Coun cil approved in September 2009 a
three-year trial with cannabis dispensaries
staed by health-care profes sion als selling
cannabis in small quantities at the prevailing
street price. Only residents would be allowed
to buy the cannabis to prevent ‘can na bis
tourism’ – mostly coming from Sweden.41
e original proposal was to sell cannabis in
20-25 municipal out lets. e City Council
envisaged a system similar to the state-
owned alcohol monopoly that operates in
neighbour ing Sweden in which the gov-
ernment would either grow cannabis itself
or license growers.42 One of the primary
goals of the pilot pro ject was to take the can-
nabis trade out of the hands of criminals.43
In a more recent proposal, the mu nicipality
of Copen ha gen would supervise cannabis
growing and sell it at a market-busting
price from ve or six outlets mod elled on
pharmacies and selling up to ve grams at a
time, but only to people over 18 with Danish
health insurance cards.44
7Transnational Institute
In order to do so, the Minister of Justice
needed to grant a legislative exemption.
Instead, he turned the City Council's request
down, alleging regulating cannabis would
likely increase both availability and use,
which was unwise given the range of side
eects.45 According to a May 2013 poll, a
slim majority of Danes approved the idea
of a pilot project for legal canna bis in the
capital: 52 per cent of respondents said it was
a good idea, while 42 per cent rejected the
plan. Support was less outside Copenhagen.46
e deadlock between the national and local
government continues, and despite growing
unease and open discontent from the Co-
pen hagen mayor, the police target sales and
harass peo ple that try to buy canna bis.47 Ta sk
Force Pusher Street’, the Christiania po lice
unit active since September 2012 claims to
have cut the can nabis trade by 30 per cent.48
In response to the increased police pres ence
in and around Christiania, people are ghting
back, using a Facebook page, Politi razzia på
Chris tiania? (Police raid on Christiania?)49,
to inform each other of police pres ence.
A recent editorial in e Copenhagen Post
lamented the inertia and denial of Denmarks
politi cal parties on the issue. While the
Danes are just months from the next general
election, “no political party has a pol icy on
the subject of how to move forward” the
newspaper said:50
e Conservatives, Liberals, Social
Democrats are in limbo. […] Police
engagement is a farce and they know it.
Everybody can see the problem, nobody
seems to have a solution, but it is inevitable
that all poli ticians will soon have to
address a problem that will not go away by
itself.
Germany
Aer years of silence, the debate about
regulating the cannabis market in Germany
ignited again when Monika Herrmann –
Green Party mayor of the Berlin district
of Friedrichshain-Kreuz berg – announced
she wanted a pilot project of city-run shops
selling cannabis as a means of tackling
the growing drug-dealing in the district's
Görlitzer Park.51 "Get ting can nabis is easier
now than ever. I want to control its sale," she
said. Although the proposed dispensaries
were dubbed coeeshops by the media,
Herrmann thinks the term to be mis leading.
She pre fers "selling points," with medically
trained workers, a mini mum age for buyers
and, if necessary, security guards. e best
solution would be to have several sel ling
points in Berlin as a whole. State-grown
can na bis would have a better quality than
its illegal alternative, is one of her other
motives.52 e initiative was shot down by
Berlin's Senate, above all by health sena-
tor Mario Czaja of the Christian Demo crats
(CDU). Nevertheless, a large majority in
the district council backed the proposal.53
Although much re mains to be decided, one
of the ideas is to have ten shops in Berlin
that can sell three to ve grams per client per
day. 54
e proposal was followed by others. A
district assembly (the Bahn hofs vier tel) in
Frankfurt-am-Main rec ommended "one or
more legal out lets for can nabis pro ducts".55
ese are not intended to make can nabis
readily availa ble, but – as in Berlin – to
con trol "the rampant black mar ket".56 In
Hamburg, the district assembly of Altona also
voted in favour of a pilot project to counter
dealing in the Florapark area.57 e district
council of the city centre of Cologne also
approved an initiative for a pilot project.58
e city coun cil of Frank furt did accept
the proposal, and the Health Department
and Drug Unit organ ised an international
expert meet ing in November 2014 to discuss
proposals, where many called for the liber-
alisation of cannabis.59
Politi cians in those towns rely on an
exemption under paragraph 3 of the Ger man
drug law: pilot experi ments can be approved
if they serve “scientic and other pur poses
of public inter est”.60 e drug law exemption
was used in Frankfurt some 10-years ago
to initiate a successful heroin prescription
pro gramme for problematic users. Since
then, the city has been consid ered a model
for pro gressive and eec tive drug policies,
and its wayward policies are known as the
Frankfurter Weg.61 How ever, the CDU and
the Greens currently form the govern ing
parties in Frank furt and an agreement needs
to be reached how to continue, since the
CDU is less con vinced to go for ward with a
regulation.
8 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
Although the dierent proposals are still
being elaborated, this bottom-up pressure
has sparked the long-moribund debate in
Germany. In 1994 the Federal Con stitutional
Court cleared the way to decrimi nalise
the use of can nabis. e 'hashish decision'
questioned excessive criminal prose -
cution and sug gested not going aer minor
infringements.62 Nevertheless, peo ple can
get a criminal record for posses sion, and the
cultivation and trade of cannabis are still for-
bidden. A driving license can also be revoked
if a driver is caught with trace amounts of
canna bis in the blood. Possession of cannabis
is decriminalised with dierent thresholds in
vari ous states, ranging from 15 grams in Ber-
lin to six grams in most states.63
Par lia mentary initiatives in 2012 by the
Green and Le parties on Cannabis Social
Clubs failed,64 but led to some discussion
and media attention. e main parties, the
christian-demo crat CDU and the social-
demo crat SPD, have blocked any attempts at
reform.65 A Janu ary 2014 opinion poll showed
that 65 per cent of Germans reject relaxing
laws restricting the production, sale and
consumption of cannabis. Just under a third
of those asked (29 per cent) would like to see
it legalised.66 Meanwhile, over 120 German
profes sors of crimi nal law – united in the
Schildower Kreis – support decriminalising
the sale and posses sion of cannabis, arguing
that the criminal prosecu tion of cannabis
users does not function as deter rence
anymore and have called on the Bundestag to
discuss the issue.67
e German police union, Bund Deutscher
Kriminalbeamter (BDK), supports the
Schildower Kreis. At the expert meeting
in Frankfurt, a representative of the BDK
explained that the police had “no discretion
in drug cases in Hessen, one of the more
liberal states of Germany. Any violation of
the law had to be reported, even though the
prosecutor's oce in Frank furt would waive
cases involving up to six grams of cannabis.
“We are tired of writing police reports that
cost us time and lead to nothing,” he said,
adding that each report takes about two
hours.68
In order to go forward with pilot projects,
an appli ca tion to the Federal Institute
for Medi cine and Me dicinal Products
(Bundesinstitut für Arznei mit tel und Medi-
zin pro duk te - BfArM) should be prepared,
pref erably with the support of research
centres, counselling cen tres, police repre-
senta tives, professional politicians and resi-
dents. e BfArM must allow the controlled
supply of can nabis and legal questions, such
as for potential operators and supply, must
also be claried. Any application for pilot
projects will prob ably be rejected by the
CDU-run Federal Ministry of Health. In
Berlin, the CDU is now advocating lowering
the decriminalisation threshold to six grams
in order to stop street deal ing and to counter
the initiative in Kreuzberg.69 Marlene Mortler,
Ger many's commissioner on drug-related
issues (Drogen be au ragte), rejects the regu-
lation of can na bis, pointing to health risks.70
However, the rejec tion of pilot projects opens
the possibility of bringing the issue before the
Fed eral Con stitutional Court, which – as in
1994 – has to determine whether or not the
pro jects would be against the public inter est.71
The grassroots model:
Cannabis Social Clubs
In the mid-1990s, cannabis activists in Spain
developed a way to circumvent restrictions
on cultivation and started to engage in
collective cultivation for per sonal use.72 is
model, known as Cannabis Social Clubs
(CSCs), has been copied by activists in other
EU countries, particularly in Belgium,73
Slovenia, the United Kingdom,74 and France.75
Persuaded that the model is in conformity
with the UN drug control con ventions, it has
gained popularity in several other European
coun tries, such as Portugal76 and Ger many. In
Uruguay, According to the 2013 cannabis law
permits clubs with up to 45 members. Having
gained legitimacy in several countries, the
model is now frequently mentioned in the
international debate about drug policy
reform.
e Euro pean Coalition for Just and Eective
Drug Policies (Encod) has issued guidelines
for operating CSCs so as to avoid accusations
of drug tracking, supplying or encour aging
use. Clubs should operate under a collective
agreement, with registered members; calcu-
late costs reecting expected individual use,
limiting the amount produced per person
in tended for immediate consumption. CSCs
9Transnational Institute
are closed to the public and new members
accepted by invitation only.77 However, the
model risks being eclipsed by commercially-
orientated entrepreneurs that have remod-
elled the clubs into coee shop-type entities.
Foreign nanciers and Dutch coeeshop
owners have in vested in Spanish clubs
anticipating regulation.
e CSC movement in the UK is growing,
but groups are not ocially involved in
cultivation.78 In De cember 2014, there were
70 CSCs united in the UK Cannabis Social
Clubs (UKCSC), an organisation founded
in 2011 to represent cannabis users.79 e
fact that growing and possessing cannabis is
illegal in the UK does not deter many can na-
bis clubs from using social media to publicise
meetings and the open ness is part of the
campaign for normalisa tion. e clubs bring
cannabis users together from all over the
UK to discuss topics ranging from fertiliser
to self-medication and cam paign ing for the
decriminalisation of the drug. However,
nationally opportunities are slim, although
an Ipsos MORI poll for the Trans form Drugs
Policy Foundation in February 2013, found
that 53 per cent of respondents supported
cannabis legalisation (legal regula tion of
production and supply) or decriminalisation
of cannabis possession.80
A variation that has emerged is CSCs
initiated by local authorities instead of
grassroots movements, such as in the case
of the Dutch city of Utrecht,81 subsequently
blocked by the government. e ministry of
Public Heath refused to issue an exemption
authorizing cultivation for the Utrecht clubs.
e result is a rather contra dic tory situation:
cities allowing coeeshops with illicit supply,
while blocking options for licit supply. In
Amsterdam the rst Dutch Cannabis Social
Club is now operating through a grassroots
ini tiative, and the prosecutor’s oce is
looking into it. In Switzer land, a broad
coalition of political parties in the canton of
Geneva has adopted the model in a proposal
for regulation, al though they prefer to call
them “can nabis users associations”, because
“social club” is con sidered too promo tional.
Spain
e legal basis for the Spanish model
of Cannabis Social Clubs is the
decriminalisation of cul ti va tion for personal
use, by taking ad vantage of a grey zone in
the national law and court jurisprudence.
Spanish law does not penal ize consumption
and in 1974 the Su preme Court ruled that
drug consumption and possession for
consumption are not criminal oences, al-
though the Public Safety Act includes admin-
istrative sanctions for use in public places.
Supreme Court rulings in 2001 and 2003,
established that pos session of cannabis, even
substantial quantities, is not a crime if there
is no clear intention of tra ck ing. e rst
club was legally constituted in 2001, followed
by hundreds across Spain, in partic ular in the
Basque Country and Catalonia over the last
three years.82
Jurisprudence tends to interpret existing
legislation as permitting ‘shared consumption
and cultivation for personal use when grown
in a pri vate place and on a non-prot basis.
While there is no additional legislation or
reg ulation dening the scale or par ticulars
under which cultiva tion could be permitted,
the CSC movement is explor ing this legal
space, reasoning that if one is allowed to
cultivate cannabis for personal use and if
‘shared con sumption’ is allowed, it can be
done in a collective manner. Nevertheless,
despite several favourable court deci sions
absolving clubs from prosecution, they are
still operating in a legal grey zone. Raids on
clubs and their plantations are common, and
clubs’ representatives have repeatedly asked
for a legal regulation to end the un certainty.
Spain now has between 500 and 600 CSCs;
about 350 of them are in Catalonia. In Barce-
lona the number of CSCs has ballooned in a
few years from 14 in 2009 to 250 by the end
of 2013; twenty of these CSCs have more
than 1,000 members and two or three of
them have over 10,000 members. In the Bas-
que Country, there are about 75 CSCs. In
Catalonia, there are two types of clubs; one
model is more cooperative/activist and the
other more commercial/entrepreneurial. e
two federations of clubs each have 20 CSCs.
Cooperative CSCs – in the Cat Fac federation
– have a limit of 650 members and 60 grams/
month/member, while com mercial CSCs – in
the FedCat federation – have no mem ber ship
limit and a higher cannabis limit (100grams/
month/member).83
10 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
the clubs at the same level as crimi nal dis-
tri butors, while, in fact, they try to avoid the
ille gal business.89 Perhaps the most concise
sum mary of the judicial authorities’ position
is that the shared use of can nabis in small
quantities by adults is not a crime, but that
"there is no obliga tion to regulate" because
it is not an individual right, since can nabis
is subject to international regula tions as it is
scheduled by the 1961 UN Single Conven-
tion. A registered cannabis club managing
small amounts, is one thing, yet collec-
tive cultivation of the plant is some thing
entirely dierent for which local and regional
authorities have no competence to act.90
Although most Spaniards favour a though
stand against drugs, 52 per cent supports the
sale of cannabis to adults.91
Notwithstanding widespread popular protest
– against what has been labelled the 'gag
law' since it limits all kinds of civil rights – a
new Public Safety Act with heavy nes for
drug possession was approved in December
2014. A small amount of cannabis92 will
be punishable by nes between €1,001-
30,000. Culti vating cannabis for personal
consumption may be punished with nes
of up to €30,000.93 Opposi tion parties have
pledged to scrap the law if elected to oce.
Despite the de jure decriminalisa tion, nes
for pos ses sion under the previous Public
Safety Act – that already limited the room
for manoeuvre of the clubs – are not a
minor issue in Spain. In 2012, for instance,
there were 356,052 police reports of drugs
possession, of which about 86 per cent were
for canna bis, some 842 per day.94
A survey in June 2014 showed that 77 per
cent of Catalans believe it is better to regu-
late the associa tions than pro hi bit them.95
In June 2014, Barcelona had set a one-year
moratorium on the crea tion of new clubs.
Police have shut down several Barcelona
clubs for alleged violations that in clude sales
to minors, drug tracking, and hawking of
memberships to tourists.96 e morato rium
was welcomed by the club fed erations that
oered their expertise in develop ing guide-
lines and best prac tices, but the closure of
clubs is considered a pre-emptive move. “We
are aware that the admin istration does its job
well and ensures the common good but this
situation would be easier if, before it acts, it
set clear rules for all cannabis associations,
In Spain, a study by one law rm calculated
that €1,163 million is spent on cannabis
yearly and that if all can nabis sales were liable
to VAT, it would generate €200 million in
tax revenue. Furthermore, it could create an
estimated 40,000 jobs, leading to revenue of
around €400 mil lion in so cial security and
income tax contribu tions.84 Catalonia clubs
have an estimated monthly turnover of €5
million, not in cluding the costs of rental,
payroll and lawyers.85 Some argue it may
be advisable for CSCs to pay taxes, adding
to their legitimacy, even though they only
dispense cannabis to members.
In the Basque Country, Catalonia and
Andalucía local governments are attempting
to regulate the clubs within the limits of
the national law. In the Basque Country in
April 2012, a parliamentary commission
was created to study a possi ble regulation of
CSCs activi ties.86 e autonomous regional
government of Cata lonia (Gene rali tat)
remained silent on the issue until the Ras-
quera case in early 2012, when one of the
larger clubs in Barcelona proposed procuring
their sup ply from large-scale plantations
in the inland Catalan municipality of
Rasquera.87 An agreement with the local
administration was signed, but was blocked
by the prosecutor’s oce. Neverthe less,
other rural mu nici palities in Catalonia have
ex pressed interest in similar cultivation
agreements with clubs in Barce lo na. Regional
governments control police with drug
enforce ment authority, giving them leverage
with the central gov ern ment to create some
kind of regulation and to develop specic as-
pects of regional law.
e conservative central government in
Madrid, however, takes a dim view of these
developments. e Public Prosecutor's
Oce issued an instruction in August 2013
to investigate all CSCs on issues such as
the limits of the right of association, and
reiterated that growing cannabis and shared
consump tion could constitute unlawful
conduct in the sense that the associations
promote the commission of a crime. e
prosecutor also warned that organizations
engaged in drug distribution could hide
behind the legal ap pearance of associations
with mem bership fees.88 Organizations of
progressive jurists ob jected, argu ing that the
instruction was dispropor tion ate by putting
11Transnational Institute
well as the fullment of certain obligations
by them. “We had two options,” said a local
councillor. “Ignore the existence of these
clubs, or attempt to regulate to ensure the
reduction of risks from con sumption.” He did
not hesitate to criticize the current, restrictive
national legislation on cannabis.101
Belgium
In 2003 and 2004, new drug laws were
introduced in Belgium. In 2005, a guideline
by the Jus tice minis ter and the public
prosecutor’s oce assigned the lowest
possible priority to prosecution for posses-
sion of up to three grams of cannabis or one
canna bis plant.102 However, this tolerance
model is now being replaced by a more
repressive mod el. In Antwerp, the Flemish
nationalist party NVA intro duced adminis-
trative sanctions with nes of €75 for
cannabis possession when they took oce
in January 2013.103 Aer the formation of
a new government in October 2014 with
the NVA, this policy has been introduced
nationwide.104 In November 2013, academics
published a cannabis manifesto critically
evaluating the policy, the risks of can-
nabis use and seriously looking at options
for regulation. ey argue that the present
clampdown costing €400 million a year does
not work.105
Currently, there are ve CSCs in Antwerp,
Hasselt, Liege, Namur and Andenne,
modelled on the Spanish CSCs.106 ese
CSCs are activist-based and operate as
social movements. e best known is
‘Trekt uw plant’ in Ant werp,107 which has
400-500 members. ere have been two
serious attempts to prosecute CSCs. In 2006,
members of the club were charged with
possession of can na bis with the aggravating
circumstance of participation in a criminal
organisation, and in 2008 for en cour aging
drug use. Both cases failed; the rst one past
the statute of limi ta tions and the second
one by acquittal, leaving the CSCs in a state
of legal insecurity. In December 2013 the
police raided the Mambo Social Club in Has-
selt and seized 1,100 grams of the member's
cannabis. In December 2014, the criminal
court in Hasselt con victed the two leading
club members, with a sus pension of sentences
for trac and incitement to use cannabis, on
the CatFac federation said aer the closure of
49 clubs in Barcelona.
In November 2014, the Public Health
Commission of the Catalan parliament
approved a proposal of the Public Health
Agency of Catalonia (Agencia de Salud
Pública de Cataluña – ASPCAT) to regulate
certain aspects of the CSCs in the form of
guidelines for good practices”. e rules are
the result of negotia tions between ocials of
the Catalan government and the clubs since
May 2012. e new set of rules are not a legal
regula tion, but “some indicative criteria,
accord ing to the Catalan health secretary.
e rules also do not address the key issue
of cultivation and supply to the clubs. e
agreed rules set an age limit of 18 years; limit
opening hours to eight hours a day with a
specic closing time; and ban selling alco-
hol in the clubs.97 e associa tions may only
dispense cannabis to members and in an
at tempt to counter “can nabis tourism, new
members need to be introduced by a member
and will have a grace period of 15 days during
which they cannot receive any cannabis. e
clubs are required to inform members about
the “harms and risks” of cannabis and train
their employees in public health issues.
Meanwhile, in Navarra a dierent situation
developed. A local referendum that collected
more than 10,000 signatories (double
the 5,000 signatures needed), obliged the
local parliament to allow the submisal of
a proposal for regulation of the clubs. e
proposal was ap proved in November 2014,
making Navarra the rst auto nomous region
to endorse the regulation of CSCs.98 However,
the regional government is not in favour
and counts on the courts to defeat the new
law as it is in conict with national law. e
initiators of the proposal, Representación
Cannábica de Navarra (RCN), contend that
the law ts perfectly with the penal code and
jurisprudence.99
In addition to regional regulation attempts
in the Basque Country and Catalonia, cities
are starting to regu late the clubs with limited
administrative rules through a municipal
bylaw. e rst one was San Sebastian in the
Basque Country – which has 23 registered
clubs with some 10,000 cannabis users.100 e
local bylaw was approved in December 2014,
and entails a formal recognition of clubs as
12 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
cutor may decide to take legal action against
the oender, to simply close the case, or to
propose other measures as an alternative to
prosecution. In 2010 a total of 157,341 drug-
law contraventions were reported, of which
87.5 per cent were cannabis-related.110
Since the late 1990s cannabis use has doubled;
there are currently about 550,000 daily users
and 1.2 million regular smokers.111 Supply
patterns have changed as well: since 2004,
there has been a drop in seized amounts of
cannabis resin (most ly from Morocco), and
there is an upward trend in domestic herbal
can na bis cultiva tion; cannabis resin remains
the main cannabis of choice, with an esti-
mated 200–300 ton nes used every year and
seizures representing about 20 per cent of
do mestic con sump tion. A record number
of 131,000 cannabis plants were seized in
2012112 and large-scale canna bis cultivation
is emerging, with plantations of hundreds
of plants controlled by organised crime
networks.113 ere are about 400 ‘grow shops
in France.114
ere have been several initiatives to regulate
the cannabis market in France. In June 2011,
a parliamen tary report – compiled by a
Socialist Party (PS) working group headed by
the former Interior minister Daniel Vaillant
– recommended “con trolled legalisation
of the cultivation and consumption of
cannabis. e cul tiva tion and sale of cannabis
should become a state-controlled activity,
like the sale of alco hol and tobacco.115 e
proposal did not gain signicant support
in the PS. During the 2012 presidential
election campaign French president Fran çois
Hollan de opposed the proposal to convert
the criminal oen ce of cannabis use into a
misdemeanour, put forward by his security
adviser, Dijon mayor François Rebsamen.
"ere are 142,000 cannabis proce dures per
year, corresponding to hundreds of thousands
of hours of work for the po lice producing
only 24,000 prosecutions", Rebsamen pointed
out, defending his proposal. His choice as
Interior minister, Manuel Valls – appointed
prime minister in April 2014 – is a rm oppo-
nent of any reform on cannabis.116 Attempts
by the Green Party to open the debate also
failed.117
ere are an estimated 200,000 cannabis
growers in France, and since 2009 some of
condition the club would end their activities
and public appear ances to defend the model.
e Mambo Social Club will appeal the
ruling.108
According to one study,109 Belgian CSCs
“seem not prot-driven, and operate as a
system in which can na bis is not too easily
available. In fact, the study goes on to
say, “[t]he model oers important poten-
tial opportunities, in terms of economic
advantages and monitoring consumption
patterns.” e main threats to Belgian CSCs,
according to this study,
consist of attempts to criminalize the
model, the emergence of prot-driven
clubs and systemic vio lence from criminal
entrepreneurs. Weaknesses of the model
relate to the unstable or transient nature
of the clubs, the transparency of their
operational procedures, the superciality
of their quality control strate gies, and
the risk of morph ing into marketing
enterprises.
e study concluded that
the CSC model could be a safe and
feasible option for policymakers to move
a meaningful distance along the spectrum
towards legally reg ulated cannabis markets
without crossing over to full commercial
availability. Gov ern mental Belgium
regulation could convert weaknesses and
threats to the model into strengths and
opportunities to ensure best practice. If
authorities refrain from action, the model
might dilute and evolve in a similar way
as the Spanish CSCs did recently, with the
establishment of large, commercial clubs.
France
France has both one of the most draconian
drug laws and among the highest prevalence
of cannabis use in Europe. Use or possession
of illicit drugs is a criminal oence and the
law does not distinguish between possession
for personal use or for track ing. However,
many prose cutors opt for a charge relating
to use or tracking that is based on the
quantity of the drug found and the context
of the case. Based on the principle of the
appropriateness of proceedings, the prose-
13Transnational Institute
parlementarian Com mittee for the Evaluation
and Control of Public Policies (Comité
d’évaluation et de contrôle des politiques publi-
ques - CEC) issued a report evaluating the
failed drug control measures in France. e
committee did not fully agree on the way
forward, but did favour a change to the 1970
law criminalizing cannabis use and punish
use as a simple misdemeanour with a ne
of €450, instead of the current €3,750.126 A
month later, the think tank Ter r a Nov a , close
to the PS, published the report “Cannabis:
réguler le marché pour sortir de l’impasse
(Cannabis: regulate the market to break the
deadlock), which shattered the current policy
– “one of the worst imaginable” – and builds
scenarios for change, including regulation
with a state monopoly – like Uruguay – that
could have a positive scal impact of €1.8
billion.127
Switzerland
In 2001 the Swiss government wanted to
allow cannabis possession and use, and
aimed at a regulated market. e legislative
proposal came from the Health ministry
and got stuck in Parliament for various
reasons. Meanwhile a police-tolerated
market had developed (with over 200 shops)
anticipating the passage of the law. However,
the proposal failed narrowly in 2004.128
e upper chamber of the Parlia ment, the
Coun cil of States, twice voted in favour of
decriminalising the personal use of cannabis,
but the National Council (lower chamber)
did not agree. As a result, ac tivists, cannabis
farmers and some political parties began
collecting the 100,000 signatures re quired
by law for a referendum. Under the plan,
per sonal consumption and produc tion of
cannabis would be decriminalised, and trade
and cultiva tion would have been sub ject to
state control in an eort to limit access by
mi nors.129 However, the referen dum – which
took place in November 2008 – was only sup-
ported by 36.8 per cent.130
With this precedent, attempts to regulate
abated; until in October 2013 cannabis
was decriminalised, allowing a maximum
amount of ten grams, small nes and no
criminal record.131 e change aimed to
reduce the 30,000 or so cannabis-related
cases that clogged Swiss courts annually.
them have organ ized Cannabis Social Clubs,
although the number of clubs is un clear.
Le Monde esti mated some 150 clubs with
2,500 members,118 while Libération es ti mated
425 clubs with approximately 5,000-7,500
members, based on information from the
clubs.119 ere has been an attempt to have
CSCs recog nized as non-prot organisations
that attracted con sid erable media attention.
One of its spokes persons, Dominique Broc,
announced that he would ocially regis ter
his club in March 2013, urging others to do
the same. e police responded by detaining
him and seizing his equip ment and records.
He was sen tenced to a suspended eight-
month prison term and ned €2,500.120 Only
six clubs tried to register, and in June 2013
a Tours court decided on the dissolution of
the clubs’ federative struc ture and banned its
members from meeting.121
In November 2013, a survey by the
Observatoire Français des Drogues et Toxico-
ma nies (OFDT), “Percep tion and opinion
of the French on drugs, showed that for the
rst time a majority of the French sup ported
allowing cannabis under certain condi tions
(maintaining the bans on minors and driving
under the inuence). is propor tion has
doubled over the period 2008-2012 from 31
per cent to 60 per cent even though there
is an increasing awareness of the risks of
regular daily consumption. Never the less, 78
per cent are against the unrestricted sale of
cannabis.122 Despite the refusal of the present
government to reform, the debate in France
continues.
In February 2014, Green party senator
Esther Benbassa proposed a law that would
decriminalise use, tax cannabis, and allow
govern ment-run stores to sell canna bis
to adults for recreational use.123 She was
supported by the Grenoble pros ecutor, Jean-
Yves Coquillat, who called for broader debate
on the re pression of the consumption and
sale of cannabis, stressing the “failure” of the
current legisla tion.124 In November 2014,
the Socialist deputy Anne-Yvonne Le Dain
called for legalization of cannabis in the pri-
vate sphere with “a regulated supply of the
product under the control of the state,125 a
position close to the one taken in 2011 by
former Interior minister Vaillant.
Le Dain did so aer the multi-party
14 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
Toni Berthel.135 Health and drugs experts
assembled in the Natio na len Arbeits gemein-
scha Sucht politik/Coordination politique des
addictions (NAS/CPA) also recommended
a regula tion model for drug markets based
on risk assess ments of the substances
involved.136
In June 2014, the Geneva working group
– chaired by sociologist Sandro Cattacin
– published a second report on its consid-
erations of the regulation model. An im-
portant issue is that “rather than throwing
taxpayers' money in a costly and in eective
war against the drug” it would be more
eective to allow adult users to smoke in a
secure and controlled environment. Although
the report did not elaborate the details, which
should be done by a group of experts, it did
set some general para meters: a minimum age
of 18 years (which is also the minimum age in
the law that decriminalises possession of ten
grams of cannabis for personal consumption
and shared simultaneous consumption
with others over 18 years). e cannabis
should be consumed at home and not in the
association.137
e report also endorsed the Portuguese-
style dis suasion commis sions138 for minors
with proble matic use who cannot be
members, as well as the obliga tion to re-
fer members that develop proble matic
use to those commissions. e group also
con sidered a limit on THC-content. e
associations should be non-prot and
mem bers are required to register, with due
consideration for privacy. e cannabis
should be for free and the pilot project
should be budget neu tral – it should not
cost the state anything, but it should also
not generate revenue for the state – with
costs covered by tax or membership fees.
e bene ts are in improved condi tions for
users and the ability to identify problem atic
users, as well as the reduction of the black
market and improvement of public secu rity.
Law enforcement will be released from petty
judicial cases to tackle more serious crime.
e proposal is now under consideration by
the political decision makers.139 Al though,
the Federal De partment of Public Health
said that a cannabis club is not com patible
with the current drug law, a com mission
was appointed in Geneva to study the feasi-
Pro-legalization groups still consider the law
too harsh. e Zürich-based group Lega-
lize it! published a brochure, “Shit happens”,
in which a person checked by police and
found in possession of less than ten grams
of can nabis is advised to either “not answer
questions or lie” about earlier consumption.
Someone who denies having smoked can-
not be ned and the cannabis they may be
carrying can not be cons cated, according to
the brochure.132
While opportunities for reform have stalled
at the federal level, there are openings at
the city level. In the past, city councils of
the larger towns such as Zürich and Basel
have advocated controlled cannabis sales,
but did not advance concrete proposals. e
debate gained impetus when in December
2013 an interparty working group of the
Geneva canton advised starting a pilot project
allowing cannabis clubs to buy state-certied
cannabis for personal use. e clubs would
be restricted to adults and called “can nabis
users associations”, because “social club” is
considered too promotional. e pro posal
was supported by a majority of parties across
the political spectrum.133
e interparty working group noted that:
the open drug market in Geneva is a cause
of insecurity to many and had led to a loss
of control over a part of the public space;
internationally, cannabis laws have been
liberalised in many countries; there is
widespread con sumption in Switzer land,
largely punished by through a simple ne.
erefore, the group proposed a three-year
pilot in Geneva to allow for the cultivation,
distribution and consumption of cannabis –
and deriva tives such as hashish and oil – in
regulated associa tions, following the Spanish
model.134 Zürich, Basel, Lausanne and Bern
are looking at partici pating in such an experi-
ment.
Meanwhile, in the wake of developments
in the US, Uruguay and New Zealand, a
Swiss parlia mentary committee looking into
drug issues (Commission fédérale pour les
questions liées aux drogues - CFLD) argued
to reopen the debate on the regulation of
psycho active substances, including cannabis,
at the federal level. “Many models that exist
around the world should be studied and
analysed,” according to com mit tee president
15Transnational Institute
access barriers such as age limits and
maximum amounts to be purchased per user
per day, week or month, and controls of the
THC and CBD contents of can nabis.
Increasingly, local and regional authorities,
non-governmental pressure groups and
grassroots move ments are advocating change
and many initiatives are under way across
Europe, mainly around the CSC move ment.
e original Cannabis Social Club model
developed in Spain has spread to Bel gium,
France, the Netherlands, Italy and the United
Kingdom, where about 70 cities have clubs,
al though they are not ac tively growing
due to the severe penalties. In Spain, the
autonomous regional govern ments of Cata-
lo nia and the Basque Country, as well as
towns like Barcelona and San Sebastian, have
adapted and recog nized the phenomenon
while trying to regulate the ever-growing
number of CSCs.
Local authorities in other countries are
advocating various forms of coeeshop-
type dispen sa ries with a regulated supply.
In the Netherlands, about 56 communities
have embraced the Joint Regulation mani-
festo to regulate the cultivation and supply
of the back door of the coeeshop. In other
countries, similar initiatives for regulation
of the cannabis market, from cultivation to
marketing, have emerged, for example in
Copenhagen in Denmark and districts in
Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Cologne
in Ger many. Meanwhile, other local
governments seek regulation under the
CSC model, for example in Utrecht in the
Netherlands. In Switzerland in particular,
municipali ties/can tons like Geneva, Basel,
Bern and Zürich are looking into setting
up “can nabis users associa tions” based on
the CSCs and Portuguese-style dissuasion
commissions to deal with youth and possible
problematic users. For countries that have
already decriminalised, such as Portugal
and the Czech Republic, it would only be a
minor step to advance towards regulation
models.
EU Member States remain the main actors
in the EU drug policy eld; at the level of the
EU, subsidiarity applies.143 While common
agreements in Europe have been achieved
at the supra-national level, in par tic ular
re garding cross-border drug tracking
bility of cannabis associations headed by
former Federal Coun cil lor Ruth Dreifuss.140
Although a denitive legal assessment is
still pending, the Swiss fed eral government
(Federal Council - Bundesrat) holds that
the pilot attempts that are being considered
in dierent cities, would be incompatible
with the Narcotics Act.141 e Dreifuss
commission's nal report urges Geneva to
seek approval for the reforms from federal
health authorities as a scientic project –
allowed under the law – which should take
o at the end of 2015.142
Conclusions and recommendations
National governments in Europe are in a
state of denial about the impact of cannabis
policy reform that is beginning to take
shape worldwide, in particular in the US,
and ignore calls for change from local au-
thorities that have to deal with the negative
consequences of a persisting illicit cannabis
market. While his torically liberal countries
like the Netherlands and Denmark used to
defend their policies with a pub lic health
argument of a separation of the markets of
less and more hazardous drugs, the emphasis
has shied to a public security approach, to
counter the public disorder of street dealing,
and the in volve ment of organized crime
groups in illicit cultivation and supply. As
shown above, initially this has led to more
re strictive policies at the national level, but
the failure of that approach is becoming
more and more obvi ous and is leading to
administrative ‘revolts’ by municipalities that
are experiencing the nega tive conse quences
of those policies.
e de facto or de jure decriminalization of
cannabis and halfway regulations like the
Dutch coee shop sys tem, while use ful to
avoid unnecessary criminalization of users
and separating the markets of can nabis and
more harmful drugs, do not address the
supply of cannabis. Local authorities are con-
fronted with a range of problems that, in the
end, are impossible to solve without some
kind of a regu lated and trans parent supply
chain. Apart from diminishing the public
security problems mentioned above, regula-
tion also provides solutions for consumer-
protection issues such as quality control of
the can nabis in terms of the use of pesticides,
16 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
harm-reduction meas ures – such as: heroin-
substitution programmes, social inclusion
through housing-and-work pro gram-
mes, drug-consumption rooms and heroin
prescription.149
It is interesting to read the statement of pur-
poses of the network:
Drug problems are crystallising, above
all, in major cities, producing the whole
pallet of subse quent prob lems to a
specically intensive extent. Approaching
these problems solely by conven tional
strategies of repressive, therapeutic,
or preventive measures have led us to
borders that cannot be crossed without
the development and implementation
of innovative - and sometimes
unconventional policies.
Moreover, it happens rather frequently that
national or international drug legislation
and guide lines prove to be instruments
unsuited for the development of pragmatic
approaches at com munal level. erefore,
we observe a clear discrepancy between
international conventions, their realisation
at governmental level, and local solutions.
In this respect, we had to recognise that
we are unable to delegate the problem to
the governments of the states. Instead, we
are being called to develop local strategies
in collaboration and exchange with other
cities and regions.
All of this is still relevant regarding the
current state of cannabis policies. It is also
interesting to note that at the core of the
ECDP network were some of the cities that
are now calling for a regula tion of the can-
nabis market. Drug policy reform is oen
a bottom-up process, as the example of the
ECDP has shown aer having successfully
initiated the adoption of eec tive harm-
reduction strategies at the national and,
ever more, the international level.150 Such a
network provides opportunities to ex change
experiences and best practices, as well as
fundraising and sharing human and nancial
resources needed for policy change. While
the ECDP is now defunct aer achieving its
goals, it is time for an ECDP 2.0 to do the
same for the regula tion of the recreational
cannabis market in Europe. e question
facing Europe today is no longer whether or
and police and judicial cooperation, drug
legislation and policies of individual Member
States remain within their exclusive national
compe tence. Dierences remain be tween and
within EU Member States, reecting their
social and political institutions, dierent
public at titudes, social and cul tural values
and traditions, and varying nancial and
human resources. Drug control policies
in the EU vary signicantly, from a liberal
pragmatic harm reduc tion ap proach –
notably in the Netherlands, Portugal and
the Czech Republic144 – to a restrictive
prohibi tionist approach in Sweden, which
makes a common EU drug policy dicult to
imagine.145
As others have argued, European cannabis
policy could best develop along the lines of
“multi-level govern ance”, an emerging style
of governance in the EU – in particular
regarding social policies – in which multiple
actors on multiple levels are engaged,
and specic details of governance are
decentralised and may diversify under
EU guidelines. In this model, practical
decisions are made at the local level, encour-
aging greater involvement from citizens
– a guiding principle in the EU. “A system
of multi-level governance would allow
initiatives to develop at the local level with
power following a bottom-up structure,
as opposed to top-down solutions that do
not t local and regional needs.146 Given
the already wide diversity of drug policies
in Europe, dierent cannabis regulation
regimes would then no longer be an arena of
multi-lateral, or even national, contention,
but would be judged on their eectiveness
and leave the desired room for manoeuvre
for local authorities.147
Cities and regions that want reform should
follow the example set by their predecessors
when they con stituted Euro pean Cities on
Drug Policy (ECDP) in 1993.148 In 1990,
Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Zürich
initiated the network by signing the Frankfurt
Resolution, which became the charter of the
ECDP. Other cities joined, including Basel,
Charleroi, Dort mund, Hamburg, Hannover,
Rotterdam, Ljubljana and Zagreb amongst
others. ese cities joined forces to advocate
a more pragmatic, less prohibitionist drug
policy including the decriminalization of
cannabis, and initiated a set of innovative
17Transnational Institute
tcm44-560750.pdf
9. De Kort, M. (1994). e Dutch Cannabis Debate,
1968-1976, e Journal of Drug Issues, 24(3): 417-427,
quoting a Memo randum [Nota] of 4 January 1974 in
the Nederlandse Staats courant (Nether lands State
Gazette), No. 5, 8 January 1974.
10. Grund, J.P. & Breeksema, J. (2013). Coee Shops
and Compromise: Separated Illicit Drug Markets in the
Netherlands, New York: Open Society Foundations, p.
18 (e report is an excellent overview explaining the
background of Dutch drug policy) ;
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
les/Coee%20Shops%20and%20Compromise-nal.
pdf
11. Lensink, H. & Derkzen, S. (2013). Internationaal
is reguleren van wiet geen probleem, Vrij Nederland,
19 December 2013; http://www.vn.nl/Archief/
Samenleving/Artikel-Samenleving/Internationaal-is-
reguleren-van-wiet-geen-probleem-1.htm
12. Van Dijk, J. J. M. (1998). e narrow margins
of the Dutch drug policy: A cost-benet analysis,
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research,
6(3), 369-393; https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/les/1000726/
Narrow.pdf
13. e policy of toleration of coeeshop sales is
based on the expediency principle in Dutch law, a
discretionary option that allows the Public Prose-
cution to refrain from prosecution if it is in the public
interest to do so. Based on that principle co eeshops are
tolerated when they follow the guidelines – known as
the AHOJG criteria – issued by the Public Prosecution
Oce: refraining from ad vertising (A), not selling hard
drugs (H), not causing public disorder (O), no sales
to minors (J), and sales limited to a small quantity per
trans action (5 grams), as well as limits on inventory
(500 grams) (G). In 2012 a new residence criterion was
added. See: Grund & Breeksema (2013), op. cit.
14. Boekhout van Solinge, T. (2002). Drugs and
decision-making in the European Union, Amsterdam:
CEDRO/Mets en Schilt; http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/
boekhout.eu.pdf
15. Van Dijk (1998), op. cit.; Blom, T. (2006),
Drugsbeleid tussen volksgezondheid en strafrecht,
Tijdschri voor Criminologie 2006 (48) 2
16. Report on the proposal for a Council Framework
Decision laying down minimum provisions on the
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in
the eld of drug tracking, Committee on Citizens’
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Aairs,
A5-0095/2004, February 23, 2004, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+REPORT+A5-2004-0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN
17. Report from the Commission on the
implementation of Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA
laying down minimum provisions on the constituent
elements of criminal acts and penalties in the eld of
illicit drug tracking, Secretary-General of the European
Commission, 5200/10, January 26, 2010, http://www.
eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vj6ipizg4suj
not there is a need to reassess and modernize
cannabis policies, but rather when and how
to do it.
Endnotes
1. Tom Blickman is a senior researcher with the
Transnational Institute (TNI). He is the co-author
of e Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: e
History of Cannabis in the UN Drug Control System
and Options For Reform, Transnational Institute /
Global Drug Policy Observatory, March 2014; http://
druglawreform.info/en/rise-and-decline
is brieng builds on the outcomes and
debates at the Expert Seminar on costs and benets of
cannabis regulation models in Europe, organized by
the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam (October 31/
November 1, 2013), http://www.druglawreform.info/
en/events/expert-seminars/item/5988-expert-seminar-
costs-and-benets-of-cannabis-regulation-models-in-
europe
2. See on this issue: Fijnaut, F. (2014), Legalisation
of Cannabis in Some American States: A Challenge for
the European Union and its Member States?, European
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 22
(2014) 207-217
3. Van Kempen, P.H. & Fedorova, M.I. (2014), Inter-
nationaal recht en cannabis: Een beoordeling op basis
van VN-drugs ver dra gen en EU-drugs regel geving van
gemeentelijke en buitenlandse opvattingen pro regulering
van cannabisteelt voor recreatief gebruik, Kluwer, p. 240;
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-
en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/03/21/rapport-
internationaal-recht-en-cannabis/rapport-internationaal-
recht-en-cannabis.pdf e report is in Dutch, but
includes an English sum mary.
4. e EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020); http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/anti-drugs/european-response/
strategy/index_en.htm
5. Para 23 of the EU Drugs Strategy (2013-2020)
6. Reuter, P. & Trautmann, F. (eds.) (2009), A report
on global illicit drugs markets, Brussels: European
Commission; http://www.druglawreform.info/en/
un-drug-control/ungass/item/2206-global-illicit-drug-
markets-1998-2007. e ten-year review was looking
at the achievement of the 1998 UN General Assembly
Special Session (UNGASS) on the world drug problem.
A next UNGASS will take place in 2016.
7. EMCDDA (2014). European Drug Report 2014:
Trends and developments, Lisbon: European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, May 2014, p.
13; http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/
att_228272_EN_TDAT14001ENN.pdf
8. Kruize, P. & Gruter, P. (2014). Drugsdelicten
beschouwd: over aard & omvang van Opiumwetfeiten
in 2012 geregistreerd bij politie en Koninklijke
Marechaussee. e Hague: WODC, p. 71. For an English
summary, see: http://wodc.nl/images/2325-summary_
18 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
policy, NRC Handelsblad, November 19, 2008, http://
vorige.nrc.nl/article2066650.ece
29. Coombes, R. (2014), Cannabis regulation: high
time for change? British Medical Journal, May 21, 2014;
http://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g3382
30. While 39 per cent are opposed. See:
Lokale bestuurders willen wietteelt reguleren,
NU.nl, March 14, 2014; http://www.nu.nl/
gemeenteraadsverkiezingen/3726433/lokale-
bestuurders-willen-wietteelt-reguleren.html e results
are available here: http://www.toponderzoek.com/
persberichten/14-maart-2014-lokale-bestuurders-over-
wietteelt/s/547
31. Labour senators won't cooperate with tough line
on marijuana, Dutch News, June 27, 2014; http://www.
dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/06/labour_senators_
wont_cooperate.php
32. Amsterdam city council calls for licensed
marijuana production, Dutch News, November 7, 2014;
http://druglawreform.info/en/newsroom/latest-news/
item/5738-amsterdam-city-council-calls-for-licenced-
marijuana-production
33. See: Van Kempen & Fedorova (2014), op. cit.. An
earlier study on what would be possible under the UN
drug control conventions was published in 2005 by
the T.M.C. Asser Institute. e report, "Experiments
in allowing the growing of cannabis to supply
coeeshops: International and European Law issues",
also concluded that cultivating cannabis for other than
medical or scien tic purposes was banned both under
UN conventions and European Union law. e report
was also commissioned by the government during one
of the previous debates on regulating the back door.
Following the legal opinion that the experiment would
not "comply with the spirit of existing treaties," the
initiative failed in June 2006 when the VVD withdrew
its initial support. See: Blickman, T. (2012d). e Dutch
2012 election result and the coeeshops, TNI weblog,
September 14, 2012, http://druglawreform.info/en/
weblog/item/3826-the-dutch-2012-election-result-and-
the-coeeshops. e T.M.C Asser report is available
in Dutch at http://druglawreform.info/images/stories/
documents/asser_onderzoek_cannabis.pdf
34. ere are major inconsistencies with this new
US international policy. It basically wants to keep the
current UN drug control conventions intact but calls for
more exibility, even if policies violate the conventions,
reecting the current situation in the US. See for a
critical review of the so-called Browneld Doctrine:
Barrett, D., Bewley-Taylor, D. &Jelsma, M.(2014), Fatal
attraction: Browneld's exibility doctrine and global
drug policy reform, TNI weblog, November 18, 2014;
http://druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/5770-fatal-
attraction-brownelds-exibility-doctrine-and-global-
drug-policy-reform
35. Asmussen, V. (2008). Cannabis policy: tightening
the ties in Denmark, in: A cannabis reader: global issues
and local experiences, Monograph series 8, Volume
1, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug
Addiction, Lisbon, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/
18. Blickman, T. (2013). Majority of the Dutch favour
cannabis legalisation, TNI weblog, October 4, 2013;
http://www.druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/4960-
majority-of-the-dutch-favour-cannabis-legalisation
19. Blickman, T. & Jelsma, M. (2013). e Netherlands
is ready to regulate cannabis, TNI weblog, December 19,
2013, http://druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/5219-
the-netherlands-is-ready-to-regulate-cannabis
20. Blickman, T. (2012e). Cannabis pass abolished?
Not really, TNI weblog, October 30, 2012; http://www.
druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/4005-cannabis-
pass-abolished-not-really
21. Most Dutch councils ignore ban on marijuana
sales to tourists, Dutch News, February 19, 2014; http://
www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/most_
dutch_councils_ignore_ban.php
22. Van Ooyen-Houben, M., Bieleman, B., Korf,
D.J. (2014). Coeeshops, tourists and the local market:
Evaluation of the private club and the residence criterion
for Dutch coeeshops. Final Report, e Hague:
WODC/Intraval/Bonger Institute of the Uni ver si ty of
Amsterdam; http://wodc.nl/images/cahier-2014-12-
summary-and-conclusions_tcm44-562326.pdf
23. Coeeshops in Nederland 2012, Intraval, October
2013; https://zoek.ocielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-
274336.pdf
24. Court sides with coeeshops in dispute over 'back
door' deals, e Amsterdam Herald, July 4, 2014; http://
www.amsterdamherald.com/index.php/rss/9-news-
special-wietpas/1206-20140704-court-sides-with-
coeeshops-dispute-back-door-deals-netherlands-
cannabis
25. Steeds vaker 'schuldig zonder straf ' in
sodrugszaken, Nieuwsuur, December 8, 2014, http://
nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2007954-steeds-vaker-
schuldig-zonder-straf-in-sodrugszaken.html
26. No jail or nes for ‘idealistic’ marijuana growing
couple, Dutch News, October 16, 2014; http://www.
dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/10/no_jail_or_nes_
for_idealisti.php/
27. Two in three large councils back organised
marijuana cultivation, Dutch News, November 15, 2013;
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2013/11/
two_in_three_large_councils_ba.php
28. See: 35 mayors call for regulated marijuana
production; minister says no, Dutch News,
January 31, 2014; http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/
archives/2014/01/35_mayors_call_for_regulated_m.
php. Why Dutch mayors want to cultivate cannabis,
e Independent, February 3, 2014; http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/why-dutch-
mayors-want-to-cultivate-cannabis-9102858.html A
similar approach by local authorities wastried in 2008,
when at a ‘cannabis summit’, 30 Dutch mayors declared
that the government should licence the growing
and supply of marijuana to coeeshops, see: Dutch
mayors call for growing marijuana, NRC Handelsblad,
November 24, 2008, http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2071306.
ece; and Local councils support tolerant cannabis
19Transnational Institute
Post, November 7, 2014; http://cphpost.dk/news/is-
prohibition-worth-the-cost.11527.html
51. Cannabis cafes could set up shop in Berlin,
Deutsche Welle, September 16, 2013; http://www.dw.de/
cannabis-cafes-could-set-up-shop-in-berlin/a-17089498
52. Drugs in Berlin: Greens Push Weed Legalization
in Park, Der Spiegel, September 12, 2013; http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/goerlitzer-park-drug-
problem-new-push-for-legal-cannabis-sales-a-921738.
html
53. Berlin plant Deutschlands erstes Marihuana-Café,
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, November 28, 2013; http://www.
sueddeutsche.de/panorama/drogenpolitik-berlin-plant-
deutschlands-erstes-marihuana-cafe-1.1830889
54. Weg frei für den Antrag auf einen Coeeshop,
Berliner Zeitung, September 11, 2014; http://
www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/coeeshop-in-
kreuzberg-weg-frei-fuer-den-antrag-auf-einen-
coeeshop,10809148,28376070.html
55. Kien für die Gesundheit, Frankfurter
Rundschau, February 19, 2014; http://www.fr-online.
de/frankfurt/coffeeshops-in-frankfurt-kiffen-fuer-
die-gesundheit,1472798,26252218.html. Cannabis
auf dem Prüfstand, Frankfurter Rundschau, March
30, 2014; http://www.fr-online.de/frankfurt/
legalisierung-weicher-drogen-cannabis-auf-dem-
pruefstand,1472798,26687774.html
56. Ortsbeiräte fordern legale Verkaufsstellen,
Frankfurter Rundschau, April 30, 2014; http://www.fr-
online.de/frankfurt/drogenpolitik-ortsbeiraete-fordern-
legale-verkaufsstellen,1472798,26997764.html. See also:
57. Stadtteilbeirat Sternschanze Protokoll
der 8. Sitzung vom 09.10.2013; http://www.
standpunktschanze.de/stadtteilbeirat-sternschanze-
protokoll-der-08-sitzung-vom-09-10-2013/ See also:
Schanze: Mehrheit für den Kier-Laden! Hamburger
Morgen post, September 17, 2013; http://www.mopo.de/
nachrichten/legaler-drogenhandel-schanze--mehrheit-
fuer-den-kiffer-laden-,5067140,24339662.html;
Coeeshop für die Schanze gefordert: Standortfaktor
Dope, Tageszeitung, November 29, 2014; http://www.
taz.de/!150405/
58. Stadt Köln prü Cannabis-Vorstoß der
Bezirksvertretung Innenstadt, Kölnische Rundschau,
December 13, 2014, http://www.rundschau-
online.de/koeln/cannabis-debatte-stadt-koeln-
prue-cannabis-vorstoss-der-bezirksvertretung-
innenstadt,15185496,29318594.html
59. Erste Frankfurter Fachtagung zu Cannabis,
Drogenreferat der Stadt Frankfurt; http://www.
frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=3003&_ffmpar[_
id_inhalt]=26738041; Experten fordern Cannabis-
Liberalisierung, DPA/Die Welt, November 17, 2014,
http://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/
brennpunkte_nt/article134410933/Experten-fordern-
Cannabis-Liberalisierung.html
60. Paragraf 3 des Betäubungsmittelgesetzes (BtMG):
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/btmg_1981/__3.
html
publications/monographs/cannabis
36. e Christiania cannabis market "included about
40 street stalls, attracting both a domestic clientele and
cross-border drugs tourists, particularly from Sweden.
Clients could openly buy drugs to take away, or could
smoke ‘in situ’ in the street or in Christiania’s bars and
cafés." See: Asmussen, V. (2008).
37. Tom Blickman, T. (2012a). Copenhagen wants
controlled cannabis shops, TNI weblog, January 9, 2012;
http://www.druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/3100-
copenhagen-wants-controlled-cannabis-shops
38. Moeller, K. (2009). Police crackdown on
Christiania in Copenhagen, Crime, Law and Social
Change, 52(4): 2009, 337-345, January, 2009; http://
www.druglawreform.info/en/issues/cannabis/
item/2536-police-crackdown-on-christiania-in-
copenhagen
39. Moeller, K. & Hesse, M. (2013). Drug market
disruption and systemic violence: Cannabis markets in
Copenhagen, European Journal of Criminology, 10(2):
2013, 206-221, March 2013; http://euc.sagepub.com/
content/10/2/206
40. Legal marijuana gets one step closer, e
Copenhagen Post, November 21, 2011, http://cphpost.
dk/news/legal-marijuana-gets-one-step-closer.34.html
41. Blickman, T. (2012a), op. cit.
42. Blickman, T. (2012c). Government opposes
Copenhagen City Council on cannabis shops, TNI
weblog, May 28, 2012; http://www.druglawreform.
info/en/weblog/item/3479-government-opposes-
copenhagen-city-council-on-cannabis-shops
43. Life aer cannabis prohibition: e city announces
its ambitions, e Copenhagen Post, March 15, 2013;
http://cphpost.dk/news/life-aer-cannabis-prohibition-
the-city-announces-its-ambitions.4671.html
44. Why the mayor of Copenhagen wants to get into
the marijuana business, e Atlantic Citylab, March
3, 2014, http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/03/
why-mayor-copenhagen-wants-get-marijuana-
business/8527/
45. Government opposes Copenhagen City Council on
cannabis shops, op. cit.
46. Copenhageners cautiously support legal cannabis,
but provinces unconvinced, e Copenhagen Post,
May 6, 2013; http://cphpost.dk/news/copenhageners-
cautiously-support-legal-cannabis-but-provinces-
unconvinced.5190.html
47. Mayor and police at odds over cannabis approach,
e Copenhagen Post, September 10, 2012; http://
cphpost.dk/news/mayor-and-police-at-odds-over-
cannabis-approach.2668.html
48. Cops continue to tout Christiania success, e
Copenhagen Post, August 28, 2013; http://cphpost.dk/
news/cops-continue-to-tout-christiania-success.6580.
html
49. https://www.facebook.com/RazziaChristiania
50. Is prohibition worth the cost? e Copenhagen
20 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
November 27, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/
justiz/cannabis-drogenbeauragte-attackiert-freigabe-
fuersprecher-a-1005452.html
71. Coeeshop-Modellversuche: Die Honung stirbt
zuletzt. Kreuzberg alleine genügt nicht, Hanf Journal,
August 16, 2014, http://hanournal.de/2014/08/16/
coeeshop-modellversuche/
72. See: Bewley-Taylor, D., Blickman T. & Jelsma, M.
(2014). e Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition:
e History of Can na bis in the UN Drug Control System
and Options For Reform, Transnational Institute/
Global Drugs Policy Observatory, March 2014, http://
druglawreform.info/en/rise-and-decline. According to
Van Kempen & Fedorova a state would less easily be in
con ict with the obligations pursuant the UN Drugs
Conventions and European law whenever that state
would in fact just leave those clubs untouched (thus
without applying regulating measures or any explicit
policy thereto), Van Kempen & Fedorova (2014), p. 242.
73. Mészáros, B. & Oddball, L. (2013). How does
a Cannabis Social Club work? HCLU Drug Reporter,
February 18, 2013; http://drogriporter.hu/en/Cannabis_
Social_Club
74. CLEAR (2013). How To Regulate Cannabis In
Britain: e CLEAR Plan Version 2.0., Cannabis Law
Reform (CLEAR), October 20, 2013; http://www.
clear-uk.org/how-toregulate-cannabis-in-britain-the-
clear-plan-version-2-0/ See for a list of Can na bis Social
Clubs already established, awaiting legislative change
that would allow them to become operative: http://
ukcsc.co.uk/ocial-club-list/
75. See for instance: Les Cannabis Social Clubs
forcent la loi, Libération, February 16, 2013; http://
www.liberation.fr/societe/2013/02/15/les-cannabis-
social-clubs-forcent-la-loi_882204 and France cannabis
campaigner convicted, ned, e Global Post, April
18, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/
afp/130418/france-cannabis-campaignerconvicted-
ned
76. Barriuso Alonso, M. (2012b).Portugal progresses
toward integrated cannabis regulation, TNI weblog,
October 25, 2012; http://www.druglawreform.info/
en/weblog/item/4003-portugal-progresses-toward-
integrated-cannabis-regulation
77. Encod (2011), ‘European Cannabis Social Clubs,
code of conduct, December 2011’, http://www.encod.
org/info/CODE-OF-CONDUCT-FOR-EUROPEAN.
html. See also: EMCDDA (2014b), Models for the legal
supply of cannabis: recent developments, Per spec tives
on Drugs, May 20, 2014, http://www.emcdda.europa.
eu/attachements.cfm/att_212362_EN_EMCDDA_
POD_2013_Legal%20supply%20of%20cannabis.pdf
78. Cannabis clubs blossoming in the UK, e
Guardian, November 17, 2013; http://www.theguardian.
com/society/shortcuts/2013/nov/17/cannabis-clubs-
blossoming-uk
79. United Kingdom Cannabis Social Clubs at http://
ukcsc.co.uk/ocial-ukcsc-list/
80. Ipsos MORI, Public attitudes to drugs policy.
61. Stöver, H. (2013). e Frankfurt way: Multi-agency
approach to drug policy on a local level, Frankfurt:
University of Applied Sciences, December 2013 http://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/les/
e_Frankfurt_Way.pdf
62. Country legal proles: Germany, European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EMCDDA); http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.
cfm/index5174EN.html ?pluginMethod=eldd.
countryproles&country=DE# See also: BVerfGE 90,
145 – Cannabis at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/
bv090145.html
63. Know Your Limit: Germany Seeks Uniform Law
on Marijuana, Der Spiegel, May 24, 2013; http://www.
spiegel.de/international/germany/german-states-
consider-standardizing-marijuana-rules-a-901717.html.
For an overview see: reshold quantities by state in the
Federal Republic of Germany at http://druglawreform.
info/images/stories/documents/reshold_quantities_
by_state_in_the_Federal_Republic_of_German.pdf
64. Leists suggest legal cannabis clubs, e
Local/DPA, January 25, 2012; http://www.thelocal.
de/20120125/40315
65. Our Right to Poison: Lessons from the Failed War
on Drugs, Der Spiegel, February 22, 2013; http://www.
spiegel.de/international/world/global-support-grows-
for-legalizing-drugs-a-884750-5.html
66. Poll stubs out legal cannabis hopes, e Local,
January 9, 2014; http://www.druglawreform.info/
en/newsroom/latest-news/item/5279-poll-stubs-
out-legal-cannabis-hopes. See also: Bei Marihuana
kennen die Deutschen kein Pardon, Stern, January
8, 2014; http://www.stern.de/panorama/stern-
umfrage-bei-marihuana-kennen-die-deutschen-kein-
pardon-2081611.html
67. Deutschland wird zur Kier-Republik, Die
Wel t , November 25, 2013; http://www.welt.de/politik/
deutschland/article122199341/Deutschland-wird-
zur-Kier-Republik.html ; Law professors demand
cannabis legalization, Deutsche Welle, April 10,
2014,http://www.dw.de/law-professors-demand-
cannabis-legalization/a-17559144; Resolution deutscher
Strafrechtsprofessorinnen und –professoren an die
Abgeordneten des Deutschen Bundestages, Schil-
dower Kreis, http://www.schildower-kreis.de/themen/
Resolution_deutscher_Strafrechtsprofessorinnen_
und_%E2%80%93professoren_an_die_Abgeordneten_
des_Deutschen_Bundestages.php
68. Polizei fordert Spielraum bei Haschisch-
Delikten, Frankfurter Rundschau, November 18,
2014, http://www.fr-online.de/frankfurt/cannabis-
legalisierung-polizei-fordert-spielraum-bei-haschisch-
delikten,1472798,29073274.html
69. Cannabis umnebelt die Koalition: Streit
um Mindestmenge, Berliner Zeitung, November
26, 2014, http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/
streit-um-mindestmenge-cannabis-umnebelt-die-
koalition,10809148,29164412.html
70. Marlene Mortler: Drogenbeauragte grei
Befürworter von Cannabis-Freigabe an, Der Spiegel,
21Transnational Institute
com/20131112/mas-actualidad/sociedad/ibarra-
niega-haya-obligacion-201311121308.html. See also:
El presidente del Tribunal Superior dice que fumar
porros no es un delito, pero tampoco «un derecho», El
Correo, November 13, 2013; http://www.elcorreo.com/
vizcaya/v/20131113/pvasco-espana/presidente-tribunal-
superior-dice-20131113.html
91. La mitad de los españoles, a favor de permitir
la venta de marihuana, El País, December 11, 2014,
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/12/11/
actualidad/1418301731_472994.html
92. Under current law, the threshold for possession
of personal use is a quantity for ve days. In practice
this means 200 grams of cannabis and 25 grams of
cannabis resin. However, according to the Public
Safety Act it is not allowed to use cannabis in public
places. See EMCDDA country prole for Spain at
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-
overviews/es and EMCDDA, reshold quantities for
drug oences, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/
index99321EN.html
93. El Gobierno incrementa la multa por llevar un
porro en el bolsillo en un 300%, El Diario, December
2, 2013; http://www.eldiario.es/politica/multa-llevar-
porro-bolsillo-crecera_0_202980429.html See also:
94. Delegación del Gobierno para el Plan Nacional
sobre Drogas (DGPNSD) (2014). Memoria 2012,
Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad,
pp. 26-27,http://www.pnsd.msssi.gob.es/Categoria2/
publica/pdf/MEMO2012.pdf
95. El 77% de los catalanes creen que es mejor regular
que vetar las asociaciones, El Periódico, June 14, 2014;
http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/
los-catalanes-creen-que-mejor-regular-que-vetar-las-
asociaciones-3301622
96. First cannabis club shut down in Catalonia for
drug tracking, El País, June 11, 2014; http://elpais.
com/elpais/2014/06/11/inenglish/1402495530_584157.
html
97. Los clubes de cannabis permitirán la entrada
solo a mayores de 18 años, El País, November 6,
2014, http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/11/06/
catalunya/1415289434_191583.html
98. Navarra aprueba la ley que regula los colectivos
de usuarios de cannabis, Diario de Navarra, November
27, 2014, http://www.diariodenavarra.es/noticias/
navarra/mas_navarra/2014/11/27/navarra_aprueba_
una_ley_que_regula_los_colectivos_usuarios_
cannabis_185352_2061.html
99. Los clubes de cannabis, legales en Navarra, pero
¿hasta cuándo? El Diario, December 6, 2014, http://
www.eldiario.es/norte/navarra/ultima_hora/clubes-
cannabis-legales-Navarra-tiempo_0_331767345.html
100. Donostia se convierte en la primera localidad en
regular los clubes sociales de cannabis, Diario Vasco,
April 30, 2014; http://www.diariovasco.com/20140430/
local/san-sebastian/donostia-convierte-primera-
localidad-201404301314.html.
101. Una ventana abierta a la marihuana, El
Drug legalisation survey for Transform Drug Policy
Foundation, February 19, 2013; http://www.ipsos-mori.
com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3134/Public-
attitudes-to-drugs-policy.aspx
81. Blickman, T. (2011). e future of Dutch cannabis
policy, TNI weblog, March 14, 2011, http://www.
druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/1188-the-future-
of-dutch-cannabis-policy
82. See for more background on the Spanish CSCs:
Barriuso Alonso, M. (2011). Cannabis Social Clubs
in Spain, TNI Series on Legis lative Reform of Drug
Policies Nr. 9, January 2011; http://www.druglawreform.
info/images/stories/documents/dlr9.pdf. For an
overview of the Court rulings: Kilmer, B., Kruithof,
K., Pardal, M., Caulkins, J.P. and Rubin, J. (2013).
Multinational overview of can nabis production regimes.
Rand Europe/WODC/Dutch Ministry of Security and
Justice, p.12-13; http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR510/RAND_
RR510.pdf
83. For more information on the dierent club models
see: Barriuso Alonso, M. (2013). Between collective
organisation and commercialisation, TNI weblog,
August 9, 2012; http://www.druglawreform.info/en/
weblog/item/3775-between-collective-organisation-
and-commercialisation
84. Sustainable Drug Policies Commission (2013), e
present continuous of cannabis clubs in Catalonia, TNI
weblog, March 30, 2013; http://www.druglawreform.
info/en/weblog/item/4604-the-present-continuous-of-
cannabis-clubs-in-catalonia
85. Los clubes de cannabis catalanes facturan
cinco millones al mes, El País, December 28,
2013; http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/12/27/
catalunya/1388176101_438021.html
86. For an overview of the cannabis club movement in
the Basque country, see: Barriuso Alonso, M. (2012a).
Cannabis reaches parliament: e debate on regulating
Cannabis Social Clubs in the Basque country, TNI
weblog, June 26, 2012; http://www.druglawreform.info/
en/weblog/item/3633-cannabis-reaches-parliament
87. Spain village fails to back growing cannabis to pay
debts, BBC News, April 10, 2012; http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-17668617
88. Fiscalía General del Estado (2013), Instrucción
2/2013 (Instrucción asociaciones promotoras del
consumo de cannabis), August 5, 2013; http://www.
policiacanaria.com/descargas/instruccion-asociaciones-
promotoras-del-consumo-de-cannabis-05-08-2013
89. Según jueces y scales progresistas la Fiscalía
General sitúa en el mismo plano el tráco de cannabis
y las asociaciones de consumo, CadenaSER, September
13, 2013; http://www.cadenaser.com/espana/articulo/
jueces-scales-progresistas-scalia-general-situa-
mismo-plano-traco-cannabis-asociaciones-consumo/
csrcsrpor/20130913csrcsrnac_30/Tes
90. Ibarra niega que haya «obligación» legal de
regular el consumo compartido de cannabis, Diario
Vasco, November 12, 2013; http://www.diariovasco.
22 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
116. Blickman, T. (2012b). Hollande will not go Dutch
on cannabis, TNI weblog, May 17, 2012, http://www.
druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/3459-hollande-
will-not-go-dutch-on-cannabis
117. French Socialists kill pro-cannabis call pre-
election, Reuters, June 7, 2012; http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/06/07/us-france-election-cannabis-
idUSBRE8560KO20120607
118. Les coopératives de cannabis sans but lucratif
aspirent à la légalité, Le Monde, December 25, 2012;
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/12/25/les-
cooperatives-de-cannabis-sans-but-lucratif-aspirent-a-
la-legalite_1810153_3224.html
119. Les Cannabis Social Clubs forcent la loi,
Libération, February 15, 2013; http://www.liberation.fr/
societe/2013/02/15/les-cannabis-social-clubs-forcent-
la-loi_882204
120. France cannabis campaigner convicted, ned,
Agence France-Presse, April 18, 2013; http://www.
globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130418/france-
cannabis-campaigner-convicted-ned
121. Les Cannabis Social Clubs partent en fumée,
Libération, June 20, 2013; http://www.liberation.fr/
societe/2013/06/20/les-cannabis-social-clubs-partent-
en-fumee_912628
122. Une majorité de français en faveur de
l’autorisation du cannabis sous conditions, Le Monde
blog, November 14, 2013; http://drogues.blog.lemonde.
fr/2013/11/14/une-majorite-de-francais-en-faveur-de-
lautorisation-du-cannabis-sous-conditions/
123. 'First ever' bill proposes legal cannabis in France,
e Local, January 30, 2014; http://www.thelocal.
fr/20140130/frances-rst-law-to-re. See also: EELV
veut autoriser l'usage contrôlé du cannabis », Le Monde,
February 5, 2014; http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/
article/2014/02/05/depenalisation-du-cannabis-
une-senatrice-ecolo-depose-une-proposition-de-
loi_4360864_823448.html
124. Cannabis: un réquisitoire contre la loi,
Libération, February 5, 2014; http://www.liberation.fr/
societe/2014/02/05/cannabis-un-requisitoire-contre-la-
loi_978254
125. Un peu moins de fumée autour des politiques
antidrogues, Libération, November 20, 2014, http://
www.liberation.fr/societe/2014/11/20/un-peu-moins-
de-fumee-autour-des-politiques-antidrogues_1147347
126. Cannabis : une contravention pour les
consommateurs ? Le Monde, November 20, 2014,
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/11/20/
cannabis-une-contravention-pour-les-
consommateurs_4526940_3224.html See: Le Dain,
A.Y. & Marcangeli, L. (rapporteurs). L’augmentation
de l’usage de substances illicites: que fait-on? Comité
d'évaluation et de contrôle des politiques publiques, 20
novembre 2014; http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/
controle/com_cec/lutte_usage_substances_synthese.pdf
127. Cannabis : les bénéces objectifs de la légalisation,
Le Monde, December 19, 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/
sante/article/2014/12/19/les-beneces-objectifs-de-la-
País, December 1, 2014, http://ccaa.elpais.com/
ccaa/2014/11/30/paisvasco/1417370065_986474.
html ; Los clubes de cannabis ya son legales en
Donostia, El Diario, December 4, 2014, http://www.
eldiario.es/norte/euskadi/clubes-cannabis-legales-
Donostia_0_331417647.html
102. Kilmer et al. (2013), op. cit.
103. 75 euro 'ne' for ALL cannabis possession
in Antwerp, Flanders News, September 7, 2013;
http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/
News/1.1723558
104. De Wever krijgt groen licht voor zijn
veiligheidsbeleid, Gazet van Antwerpen, October 14,
2014, http://www.gva.be/cnt/dmf20141014_01320173/
de-wever-krijgt-groen-licht-voor-zijn-veiligheidsbeleid
105. Academics: "Legalise cannabis in Flanders",
Flanders News, November 18, 2013; http://www.
druglawreform.info/en/newsroom/latest-news/
item/5114-academics-qlegalise-cannabis-in-andersq-
106. DeCorte, T. (2014), ‘Cannabis Social Clubs in
Belgium: Organizational strengths and weaknesses,
and threats to the model’, International Journal of Drug
Policy, September 2014; http://www.ijdp.org/article/
S0955-3959%2814%2900209-6/abstract
107. Mészáros & Oddball (2014).
108. ‘Mambo Social Club’ krijgt opschorting van
straf: 'Dit is een slag in het gezicht', Het Belang van
Limburg, December 11, 2014, http://www.hbvl.be/cnt/
dmf20141211_01423592/mambo-social-club-krijgt-
opschorting-van-straf. Parket vraagt opschorting
voor voorzitter cannabis vzw Mambo Social Club, Het
Belang van Limburg, November 13, 2014, http://www.
hbvl.be/cnt/dmf20141113_01373368/parket-vraagt-
opschorting-voor-voorzitter-cannabis-vzw-mambo-
social-club
109. DeCorte (2014), op. cit.
110. Country overview: France, European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA);
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-
overviews/fr#dro
111. Drugs, key data 2013, Observatoire Français des
Drogues et Toxico ma nies (OFDT), June 2013; http://
www.ofdt.fr/BDD/publications/docs/DCC2013en.pdf
112. Cannabis production and markets in Europe,
Insights Series No 12, European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2012, p. 215;
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/insights/
cannabis-market
113. Drugs, key data 2013, op. cit.
114. L'émergence d'un cannabis made in France, Le
Monde, May 10, 2014; http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/
article/2014/05/10/la-culture-en-appartement-fait-
exploser-le-marche-du-cannabis_4414580_3224.html
115. Légalisation contrôlée du cannabis, Rapport du
Groupe de travail parlementaire de députés SRC, June
15, 2011; http://www.druglawreform.info/en/issues/
cannabis/item/2544-legalisation-controlee-du-cannabis
23Transnational Institute
137. Groupe de réexion interpartis du Canton de
Genève (2014). Addendum 1 au rapport «Pour plus de
sécurité dans la ville. Les Associations de consommateurs
de Cannabis: un modèle ecace de régle men ta tion de
l’accès au Canna bis» du Groupe de réexion interpartis
du Canton de Genève: Document de discussion, http://
les.newsnetz.ch/upload//3/8/38981.pdf
138. Since 2001, all drugs, including cannabis, have
been decriminalised in Portugal. It is no longer a crime
to acquire, pos sess or use cannabis. e threshold for
posses sion has been set to 10 days of personal use, or
25 grams, for cannabis. Administrative sanctions can
still be applied by Commissions for Drug Addiction
Dissuasion – oen composed of a lawyer, a doctor
and a social assistant. ese commissions provide
information, dis cour age people from using drugs and
refer users to the most suitable options, including, if
required, treat ment. e Portuguese model has become
an ex ample for other countries that are looking to
change their drug policies, such as Bra zil, Norway and
the UK.
139. Genève devrait tester le marché régulé et taxé du
cannabis, Tribune de Genève, June 20, 2014; http://www.
tdg.ch/geneve/actu-genevoise/geneve-devrait-tester-
marche-regule-taxe-cannabis/story/23794737
140. Les clubs de cannabis passent un nouveau cap,
Le Matin, August 16, 2014; http://www.lematin.ch/
suisse/Les-clubs-de-cannabis-passent-un-nouveau-cap/
story/12353308
141. Bundesrat zweifelt an rechtlicher Grundlage,
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 4, 2014; http://www.
nzz.ch/schweiz/bundesrat-zweifelt-an-rechtlicher-
grundlage-1.18376997
142. Genève doit s’adresser à Berne avant de pouvoir
réglementer le cannabis, Tribune de Génève, December
29, 2014, http://www.tdg.ch/geneve/actu-genevoise/
geneve-doit-s-adresser-berne-pouvoir-reglementer-
cannabis/story/16461961
143. Subsidiarity means that in policy areas that do not
come within the exclusive competence of the EU, action
would be taken at EU level only if the objectives of
the proposed action could not be suciently achieved
by Member States acting alone and could be better
achieved by the Union.
144. Drug use is not an oence in the Czech Republic,
and possession of small quantities for personal use
is a non-criminal oence, punishable by a ne of up
to CZK 15,000 (about €600). A new Penal Code has
been eective since 2010, which, for the rst time, set
out a distinction between cannabis and other drugs
for criminal personal possession oences, whereby
possession of a quantity “greater than small” (the details
were dened and redened later) of cannabis would
attract a sentence of up to one year. e law dened
standards for cultivation of cannabis “for personal
use” that allowed small-scale cultivation (up to ve
plants) to be treated as a mis demeanour, punishable
with a ne. No distinction is made between growing
indoor and outdoor and between using lamps or not.
Possession of small amounts of all drugs remained a
legalisation-du-cannabis_4543681_1651302.html. See:
Ben Lakhdar, C., Kopp, P. & Perez, R. (2014). Cannabis
: réguler le marché pour sortir de l’impasse, Terra Nova,
at http://www.tnova.fr/note/cannabis-r-guler-le-march-
pour-sortir-de-l-impasse
128. Zobel, F. & Marthaler, M. (2014). Du Río de
la Plata au Lac Léman. Nouveaux développements
concernant la régulation du marché du cannabis,
Addiction Suisse, November 2014; http://www.
addictionsuisse.ch/leadmin/user_upload/DocUpload/
Zobel_Marthaler_Du-Rio-de-La-Plata-au-Lac-Leman.
pdf
129. Csete J. (2010), From the Mountaintops: What
the World Can Learn from Drug Policy Change in
Switzerland, Open Society Foundation;
130. Votation populaire du 30 novembre 2008:
Initiative populaire « Pour une politique raisonnable en
matière de chanvre protégeant ecacement la jeunesse
» at http://www.parlament.ch/f/wahlen-abstimmungen/
volksabstimmungen/fruehere-volksabstimmungen/
abstimmungen2008/30112008/Pages/default.aspx
131. Mixed feelings over new Swiss cannabis law,
Swissinfo, September 30, 2013; http://www.swissinfo.
ch/eng/mixed-feelings-over-new-swiss-cannabis-
law/36977488
132. Pot group advises how to avoid new cannabis
ne, e Local, October 9, 2013; http://www.thelocal.
ch/20131009/group-advises-how-to-avoid-swiss-
cannabis-ne e brochure is available at http://www.
hanegal.ch/wiki/_media/verein_li/shithappens9.pdf
133. Des députés genevois favorables à une fumette
légalisée, Tribune de Genève, December 5, 2013; http://
www.tdg.ch/geneve/actu-genevoise/deputes-genevois-
favorables-fumette-legalisee/story/11897639
134. Groupe de réexion interpartis du Canton
De Genève (2013). Pour plus de sécurité dans la
ville. Le Cannabis Social Club: Un modèle ecace
de réglementation de l’accès au Cannabis. Genève:
Document de discussion, available at http://idpc.net/fr/
publications/2013/12/pour-plus-de-securite-dans-la-
ville-un-modele-ecace-de-reglementation-de-l-acces-
au-cannabis-a-geneve
135. Swiss want to reopen pot legalization debate,
e Local, February 3, 2014; http://www.thelocal.
ch/20140203/swiss-committee-reopens-pot-
legalization-debate For more information about the
CFLD, see their website http://www.bag.admin.ch/
themen/drogen/00042/00624/00625/00791/?lang
=fr including the report Modèles de régulation des
substances psycho-actives.
136. Drogen experten machen Dampf für strareies
Kien, Basler Zeitung, April 8, 2014; http://bazonline.
ch/zuerich/stadt/drogenexperten-machen-dampf-fuer-
strareies-kien/story/27227844 See: Régulation du
marché en matière de politique des drogues, Position
générale de la Coordination politique des addictions
NAS-CPA, April 8, 2014, available at http://www.nas-
cpa.ch/leadmin/documents/grundpositionen/140408_
Grundposition_Marktregulierung_fr.pdf
24 Cannabis policy reform in Europe
misdemeanour, with thresholds of 5 gram for cannabis
resin and 15 gram for herbal cannabis. In April 2014,
the Supreme Court revised the amounts that should
be regarded as “more than a small amount”. e new
threshold is stricter than the previous one: in the case of
cannabis, possession of more than 10 gram (down from
15) is now considered a criminal oence. However,
the amounts are for guidance and other factors also
apply. See: Drug legislation in the Czech Republic,
Government Council for Drug Policy Coordination:
http://www.vlada.cz/en/ppov/protidrogova-
politika/government-council-for-drug-policy-
coordination-72748/; Csete, J. (2012), A Balancing Act:
Policymaking on Illicit Drugs in the Czech Republic,
Global Drug Policy Program, Open Society Foundations;
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
les/A_Balancing_Act-03-14-2012.pdf; and Supreme
court sets acceptable amounts for possession of illicit
drugs, Radio Prague, April 9, 2014; http://radio.cz/en/
section/news/supreme-court-sets-acceptable-amounts-
for-possession-of-illicit-drugs
145. See: Chatwin, C. (2007). 'Multi-level governance:
e way forward for European illicit drug policy?'
International Journal of Drug Policy, 18 (6). pp. 494-
502
146. Chatwin, C. (2007).
147. A Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe
was adopted by the EU Committee of the Regions
in April 2014, see: http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/
governance/Pages/charter-for-multiLevel-governance.
aspx
148. European Cities on Drug Policy (ECDP), http://
www.ecdp.net/ or http://www.realitaeten-bureau.de/
en_news_04.htm
149. Boekhout van Solinge, T. (1999), Dutch drug
policy in a European context, Journal of Drug Issues 29
(3), 511-528, http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/boekhout.
dutch.html
150. See: Schardt, S. (ed.) (2001). European Cities on
Drug Policy. Cooperation and Community Consensus.
e Multi-Agency Approach to Eective Local Drug
Policies, Frankfurt am Main: European Cities on Drug
Policy, http://www.realitaeten-bureau.de/documents/
commcoopECDP_002.pdf
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TNI’s Drugs & Democracy programme has
been analysing trends in the illicit drugs
market and in drug policies globally. e
programme has gained a reputation as one
of the leading international drug policy
research institutes and as a critical watchdog
of UN drug control institutions, in particular
the CND, the UNODC and the INCB. TNI
promotes evidence-based policies guided
by the principles of harm reduction, human
rights for users and producers, as well as the
cultural and traditional uses of psychoactive
substances. e strategic objective is to
contribute to a more integrated and coherent
policy where drugs are regarded as a cross-
cutting issue within the broader development
goals of poverty reduction, public health
promotion, human rights protection, peace
building and good governance.
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Foundations
... However, marijuana is now legal, on some level, in 24 states plus the District of Columbia [102]. Moreover, also in some European countries use of marijuana not only for medication but also for recreation (with some limitations) is permitted (Czech Republic, Holland, Spain) [103] It should be stressed that there are some opinions that, like all pharmacologically active substances, Cannabis is capable of causing harm to health, both physical and mental, dependent on dose, frequency, circumstances of use, and characteristics of the user [104,105]. ...
... Mimo to w 24 stanach plus Dystrykt Kolumbii marihuana jest zalegalizowanym związkiem psychoaktywnym [102]. Podobnie w niektórych krajach europejskich (Republika Czeska, Holandia, Hiszpania) zostało zatwierdzone stosowanie marihuany w celach rekreacyjnych (z pewnymi ograniczeniami) [103]. W Polsce tak zwana medyczna marihuana jest zalegalizowana od 31 października 2017 r. [104]. ...
Article
Cannabinoids are the derivatives of the cannabis plant, the most potent bioactive component of which is tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). The most commonly used drugs containing cannabinoids are marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil. These compounds exert their effects via interaction with the cannabinoid receptors CB1 and CB2. Type 1 receptors (CB1) are localised mostly in the central nervous system and in the adipose tissue and many visceral organs, including most endocrine organs. Type 2 cannabinoid receptors (CB2) are positioned in the peripheral nervous system (peripheral nerve endings) and on the surface of the immune system cells. Recently, more and more attention has been paid to the role that endogenous ligands play for these receptors, as well as to the role of the receptors themselves. So far, endogenous cannabinoids have been confirmed to participate in the regulation of food intake and energy homeostasis of the body, and have a significant impact on the endocrine system, including the activity of the pituitary gland, adrenal cortex, thyroid gland, pancreas, and gonads. Interrelations between the endocannabinoid system and the activity of the endocrine system may be a therapeutic target for a number of drugs that have been proved effective in the treatment of infertility, obesity, diabetes, and even prevention of diseases associated with the cardiovascular system. � 2018 Endokrynologia Polska. All rights reserved.
... Community-driven regulation was a frequent frame across the study period, acknowledging the role of grassroots activism in the legislation process and recognising medicinal cannabis advocacy as part of a social movement. This has been a significant feature of cannabis advocacy around the world, which has seen legalisation of cannabis as an outcome of the work of community-based activists ranging from patients and carers to community dispensaries, occasionally supported by local governments (Penn 2014;Blickman 2014;Frankhauser 2008). This frame did not appear until 2013, a couple of years before new legislation about medical access, reaching its peak in reports in 2017 and 2018, and demonstrating a decline in reports in 2019, once legislation was well established. ...
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Background Medicinal cannabis has been legalised for use for a range of specified medical conditions in Australia since 2016. However, the nature of the government regulations and the subsequent complexity of prescribing, as well as doctors’ safety uncertainties and the stigma of the plant, remain contributing barriers to patient access. Media representations can offer insights into the nature of the discourse about new medical products and therapies and how ideas and understandings about social phenomena become constructed. Focusing on professional medical publications, this study sought to investigate how medicinal cannabis is being represented in professional medical publications. Methods Using a content analysis approach, we investigated articles about medicinal cannabis from 2000 to the end of 2019 in the Medical Journal of Australia, Australian Doctor , Medical Observer , Australian Journal of General Practice , Australian Family Physicia n , and Australian Medicine. Articles were coded according to article type, framings of cannabis, headline and article tone, and key sources used in the article. We also used manifest textual analysis to search for word frequencies, and specific conditions referred to in the articles retrieved. Results A total of 117 articles were retrieved for analysis, the majority of which were news stories for a physician audience. Across the longitudinal period, we found that most reports carried a positive tone towards medicinal cannabis. Cannabis is most frequently framed as a legitimate therapeutic option that is complex to prescribe and access, does not have a strong evidence base to support its use, and also carries safety concerns. At the same time, the outlook on cannabis research data is largely positive. Primary sources most frequently used in these reports are peer-reviewed journals or government reports, voices from medical associations or foundations, as well as government and university researchers. Chronic pain or pain were the conditions most frequently mentioned in articles about cannabis, followed by epilepsy, cancer or cancer pain, and nausea and chemotherapy. Conclusions This analysis offers evidence that medicinal cannabis is being framed as a valid medicine advocated by the community, with potential for addressing a range of conditions despite the lack of evidence, and a medicine that is not free of risk.
... As of the end of 2019, recreational use of cannabis is allowed in 11 US states, Canada and Uruguay (D. Obradovic, 2019;Walsh & Ramsey, 2016). In Europe, national and regional authorities have considered various changes in cannabis-related policies, these include decriminalization or lowering the penalties (Blickman, 2014), but also proposals for full legalization (EMCDDA, 2018). Ongoing discussions among policymakers and academics seek clarity on the effects of recent changes in cannabis policy on public health and social outcomes, including the incidence of cannabis use, perceived risks, and criminal activities (Smart & Pacula, 2019). ...
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Background: In July of 2018, the Constitutional Court of Georgia ruled that any punishment for cannabis use is unconstitutional. The study aimed to examine changes in the behavior of regular cannabis users following the legal reform. Methods: We conducted an online cross-sectional survey of adults using cannabis regularly at least once a week. Results: Survey included 389 participants, mostly males whose average age was 28 at the time of the survey. Two thirds did not report any change in frequency of cannabis consumption after the law reform. Less frequent users were more likely to report increased consumption. Females were more likely to initiate cannabis use after the legal reform. Perceived availability of cannabis remained unchanged for the majority of participants. Females were more likely to report that the availability increased following the legal changes. A small number of participants reported quitting synthetic cannabinoids and switching to herbal cannabis products. Getting cannabis for free from friends was the most prevalent way of obtaining cannabis, both in pre- and post-reform periods. Conclusions: Future research needs to understand which of the observed changes are linked to health risks or potential benefits, and identify strategies that would prevent negative individual and public health outcomes.
... It characterized cannabis as a relatively innocuous substance and concluded that criminalization was ineffective, and therefore recommended the legalization of personal cannabis use as well as the establishment of a legal and regulated supply system positively supported by law (Nolin and Kenny, 2002). At around that same time, also amidst gradual liberalization of cannabis control practice primarily in Europe, several key socio-political entities or organizations, including the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and editorial boards of leading Canadian media outlets, explicitly called for liberalized cannabis control (Blickman, 2014; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 2004;Haddad, 2002). Most of these recommended "decriminalization" for the control of personal cannabis use. ...
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As the world's second largest coca producer, Peru has a flourishing market for coca for non-narcotic uses. With more than 20,000 hectares and approximately 35,000 officially registered farmers in the Peruvian legal scheme for coca cultivation and commercialization, this market is formally under the monopoly of the National Enterprise of Coca (ENACO). Nonetheless, ENACO only captures 2% of all coca produced nationally and has experienced a sustained reduction of farmers’ participation and coca purchases within the legal trade. At different times, these problems have opened the way to demands from left-wing political parties, subnational governments, coca growers' organizations and even Peru's central drug control institutions to reform the legal coca market in Peru. However, none of these attempts have succeeded. Based on a policy analysis of the legal coca trade and analysis of official data, together with a case study of Peru's main legal coca valley (La Convención) this article seeks to understand the current crisis of the legal coca trade as well as the repeated failures of reform. Peru's political centralism and the historical marginalization of Andean culture help to explain the successful blocking of reform attempts to the legal coca trade.
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Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs) are non-profit organizations in which typically cannabis is grown and consumed collectively. To become a member of a CSC, it is usually necessary to be of legal age and have the endorsement of a current member (Belackova, et al., 2016; Muñoz Sánchez, 2017; Parés et al., 2019). As a result, a closed circuit between producers and consumers is established (Bone & de Hoedt, 2018; Decorte et al., 2017). Since its inception, the CSC model seems to have relied on and motivated different forms of social interaction
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La reforma de las políticas del cannabis es una tarea legislativa que no admite más moratorias. El modelo prohibicionista, basado en la dialéctica del consumo de drogas como enfermedad y la represión como mecanismo para atajarlo de raíz, ha mostrado, sin género de dudas, un fracaso estrepitoso. Las políticas derivadas de la prohibición han quedado lejos de conseguir sus objetivos: eliminar la producción y venta de las sustancias sometidas a fiscalización y extinguir la demanda entre la sociedad civil. Querer imponer unos objetivos quiméricos revela un desconcertante pensamiento ilusorio. Las acciones implementadas con el objetivo de alcanzar aquello inalcanzable han comportado inevitablemente que el prohibicionismo provoque más daños que los que pretendía evitar.
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Los capítulos del presente libro fueron elaborados a partir de una selección de las Comunicaciones Orales y Pósters presentados en el I Congreso Internacional sobre Cannabis y sus derivados, celebrado en Catoira (Pontevedra) el 24 y 25 de noviembre de 2017
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Background: Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs) are private organizations or clubs of users that produce cannabis for non-profit distribution to adult members to meet their personal needs without having to turn to the black market. CSCs can be found in many countries, but the term often covers very different empirical realities. Inspired by the Spanish CSCs and similarly taking advantage of a grey area in the Belgian cannabis legislation, Belgian cannabis activists set up the first Belgian CSC in 2006, and there are now at least 5 Belgian CSCs. The paper's main objective is to analyse the (internal) strengths and weaknesses and the (external) opportunities and threats of the model, as it exists today. Methods: The paper draws on a review of international literature and qualitative data on the Belgian cannabis social clubs. Field visits and interviews were conducted with each club. We analysed membership application forms, cultivation protocols and contracts with growers, cannabis ownership certificates of members, information leaflets, the clubs' websites, and all media articles and documentaries on the clubs in the Belgian media. Results: The paper describes the membership criteria and house rules, the members' profile, the organization and protocols for cannabis production, the distribution of cannabis through 'exchange fairs', the administrative features of the clubs and their contacts with other CSCs and with local authorities, the drug sector and the media. Belgian CSCs seem not profit-driven, and operate as a system in which cannabis is not too easily available. The clubs have fairly direct control over the quality and the potency of the cannabis they distribute. The model offers important potential opportunities, in terms of economic advantages and monitoring consumption patterns. The main threats to Belgian CSCs consist of attempts to criminalize the model, the emergence of profit-driven clubs and systemic violence from criminal entrepreneurs. Weaknesses of the model relate to the unstable or transient nature of the clubs, the transparency of their operational procedures, the superficiality of their quality control strategies, and the risk of morphing into marketing enterprises. Conclusions: The CSC model could be a safe and feasible option for policymakers to move a meaningful distance along the spectrum towards legally regulated cannabis markets without crossing over to full commercial availability. Governmental regulation could convert weaknesses and threats to the model into strengths and opportunities to ensure best practice. If authorities refrain from action, the model might dilute and evolve in a similar way as the Spanish CSCs did recently, with the establishment of large, commercial clubs.
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Illicit drug policy has long been an area that has attracted international policy intervention, however, the European Union has declared it an area of subsidiarity, leaving ultimate control to national governments. Nevertheless, European Union preoccupation with the illicit drug issue and international drug trafficking and organised crime concerns have ensured that continued and increased cooperation in illicit drug policy is never off the agenda. This article examines the history of European integration in contrasting areas of policy and considers both the desirability and the viability of an increasingly harmonised drug policy for Europe. Finally, it proposes a model of integrated illicit drug policy that is strongly connected to developing patterns of European social policy, calling on multi-level governance and close involvement at the level of the citizen.
Hollande will not go Dutch on cannabis, TNI weblog
  • T Blickman
Blickman, T. (2012b). Hollande will not go Dutch on cannabis, TNI weblog, May 17, 2012, http://www. druglawreform.info/en/weblog/item/3459-hollandewill-not-go-dutch-on-cannabis
First ever' bill proposes legal cannabis in France, The Local
Une majorité de français en faveur de l'autorisation du cannabis sous conditions, Le Monde blog, November 14, 2013; http://drogues.blog.lemonde. fr/2013/11/14/une-majorite-de-francais-en-faveur-delautorisation-du-cannabis-sous-conditions/ 123. 'First ever' bill proposes legal cannabis in France, The Local, January 30, 2014; http://www.thelocal. fr/20140130/frances-first-law-to-re. See also: EELV veut autoriser l'usage contrôlé du cannabis », Le Monde, February 5, 2014; http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/ article/2014/02/05/depenalisation-du-cannabisune-senatrice-ecolo-depose-une-proposition-deloi_4360864_823448.html 124. Cannabis: un réquisitoire contre la loi, Libération, February 5, 2014; http://www.liberation.fr/ societe/2014/02/05/cannabis-un-requisitoire-contre-laloi_978254
Cannabis : une contravention pour les consommateurs ? Le Monde
Un peu moins de fumée autour des politiques antidrogues, Libération, November 20, 2014, http:// www.liberation.fr/societe/2014/11/20/un-peu-moinsde-fumee-autour-des-politiques-antidrogues_1147347 126. Cannabis : une contravention pour les consommateurs ? Le Monde, November 20, 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/11/20/ cannabis-une-contravention-pour-lesconsommateurs_4526940_3224.html See: Le Dain, A.Y. & Marcangeli, L. (rapporteurs). L' augmentation de l'usage de substances illicites: que fait-on? Comité d'évaluation et de contrôle des politiques publiques, 20 novembre 2014; http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ controle/com_cec/lutte_usage_substances_synthese.pdf 127. Cannabis : les bénéfices objectifs de la légalisation, Le Monde, December 19, 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/ sante/article/2014/12/19/les-benefices-objectifs-de-la
Legalise cannabis in Flanders
  • De Wever Krijgt Groen Licht Voor Zijn Veiligheidsbeleid
  • Gazet Van Antwerpen
De Wever krijgt groen licht voor zijn veiligheidsbeleid, Gazet van Antwerpen, October 14, 2014, http://www.gva.be/cnt/dmf20141014_01320173/ de-wever-krijgt-groen-licht-voor-zijn-veiligheidsbeleid 105. Academics: "Legalise cannabis in Flanders", Flanders News, November 18, 2013; http://www. druglawreform.info/en/newsroom/latest-news/ item/5114-academics-qlegalise-cannabis-in-flandersq
Dit is een slag in het gezicht
  • mambo Social Club' Krijgt Opschorting Van Straf
'Mambo Social Club' krijgt opschorting van straf: 'Dit is een slag in het gezicht', Het Belang van Limburg, December 11, 2014, http://www.hbvl.be/cnt/ dmf20141211_01423592/mambo-social-club-krijgtopschorting-van-straf. Parket vraagt opschorting voor voorzitter cannabis vzw Mambo Social Club, Het Belang van Limburg, November 13, 2014, http://www. hbvl.be/cnt/dmf20141113_01373368/parket-vraagtopschorting-voor-voorzitter-cannabis-vzw-mambosocial-club
Cannabis production and markets in Europe
  • Key Drugs
  • Data
Drugs, key data 2013, Observatoire Français des Drogues et Toxico ma nies (OFDT), June 2013; http:// www.ofdt.fr/BDD/publications/docs/DCC2013en.pdf 112. Cannabis production and markets in Europe, Insights Series No 12, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2012, p. 215;
A Balancing Act: Policymaking on Illicit Drugs in the Czech Republic, Global Drug Policy Program
  • J Csete
Csete, J. (2012), A Balancing Act: Policymaking on Illicit Drugs in the Czech Republic, Global Drug Policy Program, Open Society Foundations;