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Turkey's June 2011 Parliamentary
Elections
Filiz Başkan & Aylin Güney
Version of record first published: 20 Mar 2012
To cite this article: Filiz Başkan & Aylin Güney (2012): Turkey's June 2011 Parliamentary Elections,
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14:1, 165-174
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Election Report and Political Analysis
Turkey’s June 2011 Parliamentary
Elections
Filiz Bas¸kan and Aylin Gu
¨ney
The parliamentary elections in Turkey were held on 12 June 2011. The elections marked
an important turning point as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) became the
winner for the third time and with a higher vote, 49.9 per cent. The Republican People’s
Party (CHP) and the ethnically oriented Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), increased
their votes to 25.9 and 6.65 per cent, respectively, while the Nationalist Action Party
(MHP) obtained 12.9 per cent of the votes. The new parliament is highly representative,
with 95 per cent of the voters being represented. This raised hopes about the drafting of a
new constitution based on broad consensus. However, the enduring polarization of
secular and religious groups, coupled with the obstructive attitude of Turkish and
Kurdish nationalists, render this reformist undertaking difficult.
Introduction
Since its first general election victory in 2002, the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) has maintained a comfortable ruling majority
through two subsequent elections. In 2002, it won a landslide victory with 34.3 per
cent of the votes and 363 parliamentary seats. In the 2007 general elections, it
achieved a second victory with 46.6 per cent of the total votes and 341 seats. Then, in
one of the most striking elections ever held in Turkey, on 12 June 2011, AKP obtained
49.9 per cent of the total votes and 327 of the parliamentary seats. It is important to
note that, although the number of seats that AKP gained has steadily decreased in
these elections, the party’s total vote has constantly increased.
In contrast, in the June 2011 general elections, the main opposition party, the
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP), attained 25.9 per cent of
the total votes, while the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetc¸i Hareket Partisi—MHP)
took 12.9 per cent. The ethnically oriented Peace and Democracy Party’s (Barıs¸ve
Demokrasi Partisi—BDP) candidates ran as independent candidates to bypass the
10 per cent electoral threshold, obtaining 6.65 per cent of the votes.
ISSN 1944-8953 (print)/ISSN 1944-8961 (online)/12/010165-10 q2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.656983
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies
Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2012, pp. 165–174
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Background
The economic record of the AKP government that has been in power since 2002 has
been impressive. Despite the severe global economic crisis in 2008 – 2009, Turkey
experienced a 9 per cent growth rate, while inflation fell to 6.4 per cent in 2010.
1
In spite of the high unemployment rate and unequal income distribution, average
living standards of Turkish people have risen. However, there has been an increasing
polarization of secular and religious groups, and Turkish and Kurdish nationalists,
both at political and social levels. In this context, it is essential to discuss the
implications of the 2010 constitutional referendum as evidence of this polarization.
In 2010, the AKP government proposed 26 amendments to the 1982 Constitution,
including revisions to the composition of the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and
Judges and the Constitutional Court, to collective bargaining rights and to military
trials. On 12 September, a referendum was held on these changes. The main
opposition parties, CHP and MHP, argued that these amendments would lead to the
politicization of the judiciary and campaigned against them, while BDP boycotted
the referendum entirely. Nevertheless, the government won 58 per cent of the votes
for its proposed changes to the constitution. Despite the MHP’s opposition, about 25
per cent of its supporters voted for the constitutional amendments.
2
In the run-up to the 2011 elections, one of the significant issues was criticism of the
AKP government’s alleged authoritarian tendencies that was causing anxieties among
liberal and secular circles in Turkey. For example, the leader of the main opposition
party, CHP, Kemal Kılıc¸darog
˘lu, claimed there was a ‘growing “authoritarianism”
under the AKP government, growing arbitrary telephone tapping by the authorities,
investigations aimed at silencing opponents and pressure on the media, which [was]
creating “a society of fear” in Turkey’.
3
Consequently, the 2011 general elections were
held in a rather polarized atmosphere, with the results sealing this polarization.
Electoral System
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has 550 members who are elected for a four-
year term through a proportional representation system. Turkey’s current electoral
system was formulated by the 1983 Election Law, which was designed to promote
democratic consolidation by decreasing the degree of political fragmentation that had
previously led to unstable coalition governments, especially between 1974 and 1980.
The proportional representation system was kept in place, but a percentage barrier
(threshold principle) was introduced so that any party failing to receive 10 per cent of
the total national vote in a general election could not obtain parliamentary
representation. This arrangement works to the disadvantage of minor and Kurdish
parties because it was designed to push the system into a two-party model with more
stable governments based on clear majorities in the Parliament, and the exclusion of
smaller parties from the political arena. However, independent candidates, who are
exempt from the 10 per cent electoral threshold, can be elected as MPs. Therefore,
small parties have been able to bypass the electoral threshold by running individually
before forming a parliamentary party group after winning their seats. For example,
166 F. Ba s¸kan and A. Gu
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the ethnically oriented Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi—DTP)
managed to get 20 independent candidates
4
elected in 2007 and its successor, BDP,
won 36 seats by running its candidates as independents in 2011.
Political Parties and the Election Campaign
Since AKP’s rise to power in 2002, Turkey has passed through an extensive social,
political and economic transformation process. The 2002 general elections were the
turning point for AKP, which had emerged as the new face of political Islam in August
2001, following the banning of the Islamist Welfare Party and then the Virtue Party by
the Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001, respectively. Despite its unprecedented
success, unsurprisingly, it faced the suspicions of both the Turkish secular elite and
secularist segments of society due to its religious background, despite the claim of its
leader, Recep Tayyip Erdog
˘an, that AKP was not an Islamist but a conservative
democrat party.
Contrary to the expectations of secular groups, during its first term in power
between 2002 and 2007, the AKP made constitutional amendments furthering
democratization of state–society relations with the support of the EU. It also
embraced liberal economic policies in order to overcome the 2001 economic crisis in
close cooperation with the IMF. Regarding sensitive religious issues, like restrictions
on wearing the headscarf, AKP’s leaders emphasized the necessity of reaching a broad
consensus.
5
However, the nomination of Abdullah Gu
¨l, whose wife wears a headscarf,
from the ranks of AKP as the 11th President, annoyed secular groups in Turkey.
AKP’s success in increasing its vote in the 2007 general elections was significant
since, except for the Democratic Party in the 1950s, no ruling party had won an
election victory with an increased vote in Turkey. Following this victory, and in
contrast to its first term, AKP became less sensitive about the fears of secular groups.
For example, following the 2007 elections, Gu
¨l was elected as the 11th President of the
Turkish Republic. Then AKP, with MHP’s support, made two legislative amendments
to lift the headscarf ban in universities. Following these amendments, the Chief
Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals applied to the Constitutional Court to ban
AKP on the grounds that it had become a ‘centre’ of activities contrary to the
principles of secularism. However, on July 2008, the Constitutional Court narrowly
decided not to dissolve AKP. These events demonstrated the ongoing tensions
between AKP and the secular elite. Meanwhile, the second AKP government paid less
special attention to the EU accession process due to the EU’s decision to suspend
eight chapters, and because of negative signals from EU member states regarding the
likelihood of Turkey gaining full membership.
During the 2011 election campaign, AKP’s slogans and advertisements emphasized
the economic stability and prosperity achieved during nine years under AKP rule. In
addition, to compete with CHP, the party proposed grand projects, like building an
Istanbul Canal and establishing new cities in I
˙stanbul and Ankara. The party’s main
slogan was ‘Turkey is ready, the goal is 2023.’
6
Meanwhile, through adopting a more
nationalist discourse and attacking BDP, AKP tried to attract MHP voters in order to
push MHP below the 10 per cent electoral threshold.
7
This was important, because
Turkey’s June 2011 Parliamentary Elections 167
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if MHP failed to pass the electoral threshold, AKP would probably gain enough
parliamentary seats to change the constitution unilaterally without a referendum.
One of the most important political parties in the 2011 general elections was the
main opposition party, CHP, which obtained 25.9 per cent of the total votes,
increasing its vote by 5 per cent since the 2007 elections with 3.5 million new votes.
8
For the party leadership, it is more important that the CHP’s voters caught onto the
‘new CHP’ concept, as evidenced by the increase in votes, especially from the youth
and women.
9
The result was seen by many analysts as a victory, although there were
also those who criticized the party for not having passed the 30 per cent psychological
threshold.
10
CHP changed considerably in its leadership and cadres in 2010, after the disclosure
of scandalous video recordings of its then leader, Deniz Baykal. In the video
recordings, distributed via the Internet, Baykal was allegedly shown naked with his
former private secretary, Nesrin Baytok, who was a deputy in the Turkish Parliament.
Deniz Baykal resigned and, at an extraordinary convention of the CHP, Kemal
Kılıc¸darog
˘lu was elected as the new party leader. The change in leadership was
followed by a radical change in the party administration. Baykal’s old affiliates were
excluded from the party assembly and the Central Executive Board was reshaped
radically with new names, including more young and female members.
After this radical shift in the leadership, there seemed to be a shift in CHP’s party
programme as well. The programme was reshaped by de-emphasizing issues of
secularism and emphasizing more economic issues, such as unemployment and
poverty. That is, rather than using the discourses of a centrist party as it used to do
before, CHP seemed to adopt more of a centre-left party discourse. Chapters called
the ‘New Economic Order’ and the ‘Social Welfare State’ formed an important part of
the 350-page party programme.
How the new CHP addressed the main issues of Turkey also differed to some extent
from previous elections. For instance, regarding the Kurdish problem, the party
increasingly focused on the importance of local administration and the autonomy of
municipalities, especially in financial matters. The leader of the party, Kılıc¸darog
˘lu,
also stated that CHP would use the practice of self-governance to solve the Kurdish
issue, as this not only appeared in the European Charter of Local Self Government,
which Turkey accepted in 1998, but also in the ruling AKP’s party programme.
11
It can be argued that, taking into consideration criticisms of the old CHP concerning
its elitist attitude, the new CHP tried to follow an election campaign focusing more on
those issues that were deemed as more important in the daily lives of the citizens.
Unlike in previous election campaigns, one of the most important discourses of the
new CHP was its launch of new projects. For instance, ‘family insurance’
12
became a
new element in the party programme, aimed at providing support of at least
600 TL monthly to poor families. Thus, social policies played a more prominent role
than in CHP’s more classical discourses of nationalism, Atatu
¨rkism and secularism
adopted in previous election campaigns.
Apart from this, regarding the Ergenekon case,
13
CHP took a clear stance against
AKP by naming two candidates, Mustafa Balbay, a prominent journalist, and Mehmet
Haberal, the former rector of Baskent University.
14
This was clear evidence that CHP
168 F. Ba s¸kan and A. Gu
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regarded the Ergenekon case as a political case manipulated by the government,
rather than a legal one. Although these two candidates are now able to become MPs,
their court cases are still in progress. These much-discussed nominations of
Ergenekon suspects, increased CHP’s vote in their respective constituencies, with
Haberal pushing CHP votes in Zonguldak up to 39 per cent—an increase of 13 per
cent. However, there are counter arguments claiming that CHP might have gained
even more votes if it had not nominated Ergenekon suspects as candidates.
15
MHP’s performance in the 2011 elections was critical since, as noted above, failing
to pass the electoral threshold would change the composition of the parliament,
giving AKP enough seats to overhaul the constitution unilaterally. On the eve of the
elections, MHP was also shaken by the release of sex tapes involving some of its
leaders, causing 10 party candidates to resign from their posts and withdraw from the
elections. Although there was no evidence, the party’s leaders claimed that AKP was
the main actor behind the release of these sex tapes.
16
MHP’s election campaign was
based on criticism of the AKP government for allegedly negotiating for the release of
the jailed leader of the separatist PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), Abdullah O
¨calan.
17
Despite the sex tape scandals, MHP was able to obtain 12.9 per cent of the total votes
and 53 seats in the Parliament.
BDP’s performance was also vital in the 2011 elections. The party was established
in 2008, following the Constitutional Court’s December 2009 decision to dissolve its
predecessor, DTP, and the transfer of 20 parliamentarians and 98 mayors to BDP.
BDP describes itself as ‘a left leaning mass party that perceives libertarian, egalitarian,
peaceful, pluralist and multi-cultural society as richness’,
18
and is generally known as
the only regionalist pro-Kurdish party in Turkey. The party nominated 43 deputy
candidates, of which 36 were elected as parliamentary deputies, proving that the party
is a strong representative of the pro-Kurdish political movement in at least six
provinces in the predominantly Kurdish south-east. BDP’s ability to increase both its
share of the vote and number of parliamentary seats was one of the most remarkable
outcomes of the 2011 general elections. The party obtained 6.65 per cent of the votes,
compared to 5.19 per cent in the 2007 general elections. As a result, its parliamentary
seats increased to 36 from 20 in 2007. This is a considerable number that could affect
the decision-making process in the Parliament.
BDP’s election campaign and party programme focused mostly on ‘regionaliza-
tion’. In this administrative model, a regional assembly assuming power through
elections similar to those of county councils would be established, through the
operation of decentralization. This regional assembly would assume responsibility in
fields such as education, health, culture, social services, agriculture, industry,
construction, telecommunications, social security, women, youth and sports. The
central government would control foreign affairs, finance and defence services, while
security and judicial services would be jointly conducted by central and regional
government.
19
As regards citizenship, BDP has introduced a different conception, in which the
supervision of these services would be mutually determined by both levels of
government. The current definition of citizenship, which depicts every individual as
ethnically Turkish, would be replaced by citizenship of the Turkish Republic, within
Turkey’s June 2011 Parliamentary Elections 169
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a framework of ‘Turkey as homeland’ that recognizes and embraces different cultural
identities.
In the run-up to the 2011 elections, in April 2011, the most important controversy
concerning BDP developed with respect to the decision of the Supreme Election
Board (Yu
¨ksek Sec¸im Kurulu—YSK) to ban 12 BDP candidates from participating in
the election due either to past convictions or incomplete documentation, five of
whom were the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK)
20
suspects. However, soon after,
YSK reversed its decision and accepted their candidacy.
BDP’s presence in the new parliament became more visible and significant after the
2011 general elections. As already mentioned, the party was able to bypass the 10 per
cent threshold obstacle by nominating independent candidates, although this was a
risky and complicated method as it required remarkable organizational skills and
abilities in every election district.
21
However, because it successfully brought these
candidates to Parliament, it indicates that the 10 per cent electoral threshold law has
become ineffective in practice.
22
The election results have made BDP a key player in
the Turkish political scene.
Election Results
A total of 52,806,322 Turkish citizens voted in the 2011 general elections, representing
a very high turnout of 83.1 per cent. As seen in Table 1, the most remarkable result of
these elections was that the ruling AKP, with 49.9 per cent, managed to increase its
vote from its second term of rule by 3.3 per cent. However, its share of the seats in
Parliament decreased from 341 in 2007 to 327 in 2011. CHP, with 25.9 per cent, also
increased its vote by 5 per cent, and increased its seats from 112 to 135 in the
Table 1 Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, 12 June 2011
2007 2011
Party Votes Vote % Seats Votes Vote % Seats
Justice and Development Party 16,327,291 46.6 341 21,320,207 49.9 327
Republican People’s Party 7,317,808 20.9 112 11,122,420 25.9 135
Nationalist Action Party 5,001,869 14.3 71 5,575,010 12.9 53
Democrat Party 1,898,873 5.4 – 278,775 0.6 –
Independents 1,835,486 5.2 26 2,819,917 6.5 35
Young Party 1,064,871 3.0 – – – –
Felicity Party 820,289 2.3 – 541,470 1.2 –
Independent Turkey Party 182,095 0.5 – – – –
People’s Ascendancy Party 179,010 0.5 – – – –
Labor Party 128,148 0.4 – – – –
People’s Voice Party – – – 329,358 0.7 –
Grand Unity Party – – – 322,819 0.7 –
Other parties 293,943 0.9 – 631,377 2.8 –
Total 35,049,691 100 550 42,941,763 100 550
Source:Yu
¨ksek Sec¸im Kurulu, ,http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/Kararlar/2011Pdf/2011-1070.pdf..
Tu
¨rkiye I
˙statistik Kurumu, ,http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id¼42&ust_id ¼12..
Note: Registered voters: 52,806,322; valid votes: 42,941,763; turnout: 83.1%.
170 F. Ba s¸kan and A. Gu
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Parliament, while MHP was able to get 12.9 per cent of the total vote and 53 seats in
the Parliament. However, its vote decreased by 1.4 per cent from the 2007 general
elections and its seats decreased from 71 in 2007 to 53 in 2011. BDP candidates
running as independents obtained 6.65 per cent of the vote with 36 out of 43
candidates being elected as deputies. Therefore, the new Turkish Parliament is highly
representative, with 95 per cent of the electorate represented.
The Post-election Crisis
The 12 June elections were followed by an important crisis that increased tension in
the Turkish political system. This was partly due to the fact that, on 21 July, the YSK
unanimously voted to strip independent deputy Hatip Dicle, who had been elected in
Diyarbakır with BDP’s support, of his seat, since he lost an appeal in June 2011
against a 2010 conviction and 20-month prison sentence for spreading terrorist
propaganda. Under Turkey’s electoral law, any terrorism-related conviction carrying
a sentence of more than a year makes the recipient ineligible for parliament. However,
the YSK had previously accepted his nomination as a candidate and he had been able
to run in the elections, so the body’s later decision caused a major crisis as the other
independent MPs declared that they would not enter parliament to take the oath until
Hatip Dicle was reinstated. In addition, the courts decided not to release five other
newly elected independent deputies who were in prison awaiting trial for allegedly
having links to the PKK.
Meanwhile, an Istanbul court ruled against releasing the two new CHP deputies,
Balbay and Haberal, discussed earlier, who are, like the BDP deputies, under
detention awaiting trial. This infuriated the CHP’s party cadres and, as a result, CHP
decided not to take part in the parliamentary oath ceremony that was to take place on
28 June 2011, with CHP’s leader Kılıc¸darog
˘lu declaring: ‘We will not take the oath
unless the way is open for all our deputies to take the oath.’
23
Finally, one MHP
deputy, retired General Engin Alan, who was in custody accused of supporting an
alleged coup against the AKP government, was not released by the courts. Since
parliamentary deputies gain legal immunity under Turkish law, all the parties
expected these parliamentary candidates to be released from custody once they were
elected. However, when the courts refused to do this, it culminated in a post-election
crisis.
When the new Turkish Parliament convened on 28 June 2011, CHP deputies
attended the opening but refused to take their oaths of office in reaction to the court
rulings blocking eight of their colleagues from entering parliament. Finally, the crisis
concerning CHP deputies was solved on 12 July 2011, after CHP and AKP signed an
agreement in which they stated their willingness to cooperate in securing the release
of the arrested CHP deputies. The agreement also emphasized that all parties and
deputies who were elected by the country’s citizens needed to be in Parliament in
order to reflect and represent the nation, and labelled the agreement as a ‘historic
opportunity to create a constitution that fits the description of a societal contract’.
24
Meanwhile, the newly elected BDP independents decided to hold their weekly
parliamentary group meetings in Diyarbakır,
25
the city that Hatip Dicle represented,
Turkey’s June 2011 Parliamentary Elections 171
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after choosing to boycott Parliament’s opening by refusing to take oaths, and stated
that they would continue gathering their group there until a solution was reached.
This ‘oath boycott’ was ended on 1 October 2011, after a series of efforts by
Parliamentary Speaker Cemil C¸ic¸ek and President Abdullah Gu
¨l to convince the BDP
deputies to take their oaths and participate in legislative activities as well as take part
in the making of the new constitution.
Following the ending of the oath boycott by both CHP and BDP deputies, a
Constitution Conciliation Commission that included three representatives from each
party was founded at the beginning of November 2011 under the leadership of C¸ic¸ek.
Implications
Since both AKP and CHP promised to draft a new constitution in place of the 1982
Constitution, adopted in the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention, some
segments of Turkish society were hopeful that the constitution would be overhauled
following the elections. There are several reasons why this is a good opportunity.
First, the new parliament is highly representative, with 95 per cent of the voters being
represented. Secondly, the ruling AKP did not gain enough seats to change the
constitution without getting the support of other parties. Third, Kurdish-origin
deputies have a strong presence. Therefore, the hope is that this will allow a new
constitution based on consensus to be drafted. The establishment of the Constitution
Conciliation Commission can be regarded as a crucial step on the way to a new
constitution. However, because of the enduring polarization of secular and religious
groups on the one hand, and Turkish and Kurdish nationalists on the other, Turkey
may miss the chance to develop a new constitution based on consensus that brings
the country out of the shadow of the military.
Notes
[1] Tu
¨rkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası, ,http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/..
[2] Dog
˘u Ergil, ‘Constitutional referendum: farewell to the “old Turkey”’, ,http://www.faqs.org/
periodicals/201010/2185705271.html..
[3] ,http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkish-opposition-steps-referendum-campaign-
news-497394..
[4] In the 2007 general elections, 26 independent candidates were able to be elected; 20 of them
were supported by the DTP and 6 of them were supported by other parties.
[5] Filiz Bas¸kan, ‘Accomodating political Islam in Turkish democracy’, in Mu
¨ge Aknur (ed.),
Democratic Consolidation in Turkey, Universal, Boca Raton, FL, 2012, pp. 345– 376.
[6] ,http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hedef-2023/siyaset/haberdetay/17.04.2011/1378705/default.
htm..
[7] Murat Yetkin, ‘Tu
¨rkiye ic¸ in Yeni Bir Sayfa’, ,http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType¼
RadikalYazar&ArticleID ¼1052639&Yazar ¼MURAT%20YETK%DDN&Date¼03.07.
2011&CategoryID ¼98..
[8] Alper Ballı, ‘Sec¸im sonuc¸ ları belli olurken: CHP’de hayalkırıklıg
˘ı’, ,http://www.bbc.co.uk/
turkce/haberler/2011/06/110612_election_chp_alper.shtml..
[9] Serkan Demirtas¸, ‘In light of the June 12 polls’, ,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?
n¼in-light-of-the-june-12-polls-2011-06-21..
172 F. Ba s¸kan and A. Gu
¨ney
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[10] ‘CHP neden Yu
¨zde 30 olamadı?’, ,http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/chp-neden-yuzde-30-
olamadi-/siyaset/siyasetdetay/22.06.2011/1405320/default.htm..
[11] ,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n¼pm-threatens-businessman-says-kilicdaroglu-
2011-06-03..
[12] In the ‘family insurance project’, the CHP promised to provide at least 600 TL monthly to
disadvantaged families. Those with more children or disabled or elderly family members were
to receive 1250 TL as part of the project.
[13] Since 2007, over 300 people have been detained during the investigation of a terrorist
conspiracy called Ergenekon, including journalists, retired generals and other military
officers, professors and underworld figures. The conspiracy is allegedly dedicated to the use of
violence to try to overthrow the AKP government.
[14] They are both in prison on charges of allegedly being members of the Ergenekon terrorist
organization.
[15] S¸ ahin Alpay, ‘O
¨zgu
¨rlu
¨kc¸u
¨ve C¸og
˘ulcu Demokrasi Yerles¸iyor’, ,http://www.zaman.com/yazar.
do?yazino¼1146617&keyfield¼C59F6168696E20616C706179.; Ali Bayramog
˘lu, ‘Tu
¨rkiye’nin
Yeni Resmi’, ,http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i¼27795&y¼AliBayramoglu..
[16] ,http://www.milliyet.com.tr/mhp-li-yalcin-kaset-silahinin-kabzasi-akp/siyaset/haberdetay/
03.05.2011/1385339/default.htm..
[17] ,http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17978467.asp..
[18] ,http://www.bdp.org.tr/english/english.html..
[19] See the BDP party programme.
[20] The case against the alleged urban branch of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK,
comprises 152 suspects.
[21] Cenap C¸ akmak, ‘Turkey’s elections: victories and defeats’, ,http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/kose-
yazilari/942/turkeys-elections-victories-and-defeats.aspx..
[22] Gu
¨lnur Aybet and Filiz Bas¸kan, ‘Constitutional overhaul?’, World Today, June 2011, p. 21.
[23] ‘MPs’ boycott mars new term for parliament’, ,http://english.sabah.com.tr/National/2011/
06/29/mps-boycott-mars-new-term-for-parliament..
[24] ,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid¼438&n ¼oath-taking-standoff-
over-charter-is-next-2011-07-11..
[25] ,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/c.php?c¼tr-politics..
Filiz Bas¸kan is Professor of Political Science in the Department of International
Relations and the European Union, Izmir University of Economics. She was formerly
a Jean Monnet Research Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University
Institute, Florence (2000–2001). She has published in Middle Eastern Studies,South
European Society and Politics,Turkish Studies,Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,
International Journal of Turkish Studies and in several edited volumes.
Address for correspondence: Department of International Relations and the
European Union, Izmir University of Economics, Sakarya Cad. No. 156, Balc¸ova,
35330 I
˙zmir, Turkey. E-mail: filiz.baskan@ieu.edu.tr
Aylin Gu
¨ney is Associate Professor, Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and
International Relations and Head of the Department of International Relations, Yasar
University, I
˙zmir, Turkey. She received her MA and PhD degrees from the Johns
Hopkins University and Bilkent University, respectively. Her research interests
focus on the politics of European integration, state– society relations in Europe,
Turkey’s June 2011 Parliamentary Elections 173
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Turkish–American relations and civil – military relations. She has several articles
published in academic journals such as Middle Eastern Studies,Armed Forces and
Society,Futures,Security Dialogue,Turkish Studies,South European Society and Politics
and in several edited volumes.
Address for correspondence: Department of International Relations, Yasar
University, Selcuk Yasar Campus, Universite Cad. No. 35– 37, Bornova, 35100 Izmir,
Turkey. E-mail: aylin.guney@yasar.edu.tr
174 F. Ba s¸kan and A. Gu
¨ney
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