Risk Management and Reward Systems: Taking HR Governance Seriously

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Abstract
Reward systems have come under intense scrutiny ‐ again, accused of precipitating the global economic turbulence of the last two years or so. In particular, there has been a widespread consensus that weak risk management and corporate governance in the area of reward management encouraged imprudent behaviour and excessive risk‐taking. As regulators and corporations take stock of the unprecedented losses incurred, one thing is becoming clearer: HR governance has not been taken seriously by many organisations. Given that firms allocate such a huge proportion of their operating revenues and value‐added to human capital investments in the form of compensation, benefits and people development, this is certainly surprising...and unacceptable. In this paper, therefore, we argue for a more responsible management of reward systems, reviewing five high‐risk issues that are undoubtedly some of the most pressing challenges organisations face in contemporary times: strategic compensation misalignment, overreliance on short‐term incentives, skewed compensation mix, overemphasis on a single performance metric, and risk management not being a compensable factor. These challenges, though enormous, are not insurmountable, particularly since risk management and corporate governance are now high on the agenda globally. HR can add value to the business by putting in place systems to effectively identify, assess and mitigate rewards‐ and HR‐related risks. For the forward‐looking HR professional, this is a rare and tremendous opportunity to ensure that their organisations are managed in a responsible and sustainable manner. HR must lead the way!
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Human Resource Management Journal Vol. 1 No: 2, 2009 ISSN0795-7424
RiskManagementandRewardSystems:TakingHR
GovernanceSeriously
ABSTRACT
Rewardsystemshavecomeunderintensescrutiny‐again,accusedofprecipitatingtheglobal
economicturbulenceofthelasttwoyearsorso.Inparticular,therehasbeenawidespreadconsensus
thatweakriskmanagementandcorporategovernanceintheareaofrewardmanagementencouraged
imprudentbehaviourandexcessiverisktaking.Asregulatorsandcorporationstakestockofthe
unprecedentedlossesincurred,onethingisbecomingclearer:HRgovernancehasnotbeentaken
seriouslybymanyorganisations.Giventhatfirmsallocatesuchahugeproportionoftheiroperating
revenuesandvalueaddedtohumancapitalinvestmentsintheformofcompensation,benefitsand
peopledevelopment,thisiscertainlysurprising...andunacceptable.Inthispaper,therefore,we
argueforamoreresponsiblemanagementofrewardsystems,reviewingfivehighriskissuesthatare
undoubtedlysomeofthemostpressingchallengesorganisationsfaceincontemporarytimes:
strategiccompensationmisalignment,overrelianceonshorttermincentives,skewedcompensation
mix,overemphasisonasingleperformancemetric,andriskmanagementnotbeingacompensable
factor.Thesechallenges,thoughenormous,arenotinsurmountable,particularlysincerisk
managementandcorporategovernancearenowhighontheagendaglobally.HRcanaddvalueto
thebusinessbyputtinginplacesystemstoeffectivelyidentify,assessandmitigaterewards‐ and
HRrelatedrisks.FortheforwardlookingHRprofessional,thisisarareandtremendous
opportunitytoensurethattheirorganisationsaremanagedinaresponsibleandsustainable
manner.HRmustleadtheway!
Human Resource Management Journal
Journal of Chartered Institute of Personnel Management of Nigeria
JulySeptember,2009Vol.1No:2,2009Pgs.13‐26

IfedapoAdeleye,PhDSPHR

Lecturer, Human Resources and Organisations
Lagos Business School | Pan-African University
22 Lekki-Epe Expressway, Ajah – Lagos
T: +234-1-7740280 E: iadeleye@lbs.edu.ng
iadeleye
14
Keywords:RiskManagement,CorporateGovernance,HRGovernance,RewardSystems,Executive
Compensation.
Certainly,oneoftheimportantfalloutsoftheglobalfinancialcrisisand,indeedtheauditreviewof
ourbanksisthatthestructureofcompensationanditseffectonrisktakingisasafetyand
soundnessissue.Thepresentstructureofremuneration/bonusesofbankswhichischaracterisedby
“excessiveshorttermism”demonstratesadisconnectbetweenincentivestostaffandprudentrisk
management.Riskmanagement,remunerationandincentivesmustbelinked.
CharlesAkoroda,DeputyDirectorofCentralBankofNigeria(inNovember2009)
Rewardsystemshavecomeunderintensescrutinyagain,accusedofprecipitatingthe
unprecedentedturbulenceintheglobaleconomyinthelasttwoyearsorso.Inparticular,there
hasbeenawidespreadconsensusthatweakriskmanagementandcorporategovernanceinthe
areaofrewardmanagementencouragedimprudentbehaviourandexcessiverisktaking
(Nwadioke,2009).PostmortemreportsonLehmanBrothersandBearStearnsindicatethat
failuresinthisareamayhaveledthesecorporategiantstotheirtragicanduntimelydeathsin
2008(Bebchuk,2010).InNigeria,withanacutelyweakregulatoryregime,thefallouthasbeen
unsurprisinglydisastrous.Thefinancialsectorhas“outperformed”otheremergingfinancial
markets,rackingupanestimatedstaggeringsumofN9trillionintoxicassets,withbanksforced
tomakeprovisionsorcapitalinjectionsofN1.5trillionsofar(MerrillLynch,2009).Again,risk
managementandrewardsystemsareinthedock,withregulatorspointingouttheroleof
rewards,especiallyincentives,inencouragingimprudentandriskybehaviour(Komolafeand
Eboh,2009).
Ofcourseriskmanagementwasnottheproblemperse,asorganisationshadinvested
considerablyinriskmanagementtoolsandprocessesfollowingtheincreasedvolatilityinglobal
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Human Resource Management Journal Vol. 1 No: 2, 2009 ISSN0795-7424
marketsoverthelasttwodecadesorso.Itisnowclearthatwhilealotofattentionwaspaidto
assessingandmanagingliquidityrisk,creditriskandoperationalrisk,someotherriskswere
underestimatedoroverlooked(NorthedgeandBradley,2009).Oneofsuchunderestimated
areasisrewardrisk‐theriskassociatedwiththerewardsystemsnotaligningwiththevarious
strategicprioritiesofthefirm.
Thisfailuretofullyunderstandandmanagerewardriskeffectively,whilesurprising,
unfortunatelyappearstobetypical.Surprisinginthesensethatfirmsallocatesuchahuge
proportionoftheiroperatingexpenses(upto60percent)andvalueadded(upto60percent)to
humancapitalinvestmentsintheformofcompensation,benefitsandtotalrewards.Thisis
unacceptable.Theneedformoreawarenessonthepotentialrisksindesigningrewardsystems
cannotbeoveremphasisedgiventhatrewardsystemsareacriticalpartofanyfirm’sdesign,
andhowwelltheyfitwiththeotherorganisationalsystemshasaphenomenalimpactonhow
effectivethefirmis(Lawler,1993).Asthiscrisishasshown,thosewhofailtoeffectivelymanage
rewardrisksexposetheirorganisationstoconsiderablestrategic,financial,reputational,and
evenlegalandethicalrisks.Rewardgovernancemustbetakenseriously.
Thispaperisorganisedintotwomainsections.Inthefirstsection,wediscussfivehigh
riskrewardissuesorganisationsfacetoday:strategiccompensationmisalignment,overreliance
onshorttermincentives,skewedcompensationmix,overemphasisonasingleperformance
metric,andriskmanagementnotbeingacompensablefactor.Arguingthatthecurrentfinancial
crisisprovidesarareandtremendousopportunityforHRprofessionalstoaddvaluetotheir
organisations,inthesecondsectionwelookathowHRcanensurethatriskmanagementand
rewardsystemsareappropriatelyaligned.
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HighRiskIssue#1
StrategicCompensationMisalignment
Whencompaniesadjuststrategies,setnewgoals,orimplementchangeinitiatives,adominoeffect
oftenensues.Newprioritiesforthecompanyresultinnewprioritiesfordivisions,departments,and
individuals...Butthroughallthisorganisationalshifting,onecriticalfacetofmanagingpeopleis
oftenignored:compensation.Indeed,companiesimplementingeventhemostsweepingofchange
programmesoftenneglecttoaddressthewaypeoplearepaid.Theresultcanbethatwhileemployees
arebeingdirectedtowardoneend,theyarebeinginadvertentlymotivatedtoengagein
counterproductivebehaviours.
MichaelSisk(2005:3)
Thisrewardrisk,whicharisesfromthemisalignmentofrewardsystems‐particularly
incentives‐totheorganisation’scompetitivepriorities,isarguablythemostcriticalrewardrisk
organisationsfacetoday.Interestingly,SteveKerr’s1975managementclassic,OntheFollyof
RewardingA,WhileHopingforB,stillringsverytruetoday.Organisationsinmanycaseshave
stillnotbeenabletoappropriatelyalignemployeeincentivestotheirstrategyandriskappetite.
OneseniorHRexecutiverecentlysharedthechallengesofaligningHRtobusiness
strategy,asherorganisationrecentlyembarkedonastrategicreviewinlightoftheeconomic
downturnandincreasedcompetitivepressuresintheNigerianbankingsector.Essentially,the
bankwasnowputtinghighqualityanddifferentiationatthecoreofitscompetitivestrategy.
Puzzledbywhythehighlypublicisedandcraftedstrategywasnotproducingtheanticipated
results(bothinternalandexternalcustomersatisfactionstudiesshowednosubstantial
improvements),wedecidedtointerviewsomestaff.Oneemployeegaveapowerfulinsight:
“Theonlythingthatmattersismeetingyourtargetsandbringinginthedeposits.That’sallthat
counts...Anyotherthingyoudoisreallyawasteoftime”.Apparently,whilestrategylookedin
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thedirectionofhighestqualityserviceprovision,incentivescontinuedtomotivateemployeesto
pursuehighestquantitydepositmobilisation.
Apartfromthestrategicriskthisposestothefirmnotrealisingitsstrategicobjectives,
thebankisexposedtoreputationalriskasthegapbetweenitsmediacampaignrhetoricisfar
fromtherealityexperiencedbytheircustomers.Therearealsofinancialriskexposures.
Providingspotbonusesofmodestsumsand/ornonmonetaryrecognitionschemesmayhave
helpedtodrivethisstrategicchangeinitiativeandmotivateemployeestoengageinthedesired
behaviour.
HighRiskIssue#2
OverrelianceonShorttermIncentives
Itishopedthatadministratorswillpayattentiontolongruncostsandopportunitiesandwill
instituteprogrammeswhichwillbearfruitlateron.However,manyorganisationalrewardsystems
payoffforshortrunsalesandearningsonly.Undersuchcircumstancesitispersonallyrationalfor
officialstosacrificelongtermgrowthandprofit(bysellingoffequipmentandproperty,orby
shiftingresearchanddevelopment)forshorttermadvantages.
SteveKerr(1975:775)
Whilehopingthatexecutivesandemployeesfocusonlongtermgrowthandviability,reward
practiceshavetypicallyprovidedthemwithincentivestofocusonshorttermresults(Bebchuk
andFried,2004).Thepervasiveuseofannual‐andincreasinglybiannualandquarterly‐
bonuseshasinadvertently(orotherwise)ledtothefixationofbusinessexecutivestoshortterm
results.Theproblemwiththisisthatformanyorganisations/businessunits,thesetimeframes
arewaytooshorttoascertaintrueperformance.Thisriskwasundoubtedlyamajorcontributor
tothecurrentfinancialcrisis(NorthedgeandBradley,2009;CottonandChapman,2010).In
NigeriaandmanyWesterncountries,manybankexecutiveshadreceivedbonusesfor“income”
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fromloansthathavenowturnedouttobetoxicassets;loanstheyprobablyshouldneverhave
givenatall.
Severalotherfactorscontributetothisshorttermism.AsOsadolor(2009),theCFOof
UBApointedout,aseriouschallengetoriskmanagementinNigeriaisinvestors’unrealistic
demandforquickgrowthandprofits.Inthecaseofthemultinationalcompanies(andeven
localcorporates)whereexpatriatesoccupystrategicpositions,thefactthattheyaretypicallyon
shorttermassignmentsoftwo/threeyearsorlessalsocontributestoshorttermism.
Toensurethatincentivesdonotencourageshorttermorientedbehaviourthatmay
produceasingleperiodofgoodresultswithoutregardforproperriskmanagementorthelong
termviabilityofthebusiness,severalcompensationexpertshaverecommendedtheuseof
bonusbanksorclawbacks(Bebchuk,2010).Thisway,organisationswillbeabletorecover
previously“earned”incentivesifalongertimehorizonperformancemakesitclearthatthey
havenotbeentrulyearned,ortheywerebasedondubiousfinancials.
HighRiskIssue#3
SkewedCompensationMix
Remunerationstructuresforemployeeswhoperformasignificantinfluencefunctionforafirmor
whoseactivitieshave,orcouldhave,amaterialimpactonafirm’sriskprofileshouldprovideforthe
fixedcomponentsofpaytobeasufficientproportionoftotalremuneration.
Ravenscroft(2009:7)
Askewedor“unbalanced”compensationmix(whereforexample,basecompensationis10
percentandincentivecompensationis90percent,orviceversa)ishighrisk,particularlyfor
executives,highperformersandotheremployeeswhoseperformancemayhaveahighimpact
onthefinancialandriskprofileoftheorganisation.AgoodcaseinpointistheFrench“rogue
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trader”,JeromeKerviel,whocommittedthelargesteversinglehandedtradingfraudin
bankinghistory(Comstock,2009).Kervielfalsifiedtradestoconceal$73billioninriskybets
andexcessivepositionshemadein2008,incurringastaggering$7billioninlossesforhis
employer,SocieteGeneraleBank.
Themotivationforthiskindofbehaviourisnothardtoexplain.Thoughmanytraders
receiverelativelydecentbasepay(27yearoldKervielwason100,000Eurosperannum),they
canearnseveralmultiplesofthisinincentivepay(KarGupta,2008).Andgiventhatthese
bonusesareuncapped,theyare“ledintotemptation”ofinvestinginhighriskproducts(which
usuallyofferhigherrewards)tomaximisetheirbonuses,evenifsuchproductsarenot
consistentwiththeriskappetiteoftheirinstitution.Thisriskisalsocommonwhereexecutives
receiveasignificantchunkoftheirtotalcompensationinstockoptions.
However,itiswhenbasepayislow(forexample,belowmarketcompetitiveratesor
reasonablelivingcosts)thattheriskassociatedwithaskewedcompensationmixismost
dangerous.Employeesoftenbecomedesperateandembarkonriskyorfraudulentventures.
Thisappearstobeabigproblemintheinsurancesector(andincreasinglyinthebankingsector)
wherethesocalleddirectorindependentsalesagentswhoarepaidalmostentirelyon
commissionsresorttomissellingoffinancialproductsandothersharppractices.Whileitis
clearthata“balanced”compensationmixisdesirable,whatanoptimalmixwillbeisnoteasy
todetermine.Thiswouldvaryacrossorganisations,businessunitsandindividualjobs,and
requiresadeepunderstandingofthebusinessanditsdriver.
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HighRiskIssue#4
OveremphasisonaSinglePerformanceMetric
Becarefulwhatyoupayfor,youmaygetit...Incentivesprovideinformationaboutwhatbehaviours
theorganisationvaluesandwhich,amongthemanysometimesconflictingpriorities,thecompany
mostcaresabout...Butthat’saproblem.Mostcompanieshaveproductionprocessesandobjectives
thatarewaytoocomplicatedtobeadequatelycapturedinanyincentivescheme.
JeffreyPfeffer(2007:1and4)
Compensationdrivesbehaviour.Managersknowthisverywell,andoftenuseitasaleverto
driveentrepreneurialinitiativeandbusinessperformance.However,compensationoftenworks
toowell,motivatingemployeestoperformonlyactivitiesthatare(financially)rewarded.This
becomesabigissuewhenthereistoomuchemphasisonaparticularmetric,asitcan“detract
from,orevenimpede,progressonotherimportantperformancemetrics”(HayGroup,2009:3).
Forexample,seniorexecutivesinmanyNigerianbanksareawarded2and5%ofprofitbefore
taxasincentives,encouragingthemtofocuson(shortterm)profitabilityandaggressivecutting
ofcoststhatmaybenecessarytodevelopcapabilitiesforfuturegrowth(forinstance,people
developmentcosts).Ofcoursethishasoftencreatedaperverseincentivetomanipulate
financialaccounts.
Inasimilarvein,theobsessionwithsharepricesasanindicatorofperformance,andthe
attendantuseofstockoptiongrantstorewardexecutives,hasresultedinasituationwhere
executivesdeploy“anymeansnecessary”todriveupshareprices.Researchstudieshave
shownthatthehigherthestockoptionsgrantedtoseniorexecutives,themorelikelyitwasthat
theircompanieswouldsubsequentlyhavetorestatetheirfinancialstatements(Norris,2005).
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Whetheritisoneperformancemetricormore,theoverrelianceon(“stretching”)
financialmetricshasoftenyieldedundesiredoutcomes.CadburyNigeria,forexample,which
hadassigneditselfambitiousfinancialtargetsinthelastdecadeorso,hadapparently
overstateditsfinancialsoverthe2004/6periodtothetuneofbetweenN13bnand15bn
(Ogbechie,2009).Severalyearson,thecompanyisyettofullyrecoverfromthefinancial,
reputational,legalandethicallossesitsuffered.
Usingabalancedscorecardmayhelptomitigatethisrisk,ensuringthatnonfinancial
performancemetricsformasignificantpartoftherewardsystem.Indeed,someforward
lookingorganisationshaveembracedthisapproach.FirstBank,forexample,hasintroduced
nonfinancialmetricscoveringemployeeengagement,brandperception,customersatisfaction
andITperformanceandsystemsreliability.
HighRiskIssue#5
RiskManagementNotBeingaCompensableFactor
Ifriskiseverybody’sbusiness,itisharderforpocketsofrisktobeleftunobserved.Andifemployees’
compensationisaffectedbyhowtheytakerisks,theywilltakeriskmorejudiciously.
RenéStulz(inNorthedgeandBradley,2009:9)
Oneofthemajorreasonswhyriskmanagementhasnotbeentakenseriouslybyemployeesis
thatithasoftenbeenperceivedastheresponsibilityoftheboard,seniorexecutivesandrisk
professionals,noteveryone’sbusiness.Evenwhereriskmanagementisassumedtobethe
responsibilityofseniorexecutives,organisationstendnottorewardeffectiveriskmanagement.
Whilepeopleareoftencompensatedfortheskills,education,businessacumenandfinancial
results,organisationsthatgiveincentivestoemployeeswhodemonstrateanabilitytoidentify,
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assessandmanageriskeffectivelyareraretofind.Asamatteroffact,thecontraryisprevalent
aspeopletendtoreceivehighrewardsafter(successfully)undertakinghighriskventures.With
uncappedbonusschemes,thisisstretchedtoitsmaximumlimit.Theproblemoftenisthat
whileexecutivesoremployeesreceiveasubstantialshareofanyprofitstheygenerate,theydo
nothavetodefraylossestheyincur.Thiswasrampantacrossthebankingsectorglobally,
encouragingexcessiverisktaking.Worsestill,inabidtoattract“highperformers”,somefirms
givethemguaranteedbonuseswhichnotonlyinsulatesthemfromthedownsideofrisksthey
takebutleavesthemwiththeupside,inadvertentlyencouragingriskybehaviour.
Again,bonusclawbacksmaybeeffectiveintacklingthisproblem.Morefarreaching
andeffectivemeasuresinclude:makingadjustmentsforcurrentandfuturerisksinbonuspool
calculationandtheminimaluseof“riskproof”incentivessuchasuncappedbonusesand
guaranteedbonuses(Clementietal.,2010).
TakingRewardGovernanceSeriously:TheRoleofHRProfessionals
Asthefunctionalexpertsonrewardsystems,HRprofessionalshaveacriticalroletoplayin
rewardriskmanagementandgovernance,andmustabandonthestatusquowhereHR’srolehas
oftenbeenseenasperipheralingovernanceissues.Tobeabletomakeeffectivecontributionin
thisarea,HRmustworkclosely,andgaincredibilitywithotherkeystakeholders,particularly
theboardofdirectors,seniorexecutivesandriskmanagementprofessionals.
HRmustbuildacollaborativerelationshipwiththeboardofdirectors,particularlythe
remunerationcommittee,ensuringinparticularthatthereisinexistencea“formaland
transparentprocedurefordevelopingpolicyonexecutiveremuneration”(Ajogwu,2009:12).
HRprofessionalsmustalsoensurethataneffectiverewardriskmanagementframeworkisin
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placetomanageall“highrisk”employeegroupsandindeedtheentireorganisation.Giventhat
remunerationcommitteemembersoftenhavealimitedtechnicalknowledgeofrewardissues,it
maybenecessarytofirstreviewtheirlevelofknowledge,andthenimplementappropriate
supportandtraining(CIPD,2009).
Fromourreviewsofarinthispaper,alotcanandmustbedonetoalignrisk
managementandrewardsystems,andimprovethequalityofHRgovernanceinorganisations.
Thefollowingstepscansignificantlyhelptorealisetheseobjectives(CIPD,2009):Firstand
foremost,HRprofessionalsneedtoestablisheffectiverewardsriskintelligencegathering
systems.Thisshouldbefollowedbyasystematicreviewoftheorganisation’srewardsstrategy
andsystemsforrisk.Here,agoodunderstandingofthebusinessanditsdriversiscritical,as
wellasareviewoftheriskmanagementcompetencesofbusinessleadersandmanagers,
followedbyappropriatetraining.
Togaincredibilityfrommanagers,HRprofessionalsshoulduseestablishedrisk
managementtoolstoassessandmanagerewardsrisks.Collaborationwithriskprofessionalsis
certainlybeneficial,astheyhavevastknowledgeandexperienceinunderstanding,assessing
andmitigatingorganisationalrisks.Further,compliancetoestablishedrewardsriskappetite
shouldbefrequentlymonitored.Finally,adeliberatestrategymustbeputinplaceto
institutionaliseastrongriskmanagementcultureandensurethateffectiveriskmanagementis
embeddedintheperformancemanagementandincentivesystems.

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Conclusion:RiskandRewardSystemsAlignmentMustBeaStrategicPriority
Thosewhofailtograspthateveryrewardcomeswithariskattached‐andmisunderstandthatrisk‐
areintrouble.
NorthedgeandBradley(2009:9)
Asmentionedattheoutset,thebestapproachtorewardrisksmanagementistakingHR
governanceseriously.Evenifallthefiveriskshighlightedinthispapercannotbecompletely
mitigated,atleastthemagnitudeoftheirimpactcanbecurtailed.Anintegrated,organisation
wideapproachismosteffective,withtheboardofdirectors/remunerationcommittee,senior
management,riskprofessionals,andHRcollaboratingextensively.Undoubtedly,substantial
investmentsintimeandeffortarerequiredtogetrewardriskmanagementandcorporate
governanceright.Really,thisistheonlypathavailabletoforwardlookingHRprofessionals
andorganisationsseekingtobuildsustainablebusinesses.
Insum,the21stcenturyHRprofessionalinadditiontobeingachangeagent,business
partner,administrativeexpertandemployeechampion,mustalsobeaneffectiveriskmanager,
helpinghisorherorganisationtoestablishandimplementrewardpoliciesandpracticesthat
areconsistentwithsoundriskmanagement.Further,asboardsofdirectorsandbusinessleaders
becomemoresensitivetoHRgovernanceandriskmanagement,theyaregoingtobelookingup
toHR‐you‐forsoundcounselandprofessionalguidance.Willthatitselfbeanotherhighrisk
issuetheyhavetoworryabout?
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Human Resource Management Journal Vol. 1 No: 2, 2009 ISSN0795-7424
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
IfedapoAdeleyeisLecturerinHumanResourcesandOrganisationatLagosBusinessSchool.Amajor
strandofhiscurrentresearchandconsultingactivitiesfocusesonhoworganisationscangaina
competitiveadvantagethroughtheirrewardpractices.Heistheauthorof:Obama’sNobelPeacePrize:A
“Reward”GoneAwry?,DesigningStrategicCompensationSystemsinNigeria,andRiskManagementand
RewardSystems.DrAdeleyehasledsessionsonRewardManagementontheMBAprogrammesatLBS
andheistheFacultyDirectoroftheStrategicCompensationManagementprogramme.Daporeceivedhis
PhDinHRMfromManchesterBusinessSchoolandheisamemberofWorldatWork,theTotalRewards
association.Hecanbereachedoniadeleye@lbs.edu.ngor08058058091.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
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  • ... To be able to make effective contribution here, HR professionals must work closely and gain credibility with other key stakeholders, particularly the board of directors and senior executives. Thus, HR must build a collaborative relationship with the board of directors, particularly the remuneration committees, ensuring in particular that there is in existence a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration (see Adeleye, 2009;Ajogwu, 2009 andCIPD, 2009). It has been observed that: ...
    ... It is a Latin phrase which means all things being equal.3 In this research, content analysis is seen as "a research technique for the objectives, systematic and qualitative description of the manifest content of communication"(Selltize, 1977). ...
  • ... The top management team worked with the Human Capital Management and Development (HCMD) department to address employee motivation, remapping the bank's compensation strategy. Realigning compensation practices to suit business strategy is indeed a critical issue, and failure to ensure a proper alignment can have an adverse impact on strategy execution (Adeleye, 2009). FirstBank's dynamic HCMD department realized this. ...
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    This publication contains reprint articles for which IEEE does not hold copyright. Full text is not available on IEEE Xplore for these articles.