The Commercialization of Uganda’s 2011 Election in the Urban Informal Economy: Money, Boda-Bodas and Market Vendors

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The Commercialization of Uganda’s 2011 Election in the Urban Informal Economy:
Money, Boda-Bodas and Market Vendors
To be cited as: “Titeca, Kristof (2014) ‘The Commercialization of Uganda’s 2011
Election in the Urban Informal Economy: Money, Boda-Bodas and Market Vendors’,
in: Perrot, S.; Makara, S.; Lafargue, J.; Fouéré, M.A. (eds.) Elections in a hybrid regime.
Revisiting the 2011 polls. Kampala: Fountain publishers, pp.178-207.”
Kristof Titeca
In early March 2011 I was sitting in the office of the chairman of Owino Market, a man who
also holds the position of the presidential advisor on market issues. I had been given an
appointment at 2 p.m., but I was clearly not the only one waiting: the room, which offers
space for about 15 people, is crammed with about 25 people. All of them are market vendors
wearing their Sunday best, carrying the requested forms to register a Savings and Cooperative
Credit Organisation (SACCO). While everyone is waiting, chaos suddenly breaks out outside
the office: a group of 10 people, vendors from a nearby market, are shouting while holding
posters of President Museveni. Although the chairman has not arrived yet, the protesters’
message is clear: they are demanding money, which had been promised to them by the
president during the electoral campaign. People start arguing and a fight almost breaks out
before the police intervenes and evicts the protestors. Some 10 minutes later, the chairman
finally arrives: he had intervened in a conflict in another market—Wandegeya—that also
concerned promised SACCO money. In the meanwhile, the number of people waiting in the
chairman’s office has grown further. Apart from the 25 people already crammed inside,
another 20 are standing outside. The chairman decides to respond my questions while he deals
with the vendors’ requests. Naturally, the task is not easy. While I attempt to interview him,

people desperately try to get his signature on their forms, after which they receive a cheque
that will help them start up their SACCO (the amount varies from USh 9 to 91 million).
The above scene exemplifies a number of issues that will be discussed in this chapter. Most
importantly, it shows how groups within the informal urban economy have become important
actors during electoral campaigns—the introductory example proves it in the case of market
vendors, but the same is true of boda-boda (motorcycle taxi) drivers, who make up a
significant political force in this context. In expanding its “reach” towards the urban poor, the
government has used a variety of mechanisms. Among them are public policy programmes
such as SACCOs, a governmental micro-finance initiative established by the Museveni
government that provides interest-free loans to the population. This public programme was
strongly reinforced by the government during the runup to the 2011 elections, and was used
specifically to target market vendors and boda-boda drivers. These two groups compose a
very visible and not insignificant segment of the population in Kampala. For instance, it is
estimated that there are roughly 40,000 boda-boda drivers in the capital city of Uganda, and
since the year 2000, when their number increased drastically, they have been providing a
cheap and handy means of transport for the general population.
1
In view of their numbers,
these two groups are considered to be political capital that can play a crucial role in electoral
competitions–and they are aware of it. As a boda-boda group chairperson argues:
“For the politicians, we are important! We are political capital! If you need someone
to chant, if you need advertisers, you just call us. We can market persons, we can
1
Interview data boda-boda division and overall chairpersons, 2010-2011.

teach about these persons! … And we are too many! We can mobilise a big
number!”
2
In other words, boda-boda drivers and markets vendors are at the heart of multiple social
networks that can be mobilised for political action.
3
Moreover, there seems to be consensus
among government officials, policy analysts and journalists that it constitutes a particularly
active voting group.
4
Whereas many other segments of the electorate, notably the educated,
appear to have lost interest in the voting process, and cannot be bothered with the time-
consuming voting process, informal urban groups doing petty jobs are politically committed
and active. The result is that politicians regard people involved in the informal economy as
“vote banks” that are said to be “potentially vulnerable to political manipulation.”
5
This paper describes the various strategies used by the government to approach informal
urban groups, focusing on market vendors and boda-boda drivers. It argues how, as elections
become more competitive, President Museveni and the National Resistance Movement
(NRM) regime need to reach an increasing number of people in order to remain in power,
2
Interview boda-boda division chairperson, 17 October 2010. During a boda-boda stage chairperson interview
on 17 October 2010 another boda-boda driver summarised the same idea, saying “Politicians, they use us! We
are a very big vote! I have many customers, I have a wife, I pay for my brother’s school fees; all these people
listen to me!”.
3
On the political capital of urban informal groups, see also Kristof Titeca, “Les Opec Boys En Ouganda,
Trafiquants de Pétrole et Acteurs Politiques-Cairn.info,” Politique Africaine 3, no. 103 (2006): 143–159,
doi:10.3917/polaf.103.0143.
4
Interviews 2011–2012.
5
Ilda Lindell and Jenny Appelblad, “Disabling Governance: Privatisation of City Markets and Implications for
Vendors’ Associations in Kampala, Uganda,” Habitat International 33, no. 4 (2009): 397–404.

forcing the regime into adopting an array of specific strategies. In doing so, the regime relies
on a variety of resources at its disposal, mainly public programmes, the direct disbursement of
financial resources, and policy interventions. This paper revisits and discusses the central
question of the “monetisation” and “commercialisation” of Uganda’s 2011 elections, in which
financial resources were used to attract voters. The paper first engages with the theoretical
literature on the impact of multiparty elections on the “winning coalition”. This is followed, in
a second part of the paper, by a discussion of the ways in which boda-boda drivers and
vendors were targeted. After presenting an in-depth a case study relating to the SACCOs
public programme targeting the urban poor, the paper addresses two other strategies employed
by the state, that is, policy interventions and the injection of financial resources.
6
Multiparty Elections, Public Programmes and the “Winning Coalition”
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, multiparty elections have taken place in 44 out of 48
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
7
The impact of democratic reforms on patronage and
clientelism has been much debated in recent years.
8
While an optimistic group of scholars
believe that democratisation has reduced the demand for patronage on the ground, arguing
6
Fieldwork for this paper was conducted in October-November 2010 and in January-March 2011. Throughout
this period, interviews were conducted with a wide variety of actors such as government officials (both at local
and national levels), actors from different political parties, actors within the informal urban economy (boda-boda
drivers and market vendors), journalists, researchers, and so on.
7
Staffan I Lindberg and Minion KC Morrison, “Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey
Evidence from Ghana,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 1 (2008): 95–122, doi:10.1002/j.1538-
165X.2008.tb00618.x; Staffan I. Lindberg, “‘It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’’: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-
Patrimonialism Rather Than Counter-Act It?,” Democratization 10, no. 2 (2003): 121–140,
doi:10.1080/714000118.
8
Green, “Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda.”

that the electorate evaluate candidates on their policy performance rather than on clientelism
and patronage logics, a large part of the literature on African politics has remained pessimistic
about the impact of democratic reforms that, they argue, are circumvented by continuous
neopatrimonialist practices and forms of governance.
9
Regimes with competitive elections operate in a different environment, with different threats,
than genuine autocratic regimes. Whereas the latter are principally threatened by removal by
force, in hybrid regimes, rulers could lose office through force, but also risk being voted out
of office.
10
Bueno de Mesquita et al.
11
elaborate this argument by explaining how, in today’s
democracies, political leaders depend upon a “selectorate”, that is to say, “those in society
who hold the power to remove the incumbent and select her (sic) replacement”,
12
and within
this selectorate, leaders stay in power by the support of a winning coalition. Selectorate and
winning coalition are determined by political system: in autocratic systems, the winning
coalition is rather small, and the selectorate comprise those who have the power to make or
break leaders - military leaders can for example play an important role in the selectorate. In
democratic systems, the selectorate is the electorate, and the winning coalition is much
9
Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,”
World Politics 46, no. 4 (1993): 453–489; Bratton and Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime
Transitions in Democratic Perspective; Leonard Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from
a Field Experiment in Benin | Institution for Social and Policy Studies,” World Politics 55 (2003): 399–422.
10
David Stasavage, “Democracy and Education Spending in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 49,
no. 2 (2005): 345, doi:DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00127.x.
11
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” British
Journal of Political Science 32, no. 04 (September 17, 2002): 559–590, doi:10.1017/S0007123402000236.
12
Ibid., 561.

larger—depending on the specific electoral rules.
13
The size of the selectorate, in turn,
influences the provision of public goods: with a small winning coalition, a particular regime
can survive by supplying private support to these interest groups—something that can be
referred to as a patron-client relationships. This also has an effect on public policy. Van de
Walle, for example, states that governments “cannot undertake reforms that would undermine
the balance of societal forces that maintained them in power”
14
. In the case of weakly
organised pressure groups in wider society, the “societal forces maintaining them in power”
consist of state elite groups, in particular.
The larger the winning coalition, the more emphasis is placed on public policy, as this
becomes a “more attractive way for a leader to produce value for the members of her
coalition.”
15
As the work of Baum and Lake shows, because of low barriers to exit and costs
of participation, the state will provide “a relatively larger quantity of goods at relatively lower
prices—contingent upon social demand for those services.”
16
In a situation of high barriers to
exit and costs of participation, the state will “provide fewer public services and earn greater
rents.”
17
Democratic states therefore tend to provide more public services.
18
Research has
13
Ibid.
14
Nicolas Van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24.
15
Bueno De Mesquita et al., “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” 562.
16
Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake, “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital,”
American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 336.
17
Ibid.
18
D. A. Lake and M. A. Baum, “The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public
Services,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 6 (August 1, 2001): 587–621,
doi:10.1177/0010414001034006001. They specifically demonstrate this for health and education.

demonstrated how this effect also applies when the neopatrimonial nature of politics
persists.
19
A range of factors can nuance these optimistic accounts. Policies, however, always consist of
a mix of private and public goods.
20
For example, the implementation of certain policies may
lead to certain kickbacks for providers. Bates shows how African governments use
agricultural policy to reward their supporters.
21
Moreover, public services and policies can
also be used in a selective way, both in time and space: in space, public services might be
given primarily to particular areas or groups; whereas in time, policies might be concentrated
around the time prior to the elections. In both cases, policies should have “immediate, visible
results, and … they are implemented through the public sector rather than the private
sector.”
22
In sum, and as explained above, neo-patrimonial tendencies can persist after the introduction
of multiparty elections; something which is also reflected in policy outcomes. Others argue
that personalised clientelism is expected to be more common in situations of intense political
competition. A candidate is less inclined to spend his resources when he is certain of his
victory; but increased competition changes this trend: “When a small number of swing voters
19
Stasavage, “Democracy and Education Spending in Africa.”
20
Bueno De Mesquita et al., “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders.”
21
Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Politics Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986). Cited by Ibid.
22
Ole Therkildsen and Anne Mette Kjaer, “Do Ethnicity and Elections Affect Policy Outcomes in Tanzania and
Uganda?” (paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, 10-12 September 2009), cited in James
Joughin and Anne Mette Kjær, “The Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform: The Case of Uganda,” Forum for
Development Studies 37, no. 1 (2010): 63, doi:10.1080/08039410903558277.

can shift the plurality one way or the other, the value of each potential swing voter increases,
thus creating incentives for candidates to use all available means in their campaigns.”
23
In
other words, the stakes of electoral competition become higher with more candidates, in
which case clients have higher bargaining power for “electoral blackmail”—that might
eventually transform the political contest into an “economic competition.”
24
In this context,
the need for tangible and immediate results to induce political loyalty becomes more urgent.
25
The above debate is particularly interesting in the case of the 2011 elections in Uganda.
Before these elections, the margin of victory for President Museveni had been reducing
gradually and consistently: in the 1996 elections, he had achieved 76% of the votes; in 2001,
69% and in 2006, the year multiparty elections had been introduced, 59% of the votes. In
other words, there was a real chance for contender Besigye to win the 2011 elections. This
trend illuminates two important presumptions: first, the introduction of multiparty politics
swelled the “selectorate” thus requiring a bigger winning coalition for presidential
candidates— a tendency that was increased by the narrowing margin of victory of the
president. This chapter focuses on a particular group within this selectorate: actors within the
informal urban economy, explaining how these actors became politically important in this
context. Second, in targeting these groups, a variety of measures are used by the ruling
government, among which particular policy programmes. The next section discusses one of
these programmes: a microfinance programme called SACCO (Savings and Credit
Cooperative Organisation), which was used to target the urban poor in particular.
23
Lindberg and Morrison, “Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana,”
120.
24
Lindberg, “‘It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’’.”
25
Joughin and Kjær, “The Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform,” 61.

The “Politicisation” of Public Programmes: SACCOs and the 2011 Elections
SACCOs are not the first governmental microfinance initiative implemented by the Museveni
government. The first initiative of this kind was the Entandikwa Credit Scheme (ECS) that
aimed to improve the economic status of poor people—Entadikwa means “start-up capital.” It
was run by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, and was originally
proposed to parliament in 1993 as a way to cover the needs of people in war-ravaged areas in
northern Uganda. Probably due to political pressure, this initiative was extended to the whole
country, with an equal amount of loan capital being made available per constituency–
confirming the political nature of the policy. The programme started in 1995 and, by June
1996, USD 7,42 million had been disbursed.
26
However, as a UNDP study argues, “the
programme appears to have been from the beginning heavily politicized and it is not
surprising, especially given the coincidence of the programme start with the national elections
that many people saw these loans as grants.”
27
This perception had an impact on recovery
rates, and the programme collapsed when many borrowers failed to pay back their loans.
28
Because of poor repayment, the government made a decision to withdraw from direct credit
26
Tom Dichter and Ephraim Kamuntu, UNDP Microfinance Assessment Report for Uganda, Prepared as a
component of the MicroStart Feasibility Mission, March 1997, 23,
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.28492/2501_02501.pdf.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid. See also Francis N Okurut, Margaret Banga, and Mukungu Ashie, Microfinance and Poverty Reduction
in Uganda: Achievements and Challenges, Research Series No. 41 (Kampala: Economic Policy Research Centre,
april),
http://www.academia.edu/3362866/Microfinance_and_poverty_reduction_in_Uganda_Achievements_and_chall
enges.

delivery,
29
a decision that was confirmed in the PRSP Poverty Status Report 2001.
30
In
addition to the ECS, other state credit programmes (such as the Youth Entrepreneurship
Scheme, Poverty Alleviation Project, Rural Farmers Scheme and Cooperative Credit Scheme)
also collapsed due to inadequate loan repayment.
SACCOs were introduced under the 2004/5-2007/8 Poverty Eradication Action Plan of the
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. This Ministry lends money to the
SACCOs at low interest rates, and the SACCO then divides the funds among its members.
After the 2006 elections SACCOs became the second pillar of the government’s Prosperity
for All (Bonna Bagagawale) programme and was run by Salim Saleh, the Minister of State
for Microfinance. As the name indicates, this programme promised that everyone would
prosper, and focused on production and wealth creation. It was run by the President’s
Office.
31
Under this banner, the SACCO programme is implemented by the Uganda
Cooperative Savings and Credit Union (UCUSCU).
32
SACCOs are presumed to instil a culture of saving among Ugandans, and in doing so,
empower them. In order to register as a SACCO, a number of formal requirements have to be
met. There have to be at least 30 members; among the documents required are a statement of
affairs (in order to assess the credit worthiness of the association); a list of members (in order
to see the credit worthiness of each member); and a recommendation letter from each division
commercial officer; further, a board has to be established with between 9 to 15 members; and
29
Ibid.
30
Government of Uganda, Uganda Povery Status Report 2001 (Kampala: Ministry of Finance, Planning and
Economic Development, March 2001).
31
Joughin and Kjaer, 70.
32
Ephraim Kasozi, “Government to Support SACCOs,” The Monitor, December 11, 2008.

a supervisory committee has to be created in order to perform audits.
33
Members pay an
entrance fee and buy a share, which entitles them to membership, rights and benefits. In other
words, strict guidelines have to be followed, which are required to guarantee a level of
sustainability in the association.
The SACCOs became particularly active during the electoral campaign for the 2011 elections.
After poor visibility and not much popularity for a number of years,
34
a large campaign was
launched to reactivate and extend the SACCO initiative in different categories to rural areas,
market places, etc. For instance, in 2010 the government launched the Rural Income and
Employment Enhancement Project (RIEEP), which was supposed to widen SACCO outreach
and increase access to the initiative across the country,
35
and the Rural Financial Services
Programme (RFSP), which had to both increase information about and access to financial
services.
36
Particular attention was paid to involve market vendors and boda-boda drivers.
During the financial year 2010-2011, a specific budget was reserved for SACCOs in markets
(headed by the presidential advisor on markets). The strategy of targeting these two categories
of poor workers in the informal sector became highly visible in Kampala, where activities
took place among market vendors and boda-boda drivers−they generally believed they were
going to receive large sums of money.
33
“Welcome To UCSCU| Uganda Cooperatives Savings and Credit Union Limited,” accessed September 23,
2013, http://www.ucscu.co.ug/index.php?ucscu&as=35.
34
Cf. for example, Paul Watala, “Most SACCOs in Eastern Region Dormant,” New Vision, 30 November 2010.
35
Faridah Kulabako, “Fighting Poverty Through Group Saccos,” Daily Monitor, 28 October 2010; “More Cash
for SACCOs Coming,” New Vision, 15 November 2010.
36
Emmanuel Mulundo and Faridah Kulabako, “Government Launches Rural Communication Strategy,” Daily
Monitor, 20 September 2010.

The SACCO initiative for market vendors was supposed to provide market SACCOs with
financial incentives; every vendor was supposed to receive an interest-free loan. According to
the presidential advisor in charge of this initiative SACCOs were due to provide USh 30,000
to city vendors, and USh 20,000 to rural vendors.
37
However, the whole idea was marked by
confusion and contradictory information among everyone involved (government officials,
NRM, vendors, and so on). Others, including government officials, thought more money
would arrive.
38
In other words, although no one really knew how much money was to be
provided, expectations were on the high side. All markets were very active in organising
themselves to receive the expected money. In this situation, SACCOs mushroomed across all
Kampala markets. A similar situation characterised the boda-boda drivers: particularly from
November 2010, most “stages” organised themselves into SACCO groups. From late 2010,
there were clear expectations that large sums of money were going to be distributed to these
groups, which led to an increase in the number of registered boda-boda associations.
39
Although this dynamic occurs in every election—organisations coming into existence in order
to access political funding—this was particularly blatant during the 2011 elections. All groups
concerned had a strong conviction that starting a SACCO was an easy way to get quick
money. In the words of a member of a newly formed boda-boda SACCO: “when you form a
SACCO, you have money the next week.”
40
The words of the vice chairperson of one of
Kampala’s major markets describes a similar situation:
37
Interview with presidential advisor on markets, Kampala, 10 March 2011.
38
As one of the NRM MP’s argued: “the president gave us money to give to every market vendor a minimum of
USh 50,000” (2 February 2011). This figure differs from information provided by, for example, the presidential
advisor.
39
One public affairs officer of a local association summarized this as “You should join, the association is going
to be given lots of money in two weeks time!” (Interview with officer SACCO, Kampala, 24 January 2011).
40
Interview with boda-boda SACCO chairperson, 28 January 2011.

We are running SACCOs. And about 3 months ago, the NRM promised us with
(sic) 50 million to boost the SACCOs (this was November 2010). Of course, many
people organised themselves into SACCOs after this! By now, the NRM has given
us 50% of this amount. We are confident that the rest of the money will arrive. This
money is presumed to support every vendor for interest-free loan.
41
A similar situation was encountered at other Kampala markets and among various boda-boda
groups, all of whom had expectations of receiving money.
An important aspect of the SACCO programme is that it is often perceived to be an NRM
rather than a government programme. Government programmes, including SACCOs, are seen
as “gifts” from the NRM rather than as government programmes. In interviews conducted in
the markets, traders kept referring to the SACCO programme as money promised to them by
the NRM. This is mainly the result of a problem of perception, but also of communication.
SACCOs were sometimes communicated as an NRM-initiative, or there was strong ambiguity
about the source of the money. The financing of SACCOs was announced at NRM
meetings,
42
by NRM flag-bearers
43
or through presidential pledges.
44
President Museveni
41
Interview with market vice-chairperson, Kampala, 22 January 2011.
42
For example, the gift of SACCO money to every sub-county in the Buganda region was announced at an
NRM meeting; see Mercy Nalugo, “Government Gives Buganda Sub-counties Shs20 Million Each for SACCO,”
Daily Monitor, 18 January 2011.
43
Minister for Micro Finance and the NRM flag-bearer for Kiboga East, Ruth Nankabirwa, donated USh 80 and
20 million to different SACCOs in her constituency. Report on Money in Politics. Pervasive Vote Buying in
Uganda Elections (Democracy Monitoring Group, January 2011), 21,
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/documents/UGANDAmoney-in-politics.pdf.
44
Joseph Mugisha, “Shs150 m Pledge Divides Traders,” Daily Monitor, November 9, 2011; Stephen Wandera,
“Farmers’ SACCO Boosted with Shs200 Million,” Daily Monitor, February 23, 2011.

toured the country to publicise SACCOs,
45
thereby creating the perception that this
programme was more than the implementation of public policy, but formed part of a
particular party’s political project.
This politicisation had a number of effects. First, the SACCO public policy was not merely
perceived and sometimes communicated as the programme of a political party, but it was also
executed as a political rather than a technical programme. For example, some of the objective
criteria adopted by government were not taken into account in the creation of SACCO groups
and the distribution of money. In the words of a commercial officer of a Kampala division:
“People were given the money without proper criteria. You just collect some people and give
them this money.”
46
A senior Kampala City Council (KCC) officer summarised the practice
as follows: “Implementation is a major issue. They are just dishing out money. People do not
need a business plan, no income per day. They are not aware that they need to pay this back,
etc. None of this is taken into consideration. They are not sensitised well enough!”
47
Naturally, this approach also had a profound effect on the sustainability of the initiative. This
erroneous understanding of this microfinance initiative undermined the reciprocity principle
that presides upon state action. A division officer summarises this as follows:
45
For example, he explained to formerly internally displaced persons in the north that, “We encourage each sub-
county to have a SACCO from where you can save, borrow and pay back money. Once these SACCOs are
performing well in every sub-county, the government will put in more money.… We have a lot of money which
we can put in these SACCOs, but we want to be sure that people know what to do.” Chris Ocowun, “President
Museveni Markets SACCOs,” New Vision, 18 April 2010. See also Joseph Miti, “Government Asks Pastoralists
to Join SACCOs,” Daily Monitor, 22 December 2010.
46
Interview with commercial officer KCC, Kampala, 3 March 2011.
47
Interview with senior KCC officer, Kampala, 9 March 2011.

Political fever takes prominence. Politicians just say: the money is here. People get
the money and they are not ready for it. They see it as a political present rather than
as a tool for empowerment. So the implementation of this really rises up during
elections. But they collapse after the elections! People are not ready for it! … Time
will come when they have to pay back, but they are simply aware of this, they will
say it is presidential pledge.
48
This situation does not facilitate the implementation of the programme; because of the
politicisation of the programme, the money is often distributed in a non-transparent and
political manner.
49
As illustrated by the scene depicted the introduction, this can lead to
erroneous expectations and distrust, conflict and misappropriation of money by recipients.
50
These political incentives also alter the sustainability of these associations. Previous elections
have shown how many of these associations cease to exist after the elections, as their sole
interest is getting “quick cash.”
51
The nature of the donation itself was believed to be political
by the recipients. During interviews it was repeatedly stated that this “gift” would only
materialise if people openly supported the president. As one SACCO chairperson argued:
“Mzee [i.e. Museveni] said that if we organise ourselves in associations, we will be able to be
financed. This means that if we support him, there’s a sure deal of getting money.”
52
In other
words, the better you support the president or ruling party, the higher your chances of
receiving money through this programme.
48
Ibid.
49
Joseph Mugisha, “Shs 150 m Pledge Divides Traders.“
50
Ibid.
51
Chairman of the Union of Informal Workers and Presidential adviser on market issues, 4 February 2011.
52
Interview with SACCO chairperson, Kampala, 25 January 2011.

Lastly, at a macro-level, the result of this strong politicisation of public programmes, and the
significant role of the president in it is that money is given on a selective basis. Money and
programmes were, for example, given to groups and regions that play, or could play, a crucial
political role on the ground, that constitute political capital and/or because they are swing
voters whose votes need to be conquered. Boda-boda drivers and the Buganda region are
important examples in this regard: in early January 2011 it was announced at an NRM
meeting that all sub-counties in Buganda would be receiving USh 20 million each through
SACCOs in the following weeks.
53
In other words, just before the elections, the Buganda
region received a serious financial boost.
These problems are not only typical of SACCOs; they also affected other policy programmes
and government spending in general. Government spending intensified in all areas during and
before the election campaign, a phenomenon that Conroy-Krutz and Logan characterise as a
“spending spree” with an “aggressive implementation” of different government
programmes.
54
This trend was reflected in the budget of the financial year 2010/11, which
was widely considered as a “populist election budget”
55
as it had an increase in expenditure of
up to 16%.
56
Yet, even with this large budget, the money was not sufficient: halfway the
financial year, USh 6.4 trillion (USD 2.75 billion) of the 7.3 trillion (USD 3.14 billion), had
been appropriated of which 3 trillion (USD 1.29 billion) had been spent. In January, an
53
Nalugo, “Government Gives Buganda Sub-counties Shs20 Million Each for SACCO.”
54
Conroy-Krutz and Logan, “Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan Election: Did the Money Matter?,” 7.
55
Sauda Mayanya and Halima Abdallah, “Election Funding: Uganda Is Broke, Says Bbumba as Tough Times
Loom.”
56
“The Museveni Machine Grinds Into Gear,” Africa Confidential, 9 July 2010, Vol. 51 No. 14 edition,
http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/3585/The_Museveni_machine_grinds_into_gear.

additional budget of USh 602 billion (USD 260 million) was approved, which led to a total
figure of USh 8 trillion (USD 3.4 billion). In January alone, USh 3.2 trillion (USD 1.3 billion)
was spent. As a result of this spenditure, the minister of Finance, Syda Bbumba,
acknowledged that the government was “broke”, while the chairman of the parliament’s
Public Accounts Committee, Nandala Mafabi, claimed that most of this money was used for
the NRM campaign.
57
While not everyone agrees with this latter statement—NRM officials deny that public money
was spent on the party’s campaign—there is consensus that the implementation of many of
these programmes reveals the “persistent fusion of the state and the ruling party.”
58
In
Ugandan society, the distinction between a government programme and a NRM “gift”—or
between a public and private good—appear to be blurred, if not inconsistent. As a
government official puts it, “I cannot differentiate between NRM and government. It is
impossible to differentiate between the two. The way in which government institutions such
as SACCOs, NAADS, pensioners, and so on were used made this very difficult.”
59
The
Commonwealth elections report referred to it as “taking maximum advantage of government
resources and patronage, vehicles and personnel.”
60
For example, the report of the EU
electoral observation mission argued how “it was also widely reported that that most NRM
candidates used government projects such as the National Agricultural Advisory Services
57
Nick Wachira and Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Will Uganda Elections Bring Tears or Joy to East Africa?,” The
East African, 21 February 2011.
58
EUOM, Final Report: General Elections 18 February 2011, 25.
59
Interview with government official, Kampala, 6 March 2011.
60
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Uganda Presidential and Parliamentary Elections–18
February 2011 (Commonwealth Secretariat, February 24, 2011), 19.

(NAADS) and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) as tools to press voters to
support the NRM should they wish to benefit from such projects.”
61
The government denied these allegations and its effect on the playing field of the elections. It
was admitted that there was a more intensive implementation of government programs, but
the government (and NRM) does not consider this to be an unfair electoral practice. As the
deputy secretary to the Treasury argued:
How do you distinguish between a government programme and the incumbent
president? I don’t know. It is true that the government became very aggressive in
the implementation of programmes in the last two years … You may argue that we
had a higher budget than normal. But what should I say? You can’t implement
government programmes?”
62
61
EUOM, Final Report: General Elections 18 February 2011, 24.. An article in the East African newspaper
referred to the recent implementation of NAADS as “an exercise in electoral bribery” (David Kaiza, “Steep Price
of Democracy: How Its Politics Is Ruining Uganda’s Economy,” The East African, 7 March 2011.). Shortly after
the supplementary budget was approved, each MP received USh 20 million (USD 8,700) to supervise the
NAADS programme in his/her constituency, something that was widely criticised by civil society and
opposition, as this money was believed to be given in return for support of a controversial bill on cultural leaders
(Nick Wachira and Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Will Uganda Elections Bring Tears or Joy to East Africa?). This
criticism led to a civil society campaign to persuade MPs to reimburse the money, and the arrest of a number of
political activists of the NGO Forum (EUOM, Final Report: General Elections 18 February 2011, 23).
62
Interview with the deputy secretary of the treasury, Keith Muhakanizi, 7 March 2011.

Mobilisation of Groups Within the Informal Urban Economy
The informal economy plays an important role in Uganda.
63
An ILO study found that 83.7%
of urban employment in the 1990s was in the informal sector, significantly higher than
neighbouring Tanzania (67%) and Kenya (58.1%).
64
Moreover, an estimated 43.1% of
Uganda’s gross national product is estimated to originate from the informal economy.
65
According to the Ugandan national household survey of 2009-2010, about 1.2 million
Ugandan households—21% of all the households in Uganda–are engaged in informal
business.
66
In other words, the informal economy is crucial in Uganda, particularly in urban
settings. SACCOs were not the only way through which the NRM reached out to groups
within the informal economy; other mechanisms were also used to support and intervene in
these groups. In order to illustrate these dynamics and the issues at stake, I will first introduce
a case study of the Niginna groups.
Case Study: the Niginna Groups
Niginna groups are groups of women that were started around 2004 all over Kampala. They
were not connected to any political group and were composed of unemployed, poor urban
63
Tom Goodfellow and Kristof Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in
Kampala’s Informal Economy,” Cities 29, no. 4 (August 2012): 264–270.
64
Robert Palmer, The Informal Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unresolved Issues of Concept, Character and
Measurement (Edinburgh: Centre for African Studies, Edinburgh University, 2004).
65
This figure is for 1999–2000. Friedrich Schneider, “Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110
Countries Around the World” (presented at the Workshop of Australian National Tax Centre, ANU, Canberra.
Australia, 2002), 6.
66
Goodfellow and Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s
Informal Economy.”

women from all over the city. They were mostly active in microfinance, meeting on a monthly
basis to coordinate the broad range of activities they were involved in, and organising parties.
As they had managed to bring together a large number of women, they attracted the attention
of politicians. From 2005-6 onwards, NRM politicians started attending the women’s
meetings. NRM politicians supported these groups financially, and during the 2006 elections,
the Niginna supported the NRM. After the 2006 elections, Niginna started to slow down, and
in 2007–8, they no longer really existed. In 2009, they became vibrant again. As the political
season started again, politicians approached the groups again, and again, NRM politicians
were the ones attending the monthly meetings and providing money. Most Niginna groups
were given money—interviewees reveal receiving between USh 1 and 4 million in total.
In addition to providing financial support, politicians also intervened in other ways to protect
Niginna groups. For instance, one of them, called Kinamwando [widows], a cooking group
working from a Kampala bus park (Arua Park) conducted its cooking activities in a place that
was not gazetted for food production and created a nuisance, such as littering. leading to KCC
officials trying to displace the women. However, the resident district commissioner (RDC)—
the representative of the president in the area—intervened to stop this eviction, arguing that
these women comprised a poor section of society that needed to be protected (as they are
involved in these activities for their survival, to support their children, and so on). Through
his intervention, they were allowed to continue working in this location.
This detailed example introduces a number of important themes that help us understand the
interaction between political actors and groups within the informal urban economy. The case
study of the Niginna shows how these groups—and collective action within the informal
urban economy in general—are particularly popular around election time, as they are seen as

important political capital for politicians, on the one hand, and as potentially important
sources of economic capital for societal actors on the other. Being a major campaigning
platform for politicians, these groups (and their members) are themselves cunning political
actors able to display their agency during election time if it will help them gain funding. In
other words, election time enables them to financially instrumentalise their political capital—
a point already demonstrated by the case of SACCOs.
The next section of this paper focuses on the boda-boda drivers, a similar, active and visible
group within the informal urban economy whose political capital is courted by politicians.
Exploring the role and action of boda-boda drivers, as well as some other groups mentioned
here, gives insight into the intense political activity around election times.
Political Nature of Groups in the Informal Economy
First of all, groups within the informal economy can be useful tools for political campaigning.
When they agree to play this role, associations become political in nature, hence politically
divided and divisive. This is the case with boda-boda associations: one particular boda-boda
association claims to represent all Kampala’s boda-boda drivers, though this claim is strongly
contested because of its political nature. This group started as a lobby group to extend
President Museveni’s presidential term limits, and then transformed itself in an “official”
boda-boda association representing about 1,200 members. The association was officially
inaugurated in August 2010 in the presence of high-level government representatives: the
RDC, the inspector general of police and KCC officials. The association’s leaders are all
active members of the NRM and open about their NRM signature.
67
Throughout the elections,
67
The business card of the association’s treasurer, for example, refers both to the latter position and to his
position as NRM youth vice chairperson.

the leadership was actively campaigning, and the association’s office was used as campaign
headquarters. This meant benefits for the association’s members: in kind, such as yellow
helmets for the membership of the association; and in cash, as money was received for the
microfinance institution of the association. Other associations that contest the
representativeness and supremacy of this association represent and actively campaign for
opposition political interests.
Similar dynamics can be seen among the market associations: in one of Kampala’s biggest
markets,
68
the market leadership actively campaigned for the president and the NRM. This
market’s own radio station—funded by a foreign donor since 2005 for the purposes of
HIV/AIDS sensitisation—was largely used for NRM propaganda.
69
In the market secretary’s
own words during the 2011 election campaign, “we mainly use the radio to disseminate
information on the NRM, and to draw support to the NRM.”
70
In other words, “civil
society”—and in particular these actors from the informal urban economy–are not neutral
players, but can be significant political capital. Politicians actively seek the involvement of
these institutions by approaching them and, when necessary, even intervening in them
directly. This will be illustrated by the case study of an intervention in a particular group of
boda-boda drivers in central Kampala.
Case Study: Boda-Boda Drivers in Central Kampala Division
68
In order to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents, no names of associations or markets are used
throughout the article.
69
Goodfellow and Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s
Informal Economy,” 267.
70
Interview, Kampala market secretary, 18 January 2011.

In November 2010, the boda-boda group in a particular division of central Kampala received
clear government pressure (e.g. from the inspector general of police) to organise elections for
their organisation, and particularly for the position of chairperson. Elections had not been held
for about five years. Yet, members claimed they were satisfied with their chairperson, and did
not feel elections were necessary. Governmental actors—such as police representatives or the
RDC—were however exerting strong pressure, threatening to create difficulties for their
“stages” (i.e. parking places), which are de facto illegal, but normally are tolerated so that
they could function. Through pressuring the boda-boda group, the governmental actors were
clearly pushing for one particular candidate who was pro-NRM. The incumbent chairperson
was a strong opposition supporter, and the group had been campaigning for the opposition in
the early stages of the election campaign. The boda-boda drivers tried to resist this pressure,
and contacted several (other) governmental actors (such as the District internal security
organisation officer (DISO) the district police commander or politicians) in an attempt to
remedy this situation. This did not really help, and elections had to be held. The boda-boda
drivers felt they did not really have a choice, as maintaining their pro-opposition candidate—
and the general direction of the group—would create too many problems for their group in the
future. As expected, the pro-government candidate was elected.
It is hard to judge whether these kinds of practices can be generalised, but we encountered a
number of other boda-boda groups that also experienced direct intervention by the NRM,
supported by the state apparatus, in order to draw the groups to their side.
71
71
Also, there were consistent reports from boda-boda groups that security agents, dressed as bodas-boda drivers,
joining them during the elections to monitor their political behaviour.

Policy Intervention
A second issue identified in the case study of the Niginna groups is politicians’ direct
intervention to favour particular groups. The cases of the boda-boda drivers and market
vendors exemplify a similar phenomenon relating to direct political intervention.
As argued above, the boda-boda drivers are a very visible and populous presence in Kampala,
estimated to number about 40,000 individuals. Although they constitute a potentially
significant source of taxation, they do not pay taxes. In 2003, it was estimated that a tax on
boda-bodas could raise USh 700 million (USD 304,347) per year.
72
In the financial year
2002-2003, a motorcycle taxi license was introduced. The boda-boda drivers themselves
complained loudly about this tax, and in the financial year 2004-2005, in the runup to the
2006 elections, the issue was politicised. The drivers branded the tax as extortion and
harassment, a discourse that was quickly reappropriated by politicians, who branded the tax as
“exploitation of the poor.”
73
This was not limited to local-level politics, but involved high-
ranking political figures. Through their associations, and through presidential advisors (with
whom they are in regular contact), boda-boda drivers took their protest to the president.
74
On 2 June 2004, the principal private secretary to President Museveni sent a presidential
directive to KCC, directing KCC to stop collecting tax, because the taxation had been
72
Sabiti Makara, “Decentralisation and Urban Governance in Uganda” (PhD, University of the Witwatersrand,
2009), 313.
73
Government (NRM) politicians, in turn, portrayed the taxes as a deliberate move by the opposition to frustrate
boda-boda drivers.
74
Goodfellow and Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s
Informal Economy,” 267–268

instituted without consultation or sensitisation and it was illegal.
75
The tax had never reached
the estimated USh 700 million, but it nevertheless constituted a financial loss of USh 95
million (which was the amount of tax paid in 2003-2004).
76
The same logic applied to other interventions involving boda boda drivers. As soon as the city
council started implementing intervention, the officials were prevented from continuing by
accusations that the measures were exploitative, unreasonable and constituted harassment.
Drivers took these issues to State House and high-level intervention ensured that these
policies could not be implemented. In sum, to date boda-boda drivers have not paid taxes, and
the city council has failed to implement its policy measures.
Similar interventions were undertaken for market vendors. Kampala’s former mayor started
privatising the markets in 2006 in order to transform Kampala’s markets into “modern”
shopping complexes. This process involved many of Kampala’s markets being leased to
private companies.
77
This led to extreme discontent among market vendors, who had elected
the mayor on the promise that he would give them greater control over the markets; now the
vendors’ ability to continue operating in the markets was being threatened.
78
The vendors
appealed to the president for support; this led to an intervention by the central government,
which denounced the decision to lease the markets. Museveni had usurped the role of the
75
Alfred Wasike and Geoffrey Katamba, “State House Stops Tax on Boda-boda,” New Vision, 03 June 2004.
76
Goodfellow and Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s
Informal Economy,” 267–268.
77
Ilda Lindell and Jenny Appelblad, “Disabling Governance: Privatisation of City Markets and Implications for
Vendors’ Associations in Kampala, Uganda.”
78
Goodfellow and Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s
Informal Economy,” 267.

“saviour” of the market vendors.
79
In 2007 he overturned the sale of Nakasero Market by
KCC, an event that is summarised on the State House website as follows:
President Yoweri Museveni has given clearance to Nakasero Market Traders and
Vendors to go ahead with their plan of constructing a modern complex structure
of their market. The President gave the clearance this afternoon when he met a
delegation of traders under the umbrella of Nakasero Market Sitting Vendors and
Traders Limited, who called on him at State House, Nakasero.
80
This decision however contradicts legal requirements that give clear authority to KCC to
manage the market. As Article 1 of the Uganda Market Act states: “No person or authority
other than (a) the administration of a district; (b) a municipal council; (c) a town council, shall
establish or maintain a market.” In other words, the maintenance of the market by the traders
is contrary to Ugandan law. Similar interventions happened in other markets, such as
Kissekka Market. When this market was leased to a retired army colonel in 2007, violent riots
ensued in 2007-8, after which the president sent a directive that the market should to be
handed over to the vendors.
Financial and Material Support
Thirdly, in addition to “formal” financial support through the SACCOs, significant informal
financial and material support was also given to the informal urban poor. This applied
particularly to boda-boda drivers, for whom the election campaign was a lucrative period.
Boda-boda drivers received material gifts such as fuel, money, T-shirts, food, sodas and so
on to ensure that they drove in or were present at political manifestations. As one boda-boda
79
Ibid.
80
“President Meets Nakasero Market Traders,” 12 July 2007, http://www.statehouse.go.ug/.

driver explained: “for attending rallies, we always received many things: they gave us fuel, a
helmet, a t-shirt, and money at the end of the day: 10,000 or 20,000 after a rally .… Some
persons attended up to 20 rallies; so they’ve collected a lot of money!”
81
This was not only the
case in Kampala, but all over the country. A report of the Democracy Monitoring Group
shows that this happened in Kiruhura district too, where one particularly candidate used
money to hire boda-boda drivers; in Luwero, boda-boday stages received USh 3 million
each.
82
Other categories within the informal urban economy also benefited from distribution
of resources, such as the market vendors. It is noticeably not limited to the election period, as
State House undertook various other measures to draw the boda-bodas to its side. Press
reports claim that State House officials purchased 120 boda-bodas and distributed them to the
drivers through a microfinance institution.
83
In sum, clear efforts were made towards the political recruitment of groups in the informal
economy in Kampala. A variety of strategies were used by the government: direct financial
support, policy interventions to protect these groups, or direct efforts to politicise them.
Almost all these strategies are linked with the incumbent regime, which naturally made it
much more difficult for the opposition to adopt similar strategies. This does not mean that no
direct financial support was given by opposition politicians—Afrobarometer results show that
19% of the financial offers came from the FDC and 5% from the DP and UPC each—but this
is significantly less than what the ruling party could provide. According to the same
81
Interview, chairperson boda-boda stage central Kampala, 2 February 2011.
82
Report on Money in Politics. Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections, 11–13.
83
Sunday Monitor 13 June 2004 cited in Makara, “Decentralisation and Urban Governance in Uganda,” 314.

Afrobarometer, 64% of respondents stated that the offer came from the NRM.
84
This was
confirmed by field research, in which relatively little financial support of the opposition
parties was encountered. This does not mean that the opposition disagrees with these tactics
on moral grounds, but rather shows their more limited financial power.
Monetisation of Politics and Populist Tendencies of Ugandan Politics
These dynamics have a wider significance than merely the existence of interaction between
informal actors and politicians. First, they are indicative of the so-called monetisation of
politics; and second, of the populist tendencies characteristic of Ugandan politics. I will argue
that increased political competition does not necessarily lead to broader public services, but
brings about privatisation of services, finances and institutions in the hands of President
Museveni and the ruling party.
As demonstrated, material reward is a major component in attempts to bring informal urban
groups or microcredit associations to one particular side of the political spectrum. Yet, the use
financial and material resources was not only used to persuade these specific actors, but for
the 2011 elections in general. For example, financial and material support played an important
role in the 2011 elections, a trend which an international election observer mission describes
as the “disturbing” nature of the “commercialization of politics through the distribution of
vast amounts of money and gifts”
85
or the monetisation of the elections.
86
Afrobarometer polls
confirmed this tendency, showing that 56% of Ugandans stated that political parties or
84
Nicolas de Torrenté, “The Rationality of Ugandan Voters: How Opinion Surveys Can Help Explain the 2011
Elections” (presented at the African Studies Association Conference, Washington, 2011).
85
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Uganda Presidential and Parliamentary Elections–18
February 2011, 9.
86
EUOM, Final Report: General Elections 18 February 2011, 6.

candidates “often or always” buy votes during elections; while a large number of voters (15%
in December, rising to 17% in February) stated that they had been offered bribes in cash or in
kind.
87
In the same vein, a report of the UBOS of February 2011 shows how the production of
meat, beer, sodas and water for consumption went up through this election
88
Field research
found that these financial offers came mostly from the NRM. Other parties also provided
“gifts” but they seemed to be endowed with fewer resources. As the EU’s observer report
summarises: “The National Resistance Movement’s dominance and resources were much
greater than those of the opposition.”
89
It is estimated that the NRM spent USD 300 million on
its campaign;
90
a figure that is however strongly denied by the party.
91
According to a number
of NRM candidates, the party gave the following amounts of money: LCV council candidates
received USh 1.5 million; parliamentary candidates USh 25 million; and lower-level
councillors USh 500,000. Mobilisers received USh 500,000; people hanging posters USh
200,000; and donations to groups varied, but could go up to USh 2 million.
92
A special category of donations of financial resources during the electoral campaign that
needs special attention is presidential pledges. As already became clear in the section on
87
The focus group discussions of the Democratization Monitoring Group claim this is more widespread than
these results suggest. Report on Money in Politics. Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections.
88
Rukiya Makuma and Joan Akello, “Post-Election Economic Woes,” The Independent, 18 March 2011.
89
EUOM, Final Report: General Elections 18 February 2011, 6.
90
Joachim Buwembo, “Uganda’s Runaway Vote Price Inflation Has Economists Baffled,” The East African, 28
February 2011. See also Joel Barkan, Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability., A Report of the CSIS Africa
Programme (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 11.
91
A government representative estimated this amount did not exceed USD 50 million (interview, deputy
secretary to the treasury, Keith Muhakanizi, 7 March 2011).
92
Interviews with NRM candidates and mobilisers, Kampala and Arua, January-March 2011.

SACCOs, the president often promised, or directly gave, sums of money to associations or
individuals. This is no new or exceptional phenomenon and has become inherently part of
Uganda’s political culture; it was particularly common during and before the electoral
campaign. For example, in the week of 13-19 September 2010, the president met over 3,000
supporters of his former principal private secretary, whom he transported to State House.
Each of them received USh 20,000 after the meeting, totalling USh 60 million. Later in the
week, he met over 500 supporters from over 16 districts; each received USh 70,000, totalling
about USh 35 million. The same week, the president went to Bushenyi, where he gave a
seminary USh 100 million, of which 40 million was allocated to buy a bus.
93
In other words,
pledges can be made to schools, churches, individuals, associations, and so on. The Daily
Monitor reports how, between July and October 2010 alone, Museveni spent USD 2.15
million (USh 5 billion) on cash and pledges.
94
Whereas the deputy presidential spokesperson
defended this practice by arguing that the president is a “Fountain of Honour”, entitled to
“donate at any cause, at anytime, anywhere”
95
, this is often considered as an unfair advantage,
patronage and early campaigning. The Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda considers such
pledges to be a misuse of public funds.
96
When the president promises these donations, there is ambiguity about where exactly the
money will come from. In theory, these pledges are allocated to the president under State
House budget. For example, the supplementary budget passed in 2011 included an additional
93
Mubatsi Asinja Habati, “Bribery or Service?,” The East African, 29 September 2010.
94
John Njoroge, “Opposition Cries Foul as Museveni Gives Shs 741m in Cash Donations,” Daily Monitor, 7
January 2011.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.

USD 7.7 million (USh 18 billion) for presidential donations.
97
Although this is proof of the
large amount of money available for these pledges, this is not necessary sufficient. Former
Gulu district chairperson Norbert Mao, for example, argues that the district was under strong
pressure to release funds to fulfil the presidential pledges.
98
In order to resolve these, and
other, problems, a fast-track committee on presidential pledges was formed, headed by the
former prime minister, Apollo Nsibambi, to study the implementation of all the different
pledges; the committee recommended that line ministries should implement the pledges as a
way of dealing with unbudgeted promises.
99
The most important aspect of these pledges is that it entrenches a political culture in which
financial donations play a crucial role further, and therefore affects the expectations of the
electorate and the behaviour of politicians. According to the Democracy Monitoring Group,
the use of money to decide elections can therefore be considered to be “an entrenched norm”
and “culture” at all levels of government. In turn, this method of creating political power
engenders a situation of “inflationary patronage”
100
in which an increasing amount of money
is needed to stay in power—the additional budget passed in January 2011 is an example of
this fact.
101
The financial and material support to the groups in the informal urban economy
can be seen in this context, further contributing to this vicious circle.
97
Report on Money in Politics. Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections, 23.
98
Njoroge, “Opposition Cries Foul as Museveni Gives Shs 741m in Cash Donations.”
99
According to a committee report, the lands and housing ministry needs to spend USh 2.1 trillion; USh 1.27
trillion needs to be allocated to the roads sector; while the health ministry needs USh 157 billion to construct
new health centres or renovate old ones. All are promises made by the president which are not necessarily
budgeted for. See Habati, “Bribery or Service?”.
100
Report on Money in Politics. Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections, 10.
101
Barkan, Uganda: Assessing Risks to Stability.

Second, the above processes of political interaction with groups within the informal economy
provided information about political strategies in general, and more particularly about the
political strategies of the president. The policy interventions in favour of boda-bodas and
market vendors, and the phenomenon of the presidential pledges show how the president’s
political strategies have become increasingly populist, or as Weyland defines it,
a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises
government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from
large numbers of mostly unorganized followers. This direct, quasi-personal
relationship bypasses established intermediary organizations or deinstitutionalizes
and subordinates them to the leader’s personal will.
102
In doing so, “the connection between leader and followers is based mostly on direct, quasi-
personal contact, not on organizational intermediation.”
103
This phenomenon became very clear through the above events in the transport and market
sector. The direct protection and linking with the different groops urban poor citizens are a
manifestation of the president’s “empowerment of the poor” discourse, in which he presents
himself as a representative of the poor and marginalised. In doing so, the president creates
political capital by setting himself apart from other political elites, while the actors within the
informal economy are protected.
102
Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,”
Comparative Politics 34, no. 1 (2001): 13.
103
Ibid.

Moreover, through his populist pledges, the president not only disregards political elites; but,
as Carbone argues, also shows disdain for “the reigning institutions and organisations. The
latter are identified as an enemy of the people since they tend to impede simple, direct and
visible political actions.”
104
The attempts at regulating the boda-boda sector, reconstructing
markets and the implementation of SACCOs were affected by presidential interventions,
which consequently contribute to building his political legitimacy among groups in the
informal economy. The president clearly disregards the regulatory authority of other
institutions–such as the KCC and its attempts to regulate these sectors—and does not delegate
any power to these institutions. This does not come out of the blue, but is a reflection of the
increasingly personalised rule of President Museveni,
105
which has affected parliament, the
judiciary, the media
106
and the army.
107
In doing so, he uses, on the one hand, force and
intimidation, and on the other, patronage.
108
In this political strategy formal institutions only
play a secondary role. As Carbone argues: “Building institutions and organisations involves
delegating power, something that is foreign to Museveni’s leadership style. The President
104
Giovanni M Carboni, Populism Visits Africa: The Case of Yoweri Museveni and No-Party Democracy in
Uganda, Working Paper, Series 1 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, ondon School of Economics and
Political Science, 2005), 8.
105
Ibid. A civil society actor summarised this tendency as, “In this country, everything has to be done by the
president. If I have a problem with my wife, I should ask the president to intervene!” (Interview, civil society
actor, Kampala, 17 October 2010)
106
Andrew Mwenda, “Personalising Power in Uganda,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007): 23–37.
107
Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, “Military Corruption and Ugandan Politics Since the Late 1990s,”
Review of African Political Economy 18, no. 3 (2003): 539–552.
108
Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, “Politics, Donors and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions
in Uganda,” Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 101–124.

notoriously prefers to dictate and ‘micromanage’ personally all decisions, regardless of
institutional settings, norms and procedures.”
109
Conclusion
In the light of increasing electoral competition and a growing “selectorate,” all groups matter
to the winner of the election—including, or particularly, groups within the informal urban
economy, such as boda-bodas drivers and market vendors. To approach these groups, a
number of tactics were used by the political elites during the 2011 elections in order to extend
their winning coalition. This paper has shown how particular policy programmes have
become instrumentalised in order to target these groups. The SACCO programme as
discussed was used as a case study to describe the politicisation of public programmes, and
the effect of this on the ground. The politicisation of microfinance programmes had been a
problem in the past and the SACCO programme did not alter this dynamic. It did not become
more “public,” but was instead used in a way that blurred the distinction between government
and political party, and was used in a largely private manner. Moreover, the strong
intensification of the programme might have provided strong financial incentives to the urban
poor, but it created a range of negative effects for the programme itself (affecting its
sustainability, its presumed impartial/technical nature, creating conflicts, etc.).
This paper has also argued that another strategy put in place to reach these groups involved
protecting them from policy initiatives that affected them. Consequently actors in the informal
economy have “increasingly found ways to exploit their political capital”
110
by linking up with
109
Carboni, Populism Visits Africa: The Case of Yoweri Museveni and No-Party Democracy in Uganda, 13.
110
Goodfellow and Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s
Informal Economy,” 267.

politicians in general, and with the president in particular. The benefits became clear for
boda-boda drivers, who thereby managed to escape taxation, and market vendors managed to
retain control over their markets. Although regulatory measures in this field are largely
decentralised, actors within the informal economy realise that real power lies elsewhere. For
these actors, there is a general feeling that the president is accessible—either directly or
through the presidential advisers. As the chairperson of a boda-boda association explains,
“for all this harassment, our best option is to go to the state house. They are the most receptive
to our claims! We can go and try to complain go the police, but they always refuse our
demands. Then we make it politically! We go to the state house.”
111
In other words, because
of increased political competition a number of groups have become a vital electoral force for
politicians. This has led to a particular form of populist politics, and to high-ranking
politicians—particularly the president—linking up with such groups.
Lastly, under such populist politics, a final strategy to win over the urban poor consisted of
direct financial and material incentives. This applied not only to the groups targeted by this
research, but is a reflection of the wider commercialisation of the 2011 elections. This shows
how increased electoral competition–in the Uganda 2011 elections–did not lead to more
general public service delivery, but largely became what Lindberg calls an “economic
competition.”
112
This also show how the electoral playing field has been affected to a
significant extent: almost all of these strategies are associated with the incumbent regime,
which made it significantly more difficult for the opposition to approach the informal poor
workers of urban Uganda.
111
Interview, boda-boda division chairperson, 17 October 2010.
112
Lindberg, “‘It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’’.”