... This paper aims to complete the aforementioned gap. To substantiate the central argument and provide a systematic theoretical basis for analysing the integration between pain and consciousness, I first turn to Kant's discussion of consciousness in his Critique of Pure Reason [1], to his argument about language in his Anthropology [2], as well as to studies thereof, extracting three essential attributes of consciousness (int. al., [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]). ...
... The Kantian doctrine of transcendental idealism argues that the existence of things in themselves is not accessible to consciousness. 1 According to Kantian externalism, epistemic data are obtained from the products of consciousness of the phenomenal world and in accordance with the limits of consciousness. Kant's view contrasts with Frege's internalism, according to which cognitive content alone determines the meaning of phenomena [15] (p. ...
... Consciousness is limited to mere representations [1] (p. 511, A491/B519). ...
When looking for an account that explains how pain changes consciousness, one finds that most studies in the phenomenology of pain focus either on the outcome of the change, or on how it affects the self, as a conscious object, and the self’s experiences in the world of objects. This paper focuses on the mechanism of consciousness, exploring the nature of the change that pain creates in consciousness and how exactly that change occurs. The paper provides a systematic, phenomenological inquiry in three phases: one identifies three essential attributes of consciousness, another identifies three essential attributes of pain, and a third analyses the outcome of the integration between both sets of attributes. The paper demonstrates how the change wrought by pain on the self, as a conscious object, allows the self to breach its boundaries as an object, and experience being a non-object, even if only in part and temporarily.
... In fact, to capture Aristotle's burden on the matter, he proclaims; there is a branch of philosophy which studies being qua being and the attributes that belong to its very nature, this is not like any of the other sciences. 36 36 | International Journal of Scientific and Management Research 5(5) [34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43] Copyright © IJSMR 2022 (www.ijsmr.in) ...
... In fact, to capture Aristotle's burden on the matter, he proclaims; there is a branch of philosophy which studies being qua being and the attributes that belong to its very nature, this is not like any of the other sciences. 36 36 | International Journal of Scientific and Management Research 5(5) [34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43] Copyright © IJSMR 2022 (www.ijsmr.in) ...
... He argued for the existence of void which he adopted from the Epicurean philosophy. He was of the opinion that space and time are neither 38 38 | International Journal of Scientific and Management Research 5(5) [34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43] Copyright © IJSMR 2022 (www.ijsmr.in) substance nor accidents; they are just special categories of being. ...
This work offers a concise exposition and critical appraisal of Kant's notion of space and time as a priori forms of human sensibility or intuition. He dwells on these issues in his Critique of Pure Reason, under the Transcendental Aesthetics section. Owing to the fact that Kant published two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, both editions are being referenced. Letters A and B are used to denote the first and second edition respectively. Kant identifies the a priori forms of sensibility: space and time, which the mind contributes, to make experience possible. The reason is that an event cannot be experienced at all, unless it is recognized as being in ‘space’ and occurring in ‘time.’ Thus, the possibility of human experience is anchored on the spatiotemporal framework of empirical reality, which embraces both the experiences and their objects. Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican Revolution," in which he argues that it is the ‘representation’ that makes the object possible, and not the ‘object’ that makes the representation possible. With this he presents the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception. His opinion was that the rational structure of the mind reflected the rational structure of the world, even of ‘things-in-themselves.’ In other words, the operating system of the processor, by modern analogy, matched the operating system of reality. It follows from the way in which appearances are given to us that those things given in space and time must be unified in accordance with the categories, and since the ‘objects of experience’ are given to us in space and time, it follows that they must be unified in accordance with the categories. All representations are subject to the transcendental unity of apperception. Space and time, as forms of human sensible intuition, structure the manifold of appearance, since such a manifold can only occur in accordance with this form. But, space and time are represented by us not only as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves, and therefore as possessing a unity of the manifold of empirical intuition within them. This unity precedes all concepts, and it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. So the unity of space and time is explained in terms of the synthetic activity of the understanding. Space and time stand under the synthetic unity of apperception, and in so far as they are represented as unities they are themselves the product of the effect the understanding has upon sensibility, and are thus subject to the categories of human understanding.
... Цьому світу осяжного і зрозумілого протистоїть світ ціннісної ноуменальної (потойбічної) неосяжності, в якому цінності представлені як належне. Таким чином, в кантівському розумінні цінності є диференційованими щодо теоретичного та практичного пізнання, чому відповідає утворення філософії цінностей (аксіології) як сфері дослідження цінностей як трансцедентної та ноуменальної реальності [8][9]. ...
... Рудольф Лотце, німецький філософ-спіритуаліст, лікар та природознавець [10]. Саме йому належить ідея вирізнення сфери філософ-ських студій, предметом якої стають цінності як частина метафізичної реальності [8][9]. Отже, філософські студії, в їх первинному (термінологічному) розумінні, спрямовані на дослідження цінностей як проекції трансцедентної духовності на чуттєвий світ, отримали назву «аксіологія» (від грец. ...
... Or ce concept nous entraîne sur le terrain de l'identité individuelle et d'un débat philosophique entre existence et essence. L'existence n'est représentable ni par un concept ni dans le concept dans la critique de la raison pure de Kant (1996). L'essence marque la nature de la chose ainsi que l'ordre ou rang qu'elle doit tenir entre les autres choses (la caractérisation de l'identité peut se faire via l'essence), ce qui fait qu'une chose est ce qu'elle est (Gilson, 1972). ...
... De plus, l'identité narrative assurant « la permanence dans le temps du caractère et le maintien de soi » (Ricoeur, 1990, p. 196), est sollicitée à propos du rôle de la narration dans la stabilisation de l'identité. Si l'on reprend la définition de Kant (1996) à propos de la transcendance, c'est-à-dire ce qui dépasse toute possibilité d'expérience, cela signifie que parvenir à définir la raison d'être de l'organisation suppose une transcendance. Cela soulève un risque : l'apprentissage de la raison d'être pourrait être accaparé par des modèles idéologiques. ...
The “raison d’être” of the organization : a formulation based on organizational identity
The current trend is to define the raison d’être of companies as a follow-up to the incentives of the Pact Law and thus give impetus to corporate social responsibility. However, the raison d’être evokes a subject more internal to the organization. The objective of this paper is to show the path leading to the expression of a raison d’être based on organizational identity. The methodology consists of observing this process from four interventions of a specialised consultant to the reactions of the intra-company teams. This in-depth work carried out within organizations enables employees to be involved and to achieve an alignment between strategy and identity.
... For a formal description of the principle and the relationship to L. Euler, see Pulte,Prinzip,75;Radelet De Grave,"Moindre,Hecht,Pierre;Leduc,"Métaphysique,[11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]and Lyssy,"L'économie,[31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50]Versuch,20. 6 For an overview of the current controversies concerning the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, see Willaschek,Kant,Ypi,"Deduction,Thöle,"Einheit,Meer,Grundsatz,[3][4][5][6][7][8]Grier,Doctrine,and Klimmek,System, 7 See in particular Kitcher,"Order,Marcucci,"Aspetti,Watkins,Kant,[70][71][72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89]McNulty,"Use,[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]and Massimi,"Thing,Thöle,"Einheit,Horstmann,"Idee,Horstmann,"Anhang,McFarland,Concept,Ginsborg,Role,and Kitcher,"Order,. However, the theoretical scientific background of this confusion has not been taken into account. ...
... 38 Thiele, "Euler," 375-9; Ben-Menahem, Causation, 134; Pulte, Prinzip, 83-9; and Putle, "Teleologie," Man,Schramm,Natur,[38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55]Speiser,"Pierre,and Sala,Kant,[28][29][30][31][32][33] 40 "Dans le choc des corps, le mouvement se distribue de manieremanière, que la quantité d'action que suppose le changement arrivé, est la plus petite qu'il soit possible." (Maupertuis, Essai, 106)/"Bey dem Stoß der Körper wird die Bewegung also vertheilet, daß die Größe der Wirkung, welche die vorgegangene Veränderung voraus setze, so klein, als möglich, ist." (Maupertuis,Versuch,57,89) 41 "Soit que nous demeurions renfermés en nous mêmes, soit que nous en sortions pour parcourir les merveilles de l'Univers, nous trouvons tant de preuves de l'existence d'un Etre tout puissant & tout sage, qu'il est en quelque sorte plus nécessaire d'en diminuer le nombre que de chercher à l'augmenter." (Maupertuis, Essai, 1-2)/"[S]o finden wir so viel Beweise eines allmächtigen und allweisen Wesens, daß es einigermaßen nöthiger ist, die Anzahl derselben zu vermindern, als sie zu vermehren zu suchen [und] eine Wahl unter diesen Beweisen anzustellen" (Maupertuis,Versuch,(19)(20). ...
In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant formulates teleological principles, or rather ideas, and explicates them referring to concrete examples of natural science such as chemistry, astronomy, biology, empirical psychology, and physical geography. Despite the increasing interest in the systematic relevance of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and its importance for Kant’s conception of natural science, the numerous historical sources for the regulative use of reason have not yet been investigated. One that is very central is Maupertuis’ principle of least action. In 1781, Kant transformed teleology into heuristics and methodology, but in doing so, he partially develops a teleology which was disqualified by Maupertuis because its starting point lies in the construction of animals or plants, the structure of the earth, and the immensity of the celestial bodies. Based on Maupertuis’ principle of action, it can be shown that the Appendix forms a systematic interface between Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and Critique of Judgement which allows the reconstruction of Kant’s regulative use of reason and its specific status in the context of natural science and his critical appraisal of Maupertuis.
... The three most important human abilities, being memory, imagination, and reason, have been the subject of well-known philosophical reflections and discussions (Hobbes, 2010;Kant, 1781;Hume, 1882). Each of these human abilities found its place in the networking era. ...
This article explores the evolution of constructionism as an educational framework, tracing its relevance and transformation across three pivotal eras: the advent of personal computing, the networked society, and the current era of generative AI. Rooted in Seymour Papert constructionist philosophy, this study examines how constructionist principles align with the expanding role of digital technology in personal and collective learning. We discuss the transformation of educational environments from hierarchical instructionism to constructionist models that emphasize learner autonomy and interactive, creative engagement. Central to this analysis is the concept of an expanded personality, wherein digital tools and AI integration fundamentally reshape individual self-perception and social interactions. By integrating constructionism into the paradigm of smart education, we propose it as a foundational approach to personalized and democratized learning. Our findings underscore constructionism enduring relevance in navigating the complexities of technology-driven education, providing insights for educators and policymakers seeking to harness digital innovations to foster adaptive, student-centered learning experiences.
... The three most important human abilities, being memory, imagination, and reason, have been the subject of well-known philosophical reflections and discussions (Hobbes, 2010;Kant, 1781;Hume, 1882). Each of these human abilities found its place in the networking era. ...
This article explores the evolution of constructionism as an educational framework, tracing its relevance and transformation across three pivotal eras: the advent of personal computing, the networked society, and the current era of generative AI. Rooted in Seymour Papert’s constructionist philosophy, this study examines how constructionist principles align with the expanding role of digital technology in personal and collective learning. We discuss the transformation of educational environments from hierarchical instructionism to constructionist models that emphasize learner autonomy and interactive, creative engagement. Central to this analysis is the concept of an “expanded personality”, wherein digital tools and AI integration fundamentally reshape individual self-perception and social interactions. By integrating constructionism into the paradigm of smart education, we propose it as a foundational approach to personalized and democratized learning. Our findings underscore constructionism’s enduring relevance in navigating the complexities of technology-driven education, providing insights for educators and policymakers seeking to harness digital innovations to foster adaptive, student-centered
learning experiences.
... Moreover, it gathers the elements for cognition and unites them to form a certain content. 77 Thus, the various representations, collectively referred to as the manifold, interlink to create a cohesive, further representation. The union of the representations via conceptual synthesis could not exist without the unity of apperception. ...
This article traces the development of Edmund Husserl’s approach to the concept of the ego through the different stages of the evolution of his phenomenological project. The aim is to delineate Husserl’s shifting viewpoints from a Humean to a Kantian perspective, particularly focusing on the transition toward a Kantian transcendental approach. Through an analysis of Husserl’s engagement with Kant’s texts, especially on transcendental apperception, the study reveals how Husserl’s encounters with Kantian philosophy informed his conceptualization of the ego. It further examines the “empty character” of the ego, contrasting Husserl’s and Kant’s strategies to address Humean skepticism and their differing solutions for integrating the egological dimension into subjective experience: The transcendence-in-immanence of the ego for Husserl, the I as analytical form of thoughts for Kant.
... Respect is often viewed as relational, in that it is central to the way in which people relate to one another (O'Grady, Hinchion, and McNamara 2011) and as something that can exist between people (Kant 1855). The ways in which people interact are key here as 'when communication becomes interpersonal, individuals treat each one another with greater respect and trust develops' (Frymier and Houser 2000, 217). ...
... When a representation of an object is immediately given, if the judgment is reflective, this representation will be judged as beautiful only when the imagination, which primarily grasps the representationapprehends it, is in accord with understanding which comprehends it and is able to subsume it under a universal -hence, pronounce a judgment 10 . To those accustomed with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, this is fundamentally analogous to the pair of apperception and imagination constituting the basic framework for the elaboration of the idea of 'understanding' in the second chapter of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' 11 . So, the sense in which a judgment of the beautiful is subjective is that it concerns a feeling which results from the subject's own introspection -to see that a harmony between faculties occurred. ...
This paper is a systematic comparison between two well–known and theologically relevant concepts – the sublime as developed in Kant’s third Critique, and Marion’s saturated phenomenon. Although it discusses the significant and apparent similarities between them, it also criticizes Marion’s identification of the sublime as a possible example of a saturated phenomenon. This is primarily because of the different origins and philosophical presuppositions guiding the elaboration of these two ideas. Kant’s aim is to confine the reception of the phenomenon to the conditions of experience, so that both in the case of judg-ments of beauty and judg-ments of the sublime, the subject achieves pleasure through self-centred appreciation of its rational capacities. Marion’s saturated phenomenon, on the other hand, aims at dispensing with the ‘metaphysical’ horizon of either the object, or the transcendental subject, in favour of passive appropriation of givenness. Although both are meant to describe what happens when the limits of understanding are breached, in the sublime this breach only serves to reinforce the capacity of the rational subject, whereas in the saturated phenomenon it points to the possibility of apprehension of the totally Other as purely given.
... Rather than a skeptic stance, it is a well-founded awareness of the intrinsic limits of rational knowledge of nature, in perfect agreement with Socrates' awareness of not knowing and Kant's "natural illusion" of humankind, taking concept and mental images for the reality in itself [28]. It is worth underscoring the substantial agreement between Democritus' theory and the above-mentioned theories, aiming to overcome the limits of both Cartesianism and monist materialism, and merge both the physical and mental dimensions into an integrated, inseparable whole, a fact pertaining to quantum physics and philosophy at the same time. ...
n recent years, the term “quantum-like” has been increasingly used in different disciplines, including neurosciences, psychological and socio-economical disciplines, claiming that some investigated phenomena show “something” in common with quantum processes and, therefore, they can be modeled using a sort of quantum formalism. Thus, the increasing use of the term “quantum-like” calls for defining and sharing its meaning in order to adopt it properly and avoid possible misuse. There is a fil rouge linking both pre-Socratic and Eastern philosophies and quantum physics, suggesting an epistemological symmetry between them. In our opinion, the concept of “quantum-like” may be successfully applied to macroscopic phenomena and empirical sciences other than physics when the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) the behavior of the investigated phenomena show logical analogies with quantum phenomena; (b) it is possible to find a criterion of truth based on an experiential/scientific approach applied to a probabilistic model of description of the phenomena. This is only a first small step in the approach to the concept of “quantum-like”, which will hopefully be helpful in promoting further discussion and achieving a better definition.
... Rather than a skeptic stance, it is a well-founded awareness of the intrinsic limits of rational knowledge of nature, in perfect agreement with Socrates' awareness of not knowing and Kant's "natural illusion" of humankind, taking concept and mental images for the reality in itself [28]. It is worth underscoring the substantial agreement between Democritus' theory and the above-mentioned theories, aiming to overcome the limits of both Cartesianism and monist materialism, and merge both the physical and mental dimensions into an integrated, inseparable whole, a fact pertaining to quantum physics and philosophy at the same time. ...
In recent years, the term “quantum-like” has been increasingly used in different disciplines, including neurosciences, psychological and socio-economical disciplines, claiming that some investigated phenomena show “something” in common with quantum processes and, therefore, they can be modeled using a sort of quantum formalism. Thus, the increasing use of the term “quantum-like” calls for defining and sharing its meaning in order to adopt it properly and avoid possible misuse. There is a fil rouge linking both pre-Socratic and Eastern philosophies and quantum physics, suggesting an epistemological symmetry between them. In our opinion, the concept of “quantum-like” may be successfully applied to macroscopic phenomena and empirical sciences other than physics when the following two conditions are satisfied: (a) the behavior of the investigated phenomena show logical analogies with quantum phenomena; (b) it is possible to find a criterion of truth based on an experiential/scientific approach applied to a probabilistic model of description of the phenomena. This is only a first small step in the approach to the concept of “quantum-like”, which will hopefully be helpful in promoting further discussion and achieving a better definition.
... O, Tanrı'nın bilgiye değil imana konu olabileceğini söylemekte ve imanı bilginin alanına dâhil etmemektedir. 77 Benzer biçimde, Kant da 'imana yer açmak için bilgiyi inkâr etmek zorunda kaldığını' 78 söyleyerek Tanrı'ya ilişkin önermelerin bütünüyle epistemolojik bir çözümlemeden yoksun olduğunu dile getirmektedir. Fakat bu da hem Tanrı'nın var olduğuna iman edip hem de O'nun var olduğunu bilmeme gibi bir çelişkiye neden olmaktadır. ...
Dini çeşitlilik sorunu çağdaş din felsefesi ve teolojinin karşılaştığı önemli sorunlardan biri-dir. Birçok din evrenin mahiyeti, kişinin geleceği gibi temel konularla ilgili farklı ve birbiriyle bağ-daşmayan doğruluk iddialarında bulunmaktadır. Kişinin bu farklı doğruluk iddialarıyla karşılaşması onun kendi inancına dönük bir takım felsefi irdelemeler yapmasını zorunlu kılmaktadır. Dini çe-şitliliğin dini inançlar üzerinde olumsuz bir epistemik etkisinin olduğunu düşünen birçok yazar bu dinleri bir kaynağa dayandırma veya onları epistemik anlamda eşitleme ihtiyacı hissetmektedir. Bu durum da dini çoğulculuğu felsefi tartışmalara konu yapmıştır. Dini çoğulculuk hipotezinin felsefi arka planına bakıldığında Kant'ın noumena/phenomena ayırımının belirgin bir etkisinden söz etmek mümkündür. Kant varlık alanını iki kategoriye ayırmaktadır: (i) İnsanın dil ve düşünce sı-nırlarını aşan kendinden/bizatihi varlık (an sich) ve (ii) İnsan bilincine (tecrübesine) konu olabilen varlık. Kant'a göre, kişinin bilgisinden bağımsız olarak var olan kendinden/bizatihi varlık noumen alanı temsil ederken; söz konusu dünyanın insan bilincine yansıması ise fenomen alana tekabül et-mektedir. Kant'ın epistemolojik ilkesinden hareket edildiğinde Tanrı'ya ilişkin farklı doğruluk id-diaları sadece anlaşılamaz değil aynı zamanda beklenen bir durumdur. Fakat noumen alanın bütünüyle tanımlanamaz kabul edilmesi söz konusu alanın ontolojik statüsüne ilişkin şüpheleri de içermektedir. Tanrı inancının haklı bir temele sahip olabilmesi için O'nun 'ne' olduğunu ortaya koyabilecek epistemik bir gerekçe bulunmalıdır. O nedenle Kant'ın noumen-phenomen ayrımını dinlerin farklı hakikat iddialarını açıklamak için referans alan çoğulcu yaklaşım felsefi ve teolojik düşünce açısından tatmin edici değildir. A An na ah h t ta ar r K Ke e l li i m me e l le er r: : Dini çoğulculuk; dini dışlayıcılık; kant; numen/fenomen; epistemik belirsizlik; Hick; kendinden/bizatihi gerçek A AB BS S T TR RA AC CT T Religious pluralism is one of the major problems of the contemporary philosophy of religion and theology. Many religions claim different and incompatible truths on fundamental issues such as the nature of the universe and the future of individuals. Such claims require people to do a number of philosophical considerations on their own beliefs. According to many writers religious pluralism has a negative epistemic impact on religious beliefs, so that they feel the need to attribute these religions to a source or synchronize them in epistemic sense. This situation has made religious pluralism a subject of philosophical debates. When we look at the philosophical background of religious pluralism hypothesis it is possible to talk of a significant effect of Kant's Noumena / phenomena distinction. Kant divides the area of existence into two categories: (i) The real an sich that beyond the limits of human language and thought, and (ii) the real that could be a subject of human conscious (experience). According to Kant, the existence independent from the human thought presents noumena area; the appearance of that world to human conscious corresponds phenomena area. When we move from the epistemological principle of Kant, the different accuracy claims are not only incomprehensible but also an expected situation. However the acceptance of noumena area as wholly nondescript also contains doubts about the ontological status of the area. There should be an epistemic justification that demonstrates 'what' He is, in order to the belief in God may have rightful basis. For that reason, the pluralist intuition that reference Kant's noumena-phenomena distinction to describe the truth claims of different religions is not satisfactory in terms of philosophical and theological thought. K Ke ey y W Wo or rd ds s: : Religious pluralism; religious exclusivism; kant; noumena-phenomena; epistemic uncertainty; Hick; the real an sich
The starting point for this study is Kant’s approach to stating the problem of the conditions of possibility of experience and the thesis of the possibility of objects of experience (KrV, В 197). The thesis lends itself to three interpretations: the creationist interpretation, whereby a priori structures of understanding and reason create objects of experience; the moderate interpretation, in which a priori structures of understanding and reason objectify and identify intuitions; and the transcendental realist interpretation, which presents objects of experience as objectively existing. I then analyse the “polemical” style of the reading of Kant presented in the works of H. J. Paton, P. F. Strawson, J. Bennett, and others. This approach focuses on the problem of the possibility of experience, with its main source being Kant’s argument for causality in the Second Analogy from the Critique of Pure Reason. As a consequence of its polemic, this approach, as formulated by Bennett, treats the problem of the conditions of the possibility of experience as the problem of imposing a causal order on nature. Based on the results of my analysis, I propose two formulations of the above problem, which reflect the epistemic and ontological points of view respectively. In the former case, we have the problem of the “vicious circle” of cognition, while in the latter case we have “transcendental collapse” — that is, the problem of the correlation between reason and reality which acquires the transcendental property of “paradoxical compatibility”. Finally, I discuss the importance of the problem, arguing that it is the foundation of transcendental philosophy, and that which makes it productive.
The research objective. The objective of the research is to identify the ontological foundations of knowledge, analyze key metaphysical concepts, and assess their impact on the modern philosophical understanding of the connection between knowledge, reality, and being. The statement of basic material. The article studies the metaphysical foundations of knowledge through a comparative analysis of classical, modern, and contemporary philosophical approaches. The main metaphysical concepts, such as the dualism of knowledge and reality, the immanence of knowledge in the material world, the role of subjectivity, the dialectical development of knowledge, existential involvement in being, and the procedural nature of knowledge, are considered. The author focuses on the fact that the metaphysical approach to knowledge contributes to deepening the understanding of its nature, limits, and epistemic validity, which expands the modern vision of reality and existence.
Early on in their philosophical careers, Nishida Kitarō and Jeanne Hersch engaged seriously with the ideas and style of Henri Bergson, leading them to new but markedly different ways of approaching the world. Seen in the light of Kant's third antinomy, despite their diverging interests and cultural backgrounds, they have a great deal in common in that both attempt to reconsider personal experience through a more scientific approach. An analysis of their respective appropriations of Bergson, particularly with regard to the use of imagery, provides a good example of how experience can influence philosophical expression and, at the same time, points to the relevance of Nishida's and Hersch's contributions to the debate on philosophical approaches to reality and expression.
Thomas Hurka’s recursive account of value appeals to certain intuitions to expand the class of intrinsic values, placing concepts of virtue and desert within the realm of second and third order intrinsic goods, respectively. This is a formalization of a tradition of thought extending back to Aristotle and Kant via the British moralists, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross. However, the evidential status of such intuitions vis a vis the real, intrinsic value of virtue and desert is hostage to alternative explanations. If there is a plausible competing explanation for these intuitions, then the (putative) fact that desert and virtue are intrinsic (rather than instrumental or derivative) goods seems a much less obvious choice for the best explanation. As it turns out, there are plausible evolutionary explanations for these intuitions about desert and virtue. These evolutionary explanations suggest that it is adaptive to value desert and virtue separately from their instrumentality for other goods. Consequently, these explanations debunk intuitions about the intrinsic value of desert and virtue.
This study identified research trends, intellectual connections, and social connections in the field of museum visitor experiences. It also outlines future research to understand existing scientific research and shed light on key areas of research. The study reviewed 407 articles published in peer-reviewed journal articles, which were generated from the Scopus database. Bibliometric analysis software VOSviewer and Harzing POP were used. Citation analysis, co-authorship analysis, bibliometric coupling, and co-occurrence analysis have been employed. Findings highlight the need for increased representation from scholars in the Global South to ensure a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of museum visitors’ experiences worldwide. Nine key research areas for future studies were identified: sustainability, mixed reality, social media, accessibility, emotion, co-creation, interpretation, exhibition, and museum visitors’ experience and engagement. The results benefit stakeholders and researchers by allowing them to stay informed about the latest developments and breakthroughs in the global academic landscape and visitors’ experiences in museums.
Is it possible that in future we will have robot judges? And would this actually be permissible? The article answers these questions with a reluctant “yes” and a strict “no” respectively.
In the face of resource depletion, environmental changes, lifestyle changes, demographic and digital adaptation, old ideologies of city building and expensive and complex automobility solutions are in freefall. These changes are creating severe friction between the old and new paradigms. This book provides new perspectives through the process of ideological disassociation and concepts of human mobility code. The basic premise of the book, human mobility is an essential component of our creativity that comes from our unconscious desire to become a part of a community. Several new concepts in the book starts with the hallmark of new discovery of human mobility code and its implications of urban mobility boundary systems to stay within safe planetary zone. A new discovery of human mobility code from comprehensive research finding prove that each individual develops a unique mobility footprint and become our mobility identity. Beyond individual hallmarks, human develops collective mobility codes through interaction with the third space on which entire mobility systems lie and are created by the fundamentals of city planning and the design process. Readers are introduced to an innovative mobility planning process and reinvention of multimodal mobility approaches based on new mobility code while formulating new concepts, practical solutions and implementation techniques, tools, policies, and processes to reinforce low-carbon mobility options while addressing social equity, environmental, and health benefits. Finally, the book arms us with knowledge to prevent the disaster of full technological enlightenment against our natural human mobility code.
This paper introduces a neural kernel method to generate machine learning plasticity models for micropolar and micromorphic materials that lack material symmetry and have internal structures. Since these complex materials often require higher-dimensional parametric space to be precisely characterized, we introduce a representation learning step where we first learn a feature vector space isomorphic to a finite-dimensional subspace of the original parametric function space from the augmented labeled data expanded from the narrow band of the yield data. This approach simplifies the data augmentation step and enables us to constitute the high-dimensional yield surface in a feature space spanned by the feature kernels. In the numerical examples, we first verified the implementations with data generated from known models, then tested the capacity of the models to discover feature spaces from meso-scale simulation data generated from representative elementary volume (RVE) of heterogeneous materials with internal structures. The neural kernel plasticity model and other alternative machine learning approaches are compared in a computational homogenization problem for layered geomaterials. The results indicate that the neural kernel feature space may lead to more robust forward predictions against sparse and high-dimensional data.
The empirical turn has created an undercurrent of scrutiny regarding the relevance of disciplines such as philosophy and theology due to assumptions about the limitations of their epistemology. This article seeks to recognize that disciplines that are lauded as most relevant due to their reliance on empiricism as their main form of epistemology often rely upon intuition for making decisions in the research process. After delineating this process using Anthropological research as an example, I draw a parallel between descriptions of how intuition can be understood and used as a means of knowing in the work of Kant and several theologians with descriptions of how intuition is relied upon and necessarily emerges as a critical epistemology in the more traditionally empirically grounded discipline Anthropology. This parallel is offered as the launching place for connections between these disciplines through further examination of the use of intuition as an epistemology and hopes to equate the epistemo- logical integrity of disciplines such as philosophy and theology that admit to the use of intuition with those that are considered empiri- cal which rely upon intuition yet may not admit to its use overtly.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is viewed as one of the technological advances that will reshape modern societies and their relations. While the design and deployment of systems that continually adapt hold the promise of far-reaching, positive change, they simultaneously pose significant risks, especially to already vulnerable people. This work explores the meaning of AI, and the important role of critical understanding and its phenomenological foundation in shaping its ongoing advances. The values, power, and magic of reason are central to this discussion. Critical theory has used historical hindsight to explain the patterns of power that shape our intellectual, political, economic, and social worlds, and the discourse on AI that surrounds these worlds. The authors also delve into niche topics in philosophy such as transcendental self-awareness, post-humanism, and concepts of space-time and computer logic. By embedding a critical phenomenological orientation within their technical practices, AI communities can develop foresight and tactics that can better align research and technology development with established ethical principles - centering vulnerable people who continue to bear the brunt of the negative impacts of innovation and scientific progress. The creation of a critical-technical practice of AI will lead to a permanent revolution in social, scientific, and political communities. The years ahead will usher in a wave of new scientific breakthroughs and technologies driven by AI research, making it incumbent upon AI communities to strengthen the social contract through ethical foresight, a capability which only phenomenology can deliver, ultimately supporting future technologies that enable greater well-being, with the goal of delivering practical truths. A Critical Understanding of Artificial Intelligence: A Phenomenological Foundation is an essential read for anyone interested in the complex debate and phenomenology surrounding AI and its growing role in our society.
This chapter serves as a comprehensive outline of the main concepts considered and the argument offered in this study. The chapter will address earlier mathematics, in particular Pythagorean mathematics, and the mathematics (such as algebra, analytic geometry, and calculus) that emerged with the rise of modernity, as a cultural formation, in the sixteenth century and that contained some of the features of modern mathematics. As this study in general, however, the chapter will be primarily concerned with modern mathematics and radical Pythagorean mathematics. After a brief introduction in Sect. 2.1, Sect. 2.2 offers an outline of radical Pythagorean mathematics as part of modern mathematics. Section 2.3 is devoted to the concept of a mathematical concept, which, or the concept of a concept, in the first place, is rarely adequately considered in mathematical or even philosophical literature, but which is central for this study. Section 2.4 considers the relationships between geometry and algebra in modern mathematics and in radical Pythagorean mathematics, defined as Pythagorean by virtue of the relationships between geometry and algebra in it. Section 2.5 discusses the workings of the alogonal in radical Pythagorean mathematics and the ideality-without-idealism (IWI) view, a form of the reality without realism (RWR) applied to mental and thus mathematical reality.
The subject of this chapter is the conceptual nature of Bernhard Riemann’s thinking and its impact on mathematics, physics, and philosophy. Following a brief introduction in Sect. 3.1 and a general outline of the argument in Sect. 3.2, Sect. 3.3 considers Riemann’s concept of manifold [Mannigfaltigkeit], and Riemann’s understanding of space and geometry, grounded in this concept. Section 3.4 discusses the relationships between mathematics and physics in Riemann. Thus, Sect. 3.2 is more philosophical, Sect. 3.3 is more mathematical, and Sect. 3.4 is more physical. When, however, it comes to Riemann’s thinking, philosophy, mathematics, and physics are never separate from each other. Accordingly, the workings of all three in Riemann’s thought will be considered throughout this chapter.KeywordsConceptContinuityDiscretenessFoundations of geometryHypothesisManifoldRealitySpace
This chapter addresses two key aspects of the relationships between modern mathematics and physics, relationships that developed even though the project of modern mathematics was shaped by its aim of separating itself from physics. The first is the ability of physics, especially relativity and quantum theory, to use the concepts and theories of modern mathematics born from this separation. The second is the influence that theoretical physics has exerted on algebra, functional analysis, differential geometry, algebraic topology, and algebraic geometry, in sum on all key areas of modern mathematics. After a brief introduction, Sect. 7.2 considers the use of modern mathematics in relativity and quantum theory. Section 7.3 discusses the Pythagorean and radically Pythagorean character of quantum theory, in (reality-without-realism) RWR-type interpretations. Section 7.4 considers the transformation of the concept of elementary particles in quantum field theory. Section 7.5 is devoted to the role of symmetry and group representation in quantum theory. Finally, Sect. 7.6 addresses with a sharper focus (as the subject is discussed in earlier sections as well) the influence of physics on mathematics, by considering, as an example, the impact of the Yang-Mills theory, which grounds the standard model of elementary particle physics, on differential topology.KeywordsGalois theoryGroup representationsQuantum field theoryQuantum mechanicsRelativityYang-Mills theory
Using a diverse array of translation theory, this essay re-presents the task of a South Asian translator in terms of their presence, absence, and existence within the voids of translation and untranslativity of languages. In its exploration of translation theory, the essay uses Nawab Faizunnesa’s Rupjalal and Neelima Ibrahim’s Ami Birangona Bolchi, and examines how the translator addressed the issues of creative obligation and translative/academic autonomy in translating these two iconic texts. Spectrum, Volume 16, June 2021: 127-135
In this chapter, I attempt to explain how in Deleuze’s thought sense is both ideational and material. To do this, I focus on Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s “Transcendental Ideas” in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense and elaborate on the link that he makes between Ideas and problems. Next, through a reading of Albert Lautman, I give a realist account of this transcendental idealism. And finally, I connect this dynamic and genetic realism with a transcendental materialism and conclude the materiality of sense as the transcendental field. This entails a change of direction from focusing on sense as the transcendental surface to nonsense as the transcendental depth which underlies turning from the language of transcendental philosophy towards the language of psychoanalysis, and is the result of Deleuze’s replacement of the unconscious as the transcendental field for Sartre’s consciousness.
The main aim of this chapter is to tackle Deleuze’s contribution to post-Kantian transcendental philosophy by introducing a new account of the transcendental which can be called the immanent, or real, transcendental, and which entails real conditioning as production or generation. This amounts to an explanation of a title that describes Deleuze’s early philosophy well, namely “transcendental empiricism” which deals with experience at the level of transcendental sensibility or, in Deleuze’s term, sense. In this way, he disavows attaining the transcendental from subjectivity or any recourse to concepts. Thus, Deleuze ascribes an objectivity, or better, a materiality, to the transcendental which is not differentiated in the form of objects (Deleuze assigns the term “objectité”, and not objectivité, to the transcendental field to distinguish it from the empirical objectivity; LdS 72–73). He learns from Kant that the objects are the correlates of subjects and this correlation underlies the application of concepts. Thus, he blames Kant for taking one side of this correlation as the condition of the other because in this way the conditioning would be just formal. Deleuze searches for a real conditioning and defines it as generating. Therefore, the condition must be essentially different from the conditioned and should not be located in the subject and in already established objects. In this regard, Deleuze introduces sense as the transcendental field. In his term, sense is the ideational material and marks the genesis of the entities of the empirical field. In the course of the present chapter, I try to explain how Deleuze makes a reconciliation between sense as the transcendental sensibility and sense as the source of intelligibility. This would be possible if we consider it the real transcendental field.
Several international conferences in the year 2019 were organized around the broader theme of xenophobia. 2019 marked the 400 th remembrance of the arrival of black slaves in what is today's United States of America (USA). The remembrance evoked bitter memories about institutional slavery, as well as focused attention on the ongoing anti-black racism in American society. For researchers and friends of Africa, other incidents on the continent might have contributed to this resurgence of scholarly interest in the theme. 2019 witnessed a rise in violent xenophobic attacks on aliens, including nationals of other African countries in South Africa. At the domestic level, Fulani herdsmen employ terrorist tactics to coerce subservience to their hegemonic agenda. To the extent that these incidents represent attempts to forge solidarities among group members while seeking to create an "other" out of what looks different, each of these is a case of xenophobia in its own right. Xenophobia contributes to such ills as anti-Semitism, sexism, racism, and homophobia, among several others. Although xenophobia is a well-researched topic, most analyses have tended to focus, for the most part, on tragedies, the doctrine's associated ills have engendered-slavery, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and so forth. It will be the task of this inquiry to offer a philosophical reflection on the spectre of xenophobia, with a primary focus on its contradictions. If we grant Kwame Gyekye's thesis that philosophy needs to explain experience, we may better appreciate the present effort, and further appreciate this study's contention that philosophy needs to also assume a prophetic mission, in terms of confronting evil principles or ideologies, while promoting justice. NAJOP: Nasara Journal of Philosophy 138-154 139 NAJOP: Nasara Journal of Philosophy
Regular disciplinary instruction of introductory physics at high school often misses a holistic perspective of the subject matter, its structure, and hierarchy. We have considered the domain of classical mechanics as taught at school and provided such a perspective in the form of a summative lecture which frames content in the triadic structure (nucleus-body-periphery)—discipline-culture. To facilitate this approach, we have reviewed the history of mechanics, revealed its origin in the fusion of the theory of motion in natural philosophy with the theory of work devices—mechanics. We discussed a summary lecture after an introductory course in mechanics. We argued for this teaching which promotes cultural content knowledge of classical mechanics stimulates learning about essential aspects of nature of science and scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we report on the experimental lecture which presented mechanics structured as a discipline-culture. The nucleus of mechanics, Newton’s laws of motion, contrasted by conceptual alternatives, emphasized mechanics as a fundamental theory of physics. The students and preservice teachers of our sample reacted positively to the new perspective, expressed engagement and interest. The assessment revealed the beneficial impact of the discipline-culture paradigm even if applied as a short conceptual summary. Beyond the new perspective and affective impact, the lecture served as a delay organizer of students’ knowledge, upgrading it to the cultural content knowledge. Besides knowledge improvement, we were evident to students’ curiosity, both ontological and epistemic.
This paper presents a philosophical examination of classical rock engineering problems as the basis to move from traditional knowledge to radical (innovative) knowledge. While this paper may appear abstract to engineers and geoscientists more accustomed to case studies and practical design methods, the aim is to demonstrate how the analysis of what constitutes engineering knowledge (what rock engineers know and how they know it) should always precede the integration of new technologies into empirical disciplines such as rock engineering. We propose a new conceptual model of engineering knowledge that combines experience (practical knowledge) and a priori knowledge (knowledge that is not based on experience). Our arguments are not a critique of actual engineering systems, but rather a critique of the (subjective) reasons that are invoked when using those systems, or to defend conclusions achieved using those systems. Our analysis identifies that rock engineering knowledge is shaped by cognitive biases, which over the years have created a sort of dogmatic barrier to innovation. It therefore becomes vital to initiate a discussion on the subject of engineering knowledge that can explain the challenges we face in rock engineering design at a time when digitalisation includes the introduction of machine algorithms that are supposed to learn from conditions of limited information.
This book contains articles on Kant's understanding of Methaphysics and his Philosophy of Religion from different scholars. I was the general editor of this series.
The aim of this paper is an analysis of the interaction of philosophy and natural sciences in Byzantine Empire. The cornerstone for this will be the clarification of the function of philosophy as a metascience (μεταεπιστήμη) in Greek thought, which grappled the order of things in its functional unity of macroscopic and microscopic observation of the world. This macroscopic observation was never at odds with microscopic research but was a universal science (καθόλου ἐπιστήμη) or science about scientifically knowable phenomena (ἡ μάλιστα ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), that is, philosophy. Despite philosophy being an activity closely linked to natural sciences, it is not a science in itself, even though it is often mistaken for such as a term. Philosophy as knowledge, or a function that leads to knowledge, is called science (ἐπιστήμη), but this does not make it equal to scientific disciplines. In the unity of all scientific disciplines, which are hierarchically ordered into a pyramid, philosophy always stands on top, it being a science about scientifically knowable phenomena. Out of all the scientific disciplines, philosophy is the one that leads to knowledge of first beginnings and causes. It is a general observation of reality, which secures the unity of scientifically knowable facts and phenomena. Philosophical knowledge as a “universal science” (καθόλου ἐπιστήμη) concentrates all partial findings into a unified whole. Philosophy is continually attempting to reach a global understanding, while science focuses on a microscopic observation of a specific part of the system.
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