ArticlePDF Available

EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements: Defining (Common) Rules of Conduct for European Lobbyists and Public Servants

Authors:

Abstract

The introduction of a provision in the Lisbon Treaty allowing European Union institutions to forge binding inter-institutional agreements (IIAs) draws attention to the limited research that exists on these instruments of EU governance. This article contributes to the development of this literature by presenting empirical evidence on two cases of decision-making on IIAs: on lobby regulation; and on the regulation of the conduct of EU public servants. In the first case the proposed IIA was successfully concluded; in the second, it was not. In contrasting these cases this article explains these differing outcomes with reference to the relevance of shared inter-institutional values and the mutual benefits of agreement. The findings suggest that both shared values and mutual interests are likely to be important in shaping successful IIA decision-making.
This article was downloaded by: [University of Bristol]
On: 17 August 2015, At: 02:49
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG
West European Politics
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20
EU Decision-Making on Inter-
Institutional Agreements:
Defining (Common) Rules of
Conduct for European Lobbyists
and Public Servants
Michelle Cini
Published online: 08 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Michelle Cini (2013) EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional
Agreements: Defining (Common) Rules of Conduct for European Lobbyists and Public
Servants, West European Politics, 36:6, 1143-1158, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2013.826022
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.826022
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or
suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed
in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should
not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
EU Decision-Making on
Inter-Institutional Agreements: Dening
(Common) Rules of Conduct for
European Lobbyists and Public
Servants
MICHELLE CINI
The introduction of a provision in the Lisbon Treaty allowing European Union
institutions to forge binding inter-institutional agreements (IIAs) draws attention to the
limited research that exists on these instruments of EU governance. This article contrib-
utes to the development of this literature by presenting empirical evidence on two cases
of decision-making on IIAs: on lobby regulation; and on the regulation of the conduct
of EU public servants. In the rst case the proposed IIA was successfully concluded; in
the second, it was not. In contrasting these cases this article explains these differing
outcomes with reference to the relevance of shared inter-institutional values and the
mutual benets of agreement. The ndings suggest that both shared values and mutual
interests are likely to be important in shaping successful IIA decision-making.
The ratication of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 saw the introduction of a
decision-making provision, Article 295, which for the rst time allowed EU
institutions to make binding inter-institutional agreements (IIAs). The introduc-
tion of this new provision makes it all the more important for researchers to
understand how such decisions are taken. Yet IIAs are under-researched. There
is no consensus on why there are now so many of these agreements more
than 100 according to Hummer (2007) or what functions they perform
(Brandsma 2012). IIAs have been said to be useful in lling in gaps as a
response to the Treatys incomplete contract, in a process labelled as informal
constitutionalisation(Christiansen and Reh 2009: 9). They have been
described as a stepping stone towards more formal decisions (Chryssochoou
2001: 153). They are claimed in some cases to improve the quality of law,
Correspondence Address: michelle.cini@bristol.ac.uk
West European Politics, 2013
Vol. 36, No. 6, 11431158, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.826022
Ó2013 Taylor & Francis
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
transparency and democracy in the EU and to stimulate debate (Versluis et al.
2011: 63; Puntscher Riekmann 2007); they are also said to assist cooperation
(Hummer 2007; Puntscher Riekmann 2007) while at the same time allowing
institutions to side-step formal procedures (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011: 92).
IIAs may even be used to enhance the status of individual institutions such as
the European Parliament (Judge and Earnshaw 2008: 49, 66, 240).
A notable gap in the academic literature on IIAs relates to IIA decision-
making which is the focus of this article. More specically, the research
enquires as to the conditions under which IIAs are most likely to be agreed;
and conversely under what conditions they are most likely to fail. The research
contributes to an explanation of IIA decision-making which emphasises the
importance of shared values and mutual benets. To do this the article focuses
on two cases: the regulation of EU lobbying; and the regulation of the conduct
of EU public servants. In the rst case the decision-making process culminated
in an IIA, whereas in the second though an IIA had been proposed no
agreement was possible.
The cases were selected because they differ in their outcomes. At the same
time the two cases have similar characteristics in that they both deal substan-
tively with public ethics issues; they both involve decision-making between the
European Commission and the European Parliament (EP); and they both took
place in the rst decade of the twenty-rst century. By keeping constant the
substantive content of the agreement, the actors participating in it, and the time
period, other factors which are likely to explain the variation in outcome can
more easily be identied (Yin 2009).
The case studies are based on an in-depth qualitative review of potentially
relevant texts. These texts include policy statements (speeches) by commission-
ers, Commission ofcials and MEPs and ofcial documents and reports
published primarily by the European Commission and the EP. The texts were
read both for their relevance to IIA decision-making and for more explicit
references to IIAs or inter-institutional cooperation. The texts were also
reviewed to ensure that the wider context in which they had been produced
was taken into consideration. This primary literature covers the period from
1999 to 2013, though some background material dates from an earlier period.
All of the documents used in this study are in the public domain.
The rest of the article is organised in the following way: the rst section
briey reviews the EU literature on IIAs and draws from this a framework
which might explain successful IIA decision-making. The second and third
sections examine the two cases in light of this framework. The second section
shows how and why actors in the EP and European Commission were able to
work together to construct an inter-institutional register of EU interest groups.
The third section shows how and why actors in the Commission advocating an
inter-institutional ethics regime, with an ethics committee at its core, failed to
achieve agreement on this issue. A fourth section summarises the ndings;
while the Conclusion considers how these ndings contribute to the literature
on IIA decision-making.
1144 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
Framing Inter-Institutional Decision-Making on IIAs
As concrete expressions of inter-institutional cooperation, IIAs can be broadly
dened as any informal of semi-formal bilateral or multilateral agreement
involving two or more EU institutions. They cover a wide subject matter
including budgetary and scrutiny policy, legislative decision-making and issues
such as transparency, subsidiarity, comitology, the Ombudsman and democracy.
A useful instrument of EU meta-governance, IIAs have proliferated over the
past 40 years, though it is only since the 1990s that they have become a focus
for academic research.
Most of the commentary to date on IIAs has come from lawyers. Their
contribution has involved the mapping of such agreements (Hummer 2007)
with somewhat lengthy consideration given over to their legal form and effect
(Klabbers 1994; Monar 1994; Snyder 1996). For non-lawyers, the most
engaging aspect of these discussions, and one that has been further developed
since the mid-2000s, is the impact of IIAs on the EUsinstitutional balance.
This questions the extent to which agreements outside the framework of the
treaties serve not only functional ends but also alter in a more fundamental
way the relationships between and among the EU institutions (Driessen 2008;
Hummer 2007: 70; Johnson 2012).
A project funded by the Austrian Ministry of Education, Science and Culture
in the mid-2000s led by Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann and Johannes Pollak helped
to expand on these themes. The project was particularly interested in discovering
whether IIAs benet the European Parliament and what impact they have had
on EU-level democracy. Much of this work was published in a special issue of
the European Law Journal in 2007 (see Slominski 2007). In that volume Kietz
and Maurer (2007) analyse cases in which IIAs have been used by the EP to
wrest control from the Commission and the Council. They show how the EP
created factson the ground in the hope that they might later be codied.
Puntscher-Riekmann (2007) agrees that IIAs may strengthen the EP and thereby
enhance EU democracy, yet she also acknowledges that there are risks involved
for EU democracy as IIAs can be rather opaque instruments of governance.
Eiselt et al. (2007) show how IIAs are useful in addressing technical issues but
are no substitute for institutional reform of a more formal kind. Beyond the
special issue, but within the wider project, Maurer et al. (2005) explore the
conditions under which the EP benets from IIAs, arguing that this is more
likely when the initiative rests on a clearly dened treaty base. By contrast Eiselt
and Slominski (2006) take issue with the tendency in the literature on IIAs to
focus on the benets to the EP. They argue that the Parliament is certainly not
the only institution to prot from such agreements.
While this debate in the core literature is primarily concerned with the inter-
ests that drive IIA decision-making and the benets that result from agreement,
it is only in drawing on a broader literature that we identify an alternative
approach. Christiansens research on inter-institutional cooperation in the EU
suggests an ideational perspective on IIAs (Christiansen 2001). He argues that
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1145
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
while EU intra-institutional relations were becoming more fragmented over the
course of the 1990s, a counter-trend affected inter-institutional cooperation.
This saw closer relationships develop across inter-institutional boundaries.
Christiansen identies three reasons for this: the existence of a shared
allegiance as civil servants of the EU; the experience of working within a
common bureaucratic culture; and the presence of an epistemic community of
experts in the highly technical matter of EU policy-making(Christiansen 2001:
765). All three point to the importance of shared inter-institutional values as a
driver of inter-institutional cooperation.
This article draws on both sets of arguments, treating the question of whether
values (ideas) or potential benets (interests) shape decision-making as an
empirical question. Only one study of IIAs uses a similar framework. Maurer
et al.s (2005: 213) foreign policy case study recognises that both distributional
bargainingor interestson the one hand and principles and ideas on the other
might be important in shaping IIAs. The authors argue, however, that interests
and ideas are involved in different ways depending on the level of inter-
institutional interaction(Maurer et al. 2006: 213); that ideas are likely to be more
important for higher level (constitutional) issues, whereas interests will matter
more at the operational level. In adapting Maurer et al.s framework in light of
the wider literature discussed above, this research expects to nd that shared
values provide a more convincing explanation of the success and failure of IIA
decision-making where matters of constitutional signicance are at stake; and that
where IIAs deal primarily with operational matters, success or failure is more
likely to turn on the existence or absence of mutual benets. The hypotheses
embedded in this theoretical framework are explored in the two cases that follow.
The Regulation of Lobbying
1
The EP rst debated lobby regulation in 1989. This led to the publication of
the Galle Report (European Parliament 1991), a detailed document which
amongst other things proposed a code of conduct to prevent abuses such as the
selling of documents and the misuse of premises, the establishment of no go
areas in the EP, and the annual registration of lobbyists. In addition the Report
recommended that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) should be
required to declare their own and their employeesnancial interests.
There was substantial resistance to this initiative from within the EP. This
reected the different national experiences of MEPs as well as their different
conceptions of their role as parliamentarians (European Parliament 2009: 94).
An absence of urgency on the issue meant that the debate became protracted,
dragging on over several years, and making it impossible for an agreement to be
reached before the end of the parliamentary term (Chabanet 2007: 2; European
Parliament 2008c: 8; Shepherd 1999: 15558). A second attempt, after the 1994
election, watered down some of the earlier proposals (European Parliament
1996). Yet this second proposal was also contentious and almost failed. A
last-minute compromise and an emphasis placed on the symbolic nature of the
1146 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
proposal, together with the fact that the media had begun to take some interest
in the initiatives progress seemed to sway opinion (European Parliament 2008c:
9; 2009: 94). The Report was approved and the Parliaments rules of procedure
were amended accordingly (European Parliament 1996). A code of conduct
based on a voluntary code already in existence was agreed in May the following
year (Chabanet 2007: 10).
Meanwhile the European Commission was troubled by the regulatory
approach adopted by the EP, fearing that the adoption of a similar system in the
Commission might undermine its ability to gather information from interest
organisations. The Commission favoured a self-regulatory approach which led it
to set up a system of guidance for interest groups, primarily public affairs con-
sultancies, to help them to develop their own industry standards in the form of a
professional code of conduct (Shepherd 1999: 157). In its 1992 Communication,
promoting an Open and Structured Dialogue with Special Interest Groups, the
Commission also agreed to set up a directory of groups later known as
CONECCS (European Commission 1992: 23). This was primarily established
as an internal resource, however, and was only later used as an instrument to
improve transparency externally.
Another decade passed before lobby regulation was reviewed by the EU
institutions. This happened in the context of a renewed interest in the subject
after 2005 in both the Commission and the EP, though the Commission was the
agenda-setter on this issue. Lobby reform was a key element within the
Commissions European Transparency Initiative (ETI) (Cini 2008; Kallas 2005).
This initiative was promoted by the new commissioner, Siim Kallas, who felt
strongly that tighter control of relations between lobbyists and Commission
ofcials was needed (Kallas 2005). There was some disagreement between the
Commission and pro-reform NGOs over how far the Commissions involvement
should stretch, however. Even those in the Commission like Kallas who
advocated reform were reluctant to impose mandatory registration, or get too
embroiled in the practical operation of the system. After a period of consultation
the Commission adopted a voluntary scheme and a code of conduct based on the
earlier industry code (SEAP 2000). A web-based Register was launched in May
2008. Registration was to be rewarded by early access to consultation, and a sys-
tem of monitoring and sanctions was introduced (European Commission 2007).
The Commission was keen to extend this initiative beyond its own institu-
tional walls and proposed, or as Commissioner Kallas put it at the time, sug-
gested,acommon inter-institutional register and code of conduct to cover the
Commission, EP and the Council (Kallas 2008: 3, 8). Kallas said that this has
been his original ambition from the very start of the ETI as he realised that it
was the model that stakeholders (or interest groups) preferred (Kallas 2008: 4).
Kallas also highlighted the extent of the consensus on the issue by this stage and
claimed that the differences between the institutions were merely administrative
(Kallas 2008). By all accounts the EPs response was favourable (European
Parliament 2008c: 5; Kallas 2008). The Committee on Constitutional Affairs
(AFCO) responded rst by organising a workshop with stakeholders (in October
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1147
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
2007) and then by appointing Alexander Stubb as rapporteur (replaced after the
2009 election by Ingo Friedrich) (European Parliament 2008c). The Report
drafted as a result of this process included a motion for a (non-legislative)
resolution which was ultimately approved by the Plenary on 8 May 2008.
Overwhelming support for the initiative across the political spectrum is
evidenced in the voting data of the ve committees that gave their Opinion on
the AFCO Report with at most one member only voting against in each commit-
tee. A similar pattern emerges from AFCO itself and in the nal plenary vote
(European Parliament 2008c). In terms of the principle of having some kind of
joint lobby system both the Commission and the EP were in agreement from the
start.
Even so the EP had concerns over whether a common Register would be
mandatory, the extent of the nancial information to be published, the organi-
sations that would be obliged to register, and whether the sanctions proposed
would provide an adequate deterrent to those tempted to provide misleading
information (European Parliament 2008c; Wallis 2011). The EP also wanted to
make sure that groups, especially those representing civil society, would not be
deterred by the new system from working with MEPs (European Parliament
2008a, 2008b). In an initiative unique to the EP, the voluntary application of
the legislative footprint, a list attached to a parliamentary report indicating
the interests consulted, was accepted as part of the project (European
Parliament 2008b; Wallis 2011). The Committee Report proposed that this
should also be considered by the Commission.
In accepting the Resolution, the EP expressed its support for the
Commissionsone-stop shopfor lobbyists. The EP called for an IIA to be
signed by the Commission, the EP and the Council (European Parliament
2008c). Diana Wallis, one of the EPs vice-presidents at the time, has
implied that this suggestion came from her and Alexander Stubb (Wallis
2011). From the outset the IIA was expected to set up a common manda-
tory register to entail full nancial disclosure,a common mechanism for
removal from the register and a common code of ethical conduct. However,
it was also stated that [b]earing in mind the essential differences
between the institutions, Parliament reserves the right to evaluate the
Commissions proposal when it is nalised and, only then, to decide on
whether to support it(European Parliament 2008b). It was agreed that a
joint working group be set up to consider the implications of the proposal
(European Parliament 2008c: 6).
The High-Level Working Group (HLWG) was led by Diana Wallis,
Vice-President of the Parliament, supported by MEPs Isabelle Durant, Jo
Leinen and Carlo Casini for the EP and for the Commission the responsible
commissioners, Siim Kallas, and after the 2009 election MaroŝŜefcoviĉ
(European Commission 2009a). The Council was also invited, but did not
choose to attend (Wallis 2011). The Group held meetings over the course of
2009 and 2010 to deal with concerns that were raised in the EP about the
operation of the proposed Register. There was no evidence to suggest that
1148 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
this was a very difcult process as the lines of division separating the two
institutions were very clear, and in a very short time, in fact already by April
2009, the Working Group had agreed a joint set of guidelines, a revised draft
of the code and a common webpage (European Commission 2009b). For the
Working Group to agree these initiatives so early spoke of the fundamental
support that existed across the two institutions.
Although the EPs position was that a mandatory regime was preferable,
it accepted that in the rst instance it would support the Commissions vol-
untary framework. It was recognised that by tying registration to access to
the EP buildings the new system would be in any case be quasi-mandatory
(Wallis 2011). A further difculty concerned the denition of the term lob-
byistwhich the Parliament felt had been too narrow in the Commissions
version of their Register (Wallis 2011). Bringing lawyers, think tanks, the
churches and local and regional authorities which baulked at being labelled
as lobbyists into the Register led to some heated arguments and a lot of
negotiations(Wallis 2011) with the groups concerned; yet a suitable compro-
mise expanding on the Commissions earlier denition was eventually found,
and there was no opposition in the Commission on this issue. Finally, those
leading the negotiations feared that the information provided in the Register,
especially on nancial disclosure, would be too vague to be meaningful, and
that its voluntary status meant that the system as a whole would be weak.
However, despite these concerns, many of which were pushed into a future
review of the agreement two years on (mid-2013), an IIA was eventually
approved by both the Parliament and the Commission in May 2011
(European Parliament and European Commission 2011). The joint register
and code of conduct became operational a few weeks later on 23 June 2011
coordinated by the new and highly innovative Joint Secretariat based in the
Commissions Secretariat-General and staffed by ofcials from both the
Commission and the EP (Greenwood and Dreher 2013: 1434).
In spite of some of the technical difculties and the different interpreta-
tions held by the two institutions, the agreement to set up an inter-institutional
Transparency Register was not particularly contentious. This marked a major
shift for both institutions when compared to the discomfort that the issue had
caused just over a decade earlier. Both institutions accepted the need to
improve the existing system; both saw efciencies arising out of a common
approach; both saw that this initiative was acceptable to stakeholders; and both
acknowledged that working together to that end would demand some
compromise on both sides. While the Commission was able to set the agenda
with its pre-existing Transparency Register, the EP was able to do what it does
best and propose amendments to the Commissions baseline proposal.
Ultimately the IIA that resulted involved some negotiation but without any of
the rancour that can characterise EPCommission relations. Even if neither got
entirely what they wanted, both institutions were satised with the outcome.
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1149
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
Regulating the Conduct of Public Servants
Since the 1990s public organisations across Europe have been developing new
ways to regulate the conduct of public servants. This has led to a proliferation
of ethics rules, codes and guidelines, ethics committees, and training and
consciousness-raising initiatives. A similar trend is visible within the EU insti-
tutions. It was only after 2000 that the EU institutions, and the Commission in
particular, began to take ethics seriously. The agenda was forced upon the
Commission as part of the reform programme that followed the resignation of
the College of Commissioners in March 1999 (see for example Macmullen
1999).
For Members of the European Commission (commissioners) the route to eth-
ical salvation was to come via internally agreed Codes of Conduct, the rst of
which was formally agreed in September 1999 (European Commission 1999).
This has since been revised twice in 2004 and 2010 (European Commission
2004, 2011). The Code identies the standards of conduct expected of commis-
sioners. It deals with nancial interests and assets; business travel, receptions
and professional representation; post-employment cooling offperiods; as well
as the receipt of gifts, honours and other benets (Cini 2010, 2013; European
Commission 1999, 2004, 2011). Advising the Commission President on the
post-employment aspects of the Code is an Ad Hoc Ethical Committee
(European Commission 2003). This is a rather opaque advisory body that might
be labelled semi-independent, composed of three senior European notables.
The approach is soft and non-regulatory. It puts the Commission President at the
heart of the Commissions ethical decision-making system.
By contrast, the post-1999 ethics regime for Commission ofcials was dealt
with in a more regulatory manner by means of the revisions to the EUs Staff
Regulations (Cini 2010; European Union 2004). These were rewritten in 2004
to include reworked provisions on the loyalty obligations of ofcials, rules on
whistleblowing and new disciplinary procedures to apply in the event of
misconduct. Beyond these provisions other initiatives have encouraged greater
awareness of ethical issues. A network of ethics contacts was established
throughout the Commissions services; individual departments such as the
Directorate General (DG) Competition have developed bespoke Codes; and
new training courses on ethics have been set up. The one-stop shop website on
ethics issues which is a work-in-progress provides ofcials with a useful
central online resource (Năstase 2012). EP ofcials are also subject to the Staff
Regulations. Beyond the general framework there are relatively few bespoke
initiatives on ethics relating solely to parliamentary ofcials, though impor-
tantly, since 2009, parliamentary assistants, now categorised as temporary
agents, are covered by these rules (with the exception of the provisions on
political neutrality) (European Parliament 2011: 27). This system is inherently
inter-institutional even if individual institutions are able to develop their own
supplementary ethics systems.
1150 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
While MEPs have been quick to challenge the Commission for its ethical
failures, they have been much slower and more reluctant to revise their own
ethics system. Although there were numerous criticisms of the Parliament in the
past along the lines that MEPs ddle their expenses(van der Laan 2003: 1),
these have not until very recently reached the intensity experienced by the
Commission. Yet MEPs have had a framework to guide their conduct since
1996 (Chabanet, 2007: 8; European Parliament 1996); and since the mid-1990s
they have been required to make and update declarations of nancial interests
(ECPRD 2001: 61). These and other rules on transparency were enshrined in
the Parliaments Rules of Procedure (ECPRD 2001: 58). However, for a long
time the vast majority of Members paid no heed whatsoever to the obligation
to declare their nancial interests (Chabanet 2007: 9), and the ethics rules, in
any case rather limited in scope, were poorly enforced. Since the mid-1990s
support for revisions to the existing system has grown, driven by an inux of
new and primarily young and reform-minded MEPs. The establishment of the
Campaign for Parliamentary Reform (CPR) in March 2001 coincided with
hostile press attention over the failure of some MEPs to declare their interests
(see European Voice, 7 June 2001 and 19 July 2001; see also ECPRD 2001:
61). This gave moral weight to the arguments of the reformers and provided the
context for the agreement of a Single Statute in 2005 (European Parliament
2005). This did not encompass a full-edged ethics system, however.
It was not until 2011 that the Parliament nally agreed to overhaul it legisla-
tive ethics regime for MEPs. This was a direct response to the cash-for-laws
scandal that hit the Parliament in March of that year, the result of a stingby
the UK newspaper The Sunday Times. Undercover journalists recorded four
MEPs admitting that they would accept bribes in exchange for proposing
amendments to draft EU legislation (The Sunday Times, 20 March 2011). This
provoked the President of the Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, to set up a Working
Group of MEPs to propose reforms. There was a debate at this time over
whether an independent ethics committee ought to be set up but this proposal
was rejected by the Working Group. It was agreed, however, that a Code of
Conduct would be drafted and a ve-member advisory committee (of MEPs)
would investigate alleged breaches of the Code. The new ethics system came
into force on 1 January 2012 (European Parliament 2011: 23).
Since initiating its own reform in late 1999 the Commission has twice
pushed for a joint inter-institutional ethics system with the EP (with the Council
also invited to participate). On both occasions the Parliament has rejected the
Commissions overtures. The EP, by contrast, has preferred to rely on its powers
of scrutiny over the executive. This continues the role it has played effectively
since the 1990s, when it sought to put pressure on the Commission to respond
to accusations of ethical misconduct. In this way the EP has continued to nd
new avenues for shaping the Commissions ethics framework while rejecting
participation in joint initiatives.
At the administrative level the situation has been rather different. As
mentioned earlier, ofcials working in both the Commission and the Parliament
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1151
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
are employed in accordance with the Staff Regulations. This means that many
of the formal ethics rules that apply to ofcials in the Commission also apply
to ofcials in the EP. When the Staff Regulations were revised from 2002 to
2003 ethical issues did not constitute a particularly contentious element in the
negotiations. Other more difcult issues dominated discussions in the planning
stage in the inter-institutional Staff Regulations Committee. At subsequent
stages of the legislative process the EP had little inuence since the revision of
the Staff Regulations was governed by the consultation procedure and as such
the EP was able only to present an Opinion on the Commissions proposal.
The idea of setting up an inter-institutional committee, provisionally labelled
the Advisory Group on Standards in Public Life after its UK equivalent was rst
raised by the Committee of Independent Experts (CIE) in its highly inuential
Second Report published in September 1999 (Committee of Independent
Experts 1999: para. 7.7.15, Recommendation 7.16.9; see also European Voice,
29 July 1999). The reference in the Report is rather vague, with little detail on
the form the Committee should take other than that it should be a joint
committee incorporating not only the Commission (Van Gerven 2000). As a
consequence, a reference to an Advisory Group appeared in the Commissions
2000 White Paper on Reform (European Commission 2000) and this led the
Commission to draft a proposal later that same year. This was transmitted to the
Council in late 2000 and to the EP in early 2001. Although the Commission
was keen to promote inter-institutional cooperation on this matter, early attempts
to negotiate with the EP suggested that pursuing the initiative at this time would
be pointless, and it was quickly set aside (Bounds 2005).
The Commissions proposal remained on the table to be reactivated several
years later in 2005 in the context of the European Transparency Initiative. This
was provoked by the media storm over accusations that Commission President
Barroso had taken a holiday on the yacht of an old friend who had received
substantial EU funds. Responding to this criticism, Barroso wrote a letter to
the President of the EP, Josep Borrell, stating that though he felt he had done
nothing wrong he accepted that some oversight of his role might be necessary
as he alone was responsible for his own ethical conduct under the Code of
Commissioners (European Voice, 4 May 2005). He stated that this oversight
should take the form of an inter-institutional initiative. Referring to the 2000
proposal, he argued that he was ready and willing to negotiate with the EP on
this issue (Bounds 2005).
This was in line with the spirit of the ETI, which planned to develop ethi-
cal standards in the EU institutions. The Commission used this framework at
the time to channel the argument in favour of an inter-institutional approach to
ethics. Kallas even made references to the creation of a European ethical
space, though what this meant in practice was never claried (Cini 2007:
18096). A Commission Inter-Departmental Working Group (European
Commission 2005) tasked with drafting a Communication on ethics subse-
quently linked the inter-institutional initiative to a revised version of Code of
Conduct for Commissioners. Indeed, the Colleges view was that future
1152 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
revisions of the Code would only be useful if it [was] part of an
inter-institutional debate on an inter-institutional Advisory Group(European
Commission 2005: 7).
From the Parliaments perspective inter-institutional decision-making on
ethics continued to be a matter of keeping the Commission in check rather than
agreeing to work cooperatively with the Commission to create some kind of
inter-institutional regime. As the issue was seen as political rather than adminis-
trative or technical, an IIA was not deemed an appropriate instrument to use to
this end. This is illustrated in the way in which the Parliament responded to
Commission requests to link the revision of the CommissionersCode to an
inter-institutional agenda. First, the Parliament had already made sure that the
revised Inter-Institutional Framework Agreement signed between the two institu-
tions in 2010 included a reference to the Parliaments right to scrutinise the
Code (European Parliament and European Commission 2010); and second the
Parliament asked that a condential version of the Code not yet in the public
domain be given to the Conference of Presidents for consideration behind
closed doors prior to its formal approval by the College of Commissioners.
The Commissions enthusiasm for an inter-institutional response may be
viewed rather cynically as a short-term delaying tactic or as a way of deect-
ing attention towards the lack of an ethics system in the Parliament. The
inter-institutional approach might also allow the Commission to pre-empt
future parliamentary criticism over ethical issues if it is closely locked into a
system with the Parliament. Not surprisingly the Parliament resisted any loss
of autonomy on ethics-related issues. To agree to the Commissions request for
an inter-institutional system would have allowed the Commission to set or at
least shape its agenda, reversing the traditional scrutiny relationship of
Commission and Parliament and this was unacceptable to the Parliament. As
such, no inter-institutional agreement was possible in this case.
Shared Values and Mutual Benets: The Conditions of Successful
Inter-Institutional Decision-Making
This research began by hypothesising that both shared values and mutual benets
might be important in shaping the success or failure of IIA decision-making.
More specically, it was posited that where IIA decision-making was of constitu-
tional signicance, shared values would be more important in shaping the
outcome of the process than mutual benets. Conversely, where only operational
matters were at stake, shared values would become less relevant to the success or
failure of IIA decision-making, with mutual benets becoming more important.
To what extent do the two cases provide evidence in support of this hypothesis?
The ndings suggest that in both cases shared values and mutual benets
were important in conditioning the success or the failure of IIA decision-
making. The rst case, on lobby regulation, primarily comprised a technical or
administrative process. There were no contested constitutional issues to
address, and the issue was not politically sensitive. The nal agreement was
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1153
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
built on the back of mutual benets, but was only possible because of an
earlier convergence of values over an appropriate lobby regulation system. The
contrast between the reform process of the 2000s and the divergent positions
of the two institutions only a decade earlier demonstrate this clearly. The sec-
ond case, that of public ethics, is constitutional in character. Here there is an
absence of both shared values and mutual benets. It is more difcult in this
second case to prove the negative, that is, to show that the absence of shared
values and mutual benets led to the failure of the IIA. What is clear is that
the values of the two institutions on this issue were very different, as were the
benets that would accrue to each of them should an IIA be concluded.
In the rst case, that of lobby regulation, the initiation and negotiation of a
joint register for lobbyists for the two institutions was presented from the
outset as a way of resolving certain problems with the management of interest
organisations at EU level. The assumptions underpinning the lobby reform
agenda were normative in the sense that they comprised a set of beliefs about
what good governance (with regard to lobby regulation) ought to look like in a
modern public organisation (whether that organisation is an executive or a leg-
islative body). The process by which the IIA came onto the EU agenda, and
the way in which it was negotiated, with little controversy, point to the mutual
benets for both institutions cooperating on this issue. Lobbyists would still be
able to contribute fully to EU decision-making, but they would be less able to
abuse their position in that process. This was important given that both institu-
tions were heavily dependent on the advice and expertise of interest organisa-
tions. An agreement would demonstrate to the outside world that both
institutions saw both the pitfalls and the advantages of engagement with out-
side interests, and the necessity of introducing greater transparency into the EU
decision-making process. These characteristics of the IIA decision-making
process are particularly noteworthy given the difculties the two institutions
had in seeing eye-to-eye on the issue back in the 1990s. It is as though the
issue had shifted within the space of a decade or so from being highly
political one might say constitutionally signicantfor the two bodies’–to
one which was by-and-large a matter or ironing out administrative technicali-
ties. In sum, it was both the existence of (or convergence of) shared values
and a set of uncontroversial mutual benets that made a successful IIA
possible.
In the second case, the experience of the two institutions was very different,
and attempts to create a joint inter-institutional ethics system were unsuccessful.
This is not a matter of proving a negative (the absence of shared values) as
much as demonstrating that the values held by the two institutions were very
different with regard to this issue. In this case the values of the two institutions
were closely related to their formal constitutional roles within the EU system of
governance, that is, the EP as (co-)legislature and the Commission as executive.
It is ironic that it was pressure from the EP that shunted the Commission into its
new era of ethics reform at the end of the 1990s; and throughout the 2000s it
was pressure from the EP that effected change in the Commission when
1154 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
enthusiasm for yet another revision of the Commissioners Code of Conduct
waned. But the EPs position was very different from that of the Commission.
There was relatively little external pressure on it, even from NGOs whose focus
of attention remained primarily with the Commission. There was a continued
adherence to a view of parliamentarianism which saw the EP as answerable only
to its electorate and determined to maintain its autonomous position, subject to
as little regulation or as few accountability mechanisms as possible. Even the
new system adopted in 2011 rejected the idea of an independent committee to
oversee the conduct of MEPs.
But just as the values of the two institutions differed, so too did the interests
or likely benets that might be derived from setting up an inter-institutional
ethics regime. The Commission had everything to gain and could see the advan-
tages in such an approach as it would make it more difcult for the EP to
criticise Commission ethics. As a consequence, the EP could only lose from any
joint agreement.
Conclusion
This article began by enquiring into the conditions under which decision-making
on IIAs succeeded or failed. The research rested empirically on two similar
issues, each of which had had IIAs proposed for them. The purpose of the article
was to examine why in the rst case on lobby regulation a successful
decision-making process led to an IIA, whereas in the second on public
ethics no agreement was possible. The article adopted a framework which
identied the relative importance of interests and ideas in IIA decision-making,
conceptualising the latter as mutual benetson the one hand and shared val-
ueson the other. It hypothesised that shared values would be more important in
cases of constitutional signicance; whereas where operational matters were con-
cerned mutual benets would determine the success or failure of the agreement.
The evidence presented in this article demonstrated that both shared values
and mutual benets were important in determining the success or failure of
inter-institutional decision-making, regardless of whether the issues were of
constitutional signicance or not. This conclusion rejects the above hypothesis.
It also differs from the thrust of much of the existing literature on IIAs, which
has focused either on the legal form and effect of the agreements or on the
benets accruing to only one party to the agreement, the EP. While the
ndings in this research do not argue that the EP does not benet, it does
supplement the existing literature by focusing attention on a wider range of
variables than is commonly discussed with regard to IIAs. It demonstrates the
advantages of adopting a broader theoretical perspective when analysing IIA
decision-making and suggests that the way forward for research in this eld is
to investigate the involvement of all parties to the agreement rather than just
one, and to be open to the possible inuence of both interests (benets) and
ideas (values) as mediating variables conditioning the success or failure of IIA
decision-making.
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1155
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
Note
1. The research in this section of the article is drawn from joint work conducted with Nieves
Pérez-Solórzano Borragán.
References
Bounds, Andrew (2005). Barroso Seeks Watchdog to Vet Conicts of Interest,Financial Times,
26 April.
Brandsma, Gijs Jan (2012) Hidden Parliamentary Power: Informal Information-Sharing between
EU Institutions from Agenda-Setting to Execution, paper presented at the UACES Conference,
Passau, Germany, 35 September.
Chabanet, Didier (2007). The Regulation of Interest Groups in the European Union, discussion
paper presented at the Connex Thematic Conference on Accountability, Florence, 2930 June.
Christiansen, Thomas (2001). Intra-institutional Politics and Inter-Institutional Relations in the EU:
Towards Coherent Governance?,Journal of European Public Policy, 8:5, 74769.
Christiansen, Thomas, and Christine Reh (2009). Constitutionalizing the European Union.
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. (2001). Theorizing European Integration. London: Sage.
Cini, Michelle (2007). From Integration to Integrity: Administrative Ethics and Reform in the
European Commission. Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press.
Cini, Michelle (2008). European Commission Reform and the Origins of the European Transpar-
ency Initiative,Journal of European Public Policy, 15:1, 74360.
Cini, Michelle (2010). Éthique et Réforme Administrative de la Commission Eeuropéenne,Revue
Française dAdministration Européenne, 133, 4560.
Cini, Michelle (2013). Institutional Change and Ethics Management in the EU College of Commis-
sioners,British Journal of Politics and International Relations, doi:10.1111/1467-856X.12008.
Committee of Independent Experts (CIE) (1999). Second Report of the Committee of Independent
Experts, September.
Driessen, Bart (2008). Interinstitutional Conventions and Institutional Balance,European Law
Review, 33:4, 55062.
ECPRD (European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation) (2001). Parliamentary
Codes of Conduct in Europe: An Overview, Strasbourg: European Parliament), available at
http://www.ecprd.org/Doc/public/OTH/CodeofConduct.pdf, 2001/11/00 (accessed 10 October
2005).
Eiselt, Isabelle, and Peter Slominski (2006). Sub-constitutional Engineering: Negotiations, Content
and Legal Value of Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU,European Law Journal, 12:2, 20925.
Eiselt, Isabelle, Johannes Pollak, and Peter Slominski (2007). Codifying Temporary Stability? The
Role of Interinstitutional Agreements in Budgetary Politics,European Law Journal, 13:1, 7591.
European Commission (1992). Communication on An Open and Structured Dialogue between
the Commission and Special Interest Groups”’,Ofcial Journal 93/C 63/02.
European Commission (1999). For a European Political and Administrative Culture: Three Codes
of Conduct, Brussels, March.
European Commission (2000). Reforming the Commission: A White Paper, Part II Action Plan,
COM (2000) 200 nal/2, Brussels, 1 March.
European Commission (2003). Commission Decision Setting Up the Ad Hoc Ethical Committee
Foreseen by the Code of Conduct of Commissioners, C(2003) 3750 of 21 October 2003.
European Commission (2004). Code of Conduct for Commissioners, SEC(2004) 1487/2.
European Commission (2005). Commission Staff Working Document Report of the Inter-Departmen-
tal Working Group on a Possible European Transparency Initiative”’, SEC(2005) 1300 nal.
European Commission (2007). Communication from the Commission of 21 March 2007 Follow-
up to the Green Paper European Transparency Initiative”’, COM (2007) 127 nal.
1156 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
European Commission (2009a). Conference of Presidents Minutes of the Ordinary Meeting of 15
October 2009, PV CPG 15.10.2009, PE7/CPG/PV 200904, PE 429.03/CPG.
European Commission (2009b). The European Transparency Initiative: The Register of Interest
Representatives One Year After, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council, COM (2009) 612, 29 October.
European Commission (2011). Code of Conduct for Commissioners, SEC(2011) 2904.
European Parliament (1991). Galle Report, PE 2000/405, 16 March.
European Parliament (1996). Report on the Amendment of Annex I of the Rules of Procedure Con-
cerning Transparency and MembersFinancial Interests(Nordmann Report), European Parliament,
30 May, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&refer-
ence=A4-1996-0177&language=EN (accessed 12 February 2007).
European Parliament (2005). MembersStatute. European Parliament Resolution on the Amendment
of the Decision of 4 June 2003 on the Adoption of the Statute for Members of the European Parlia-
ment, P6_TA(2005) 0245 (2005/2124(INI)).
European Parliament (2008a). Development of the Framework for the Activities of Interest Repre-
sentatives (Lobbyists) in the European Institutions, Procedure File, INI/2007/2115.
European Parliament (2008b). Framework for the Activities of Lobbyists in the EU Institutions,
Text adopted by the Parliament, P6_TA-PROV(2008) 0197, A60105/2008.
European Parliament (2008c). Report on the Development of the Framework for the Activities of
Interest Representatives (Lobbyists) in the European Institutions, Committee on Constitutional
Affairs (Rapporteur: Alexander Stubb) A60105-2008, 2 April.
European Parliament (2009). Building Parliament: 50 Years of European Parliament History 1958
2008. Luxembourg: Ofce of Ofcial Publications.
European Parliament (2011), Parliamentary Ethics: A Question of Trust, European Parliament/
OPPD: Brussels.
European Parliament and European Commission (2010). Framework Agreement on Relations
between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ L304/47, 20 November.
European Parliament and European Commission (2011). Agreement on the Establishment of a
Transparency Register for Organisations and Self-Employed Individuals Engaged in EU Policy-
making and Policy Implementation, OJ L191/29 of 22 July 2011.
European Union (2004). Staff Regulations of Ofcials of the European Communities, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf (accessed 10 February 2006).
Greenwood, Justin, and Joanna Dreger (2013). The Transparency Register: A European Vanguard
of Strong Lobby Regulation?,Interest Groups and Advocacy, 2:2, 13962.
Hummer, Waldemar (2007). From Interinstitutional Agreementsto Interinstitutional Agencies/
Ofces?,European Law Journal, 13:1, 4774.
Johnson, Desmond (2012). When Agreements lead to Conict: Interinstitutional Agreements and
the Institutional Balance. A Coherent Relationship?, Paper presented at the UACES Conference,
Passau, Germany, 35 September.
Judge, David, and David Earnshaw (2008). The European Parliament. 2nd ed Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Kallas, Siim (2005). The Need for a European Transparency Initiative, Speech given at Notting-
ham Business School, University of Nottingham, SPEECH/05/130, 3 March.
Kallas, Siim (2008). The European Transparency Initiative: A Great Opportunity for Lobbyists,
Speech to the America European Community Association, SPEECH/2008/216, Brussels, 25 April.
Kietz, Daniela, and Andreas Maurer (2007). The European Parliament in Treaty Reform: Predening
IGCs through Interinstitutional Agreements,European Law Review, 13:1, 2046.
Klabbers, Jan (1994). Informal Instruments Before the European Court of Justice,Common Market
Law Review, 31:5, 9971004.
Lelieveldt, Herman, and Sebastian Princen (2011). The Politics of the European Union. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Macmullen, Andrew (1999). Political Responsibility for the Administration of Europe: The
Commissions Resignation March 1999,Parliamentary Affairs, 52:5, 20210.
EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements 1157
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
Maurer, Andreas, Daniela Kietz, and Christian Völkel (2005). Interinstitutional Agreements in the
CFSP: Parliamentarisation through the Backdoor, EIF Working Paper Series, Working Paper,
No 5. Vienna: Institute for European Integration Research.
Monar, Jörg (1994). Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its New Dynamics after
Maastricht,Common Market Law Review, 31:4, 693719.
Năstase, Andreea (2012). Managing Ethics in the European Commission Services: From Rules to
Values,Public Management Review, 15:1, 6381.
Puntscher-Riekmann, Sonja (2007). The Cocoon of Power: Democratic Implications of Interinstitu-
tional Agreements,European Law Journal, 13:1, 419.
SEAP (Society of European Affairs Professionals) (2000). Code of Conduct, Brussels.
Shepherd, Mark. P. (1999). The European Parliament: Getting the House in Order, in Philip Norton
(ed.), Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe. London: Routledge, 14566.
Slominski, Peter (2007). The Fabric of Governance: Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU,
European Law Review, 13:1, 23.
Snyder, Francis (1996). Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional Limitations,in
G. Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law. Berlin: Nomos Verlag, 45366.
Van der Laan, and Lousewies, (2003). The Case for a Stronger European Parliament. London:
Centre for European Reform.
Van Gerven, and Walter, (2000). Ethical and Political Responsibility of EU Commissioners,
Common Market Law Review, 37:1, 15.
Versluis, Esther, Mendeltje van Keulen, and Paul Stephenson (2011). Analyzing the European Policy
Process. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Wallis, Diana (2011). EU Transparency and Lobbying, Speech at University College London Public
Policy, 1 November.
Yin Robert, K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 4th ed. London: Sage.
1158 M. Cini
Downloaded by [University of Bristol] at 02:49 17 August 2015
... Throughout time, regarding the shape and form of lobbying regulation, the three institutions could be placed on a policy continuum in which the Council was at one extreme (no regulation), the Commission was somewhere in the middle (supporting voluntary, incentives-and transparency-based regulation) while the EP was located closer to the 'more regulation' side of the spectrum by adopting a rhetoric demanding a more comprehensive in scope and transparency regulatory regime. 3 The Commission evolved over time from a strong preference for a 'partnership arrangement' with certain organizations and no formalized regulation, to that of a voluntary, incentives-based TR, to now supporting a mandatory Register covering all three institutions (Cini 2013). On issues of accountability and procedural transparency, the Commission and EP's positions became more closely aligned amid ongoing debates about EU democratic deficit, increasing Euroscepticism and distrust in supranational institutions. ...
... Institutional agreements are key in the process of 'informal constitutionalisation' aimed at addressing issues that were unaddressed or only incompletely addressed in the text of the Treaties (Christiansen and Reh 2009: 9, cited in Cini 2013). Embedded in article 295 of the Lisbon Treaty, interinstitutional agreements constitute a legal instrument that rest somewhere in between a legal act and a political declaration (Cini 2013). They are legally binding and rest on the idea of 'sincere' or 'loyal' cooperation between EU institutions. ...
... However, despite its (relatively) more ambitious rhetoric asking for a mandatory TR, the EP has never introduced a register recording the meetings between interest groups and MEPs or their staff members, nor has it ever adopted more stringent rules regulating lobbying activities within its premises or involving its elected members. Cini (2013) discusses this nuanced EP position on lobbying regulation across time and political groupings. 4. http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage. ...
Article
Full-text available
Designing a regime regulating supranational lobbying is a contentious topic in the EU interinstitutional dialogue. Recently, the Commission drafted a proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register, and during this formulation process it consulted broadly with stakeholders. A key question is to which stakeholders has the Commission aligned itself with when designing this proposal? I argue the Commission acted as a legitimacy maximizer aiming to bolster its leverage in interinstitutional negotiations. To enhance input legitimacy, it had to build a reputation for being a responsive and representative policy initiator. To enhance output legitimacy, it needed a reputation for being a competent regulator. The analyses show the Commission prioritized input over output legitimacy and building a reputation for regulating lobbying in line with preferences of stakeholders representing the public interest. In politicized contexts, the Commission trades long- standing policy networks for a realignment with stakeholders that serve its legitimacy needs.
... According to this body of literature, the ultimate goal of lobby registers is to reduce and prevent corruption (Bauhr, Czibik, de Fine Licht, & Fazekas, 2019;Bauhr & Grimes, 2014. As a prevention tool, lobby registers allow citizens to monitor and hold accountable elected politicians helping them identify misconduct in the interaction between lobbyists and policymakers (Bunea, 2018;Cini, 2013;Pal, 2012, p. 175). ...
... The anti-corruption aspect on lobby registers has emerged in the policy agenda of the EU (Bunea, 2018(Bunea, , 2019Cini, 2008Cini, , 2013European Commission, 2007;Kanol, 2012;Milicevic, 2017) and the OECD (Alter, 2010). The OECD recommendations for regulating lobbying, setting ethical conduct, managing conflict of interest, and regulating public procurement all share "a strong moral stance against corruption, bribery, and inappropriate influence in the policy process, as well as support for ethics and integrity in the public service" (Pal, 2012, p. 175). ...
Article
Full-text available
Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Union (EU) recommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such measures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second parliamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.
... The extent to which transparency-based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors, and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance by both regulated actors and the general public, constitutes a key empirical issue in the literature on regulatory governance (Graham 2002;Fung 2006;Weil et al. 2006;Fung et al. 2007;Baldwin et al. 2012). This is also a fundamental topic raised in relation to the EU lobbying regulation regime: the literature questions the extent to which increased transparency and information disclosure improve lobbying practices and ensure unbiased, accountable and legitimate participation of interest groups in supranational decision making (Greenwood 2011;Cini 2013;Greenwood & Dreger 2013;Smismans 2014). A central question is whether the Register contributes to the legitimacy of supranational policy making by being recognised as an effective regulatory tool by both its regulatory targets (interest groups) and its users (the public). ...
... The extent to which these transparency measures have managed to achieve their desired policy objectives remains however a topic open to inquiry and debate in need of systematic empirical assessment (Smismans 2014). The main approach in the literature on lobbying regulation is to focus on the institutional side and to comparatively examine and explain levels of lobbying regulation across political systems (Greenwood & Thomas 1998;Chari et al. 2010Chari et al. , 2007Holman & Luneburg 2012), or to examine through detailed case studies different institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes (Greenwood 2011;Cini 2013;Greenwood & Dreger 2013). It is important, however, to understand and empirically map how the regulated actors themselves perceive and evaluate the efficiency, sustainability and legitimacy of regulatory regimes aimed at structuring their lobbying activities and participation in decision making. ...
Article
Full-text available
Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency-based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency-based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation-level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.
... They can result in important changes to the institutional status quo. However, the literature pays little attention to the Commission's role in these negotiations (exceptions are Stacey, 2012 andCini, 2013). This neglect is surprising given that the Commission enjoyed agenda-setting (drafting) power in some negotiations and several agreements introduced additional constraints on its institutional autonomy and power. ...
... the EC as to the opportunity and the way lobbying should be regulated. While the EP favoured an interventionist approach in the form of a public lobby register, the EC was lukewarm to the idea as it preferred to keep its doors open to a wide variety of interest representatives (Cini 2013(Cini , p. 1147. The EP managed to launch its register in 1996, which was voluntary but incentivised: access passes to EP premises (valid up to one year) were granted to those who signed up and thereby publicly declared the organizations they represented, the nature of their activities in the EP, as well as any gifts or services granted to MEPs (Greenwood 1998, Chabanet 2006. ...
Article
Full-text available
The regulation of lobbying activities nowadays represents an internationally recognized standard of good governance. Such measures usually consist of mandatory public registers of lobbyists, meant to increase scrutiny and account-holding over the activities of lobbyists in the political and policy arena. In parallel to public regulation, industry-led initiatives have proliferated in recent years, in the form of private codes of conduct sponsored by professional lobbyists’ associations. However, existing research on lobbying regulation has largely ignored these developments. The article addresses this research gap. It proposes that codes of conduct developed by practitioners’ associations should be assessed through a professional ethics framework and tests this approach in a case study of the European Union (EU). Findings shows that, although the relationship between professionals and the beneficiaries of their services is central to the ethics of any profession, the codes of conduct developed by the EU associations neglect lobbyists’ obligations towards those whose interests they represent. Having been created in response to the threat of public regulation, these private codes sought to reassure the EU institutions of lobbyists’ integrity, leading to a narrow interpretation of ‘ethical’ lobbying as not exercising a corrupting influence over public officials or the public decision-making process.
... They can result in important changes to the institutional status quo. However, the literature pays little attention to the Commission's role in these negotiations (exceptions are Stacey, 2012 andCini, 2013). This neglect is surprising given that the Commission enjoyed agenda-setting (drafting) power in some negotiations and several agreements introduced additional constraints on its institutional autonomy and power. ...
Article
Full-text available
The negotiations that precede the adoption of EU interinstitutional agreements present relevant opportunities for political entrepreneurs to politicise the interinstitutional dialogue. This study asks when and how does the European Commission politicise the negotiations of EU interinstitutional agreements? Building on a classic model explaining the politicisation of EU at domestic level, the study argues that the Commission has incentives to politicise negotiations when these revolve around substantive agreements that propose relevant change, when it anticipates autonomy or power losses and opposition on behalf of negotiations counterparts. Politicisation is used as a tool for re-legitimisation with a view to strengthening the power to shape negotiation outcomes. Stakeholder consultations and issue framing are instruments used to deploy classic politicisation strategies of expanding publicity, the universe of actors and controversy. The study shows how the Commission politicised the negotiations of two most recent agreements on a mandatory Transparency Register and Better Law-making.
... Thus, one of the key discussions in existing analyses is whether it is ideas or interests that drive actors to push for, accept or tolerate more differentiation. However, while this distinction between interests and ideas makes sense analytically it can be difficult to observe empirically (Cini, 2013). A practice approach argues that the social world escapes such distinctions. ...
Article
Full-text available
This article advances a practice‐approach to differentiated (dis)integration in European security and defence in light of Brexit. We propose that understanding how differentiation in the area of security and defence is given meaning on the ground requires examining the everyday social practices of officials and military professionals. Therefore, we focus on the “low politics” of security and defence cooperation in Europe. We do so by entering the diplomatic “engine room” in the EU's Political and Security Committee. We show how arguments that Brexit will be the ultimate death blow to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy or that it will be the catalyst for deeper military cooperation, fail to take account of the social dynamics and the historical path of existing security and military cooperation in Europe. Future research on differentiation should pay particular attention to how such mechanisms plays out in everyday social negotiation of meaning among practitioners.
... However, this distinction between interests and ideaswhile it makes sense analyticallyis difficult to observe empirically. For instance, Michelle Cini (2013) concludes that both interest and ideas matter in the negotiation of inter-institutional agreements. A practice approach would argue that the social world escapes such distinctions. ...
Article
Full-text available
This article explores how practice theory can be recruited for the study of European integration. New generations of EU researchers are fascinated by the prospect of leaving the armchair and studying the people and artefacts that make the EU on an everyday level. This article surveys key practice-oriented, anthropological and micro-sociological studies of the EU and European integration and shows how their findings challenge more traditional understandings of the dynamics of European integration. Moving beyond a stock-taking, the article distinguishes between 'ordering' and 'disordering' practices and explores the potential of a practice turn in EU studies for both theory (overcoming dualism, replacing substantialism with processualism and rethinking power) and methods (including unstructured interviews, fieldwork and participant observation). A practice turn will force us to rethink core assumptions about the EU and allow us to grasp otherwise uncharted performances and social activities that are crucial for European integration.
Article
Full-text available
During the 2000s–2010s, EU Commission and Parliament and European interest groups advanced a specific model of regulation. It combines, on one side, lobbyists self‐regulation—the codes of conduct for EU lobbying professionals' associations, such as SEAP and EPACA—with institutional nonbinding or “soft” regulation on the other side—the EU Transparency Register framework for registered interest groups, its code of conduct, the related system of checks, alerts, and complaints about interest groups misconduct put forward by the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, the list of Dos and Don'ts by the EU Ombudsman. This paper examines the peculiar lobbying self‐regulation and soft regulation tools and practices, as implemented within the EU model: SEAP and EPACA codes of conduct, EU Transparency Register, EU Interest Groups Code of Conduct, Commissioners and MPs codes of conduct, the procedures of the EU Joint Transparency Register Secretariat, and the Ombudsman list of Dos and Don'ts, underlining their growing impact on interest groups registration to the EU Transparency Register. This EU innovative regulatory model‐based on a peculiar mix of self‐regulation and institutional, incentive‐based, soft regulation‐stands as a concrete alternative to the traditional North American top‐down binding regulatory pattern. The EU model is based on a participatory, cooperative, and pragmatic dialogue between European policy makers and interest groups. Clarifying the concept, the nature, and the functions of this model, while underlining its peculiarity is the purpose of this paper.
Article
Full-text available
This article offers a systematic exploration of why interest groups sign up to the European Union Transparency Register, a non‐binding lobby regulation system. We distinguish between instrumental and normative perspectives to explain voluntary compliance, and find that concern for one's reputation represents the most important motivational driver. Based on this, we suggest that the Transparency Register can be understood as a “voluntary club” sponsored by European institutions. This theoretical perspective captures the appeal of the instrument among lobbyists, but also a number of inconsistencies in its current design, which make it unviable in the long term. We outline implications for the ongoing reform of the Transparency Register, and more generally for the regulation of lobbying activities. The analysis draws on semi‐structured interviews with various types of lobbyists active in Brussels, and on data from public consultations organized by the European Commission.
Book
A new introduction to the European Union which uses the lens of comparative politics. This approach helps students understand the EU through comparisons with domestic politics and links with broader debates in political science. The text is supported by numerous examples, and chapters include briefings, fact files and controversy boxes which highlight important information and controversial issues in EU politics to widen and deepen student understanding. The authors have developed online 'Navigating the EU' exercises that introduce students to useful sources of information on the internet and help them to analyse policy-making in the EU. This textbook is a comprehensive introduction to EU politics and covers history, theory, key institutions and participants, as well as policies and policy-making.
Article
Interinstitutional arrangements cover the length and width of the European Union's activities. They are very diverse in nature and many of them are not based on law. Such political arrangements are best analysed in terms analogous to constitutional conventions as they exist in national constitutional law. This paper explores the impact that these interinstitutional conventions have on the institutional balance doctrine developed by the Court of Justice and discusses their limitations.
Article
Fully revised and updated throughout, Theorizing European Integration 2nd edition provides a comprehensive introduction to the theoretical study of European integration. Combining perspectives from international relations, comparative politics and social and political theory, Dimitris N. Chryssochoou offers a complete overview of the many competing approaches that have sought to capture and explain the evolving political nature of the European Union (EU) and its qualitative transition from a union of states to a polity in its own right. Contemporary issues, themes and theories addressed include: the different uses and current state of EU theorizing, statecentric accounts of integration and their critics, new normative challenges to the study of the EU, the political dynamics of European treaty reform, new forms of democracy, citizenship and governance, the limits and possibilities of EU constitutionalism, interdisciplinary understandings of EU polityhood, the introduction of a theory of organized synarchy, the transformations of state sovereignty in late modern Europe.
Article
Can the European Parliament (EP) provide a democratic leadership link with citizen followers? Because there is no EU government, the EU cannot be authorized by and accountable to the EP which has had to exercise leadership in three other ways. First, it acted as a visionary constitutional entrepreneur in preparing the draft Treaty of European Union and the abortive Constitutional Treaty. Second, the EP has held the Commission to account and influenced and legitimized its agenda through prior authorization. Third, the EP has contributed to policy leadership, notably in environment, water policy, and biotechnology. Nevertheless, the EP's past and likely future leadership role derives from the fact that as the only directly elected supranational institution, it can offer the prospect of participative followership.
Article
Over the past decades, transparency of European policy making has been high on the political agenda. Most attention is paid to public access to documents and other information, be it in terms of the scope of access to documents regulations or the degree to which transparency is a necessary prerequisite for the democratic functioning of the European institutions. Although transparency towards the general public has unquestionably increased since the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty, a parallel trend of increasing information-sharing between the European institutions has for the most part been overlooked. Compared to the number of public transparency requirements of the Commission, Council and Parliament, the number of inter-institutional information sharing requirements is vast. This article presents an overview of these rules, which for the most part are not mentioned in the Treaties but rather are hidden in the rules of procedure of the institutions, or in informal agreements between them. The analysis shows that there is a dense web of inter-institutional information-sharing rules that strongly affects European Union policy-making processes which benefit some institutions more than others, even to the degree of fundamentally altering the division of powers that is provided for in the Treaties.