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Devotion in Dixie and beyond: A Test of the "Shibley Thesis" on the Effects of Regional Origin and Migration on Individual Religiosity
Abstract
This article examines the relative prominence of religion in the American South, in light of two contemporary phenomena: increased interregional mobility in the United States, and the rise of American evangelicalism. We investigate the effects of regional migration and non-migration on church attendance and importance of faith in the South as compared to the rest of the country. Results show that religiosity increases when people move to a region of high religious commitment, and decreases when one moves to an area where religious commitment is lower. The evidence suggests that the South maintains its religious distinctiveness for natives, but the prospects of maintaining as strong a religiosity for those who migrate out of the South are low. These findings call into question Mark Shibley's thesis (1996) about the sources of the resurgence of American evangelicalism.
... Thus far, the study of religiosity and migration has focused on how migrating impacts a person's level of religiosity, leading social scientists to identify interesting trends in religious behavior among migrants in receiving countries (e.g., Bosswick and Husband 2005;Connor 2008). Although there is general agreement that aspects of religiosity change because of migration (Smith et al. 1998), some research suggests that migration decreases religious participation (Finke and Stark 1992), while other studies suggest that it increases an immigrant's spiritual consciousness and participation (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003;Warner 1998). Despite this ambiguity, it is evident that migration has an impact on people's beliefs, place of worship, and level of religious involvement (Levitt 1998;Smith et al. 1998), and this change seems to be associated with gender, religious affiliation, family structure, economic activity, and marital status once in the receiving country (Connor 2008;Van Tuburgen 2006). ...
... Although there is general agreement that aspects of religiosity change because of migration (Smith et al. 1998), some research suggests that migration decreases religious participation (Finke and Stark 1992), while other studies suggest that it increases an immigrant's spiritual consciousness and participation (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003;Warner 1998). Despite this ambiguity, it is evident that migration has an impact on people's beliefs, place of worship, and level of religious involvement (Levitt 1998;Smith et al. 1998), and this change seems to be associated with gender, religious affiliation, family structure, economic activity, and marital status once in the receiving country (Connor 2008;Van Tuburgen 2006). ...
International migration has become an important topic of discussion from a policy and humanitarian perspective. Part of the debate includes a renewed interest in understanding the factors that influence decisions about migration to the US among Mexican youth still residing in their country of origin. The purpose of this study was to advance knowledge specifically about internal and external religiosity and their influence on youths' migration aspirations. The data for this study were collected in 2007 from students enrolled in an alternative high school program located in the state of Guanajuato, Mexico. The findings indicated that as external religiosity increases, the desire to work or live in the USA decreases. Furthermore, as internal religiosity increases, the desire to work or live in the USA and plans to migrate increase. The results are interpreted and discussed in light of previous research on religious and cultural norm adherence.
... As Stump (2008, p. 21) suggests, though, the relevant contextualization for religious identity is actually at the local level, where ''religions are created and reproduced most immediately through processes of interaction that are primarily local in scale…'' Few empirical studies of individual religious identity have sample sizes that are sufficient to facilitate examination of this connection for local communities. When Smith et al. (1998) test for the contextual effects on religious behavior of Southern evangelists, they contrast those who stayed in the South and those who out-migrated from the South, but focus primarily on influences at the regional (South) level, inferring the influence from differences between out-migrants and stayers. More recent research on adolescent religiosity finds influences of ''microcontexts'' (e.g., friends, family, schoolmates) (Regnerus et al. 2004), as well as ecological and socialstructural contexts (Roehlhepartan et al. 2011). ...
... Hartman and Kaufman (2006) suggest that in terms of how ethnicity is intertwined with their religious identity, Jews in fact are not as different as one would expect. In research on evangelicals, Smith et al. (1998) concluded that regional differences matter, since life-long Southerners are more religious than non-Southerners, but out-migrating Southerners do not carry their stronger levels of religiosity with them. However, we do not know whether this regional variation reflects self-selection (e.g., out-or in-migration to a compatible region) or the impact of the religious environment itself. ...
While much research shows the relationship between individual-level variables, such as Jewish background, education, age, and income and an individual’s Jewish identity, very little research has systematically addressed the question of community context, either general or Jewish, as a factor influencing Jewish religious or ethnic identity. This lack of research has been partially a result of the lack of an adequate data set to facilitate such analysis. Using the newly-aggregated Decade 2000 data set, with its 19,800 cases spread across 22 Jewish communities, we find that despite the anecdotal evidence and the logic that suggests that environment impacts behavior, the environmental impact on Jewish identity is clearly weak. Individual characteristics are much stronger than community context in explaining variations in the strength of Jewish identity.
... Several demographic characteristics have been tied to youth religiosity, although there is less evidence regarding their affect on change in religiosity over time. In many studies, young women are more likely to be religious than young men and participate more actively in religious institutions (Gunnoe & Moore, 2002;Smith et al., 2002;Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998;Wallace et al., 2003;Willits & Crider, 1989). Among adult women, this difference has been explained by women's reduced participation in the labor force (De Vaus & McAllister, 1987). ...
... Young people and adults in the South are more likely than people living in other parts of the United States to report high levels of religious attachment (Gunnoe & Moore, 2002;Smith et al., 2002;Wallace et al., 2003). Smith et al. (1998) found that this applies primarily to Southerners who lived in the region in both adolescence and adulthood, and somewhat for those who moved to the South after age 16. Southerners who move out of the region demonstrate significantly less religious attachment compared to nonmigrant Southerners. ...
This study examines changes in religious service attendance over time for a contemporary cohort of adolescents moving from middle to late adolescence. We use two waves of a nationally representative panel survey of youth from the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR) to examine the dynamics of religious involvement during adolescence. We then follow with an analysis of how demographic characteristics, family background, and life course transitions relate to changes in religious service attendance during adolescence. Our findings suggest that, on average, adolescent religious service attendance declines over time, related to major life course transitions such as becoming employed, leaving home, and initiating sexual activity. Parents’ affiliation and attendance, on the other hand, are protective factors against decreasing attendance.
... Several religions are unlikely gender emancipatory and explicitly reinforce traditional divisions of labor, including Islam and Hindu [44,49]. Nonetheless, migration alters many aspects of religiosity for migrants [84]. It can enhance religious consciousness and practices [41], decline their level of religious participation over time [1,60,98], and challenge traditional gender beliefs of migrants. ...
This study reviews the inclusion of ‘gender’ and ‘integration’ in the policies and legislation designed to facilitate the integration of women migrants and their impacts on migrant’s gender ideology in two European legislative regimes: Germany and Sweden. The study is conducted in four steps; (1) a thematic analysis of twenty conventions and recommendations of the UN, ILO, and EU, (2) latent analysis of ten policies/pieces of legislation, (3) survey with women migrants, and (4) in-depth interviews with experts. This study finds that existing legal frameworks do not fully comply with the international legal frame to meet women migrant’s ‘gender’ and ‘integration’ needs, although the situation seems relatively better in Germany than in Sweden. It is found that migration has brought positive changes in gender ideology for migrants in many arenas, except one. Migrant’s satisfaction with legal measures also contributes to this transition. The study summarizes three groups of barriers to the transformation of gender ideology for both countries. These are; agency-specific, institution-specific, and state-specific.
... It is important that my students understand how social and political effects of religious practices and beliefs do not operate solely through individual beliefs but through a larger social context at the level of an entire community or population. For example, Smith (2017) has shown how regional differences in the United States increase or decrease people's religiousness, independently of the religion they practice (see also Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998). The context then, through downward causation from the social to the personal level, exerts influences on the people living in it, independently of the religious characteristics of the people. ...
The study of religion and international religions has witnessed an exponential growth in recent decades. Courses and programs exploring the complex entanglements between faith and global politics have likewise mushroomed around the world. Despite this ferment, reflections on teaching religion and international relations have so far lagged behind. This forum seeks to remedy this general silence. It brings together a diverse range of scholars from a multiplicity of national, religious, methodological, and theoretical backgrounds who teach across a variety of different geographical settings including North America, Europe, and East Asia. Contributors reflect on three broad themes. First, how do we engage with the contested character of religion as a category of analysis and practice, and with the multidisciplinary nature of its study? Second, how does the context within which we operate—be it geographical, cultural, institutional, or historical—influence and shape who, what, and how we teach? Third, how do we address the important and, at times, contentious personal and ethical challenges that our research and teaching on religion and politics inevitably raises in the classroom?
... Research has shown that geographic mobility can shape changes in religious involvement and affiliation (Bibby 1997;Smith et al. 1998;Smith and Sikkink 2003). Moving can introduce an individual to new social networks containing different religious affiliations. ...
Religion has been, and continues to be, a source of external hostility and internal struggle for many sexual minorities. This has potential implications for the observed religious origins and current religious affiliations of individuals identifying as a sexual minority. Regarding origins, self-identified sexual minorities might be less likely than heterosexuals to have come from religious traditions that have tended to be hostile to minority sexualities, as individuals raised within those traditions might be hesitant to identify as a sexual minority even if they have same-sex attractions. Regarding destinations, self-identified sexual minorities might be more likely than heterosexuals to switch away from religious traditions that have tended to be hostile to minority sexualities. We examine these expectations using nationally representative survey data from the 2008 to 2014 General Social Surveys. The analysis shows that sexual minorities do not significantly differ from heterosexuals by the religious traditions in which they were raised. Sexual minorities are, however, more likely than heterosexuals to move away from Christian traditions and towards disaffiliation or reaffiliation with “other” traditions that include Judaism, Buddhism, and liberal nontraditional religions such as Unitarian Universalism. For gay and lesbian individuals, these patterns of disaffiliation and reaffiliation can be attributed to higher on average education and lower likelihood of being married and having children; however, these sociodemographic factors do not explain the disaffiliation and reaffiliation of bisexual individuals. Further research should explore the different religious experiences of sexual minority sub-groups.
... Historically, rates of church attendance and evaluations of religion's importance have been highest in the American South (Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Despite broader patterns of American secularization, the South retains a "distinctive regional culture" where church affiliation remains even a relevant topic for polite small talk (Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998). This suggests that relative to the rest of the country-and particularly the more secular Northeast and American West-religious institutions remain highly compatible with other foci of social activity in the American South. ...
Triadic closure is the common tendency for connections to emerge between people's social network ties. This phenomenon has clear implications for congregational networks and may underlie many of the social benefits associated with church involvement. Less documented in the sociology of religion, is the occurrence of triadic closure involving congregational and noncongregational relationships within people's close personal networks. To conceptualize this boundary-spanning network overlap, we elaborate the concept of trans-congregational triadic closure (TCTC). Using data from the Portraits of American Life Survey—a project that examines both general and congregation-specific networks of U.S. adults—we consider how religious tradition, macro-level context, and individual factors predict the occurrence of TCTC in churchgoers' networks. Findings suggest pronounced differences between evangelicals and mainline Protestants, a considerably lower likelihood of TCTC in densely populated areas, and higher likelihoods of TCTC corresponding with long durations of congregational involvement. We conclude by noting some of the implications of TCTC for the lives of individual believers and for religious organizations, and suggest ways that this concept could elucidate further aspects of contemporary religious life.
... Recently, part of this literature has shown how religiosity affects, among other things, school attendance (Freeman, 1986), educational attainment of women (Lehrer, 2004), taxmorale (Torgler, 2006), corruption (Sommer, Bloom, & Arikan, 2013), well-being (Gundlach & Opfinger, 2013;Opfinger, 2010), health (Ellison, 1991) and, most importantly, wages (Chiswick, 1983), income and growth (Barro & McCleary, 2003;Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2003). 3 So far, the link between religion and migration has mainly focused on the effects of migration on religiosity at individual level (Bosswick & Husband, 2005;Connor, 2008;Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998). While Finke and Stark (1992) suggest that migration lowers religious participation, other studies emphasize the fact that migration increases an immigrant's spiritual consciousness and participation (Hagan & Ebaugh, 2003;Warner, 1998). ...
This paper studies radical Islam as a determinant of individuals’ willingness to migrate. Surprisingly, despite its relevance in the political debate, this topic has not been investigated empirically in the literature. In order to fill this gap, we develop a model of the decision to migrate focusing in particular on the role played by cultural traits. More specifically, we focus on radical Islam as a deterrent for migration. Following Berman (2003), we define radical Islam as a set of ideologies, also referred to as Political Islam, holding that Islam should guide not only personal life, but also social and political life. In our model, more radical values imply a higher psychological cost of migrating. This cost derives from the fact that connections with socio-religious friends and neighbors are generally not maintained after migration, thus deterring individuals from migrating (Mayers, 2000). We then test empirically the predictions of the model, using individual-level data from the second (2010–11) and third (2012–14) waves of the Arab Barometer. Our results suggest that, ceteris paribus, more radical individuals are less willing to migrate. This finding is robust to alternative specifications of the model and to the use of Instrumental Variables and Propensity Score Matching aimed at addressing the potential endogeneity of radical Islam. The result is also qualitatively unchanged when using aggregate data on actual outflows of migrants.
... In the economic literature there is a growing body of research indicating that cultural factors play an important role for economic behavior (Fogli and Fernandez, 2009;Guiso et al., 2006Guiso et al., , 2009Tabellini, 2010). Recently, part of this literature has shown how religiosity affects, among other things, school attendance (Freeman, 1986), educational attainment of women (Lehrer, 2004), tax-morale (Torgler, 2006), corruption (Sommer et al., 2013), well-being (Opfinger, 2010;Gundlach and Opfinger, 2013), health (Ellison, 1991) and, most importantly, wages (Chiswick, 1983), income and growth (Guiso et al., 2003;Barro and McCleary, 2003). 2 So far, the link between religion and migration has mainly focused on the effects of migration on religiosity at individual level (Smith et al., 1998;Bosswick and Husband, 2005;Connor, 2008). While Finke and Stark (1992) suggest that migration lowers religious participation, other studies emphasize the fact that migration increases an immigrant's spiritual consciousness and participation (Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003;Warner, 1998). ...
... In the economic literature there is a growing body of research indicating that cultural factors play an important role for economic behavior (Fogli and Fernandez, 2009; Guiso et al., 2006 Guiso et al., , 2009 Tabellini, 2010). Recently, part of this literature has shown how religiosity affects, among other things, school attendance (Freeman, 1986), educational attainment of women (Lehrer, 2004), tax-morale (Torgler, 2006), corruption (Sommer et al., 2013), well-being (Opfinger, 2010; Gundlach and Opfinger, 2013), health (Ellison, 1991) and, most importantly, wages (Chiswick, 1983), income and growth (Guiso et al., 2003; Barro and McCleary, 2003). 2 So far, the link between religion and migration has mainly focused on the effects of migration on religiosity at individual level (Smith et al., 1998; Bosswick and Husband, 2005; Connor, 2008). While Finke and Stark (1992) suggest that migration lowers religious participation, other studies emphasize the fact that migration increases an immigrant's spiritual consciousness and participation (Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003; Warner, 1998). ...
... Region of residence comprised four dummy variables regarding whether or not (coded 1 or 0 respectively for each region in the United States) respondents lived in the Northeast, South, North Central, or West in Round 4 survey year 2000. It reflected previous research findings (e.g., Smith et al., 2002;Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998) that adolescents who resided in the South were the most likely to attend religious services weekly and the least likely never to attend compared with youth from other regions in the United States. For purposes of the multivariate analyses described below, the South served as the missing or reference category. ...
This study examined the effects of parent religiosity, family processes, and peer influences on adolescent behavior in light of social control and social learning theories. Data were obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997. Findings of the study sample of 1,911 adolescents indicated that parent religiosity was positively associated with good health and higher levels of education, while inversely related to substance abuse. Adolescents with authoritarian parents had higher levels of delinquency, worse health, and worse mental health than those with permissive parents. Adolescents with uninvolved parents completed fewer years of schooling. Compared with parental religiosity and family processes, peer influences had the most influential effects on delinquency, substance abuse, education, and, to a lesser extent, mental health.
... Significantly, migration to less committed regions diminishes religious devotion, while moving to more pious areas enhances religious participation and the importance of faith (C. Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998). Personal religious devotion is significantly less predictive of church attendance among whites in the South than for those in other regions of the country (Stump, 1986). ...
Recent birth cohorts of Americans are more likely than previous cohorts to be raised out-side of a religious tradition. In addition, those raised with no religion are increasingly likely to have no religion as adults. Despite their growing numbers, individuals raised with no religion have received lit-tle attention from scholars. The adult religious preferences of these individuals provide researchers with a unique opportunity to test theories of religion and social change. Using General Social Survey data, I examine the adult religious preferences and beliefs of individuals raised with no religion. I pro-vide evidence of a shift in socialization and social influences experienced by those who report growing up with no religion. Compared with earlier cohorts raised with no religion, more recent cohorts have had more secular upbringings and tend to be more secular, liberal, and wary of organized religion as adults. They are also more likely to have a religiously unaffiliated spouse, if they marry at all. Results from a logistic regression analysis indicate that these trends explain much of the cohort differences in the likelihood of remaining unaffiliated as an adult.
... Previous research has established differences in Jewish infrastructure across communities (e.g., Dollinger 2000;Sheskin 2001), as well as variations in religious identity and practices (both Jewish and non-Jewish) across regions or communities (e.g., Graham 1983;Kosmin and Keysar 2006;Phillips 1993;Sheskin 2001Sheskin , 2005aSilk and Walsh 2008;Smith et al. 1998;Stump 2008). One of the relevant sources of variation is size of the Jewish population. ...
This paper explores the manner in which Jewish community contexts relate to Jewish identity. We employ the Decade 2000 Data Set that contains almost 20,000 randomly selected Jewish households from 22 American Jewish communities interviewed from 2000 to 2010. Because of the large sample size, and its incorporation of community infrastructure data, this research also is able to examine various influences on Jewish identity that have not been definitively addressed in previous research, including the manner in which characteristics of Jewish community infrastructure are related to individuals’ Jewish identity. The Decade 2000 Data Set used for the analysis is described and some of the methodological considerations involved in its use are presented. Jewish identity is conceptualized as multidimensional, and a factor analysis results in four Jewish identity factors: a communal religious factor, a private religious factor, a broader ethnic factor, and a local ethnic factor. Multiple regressions for each of the Jewish identity factors are related to Jewish community characteristics; more commonly researched individual-level variables (Jewish background and connections, family status, socioeconomic status, demographic/geographic characteristics); and survey-level variables (such as size of sample and year of study) are also controlled. Surprisingly, except for the local ethnic factor, Jewish community characteristics have little relationship to individual Jewish identity. The contributions to a “sociology of Jewish place” and suggestions for further research are also discussed.
... Region of residence comprised four dummy variables regarding whether or not (coded 1 or 0 respectively for each region in the U.S.) respondents lived in the Northeast, South, North Central, or West in Round 4 survey year. It reflected previous research findings (e.g., Smith et al., 2002;Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998) that adolescents who resided in the South were the most likely to attend religious services weekly and the least likely never to attend than youth from other regions in the U.S. For purposes of the multivariate analyses described below, the South served as the missing or reference category. Urban status was a dichotomous measure signifying whether respondents were living in an urban or rural area (coded 1 or 0 respectively) as of the Round 4 survey date. ...
This study examined the effects of parent religiosity, family processes, and peer influences on a nationally representative sample of adolescents stratified by ethnicity/race in light of social control and social learning theories (N = 1,911). Findings revealed the differential impact of parent religiosity, family processes, and peer influences on delinquency, substance abuse, physical and mental health, and educational attainment of adolescents stratified by ethnicity/race. On the whole, findings providedevidence of conditions under which social control vs. social learning theories might be better guides to therapeutic interventions that incorporate religious components, while they also highlighted limitations or boundaries of related practices.
... Region of residence comprised four dummy variables regarding whether or not (coded 1 or 0, respectively for each region in the U.S.) respondents lived in the Northeast, South, North Central, or West in Round 4 survey year. It reflected previous research findings (e.g., Smith et al., 2002;Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998) that adolescents who resided in the South were the most likely to attend religious services weekly and the least likely never to attend than youth from other regions in the U.S. For purposes of the multivariate analyses described below, the South served as the missing or reference category. Urban status was a dichotomous measure signifying whether respondents were living in an urban or rural area (coded 1 or 0, respectively) as of the Round 4 survey date. ...
This study examined the relative influence of religiousness on a sub-sample of adolescents (N = 1911) from a nationally representative sample of youth. Outcome measures included delinquency, substance abuse, physical health, mental health, and education. The study controlled for family processes and peer influences, as well as a variety of sociodemographic factors.Parent religiosity and family processes, especially parental styles, are found to influence girls more so than boys, while exposure to peer influences affects both boys and girls on all outcome measures except delinquency. Findings highlight gender related similarities and differences that should be taken into account when providing interventions to adolescents and their families.
... Research on American adults has shown regional effects on religiosity (Smith et al. 1998). We find similar effects on the religious participation of American youth. ...
Sociologists know surprisingly little about the religious attitudes and practices of adolescents in the United States. This article begins to redress that lack of knowledge by examining descriptive findings on adolescent religiosity and attitudes toward religion from two recent, reputable national surveys of American youth. We present descriptive statistics on three fundamental aspects of subjective youth religiosity (importance of religion, frequency of prayer, born again status) and four measures of youth attitudes of alienation toward religion (agreement with parents, approval of churches, desired influence of churches, financial donations to churches). We also examine the influences of gender, race, age, and region on most of these religious outcomes. This descriptive inquiry should help to increase understanding of and to help lay down a baseline of essential descriptive information about American adolescent religiosity. Further research is needed to investigate the social influence of different kinds of religiosity on various outcomes in the lives of American youth.
... A third limitation is the unique relationship between southerners and religion. Southerners attend church more often than individuals from other regions (Smith, Sikkink, & Bailey, 1998) and rural areas in the South are commonly referred to as the ''Bible Belt" (Fitcher & Maddox, 1965). Addressing these limitations in a replication of the current study would be both informative and interesting. ...
It has been purported that univariate analyses may be too simplistic when studying correlates of religiosity and spirituality (Thoresen & Harris, 2002). Consequently, the current study evaluated the relationships between religiosity, spirituality, and personality at both the univariate and multivariate levels. Our results suggest strong relationships between these constructs at both levels. At the univariate level, all religiosity and spirituality variables, excluding the Extrinsic orientation, demonstrated significant associations with the Big Five. However, at the multivariate level, the Extrinsic orientation, in conjunction with the Quest orientation and the Intrinsic orientation, demonstrated a significant association with the Big Five. These findings support the supposition that religious and spiritual constructs ought to be examined at a multivariate level and further explicates the nature of religious and spiritual constructs by grounding them within a comprehensive taxonomy of personality.
... Local churches in the South are characterized by higher religious commitment than those in the West. Others have observed that people who move from the South to other regions tend to decrease their church attendance and their faith becomes less important (Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998). In addition, movers become cultural "cowbirds," learning so much about local culture that their knowledge equals or surpasses that of lifelong residents (Griswold and Wright 2004). ...
The authors coin the term double embeddedness to denote the two-sided nature of communities, markets, and organizations-where social, political, and economic actions are embedded in social structure and culture. Structural embeddedness and cultural embeddedness and their interactions are variable, dynamic, and complex. The authors develop a typology based on these two forms of embeddedness, illustrating four ideal-types with examples from the United States and Europe. Two paths of stability and change in the United States are analyzed. The first is the observed decline of social capital coupled with the observed stability of shared values. The second is the hypothesized geographical polarization of values and networks, such as red versus blue states. Applying Coleman's macro-micro-macro model, it is shown that these two paths are the first and second cycles of a two-cycle model of social change. Also analyzed are some of the social mechanisms (situational, action formation, and transformational) that underlie this two-cycle model.
... First, the religiousness of the majority population in the United States is relatively stable at a high level whereas in the Netherlands it is one of the lowest in the world (Becker and De Hart 2006). Previous studies have found that when moving to more secular surroundings, migrants tend to become more secular (Inglehart and Norris 2009;Smith, Sikkink, and Baily 1998;Stump 1984). Second, the majority of the migrants in the US come from a Christian background, like the majority (Firebaugh and Harley 1991), ...
In this dissertation, I set out to describe religiosity and religious trends among the Dutch Muslim population, and to assess the influence of the social integration of Muslims in co-ethnic minority and majority social networks. Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands migrated from countries in which the vast majority of the population is Muslim (such as Turkey and Morocco), to a relatively secular context, in which Islam is truly a religion of immigrants. The second generation is currently growing up, and is caught between the religious world of their parents and the broader secular environment. In addition to being relatively secular, attitudes towards Muslims in the Netherlands have become quite negative in recent periods. Against this background, I asked what were the trends in religiosity of immigrants and their offspring and how these relate to their social integration. Contrary to expectations from a secularisation perspective, I did not find strong evidence of religious decline over time or generations. Rather, my analyses show relatively stable religious alignment of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch populations at a very high level over time. Being Muslim remains an important part of the social identities of many of the Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch across both generations. Moreover, religious identification has clear behavioural implications so that most self-identified Muslims engage in some form of religious practice. Finally, religiosity is also consequential in terms of attitudes towards crucial life choices (such as partner choice) and towards religion in the public domain (such as the role of religion in politics). In line with the key role of embeddedness within the minority group in explaining high degrees of religious continuity, religion is successfully transmitted within immigrant families and further reinforced by co-ethnic friends, and to a lesser extent by the presence of co-ethnic neighbours. At the same time, I found that the more Dutch majority friends Muslims have, and the more they identify as Dutch, the less religious they are. The role of the majority however, is smaller than that of the minority in predicting religiosity, particularly religious practice. The fact that social integration in the majority group does not manifest itself in lower levels of religiosity among the second generation as compared to the first may be related to relatively high levels of ethnic segregation along with negative experiences of discrimination, which tend to reinforce religiosity. Previous expectations and findings in the Netherlands of religious decline across generations and over time are challenged by my research on most recent data. I even find some support for increased practice among the second generation in recent years, off-setting a downward trend among the first generation
... On the one hand, Wuthnow and Christiano (1979) argued that migration was inherently disruptive and led to reduced participation after a move. On the other hand, Warner (1998) argued that " the distinctive need of people in a mobile, heterogeneous society to link themselves with others of their own kind " would make religion " more salient " for immigrants.In addition, a large literature suggests that immigrant status is just one of many factors affecting religious participation, including age (Alanezi and Sherkat 2008; Argue, Johnson, and White 1999; Campbell and Curtis 1994; Connor 2008; Firebauch and Harley 1991; Ploch and Hastings 1994; van Tubergen 2006), gender (Abusharaf 1998; Alenazi and Sherkat 2008 George, 1998; Hout and Greeley 1987; Lummis 2004; Miller and Hoffman 1995; Miller and Stark 2002; Min 1992; Stark 2002; van Tubergen 2006;), marital and family status (Alenazi and Sherkat 2008; Campbell and Curtis 1994; Connor 2008; Iannaccone 1990; Kurien 2002; Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998; Tilikainen 2003; Veglery 1998; van Tubergen 2006), education ((Alenazi and Sherkat 2008; Connor 2008; Kelly and De Graaf 1997; Ploch and Hastings 1994; Smith, Sikkink, and Bailey 1998; van Tubergen 2006), and employment (Campbell and Curtis 1994; Edgell 2005; Finke and Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1990; van Tuberen 2006). ...
Using data from the New Immigrant Survey, we examine the religious beliefs and practices of new legal immigrants to the United States. We find that Christian immigrants are more Catholic, more Orthodox, and less Protestant than American Christians, and that those immigrants who are Protestant are more likely to be evangelical. In addition to being more Catholic and more Orthodox than American Christians, the new immigrants are also paradoxically less Christian, with a fifth reporting some other faith. Detailed analysis of reported church attendance at places of origin and in the United States suggest that immigration is a disruptive event that alienates immigrants from religious practice rather than "theologizing" them. In addition, our models clearly show that people who join congregations in the United States are highly selected and unrepresentative of the broader population of immigrants in any faith. In general, congregational members were more observant both before and after emigration, were more educated, had more cumulative experience in the United States, and were more likely to have children present in the household and be homeowners and therefore yield biased representations of all adherents to any faith. The degree of selectivity and hence bias also varies markedly both by religion and nationality.
... Secondly, religiosity may change in degree as well as expression. Some studies of internal migration between more and less religious regions of the United States conclude that individuals adapt to their environments to at least a modest extent (Stump 1984, Smith et al. 1998, Iannaccone & Makowsky 2007. Similarly, people coming from abroad-and more specifically their descendants-may become more religious in the United States (Warner 1998, Greeley & Hout 1999, Kurien 2002, Foley & Hoge 2007; but see Connor 2009b) or less religious in more secular countries (Van Tubergen 2006Connor 2008Connor , 2009aPhalet et al. 2008). ...
What happens to the religious identity, belief, and practice of Muslims who settle in Western countries? Do they, or their children and subsequent generations, gradually become more secular? Or do they react against the dominant ethos and perceived prejudice by becoming more religious? We review recent research that touches on these questions. Most Muslim immigrants outside the United States come from rural areas of less developed countries where religiosity is higher than in the receiving societies. Residence in areas of high coethnic concentration, support from religious communities, and religious endogamy help to maintain religious commitment. The situation is more complicated for the second generation. Western culture has an influence, but structural integration does not necessarily reduce religiosity. Some children of immigrants try to follow a “real” Islam that has been purified of culturally specific practices. Hostility toward Muslims may lead some to react by increasing their own religious involv...
... Regional concentrations of denominations have led to some characteristic patterns in the United States, generally described as a more " devoted " South and a relatively irreligious West (Shibley 1996, Stark & Bainbridge 1985). Recent research demonstrates that migration to less committed regions diminishes religious devotion, while moving to more pious areas enhances religious participation and the importance of faith (Smith et al 1998). African Americans from the South, and especially the rural South, have high rates of religious participation and are unlikely to switch to nonreligion (Ellison & Sherkat 1995, Sherkat & Ellison 1991). ...
The sociology of religion is experiencing a period of substantial organiza-tional and intellectual growth. Recent theoretical and empirical papers on the sociology of religion appearing in top journals in sociology have generated both interest and controversy. We begin with a selective overview of re-search on religious beliefs and commitments. Second, we investigate the in-fluence of religion on politics, the family, health and well-being, and on free space and social capital. Finally, we review rational choice theories in the so-ciology of religion and the controversies surrounding applications of these perspectives.
Religion plays an important part in the lives of many immigrants. The second generation is assumed to have a higher level of integration into the host society and lower religious and ethnic identification. This assumption, however, views acculturation as an essentialist process producing common outcomes for all groups. Yet such an assumption needs to be tested with different ethnic groups. This chapter, therefore, explores the cases of second generation Pakistani and Indian immigrant youth in Hong Kong. The findings indicate that it is not possible to generalise across these groups. Indian youth seem to have acculturated with a lower sense of religious and ethnic identification. Pakistani youth, on the other hand, reported relatively strong religious affiliation and sense of belonging to their heritage culture. This suggests that acculturation is a more nuanced process than is often portrayed and is strongly context dependent, influenced by group values, commitments and practices.
The current study examines the inclusion of ‘gender’ in the policies/legislation relating to the human development of women migrants (from Asian and African origins) and their impact on six determinants of migrant's gender ideology in two different European gender regimes: Germany and Sweden. The study is conducted in four stages: (1) thematic analysis of different conventions and recommendations of the UN, ILO, and EU, (2) latent analysis of selected policies/legislation, (3) survey of women migrants, and (4) expert interviews. Exposure to relatively egalitarian gender regimes through migration has brought positive changes in all determinants of the gender ideology of migrants, except domestic chores and caregiving responsibilities. Inclusion of a missing ‘gender’ perspective in relevant measures can expedite smooth integration of migrants, but lack of political commitment, scarcity of financial resources, the absence of gender experts, and lack of coordination between line ministries/agencies are salient barriers to its ‘inclusion’ in both countries.
The aim of this paper is to show the relationship among the Hispanic immigration (mostly with an irregular citizen status) in US (some areas where they live many Hispanic) and the churches that are linked to these communities. The undocumented Hispanics are being persecuted, deported and in the elections talk down them to win votes. Only in their confessions have they have found the most stable refuge for a long time due to during the past two decades, churches become in the main upholder and protector of the Hispanic community in the United States. Thus, this research explores the ramifications and the pillars of this outstanding relationship that had been built through time. This paper also analyzes the relationship between the labor market and unauthorized immigration, as it is attributed to unauthorized immigrants to be the cause of unemployment of the natives. As well as being criminals and the main inhabitants of prisons. Reality that is far from reality. The Trump Administration, following many of the thoughts of some American citizens, maintains the accusation towards Hispanic immigration of working illegally in the country, as well as increasing crime.
Although there has been a fast rise in the share of Americans reporting no religion, it is unclear whether this trend has affected different parts of the country equally. Against this backdrop, we apply dynamic multilevel regression and poststratification (Dynamic MRP) to General Social Survey data over the period 1973 to 2018 to estimate state-level religious trends. We validate our estimates against external benchmarks, finding that they perform well in terms of predictive accuracy. Substantively, we find steeper increases in the share of religious nones in states that had more nones to begin with. Moreover, whereas state-level increases in the share of religious nones are strongly linked to declines in occasional church attendance and moderate religious identification, the associations with trends in regular attendance and strong identification are much weaker. States have thus not only diverged in their share of religious nones but also experienced different degrees of religious polarization.
This paper explores whether and how parents’ attitudes toward the spanking of children have changed over the last 30 years, a period when parents’ use of corporal punishment declined precipitously in the U.S. We compare these trends across parents’ socioeconomic status (SES) and region of the country to identify whether shifts in attitudes toward these practices parallel documented shifts in their use by SES and region. We draw data from the General Social Surveys (GSS) from 1986 through 2016, which asked respondents how much they agree children sometimes need “a good, hard spanking.” We compare responses among parents at the 80th (high-SES) and 20th (low-SES) percentiles of the income and education distributions, and between parents in southern versus non-southern states, controlling for child and parent age and parent gender. In non-southern regions, parents’ support for corporal punishment declined over time, especially among high-SES parents, whereas in the South parents’ support for corporal punishment remained stably high over time across the socioeconomic distribution. These findings imply a distinct cultural perspective on corporal punishment in the South, one that may help explain the disproportionate maintenance of the practice in schools and provide a potent target for policy and program interventions to reduce its use.
In the United States Baby Boomers constitute a "lead cohort" due to their sheer size and influence on cultural, religious, and spiritual trends. As Boomers matriculate through the life-cycle, their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors will likely continue to alter the national religious landscape. There is, however, no explicit research as to how this generation influences the religious scene as they leave the workforce, especially those who migrate to moderate climates throughout the United States and reestablish their faith in a new location. In order to gain insight into the Boomer's changing religious practices, this dissertation isolates a single denomination (Roman Catholic), an age/situation specific cohort (retiring Baby Boomers), and unidirectional regional migration (north-to-south) to understand fluctuations in religious commitment. The dissertation focuses exclusively on the Diocese of Raleigh, NC where north-to-south migration undergirds the explosive growth of its Catholic population although Catholics still constitute a small minority of religious adherents in the region.
The study combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies to gauge effects of migration, recently acquired minority status, and life-cycle changes on Catholic Boomers' religious commitment in the Diocese of Raleigh. Surveys were distributed to Catholics across six parishes in three distinct retiree-heavy regions. A subset of Baby Boomers was also interviewed about their experiences of Catholicism in the South.
Empirical results demonstrate increasing religious commitment among recent Catholic migrants; however, differences emerge between Boomers and other generational cohort-groups. Additionally, the impetus behind fluctuations in religiosity varies depending on the survey measure. Binomial logistic regression shows minority status has a direct, positive effect on bible reading and an inverse effect on Mass attendance. For Baby Boomers, the number of parish friends is the most powerful predictor of heightened religious commitment. Qualitative data supplement these findings.
A more intense religious environment across all faiths in the region also has a positive impact on the religious commitment of incoming Catholics. The spillover effect is most apparent in changes reported in the frequency of bible reading and Mass attendance. As Catholics who migrated to the region increased their religious commitment, they influence the most recent migrants to follow suit.
This study examined the effects of parent religiosity, family processes, and peer influences on adolescent behavior in light of social control and social learning theories. Data were obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997. Findings of the study sample of 1,911 adolescents indicated that parent religiosity was positively associated with good health and higher levels of education, while inversely related to substance abuse. Adolescents with authoritarian parents had higher levels of delinquency, worse health, and worse mental health than those with permissive parents. Adolescents with uninvolved parents completed fewer years of schooling. Compared with parental religiosity and family processes, peer influences had the most influential effects on delinquency, substance abuse, education, and, to a lesser extent, mental health.
Para além da filiação religiosa: religião, religiosidade e o panorama religioso em Ribeirão das Neves-MG, Brasil (Beyond the religious affiliation: religion, religiosity and the religious panorama in Ribeirão das Neves- MG, Brazil)DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2011v9n23p715Conhecer o panorama religioso no nível nacional e ao longo do tempo pode ser considerado um privilégio do Brasil, cujos censos demográficos coletam informações a este respeito pelo menos desde 1940. No entanto, a literatura sugere que a filiação religiosa não é suficiente para entender o papel da religião na vida dos indivíduos. Sendo assim, o objetivo deste artigo é mostrar, através do exemplo de Ribeirão das Neves, MG-Brasil, a importância da religiosidade no panorama religioso. O estudo combina dados do Censo Demográfico de 2000 com informações sobre estudantes do Ensino Médio da rede pública estadual coletados pela Pesquisa Jovem, levando em consideração não apenas a filiação religiosa, mas também a frequência às cerimônias e da frequência com que se reza/ora fora das cerimônias religiosas. Os resultados do Censo 2000 sugerem que o município de Ribeirão das Neves é distinto de Minas Gerais e do Brasil no que tange à filiação religiosa. A inclusão da frequência às cerimônias e de medida de religiosidade no âmbito doméstico desvenda outros aspectos relativos à religião, sugerindo que ir além da filiação religiosa pode ajudar a compreender melhor a complexidade do panorama religioso. Palavras-chave: Religião. Religiosidade. Ensino Médio. Juventude. Ribeirão das Neves, Brasil Abstract Knowledge of the religious landscape over time and at the national level could be considered a privilege of Brazil. Brazilian demographic censuses have collected information related to religion since 1940. However, the literature suggests that religious affiliation is not sufficient for understanding the role of religion in the lives of individuals. Thus, the objective of this article is to show the importance of religiosity in the religious landscape, using the example of Ribeirão das Neves, Minas Gerais. The study combines data from the Demographic Census of 2000 with information about high school students in the state-run, public school system collected by the Pesquisa Jovem (Youth Survey). The study takes into consideration not only religious affiliation, but also attendance at worship services and the frequency with which individuals pray outside of worship services. The results of the 2000 Census suggest that the municipality of Ribeirão das Neves is distinct from Minas Gerais and Brazil in relation to religious affiliation. The inclusion of attendance at worship ceremonies and a measurement of religiosity in the home reveal other aspects related to religion, suggesting that going beyond religious affiliation may help to better understand the complexity of the religious panorama. Key words: Religion. Religiosity. High School. Youth. Ribeirão das Neves, Brazil
Interest in adolescent religious and spiritual development has gained momentum in the last decade. This trend is likely because of a combination of scientific, political, and societal factors. The interdisciplinary field of positive youth development (Benson & Pittman, 2002) has recently identified religious engagement as a developmental resource that lessens risk behavior or enhances positive outcomes (Bridges & Moore, 2002; National Research Council, 2002; National Research Council, 2002; Scales & Leffert, 2004). This, in turn, has led to renewed interest in the study of religion in the fields of public health, social work, education, developmental psychology, and prevention. At the same time, new global con- flicts have heightened interest in the role of religious ideology in creating or exacerbating intertribal and international animosity.
How important is religion for young people in America today? What are the major influences on their developing spiritual lives? How do religious beliefs and practices change as young people enter into adulthood? This book explores these questions and many others as it tells the definitive story of the religious and spiritual lives of emerging adults, ages eighteen to twenty-four, in the U.S. today. Based on candid interviews with thousands of young people tracked over a five-year period, this book reveals how the religious practices of the teenagers portrayed in a previous book Soul Searching have been strengthened, challenged, and often changed as the young people have moved into adulthood. The book vividly describes as well the broader cultural world of today's emerging adults, how that culture shapes their religious outlooks, and what the consequences are for religious faith and practice in America more generally. Some of the book's findings are surprising. Parents turn out to be the single most important influence on the religious outcomes in the lives of young adults. On the other hand, teenage participation in evangelization missions and youth groups does not predict a high level of religiosity just a few years later. Moreover, the common wisdom that religiosity declines sharply during the young adult years is shown to be greatly exaggerated.
Drawing on the massive National Study of Youth and Religion's telephone surveys and more than 120 in-depth interviews, the authors chart the spiritual trajectory of American adolescents and young adults over a period of three years. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, the authors find that religion is an important force in the lives of most-though their involvement with religion changes over time, just as teenagers themselves do. Pearce and Denton weave in fascinating portraits of youth to give depth to mere numerical rankings of religiosity, which tend to prevail in large studies. One teenager might rarely attend a service, yet count herself profoundly religious; another might be deeply involved in a church's social world, yet claim to be "not, like, deep into the faith." They provide a new set of qualitative categories-Abiders, Assenters, Adapters, Avoiders, and Atheists-quoting from interviews to illuminate the shading between them. And, with their longitudinal survey, they offer a rich understanding of the dynamic nature of faith in young people's lives during a period of rapid change in biology, personality, and social interaction. Not only do degrees of religiosity change, but so does its nature, whether expressed in institutional practices or personal belief. By presenting a new model of religious development and change, illustrated with compelling personal accounts of real teenagers, Pearce and Denton offer parents and religious leaders a new guide for understanding religious development in youth.
This chapter examines the relationship between religion and perpetration of intimate partner violence and abuse. The chapter opens with a brief overview of the problem, including several risk factors that have been examined extensively in empirical research. Very little research has examined how religion may affect likelihood of intimate partner violence and abuse perpetration; despite the fact that there are several reasons to hypothesize that religion could serve as either a protective or a risk factor. We focus largely on the religiosity construct and review the research literature on religiosity and intimate partner violence and abuse, noting the limitations of many of the studies, including narrow operationalizations of religiosity. We then turn to an examination of studies that use multidimensional measures of religiosity as well as research that indicates that religiosity per se is less important in predicting intimate partner violence and abuse perpetration than is style of religious self-regulation, that is, introjected versus identified religious self-regulation. We highlight some of the critical gaps in empirical research on the relationship between religion and intimate partner violence and abuse perpetration and identify directions for future research in this area.
Which Americans remain in the religious communities and traditions within which they were raised? Which move to different traditions within their own religion, switch to different religious traditions altogether, or become non-religious entirely? And what social factors influence these outcomes and processes? This article engages the extant literature on religious retention and switching by using measures of religious tradition self-identification, instead of denominations, and by highlighting the dissimilarity of social factors predicting retention and switching for different traditions. Analysis of the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence survey shows that different social factors influence different groups of people in diverse religious traditions in dissimilar ways. The discussion attempts to theorize these findings.
Resumo
Para além da filiação religiosa: religião, religiosidade e o panorama religioso em Ribeirão das Neves-MG, Brasil (Beyond the religious affiliation: religion, religiosity and the religious panorama in Ribeirão das Neves- MG, Brazil)
DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2011v9n23p715
Conhecer o panorama religioso no nível nacional e ao longo do tempo pode ser considerado um privilégio do Brasil, cujos censos demográficos coletam informações a este respeito pelo menos desde 1940. No entanto, a literatura sugere que a filiação religiosa não é suficiente para entender o papel da religião na vida dos indivíduos. Sendo assim, o objetivo deste artigo é mostrar, através do exemplo de Ribeirão das Neves, MG-Brasil, a importância da religiosidade no panorama religioso. O estudo combina dados do Censo Demográfico de 2000 com informações sobre estudantes do Ensino Médio da rede pública estadual coletados pela Pesquisa Jovem, levando em consideração não apenas a filiação religiosa, mas também a frequência às cerimônias e da frequência com que se reza/ora fora das cerimônias religiosas. Os resultados do Censo 2000 sugerem que o município de Ribeirão das Neves é distinto de Minas Gerais e do Brasil no que tange à filiação religiosa. A inclusão da frequência às cerimônias e de medida de religiosidade no âmbito doméstico desvenda outros aspectos relativos à religião, sugerindo que ir além da filiação religiosa pode ajudar a compreender melhor a complexidade do panorama religioso.
Palavras-chave: Religião. Religiosidade. Ensino Médio. Juventude. Ribeirão das Neves, Brasil
Abstract
Knowledge of the religious landscape over time and at the national level could be considered a privilege of Brazil. Brazilian demographic censuses have collected information related to religion since 1940. However, the literature suggests that religious affiliation is not sufficient for understanding the role of religion in the lives of individuals. Thus, the objective of this article is to show the importance of religiosity in the religious landscape, using the example of Ribeirão das Neves, Minas Gerais. The study combines data from the Demographic Census of 2000 with information about high school students in the state-run, public school system collected by the Pesquisa Jovem (Youth Survey). The study takes into consideration not only religious affiliation, but also attendance at worship services and the frequency with which individuals pray outside of worship services. The results of the 2000 Census suggest that the municipality of Ribeirão das Neves is distinct from Minas Gerais and Brazil in relation to religious affiliation. The inclusion of attendance at worship ceremonies and a measurement of religiosity in the home reveal other aspects related to religion, suggesting that going beyond religious affiliation may help to better understand the complexity of the religious panorama.
Key words: Religion. Religiosity. High School. Youth. Ribeirão das Neves, Brazil
The ability of conservative Christian political organizations to influence local and national political races seems remarkable—made
possible through mass distribution of voter guides, magazines, radio advertisement, and political talk show appearances. Research
on the Christian Right offers several competing ideas about support for the Christian Right. But little research to date has
examined an important means of Christian Right influence in the contemporary political process: helping people decide how
to vote in elections. This article analyzes nationally representative data on the influence of conservative Christian political
organizations on voting, and seeks to explain who uses the electoral advice of such organizations, and why. Our results affirm
some perceptions of Christian Right influence—that it is higher among evangelical Protestant voters—and challenge others—that
it is higher among the elderly, less educated, whites, economically insecure, and southerners. Finally, we provide theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence for the importance of accounting for social context to understand the appeal of Christian
Right perspectives to the nearly 20% of Americans who claim to be influenced by them.
Objective
The recent surge in hate group activity is a concern to many citizens and policymakers. We examine the roles of socioeconomic factors measured at the county level that are hypothesized to account for the presence of such groups, including social capital and religious affiliations.Methods
We estimate a Poisson regression model using counts of hate groups provided by the Southern Poverty Law Center for each of the over 3,000 U.S. counties. Our regressors include a wider set of variables than has been considered in previous studies, such as Jefferson and Pryor (1999).ResultsOur approach produces a better statistical fit than that in Jefferson and Pryor's paper, and the additional regressors contribute significantly to our understanding of hate groups.Conclusion
Both social capital stocks and religious affiliation exert an independent and statistically significant influence on the number of hate groups, as does the presence of Wal-Mart stores, holding other factors constant.
This research note focuses on Muslim minorities living in a secular context, the Netherlands. The question is whether mosque attendance among Turkish-and Moroccan-Dutch changed between 1998 and 2006, testing mechanisms of religious decline and religious vitality. Elaborating on previous research of the same Muslim groups, this study examines a longer time span and adds contextual-level explanations. Whereas previous research reported a linear trend towards secularization over time and over generations, in recent years the trend has become more complex. The revival of religious attendance among the second generation is most striking. Forces of secularization such as educational attainment and generational replacement gradually lose their predictive power. Over time, processes of secularization are therefore not inevitable.
Analyzing a unique module of the General Social Survey, we test hypotheses that three religion dimensions — affiliation with specific religious traditions (belonging), service attendance (behaving), and religious orthodoxy (believing) are associated with compassionate feelings, and that these feelings carry over into support for government efforts to help the poor, blacks, and the sick. The religiously orthodox report more compassionate feelings toward others than do modernists and, partly because of this, are more supportive of government intervention to help the poor. Yet attending religious services frequently does not increase compassionate feelings and makes people less supportive of government efforts to help the poor. There are no differences among religious traditions in compassionate feelings, and the only difference on economic policy preferences is for Black Protestants to support government assistance to blacks. Compassionate feelings have comparable effects to political ideology and party identification on support for government assistance to the disadvantaged and misfortunate. We conclude that people of faith, variously defined, do not constitute a monolithic “Religious Right” and are potentially open to policy appeals from both political parties.
Det antages af studier i migrationslitteraturen, at folk, der migrerer fra en region i et land til en anden region, tilpasser deres religiøsitet til destinationsregionens (van Tubergen 2006: 4, Smith, Sikkink & Bailey 1998: 494-506). Ud fra disse ideer må det antages, at immigranters religiøsitet har en tendens til at tilpasse sig modtagerlandets. I så fald kunne man forestille sig, at personer af muslimsk baggrund, der migrerer til Danmark qua tilpasningsprocesser med tiden vil blive mindre religiøse. Spørgsmålet er følgelig, om det danske samfund virker sekulariserende, eller om forholdene i Danmark netop synes at fremme religiøsiteten hos de, der føler, at religiøsiteten trues? Disse er nogle af de spørgsmål, der vil blive diskuteret i denne artikel.
Based on interviews with 30 southern rock musicians, a content analysis of their lyrics and web pages, and observations of their performances over a two year period, I analyze the construction of rebel manhood used by a group of under-educated, under-employed, marginalized, white, working-class men to empower their otherwise disempowered selves. My analysis shows how the musicians empower the self by glorifying a lifestyle of “drifting,” which involves traveling from city to city performing and overcoming the challenges of the open road. In their struggle to compete with a culture industry that produces popular music for mass audiences, southern rock musicians construct themselves as authentic and legitimate musical artists who exemplify and express the experience of a poor, rural, white American culture and rebel masculine identity. Southern rockers construct and signify this rebel masculinity using a variety of identity work strategies. They signify the self as both strong and independent through their ability to negotiate rural poverty with their hunting, fishing and faming skills—while at the same time they chastise the middle class virtues of family, education, work and religion as metaphorical prisons to which only the weak succumb. Rebelliousness is exemplified by southern rockers as they embrace and even celebrate the disgrace of rural poverty by revaluing labels used by the larger society to stigmatize the rural poor such as “hillbilly,” “redneck,” and “white trash.” They flaunt whiteness through display of the confederate battle flag. Another identity work strategy engaged by southern rockers to construct the rebel masculine self is through celebrating “sinning,” or drinking alcohol, using drugs, and having casual sex. However, these rebel masculine behaviors can also perpetuate the increasingly marginal status that white, working class men find themselves by reinforcing stereotypes that they are sexist, racist, homophobic, unskilled, uneducated, uncivilized drunks.
The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of regional differences in homicide rates by focusing on the role of religious culture—specifically, the influence of the southern brand of conservative Protestantism in sustaining and legitimating distinctive forms of violence. A rationale for focusing on Southern religious culture is outlined and several hypotheses derived from these arguments are tested using 1980 data on homicide rates, religious concentrations, and socioeconomic and other characteristics of 247 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). After controlling for a number of relevant covariates, this study finds a positive relationship between percent conservative Protestant and homicide rates; the effect is significant in Southern MSAs but not in non-Southern MSAs. The findings' implications for research on regional variations in violence are discussed and promising directions for future research on this issue are outlined.
In this article we utilize state-level data to investigate the factors affecting the location of Christian bookstores, astrologers, and psychics. We distinguish between factors related to general consumption of goods and factors related to religious economies to see if religious products are merely another consumption good whose popularity has no relation to the religious environment or if the consumption of these products is related to competition in the religious marketplace. Our results indicate that, whereas the location of astrologers and psychics is strongly related to general consumption related demographic factors, the location of Christian bookstores does not seem to be affected by these factors. Christian bookstores instead reflect the religious composition of state markets. Further, the presence of conservative Protestants appears to have a dampening effect on the location of psychics and astrology studios.
Religion is a major culture trait that is imprinted unevenly across the American religious landscape. Research utilizing church membership and adherent count data has described spatial patterns of group affiliation since the 1950s and identified distinct regional patterns that have remained fairly stable over time. The population of religious adherents is a subset of the general population. High levels of population mobility in recent decades, particularly Sunbelt and Latin American in-migration, suggest the potential for shifts in geographic patterns of religious adherents. This paper uses recently released data and centrographic methods to analyze patterns of stability and change for a set of major U.S. Christian groups for 1980–2000. Quantitative analyses of enumeration counts, weighted mean centers, and standard deviational ellipses reveal different patterns of change among groups. Relative levels of change vary depending on the use of raw or normalized measures. Catholics, Mormons, and Seventh-Day Adventists were among the most dynamic groups with Southern Baptists being the most stable. Continuation of recent trends can potentially impact established culture regions and issues of regional identity and perceptions.
Borrowing from the literature on religion and deviance, the concept of moral communities is applied to religious and secular postsecondary education to explain institutional influences on student religious participation. Results from nationally representative panel data indicate that students attending Catholic and mainline Protestant affiliated institutions decline in religious participation at a faster rate than students attending evangelical institutions or students attending nonreligious public colleges and universities. This finding is consistent with Catholic and mainline Protestant institutions less successfully providing a shared moral order that legitimates religious language, motive, and behavior when compared to conservative Protestant colleges. At the same time, the religious and ethnic pluralism that activates minority religious identity at nonreligious public institutions is also less likely to be present on Catholic and mainline Protestant college campuses. Additional results indicate that evangelical students' religious participation declines while attending Catholic colleges and universities, while Catholic students increase their participation while attending evangelical institutions. The religious composition of students may act to alter friendship networks, and thus participation rates, on these campuses, although further research is necessary to validate the proposed institutional mechanisms.
This article examines changes between 1985–1990 and 1995–2000 in relationships between migration and religioethnic identification among U.S. Jews. The results of multivariate analyses of the 1990 and 2000 National Jewish Population Surveys show that Jewish background characteristics have lost their significance as determinants of internal migration and, especially, migration across state boundaries. Concurrently, migration no longer constitutes a serious threat to group continuity and erstwhile negative effects on major religious and social behaviors have disappeared. When the two surveys were integrated into one data set, it was found that “time” enhances the inclination of Jews to move and strengthens their religious and ethnic commitments (though not their commitments to informal Jewish networks). The results are discussed in reference to three competing perspectives of migration-identification relationships—“selectivity,”“disruption,” and “heightening”—and in the wider theoretical context of religious and ethnic processes in the contemporary United States.
Two conceptual models have been proposed to describe changes in religious commitment among regional migrants. The "dislocation" model predicts that all migrants undergo a decline in commitment after being uprooted from familiar surroundings; the "adaptation" model asserts that commitment among migrants will rise or fall depending on their new region's norms of religious behavior. This paper tests these models through an examination of patterns of church attendance and strength of adherence within national samples of white and black Baptists, and white Lutherans, Methodists and Catholics in the United States. Findings confirm the adaptation model's prediction that religious commitment rises among migrants to regions of higher native commitment, such as the South, and falls among migrants to regions of lower commitment, such as the West. These results suggest that, contrary to expectation, migration may contribute to the persistence of regional religious differences in the United States.
The most visible development in American religion in the past two decades is the resurgence of evangelical Protestantism. Because evangelical religion has remained the dominant twentieth century form of Protestantism in the South, and not in other regions of the country, John Egerton (1974) has characterized the recent nationwide revival of evangelical Protestantism as a movement of Southern-style religion back into the mainstream of American culture - a process he calls the "Southernization of American religion." Using the Glenmary Research Center's church membership data, and population and migration data from the United States Census, this article tests the Egerton hypothesis on the spread of Southern religion. In fact, I found that virtually all the membership growth in evangelical churches between 1971 and 1980 can be attributed to growth in specifically Southern evangelical churches. The growth of Southern-style religion was especially marked outside the South and corresponds with regions that experienced high levels of in-migration from the South during the same period - suggesting that migration is an important mechanism by which America's religious landscape evolves. In short, my data support the Egerton hypothesis. Although more research needs to be done in this area, based on my findings, I conclude that a region-based approach to understanding recent changes in American religion is indeed plausible.
This article reviews recent literature on U.S. religious institutions and argues that a new paradigm is emerging in that field, the crux of which is that organized religion thrives in the United States in an open market system, an observation anomalous to the older paradigm's monopoly concept. The article has six sections: first, a brief survey of the paradigm crisis; second, a development of the concept of an open market in the historiography and sociology of U. S. religion; third, fourth, and fifth, arguments that U. S. religious institutions are constitutively pluralistic, structurally adaptable, and empowering; sixth, a consideration of recent religious individualism in the light of the new paradigm. A conclusion sketches some research implications.