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Incentives and policies for integrated pest management in
Europe. A review
Marianne Lefebvre ● Stephen Langrell ● Sergio Gomez-y-Paloma
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Article published in Agronomy for Sustainable Development, January 2015, 35(1):27-45
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13593-014-0237-2
Abstract: Integrated pest management and organic farming are alternatives for sustainable
agriculture and less pesticide use in the European Union. All professional users of pesticides in the
European Union should follow the general principles of integrated pest management from 2014.
States should report to the European Commission on their national action plan for the effective
application of those guidelines. The major remaining issues are: 1) when guidelines are not already
applied, what incentives would encourage European farmers to adopt those guidelines? 2) How and
to what extent should public money be used to promote the adoption of guidelines? Here we review
the adoption of integrated pest management in Europe. We deliver a framework to understand the
drivers of changes in farmers' pest management practices. This framework also helps to understand
farmer reaction to different policy incentives.
Key words: Integrated Pest Management, adoption, incentives, Sustainable Use Directive, pesticides,
sustainable agriculture, Common Agricultural Policy
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European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS),
Agrilife Unit, Edificio Expo. c/ Inca Garcilaso, 3, 41092 Seville, Spain
The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating
an official position of the European Commission.
Corresponding author: lefebvremarianne@gmail.com
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Contents
Incentives and policies for integrated pest management in Europe. A review ...................................... 1
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Private incentives for Integrated Pest Management adoption....................................................... 5
2.1 Cost effectiveness of Integrated Pest Management technology .................................................. 5
2.2 Market access and price premium with Integrated Pest Management ........................................ 8
2.3 The role of farmers' attitudes ..................................................................................................... 10
3. Public policies to foster Integrated Pest Management adoption ................................................. 11
3.1 Why is public intervention necessary in crop protection?.......................................................... 12
3.1.1 Crop protection and externalities ........................................................................................ 12
3.1.2 Crop protection, landscape ecology and coordination failure ............................................. 12
3.2 How can public policies encourage IPM adoption? .............................................................. 13
3.2.1 Regulatory instruments ....................................................................................................... 13
3.2.2 Information dissemination measures .................................................................................. 15
3.2.3 Incentive-based instruments ........................................................................................ 16
4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 19
References ........................................................................................................................................... 27
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1. Introduction
Health and environmental concerns about the risks posed by the use of pesticides have led the
European Union to introduce a series of measures in 2009 commonly referred to as the “pesticides
package”, consisting in four pieces of legislation related to pesticides use
2
. Within this package, the
Sustainable Use of pesticides Directive provides a framework for action to promote the adoption of
low pesticide input pest management approaches, in particular Integrated Pest Management (IPM)
(EU 2009). IPM, as described in the Sustainable Use Directive, is defined as a system based on three
main principles: i) the use and integration of measures that discourage the development of
populations of harmful organisms (prevention); ii) the careful consideration of all available plant
protection methods; and iii) their use to levels that are economically and ecologically justified.
Figure 1: Alt’Carpo net for pomefruits in Valence
(France) (Photo: INRA Gotheron)
Figure 2: Inter-row hoeing of winter oilseed
rape, as part of an innovative IPM solution for
winter-wheat based rotations in Flakkebjerg
(Denmark) (Photo: PURE)
Since the introduction of the concept in 1959, many studies have suggested that adoption of IPM
principles provides environmental, economic and health benefits (Stern, Smith et al. 1959). Despite
the various benefits expected from IPM, not all Utilized Agricultural Area in Europe
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is cultivated
according to IPM principles. Overall, while adoption of IPM is rather common in orchards and
protected (greenhouse) production systems, it still remains largely marginal in arable and field crops.
But according to the new European legislation (EU 2009), all professional users of pesticides should
follow the general principles of IPM (already since 1 January 2014). European Member States have
been asked to set up National Action Plans to support this objective. Notwithstanding, this legislative
pressure, an immediate switch cannot be reasonably expected in the highly diverse crop production
systems in Europe. During this transition phase, it is unclear how readily such Integrated Pest
Management approaches and crop-specific strategies will be adopted, especially whilst knowledge
and technology gaps still exist. Moreover, there is high heterogeneity in the National Action Plans
and level of commitments of the Member States.
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Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products in the market, Directive
2009/128/EC establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides,
Regulation (EC) No 1185/2009 concerning statistics on pesticides, Directive 2009/127/EC amending Directive
2006/42/EC with regard to machinery for pesticide application.
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The terms Europe and European Union are used indistinctly in the text.
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In this context, understanding drivers of change, and how rapidly a switch in the crop protection
paradigm from conventional dependent to an IPM basis can be pragmatically achieved is of interest.
Why would European farmers adopt such principles if there were no mandatory regulation? Even in
the presence of readily workable IPM alternatives, why would farmers adopt them if they are most
costly? In the event of higher production costs, will consumers be willing to pay higher prices for
goods produced with such approaches? Would retailers be willing to create specific market segments
for IPM products? Will insurers be willing to cover the potential risks linked to IPM adoption? Beyond
mandatory approaches, to what extent should public money be used to promote IPM adoption? In
the de facto interim, how should incentive-based policies be designed? Answers to these questions
are beyond the scope of agro-ecology research in pest management, but are nevertheless central to
the success of evolution of farming towards the sustainable use of pesticides. Here, the economics
tool box can help address some of these questions.
This article draws on a large body of research in economics of pest control and management and
provides a reflection on a range of pertinent issues towards understanding the drivers of change in
plant protection practices. A few authors have reviewed the existing research in economics of pest
management and pesticide policies (Carlson and Wetzstein 1993; Sexton, Lei et al. 2007; Waterfield
and Zilberman 2012). However, understanding the drivers of IPM adoption requires another step
since IPM covers a large set of principles and is, by far, not solely limited to reducing pesticide use.
Such exercises have already been performed in the US, where the US congress has supported IPM
development, providing financial backing for large IPM programs since the seventies (McCarl 1981;
Kogan 1998; Swinton and Day 2003). Consequently, most of the literature addressing the question of
why some farmers adopt IPM, whilst others do not, predominantly concern US farmers, or, in
particular, those in developing countries, where low input agriculture is the norm (Fernandez-
Cornejo 1996; Fernandez-Cornejo 1998; Yong-gong and Guo-jun 2001; Mauceri, Alwang et al. 2005;
Sexton, Lei et al. 2007; Bonabana-Wabbi, Taylor et al. 2012). By contrast, with the exception of crop-
specific sectors (e.g. protected crops and fruit production), evidence for the extent and drivers of
IPM principles adoption by European farmers remains incomplete (Bailey, Bertaglia et al. 2009; Freier
and Boller 2009; Sharma, Bailey et al. 2009; Hillocks and Cooper 2012). In this article, we propose
updated information as well as a selection of questions and literature relevant for the European
context.
The target audience of this paper are the extension services and persons in charge of the design or
local implementation of measures to support IPM adoption in the European Union, as well as farmers
willing to understand the legislation behind the changes in their environment. The objective of the
article is to contribute to the understanding of the factors underlying and directing farmer's adoption
of new plant protection practices in general, and IPM in particular. This is certainly a prerequisite to
predict farmers' expected reactions to different policy incentives, and the successful formulation of
policies and extension services supporting the evolution of IPM adoption in the European Union. The
article is structured in two sections. In section 2, we explore private incentives likely to incite IPM
adoption. In section 3, we consider a possible rationale for government intervention, whilst
simultaneously illustrating some of the practical challenges in the design and implementation of
policies supporting the adoption of IPM based farming. Based on the review of these two aspects, we
conclude in section 4 with the presentation of an analytical framework to understand the drivers of
changes in farmers' pest management practices (Figure 3).
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2. Private incentives for Integrated Pest Management adoption
In modern agricultural systems responding to market signals, private incentives are important drivers
for the adoption of new technologies and practices. The profitability of a new technology for a given
farmer is determined by the characteristics of the production technology itself (its impact on
quantity, quality and costs), but also by a number of farm-specific factors, such as farm size, human
capital, labour availability, financial constraints, access to information, new inputs and, importantly,
markets (Feder, Just et al. 1985; Goodhue, Klonsky et al. 2010). Here, we are interested in those
factors likely to encourage European farmers to adopt IPM principles in the absence of mandatory
regulation and specific policy instruments. They can be classified into three categories: cost
effectiveness of IPM technology(ies), opportunities offered to IPM products in the market, and other
non-financial and behavioural factors. Knowledge of such private incentives is important since it
determines the need for, and type of public policies required, which are aspects developed in section
3.
2.1 Cost effectiveness of Integrated Pest Management technology
Overall, there is a lack of quantitative evidence on the potential of Integrated Pest Management to
increase economic sustainability relative to non-IPM strategies under region- and crop-specific
growing conditions. Indeed, data on the economic costs and benefits of IPM solutions are scarce, and
even more so with consideration of the European context. Moreover, because Integrated Pest
Management encompasses many principles and practices, as illustrated by the long list of general
principles of IPM in the Annex III of the Sustainable Use Directive (EU 2009)), assessing the cost-
effectiveness of IPM and comparing its implementation across countries is challenging (Waterfield
and Zilberman 2012). Moreover, producers often only adopt parts of the spectrum of IPM principles
and practices suggested by research and extension services. There is high diversity of "IPM-based"
practices, ranging from "almost no IPM" to "ultimate IPM". Furthermore, IPM is a dynamic and
continuous process, were the different strategies part of IPM are very rarely simultaneously
implemented. The assessment of the profitability of partial, or step-wise adoption, is rendered
difficult by the fact that the efficiency of pest control is often obtained as a result of the
complementarities of the different components within the IPM portfolio or spectrum (Zepeda,
Barreto-Triana et al. 2006).
The most comprehensive summary of producer-level economic evaluations of IPM programs to date
was developed in the Unites States (Norton and Mullen 1994; Fernandez-Cornejo 1998). Although
evidence in Europe is growing, albeit slowly, it is currently mostly restricted to ex-ante analysis based
on expert judgment, and rarely on quantitative empirical evidence collected directly from field trials.
The on-going PURE project financed by the European Commission FP7 program (Innovative crop
protection for sustainable agriculture, www.pure-ipm.eu) aims, amongst other objectives, to produce
this evidence with on-station and on-farm data, from six key European farming systems (winter-
wheat based rotations, maize-based cropping systems, field vegetable crops, pomefruit, grapevine,
and protected vegetables) through the evaluation of a range of candidate IPM solutions from
intermediate (solutions easy to implement and scientifically validated) to advanced (solutions in the
experimental stage). We here provide a summary of recent experience and data in Europe, although
limited, on the cost effectiveness of IPM adoption.
Pelzer, Fortino et al. (2012) proposed a multi-attribute model (DEXiPM) to perform ex ante
assessments of the sustainability of IPM in arable cropping systems, defined in a maize production
context corresponding to the French region of Poitou-Charentes. This model highlighted differences
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between winter crop-based and maize-crop based systems. For the winter crop-based innovative
system, economic sustainability was found to decrease for the IPM approach compared to the
conventional baseline. Higher labour costs, due to superficial tillage and crop monitoring, were
recorded. However, systematic field observations for the monitoring of pests, weeds and disease
populations, and treatment decisions based on thresholds defined according to local conditions, can
help limit pesticide use to the actual minimal required dosage level, and therefore reduce input
costs. Moreover, lower yields and lower selling prices were observed, due to reduced opportunity for
alternative cash crops in the rotation. By comparison, for the maize-based system, the economic
sustainability was found to be improved with IPM. The production costs are reduced with IPM
compare to conventional (lower pesticide, fertiliser and irrigation costs), the yields are higher, but
the selling price at the cropping system scale is lower due to the introduction of sunflower in the IPM
crop sequence. Other results on ex-ante evaluation of more innovative IPM strategies for maize-
based cropping systems have also been collected by Vasileiadis, Sattin et al. (2011). Interviewing
experts (mostly advisors) in five European regions (Denmark, Netherlands, Hungary, Spain, and Italy),
found that automatic weed monitoring, as well as longer term system monitoring, are expected to
have a neutral economic impact. However, deployment of reliable cultivars, pest and disease
forecasting models, early detection methods, precision spraying employing advanced Global
Positioning System, as well as community-based decisions and information sharing, are all
approaches that can result in a system net profit within a time frame of 3–4 years.
Focusing on another top fruit production system, Mouron, Heijine et al. (2012) proposed a
comprehensive methodology (SustainOS) for evaluating the environmental and economic
sustainability of region-specific IPM strategies in apple orchards from across 5 European regions
(Switzerland, Germany, The Netherlands, France and Spain). Experts estimate that pesticide use can
be reduced without reducing total yield or quality, but with considerable differences between
countries. In some countries, IPM strategies were expected to increase total yield by up to 29%, and
to increase the percentage of first class fruit by up to 20% compare to conventional strategies. But
the use of IPM was predicted to result in economic disadvantages in some countries because some
alternative measures are labour and capital intensive. The cost for alternative crop protection
measures (such as a higher proportion of area with hail netting or enclosure netting) can be greater
than the capital saved by reduced spraying. Furthermore, monitoring and training increase labour
costs. Nevertheless, overall, in some of the regions and systems tested, higher yields compensated
for increased costs.
Overall, the impact of IPM on cost depends not only on the impact of the adoption of IPM principles
on pesticide use, but also on the cost of substitutes. Based on two different samples of French farms
producing arable crops (in the departments of Meuse and Eure et Loire), Boussemart et al. (2012)
showed that agricultural practices using less pesticide per ha are cheaper than practices using more
pesticides, without increasing the costs due to the use of substitutes. In addition, they found cost
dominance
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to be a robust phenomenon across size and scope dimensions (Boussemart, Leleu et al.
2011; Boussemart, Leleu et al. 2012). Concerning substitution of chemical control with biological
control, through their review of various studies, Bale et al. (2008) concluded that the cost–benefit
ratio for biological control is highly favourable compared to chemical control. Similarly, McConnachie
et al. (2003) reviewed several examples of successful applications of biocontrol, with high benefit-
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Cost dominance of agricultural practices using less pesticide per ha means that the optimal cost frontier of the
farms with lower pesticide use is below the one of farms with higher pesticide use (for farms within the same
region with homogenous pedoclimatic characteristics). The cost frontier framework allows for eventual
presence of technical and allocative inefficiencies in the data, and is therefore preferred to a traditional cost
function.
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cost ratios. Again, such results are highly crop-dependant. Biological control is very well developed
and highly profitable in protected environments for greenhouse crops, as well as in many orchards,
offering solutions that work technically better than chemical control. In these systems, chemical
control often failed because the most important pests had become resistant against the available
pesticides. However, it is more difficult to make biological control work in in open fields and
production systems with short crop cycle.
Quantitative evidence on the impact of the adoption of IPM principles on labour and management
costs also remains limited. It is generally agreed that IPM strategies are time and
information/knowledge intensive, compared to purely chemical control and more capital-intensive
pesticide-based pest management strategy as used in conventional agriculture (Beckmann and
Wesseler 2003; Waterfield and Zilberman 2012). Empirical studies in the United States have shown a
significant negative impact of off-farm income on the adoption of IPM, confirming that opportunity
costs of labour
5
are an important variable towards explaining rates of adoption. The higher the
opportunity cost of labour, the less the farmer is likely to spend time on his farm, and therefore to
engage in farming practices labour-intensive (McNamara, Wetzstein et al. 1991; Fernandez-Cornejo,
Beach et al. 1994; Fernandez-Cornejo 1998). Based on survey data from durian growers in Thailand,
Beckmann et al. (2009) found that farms employing hired labour exhibited a lower adoption rate of
IPM. In other words, the comparative advantage of IPM is higher under owner-operated pesticide
application as hired labour is difficult to employ in many IPM tasks. Of course, the validity of this
result in Europe will depend on the farm structure considered, as well as the qualification of
farmers/agricultural operators.
The evaluation of the economic return of IPM adoption should not be limited to costs and yields
effects. Indeed, crop protection also aims at maintaining output quality. It is recognised on one hand
that pest damage can reduce the value of agricultural commodities when blemished (Yue, Alfnes et
al. 2009), and, on the other, that chemical pesticides can have a quality-improving effect, especially
for fruits and vegetables (Babcock, Lichtenberg et al. 1992). There is nevertheless evidence that IPM
has no negative impact on output quality, measured for example as the percentage of 1st class fruits
(Mouron, Heijne et al. 2012).
Moreover, the evaluation of the economic return should not be restricted to one growing season.
Indeed, benefits from IPM adoption can be delayed in time. For example, relying on the full portfolio
of tools at the farmer’s disposal -including biological control using natural predators of pests,
mechanical control using specific tilling and cultivation techniques, as well as chemical control with
pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides- and the systematic alternation between methods can help
delay, or even prevent pesticide resistance build-up. This will be a source of cost saving, but only in
the long run.
-
We have summarized here recent studies in Europe on the cost effectiveness of IPM adoption.
Available evidence accounts for the impacts on labour and input costs, as well as on yields, but is
often restricted to the evaluation of single strategies part of IPM toolbox, with little guidance on the
impact of their integration, the differentiation of the impact in the short and long run, and the
potential variability in the results according to crops and agro-climatic conditions. Quantitative
evidence on the cost-effectiveness of IPM in Europe is unfortunately too scarce to provide farmers
with tools to predict the impact on their profits of IPM adoption. Apart from cost saving, one
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The opportunity cost of labour is the best wage the farmer could get in a job outside farming.
8
potential source of economic return consists in establishing new opportunities to sell IPM products
compared to conventional products. In the next sub-section, we review the situation regarding the
placement and recognition of IPM in the food market.
2.2 Market access and price premium with Integrated Pest Management
In general, differentiation of agricultural products, and its communication to the consumer, can
provide growers with access to new markets, and, in some cases, price premiums for their product.
However, the case of IPM is particular. Here, we review the situation regarding the placement and
recognition of IPM in the food market nowadays, and how it is likely to evolve with IPM becoming a
mandatory requirement for all agricultural products.
There is evidence that consumers are willing to pay more for reduced exposure to pesticide risk in
general (Florax, Travisi et al. 2005) and for organic products in particular (Torjusen, Sangstad et al.
2004). However it remains unclear whether products complying with other certifications (e.g.
Integrated Pest Management) are recognized and positively valued by consumers. A limited number
of studies have focused for example on the willingness to pay for non-organic apples, but certified by
schemes including requirements in terms of crop protection (Loureiro, McCluskey et al. 2001;
Marette, Messéan et al. 2012; Bazoche, Bunte et al. 2013). All these studies concluded that
consumers' willingness to pay for such certified, but non-organic apples, is significantly higher than
consumers' willingness to pay for conventional, and significantly lower than consumers' willingness
to pay for organic apples. Although restricted to apples
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, these results suggest that IPM products can
satisfy a niche market for consumers less willing to trade off price for higher environmental benefits
compared with organic consumers. However, the price premium observed in these experiments,
compared with conventional products, is rather low.
Beyond the fact that consumers are only moderately willing to pay more for IPM products, marketing
Integrated Pest Management products is not an easy task, in the absence of official label at the
European level. First, pest control based on economic thresholds and decision models, without a
clear commitment regarding the reduction in overall pesticides use, appears difficult to
communicate. Moreover, given the varieties of principles covered by the term "IPM", there is a risk
of multiplication of labels, with quite different interpretations and approaches. Not least, such a
situation may add to the possible market saturation of certification schemes and labels and
information overload for end consumers. Indeed, in this context, producers are encouraged to apply
to different certifications for the same product in order to have access to different market segments
(Canali 2011), resulting in increased production costs whilst simultaneously contributing to
consumer confusion.
These different arguments may explain why retailers have been reluctant to create a specific market
segment for IPM. Currently, in Europe, products grown using IPM are rarely identified as such in the
market place for the end-consumers. However, retailers use IPM as a prerequisite for producers to
deliver products to market segments with stricter environmental specification or access preferred
supplier categories (i.e. the group of suppliers supermarkets will preferentially call upon) (ENDURE
2010). Complying with these general principles of Integrated Pest Management can lead producers
to sell at higher prices but not always (Canali 2011). This is explicitly stated in the Global GAP
business-to-business certification: "Most people confuse global gap with higher prices, that is, they
6
Apples market is often analysed because it corresponds to an important market share of fruit sales and
because apple production relies heavily on pesticides.
9
think that once you have been certified you can charge higher prices than the one who hasn't been.
That is not very true. Yes, global gap opens up many markets for you, but it is not an assurance for
higher prices. In most European countries, certain products are not allowed unless they are certified.
So the benefits of global gap are more markets than more money. But then again if you push more
products, you will enjoy economies of scale and make more profits" (http://www1.globalgap.org).
Global GAP is one of this business-to-business certification integrating some principles of Integrated
Pest Management as a requirement. The "Inventory of certified schemes for agricultural products
and foodstuffs marketed in the European Union Member States" is the most up to date inventory of
certified schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs marketed in European Union Member
States (Areté consultants 2010). Of the 427 certified schemes identified in this inventory, 56
voluntary schemes relate to integrated crop and integrated pest management principles, including
both Business-to-business and Business-to-consumer schemes. They have been developed by the
private sector, including both retailers and producers organizations. Fruits and vegetables are by far
the crops mostly concerned by IPM certification. As a way of illustration, some of these various
schemes are highlighted in Table 1.
------------------------ Table 1 --------------------------
With the new European legislation (mandatory compliance with the general principles of integrated
pest management for all professional users of plant protection products) certification schemes need
to evolve beyond general IPM practices, since, at least in Europe, voluntary certification schemes
cannot certify practices corresponding to legal requirements (EC 2010). Therefore, even if the
question has already been debated, there will be no official European official for IPM, contrary to
what exists for organic farming. Indeed, producer and retailer organizations willing to develop IPM
voluntary certification schemes will have to include specific requirements, going further and beyond
general IPM principles as defined in the Sustainable Use Directive (certifying the application of more
innovative and crop-specific IPM approaches and practices).
Another, not unrelated but associated question, relates to the expected impact of the new legislation
on prices and consumers' preferences. As mentioned, IPM has been, up until now, a requirement for
market access imposed by retailers. Even if IPM adoption is akin to product differentiation, producers
receive no price premium for IPM products. In Europe, adoption of IPM general principles is now a
legal requirement imposed by the legislator (and no longer by retailers), but the expected impact is
similar, i.e. no price premium for IPM grown products. According to basic economic theory, prices
would increase only if large-scale adoption would result in higher production costs and lower yields
at European level; or by a change in consumers' preferences. Using economic experiments, Biguzzi et
al. (2014) found that the gradual reduction of shelf space for conventional tomatoes, following the
implementation of the sustainable use directive, would benefit equally to organic and IPM tomatoes,
whatever the prices. However, in their experimental study, they found that if conventional tomatoes
totally disappeared, the winning market segment between organic and IPM would depend on the
price difference between these products.
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In this section, we have analysed the impact of IPM adoption on market access and price premium. In
general, IPM products emerge as poorly recognised by the end-consumer, given the relatively few
IPM labels on the supermarket shelves. Most certification schemes are business-to-business, where
adoption of IPM practices is a requirement for market access. In this context, it is considered that the
new legislation will not have a major impact on the market, only force producer and retailer
organizations to redefine their certification schemes so that they include requirements that go
beyond the legal ones. Finally it is worth mentioning that the evidence presented in sections 2.1 and
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2.2 concerns merely the impact of IPM adoption on costs, yields and output prices and market
access. As such, all these indicators concern the economic dimension. Recent advances in
behavioural studies of farmers' decision making warns us against the exclusive use of pure economic
rationality frameworks, supporting the inclusion of social, cognitive, as well as emotional factors
towards the analysis of production decisions. In the next section, with this in mind, we look at the
effect of attitudes on IPM adoption.
2.3 The role of farmers' attitudes
Behavioural factors and farmers' attitudes towards risk, innovation or the environment are likely to
explain the deviation from an adoption decision purely driven by economic rationality. Such factors
are important to take into account as they can impact farmers' responsiveness to policy instruments
based on purely financial incentives.
First, we focus on the role of farmers' risk preferences. Pest and disease attacks constitute one of the
biggest sources of risk in agriculture; especially because they are likely to provoke "catastrophic risk"
(up to 100% crop losses). Not only can pests and diseases reduce yields, but they can also impact
quality, therefore exposing producers to quality-based price risk. Consequently, risk is considered a
major factor reducing the rate of adoption of new agricultural technologies (Marra, Pannell et al.
2003). According to the conventional view, pesticides have been considered an important
component in reducing the risk of yield loss and are commonly used as an insurance by risk-averse
farmers (Mumford and Norton 1984). However, some results suggest that fertilizer and pesticides
may, in fact, constitute risk-increasing inputs in some contexts (Pannell 1991; Horowitz and
Lichtenberg 1993; Regev, Gotsch et al. 1997). Quantitative evidence on the impacts of the adoption
of IPM principles on production risk are now old references and restricted to the US experience, and
they have shown heterogenous results (Musser, Tew et al. 1981; Hurd 1994). Currenlty, and to the
best of our knowledge, the only available information in the Europe is given in Mouron, Heijine et al.
(2012), according to whom experts judge income variability (both due to the standard deviation of
yield per ha and the standard deviation of the proportion of 1st class fruit) to be higher in IPM than
in conventional European apple orchards.
In spite of the absence of convincing evidence that profit variability is significantly affected by IPM
principles adoption, growers often perceive new practices as posing inherent risk (Musser, Wetzstein
et al. 1986). In this context, adoption of IPM can be clearly considered as risky, due to the novelty of
some of the strategies part of the IPM toolbox, but also the knowledge or experience gap. Farmers
can perceive as risky the decision to learn new plant protection methods, compared to the perceived
certainties and experiences of the conventional production paradigm and the risk management
potential offered by chemical control.
In this context, insurance represents a potential tool to encourage adoption of IPM principles
(Feinerman, Herriges et al. 1992; Mitchell 1999). Until now, there is a relatively low and slow uptake
of crop insurance in Europe (compare to the US). Most insurance schemes do not appear well suited
to alternative farming practices. For example, the insured party should prove that he has used all
possible crop protection tools available in agriculture in order to be compensated for crop losses. Not
using maximal chemical control and departing from conventional crop protection tactics could be
qualified by insurers as a motive to refuse compensation. Recently, efforts have been made to take
into account the specific insurance needs of organic farming. In this respect, the US Agricultural Risk
Protection Act now takes into account organic farming specificities (Singerman, Hart et al. 2011;
USDA 2013). Recently, some private insurance companies have started offering specific insurance
policies for organic agriculture in Europe (eg. "Atout 5 bio" by Crédit Agricole, France). Therefore,
conceptually, there is no real impediment as to why this could not be expanded to Integrated Pest
11
Management. Insurance products designed for corn rootworm IPM users have been already
developed under a collaboration between the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management
Agency and the Agricultural Conservation Innovation Center (Cubie 1999). However, to date, we are
not aware of any similar large-scale experience in the European Union, neither for IPM nor for
integrated farming in general.
Beyond farmers' attitudes towards risk, there is evidence that attitudes towards health and
environmental risk due to pesticide exposure can be key factors in adoption (Lichtenberg and
Zimmerman 1999; Cuyno, Norton et al. 2001). Indeed, there is evidence that some farmers are
willing to trade-off economic profitability for reduced health and environmental risk due to their
farming practices. This would be in favour of IPM since IPM principles contribute to the reduction of
environmental risks associated with pesticide use by encouraging the adoption of more ecologically
benign control approaches and strategies. Several studies show that the environmental sustainability
(as measured by indicators of resource use, water and soil quality, flora and fauna, C02 emission, etc.)
of IPM is improved compared to conventional systems (Mouron, Heijne et al. 2012; Pelzer, Fortino et
al. 2012). Moreover, as IPM approach includes the use of the most effective formulations and safest
application technologies, and can result in fewer pesticide applications, health risks to agricultural
workers and rural communities are minimized (Brenner, Markowitz et al. 2003).
Farmers' attitudes towards innovation are also important when it comes to adoption of new crop
protection methods. They determine whether farmers know (about new techniques), be willing (to
apply), be able (have the skills), be allowed (social component for change) and dare (to experiment)
to apply new techniques.
-
This section discusses private incentives for Integrated Pest Management adoption, i.e. those factors
likely to encourage European farmers to adopt IPM principles in the absence of mandatory regulation
and specific policy instruments. Overall, there is lack of quantitative evidence on the potential of
Integrated Pest Management to increase economic sustainability relative to non-IPM strategies
related to European agro-ecosystems. However, there are little arguments against the fact the
application of IPM general principles will represent for farmers the opportunity to increase returns
via saving on costs. Until now, adoption of IPM practices has allowed producers to get access to
specific markets, but did not guarantee any price premium. The new legislation is not expected to
have any major impact on market organization, since it only transforms a requirement imposed by
retailers into one imposed by the European legislator. It will only forces retailers and producers
organization to revise their certification schemes and include requirements going beyond the legal
ones. Finally, the behavioural factors briefly presented can explain why, even when alternative pest
control methods are more profitable than chemical control, other external incentives can be
required, at least during a transition period, towards IPM adoption. We further explore and expand
on policy drivers in the next section.
3. Public policies to foster Integrated Pest Management adoption
While pest management decisions are made at the farm level, they can be influenced or constrained
by public policies. The question is whether the private incentives presented in the previous section
are sufficient to lead to a rapid and wide adoption of IPM principles or whether there is room for
government intervention. Through the Sustainable Use Directive, the European Union has decided to
rely on regulation and has made the adoption of IPM general principles mandatory for all European
farmers. In the first instance, it is interesting to understand the rationale behind policy intervention
12
in crop protection. Secondly, we present and evaluate the usefulness of a number of potential
options available within a policy ''toolbox". While we rely on the economic literature on the role of
policy drivers in adoption of new practices in general, we always have in mind the actual context in
the European Union and illustrate some of the practical challenges in the design and implementation
of such policies in the current European Context.
3.1 Why is public intervention necessary in crop protection?
Crop protection in agriculture presents various cases of market failure (Waibel 1993). Market failures
are situations where individuals' pursuit of pure self-interest leads to results that are not efficient,
i.e. that deviates from the socially optimal pest control practices maximizing the net benefit to
society including consumers, farmers, plant protection products producers, as well as the
environment. Market failure remains one of the most influential arguments for public intervention.
Having in mind the market failure framework, we illustrate here why and to what extent public
policies have a role and are necessary to promote IPM adoption in Europe.
3.1.1 Crop protection and externalities
While farmers are private entrepreneurs, taking their business decisions individually, outside agents
are impacted unintentionally, both positively and negatively, by pest management practices.
Externalities associated with crop protection decisions are numerous, with impacts at diverse levels:
farm workers, soil and water contamination, degree of pest pressure and resistance and impact on
the quality and safety of food (Sexton, Lei et al. 2007). These externalities are usually not taken into
account in the market in the form of higher prices for pesticides, or lower prices for pesticide-
intensive crops. Moreover, farmers usually do not take into account the costs of compensating other
agents for possible environmental or health damages due to their farming practices for which they
can be held liable. This implies that the signals received by farmers when they have to take decisions
relative to crop protection are inefficient. Whereas farmers can have private benefits from IPM
adoption in the form of increased profits or non-pecuniary advantages (as describe in section 2),
many of the benefits of the adoption of IPM principles are also in terms of avoided negative
externalities, benefiting to society at large. Extra incentives, either through mandatory or voluntary
approaches, are therefore required to make the time and financial investment associated with IPM
adoption attractive and economically viable, particularly in a transition period as currently being
experienced in Europe (Waterfield and Zilberman 2012). The design of policy instruments should be
such that farmers integrate the social benefits from IPM adoption in their objective function when
taking decisions about pest management.
3.1.2 Crop protection, landscape ecology and coordination failure
Coordination failure arises when a group of farms could achieve a situation more desirable for
society but fail to do so because of the absence of coordinated decisions, although each individual
understands the challenges and recognises the need for action. For example, since pest populations
migrate across farms and wider areas, coordinated pest control actions among farmers confronting
with the same pest pressure is an optimal IPM approach. It allows prevention of pest population
spread, damage and resistance build-up at both farm/field and landscape levels. Recent results in
landscape ecology have shown that IPM activities designed at the landscape/regional scale can offer
greater benefits than IPM at field level because of the positive externalities from one farm to the
other (McKee 2011) (e.g. pheromones insect traps (Tscharntke, Bommarco et al. 2007)). However,
regional IPM strategies are considered most costly to implement as they require additional societal
acceptance, coordination and cooperation among farmers (Brewer and Goodell 2012) and different
forms of incentives are necessary to encourage their development at such scales.
13
Given this clear role for public policies to promote IPM adoption, we present in the next section the
instruments currently used in Europe and illustrate some of the practical challenges in their design in
order to address these market failures.
3.2 How can public policies encourage IPM adoption?
Over the years, a number of instruments have been proposed to influence farmers' decisions with
regard to crop protection. They can be classified in three categories: regulatory instruments,
information dissemination measures and incentive-based instruments. Here, we discuss the
advantages and limits of these instruments for the promotion of IPM adoption, both in the transition
period of implementation of the Sustainable Use Directive, and in the long run.
3.2.1 Regulatory instruments
With regulatory instruments, public authorities mandate and control the environmental performance
to be achieved or the technologies to be used by farms. In recent years, the European Union has
released several regulations and directives
7
, either targeting IPM directly or with potential indirect
impacts on IPM adoption.
Different pieces of European and national legislations have been developed over recent years to
regulate pesticide use. While they do not target IPM adoption, they may indirectly favour the use of
alternative pest control methods by constraining the use of certain active substances and plant
protection products. Firstly, the criteria for the approval of active substances are regulated at
European Union level, while authorisations to place plant protection products on the market remains
the responsibility of individual Member States (EU 2009). Secondly, the European Union also imposes
Maximum Residue Levels of pesticides permitted in food products (EU 2005). Maximum Residue
Levels are the upper legal levels of a concentration for pesticide residues in or on food, or feed,
based on good agricultural practices and to ensure the lowest possible consumer exposure. Finally,
European Union legislators have also specified requirements with which machinery for pesticide
application must comply before being placed on the market and/or put into service (EU 2009).
In addition, as part of the pesticide package, the Sustainable Use of pesticides Directive 2009/128/EC
explicitly mentions IPM, from where two fundamental types of provisions are distinguished:
obligations imposed to all the professional users of pesticides in the European Union, and, secondly,
obligations imposed at Member State level. Concerning professional users, the mandatory character
of IPM is reflected in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection
products on the market (Article 55). Therein it is stated that plant protection products shall be used
properly, and proper use includes the compliance with the general principles of integrated pest
management defined in annex III of the directive, which shall apply at the latest by 1 January 2014
(EU 2009). Concerning the obligations imposed at Member State level, according to article 14 of the
Sustainable Use Directive (EU 2009), Member States have to describe in their National Action Plans
7
From the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union Article 288 : "A directive shall be binding
as to the result to be achieved upon each Member States to which it is addressed but shall leave to
the national authorities the choice of form and methods." It can be distinguished from regulations
which are self-executing and do not require any implementing measures. Directives normally leave
member states with a certain amount of leeway as to the exact rules to be adopted.
14
how they ensure that the general principles of IPM are implemented by all professional users by 1
January 2014. Furthermore, beyond the general principles of IPM, Member States shall establish
appropriate incentives to encourage professional users to implement crop or sector-specific
guidelines for integrated pest management on a voluntary basis.
8
Among the practical challenges in the implementation of the Sustainable Use of pesticides Directive,
there is the fact that the introduction of two levels of responsibilities (at the individual level for every
professional user, and at the Member State level) resulted in dilution of responsibilities and increases
the need for coordination. Indeed, there is a risk that, if crop specific guidelines are not available at
Member State level, then making adoption of general IPM principles mandatory at individual level
will not have a major impact. Moreover, another challenge relies on the fact that individual Member-
States are responsible for the crop-specific guidelines, but international organizations already have
taken on board part of this task. For example, major activities of the International Organisation for
Biological Control (IOBC) include "the practical implementation of biological and integrated controls
for pests and diseases of particular crops" (IOBC-WPRS web). However, the guidelines available still
need to be refined to be of practical use for producers, as well as updated with the latest scientific
advances concerning the efficiency of different plan protection strategies and their integration.
Beyond legislation related to pesticides use, it is also important to consider the full regulatory
environment on agriculture, as pest management decisions are inevitably impacted by the
agricultural policy (Sexton, Lei et al. 2007). The Sustainable Use Directive is consistent with the
objective of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to promote more sustainable farming
practices. When the Sustainable Use Directive is finally implemented in all Member States, and the
obligations directly applicable to farmers clearly identified through their respective National Action
Plans, the relevant parts of the Directive should be included in the system of cross compliance (EU
2013). The exact timing will depend of the proper implementation on the ground. Under this so-
called cross compliance system, Member States impose penalties in the form of reduction or
exclusion of CAP support in case of non-compliance of individual farmers.
A similar approach was retained in Switzerland, where, in 1996, Swiss citizens voted for an
amendment to the federal constitution to include the principle of multi-functionality and
sustainability for the Swiss agricultural sector. As a result, it was decided that farmers should enrol
in a national programme on ecological production and respect the guidelines of either integrated
or organic production in order to qualify for direct payments. At that time, the requirements to
comply with integrated crop/livestock production were: management of crop rotation, cultivation of
meadows, ground covering, closure of nutrition cycles, phosphorus and nitrogen balances, use of
pesticides only if damage thresholds are reached, ecological set-asides on at least 5 % of arable land,
buffer strips along surface water, hedges and forest (Swiss Confederation 1996). In 2005, target
objectives were achieved with 90% of the cultivated land in integrated production and 10% certified
as organic. Nowadays, organic farming receives extra compensation on top of direct payments
(ecological direct payment) but integrated production is not rewarded since it became the norm.
Rather, the Swiss Confederation supplements farmers’ incomes with direct payments on condition
that a “Proof of Ecological Performance” is made (Swiss Confederation 2013). Besides direct
8
The development and implementation of Member State National Action Plans are still on-going and it is
difficult to assess, at this stage, levels of consistency / variability between Member States or expected or
anticipated levels of success with respect to overall IPM adoption (this would be subject of a future analysis
from a period of application and experience, unable to be addressed effectively at this stage, and as such is
beyond the current scope of this review).
15
payments, farmers profit from joining the national programme by being able to market their
produce under Swiss-wide unified labels for either integrated production (IPSuisse (Table 1)) or
organic production (Bio Suisse).
Following a similar path, European Policy makers have chosen to make adoption of IPM general
principles mandatory at farm-level. The penalties in case of non-commitment (defined by the
Member States in accordance with Article 17 of the Sustainable Use Directive) together with the
cross compliance regime act as an incentive for farmers to adopt IPM. But Member States are also
required by the Article 14 of the Directive to "establish appropriate incentives to encourage
professional users to implement crop or sector specific guidelines for integrated pest management
on a voluntary basis". Despite the fact that a mandatory approach has been chosen, it is recognized
that there are adjustment costs to the new legal requirements. This may create the needs for
incentive-based instruments, likely to compensate part of these costs. Moreover, to allow the
application of general principles of IPM from all professional users, an increase in advisory services
has been identified as a central resource to assist practioners with the necessary technical and
economical adjustments, inherent to IPM adoption. We develop in the next section the role of
information dissemination measures and support to farmers' training.
3.2.2 Information dissemination measures
Persistent barriers to the adoption of new farming practices include, among other factors, limited
availability of and access to production and market information (Atanu, Alan Love et al. 1994; Lohr
and Salomonsson 2000; Dimara and Skuras 2003). The objective of training and advisory systems is
first to raise awareness and to stimulate farmers’ interest in alternative methods of pest
management (Schreinemachers and Tipraqsa 2012), then to provide farmers with the necessary tools
to implement crop-specific guidelines for IPM (Braun, Jiggins et al. 2006). Educational programs are a
useful method for approaching the complex problem of pesticide regulation, especially when there
are uncertainties regarding the efficacy or environmental effects of alternatives crop protection
methods and when the integration of different approaches is the solution (Goodhue, Klonsky et al.
2010).
Information measures important for IPM adoption include free or subsidized pest management
advisors, independent from, and complementary to, the advice provided by companies or
commercial entities selling plant protection products (Waterfield and Zilberman 2012). Moreover,
advisory services should contribute to the implementation of farmers groups in order to share the
costs associated with IPM and to better manage spill overs at landscape-scale (e.g. through
cooperatives). Demonstration farms are considered very valuable measures for both knowledge
exchange between research, advisors and farmers and for the efficient dissemination of IPM
methods to other farmers. Demonstration activities serve as proof of concept and are often highly
appreciated within farming communities (Bailey, Garforth et al. 2006).
The Sustainable Use Directive places considerable emphasis on such measures. European Union
Member States have to provide professional users with information and tools for pest monitoring
and decision making, as well as advisory services (Article 14). Measures for risk reduction and
information about IPM are listed in the training subjects (Annex I to the Directive). In the National
Action Plans recently released by Member States, training measures for farmers, advisors and
pesticide distributors, as well as the establishment of advisory services and dissemination measures
have a critical and central role (Table 2). Many countries already have mandatory farmer training and
now include IPM issues in their existing schemes. A novel component here is that the training of
advisors or trainers will become mandatory in most countries, in order to ensure that up to date
technical information and approaches are disseminated (Dachbrodt-Saaydeh 2013).
16
------------------------ Table 2--------------------------
Such IPM Training activities could be organized and expanded within the framework of the CAP Farm
Advisory Services (FAS) since it is foreseen that Member States should provide advice to farmers
through the Farm Advisory System on the proper use of plant protection products, and in particular
compliance with the general principles of integrated pest management. Advisory services offered to
farmers can be free or not, face-to-face, trough brochures, internet, seminars …. If the advice is not
free, countries can decide to include training in the list of possible rural development measures
9
and
farmers applying to such measure would receive compensation for the cost of training (EU 2013).
Such compensation are part of the incentive-based instruments, developed in the next sub-section.
3.2.3 Incentive-based instruments
While European policy makers have decided to rely on mandatory approaches to reach the adoption
of the general principles of IPM by all farmers, there is still some room for incentive-based
instruments. Indeed, the Sustainable Use Directive recognizes that incentive-based instruments can
play a crucial role in the achievement of objectives relating to the sustainable use of pesticides and
encourage their use, while stressing that individual Member States are free to include them or not in
their National Action Plans. More precisely, the Sustainable Use Directive explicitly refers to the
establishment of incentives to encourage the implementation of crop or sector-specific guidelines.
Moreover, given that adoption of general IPM principles does not necessarily mean reduction in
pesticide use, incentive-based instruments can be used as a complement to influence farmers'
behaviours in that direction.
Incentive-based policies usually refer to taxes and subsidies. Taxes or subsidies can be used to modify
the private incentives to the adoption of different pest management methods when users fail to take
into account all the externalities of their pest control practices (Rademaekers, van der Laan et al.
2011). The principle is rather simple and straightforward: if the action of one agent provides a
beneficial service to society at large, then the individual may need to be compensated (subsidy) in
order to provide the socially optimal level of the service. If, on the contrary, the actions cause harm
to society, then the individual may need to be charged, or taxed, for those actions to maximize
collective social welfare.
The times of subsidies, or reduced value added tax rate(s) for pesticides, is now passed
(Schreinemachers and Tipraqsa 2012). The elimination of environmentally harmful subsidies was the
first step taken to encourage the rationalization of crop protection (Withana, Brink et al. 2012). Some
European countries have even taken a further step by taxing pesticide use and subsidizing adoption
of alternative crop protection methods. Here, we review some of these initiatives and present their
advantages and limits in promoting IPM adoption.
9
Under the new rural development policy (Article 15 Advisory services, farm management and farm relief
services), it is explicitly stated that support can be granted in order to help farmers benefit from the use of
advisory services for the improvement of the economic and environmental performance as well as the climate
friendliness and resilience of their farms, and to promote the training of advisors.
17
3.2.3.1 Tax on pesticide use
In theory, a tax on the use of a pest control treatment constrains producers to take into account all
the positive and negative externalities associated with the use of the treatment. With a well-
designed tax system, pesticides are used up to the point where using more pesticides will be more
costly (including also environmental damages) than beneficial (Zilberman and Millock 1997).
Moreover, taxes play the role of innovation stimulation, through their impact on farmers and crop
protection industries' willingness to find alternative practices (EUROSTAT 2007). It is therefore a
useful complement to regulation on IPM adoption. Lastly, tax revenues can cover the costs attached
to their collection, and potentially be used to finance research and extension services. Nevertheless,
it should be noted that an effective tax will raise limited benefits if the agents adapt their behaviours
so as not to pay the tax.
Although, in theory, taxes are appealing, a number of practical challenges limit their feasibility
(Zilberman and Millock 1997). A well-designed tax should take into account all the external effects of
pesticide use. It therefore requires a lot of data on biological processes (Zilberman and Millock 1997),
especially given that the magnitude of these external effects varies not only with the level of
pesticides applied, but also with the manner, time, and space of application. According to
environmental taxation theory, the tax rate should vary from farm to farm, according to the location
of the farm and the application rate and technology. Such a flexible taxation scheme has never been
implemented since it would be overly costly to formulate and difficult to implement and enforce
(Falconer and Hodge 2001). The few European Union countries who have introduced pesticide taxes
rely on a simpler approach (Baumol and Oates 1988): they have defined an objective of reduction in
pesticide use and have fixed the pesticide tax such as to attain it, with limited consideration of the
marginal damage function and marginal costs of reduction
10
(with the exception of the recently
reformed pesticide tax in Denmark). Table 3 summarized the existing pesticide taxes in Europe.
------------------------ Table 3 --------------------------
3.2.3.2 Payments for IPM adoption
Agri-environmental measures (AEM) have been implemented within the European Common
Agricultural Policy with the aim to encourage farmers to protect and enhance the environment on
their farmland, when the cost of doing so outweighs the benefits at farm level. Such payments
provide a compensation for the costs associated to the learning phase of adoption, or the riskiness of
the new practice. Subsidies also constitute a payment for the services provided by early adopters to
the community: early adopters will gather experiences and information that will benefit other
farmers interested in adoption.
Under the Common Agricultural Rural Development Policy, European Union Member States have to
select and specify the AEM most relevant to their particular farming systems and environmental
conditions. In the programming period 2007-2013, some Member States supported integrated
production in general (e.g. Austria, Portugal), while others targeted the implementation of integrated
production in specific sectors (e.g. horticulture in Brandenburg, Germany), or under measures
dealing with food quality schemes (e.g. Poland). Other agri-environmental measures have aimed to
decrease the adverse impact of pesticide use but did not necessarily promote IPM. For example,
10
Marginal cost of reduction corresponds to the increase in cost when pesticide use is reduced by one unit, or
one percent. Marginal damage corresponds to the increase in damage due to the increase by one unit or one
percent of pesticide use. In theory, both should be taken into account to design an optimal environmental tax.
18
compensation for riparian buffer zones along streams and lakes have been offered to Danish farmers
in order to protect the aquatic environment and to prevent leaching of pesticides to ground water
(Christensen, Pedersen et al. 2011).
Agri-environment-climate payments can cover only those commitments going beyond mandatory
standards. Therefore, Member States will not be permitted to support adoption of IPM general
principles via AEMs after 2014. Rather, Member States willing to design AEMs targeting crop
protection will have to focus on the support to sustainable agronomic practices going beyond the
mandatory requirements (e.g Integrated Crop Management (PAN Europe 2010)).
One risk of such payments is to provide incentives for the adoption of single and crop-specific
practices. Rather, they should be cautiously designed to encourage the adoption of IPM as a system,
at the farm or even landscape-scale. According to Ehler and Bottrel (2000), the IPM policy experience
in the US has failed because the approach was restricted to the adoption of some specific techniques,
without the required integration between them. Current agri-environmental schemes in Europe also
tend to have this shortcoming (e.g. support to crop rotation in France and Germany, support to
mechanical weeding in Belgium). Taking advantage of the on-going reform of the European Common
Agricultural Policy and the evolution of national Rural Development plans, policy instruments could
be improved towards the promotion of IPM as an integrated approach, beyond the current support
to disparate single techniques.
-
We have described here the various European regulations, information dissemination measures and
incentive-based instruments likely to influence farmers' decisions with regard to crop protection and
favour the adoption of Integrated Pest Management. Some of them have already been implemented
in some Member States, especially with the objective to reduce pesticide use. But IPM adoption by
all European farmers is a different objective. IPM adoption being a dynamic and continuous process,
were the different strategies part of IPM are often implemented step-by-step, a more pragmatic
approach to fit with the nature of IPM is to rely on a combination of these instruments.
Concerning the tax on pesticide use, we know that price elasticity of pesticide use is very low and
therefore very high tax rates are needed to achieve reduction (Falconer and Hodge 2001; Jacquet,
Butault et al. 2011; Skevasa, Stefanoua et al. 2012). Moreover, price elasticity is also likely to
decrease with efforts to reduce chemical control, therefore the tax rate should increase when the
quantity of pesticide reduces. Therefore, given that such tax rates are rarely politically acceptable, a
pesticide tax, as a stand-alone measure, is ineffective and should be complemented by other
financial incentives and extension services (Falconer and Hodge 2000). For example, taxes that
differentiate according to toxicity are effective only if farmers are informed on the use of low-toxicity
substitutes (Skevasa, Stefanoua et al. 2012)
11
. Moreover, it should be noted that whereas pesticide
taxes are useful to encourage pesticide use reduction in a more flexible way than bans on active
substances, they do not provide incentives to adopt IPM as a systematic and/or holistic approach.
Efficient training on the various crop protection strategies available, and on their integration is
necessary to promote crop protection strategies going beyond the reduction of pesticide use.
11
Pesticides are categorized in toxicity classes in the European Union's classification system, regulated by the
Dangerous Substances Directive (Directive 67/548/EEC) prior to 2016, and the regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of
the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and
mixtures from 2016.
19
The effectiveness of these policies likely to foster IPM adoption will differ according to each farmer
characteristic and farming system, not least crop. While the approach retained in Europe consists in
accepting that IPM general principles are applicable to all crops and across all Member States,
farmers' reaction to policy instruments can be highly diverse. For example, since fruits producers
have a very low share of their income coming from agricultural policy payments, they are more
dependent on farm-gate prices they receive for their products, compare to arable farmers for
example. Therefore, they may be more likely to adopt practices for which they will get a price
premium, or at least new market access. Large-scale adoption of IPM, beyond the mandatory general
principles, may therefore only be achieved through crop-specific and region-specific programs
(Vasileiadis, Sattin et al. 2011; Mouron, Heijne et al. 2012).
4. Conclusion
In this review, we have tried to decipher and understand the pertinent drivers of changes in farmers'
pest management practices and their expected reaction to different policy incentives targeting IPM
adoption, in a context of legislative change in the European Union. Indeed, a good understanding of
the spectrum and relevance of private incentives is a first step towards the design of more efficient
policies. Based on the results from the literature and considerations discussed above, we propose a
framework summarizing the incentives for Integrated Pest Management adoption (Figure 3). It
includes four main categories of drivers: First, the cost effectiveness and impact on risk of IPM
technology, the market drivers (access to market and farm-gate price for IPM products, input prices)
and farmers' attitudes towards innovation, the environment and health risks correspond to the
private incentives for adoption. The last box recaps the policy instruments likely to further support
adoption, when private incentives are too weak, especially in a transition period, or when the market
sends wrong signals in the presence of external effects of farmers' crop protection decisions.
------------------------ Figure 3 --------------------------
We briefly summarize here the main results. We have reviewed the incentives linked to the cost-
effectiveness of IPM technology. While adoption of IPM principles can provide positive economic
benefits for farmers in the form of reduced costs, large variations according to the specific IPM
practice under study, the crops and local conditions, are expected. Unfortunately, experience in
Europe is too limited to provide general guidance to farmers on the most technically and
economically efficient IPM strategies at present. As pointed-out in the Sustainable Use of Pesticide
Directive, crop-specific guidelines are still to be developed. Concerning market incentives, it is clear
that products grown using IPM methods are currently rarely identified as such in the European
market place. Up to now, certification schemes including IPM requirements have functioned rather
as market entry requirement, or a condition for selling in specific market segments. Early adopters
did not get a premium for IPM products, unless in the cases where compliance with IPM approach
allowed to reach higher market segments. In this context, it is not expected that mandatory adoption
of IPM principles will have a strong impact on the output markets. We have also considered the
importance of non-financial incentives likely to foster IPM adoption, such as concern for reducing
profit variability, as well as environmental and health risks. It is now well recognised that attitudes
are clue, especially when the profitability of a new technology is not well known.
In the European context, a clear argument still remains for the role of public intervention in
promoting IPM adoption. The main arguments supporting public intervention in crop protection
include the fact that signals received by farmers when they have to take decisions relative to crop
protection are inefficient, given the existence of externalities, as well as the need for coordinated
action at landscape-level, in order to reach maximum benefits from IPM. Adoption of IPM general
20
principles has been made mandatory for all farmers through European Union legislation but we have
shown in this article that incentive-based and information dissemination measures are useful
complementary instruments.
Incentive-based instruments impact the profitability of IPM by increasing pesticide costs through
taxes and subsidizing farmers for the specific production practices whose social benefits are larger
than individual private ones. Information dissemination should complement such incentive-based
measures to modify farmers' attitudes towards risk (e.g. by the design or support of adequate
insurance products), innovation (e.g. by the empowerment of extension services on IPM) and the
environmental and health consequences of their decisions. Importantly, adoption of alternative
farming technologies does not depend only on farmers, but often requires changes in the whole
system. Thus, there is also a role for the State to promote recognition of IPM across the whole agri-
food sector, including retailers and end-consumers. Policies for IPM promotion should search for high
integration between all such instruments.
Acknowledgments: The research leading to this article has received funding from the European
Union Seventh Framework Programme PURE under the grant agreement n°265865. This work does
not necessarily reflect the view of the European Union and in no way anticipates the Commission’s
future policy in this area. The authors would like to thank Silke Dachbrodt-Saaydeh, Alison Burell,
Patrizia Pitton and Aymeric Berling for providing valuable inputs and comments. We would also like
to thank the partners of the PURE FP7 (Innovative crop protection for sustainable agriculture,
www.pure-ipm.eu) and participants of the "Future of IPM" conference (Riva del Garda, Italy 19-21
March 2013) for inspiring discussions.
21
Table 1: Examples of schemes certifying Integrated Pest Management in the European Union
Name of the scheme
Coverage
How is Integrated Pest Management included?
EU, extended to
non-EUROPEAN
UNION countries
Business to
Business (not
directly visible for
the consumers)
GlobalGAP is a private sector body that sets
voluntary standards for the certification of
agricultural products based on Good Agricultural
Practices (GAP). It was initiated in 1997 by a
number of retailers represented in the Euro-
Retailer Produce Working Group. It is a pre-farm-
gate-standard that means the certificate covers
the process of the certified product from before
the seed is planted until it leaves the farm.
The Global GAP crops module covers Integrated
Pest Management, as well as traceability,
propagation material, site history and site
management, soil management, fertilizer
application, irrigation/fertigation, plant protection
products and equipment.
The GLOBAL G.A.P. Database registers the
assessment and certification data of more than
130,000 farms in over 120 countries.
Producción Integrada
Spain
Business to
Consumer
Each Spanish region has developed his own
scheme for integrated production, but since 2002,
all regional schemes are covered by the "Real
Decreto 1201/2002, de 20 de noviembre, por el
que se regula la producción integrada de
productos agrícolas." Integrated Pest
Management principles are included in the "crop
protection" chapter of "producción integrada".
Integrated Production certified farms can receive
agri-environmental payments.
The surface registered account for 659 294 ha in
2010.
Certification environnementale des
exploitations agricoles
France
Business to
Consumer
The French scheme of farms environmental
certification was created in 2010. It is built around
four themes: Biodiversity, Plant protection
strategy, Management of fertilizer use, Water
management. Farms can be certificated at three
different levels:
-Level One: fulfilment of the environmental
requirements in cross-compliance.
-Level Two: compliance with a set of 16 different
criteria, among which some are related to crop
protection. Among the indicators, some can
reflect a certain level of Integrated Pest
Management (eg. treatment frequency index, use
of non-chemical alternatives to crop protection).
Existing programs have received recognition on
their equivalence with level 2 (eg. "Agriculture
raisonnée" managed by the inter-professional
association FARRE)
-Level Three “High Environmental Value”: It
22
involves a formal agreement to achieve defined
outcomes. The farmer can choose to be assessed
according to four composite indicators related to
biodiversity, plant protection strategy, fertilizer
use, water management or two synthetic
indicators (share of ecological focus area or
permanent pasture in UAA and share of input
costs in turnover).
LEAF
United Kingdom +
40 other
countries in
Europe, Middle
East, South
America and
North Africa
Business to
Consumer
LEAF (Linking Environment And Farming) is a non-
governmental initiative set up in 1991 with a view
to develop Integrated Farming Management
(IFM). Integrated Pest Management is an integral
part of IFM. Farmers applying for LEAF
certification must first have globalGap
certification, plus extra control points on crop
protection.
In 2012, 357 761 ha were LEAF certified across the
world, with 223 141 ha in UK (487 farms).
Fruitnet
Belgium,
extended to
Belgique, France,
Spain, New-
Zealand and
South Africa
Business to
Consumer
Fruitnet is an example of private brand who has
designed his own certification scheme, following
the principles described in Belgian law on
integrated production in fruit production (Arrêté
du Gouvernement flamand du 26 mars 2004).
IP SUISSE
Switzerland
Business to
Consumer
IPSuisse is a swiss certification scheme focused on
Integrated Production. It includes three layers:
general requirements for the farm (including legal
requirements and requirements of the program
“Proof of Ecological Performance” that sets
minimum standards for direct payments), general
requirements for biodiversity, security and
training, as well as and product-specific
requirements for 6 categories of products
(cereals, colza, potatoes, fruits, cider and meat).
For the biodiversity requirements, farmers get
points when following some practices (eg. crop
rotation, soil cover, limited fertilizer use,
mechanical weeding, use of auxiliaries, ecological
focus area…) and they need a minimum of points
to be certified.
In 2014, 20000 farms are certified: 15250
livestock farms, 4500 cereal producers (24000ha),
250 seed rape producers (950ha).
Authors own elaboration. We have selected some schemes (non-exhaustive selection) from the list of
certification schemes included in the "Inventory of certified schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs
marketed in the European Union Member States"(Areté consultants 2010). The information presented here is
based on information collected on the websites of the different schemes.
23
Table 2: Mandatory training for different groups according to the implementation of the
Sustainable Use Directive
Country
Training mandatory for the advisors
(since/from)
Training mandatory for the agricultural
professionals (since/from)
Bulgaria
YES
YES (2013)
Czech republic
YES (2004)
YES (2004)
Germany
YES (1987)
YES (1987)
Denmark
NO
YES (1993)
Estonia
YES (2013)
YES (2000)
Spain
YES (2012)
YES (2015)
Finland
NO
NO
France
NO
NO
Ireland
NO
NO
Italy
YES (2015)
YES (1995)
Lithuania
YES (2012)
YES (1995)
Latvia
YES (2004)
YES (1995)
Malta
NO
YES (2004)
Netherlands
YES (1996)
YES (1996)
Poland
YES (2013)
YES (1996)
Portugal
YES (2006)
YES (2006)
Romania
YES
YES
Slovakia
YES (2014)
YES (2010)
Sweden
NO
YES
Slovenia
YES (1998)
YES (2001)
United Kingdom
NO
YES (1986)
In the National Action Plans recently released by Member States, training measures for farmers, advisors and
pesticide distributors, as well as the establishment of advisory services and dissemination measures have a
critical and central role. The information was compiled based on the National Action Plans by S. Dachbrodt-
Saaydeg (2013). The year corresponds to the year where training have/will become mandatory for the advisors
or the agricultural professionals. Many countries already have mandatory farmer training and now include IPM
issues in their existing schemes. A novel component here is that the training of advisors or trainers will become
mandatory in most countries, in order to ensure that up to date technical information and approaches are
disseminated.
24
Table 3: Pesticide taxes in EU
Country
(date of
implementation)
Tax rate, base and payers
Complementary measures
Outcomes and limits
Sweden (1984)
Fixed amount on every kg of
active ingredient (3.3 EUR per kg
of active substance),
corresponding in average to a 5-
8% tax rate on retail price.
Tax paid by manufacturers and
importers.
The tax revenues finance
activities of the pesticides
programme including
education and inspections
of farmers.
The doses per hectare
have remained stable
since the tax was
introduced in 1984, but
the tonnage of active
substance has decrease
by more than 60%, and
the aggregate risk
factor has also declined
by over 70%.
Denmark (1996)
Since 1998, the tax rate was
equal to 54% of retail price for
insecticides and 33% for
herbicides, growth regulators
and fungicides.
The tax scheme has been revised
in 2012 to take into account the
load on environment and human
health of each pesticide product.
The products with the least
desirable properties (the higher
load) are now more expensive.
Tax paid by manufacturers and
importers.
Around 75% of tax revenues
are returned to the farmers
through reduced land taxes.
The remainder is used to
finance various actions such
as farmers' education
campaign, compensation to
farmers for maintaining
buffer zones, tighter
pesticide approval
procedures…
An "Integrated Pest
Management points
system" is currently
developed as a tool to be
used by advisory services to
promote the use of
Integrated Pest
Management and to be able
to measure the progress.
The treatment
frequency index (TFI)
has been at
approximately the
same level as before
the tax was adopted
(2.5), whereas the
objective was to reach
1.7.
Moreover, Danish
pesticide use has
increased by around
50% from 2002 to 2011.
Given that the tax rate
was not differentiated
according to product
toxicity until recently.
Norway (1998)
€/ha according to product
toxicity class.
A new tax system was
implemented in 1999. It
introduced differentiation
according to human health and
environmental criteria. The tax is
area-based with a base rate of
about 3.4 euros per hectare.
This is then multiplied with a
factor (0.5 to 9) for one of the
five tax classes, to give the tax
for each plant protection
product. Standard area dose (g
or ml per hectare) is used to
convert tax per hectare to tax
per kg or litres of product.
France (2000)
The General Tax on Polluting
Activities (TGAP) has been
The proceeds of the tax are
distributed among the water
The tax rate is too low
and the tax revenues
25
applied to “antiparasitic
products for use on farms, and
other similar products” from
2000.
But since 2008, the TGAP was
replaced by a fee on diffuse
agricultural pollution collected
by public water agencies from
pesticide distributors, according
to the quantity of active
substance sold by products
distributors in France and the
toxicity level. The rate is equal to
2 €/kg for dangerous organic
substances and 0,90 €/kg for
mineral substances (OECD
2011).
Pesticides were suppressed from
the list of products benefiting
from a reduced VAT rate in
2011. VAT applied is now 19.6%.
and waste-treatment-plant
operators.
The French National Action
Plan (Eco-Phyto) is mainly
based on an awareness and
education campaign, the
development of a real-time
warning system against
pests and the banning of a
number of substances used
in pesticides.
cover less than the sole
cost of treating
pesticide contaminated
water for drinking.
We have summarized here the information on the existing pesticide taxes in Europe, based on the following
sources: (Aubertot, Barbier et al. 2005; PAN Europe 2005; Pedersen, Nielsen et al. 2011; Rademaekers, van der
Laan et al. 2011; Miljøstyrelsen 2012; Nordic Association of Agricultural Scientists 2012)
26
Figure 3: Incentives for Integrated Pest Management adoption – general framework
We have summarized here the main drivers of Integrated Pest Management adoption. While IPM adoption is a
farm-level decision, depending both on the technology itself and farmers' attitudes towards this technology,
there are also external factors likely to trigger adoption such as market prices, society preferences, and policy
instruments creating the incentives towards widespread adoption. We highlight the interrelations between the
components with the arrows. For example, consumers' willingness to pay for reduced exposure to pesticide risk
are influenced by information dissemination measures.
27
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