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West European Politics
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A New Divide? The Impact of
Globalisation on National Party
Systems
Eftichia Teperoglou & Emmanouil Tsatsanis
Available online: 01 Nov 2011
To cite this article: Eftichia Teperoglou & Emmanouil Tsatsanis (2011): A New Divide?
The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems, West European Politics, 34:6,
1207-1228
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A New Divide? The Impact of
Globalisation on National Party
Systems
EFTICHIA TEPEROGLOU and EMMANOUIL TSATSANIS
This article contributes to the ongoing discussion concerning the impact of globalisation
and European integration on the structure of ideological space in Western Europe. The
empirical investigation is based on an examination of Euromanifestos data from four
European countries – Germany, United Kingdom, Greece and Portugal – for a time
frame of up to 30 years. The findings largely support the hypothesis of a transformation
of the content of the standard cultural axis due to the emergence of conflicts over the
desirability for regional and/or global integration. However, this transformation occurs
in different ways and by different actors across national contexts. Whereas in the
United Kingdom and Germany objections against ongoing integration processes have
been mainly articulated by political parties of the conservative and populist right, in
Greece and Portugal left-wing political parties emerge as the main representatives of
the anti-integration camp.
The political science literature on the structure and dimensionality of
ideological space and political competition in contemporary democracies
stretches back (at least) to the middle of the previous century with the
median voter theorem (Black 1958) and its familiar assumption about the
unidimensionality (e.g. left–right dimension) of ideological space. However,
cursory as well as more systematic observations of party coalition strategies
or parties’ policy preferences (e.g. Budge et al. 1987), suggested that
assumptions about the unidimensionality of ideological space did not
conform well with the realities observed in most political systems, especially
those in Western Europe. As a result, the assumption of multidimensionality
of ideological space has become a staple for most recent analyses. Such
approaches have also been undoubtedly buoyed by Lipset and Rokkan’s
(1967) influential work on cleavages which, as is well known, identified four
main dimensions of societal conflict in West European societies that, in turn,
gave rise to political parties with particularistic policy agendas.
Correspondence Address: eftichia.teperoglou@mzes.uni-mannheim.de; etsats@gmail.com
West European Politics,
Vol. 34, No. 6, 1207–1228, November 2011
ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online ª2011 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.616660
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As the literature on cleavages investigates the links between demand-side
and supply-side politics, it is no surprise that the identification of structural
transformations in Western societies has prompted new analyses of the
major divisions in contemporary political systems. Technological changes,
the reorganisation of economic production and the increased significance of
the ever-expanding middle class have supposedly dulled the classic capital–
labour conflict. In addition, economic growth, increased affluence levels and
the rapid expansion of education have created a secularising dynamic and a
purported generational value shift (Inglehart 1977). Hypotheses that new
cleavages are gradually replacing older ones, or that simply traditional
cleavages are in decline (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992), abound in the relevant
literature. The new divisions might reflect divergence of interests within the
middle class (Kriesi 1998) or the emergence of new value conflicts. There has
been an array of labels intended to capture these new cleavages: left
libertarianism vs. right authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1994), new left vs. new
right (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003), materialist vs. postmaterialist
(Inglehart 1977, 1990). These new conflicts are not supposed to have added
any fundamentally new dimension of conflict into the political space but
merely transformed the meaning of the two already existing ones (Kriesi
et al. 2008b: 13). In other words, all cleavages, whether the old Rokkanean
ones or the newer ones, essentially boil down to two dimensions of conflict:
an economic conflict over distributional preferences, reflecting a divergence
of objective material interests; and a cultural–political conflict informed by
fundamental value divides (e.g. religiosity vs. secularism).
The New ‘Globalisation Divide’
The latest structural transformations that are supposed to rearrange the
configuration of national cleavage structures are associated with the process
of globalisation. The most important, perhaps, empirical investigation of
this thesis has been carried out by Hanspeter Kriesi and other political
scientists from the Universities of Zurich and Munich (Kriesi et al. 2006,
2008a; Bornschier 2010). The assumption underlying the thesis is that as the
impact of globalisation in its various aspects (economic, cultural and
political) can assume a diversity of forms for the different members of a
national community, new disparities and new forms of conflict are created.
Citizens tend to perceive these differences in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
of globalisation and that the aspirations or grievances of these competing
groups will be articulated by political parties (Kriesi et al. 2008b: 3).
Following this reasoning, we investigate the thesis about the growing
politicisation of issues pertaining to European integration and/or globalisa-
tion and the ensuing polarisation dynamic within European political
systems between supporters and foes of the latter processes.
The roots of this thesis are largely to be found in the political economy
literature which flourished especially in the late 1980s and 1990s and sought
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to investigate the impact of globalisation on national economic policies.
Such analyses tended to focus on how the economic aspects of globalisation
(e.g. trade liberalisation, transnationalisation of capital) affect the interests
and demands of specific economic groups and sectors, as well as the strength
and stability of broader socio-political coalitions at the domestic level
(Gourevitch 1986; Garrett 1995). In addition, many analysts argued that
changing economic realities, induced by international integration, have
constricted the policy options of governments and have made it much more
difficult for policy makers to pursue expansionist economic policies (Hall
1999: 146; Stephens et al. 1999: 164). The result would be a shift in the
landscape of domestic political demand through the creation of ‘new social
divisions arising from the ashes of the old class divide’, such as divides
between the skilled ‘knowledge’ strata and low-skilled marginal workers, or
between the securely employed (insiders) and the unemployed (outsiders)
(Esping-Andersen 1999: 294). The main limitation of this literature is that it
generally ignores non-economic aspects of globalisation, and thus tends to
underestimate the possibility for the creation of conflicts along alternative
policy dimensions.
In this article, we attempt to fully acknowledge the multidimensional
nature of globalisation, and consider the different ways in which it might
impact on the structure of domestic political competition. Specifically, the
main research hypothesis tested in this article is that even though
globalisation and Europeanisation
1
constitute multifaceted and diffuse
processes, preferences of political actors on issues related to the challenges
and opportunities of globalisation manifest clear tendencies of consistent
directionality across distinct economic, cultural and political domains. In
other words, we posit that there is a unidimensional underlying ideological
axis (which we call the nationalism–postnationalism axis) that can be used to
aggregate consonant predispositions in issues as seemingly disparate as the
strengthening of EU institutions and perceived challenges to national
sovereignty, attitudes towards immigrants and the perceived erosion of
national identity, as well as market integration and trade liberalisation. In
addition, we expect that this dimension is aligned with the traditional
cultural–political issue dimension within the ideological space and that – as
the effects of globalisation are becoming increasingly felt by national
populations around the world – it is gradually redefining the content of the
cultural–political dimension. We hold the same expectation for the
economic dimension of globalisation and, for this reason, we have
conceptualised and operationalised distinct categories for economic integra-
tion and economic liberalism, even though the two are often conceptually
and operationally collapsed (as in the work by Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a). We
argue that the economic integration category is fundamentally a boundary
issue, not unlike the cultural and political components of the globalisation
divide, and that orientations in favour of or against it ultimately stem from
ideological predispositions on the problem of community demarcation.
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We test this hypothesis by examining the programmatic commitments of
political parties from four European countries (Germany, United Kingdom,
Greece and Portugal) as expressed in their European election manifestos.
We employ data from the Euromanifestos and ‘Providing an Infrastructure
for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union’ (PIREDEU)
project and the time frame of our study covers up to 30 years (for Germany
and the United Kingdom), beginning with the first European elections of
1979. In the following section we present in detail our research strategy and
design, which offers an overview of the Euromanifestos data and focuses the
discussion on the operationalisation of our main ideological categories and
the selected method of analysis.
Data and Methods
The empirical research strategy of the article focuses on three main
objectives. The first and overarching one is to examine the structure of the
ideological space of different party systems and, subsequently, the position
of globalisation-related issues within this space. Another main objective is
to measure the salience of the debate around these issues for each party
system and to identify possible trends of growing politicisation surrounding
globalisation. Moreover, we attempt to locate the exact position of all
relevant political parties within the national ideological space by examining
the proximity between political parties and particular ideological cate-
gories.
Selection of Data
Our analysis focuses exclusively on the supply-side of party competition.
Undoubtedly, the demand-side of electoral competition, consisting of the
policy preferences of the electorate, is a crucial component of the complete
equation that captures major changes in the ideological space. A cross-
national analysis with a longitudinal perspective that covers both sides of
the equation would obviously be a tall order given the space limitations of a
journal article and, for this reason, we have decided to focus our analysis
exclusively on parties’ policy positions.
The first and most important step of our research design was to make an
appropriate choice of data in order to estimate the policy positions of
political actors, in accordance with our research question and with the
availability of data for the selected time frame. Over the past 25 years or so,
different methodological attempts have been made to locate the positions of
political actors in ideological spaces. The two most dominant approaches so
far have been: a) the analysis of party programmes and manifestos and b)
expert surveys (Mair 2001). However, a more recent approach is the content
analysis of articles in major daily newspapers based on human coding
(Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a; Bornschier 2010), devised to examine a similar
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research question, namely the impact of the globalisation-inspired ‘new
cultural’ divide on the ideological space in Europe.
The empirical investigation of our study rests on an analysis of party
manifestos from European Parliament (EP) elections taken from four
different countries in an attempt to contribute to the ongoing discussion
concerning the (re)structuring of the ideological space in European politics
by employing a different data source. We have used the database of the
‘Euromanifesto Project’ (EMP)
2
at the Mannheim Centre for European
Social Research (MZES) for the time period of 1979–2004; for the
Euromanifestos of 2009, the available database of the Manifesto Study
2009 of the PIREDEU project was analysed. It should be noted that the
selection of party programmes for ‘second-order’ elections, unlike previous
studies that employ strictly ‘first-order’ elections, constitutes an innovative
research approach. Not only are elections to a supranational representative
body likely to be more appropriate for investigating party positions on
globalisation-related issues; the regularity of EP elections across member
states (on the same day every five years) facilitates the strategy of cross-
national comparisons.
As it is well known, the starting theoretical and analytical point for the
content analysis of manifestos is that the (human) coding is based on the
assumptions of the saliency theory of party competition (Robertson 1976;
Budge et al. 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994). The theory posits that the
relative policy position of parties can be determined by the emphasis they
place on each issue, not necessarily on the articulation of an explicit
position, which the theory assumes is more or less the same for all parties.
Several critiques have been levelled against the MRG/CMP project over the
years. Perhaps the most important are that manifestos have a soft-focus
effect – meaning that parties avoid clear statements – and that voters tend to
not read manifestos (Dolezal 2008a: 67). Nevertheless, there are many
benefits from using manifesto data. Braun et al. (2010: 5) emphasise inter
alia that the party manifestos cover a wide range of themes, problems and
political positions. Changes of issue emphases and policy positions of
parties can be studied in a diachronic and cross-national perspective.
Selection of Countries, Parties and Time Frame of the Study
One of our goals was to select a sample of countries that reflect the diversity of
socio-economic and cultural contexts in Europe, with a particular interest in
presenting a comparison of trends in the structure of ideological space
between countries of Western and Southern Europe, an aspect neglected in
recent investigations. For this reason we have decided to study the party
systems of Germany, the UK, Greece and Portugal. This particular group of
countries allows for variation in national levels of pro- and anti-European
attitudes at the level of public opinion, level of economic development, as well
as status of net beneficiary vs. net contributor within the European Union.
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At this point, it should also be mentioned that for the final selection of
these countries we had to take into account the issue of data availability.
As one of our aims is to study the transformation of ideological space over
time, the first EP election of 1979 constitutes the starting point for our
analysis (going all the way to the last EP election in 2009). Nevertheless, it
was necessary to adjust this time frame for the two Southern European
countries. For Germany and the UK there is a consistent time-series of
selected and coded Euromanifestos for (at least) all major parties from 1979
to 2009, which allowed the study of the basic structure of ideological space
of the party system at a given time and which constituted our threshold
criterion for the inclusion of an election in our study. Based on this criterion,
the final time frame for the other two countries is 1989 to 2009 for Portugal
and 1999 to 2009 for Greece.
For the criterion of party relevance for the inclusion of a political party in
our analysis, we have decided to follow the standard practice of equating
relevance with the securing of representation in the corresponding
representative institution after a given election. Only in the case of the
UK have we opted for the exclusion of small regional parties based on the
consideration that we wish to investigate ideological spaces exclusively on a
nationwide scale; the inclusion of small regional parties that compete strictly
within confined sub-national systems would pose significant challenges to
this endeavour for obvious reasons.
Operationalisation of Ideological Categories
The scores in the Euromanifestos dataset represent percentages of political
arguments (quasi-sentences)
3
related to particular issues within each
manifesto. Because of differences in the length of the documents, the
number of quasi-sentences in each category is standardised in order to make
coded manifestos comparable. We have selected only a subgroup of
categories for our analysis;
4
those are then regrouped into nine distinct
categories that denote more abstract ideological orientations: economic
liberalism, welfare state economy, fiscal conservatism, cultural liberalism,
socio-political authoritarianism, environmentalism, economic integration,
Euroscepticism and nativism. The particular issues and the broader
ideological categories were selected in an attempt to satisfy two main
criteria: a) ideological clarity, in terms of selecting categories of issues that
correspond more clearly to the two main dimensions of political competition
as identified in the opening part of the article (socio-economic and cultural–
political), plus the nationalism–postnationalism axis that constitutes the focus
of our study; b) conceptual congruence, in terms of striking the best possible
balance between more abstract ideological categories (e.g. economic
liberalism) and concrete policy issues (e.g. privatisation). We achieved the
latter by selecting issues with detailed definitions (in the Euromanifestos
codebook) that were unambiguously associated with one of our nine
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categories. Some issues were excluded due to the fact that components of
their definitions had no direct relevance with our strictly defined ideological
category, even in cases where the title of the issue category at first appeared
relevant. We decided, at this stage, against pursuing a more inductive
approach by applying data reduction techniques to the entire group of
available issue categories in the Euromanifesto dataset for the construction
of our ideological categories. Such an approach would have probably
allowed us to employ additional issues from the dataset in our analysis and
to quantitatively identify underlying factors, surely at the cost of greater
conceptual stretching and lower content validity for our composite
categories (cf. Ray 2007: 12; Keman 2007: 78).
As mentioned above, following our first criterion we have created
categories that correspond to the two classic dimensions related to economic
and cultural–political issues, plus the nationalism–postnationalism axis: a)
economic liberalism,welfare state economy and fiscal conservatism corre-
spond to the economic dimension; b) cultural liberalism,socio-political
authoritarianism and environmentalism correspond to the (broadly defined)
cultural–political dimension, which includes the ‘new politics’ dimension;
and c) economic integration,Euroscepticism and nativism capture the
economic, political and cultural aspects of globalisation.
The nine ideological categories are defined in such a way that they
indicate clear directionality. More specifically, we have distinguished
between positive and negative references for all the selected issues. It should
be noted that a major benefit of using the dataset of the Euromanifestos
project, in comparison to the MRG/CMP, is that the direction of parties’
statements is documented in most of its categories. The nine ideological
categories are computed by summing up all the positive references and
subtracting the negative ones.
5
We have applied this formula to all the
relevant parties of each country and for each EP election.
Method of Analysis
We selected multidimensional unfolding (MDU) as our main method of
analysis due to the appropriateness of the method when trying to represent
the relative positioning of ideological categories and parties in a low-
dimensional space. The capacity to locate political parties and specific
ideological categories within a common space allows us to compare parties
and party systems both cross-nationally and over time. Perhaps most
importantly, the visualisation of the structure of the ideological space and
the place of parties within it produces easily interpretable findings. MDU
can be seen as a special case of multidimensional scaling (MDS), where the
within-sets proximities are missing (Borg and Groenen 2005: 293) – in our
case proximities between parties and between ideological categories
respectively. Instead, our data represent only between-sets proximities, that
is proximities between parties and ideological categories.
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MDU is best applied when the data constitute preference scores (such as
rank-orders of preference) of different individuals (or, in our case, political
parties) for a set of choice objects (in our case, ideological categories) (Borg
and Groenen 2005: 293). Therefore, based on the scores that we obtained on
each of our ideological categories for each party, we ranked ideological
preferences for each of our parties in each separate election, in order to
determine the initial unweighted proximities between parties and ideological
categories.
6
Aiming to account not only for the similarities between pairs of
objects (parties and ideological categories), but also for the salience of these
relationships, we used the measure of this salience (i.e. the frequency of the
entire set of quasi-sentences used per ideological category by each political
party) as a weight that adjusts the original proximity between party and
ideological category. As a result, the distances on the joint space
corresponding to salient relationships between parties and ideological
categories will be more accurate than the less salient ones (see Dolezal
2008a: 72). In addition, we employ the same frequencies to examine in
separate tables salience trends for the three ideological categories that
correspond to the nationalism–postnationalism axis. Even though all our
unfolding solutions are completed for a two-dimensional space following
our main hypothesis, we do not simply assume that the optimal
dimensionality of the ideological space will be the same for every single
election. We run each unfolding model for a different number of dimensions
and use badness-of-fit values (Kruskal’s Stress-1) to gauge the optimal
dimensionality of the unfolding model.
Findings
For presentation purposes, we have rotated the two-dimensional plots in a
way that the economic axis is arranged horizontally, always running from
left to right (welfare state economy to economic liberalism). Following the
presentational strategy employed by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008a), we have
drawn an additional vertical or near-vertical axis on each plot based on our
visual representation of the second dimension structuring the ideological
space. The categories forming the cultural–political axis can change from
one election to the next, and so does the degree of integration between the
two axes. Specifically, the strategy for drawing the vertical unbroken lines
relies on the selection of those ideological categories (two or more, if
selecting only two becomes exceedingly difficult) that best capture the
dispersion of political parties based on the criterion of proximity/distance of
political parties and ideological categories. In other words, of all possible
lines that can be drawn connecting non-economic ideological categories
(that are supposed to represent the cultural–political axis), we select the one
that appears to provide the best fit with the location of the political parties.
In some figures we have drawn only the left–right economic axis, because the
raw stress values for one-dimensional solutions suggest that there is no need
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to go beyond a single dimension to capture the complexity of the party
system. At this point, we should once again point out that the distances
between parties and ideological categories represent relative distances. In
other words, we can only say that a party adopts culturally liberal positions
if it is located very close to that category, not necessarily because it is located
in the upper end of the configuration (see Dolezal 2008a: 73). We should
note that, due to space limitations, we have not included all the available
solutions in our figures but have restricted our presentation to the ones that
best capture the relevant ideological trends.
Germany (1979–2009)
In the relevant literature, the German party system is typically described as
being historically dominated by two cleavages: class and religion (Urwin
1974; Dolezal 2008b). Perhaps the only qualification that should be added is
that the religious cleavage of Protestants vs. Catholics transformed early on
in the post-war period, after the CDU expanded its appeal to both religious
Catholics and Protestants, into a typical cultural cleavage (church–state in
Rokkanean terms), captured by the traditional cultural categories (in our
analysis cultural liberalism versus authoritarianism). Indeed, the first
important finding is that we observe in Germany a two-dimensional space
of conflict, with the exception of 1984, where the stress value is lower than
0.2 even in the one-dimensional solution (see Figure 1).
Even though pre-1990 studies inevitably focus solely on West Germany,
the structure of the German system did not change significantly after
unification. The main legacy of unification has been the emergence of a
national party of the post-communist left (PDS/Die Linke). However, the
long lasting three-pronged format (SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP) had already
come to an end with the advent of the Greens onto the political scene in the
1980s. The emergence of the Green party also effected a significant
transformation to the structure of ideological space. The traditional cultural
categories ceased to be the only ones that structured the second dimension
of German ideological space. Environmentalism and anti-growth politics
emerged in the 1990s as an important structuring category of the second
dimension, and by the 2009 EP election one could say that the environment
had been transformed into a valence issue.
However, the ‘new politics’ category was not the only one to contribute to
the transformation of ideological space in Germany. With the rise of
refugees and asylum-seekers in the late 1980s, immigration has emerged as a
hot-button issue, with the CDU and (especially) the CSU becoming more
attuned with the growing anti-immigration and culturally protectionist
sentiments across the country. Indeed, nativism is the only globalisation-
related category that often contributes to the content of the cultural
dimension (with the partial exception of economic integration in 1979 and
1999). None of the relevant German parties of our study have endorsed
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‘hard’ Eurosceptic positions (with the exception of the Republicans in 1989).
The political aspects of integration have never been a polarising issue for
German parties and Euroscepticism in German party politics is mainly
expressed by individual politicians and is not translated into party policies
(Busch and Knelangen 2004: 89).
The economic dimension does indeed remain an important structuring
dimension in German politics, as many scholars have suggested (Klinge-
mann 1999; Bornschier 2010). However, our configurations do not entirely
confirm the findings of Bornschier (2010). Indeed, by 2004, the CDU and
CSU seem to have excluded overtly anti-immigration themes from their
ideological repertoire, however it does not transpire that they have adopted
centrist positions along the cultural line of conflict (Bornschier 2010: 438),
FIGURE 1
GERMANY
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thus reprivileging the economic left–right dimension. In fact, in the 2009
election, there are clear leftward tendencies for most parties, with welfare
state economy appearing as a valence category,
7
while the cultural axis re-
emerges as a more potent structuring dimension.
United Kingdom (1979–2009)
Open any textbook on British politics and in the opening paragraphs you
will find, almost without exception, a similar introductory note. For the
most part of the past century or so, British politics has been dominated by
the class cleavage. Undoubtedly, the past three decades has been an era of
great transformation for the British party system. There has been a
proliferation of parties (including the resurgence of the Liberals) and a
steady decline for the combined percentages of the Conservative and Labour
parties. After a near two-decade hegemonic period for the Conservative
party that was marked by intense ideological polarisation, the (New)
Labour party moderated its image, fashioning third-way politics under
Tony Blair, and managed to kick off its own successful run that terminated
in 2009 for EP elections and in 2010 for national elections. The gradual
tendency towards fragmentation and multipartyism for the once classical
two-party system certainly appears more accelerated when focusing solely
on EP elections, with the addition of the Greens and the UK Independence
Party, as well as the British National Party in the last EP election.
Going back to the 1980s, the British ideological space appeared to be
quite straightforward, largely thanks to Margaret Thatcher’s electorally
triumphant neoliberal project. The Conservatives under Thatcher had
launched a true ideological revolution, combining an extreme – for the
time – economically liberal agenda with socially conservative rhetoric (cf.
Kelly 2003: 255–57; Hall 1988). This innovation had not only polarised
but also simplified the structure of ideological space in Britain, with the
broader left–right dimension signifying the entire British political
universe (see Figure 2). Indeed, we find that the party system in the
elections of 1979 and 1984 can be best described as unidimensional, with
the single economic axis accounting for almost all variance (the raw
stress value for a one-dimensional solution for 1979 is 0.04 and for 1984
is 0.17).
Even back then, however, one could detect the first few signs of a new set
of issues that was gradually coming to the centre of political discourse. As
the process of European integration intensified in the mid-1980s and early
1990s, Europeanisation-related issues started to compete with classic
distributional issues in political interest terms. European integration
awakened deeply-held prejudices toward continental powers and politics
and, in addition, influx rates of immigration increased once again after a
three-decade hiatus in the 1990s (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 190), raising
anxieties concerning the integrity of the British social fabric and culture.
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The EP election of 2009 confirms the full transformation of British
political space into a two-dimensional system, where the content of the
second dimension is determined by the globalisation-related categories and
acquires a near orthogonal position to the economic axis. The inclusion of
UKIP and BNP, which are comfortably located at the ‘nationalism’ end of
the axis, certainly contribute to this alignment.
8
Overall, in relation to
Germany, the content of the second dimension is much more determined by
euroscepticism and economic integration since the mid-1990s – a fact also
reflected in changes in the salience of the globalisation debate in the post-
Maastricht period
9
– but with nativism also strongly entering the picture,
especially with the advent of the BNP in the last elections, and the more
pronounced anti-immigration stances of the UKIP.
In general, the results of our analysis are in line with findings of previous
studies (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 204; Bornschier 2010: 438) in relation to the
FIGURE 2
UNITED KINGDOM
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structuring of the second dimension by ‘community’ issues, but do not
support the ‘slow transformation’ thesis pertaining to changes in the cultural
axis. Contrary to the previous analyses, we detect a transformation of the
British political space from a unidimensional to a two-dimensional con-
figuration, the second of which arose due to the injection of Europeanisation
and globalisation themes into British political discourse.
Greece (1999–2009)
Even though the party system of Greece is relatively new, created after the
return to democracy in 1974, memories of the political divisions of the pre-
authoritarian period continued to condition the understanding of Greek
politics and to shape political identities long after regime transition. It has
been argued that Greek political space has been characterised by a three-
pronged (left–centre–right) unidimensional structure and a single cleavage,
with its exact point of division along the single axis shifting according to the
historical juncture (Lyrintzis 2005: 244; Moschonas 1994).
Despite the seemingly straightforward intelligibility of the unidimensional
left–right space, it should be noted that in the case of Greece the content of
this dimension never quite corresponded to its classic definition and
understanding. Even though political divisions in Greece forged resilient
identities, they never amounted to full cleavages – in the strict sense – due to
the exceptionally weak structural anchoring of both political identities and
voting choices. The absence of a sizeable industrial working class due
to late industrialisation, coupled with the post-war regime of quasi-
authoritarianism, meant that the left–right axis was primarily understood
in terms of a conflict over socio-political values and not as outright class
conflict (Tsatsanis 2009: 39).
Indeed, our findings indicate that even though the Greek political space is
two-dimensional and not unidimensional, party positions on cultural and
political issues form a clearer structuring dimension of the ideological space
in relation to the economic one. In other words, polarisation along the
cultural–political axis appears to be significantly more acute than
polarisation along the economic axis (see Figure 3). This observation is in
line with previous studies (e.g. Tsatsanis 2006, 2009), which have
documented comparatively extreme leftward tendencies on economic issues
for all political parties as well as voters in Greece. In every election, welfare
state economy emerges as a valence issue for all parties, with the exception of
the conservative New Democracy party (ND) in 1999, which espouses
(comparatively) very liberal, economically, positions and right-wing popu-
list LAOS in 2009, which becomes an outlier party in economic policy terms.
Another important observation relates to the alignment between the ‘new
politics’ category (environmentalism)andwelfare state economy, meaning
that the ‘new politics’ and the economic dimension overlap, simplifying
the ideological space. Thus, as reflected in the low raw stress scores for the
The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems 1219
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two-dimensional configurations, Greece might have developed a more
complicated structure than the unidimensional one that had been identified
in past decades (see discussion above), but probably one does not need to go
beyond two dimensions to capture the complexity of contemporary Greek
politics. An additional interesting finding is that in the EP elections of 2004
and 2009 there is a peculiar alignment of authoritarianism and pro-
integration positions, a fact that reflects the ND’s steady proximity to both
ideological categories. In fact, New Democracy is the only party that is very
close to the authoritarian category in every election, due to the fact that law
and order, together with defence, are consistently high on the party’s
priority list.
FIGURE 3
GREECE
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Overall, the findings for Greece appear to confirm Kriesi’s basic
hypothesis: globalisation-related issues generally tend to be aligned with
and on occasion to substitute more traditional cultural–political issues. The
proximity between nativism and Euroscepticism, and their contribution to
the content of the cultural–political axis in 1999 and 2004, conforms to the
hypothesis concerning the directionality of the ‘globalisation categories’
and, in the case of Greece, can be explained by two factors. The first is that
the Communist Party (KKE), the main representative of Euroscepticism in
Greece, has moved towards culturally protectionist and anti-immigration
positions since the early 1990s, reflecting a more general strategic choice to
rely upon a more explicit national–populist agenda. The second factor has
been the advent of the right-wing populist party (LAOS) onto the political
scene, which has increased the relevance of its flagship issues: immigration
and protection of the national culture (the issues corresponding to the
nativism category).
Portugal (1989–2009)
The Portuguese party system is the newest party system included in our
analysis in the sense that prior to democratisation in the mid-1970s, the
country was under a long-lived authoritarian regime in which political
parties were not allowed and the population had virtually no exposure to
party politics (Bruneau 1997: 3). Our analysis of Portugal begins with the
1989 EP election, a couple of years after the watershed national election of
1987, which effected a major realignment of the Portuguese electorate and
led to the stabilisation of the party system after a transitional decade
characterised by high levels of electoral volatility. Observing our findings for
1989 (see Figure 4), the ideological space exhibits a simple configuration
(raw stress value of 0.17 in unidimensional unfolding model), displaying
tendencies towards unidimensionality as in Germany and the UK during the
same pre-Maastricht era.
The two-and-a-half party system that was consolidated during that
period, with its four-party format, developed the same tendencies toward
two-partyism as in Greece, but the similarities do not end here, as our
findings reveal. As in Greece, the ideological space in Portugal, election after
election, appears to be tilted towards the left end of the spectrum. Welfare
state economy often emerges as a valence category, and there is once again a
consistent proximity between the latter category and environmentalism,
reproducing the pattern of alignment between economically leftist and pro-
environment positions.
Moreover, the composition of the cultural–political axis displays a similar
contribution by the three globalisation categories, which appear to produce
more potent structuring effects on the ideological space in relation to the
standard cultural categories. The election of 2004 is the only one that yields
relatively more indeterminate results as to the composition of the vertical
The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems 1221
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axis due to the combined contribution of all three globalisation categories,
in addition to fiscal conservatism. The contraposition between Euroscepti-
cism and nativism in 2009 appears a bit counterintuitive, but seems to follow
a South European pattern where smaller leftist parties emerge as the
primary representatives of Euroscepticism and economic protectionism,
while maintaining more ambivalent stances toward issues of cultural identity
(even though KKE in Greece, as mentioned above, has recently opted for
more unambiguous culturally protectionist stances). In some ways, the
presence of unreformed communist parties in both Greece and Portugal
FIGURE 4
PORTUGAL
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produce effects on the ideological space comparable to those produced by
right-wing populist parties in several West European party systems. One
could say that the findings from both Greece and Portugal reveal a stronger
influence of the globalisation divide in ideological space, and this can be
attributed to two factors: a) the minor influence of the standard class
cleavage in the two countries which led to the politicisation of the left–right
divide over cultural–political issues, and b) the presence of significant
hardline communist parties, that combine ‘nationalist’, ‘anti-globalisation’
and ‘anti-systemic’ themes and, thus, endorse a protectionist stance on a
wide range of issues.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have tried to investigate the thesis that orientations of
political parties on the economic, cultural and political aspects of globalisa-
tion and Europeanisation tend to be expressed in the form of ideological
preferences along a common underlying dimension. We have posited that
this divide will tend to be embedded in the classic ideological space,
structured by the two broadly conceived traditional conflicts: an economic
conflict over distributional preferences, reflecting the historical class
cleavage; and a cultural–political conflict informed by different
value divides. We hypothesised that the nature of this globalisation-
inspired divide will lead to a specific route of embedment into national
ideological spaces: the different components of the nationalism–postnation-
alism axis will tend to transform the content of the traditional cultural–
political dimension.
Our four-country analysis produced some interesting results. To begin
with, in all four countries the general assumption concerning the dual
structure of ideological space was largely confirmed with a few minor
exceptions. These exceptions, however, challenge to some extent findings of
previous analyses that have reported a constant two-dimensionality of the
political space cross-nationally for a period that spans more than three
decades (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008a; Bornschier 2010). The fact that the lowest
badness-of-fit values for unidimensional solutions were recorded for
elections during the pre-Maastricht era, when the salience of the debate
on globalisation had not yet peaked, leads us to the conclusion that the
globalisation divide has contributed, in some cases, to the creation, and not
only the transformation, of two-dimensional ideological spaces.
Overall, however, the findings appear to confirm the hypothesis that the
globalisation divide tends to transform the content of the cultural–political
dimension, with the partial exception of Germany, for which the findings
cannot support such a conclusion. Even if, in terms of its salience, the
globalisation debate appears to be losing some steam in comparison to the
1990s, in no way can we confirm findings that its structuring dynamic is tied
primarily to the presence of successful right-wing populist parties or that it is
The Impact of Globalisation on National Party Systems 1223
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bound to prove less durable in the longer run (Bornschier 2010). Our
findings from the two Southern European countries showed that the
polarising effect of the globalisation divide does not depend on the presence
of right-wing populist parties.
The observed location within national ideological spaces of the three
categories associated with the globalisation divide (nativism,economic
integration,Euroscepticism) exhibit strong tendencies towards unidimen-
sionality and consistent near-orthogonal positions to the socio-economic
axis. Even the nominally economic category (i.e. economic integration),
election after election across all the countries of our sample, was most often
located in an orthogonal position to the classic distributional categories (i.e.
welfare state economy versus economic liberalism). However, our hypothesis
about the consistent directionality of political parties in favour of or against
globalisation in all its aspects is most strongly challenged by our findings for
the two Southern European countries. The contraposition between
Euroscepticism and nativism in certain elections can be attributed to the
exceptional influence of small leftist parties with their staunch rejection of
economic and political aspects of globalisation and their more ambivalent
stances towards immigration and policies of cultural protectionism. There-
fore, the transformation of the ideological space occurs in different ways
across national contexts and it remains a question for our future research
also to complement the supply-side analyses with an empirical study of the
preferences of the electorate in these four countries in order to thoroughly
explore the potential of the globalisation divide to be consolidated into a
new fully developed cleavage.
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our gratitude to Ioannis Andreadis and Hermann
Schmitt for their invaluable help and constructive suggestions. We also wish
to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
Obviously, any remaining errors and shortcomings are ours alone.
Notes
1. Globalisation can be broadly defined as the accelerated movement of goods, services, capital,
technologies, people and ideas across national borders. The notion of Europeanisation has
been conceptualised in several different ways in the literature (see Quaglia et al. 2007: 406–8);
it primarily – but not exclusively – refers to the domestic impacts of European-level
institutions and norms. However, the effects of these processes on the domestic politics of
European member states are not always uniform and, in certain policy areas, it can be said
that they are not even unidirectional, as Europeanisation can function as a buffer against
certain aspects of globalisation. Nevertheless, it is often very hard to disentangle the effects of
globalisation from the effects of Europeanisation. The latter, like globalisation, accelerates
economic, social and cultural integration and homogenisation, profoundly redefines the limits
of national sovereignty, affects democratic accountability and legitimacy, and creates similar
anxieties related to questions of citizenship and cultural identity (Jabko and Meunier 2003: 3).
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2. The roots of the EMP go back to the flagship study of party manifestos for national
elections, the cross-national ‘Manifesto Research Group’ (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos
Project’ (CMP). The Euromanifesto Project started in 2000, when Professor Hermann
Schmitt (MZES) started to apply the MRG/CMP approach of analysing party manifesto
content of European Parliament elections (for more details see Wu
¨st and Volkens 2003;
Braun et al. 2006).
3. A ‘quasi-sentence’ is the coding unit in a given party programme, defined as an argument. An
argument is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue. In its simplest form,
a sentence is the basic unit of meaning. Therefore, punctuation can be used as a guideline for
identifying arguments (Braun et al. 2006: 40). After breaking down a paragraph into separate
quasi-sentences, the coders identify the domain and then the category (and subcategory if
available) that definitely captures the sense of the identified quasi-sentence. They repeat this
procedure for every quasi-sentence in the paragraph, proceed then to the next paragraph and
repeat the same steps (Braun et al. 2010: 21).
4. The original Euromanifesto Coding Scheme (EMCS) includes a range of policy domains:
external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of
life, fabric of society and social groups. They are further divided into several content
categories and sub-categories.
5. The particular issues that form the components of each of the nine ideological categories: a)
environmentalism – environmental protection, anti-growth politics, steady state economy,
ecologism, ‘green politics’, minus any opposite mentions; b) Euroscepticism – hostile
references to Europe or the EU, no ‘deepening of Europe’ necessary, a more integrated
Europe and the transfer of power to the EU is rejected, hostile reference to the European
Parliament and its MEPs, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and
other EU institutions, required unanimity in the European Council, minus all opposite
mentions; c) cultural liberalism – opposition to traditional moral values, support for divorce,
abortion etc., favourable mentions, support or assistance for homosexuals and women, minus
any favourable references to traditional moral values, prohibition, censorship and
suppression of immorality, stability of family, negative references to homosexuals and
women; d) economic integration – favourable references to or support for the Single European
Market and the European Monetary Union, favourable reference to labour migration and
support for the concept of free trade, support or accept national contributions to finance the
EU or its policies, maintain or extend EU funds for structurally underdeveloped areas, minus
any opposite references; e) economic liberalism – favourable references to free enterprise, need
for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise, privatisation* (*: only for 2004 and 2009);
negative references to corporatism, direct government control of economy, social ownership,*
public-owned industry,* socialist property,* nationalisation, market regulation, Marxist
analysis, minus any opposite references; f) fiscal conservatism – need for traditional economic
orthodoxy (e.g. reduction of budget deficits), support for strong currency, positive references
to the European Central Bank, minus positive references to Keynesian demand management
and any negative references to economic orthodoxy and the European Central Bank; g)
nativism – enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration, any appeals to patriotism
and/or nationalism, need to reduce immigration, negative references to or no support for
immigrants and foreigners, minus any opposite references; h) socio-political authoritarianism –
enforcement of all laws, actions against crime, support and resources for police, fight against
terrorism,* need to maintain or increase military expenditure, negative references to the
importance of human and civil rights, minus opposite references; i) welfare state economy –
need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme, the concept
of equality, fair treatment of all people and special protection for underprivileged, references
to labour groups, specific measures for supporting the expansion of the welfare state
(pensions, health care and nursing service, social housing, child care), minus opposite
mentions.
6. Each ideological category assumes a positive or negative score for each party, based on the
subtraction of negative quasi-sentences from positive quasi-sentences. Based on these scores,
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all ideological categories for each party included in the analysis are ranked from 1 to 9, which
indicate maximum ‘similarity’ (for a score of 1) to maximum ‘dissimilarity’ (for a score of 9).
The distances are then further adjusted based on weights added to the analysis, which
represent the frequency of the entire set of quasi-sentences used per ideological category per
each political party.
7. Concerning the movement of parties across time, the SPD maintains throughout the 30-year
period mostly economically leftist and culturally libertarian positions but since the entry of
PDS/Die Linke into the political system, it tends to move closer to the centre of the economic
axis. However, the most impressive transformation is probably the shift towards economic
liberalism and the abandonment of pro-welfare positions for CDU after the 1989 EP
election; until then, the positions of the party on the economic axis had been close or even to
the left of the SPD. In this regard, the 2009 election signal a significant reorientation of the
CDU/CSU coalition via its distancing from economically liberal positions, perhaps due to
the onset of the global economic crisis only a year before.
8. The observed movement of the other parties conforms to the widespread views about the
changes in the orientations of the Labour and Conservative parties, especially in regard to
issues related to Europe (see Rosamond 2003). Like many leftist parties, the Labour party
initially adopted Eurosceptic anti-integration positions, only to become a pro-integration
political force along with the Liberal party. In contrast, the Conservatives, traditionally
containing both pro-European and Eurosceptic factions within the party, initially adopted
more pro-European stances, only to begin shifting to Euroscepticism in the post-Thatcherite
period (cf. Spiering 2004: 131).
9. After peaking in the late 1990s (in all four countries, just under or over 50 per cent of
references in 1999 correspond to the three ‘globalisation’ categories), there is declining trend
for globalisation-related references in 2004 and 2009 to pre-1999 levels, with the exception of
Germany, where the proportion continues to hover around 40 per cent throughout the post-
1980s period.
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