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Ethics and Education
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Ethics, literature, and education
Jacob Buganza a
a Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad Veracruzana, Mexico
To cite this article: Jacob Buganza (2012): Ethics, literature, and education, Ethics and Education,
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Ethics and Education
Vol. 7, No. 2, July 2012, 125–135
Ethics, literature, and education
Jacob Buganza*
Instituto de Filosofı´a, Universidad Veracruzana, Mexico
In this article, the author makes attempts to demonstrate that, from the
educational standpoint, the relationship between philosophy and literature
cannot be overlooked. Even the most remote cultures testify their
transmission of moral teaching through literary accounts. In this sense,
the author promotes this methodology hence argues that the axial concept
structured by ethics is the concept of acknowledgment. Secondly, the
author explains how the concept of acknowledgment has been present
in contemporary ethical discourses and proposes which he considers
fundamental on the basis of a theory of knowledge which closely relates
understanding and will together. He sustains that fundamental acknowl-
edgment is that which is established by the recognition that the other is
a person, a thesis which precedes the acknowledgment of the other as a
legitimate interlocutor or a responsible subject. Next, the author aims his
effort to explain two ways (among many other possible ones) in which
literature applies to education as empathy and as paradigm. With respect
to empathy, he argues that the self-recognition the reader can establish with
a literary character is essential. In this sense, he considers that the empathy
attainable can be only analogical, as it can only be partial. Empathy
requires a point in common, which the author places in ‘humanity’; thus,
a certain form of equality between the empathic subject at the subject he
attempts to be relate to, becomes possible. As for paradigms, the author
sustains that literature is abundant in models and icons of virtue and vice
and that such paradigms turn out to be essential for the ethical-moral
upbringing of an individual. He takes up the concept of paradigm
as analogical representation, that is, as a model-sign of man, and on
these grounds, he reassumes some theses which have become recurrent
in contemporary moral philosophy, as is the case with Max Scheler,
Karol Wojtyla, Luis Pareyson, and Fernando Salmero
´n, among others.
The author argues that the reader can recognize himself in the character;
the later can then exert an aspirational force, which allows a connection
to be established, by which the reader tries to approach the paradigm.
Keywords: virtue ethics; moral education; paradigm; literature
Introduction
Philosophy, literature, and education have never been separated one from the other.
One way or another a philosophical doctrine is, and can be, taught through words,
whether oral or written and, in some cases, through examples. Since the times of
*Email: jbuganza@uv.mx
ISSN 1744–9642 print/ISSN 1744–9650 online
ß2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2012.733595
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ancient Greek literature, especially lyrical literature, it has been conceived as a means
to teach philosophical doctrines (besides religious ones, as occurs with Homeric and
Hesiodic mythology). One only has to read some of the works left behind by the
first Greek philosophers and in most of these, a certain harmony becomes evident
between poetry, philosophy, and education. An example is that of Xenophanes
of Colophon, ‘the teacher of the severe style’ (Linero 1949, 1501).
That being said, literature holds many positive aspects that are taken up by
philosophy. To understand this idea, the following phrase by Linero is accurate:
‘Philosophical thinking contributes to poetic creation, as provend by the history of
universal literature. In primitive times, of rudimentary culture, the first literary fact
always records emotion, not ideas; these appear later according to the spiritual
evolution of man. This is why the intrusion of the intellect upon literature is the index
of ascending and constructive civilization’ (Linero 1949, 1504). There are two aspects
of utmost importance in this quotation. The first is that literature, at first, seems to
record concrete, individual facts (as in the case of realism), mixed with emotions that
make the reader believe in the character. This turns out to be fundamental for ethics,
since through the appreciation of concrete facts one can take the step from the
unknown to the proper acknowledgment of ethics. There does not seem to be any
other reason why Fernando Salmero
´n, who dedicated a great deal of his lucubrations
to the relationship between education and ethics, affirms that ‘The form of the story
is the only possibility to seize certain characteristics of human life that contribute to
the definition of moral attitudes, virtues and of character. It is the only possibility to
describe practical reasoning in depth; therefore, the true form of initiation in moral
life’ (Salmero
´n 2000, 386). Salmero
´n’s thesis is better understood if one bears in mind
that literature, even though it records concrete events, can build, with these events,
situations that are universal or universable to a certain extend. The second aspect,
which relates indefectibly to the first, is the degree of universability that emerges
from the proper intellectualization of literature, as Linero calls it: this intellectual-
ization is equivalent to a universalization that arises through emotions, since
emotions can reproduce in every possible human being.
Because of the afore mentioned Balmes is right when he writes: ‘It has been said
that literature is the expression of society, and it has also been said that literature
contributes largely in the formation of society’ (Balmes 1948, 1505). On the one hand
literature feeds on the same society it elaborates, for no human creation is ex nihilo:
on the other hand literature forms society (ethically or morally), and this can be done
in multiple ways, two of which we will see in this work. We will finish this thesis what
Maffesoli (1993) says about fiction, since this, ‘With all its ways, serves to remind us
of the frequency of the imaginable; everyday life is also full of uncontrollable
unrealities, and our scientific studies even more so [...] The imaginative element is
never to be eliminated from social and individual structures’ (107).
To take this one-step further, one might say that ethics is that part of philosophy
that reflects on morality, that is, on human actions, on whether these are good or
bad, organized or unorganized, and fair or unfair. Moreover, ethics can also, and
must, have an impact on both the capacity of and the attitude towards reflecting on
what is moral. Ethics can be taught through two general means that relate with what
is said immediately afterwards. The first one is through reasoning, which implies
the use of concepts and their linking, with which in the end the agent can be
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persuaded to act correctly, morally speaking. The second means is an example that
can follow multiple paths. Certainly, one of these paths is literature. However, before
we see the concept of acknowledgment in the field of ethics, since this will serve as a
structuring concept at the time, we consider the before-mentioned means.
Ethics and acknowledgment
The neuralgic point of ethics is the acknowledgment of the other, the acknowledg-
ment of its humanity, that is, the acknowledgment of what a person is. Without a
doubt, the topic of acknowledgment, even though it has a long tradition in western
ethics, has experienced an upturn in idealistic philosophy, especially in Hegelian
philosophy and its successors (Ferna
´ndez Lira 1998, 57–84), and in the twentieth
century, there have been many who have dealt with the topic one way or the other,
from Husserl, through Levinas, Heidegger and others, up to post-metaphysic ethics
and the policy of acknowledgment, which facilitates the acceptance and respect
of the other. Axel Honeth puts forward in only a few lines how the concept of
acknowledgment has been present in western philosophy, but in a different sense
than the one we propose in this work, which relates in the most irrefutable way with
the Kantian part, mentioned by this German philosopher and sociologist:
In ancient ethics, the conviction was predominant, that only the person whose way
of acting could find social stimulus within the polis would be able to lead a good life;
the moral Scottish philosophy was led by the idea that public acknowledgment and
disapproval represent the social mechanism through which the individual can be
stimulated to reach desirable virtues; and in Kant’s work, finally, the concept of respect
(Achtung) takes on the function of a supreme principal of moral, even in the sense that
it contains the nucleus of the categorical imperative of trying with all one’s strength to
be human, as a goal in itself (Honneth 1998, 20).
Duarte (2006) in his turn, in an interesting claim on Heidegger’s ethical
thinking (which may be questioned because of his relationship with Nazism), writes,
‘In everyday life the other does not seem a stranger to me, but I always and
immediately understand him to be someone similar to me, and to whom I can be
kind, mistrustful, fearful, hostile, indifferent etc. This means that the other with
whom I meet in the everyday world, I sometimes do not find in his peculiar alterity,
but as the other that has always been previously understood, which is why Levinas
detected the supposed ethical flaw in Heidegger’s ontological reflection: the inability
to accept the ‘‘face’’ of the other. However, [...] Heidegger left the possibility open
for a face recognition of the other, since the possibility of taking up otherness lies
in itself’ (77–78). This phenomenology of everyday life has not yet occurred,
historically, as Duarte states. What is more, acknowledgment does not ‘always and
immediately’ occur, but requires a certain effort of the will to re-cognize what
understanding represents. In other words, acknowledgment is not now something
common, but should become exactly that from an ethical-moral point of view.
Historically, acknowledgment has not been immediate, and to prove that it suffices
to resort to the different historical facts, where some individuals and groups of
people have not been acknowledged as such, but have been viewed from above, have
been underestimated, like Afro-Americans, indigenous people and Jews.
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Levinas is also a representative of the ethics of acknowledgment, maybe even
the most eminent in the twentieth century, as is traditionally Hegel during the
tenth century (we might add Antonio Rosmini as a representative of the moral
philosophy of acknowledgment). Paul Riccoeur also follows the same line, specif-
ically the affective, legal, and social acknowledgment of the other; but the other also
has to acknowledge me, which makes it a mutual acknowledgment (Brugiatelli 2008,
115ss.). Finally, Charles Taylor has likewise fought in favor of an acknowledgment
of differences from a multicultural point of view, starting from a Hegelian and
communitarian stand.
Without a doubt, the concept of acknowledgment is far from being univocal
in everyday and philosophical speech, in the sense that it acquires different meanings
depending on the context in which it is used (pragmatically speaking). For instance,
the concept of acknowledgment in discourse ethics refers to the equality of all
participants in the discussion, while acknowledgment in moderately feminist
discourse deals with to the equal positioning of women. However, the concept
of acknowledgment must have deeper roots, which might be the acknowledgment of
not only women, or slaves, etcetera, but of all human beings.
Honneth mentions three levels of acknowledgment, parting from Hegel’s
philosophy. According to him, in short, the three forms of acknowledgment are
the following: (1) ‘the singular is acknowledged as an individual whose needs and
desires have a unique value for someone else’, (2) ‘the singular is acknowledged as a
person, who has the same moral responsibility over his actions as over all other
human beings’, (3) ‘the singular is acknowledged as a person whose abilities have
a constituent value for a concrete community’ (Honneth 1998, 32). The most
fundamental acknowledgment of the former there is certainly the second one,
although, when taking the path of Kantian moral, it may arise on the course of
moral responsibility, that is, in the theory that we are all equally responsible. There is
even a fourth level of intersubjective responsibility, which acknowledges a singular as
a person: it is the acknowledgment that we share the same essence. To us, the
acknowledgment of a person, without further ado, is the most fundamental, that is,
it is the most necessary from an ethical point of view.
However, we need to set acknowledgment from a broader point of view. In fact,
ethics consists of recognizing what things are, and things refers, from an ontological
point of view, to essence. In this sense, everything ‘that is’ is thing, which means that
it has essence. This essence is intelligibly known, as far as humans are concerned,
as simple apprehension, which is an act of understanding. Once the thing is known,
that is, once understanding knows what the thing is, once we know which is the
known essence, it can be recognized or not, which implies the structure/network
of relationships between understanding and will, which has the use of freedom that
manifests itself in choice. Freedom can distort or not the known essence, that is,
it can acknowledge it or not; therefore, ethics has to do with acknowledgment.
In other words, ethics, which has to do with the use of freedom when the essence
is recognized, refers to not deforming what is known, since if it does deform, it is
very likely that one acts incorrectly or in a disorganized manner, for acting
wrongly, ethically speaking, is acting in a disorderly fashion. Rectitude or correct
acknowledgment is the beginning of all ethics.
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This rectitude or acknowledgment allows the subject or moral agent to collocate
the other in the position that corresponds to him, position that is commonly
denominated ‘a person’s dignity’. A person’s dignity is the root of all considerations
and rights that are owed to him because of the simple fact of being just that. They
are natural rights or inherent to known essence. Therefore, Hervada (1993) writes:
‘By human rights we understand rights that preexist to positive laws’ (452).
Therefore, of these rights is said that they proclaim themselves; and of them is also
said that they are recognized – not that they are given or granted- by positive
laws. However, before stating them it is necessary to acknowledge them. This is why
acknowledgment is most fundamental from an ethical point of view, theory which
is even sustained chronologically, since first something becomes known, then it is
acknowledged and finally, it is proclaimed. When applied to the case of human
rights, the first thing that is known is the essence of the person (which does not cease
to be an intelligible representation, but based on what is real, undoubtedly), then
his dignity is acknowledged, that is, he is acknowledged as a bearer of certain
fundamental rights and finally they are proclaimed (example.g., in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
Since critical hermeneutics and ethics of discourse, Gustavo Pereira and Helena
Modzelewski consider that ethical-civic education advances from ‘the estrangement
of the other to his acknowledgment’, with which the non-exploitation is furthered,
which in its turn is built upon essential equality of all human beings. This
acknowledgment, in essence, consists of estimating in an orderly fashion the absolute
value of the person (Buganza 2008). Hence the objective of ethical-civic education
‘ought to be to educate the citizen’s look to be able to acknowledge humanity in those
dimensions in which it is usually denied’ (Pereira and Modzelewski 2006, 113).
In effect, recognition of the person is nothing more than accepting what direct
knowledge we are presented with. A direct knowledge presents us with the essence of
an entity that has unique capacities, which are included in the term ‘intelligence’.
To try to link the previously said about the inevitable relationship established
between literature, education, and ethics, one might say that the first is a very
convincing means to generate at least two ethical access roads in the reader. On the
one hand, it furthers the before mentioned acknowledgment, with which the
development of empathy is evoked. On the other hand, literature portrays action
paradigms, which can be found in all parts of its social web (Spang 1998, 175–178).
Literature, empathy, and ethics
With respect to empathy, which can motivate literature, Pereira and Modzelewski
are very precise in their already quoted work. To them, ‘how distinctive literary work
is, resides in the fact that the reader is invited to put himself in the position of the
other and acquire his experiences; his interpellation as a reader makes it possible to
be links between himself and the characters, activating emotions and imagination,
which leads us to see up close many things that outside this space are unworldly to
us’ (Pereira and Modzelewski 2006, 115). If a theory of knowledge is provided
for, emotions and imagination turn out to be detonators of what, measured through
understanding, the will is acknowledged in the narrative, for if there is any truth
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in Terence’s wise phrase that nothing human is unworldly to human (Homo sum,
humani nihil a me alienum puto), then whatever occurs to the literary character,
composed, surely, of words, but where these point towards something that can be
shared and experienced in reality, redounds in a new experience for the reader.
This is nothing more than the transit of the estrangement to the acknowledgment
of which Pereira and Modzelewski (2006) speak, since the characters portrayed in the
literary work in some way, in some possible world, could share their characteristics
and circumstances with the reader. This is why they claim that, ‘the acknowledgment
that one may suffer from what happens to the other, breaks with the bases of
selfishness and propitiates the development of pity or compassion in individuals,
which is necessary for a full social rationality’ (118).
Empathy has a clear ethical function, for this philosophical branch has to do
with, among other aspects, the relationships that are established with the others.
Among the multiple relationships that are established with the rest, one of them may
be empathy. Empathy consists in an interpretative, passionate-intellective exercise,
based on which one tries to comprehend the situation of another human being.
The interpreter tries to put himself, in a passionate-intellective way, in the place
of the other to comprehend a situation or circumstance that is not his own. Ethics
enters to precisely try to envision the consequences of an action that has
repercussions on the other, trying to see what it is that the interpreter would feel-
think if somebody acted as planned. Evidently, the relationship of empathy refers to
the forthcoming, that is, to what he might feel-think in the (near of far) future in case
the other’s place were to be taken by the interpreter-agent.
Apart from being a hermeneutic exercise, empathy is analogical. In effect,
it cannot be univocal because it is not possible to be, completely, the other. That is,
nobody can take the exact place of the other, for his time, space, circumstance,
etcetera, are unique when all of them are joined there. Empathy can also not be
equivocal because it needs at least one common denominator to come into being.
This common denominator is the humanity they share in terms of the relationship.
This is why an equivocal empathy turns out to be completely unintelligible.
Empathy, when demanding at least one point in common, enables emotional–
intellectual comparison, for the other resembles the I at least in this intersection.
The circumstance is different, and intend of the empathetic exercise, is trying to put
the interpreter in that circumstance to envision how the other sees reality. Empathy
consists, in ethical terms, of the acknowledgment that the circumstance of the other
can be one’s own, that is, might have been the situation of the interpreter-agent and
that, therefore, whatever happens to the other must be taken into consideration.
Now, the empathetic function of literature is truly ancient. In effect, Aristotle’s
appraisals, present in the Poetics, seem to be most accurate and valid. The reader,
who in the case of the staging is the spectator, may try to mirror himself in the
characters of the play, that is, he may implement the interpretative exercise
denominated empathy. The reader or spectator acknowledges that the character is a
person and that his circumstance might have been his own, as unrealistic it may be,
because it lies within possibility. For Aristotle, tragedy has a cathartic function,
a function that is carried out through compassion and fear. Both compassion
and fear are closely related to empathy, because when one puts oneself analogically
in the other’s place one is able to comprehend what the latter perceives, which makes
130 J. Buganza
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it possible for the interpreter to sympathize with him and, eventually, be afraid of
the circumstance that surrounds him. Tragedy itself is imitation for the Stagirit:
‘Imitation in the active sense (that is, the process through which imitation takes
place) and imitation of reality [...] It is not a copy, a mere reproduction of reality;
it is a creating process, a re-creation of reality’ (Sa
´nchez Palencia 1996, 131).
Following Nussbaum, Pereira, and Modzelewski (2006) state that ‘Literature and
its empathetic power find themselves intrinsically linked to emotions, both from the
perspective of the reader in whom an answer to these is produced, and in the
motivation that makes the author conceive them, and it is through this emotional
constitution that literary works can form bonds of compassion and identification,
inducing the reader or the spectator to experience mercy or fear for the characters,
and also fear for themselves, when they see the hero as vulnerable as they themselves,
the readers, are’ (116–117). This is confirmed by what Alzola (2007) writes:
‘In reading a narrative we feel mercy, compassion, kindness, etc., for we make our
way into the characters, in their feelings. In this way, we can learn the most
important lessons in life’ (155).
As we have said before, we may state that, through empathy, the interpreter puts
himself analogically in the place of the other. This position is cognitive-affective,
since, on the one hand, it knows in part the situation of the character and, when
making our way in, can generate in him the feeling that the character experiences
in words; on the other hand, he may feel a certain affection for the character, which
makes us understand that there are two, only rationally, separated moments. This is
the case, for instance, of Bartleby the Scrivener, with whom the reader can share the
feeling of loneliness that Bartleby experiences and, on the other hand, feel pity
for him, that is, feel pity for the circumstance that this character ‘lives’. There the two
hermeneutic moments meet: to put oneself in the place of another is not just to share,
in a way, what the character experiences, but also feel affected by that experience.
Literature, paradigms of virtue, and ethics
The concept of ‘paradigm’ (para5deigma), which means, among other things, model
for example, has been very recurrent in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of
science, due to the studies by Thomas Kuhn in his work The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Nevertheless, its application may be extended to moral philosophy.
One only needs to argue the following: ethics is, in a certain way, an invitation to the
good life; the good life, apart from mentioning it, as Wittgenstein asseverates in his
famous Conference on Ethics, must be demonstrated. What is more, ethics may result
more intelligible when shown. From there he continues saying that ethics may make
use of action paradigms, that is, of the paradigms of the good life, even when at the
level of maxim ethics.
The paradigm is a representation or sign. In effect, the sign is something that,
present at the cognitive faculty, leads the cognoscente to something else. The signs,
in a primitive kind of way, are categorized in natural and artificial ones. The first are
the ones that denote, univocally, a thing, like smoke being the sign of fire; the second
are conventional, like the letter ‘a’ means a vowel, a sound, etcetera, but could mean
something else. In a certain way, conventional signs are equivocal. But, one may also
talk about analogical signs, like with the so-called consuetudinary signs; this seems
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to be the case of the tablecloth on the table, which indicates the proximity of a meal.
With respect to conventional and consuetudinary signs, the semiotic experience,
through which the cognoscente is led to a different knowledge, is exclusively human.
Consequently, Piotrowski (2006) is right when he writes that, ‘The world of signs
is the world of human par excellence, and exclusively of man. For this reason, it is
of utmost significance to acknowledge the existence of personal signs. These personal
signs illustrate the realization of the existence of man. It is exactly they, who
transform human life within the same human subject and not only in the result
of their work or creation. Personal signs can deteriorate a person or raise him to a
higher level’ (85).
Having established this panorama, it is necessary to ask what kind of sign
corresponds to the paradigm. It must be understood that the paradigm ought to be a
sign, since it is a representation. We propose that the paradigm be an analogical sign,
for it is partially natural and partially artificial. This is directly applied to the case
of the ‘ethical paradigm’, as seen from a moral point of view, through which
the Kantian terminology acquires greater significance. The ethical paradigm is an
analogical sign, given that it is natural in that it shows how a man can be concrete,
what his character is like and how he can behave; but it also artificial in that it is a
construction which function is precisely representation. In this sense, the paradigm is
a universal sign that represents how man should be, because who acts in accordance
with the paradigm, resembles it, which is why we can state that when resembling
the paradigm a causal relationship is established. The paradigm can eventually be the
agent’s cause of action. Evidently, it is an exemplary cause, in Platonic terminology,
or formally, when considering Aristotle’s. But, it is formal causality, because the
exemplary is reduced to form as regards to what is structuring, and this is basically
structure.
In addition to this, Alzola (2007) warns us that ‘Models are not logical
argumentations, explicatory theories, evaluative concepts or moral judgments;
but that they, through narratives, iconic representations, movies, personal conduct,
or public biographies, succeed in showing in an incarnated and concrete way, a
manner of value realization. In effect, these models show a type of conduct, attitude
or way of living that, apart from proposing values, presents the technique of putting
them into practice’ (157). In this particular case, models are universally concretized.
In other words, they are analogical. Undoubtedly, paradigms escape from everyday
life, but one should not extrapolate their use. Everyday life, when examined
carefully, cannot be represented in an irrefutable manner, but, at most, analogically.
However, this is the function of analogy. As Maffesoli says, ‘It is easy to abstractly
build a theoretical model or to provide a reading which can be applied to all
phenomena, but we are stunned when we realize that the event always takes place
at the margins, and everyday life steadies itself, represents itself, maneuvers, and
resists universally’. Therefore, analogy becomes an instrument to ‘Establish, from
a social polyphonic point of view, the map of analogies that precisely allow[s]
to understand the multiple social phenomena, and among them, moral’ (Maffesoli
1993, 100).
Surely, in the same sense, we might interpret Pereyson’s (1949) idea, who declares
that, ‘The ideal, a lifetime task, becomes a norm or law, in a reciprocal integration
that corrects the rigorousness of the law with aspiration and fortifies love with moral
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necessity’ (1081). The paradigm becomes a formal cause, not of substantial form,
but of accidental form. The paradigm, being exemplary, becomes ideal; moreover,
the ideal is norm, that is, it is something that ought to be followed when it is desirable
for the moral agent. In addition to this, the ideal expresses its justification, which
means it expresses its reason for being (Salmero
´n 2000, 386). In this way, whatever is
ideal and whatever is real become tensed. However, it is not about coercive tension,
but about a relationship in the form of an invitation, since moral norms invite one
to carry out good human actions. Certainly, a tension exists ‘Between the person one
is and the one he should or would like to be; even more so, the persons one would
like to be are many, as well as successive and replaceable, so that in this sense
the person really becomes the mask, that is, the typical character that is assumed or
deposed or replaced, such as their ideal or task’ (Pareyson 1949, 1081).
To this pedagogical function that the paradigm represents, Karol Wojtyla, in
a studies that has becomes classical, wrote that the model is the ‘object to be
followed’. He writes that ‘The idea of following assumes great ethical-social
responsibility. The moral model acts in its environment and provides an immediate
object to be imitated [...] The influx of models has great pedagogical significance’
(Wojtyla 1982, 53). In effect, model or paradigm and education go hand in hand.
Ethical education needs to show how moral perfection can be reached, since the
agent is invited to improve in such a way, that is nothing more than to improve as a
person, because in contrast with another type of more restricted acts, like painting or
counting, moral acting is something imminent to every human being.
Before Wojtyla, Antonio Rosmini points out, in his Philosophical System, that
a fundamental part of ethics is Telethics. Thelethics serves the moral agent as
orientation, and such orientation is brought by a paradigm or a model. Telethics is
therefore exemplary, of models. The paradigm is a practical ideal, for ‘Man learns
from a model what to do, how to behave, to put moral perfection of himself as a
person into practice’ (Wojtyla 1982, 57). That being said, such a model may exert
a certain force of attraction upon the disciple, who in this context is the one that
follows it. The disciple finds certain values expressed in virtues which he considers to
be his paradigm or ideal, which exert in him a force of attraction, so that he is invited
to follow the path that is indicated by the model. But one has to bear in mind that the
paradigm is nothing more than an ‘invitation’, an does therefore not necessarily
generate in an immediate way the appearance of analogical values in the disciple.
This is why one may say that ‘The personal model, that is, the ideal, does not injure,
nor limit such autonomy [autonomy, in Kantian terms]. All of the exemplary influx
bases itself on the love for the person of the teacher-model, and exactly this love is
the essential origin of the affective-cognitive perception of the values that, according
to Scheler, ought to be the object of volition’ (Wojtyla 1982, 63). In effect, love is
nothing more than the result of the invitation that manifests itself in the paradigm,
since will is able to love the known ideal. The paradigm shines in such a way that
it brings about a form of attraction in the disciple, and the latter one, if such
a cognitive-volitive relationship is in place, aspires to resemble the paradigm
(cf. Ricoeur 1999, 27ss).
It is in the sense that the paradigm exerts an ‘aspirational force’ in the disciple.
And, there is a certain circle, that is not a request in principle, when one asks if the
ideal becomes just that, the moment it becomes known-cherished (or loved) by the
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disciple. However, the paradigm contains in itself, that is, in an objective way, some
moral perfection that make it desirable for the disciple. That is why the paradigm
attracts the will of the latter.
Our thesis is that literature is full of paradigms of moral action. And, that
these are both moral and immoral action paradigms. It is nothing more than
criticism, starting from ethics, between heroes and villains. Such paradigms may
be viewed from a formative position, that is, pedagogically. The disciple or reader,
in this case, is acknowledged aspirationally in the paradigm. In other words, the
paradigm becomes aspiration in the disciple, since the latter, theoretically, desires
to resemble it.
Conclusion
Summing up, and to finish this work, literature can be considered an excellent motor
for moral education and, why not, for ethics; the latter, due to the fact that it
provides a good incentive to reflect on moral.
With respect to ethical education, the acknowledgment of a person, central theme
on which ethics can be based, receives fundamental backup from literature. In the
first place, we have seen that it is a good tool that allows empathy, since it facilitates
the fact that the reader acknowledges the literary character as a possible ‘I’, in that
they analogically have ‘humanity’ in common, even though in one case, that may be
of pure words and in another, of reality. Secondly, we have stated that literature
is full of paradigms and models, which can be the object of imitation on behalf of the
reader, who sees in these some positive, and therefore kind, characteristic, which is
why he decides to acquire them.
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