Where is the "g" in creativity? A specialization-differentiation hypothesis

Abstract

Unlike the construct of intelligence operationalized by the g-factor, there is limited evidence suggesting that creativity is a domain-general (i.e., as opposed to domain-specific) and a generalized (i.e., unitary) construct. However, there is a common and implicit g-factor view of creativity that potentially stems from the assumption that creativity represents an ability normally distributed in the human population (i.e., following a Gaussian distribution), ranging from everyday manifestations to eminent accomplishments. Indeed, individual differences exist in the outcome of human creative potential (i.e., particular combination of resources coming into play in creative work, including aspects of motivation, cognition, personality), but this does not suggest that creativity represents a generalized entity per se. This nuance is critical since many psychological and neuropsychological studies of creativity have made inferences about creativity as a generalized construct while relying on a set of highly specific tasks within highly specific domains, although there is limited support for the domain-generality of creativity. In fact, rare eminent individuals are those associated with exceptional creative achievement in multiple domains, and across multiple subdomains within a given field (Gray, 1966; Baer, 1998). The domain-specificity of creative behaviors and achievements is also repeatedly identified within general population samples (e.g., Carson et al., 2005; Silvia et al., 2009). In this article, we propose an alternative to the g-factor view of creativity: an organizing principle of the creative potential that involves its specialization through the formation of commitments and interests within a limited set of creative outlets. We outline evidence that such specialization arises during adolescence, a time during which biological maturational processes take place.

Full text

OPINION ARTICLE
published: 13 January 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.01041
Where is the “g” in creativity? A
specialization–differentiation hypothesis
Baptiste Barbot
1,2
*
and Pablo P. L. Tinio
3
1
Individual Differences in Development Lab, Department of Psychology, Pace University, New York, NY, USA
2
Child Study Center, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
3
Department of Educational Foundations, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ, USA
*Correspondence: bbarbot@pace.edu
Edited by:
Zbigniew R. Struzik, The University of Tokyo, Japan
Reviewed by:
Zbigniew R. Struzik, The University of Tokyo, Japan
Rosalind Arden, King’s College London, UK
Keywords: creative potential, creative cognition, domain specificity, adolescent development, developmental neuroscience, puberty, motivated cognition
Unlike the construct of intelligence oper-
ationalized by the g-factor, there is lim-
ited evidence suggesting that creativity
is a domain-general (i.e., as opposed to
domain-specific) and a generalized (i.e.,
unitary) construct. However, there is a
common and implicit g-factor view of
creativity that potentially stems from the
assumption that creativity represents an
ability normally distributed in the human
population (i.e., following a Gaussian dis-
tribution), ranging from everyday man-
ifestations to eminent accomplishments.
Indeed, individual differences exist in the
outcome of human creative potential (i.e.,
particular combination of resources com-
ing into play in creative work, including
aspects of motivation, cognition, person-
ality), but this does not suggest that cre-
ativity represents a generalized entity per
se. This nuance is critical since many psy-
chological and neuropsychological studies
of creativity have made inferences about
creativity as a generalized construct while
relying on a set of highly specific tasks
within highly specific domains, although
there is limited support for the domain-
generality of creativity. In fact, rare emi-
nent individuals are those associated with
exceptional creative achievement in mul-
tiple domains, and across multiple sub-
domains within a given field (Gray, 1966;
Baer, 1998). The domain-specificity of cre-
ative behaviors and achievements is also
repeatedly identified within general pop-
ulation samples (e.g., Carson et al., 2005;
Silvia et al., 2009). In this article, we pro-
pose an alternative to the g-factor view of
creativity: an organizing principle of the
creative potential that involves its special-
ization through the formation of commit-
ments and interests within a limited set
of creative outlets. We outline evidence
that such specialization arises during ado-
lescence, a time during which biological
maturational processes take place.
There is evidence that creativity simul-
taneously and partially involves: (1)
a domain-general ability, (2) a set of
domain-specific abilities, and (3) a set of
task-relevant abilities (e.g., Lubart, 1999;
Lubart and Guignard, 2004; Dietrich,
2007). This is due to the fact that the
nature of creative work varies accord-
ing to the creative domain, and even
to the particular task constraints within
that domain (e.g., Barbot and Lubart,
2012a). Correspondingly, several studies
have shown that different modes of think-
ing involved in different types of creative
work are accompanied by different pat-
terns of brain activity (Razoumnikova,
2000; Fink et al., 2007; Sawyer, 2011;
Kleibeuker et al., 2013b). A recent meta-
analysis of 34 functional imaging studies
of creative cognition has demonstrated the
involvement of specific br ain regions that
align with general, domain-specific, and
task-relevant aspects of the creative work
(Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). Not surpris-
ingly, prefontal regions were associated
with all creativity tasks investigated (rep-
resenting the domain-general aspects or
“common ground” across all tasks, or per-
haps of all hig her-cognitive functions; e.g.,
Dietrich, 2004; Reuter et al., 2005), while
other regions were associated with dis-
tinct domain-specific areas (e.g., verbal vs.
figural) and others with particular tasks
(Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). Showing
high creative potential in a given task may,
therefore, depend on the efficient recruit-
ment of domain-general, domain-specific,
and task-relevant brain regions.
Consistent with componential mod-
els, such efficient recruitment may reflect
the confluence of multiple resources typ-
ically associated with creativity, including
intelligence, knowledge, cognitive styles,
personality, motivation, emotions, and
aspects of the physical and socio-cultural
contexts (e.g., Sternberg and Lubart,
1995). Based on this view, there is an
established set of resources that seems
to be involved in creative performance
across domains and tasks (e.g., divergent
thinking, openness to experiences, intrin-
sic motivation)—perhaps representing the
domain-general aspects of creativity. To
achieve a high level of creativity, an “opti-
mal” combination of these resources is
necessary, and such a combination could
vary according to the domain or task
under consideration (e.g., Barbot et al.,
2011; Lubart et al., 2013). As an example,
consider the set of skills involved in cre-
ative writing. Factors such as associative
thinking and selective combination might
be among the most important resources
for writing poems, while perse verance and
elaboration might be the most impor-
tant resources for writing creative fiction
(Barbot et al., 2012). Hence, due to the
specific demands of these creative out-
lets, a different set of resources must come
into play in a particular way to lead to
creative outcomes. Together, all of these
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Barbot and Tinio Specialization-differentiation hypothesis
resources may be important for creative
writing in general, along with a set of other
domain-specific resources (e.g., vocabu-
lar y), and domain-general resources (e.g.,
divergent thinking, openness). According
to this view, individuals have multiple
potentials for being creative depending on
the “fit” between their resources and the
creative task demands (and contexts of
time and place). For this reason, the prob-
ability of achieving an exceptional level
of creativity in a given creative outlet is
very low because a specific set of resources
hastocomeintoplayinaspecificway
within the same person and at the right
time and place. On the contrary, the vast
majority of people will possess a combina-
tion of resources that does not optimally fit
the demands of a specific creative outlet,
time, and place, resulting in the majority
of outcomes of “average” quality.
In sum, although some domain-general
resources underlie creativity (Baer and
Kaufman, 2005), they are less cr ucial
than the interaction between person-level
resources and the demands of the partic-
ular domain, task, time, and place. This
lies in stark contrast to the view of creativ-
ity as a generalized trait or ability (Barbot
et al., 2013b). Therefore, the quest for a
g-factor of creativity might be unproduc-
tive. Rather, a more promising direction
would be to focus on a central organizing
principle that explains the optimal com-
bination of all the person-level resources
required in specific creative outlets. One
such organizing principle is the forma-
tion of commitments within a limited
set of creative domains or sub-domains
that may lead to the specialization of a
person’s creative potential in these spe-
cific outlets. According to Plucker and
Beghetto (2004), individuals themselves
make their creativity a domain-specific
entity by engaging in a field that inter-
ests them. Indeed, commitment to a cre-
ative task is an essential component of
creative productivity, not only because it
strengthens the motivational component
of creativity, but also because as people
invest in a specific domain, they have less
time to devote to other areas. Therefore,
the critical “source” of creativity may not
be a g-factor, but instead the specializa-
tion of interests and commitments to a
specific domain or creative outlet of inter-
est, which in turn, facilitates the process
of differentiation (development of a set
of “specialized” skills needed for that par-
ticular outlet) of an individual’s creative
potential. This potential is differentiated
because the individual has, voluntarily or
not, specialized into a specific content area.
With the emergence of domains of interest
in which individuals focus their commit-
ments, adolescence seems to be the critical
time for the development of such “spe-
cialized” creative potential (Barbot and
Lubart, 2012b).
This “specialization-differentiation”
hypothesis is supported by studies that
have emphasized the non-linearity of
the development of creativity (e.g.,
Kleibeuker et al., 2013a), mirroring
the non-normality of creative potential.
Before the recent advancement of research
on the neuroscience of creativity, scholars
have outlined the critical role of puberty
and associated biological processes for
the development of creativity in its “adult
form.” According to Albert (1996),thereis
a discontinuity between creative potential
in childhood and in adolescence because
each is associated with fairly distinct
developmental conditions and pathways.
Similarly, Rothenberg (1990) suggested
that creativity in its adult form begins to
develop as many biological and psychoso-
cial changes transpire during adolescence.
Neuroscientific evidence supports these
suggestions. First, the adolescent brain is
in a dynamic state and is characterized by
tremendous neural plasticity (Blakemore
and Choudhury, 2006). Because the pre-
frontal cortex represents the neural basis
of higher cognitive functions including
creative thinking (e.g., Dietrich, 2004),
creativity de velops in close relation with
the thickness of this br ain structure (e.g.,
Jung et al., 2010). At the onset of puberty
and throughout adolescence, the pre-
frontal cortex is associated with a pruning
process whereby neuronal connections
that are used are strengthened, and those
that are not are eliminated (Nelson and
Guyer, 2011). This is evidenced by imaging
studies showing a decrease of gray mat-
ter during adolescence (Raznahan et al.,
2010), which in turn, might account for
the creative cognition “slumps” that are
often observed during adolescence (e.g.,
Charles and Runco, 2001). Occurring in
parallel is the rapid decline in dopamine
receptors at the onset of puberty (Te icher
et al., 1995; Sisk and Foster, 2004). With
fewer receptors to transmit signals, greater
stimulation is required to activate the neu-
rons, thus compelling adolescents to seek
intense behavioral and emotional stimu-
lations (Galván, 2010; Barbot and Hunter,
2012), behaviors that are themselves linked
to aspects of personality that are impor-
tant for creativity (e.g., sensation-seeking,
risk-taking; Reuter et al., 2005). Together,
these neurobiological dynamics are in
line wi th studies that indicate a relative
decrease of the cognitive aspects of cre-
ativity at the onset of puberty (particularly
divergent thinking; e.g., Lau and Cheung,
2010),whilethelevelof“divergentfeeling”
(including curiosity, complexity, risk-
taking) increases dramatically (Claxton
et al., 2005). Other neural processes salient
in adolescence may contribute to specific
aspects of the development and special-
ization of creative potential, notably the
process of myelination associated with
an enhanced integration of distributed
brain areas (Spear, 2013), needed for
the efficient recruitment of the regions
associated w ith general, domain-specific,
and task-relevant aspects of creativity.
The specialization–differentiation hypoth-
esis helps us understand contradictions
inthesparseliteratureonthedevelop-
mental aspects of creative p otential in
adolescence: individual differences in
commitment to specific creative outlets
may contribute to the discontinuous tra-
jectories of creativity, as well as differences
in the peak-age of creativity “slumps”
and domains associated with such
slumps.
Hence, it is possible that an adoles-
cent committed to a specific creative outlet
will strengthen the neurological substr ates
that underpin the resources critical for that
particular outlet by “activating” them on
a regular basis. Using the creative writ-
ing example, an adolescent who regularly
creates poems will develop a set of task-
relevant skills (e.g., associative thinking)
that are associated with underlying neuro-
logical structures. Because writing poetry
also “activates” a set of domain-specific
skills (e.g., vocabulary), this adolescent
will likely show creative potential not only
in outlets that require a similar combi-
nation of task-relevant skills (e.g., various
subtypes of poetry such as haiku or slam),
but also, to some extent, in outlets that
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Barbot and Tinio Specialization-differentiation hypothesis
involve similar domain-specific skills (e.g.,
creative fiction). It is important to contrast
this sort of carryover of the creative poten-
tial across similar creative tasks with the
concept of domain-generality (reflecting a
g-factor of creativity) for which we know
there is limited evidence.
The specialization–differentiation
hypothesis also finds support in sev-
eral behavioral studies using training
and transfer designs. They have shown
that specific resources in one creativity
domain can partly carryover in domains
that share similar task-requirements (Baer,
1996; Barbot et al., 2013a; Onarheim and
Friis-Olivarius, 2013). Developing mul-
tiple specialized skills needed to fit the
requirements of various creative activities
increases the odds of fitting the require-
ments of multiple tasks across domains,
as long as these tasks share some of the
features of the tasks in which the individ-
ual has specialized. Although this is not
incompatible with the idea of a Domain-
General factor, the contribution of such a
factor may only be minimal.
In conclusion, the proposed
specialization–differentiation hypothe-
sis addresses current misconceptions
of creativity as a domain-general and
generalized entity. We propose that task-
oriented commitment is an organizing
principle of the creative potential. By spe-
cializing in creative domains and tasks
of interest, a person’s creative potential
will progressively differentiate into task-
relevant skills underlined by specific brain
regions recruited on a regular basis. We
posited that such process could peak dur-
ing adolescence, g iven the neurobiological
context associated with this period. Future
longitudinal studies within the field of psy-
chology and developmental neuroscience
should explicitly test this hypothesis to
uncover the developmental pathways lead-
ing to differentiated creative potentials in
specific creativity outlets. To this end, work
focusing on the neural systems underlying
motivated behaviors (e.g., Ernst, 2014)as
the basis of one’s commitment to specific
creative outlets may be particularly use-
ful to test the mechanisms that eventually
drive this organizing principle.
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Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of
interest.
Received: 22 August 2014; accepted: 12 December 2014;
published online: 13 January 2015.
Citation: Barbot B and Tinio PPL (2015) Where is
the “g” in creativity? A specialization–different iation
hypothesis. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:1041. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2014.01041
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