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Where is the "g" in creativity? A specialization-differentiation hypothesis



Unlike the construct of intelligence operationalized by the g-factor, there is limited evidence suggesting that creativity is a domain-general (i.e., as opposed to domain-specific) and a generalized (i.e., unitary) construct. However, there is a common and implicit g-factor view of creativity that potentially stems from the assumption that creativity represents an ability normally distributed in the human population (i.e., following a Gaussian distribution), ranging from everyday manifestations to eminent accomplishments. Indeed, individual differences exist in the outcome of human creative potential (i.e., particular combination of resources coming into play in creative work, including aspects of motivation, cognition, personality), but this does not suggest that creativity represents a generalized entity per se. This nuance is critical since many psychological and neuropsychological studies of creativity have made inferences about creativity as a generalized construct while relying on a set of highly specific tasks within highly specific domains, although there is limited support for the domain-generality of creativity. In fact, rare eminent individuals are those associated with exceptional creative achievement in multiple domains, and across multiple subdomains within a given field (Gray, 1966; Baer, 1998). The domain-specificity of creative behaviors and achievements is also repeatedly identified within general population samples (e.g., Carson et al., 2005; Silvia et al., 2009). In this article, we propose an alternative to the g-factor view of creativity: an organizing principle of the creative potential that involves its specialization through the formation of commitments and interests within a limited set of creative outlets. We outline evidence that such specialization arises during adolescence, a time during which biological maturational processes take place.
published: 13 January 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.01041
Where is the “g” in creativity? A
specialization–differentiation hypothesis
Baptiste Barbot
and Pablo P. L. Tinio
Individual Differences in Development Lab, Department of Psychology, Pace University, New York, NY, USA
Child Study Center, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Department of Educational Foundations, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ, USA
Edited by:
Zbigniew R. Struzik, The University of Tokyo, Japan
Reviewed by:
Zbigniew R. Struzik, The University of Tokyo, Japan
Rosalind Arden, King’s College London, UK
Keywords: creative potential, creative cognition, domain specificity, adolescent development, developmental neuroscience, puberty, motivated cognition
Unlike the construct of intelligence oper-
ationalized by the g-factor, there is lim-
ited evidence suggesting that creativity
is a domain-general (i.e., as opposed to
domain-specific) and a generalized (i.e.,
unitary) construct. However, there is a
common and implicit g-factor view of
creativity that potentially stems from the
assumption that creativity represents an
ability normally distributed in the human
population (i.e., following a Gaussian dis-
tribution), ranging from everyday man-
ifestations to eminent accomplishments.
Indeed, individual differences exist in the
outcome of human creative potential (i.e.,
particular combination of resources com-
ing into play in creative work, including
aspects of motivation, cognition, person-
ality), but this does not suggest that cre-
ativity represents a generalized entity per
se. This nuance is critical since many psy-
chological and neuropsychological studies
of creativity have made inferences about
creativity as a generalized construct while
relying on a set of highly specific tasks
within highly specific domains, although
there is limited support for the domain-
generality of creativity. In fact, rare emi-
nent individuals are those associated with
exceptional creative achievement in mul-
tiple domains, and across multiple sub-
domains within a given field (Gray, 1966;
Baer, 1998). The domain-specificity of cre-
ative behaviors and achievements is also
repeatedly identified within general pop-
ulation samples (e.g., Carson et al., 2005;
Silvia et al., 2009). In this article, we pro-
pose an alternative to the g-factor view of
creativity: an organizing principle of the
creative potential that involves its special-
ization through the formation of commit-
ments and interests within a limited set
of creative outlets. We outline evidence
that such specialization arises during ado-
lescence, a time during which biological
maturational processes take place.
There is evidence that creativity simul-
taneously and partially involves: (1)
a domain-general ability, (2) a set of
domain-specific abilities, and (3) a set of
task-relevant abilities (e.g., Lubart, 1999;
Lubart and Guignard, 2004; Dietrich,
2007). This is due to the fact that the
nature of creative work varies accord-
ing to the creative domain, and even
to the particular task constraints within
that domain (e.g., Barbot and Lubart,
2012a). Correspondingly, several studies
have shown that different modes of think-
ing involved in different types of creative
work are accompanied by different pat-
terns of brain activity (Razoumnikova,
2000; Fink et al., 2007; Sawyer, 2011;
Kleibeuker et al., 2013b). A recent meta-
analysis of 34 functional imaging studies
of creative cognition has demonstrated the
involvement of specific br ain regions that
align with general, domain-specific, and
task-relevant aspects of the creative work
(Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). Not surpris-
ingly, prefontal regions were associated
with all creativity tasks investigated (rep-
resenting the domain-general aspects or
common ground” across all tasks, or per-
haps of all hig her-cognitive functions; e.g.,
Dietrich, 2004; Reuter et al., 2005), while
other regions were associated with dis-
tinct domain-specific areas (e.g., verbal vs.
figural) and others with particular tasks
(Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013). Showing
high creative potential in a given task may,
therefore, depend on the efficient recruit-
ment of domain-general, domain-specific,
and task-relevant brain regions.
Consistent with componential mod-
els, such efficient recruitment may reflect
the confluence of multiple resources typ-
ically associated with creativity, including
intelligence, knowledge, cognitive styles,
personality, motivation, emotions, and
aspects of the physical and socio-cultural
contexts (e.g., Sternberg and Lubart,
1995). Based on this view, there is an
established set of resources that seems
to be involved in creative performance
across domains and tasks (e.g., divergent
thinking, openness to experiences, intrin-
sic motivation)—perhaps representing the
domain-general aspects of creativity. To
achieve a high level of creativity, an “opti-
mal” combination of these resources is
necessary, and such a combination could
vary according to the domain or task
under consideration (e.g., Barbot et al.,
2011; Lubart et al., 2013). As an example,
consider the set of skills involved in cre-
ative writing. Factors such as associative
thinking and selective combination might
be among the most important resources
for writing poems, while perse verance and
elaboration might be the most impor-
tant resources for writing creative fiction
(Barbot et al., 2012). Hence, due to the
specific demands of these creative out-
lets, a different set of resources must come
into play in a particular way to lead to
creative outcomes. Together, all of these
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 1041
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Barbot and Tinio Specialization-differentiation hypothesis
resources may be important for creative
writing in general, along with a set of other
domain-specific resources (e.g., vocabu-
lar y), and domain-general resources (e.g.,
divergent thinking, openness). According
to this view, individuals have multiple
potentials for being creative depending on
the “fit” between their resources and the
creative task demands (and contexts of
time and place). For this reason, the prob-
ability of achieving an exceptional level
of creativity in a given creative outlet is
very low because a specific set of resources
within the same person and at the right
time and place. On the contrary, the vast
majority of people will possess a combina-
tion of resources that does not optimally fit
the demands of a specific creative outlet,
time, and place, resulting in the majority
of outcomes of “average” quality.
In sum, although some domain-general
resources underlie creativity (Baer and
Kaufman, 2005), they are less cr ucial
than the interaction between person-level
resources and the demands of the partic-
ular domain, task, time, and place. This
lies in stark contrast to the view of creativ-
ity as a generalized trait or ability (Barbot
et al., 2013b). Therefore, the quest for a
g-factor of creativity might be unproduc-
tive. Rather, a more promising direction
would be to focus on a central organizing
principle that explains the optimal com-
bination of all the person-level resources
required in specific creative outlets. One
such organizing principle is the forma-
tion of commitments within a limited
set of creative domains or sub-domains
that may lead to the specialization of a
persons creative potential in these spe-
cific outlets. According to Plucker and
Beghetto (2004), individuals themselves
make their creativity a domain-specific
entity by engaging in a field that inter-
ests them. Indeed, commitment to a cre-
ative task is an essential component of
creative productivity, not only because it
strengthens the motivational component
of creativity, but also because as people
invest in a specific domain, they have less
time to devote to other areas. Therefore,
the critical “source of creativity may not
be a g-factor, but instead the specializa-
tion of interests and commitments to a
specific domain or creative outlet of inter-
est, which in turn, facilitates the process
of differentiation (development of a set
of “specialized” skills needed for that par-
ticular outlet) of an individual’s creative
potential. This potential is differentiated
because the individual has, voluntarily or
not, specialized into a specific content area.
With the emergence of domains of interest
in which individuals focus their commit-
ments, adolescence seems to be the critical
time for the development of such “spe-
cialized” creative potential (Barbot and
Lubart, 2012b).
This “specialization-differentiation
hypothesis is supported by studies that
have emphasized the non-linearity of
the development of creativity (e.g.,
Kleibeuker et al., 2013a), mirroring
the non-normality of creative potential.
Before the recent advancement of research
on the neuroscience of creativity, scholars
have outlined the critical role of puberty
and associated biological processes for
the development of creativity in its “adult
form. According to Albert (1996),thereis
a discontinuity between creative potential
in childhood and in adolescence because
each is associated with fairly distinct
developmental conditions and pathways.
Similarly, Rothenberg (1990) suggested
that creativity in its adult form begins to
develop as many biological and psychoso-
cial changes transpire during adolescence.
Neuroscientific evidence supports these
suggestions. First, the adolescent brain is
in a dynamic state and is characterized by
tremendous neural plasticity (Blakemore
and Choudhury, 2006). Because the pre-
frontal cortex represents the neural basis
of higher cognitive functions including
creative thinking (e.g., Dietrich, 2004),
creativity de velops in close relation with
the thickness of this br ain structure (e.g.,
Jung et al., 2010). At the onset of puberty
and throughout adolescence, the pre-
frontal cortex is associated with a pruning
process whereby neuronal connections
that are used are strengthened, and those
that are not are eliminated (Nelson and
Guyer, 2011). This is evidenced by imaging
studies showing a decrease of gray mat-
ter during adolescence (Raznahan et al.,
2010), which in turn, might account for
the creative cognition “slumps” that are
often observed during adolescence (e.g.,
Charles and Runco, 2001). Occurring in
parallel is the rapid decline in dopamine
receptors at the onset of puberty (Te icher
et al., 1995; Sisk and Foster, 2004). With
fewer receptors to transmit signals, greater
stimulation is required to activate the neu-
rons, thus compelling adolescents to seek
intense behavioral and emotional stimu-
lations (Galván, 2010; Barbot and Hunter,
2012), behaviors that are themselves linked
to aspects of personality that are impor-
tant for creativity (e.g., sensation-seeking,
risk-taking; Reuter et al., 2005). Together,
these neurobiological dynamics are in
line wi th studies that indicate a relative
decrease of the cognitive aspects of cre-
ativity at the onset of puberty (particularly
divergent thinking; e.g., Lau and Cheung,
(including curiosity, complexity, risk-
taking) increases dramatically (Claxton
et al., 2005). Other neural processes salient
in adolescence may contribute to specific
aspects of the development and special-
ization of creative potential, notably the
process of myelination associated with
an enhanced integration of distributed
brain areas (Spear, 2013), needed for
the efficient recruitment of the regions
associated w ith general, domain-specific,
and task-relevant aspects of creativity.
The specialization–differentiation hypoth-
esis helps us understand contradictions
mental aspects of creative p otential in
adolescence: individual differences in
commitment to specific creative outlets
may contribute to the discontinuous tra-
jectories of creativity, as well as differences
in the peak-age of creativity “slumps
and domains associated with such
Hence, it is possible that an adoles-
cent committed to a specific creative outlet
will strengthen the neurological substr ates
that underpin the resources critical for that
particular outlet by activating” them on
a regular basis. Using the creative writ-
ing example, an adolescent who regularly
creates poems will develop a set of task-
relevant skills (e.g., associative thinking)
that are associated with underlying neuro-
logical structures. Because writing poetry
also “activates a set of domain-specific
skills (e.g., vocabulary), this adolescent
will likely show creative potential not only
in outlets that require a similar combi-
nation of task-relevant skills (e.g., various
subtypes of poetry such as haiku or slam),
but also, to some extent, in outlets that
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience January 2015 | Volume 8 | Article 1041
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Barbot and Tinio Specialization-differentiation hypothesis
involve similar domain-specific skills (e.g.,
creative fiction). It is important to contrast
this sort of carryover of the creative poten-
tial across similar creative tasks with the
concept of domain-generality (reflecting a
g-factor of creativity) for which we know
there is limited evidence.
The specialization–differentiation
hypothesis also finds support in sev-
eral behavioral studies using training
and transfer designs. They have shown
that specific resources in one creativity
domain can partly carryover in domains
that share similar task-requirements (Baer,
1996; Barbot et al., 2013a; Onarheim and
Friis-Olivarius, 2013). Developing mul-
tiple specialized skills needed to fit the
requirements of various creative activities
increases the odds of fitting the require-
ments of multiple tasks across domains,
as long as these tasks share some of the
features of the tasks in which the individ-
ual has specialized. Although this is not
incompatible with the idea of a Domain-
General factor, the contribution of such a
factor may only be minimal.
In conclusion, the proposed
specialization–differentiation hypothe-
sis addresses current misconceptions
of creativity as a domain-general and
generalized entity. We propose that task-
oriented commitment is an organizing
principle of the creative potential. By spe-
cializing in creative domains and tasks
of interest, a person’s creative potential
will progressively differentiate into task-
relevant skills underlined by specific brain
regions recruited on a regular basis. We
posited that such process could peak dur-
ing adolescence, g iven the neurobiological
context associated with this period. Future
longitudinal studies within the field of psy-
chology and developmental neuroscience
should explicitly test this hypothesis to
uncover the developmental pathways lead-
ing to differentiated creative potentials in
specific creativity outlets. To this end, work
focusing on the neural systems underlying
motivated behaviors (e.g., Ernst, 2014)as
the basis of one’s commitment to specific
creative outlets may be particularly use-
ful to test the mechanisms that eventually
drive this organizing principle.
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Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of
Received: 22 August 2014; accepted: 12 December 2014;
published online: 13 January 2015.
Citation: Barbot B and Tinio PPL (2015) Where is
the g” in creativity? A specialization–different iation
hypothesis. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:1041. doi: 10.3389/
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... However, that boost is not linear. During puberty, there is a drop in gray matter and the number of dopamine receptors; this likely explains the decrease in the cognitive aspect of creativity and the increase of the aspects related to personality, such as openness, thrill-seeking and novelty (Barbot and Tinio, 2015). The relationship between androgens and creative expression could indicate the existence of sexual dimorphism in creativity, but, considering physical and psychological characteristics in general, humans have milder sexual dimorphism than other species (Janicke and Fromonteil, 2021). ...
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Cultural innovations, such as tools and other technical articles useful for survival, imply that creativity is an outcome of evolution. However, the existence of purely ornamental items obfuscates the functional value of creativity. What is the functional or adaptive value of aesthetic and intellectual ornaments? Recent evidence shows a connection between ornamental creativity, an individual’s attractiveness, and their reproductive success. However, this association is not sufficient for establishing that creativity in humans evolved by sexual selection. In this critical review, we synthesize findings from many disciplines about the mechanisms, ontogeny, phylogeny, and the function of creativity in sexual selection. Existing research indicates that creativity has the characteristics expected of a trait evolved by sexual selection: genetic basis, sexual dimorphism, wider variety in males, influence of sex hormones, dysfunctional expressions, an advantage in mating in humans and other animals, and psychological modules adapted to mating contexts. Future studies should investigate mixed findings in the existing literature, such as creativity not being found particularly attractive in a non-WEIRD society. Moreover, we identified remaining knowledge gaps and recommend that further research should be undertaken in the following areas: sexual and reproductive correlates of creativity in non-WEIRD societies, relationship between androgens, development, and creative expression, as well as the impact of ornamental, technical and everyday creativity on attractiveness. Evolutionary research should analyze whether being an evolved signal of genetic quality is the only way in which creativity becomes sexually selected and therefore passed on from generation to generation. This review has gone a long way toward integrating and enhancing our understanding of ornamental creativity as a possible sexual selected psychological trait.
... Age-related differences in creative self-regulation are expected given the changes in generality-specificity of creativity throughout development (Plucker & Beghetto, 2004). Notably, such gradual specialization of creative potential (Barbot et al., 2016;Barbot & Tinio, 2015) might contribute to the formation of unique, domain-specific ways of dealing with creative challenges (Glaveanu et al., 2013). By focusing efforts on a particular creative domain, one gains knowledge and skills regarding how to be creative and how to approach problems that arise in that area (Baer & Kaufman, 2017). ...
... Specifically, in this investigation, we tested whether creative self-regulation, as theorized by Ivcevic and Nusbaum (2017), and found it suitable for describing creative self-regulation of adolescents (see the central part of Figure 1) is applicable to adults' creativity. As suggested by the specialization-differentiation hypothesis (e.g., Barbot & Tinio, 2015), the developmental process of channeling one's creative interests to a chosen domain leads to the progressive specialization of skills. Thus, adults who become more domain-oriented in creative actions develop domain-specific ways of dealing with challenges and striving for a creative goal. ...
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To put creative ideas and insights into action, people need to overcome obstacles, monitor their processes, and effectively evaluate the steps they take. Across two studies (N = 832 and N = 843), we explored the structure, correlates, and cross-domain similarity and specificity of creative self-regulation. Both studies supported a seven-factor model of creative self-regulation, with different self-regulatory behaviors engaged in the phases of forethought (obstacle expectations, uncertainty acceptance), performance (adjusting approach, managing and reframing ambiguous goals, and emotion regulation), and self-reflection (improving approach and readiness for sharing). Across both studies, creative self-regulation was systematically correlated with creative self-concept and less systematically with personality. Additionally, in Study 2, creative self-regulation explained a unique portion of the variance in creative activity, achievement, and declared future engagement when personality and creative self-beliefs were controlled. A substantial similarity of self-regulation across different domains was observed in terms of the structure, difficulty, and residual variances (measurement invariance), yet some self-regulatory behaviors and strategies were more pronounced in certain domains than others. We discuss the consequences of these findings along with future research directions.
... Since then, creativity is often interpreted as a "variable" as both an object of observation and individual differences. An unfortunate consequence is that, correspondingly, creativity is routinely conceptualized and operationalized as "one variable", as if it was a monolithic ability or "trait" Barbot & Tinio, 2015), on which people differ from one another (i.e., between-or inter-individual differences). First, this view is inconsistent with Guilford's (1950) original conceptualization of creativity as a multivariate entity 1 , which has been largely substantiated empirically since then (e.g., Lubart, 1999). ...
... In creativity, we can consider this type of IIV through two angles: a) individual profiles of resources for creativity, and b) individual profiles of performance or achievements across different tasks or domains (as opposed to within the same task, as in processing fluctuation). The first refers to the nature or "shape" of one's creative potential (e.g., Lubart et al., 2013), whereas the second highlights individual preferences and possible specialization of creative potential on a given creative outlet (Barbot & Tinio, 2015). ...
Individual differences perspectives have dominated the scientific study of creativity since the 1950’s. These perspectives, however, mainly emphasize group-level variations or inter-individual differences, with limited interest in individual-level variations. Yet, (1) group-level findings are often used to make inferences at the person-level, which might not apply consistently across individuals, and (2) a focus on intra-individual variations could supplement knowledge based on inter-individual differences and accurately inform creativity as a dynamic and multifaceted psychological construct. Indeed, when observed at the individual level, creativity can vary from moment to moment, task to task, and even item to item, which is not well reflected in the current understanding of creativity. After introducing the historical context for the study of individual differences in creativity, this article presents and illustrates three fundamental and distinct aspects of intra-individual variability as they apply to creativity, namely (in)consistency (or processing fluctuation), dispersion, and intraindividual change. While doing so, recent developments in apparatus and methods to assess creativity as a more dynamic phenomenon are presented. The article concludes by discussing the promise of accounting for intra-individual variability in creative performance and potential and the new knowledge it may elicit for both creativity research and practice.
... (c) general cognitive ability, as reflected in standardized measures of abstract fluid reasoning and vocabulary. Although the exact nature of the contribution of intelligence or general mental ability to creative thinking continues to be debated [53][54][55], meta-analyses reveal that there is a modest positive correlation between both fluid and crystallized facets of intelligence with creativity [56]. This correlation partially reflects such general cognitive processes as memory/conceptual retrieval ability [57] though these domain-general abilities likely coexist with sets of domainspecific and task relevant abilities [53]. ...
... Although the exact nature of the contribution of intelligence or general mental ability to creative thinking continues to be debated [53][54][55], meta-analyses reveal that there is a modest positive correlation between both fluid and crystallized facets of intelligence with creativity [56]. This correlation partially reflects such general cognitive processes as memory/conceptual retrieval ability [57] though these domain-general abilities likely coexist with sets of domainspecific and task relevant abilities [53]. Accordingly, we also assessed (d) task-specific factors, such as knowledge of the task domain for the Design Product Ideation challenge, and interest or engagement in that task. ...
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What factors predict the originality of domain-specific idea generation? Replicating and extending an earlier study using a Design Product Ideation task in an introductory university design course, the present research, grounded in the componential theory of creativity, assessed the relative contributions to originality of design ideation from five factors: divergent thinking, personality traits, general cognitive ability, prior creative experience, and task-specific challenge/interest. The Design Product Ideation task asked participants, at two different timepoints, to propose ideas for products to improve either the experience of urban gardening or of outdoor picnics. Four divergent thinking tasks were used, including the predominantly conceptually-based Alternative Uses Task, a newly developed perceptually-based Figural Interpretation Quest, and two modified verbal tasks from the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance Suppose and Torrance Product). Regression analyses revealed that, at both timepoints, originality on the Design Product Ideation tasks was predicted by multiple divergent thinking, personality, and task-based factors. Originality of responses to the Figural Interpretation Quest was a significant predictor at both timepoints, and continued to add incremental value after controlling for the other divergent thinking measures. Collectively, these findings indicate that the four divergent thinking tasks, though related, do not measure identical constructs, and that many individual difference components, both trait-based (e.g., openness to experience) and more specifically task-based (e.g., perceived challenge of the task), shape creative performance. Methodologically, and from a practical standpoint, these findings underscore the value of incorporating both conceptual and perceptual measures of divergent thinking as contributors to originality in domain-specific idea generation.
... Daarbij vormen verworven kennis (generiek en specifiek) en vaardigheden een deel van het potentieel . Ten slotte is de culturele, sociale en fysieke omgeving een bron van potentiële mogelijkheden (Barbot & Tinio, 2015). Hoe het creatief vermogen zich manifesteert en ontwikkelt is dus een samenspel van persoonlijk potentieel en de gegeven taak of uitdaging. ...
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The development of creative ability of prevocational students Developing the creative ability of prevocational students requires a structured approach. Schools play an important role in this but lack the expertise to design, implement and evaluate creativity interventions. The current study aims to investigate the effects of the intervention conscious use of creative competences on the creative ability of pre-vocational secondary education students. A quasi-experimental study with 53 first-year students was implemented. The experimental group (n = 23) was offered an intervention which consisted of one generic and five technological learning trajectories, described in a teaching method. No intervention was presented to the control group. The control group (n = 30) only completed both questionnaires. The creative capability questionnaire was used to collect the data from the research groups. The intervention had a significant effect on the competences resourceful and interacting with others. The results suggest that the intervention is helpful in developing the creative capacity of students in pre-vocational secondary education. Keywords: creative ability, competences, intervention design, pre-vocational education
... Indeed, enhanced knowledge and experience associated with higher educational levels (i.e., years of schooling) can be postulated to facilitate the translation of creative potential into creative production (Lau & Cheung, 2010). Additionally, individuals with higher educational levels seem to develop highly specialized creativity skills, which supposedly promote creative production (Barbot & Tinio, 2014; Said-Metwaly, Van den Noortgate, & . Hence, differences in educational levels of subjects across studies might explain discrepancies in results. ...
Achieving creativity in the real-world depends on multiple individual and environmental factors. Among them, divergent thinking (DT) has long been considered a key ingredient of creativity and an essential criterion for predicting real-life creative outcomes. However, the link between DT and creative achievement (CA) has yielded heterogeneous results, as outlined by a prior meta-analysis on the DT–CA link published in 2008. Given several limitations of this meta-analysis and the large body of relevant studies that have been published since then, the present article aimed to offer an updated and methodologically rigorous meta-analytical examination of the DT–CA link. A total of 766 effect sizes from 70 studies encompassing 14,901 subjects were analyzed using a meta-analytic three-level model. The results showed that DT was positively, albeit weakly, linked to CA, with only 3% of shared variance. Moderator analyses indicated that this link was robust to variations in DT and CA measures used, gender, educational level, measurement interval between DT and CA, and country of study, but differed by DT task modality, CA domain, and intellectual giftedness. Specifically, the strength of the DT–CA link was significantly larger for (a) verbal DT tasks, (b) CA in the performance domain, and (c) gifted subjects. A significant interaction effect was also found between CA domain and intellectual giftedness, with the DT–CA link being strongest among gifted subjects in the performance domain. Implications of these results for the study and measurement of creativity are discussed.
... Figure 13.1.Illustration des courbes de développement mises en évidence dans la méta-analyse de Said-Metwaly et al.[9], pour les indices de fluidité (nombre d'idées générées), de flexibilité (nombre de catégories abordées) et d'originalité (créativité des réponses) au fil des âges.Grâce à l'investissement dans des activités créatives (poursuite des intérêts de l'enfance ou de nouveaux intérêts), les adolescents peuvent développer leurs capacités créatives et leur expertise au sein d'un domaine spécifique[10]. En d'autres termes, les adolescents ont tendance à spécialiser leur potentiel créatif autour d'activités qui les intéressent. ...
The study explored the impact of experimentally induced state self-objectification on creative potential in visual domain in mid-adolescence. The experiment was conducted in a group of 140 adolescents at the age of 14–16: 70 boys (Mage = 15.21; SD = .81) and 70 girls (Mage = 14.99; SD = 0.83), randomly allocated to two groups: experimental and control. The state self-objectification was obtained by means of a magnifying mirror, and measured by the State Self-Objectification Questionnaire. In both groups the Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production was administered twice (in A and B versions, randomly selected). Statistical analyses were performed with a mixed model ANOVA (2 drawings x 2 groups x 2 sexes). Results showed that mid-adolescent girls are susceptible to state self-objectification to a greater extent than the boys, and the experimentally induced state self-objectification has an impact on creative potential in the visual domain in the groups of adolescent boys and girls.
Although creativity and critical thinking are two of the 4C skills for 21st-century students, little is known about their relationship from a developmental perspective. It is also suggested that different creativity measures should be distinguished and compared. Based on cognitive theoretical views, this study predicts and investigates the different developmental trends of open-ended versus closed-ended creative potentials in relation to adolescents’ critical thinking abilities. We recruited 312 junior high and high school students from Grade 7 to Grade 11 for testing on open-ended creativity, closed-ended creativity, and critical thinking. After we controlled for the socioeconomic status variable, the results showed that open-ended creativity indices revealed a mostly steady trajectory across grades, while closed-ended creativity and critical thinking performances both exhibited a prominent ascending trend. The path analysis results further demonstrated a significant 39.2% variance of closed-ended creativity performances for which critical thinking accounted, but only 3% for open-ended creativity. These empirical results support the theoretical predictions, suggest future studies that may arise, and can help design appropriate training projects to enhance adolescents’ different creativities and critical thinking.
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Abstract Scientific inquiry represents a multifaceted approach to explore and understand the natural world. Training students in the principles of scientific inquiry can help promote the scientific learning process as well as help students enhance their understanding of scientific research. Here, we report on the development and implementation of a learning module that introduces astrobiology students to the concepts of creative and scientific inquiry, as well as provide practical exercises to build critical thinking skills. The module contained three distinct components: (1) a creative inquiry activity designed to introduce concepts regarding the role of creativity in scientific inquiry; (2) guidelines to help astrobiology students formulate and self-assess questions regarding various scientific content and imagery; and (3) a practical exercise where students were allowed to watch a scientific presentation and practice their analytical skills. Pre- and post-course surveys were used to assess the students' perceptions regarding creative and scientific inquiry and whether this activity impacted their understanding of the scientific process. Survey results indicate that the exercise helped improve students' science skills by promoting awareness regarding the role of creativity in scientific inquiry and building their confidence in formulating and assessing scientific questions. Together, the module and survey results confirm the need to include such inquiry-based activities into the higher education classroom, thereby helping students hone their critical thinking and question asking skill set and facilitating their professional development in astrobiology. Key Words: Scientific inquiry-Critical thinking-Curriculum development-Astrobiology-Microbialites. Astrobiology 15, xxx-xxx.
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This article presents the concept of creative potential and its link to talent. Psychological measures to assess creative potential in children and adolescents (EPoC) and adults (Creative Profiler) are then described. Implications for developing creativity are proposed.
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This chapter explores the current state of knowledge on the genetic etiology of creativity (e.g., the genetic bases of the individual differences in creative ability). To extend this perspective, we review the socio-cultural aspects of creativity and present how these aspects have been interpreted from an evolutionary perspective. This includes examinations of the genetic forces that shape populations and their cultures, the cultural environment that receives the creative product and determines its usefulness and value, and some possible interactive effects that may contribute both to creativity as an individual ability and to the reception and adoption of novelty as a social process. We conclude by underlining the importance of studying creativity not only as an individual, objective “ability,” but also as a cultural, time-specific, biologically-grounded phenomenon with a social purpose
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Creativity is considered key to human prosperity, yet the neurocognitive principles underlying creative performance, and their development, are still poorly understood. To fill this void, we examined the neural correlates of divergent thinking in adults (25-30 years) and adolescents (15-17 years). Participants generated alternative uses (AU) or ordinary characteristics (OC) for common objects while brain activity was assessed using fMRI. Adults outperformed adolescents on the number of solutions for AU and OC trials. Contrasting neural activity for AU with OC trials revealed increased recruitment of left angular gyrus, left supramarginal gyrus, and bilateral middle temporal gyrus in both adults and adolescents. When only trials with multiple AU were included in the analysis, participants showed additional left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)/middle frontal gyrus (MFG) activation for AU compared to OC trials. Correspondingly, individual difference analyses showed a positive correlation between activations for AU relative to OC trials in left IFG/MFG and divergent thinking performance and activations were more pronounced in adults than in adolescents. Taken together, the results of this study demonstrated that creative idea generation involves recruitment of mainly left lateralized parietal and temporal brain regions. Generating multiple creative ideas, a hallmark of divergent thinking, shows additional lateral PFC activation that is not yet optimized in adolescence.
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This article investigates how neuroscience in general, and neuroscience of creativity in particular, can be used in teaching "applied creativity" and the usefulness of this approach to creativity training. The article is based on empirical data and our experiences from the Applied NeuroCreativity (ANC) program, taught at business schools in Denmark and Canada. In line with previous studies of successful creativity training programs the ANC participants are first introduced to cognitive concepts of creativity, before applying these concepts to a relevant real world creative problem. The novelty in the ANC program is that the conceptualization of creativity is built on neuroscience, and a crucial aspect of the course is giving the students a thorough understanding of the neuroscience of creativity. Previous studies have reported that the conceptualization of creativity used in such training is of major importance for the success of the training, and we believe that the neuroscience of creativity offers a novel conceptualization for creativity training. Here we present pre/post-training tests showing that ANC students gained more fluency in divergent thinking (a traditional measure of trait creativity) than those in highly similar courses without the neuroscience component, suggesting that principles from neuroscience can contribute effectively to creativity training and produce measurable results on creativity tests. The evidence presented indicates that the inclusion of neuroscience principles in a creativity course can in 8 weeks increase divergent thinking skills with an individual relative average of 28.5%.
The purpose of this study was to investigate divergent thinking and evaluative skill as importantprocesses in the development of creative thinking in elementary schoolchildren. Children from the 3rd, 4th, and 5th grades (N = 117) received divergent thinking tasks and measures of evaluative accuracy. The latter indicated how well they liked various ideas (i.e., their preferences) and the degree to which the children believed those ideas tobe original. Results indicated that the accuracy of their originality judgments increased significantly with age, as did the preference for appropriate ideas. Unlike previous research, evaluative scores were not related to divergent thinking test scores. Also somewhat surprising, given earlier research, was the lack of a "4th-grade slump." In fact, there was a significant peak, rather than slump, in the divergent thinking of 4th-grade children, at least in the raw fluency scores. When fluency ratio scores were compared, there were still some incidents of a 4th-grade peak, but there was also a significant decline with grade in the proportions of 1 index of highly appropriate ideas. Although a relation was not found between evaluative skill and divergent thinking raw fluency scores, an increasing preference for appropriate square ideas was found to contribute significantly to the prediction of decreases in the proportion of high-quality round ideas given. Possible explanations are given to account for this unexpectedfinding, including differences in interpersonal and intrapersonal evaluative skills, and the distinction between the ability to accurately identify original or appropriate ideas and choosing to selectively express such ideas.
Although there is a growing body of evidence indicating that divergent-thinking skills may be very task specific, there has been no research testing how narrowly divergent-thinking training can be targeted. Seventy-nine seventh-grade students received training in poetry-relevant divergent-thinking skills. These subjects and a matched control group later wrote poems and stories, the creativity of which was judged by experts. There was a significantly greater impact on poetry-writing creativity. Implications for creativity theory and training programs are discussed.
There is a debate about the factor structure of adults' ability to delay gratification and mixed findings concerning the relationship between delay of gratification and achievement. Three studies were conducted to show that delay of gratification had two components. In Study 1, exploratory factor analyses showed that the Generalizability of Deferment of Gratification Questionnaire had two factors: Controlling-Impulse and Planning-and-Waiting. Study 2 verified the two-factor structure by confirmatory factor analysis and demonstrated acceptable reliability, construct and divergent validity. Specifically, Planning-and-Waiting was correlated with delay-discounting, self-control, uncertainty avoidance, Openness, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and self-efficacy, whereas Controlling-Impulse was correlated with self-control, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. Moreover, Planning-and-Waiting was the unique predictor of CFC-Future, but Controlling-Impulse predicted substantive variance in both CFC-Future and CFC-Immediate. Study 3, using multi-wave and multi-source data, further showed that only Controlling-Impulse was an important predictor of long-term performance and creative performance, supporting the distinctiveness of the two factors.
The triadic neural systems model is a heuristic tool, which was developed with the goal of providing a framework for neuroscience research into motivated behaviors. Unlike dual models, that highlight dynamics between approach systems centered on striatal function and control systems centered on prefrontal cortex, the triadic model also includes an avoidance system, centered on amygdala-related circuits. A first application of this model has been to account for adolescent behavior. Published by Elsevier Inc.