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Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Abstract
This article begins with some brief reflexions on the definition of determinism (II), on the notion of the subject of experience (III), and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events (IV). The main discussion (V‐XIII) focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ‘life‐hopes'). It is argued that this is half right: the truth of determinism does indeed threaten certain vital parts of our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents. The trouble is that the falsity of determinism does not diminish the threat in any useful way. The old, natural, and recurrent mistake is to think that we would really be better off, so far as free will and moral responsibility (and our ‘life‐hopes') were concerned, if determinism were false. It is argued that there is no important sense in which this is true, and that the question of whether determinism is true or false is therefore of no real importance, so far as the free will debate is concerned.
... These pure source incompossibilists argue that free will has a necessary source condition, but they explicitly reject the proposal that it has an actual-sequence couldhave-done-otherwise condition (either as a free-standing necessary condition or embedded in the source condition). For instance, Derk Pereboom (2001Pereboom ( , 2014 and Galen Strawson (1986Strawson ( , 1989Strawson ( , 1994Strawson ( , 2008 are both source-only incompossibilists in this sense. Because Pereboom and Strawson each hold that it is impossible for normal humans to act freely, they are generally lumped together as incompatibilists and free-will skeptics. ...
... These pure source incompossibilists argue that free will has a necessary source condition, but they explicitly reject the proposal that it has an actual-sequence couldhave-done-otherwise condition (either as a free-standing necessary condition or embedded in the source condition). For instance, Derk Pereboom (2001Pereboom ( , 2014 and Galen Strawson (1986Strawson ( , 1989Strawson ( , 1994Strawson ( , 2008 are both source-only incompossibilists in this sense. Because Pereboom and Strawson each hold that it is impossible for normal humans to act freely, they are generally lumped together as incompatibilists and free-will skeptics. ...
... These pure source incompossibilists argue that free will has a necessary source condition, but they explicitly reject the proposal that it has an actual-sequence couldhave-done-otherwise condition (either as a free-standing necessary condition or embedded in the source condition). For instance, Derk Pereboom (2001Pereboom ( , 2014 and Galen Strawson (1986Strawson ( , 1989Strawson ( , 1994Strawson ( , 2008 are both source-only incompossibilists in this sense. Because Pereboom and Strawson each hold that it is impossible for normal humans to act freely, they are generally lumped together as incompatibilists and free-will skeptics. ...
... Para una mirada más amplia sobre el debate del neuroderecho y las diferentes posturas existentes en él, véase el rico trabajo de Nadelhoffer (2013). Para explorar el tema del "libre albedrío" en relación con la neurociencia y el derecho, se sugiere la siguiente bibliografía: Watson (1982), Dennett (1984Dennett ( , 2003, Pettit (2002), Wegner (2002); Fodor (1987), Strawson (1989), Wallace (1994), Goldstein et al. (2003), Morse (2006Morse ( , 2007aMorse ( , 2007bMorse ( , 2008Morse ( , 2014Morse ( , 2021, Kane (2011), Vihvelin (2013, Glannon (2015), List (2019), Moore (2020). 30. ...
Este trabajo se centra en la creciente interacción entre la neurociencia y el derecho, delineando cuestiones de responsabilidad penal y en el marco más amplio de las interacciones epistemológicas entre diferentes campos del conocimiento. Ilustra la oportunidad de mantener un “debate” o diálogo peculiar entre las ramas de la ciencia consideradas y en el ámbito particular del neuroderecho. A continuación, el artículo presenta el método socrático como un enfoque dialéctico específico para orientar racionalmente estas conexiones epistemológicas, favorecer la comparación crítica de perspectivas heterogéneas y, por tanto, poner de manifiesto espacios comunes fértiles en los que es posible alcanzar nuevos conocimientos interdisciplinarios. Por último, el artículo considera posturas significativas en el debate sobre el neuroderecho para mostrar que, en la medida en que se basan en la dialéctica y la refutación, pueden considerarse como fuertes manifestaciones de un diálogo socrático. Por lo tanto, aprovechando esta práctica, incluso en los sistemasjurídicos hay espacio para las pruebas y las aportaciones neurocientíficas, aunque esto conlleve una pizca de “neuromodestia”, pensamiento crítico y una defensa del método socrático.
... Though majority of the interviews attested that the participants were strongly influenced by social structure in deciding their leisure preferences, raising the key question about the existence of free will and agency. According to Strawson (1989), an important requisite of free will is that it entails true moral responsibility, that is, subjects take full moral responsibility for their actions. The compulsive nature of leisure in Nepal suggested by this study is against the very notion of leisure as non-work, non-obligation and non-constraint. ...
Scholars have identified the need to study cases of leisure from wider social and political contexts so that existing Western perspectives on leisure theories can be challenged. This study responds to that need by exploring the sociological factors that inform the conception and practice of leisure in Nepal. This exploratory study applies the qualitative method and data is collected through in-depth interviews of the purposely selected samples of 25 individuals at three leisure sites in Nepal. The study finds that the Nepali concept of leisure is strongly informed by the belief in fatalism, where there is limited individual agency or free will, and that social time rather than free time is central to this concept. The findings suggest the existence of a new ontology of leisure and identifies the need for more critical debates on the cross-cultural comparisons of leisure.
... Whilst consciousness was often assumed to be entwined with free will by scientists and philosophers (e.g. Baumeister et al., 2010;Blackmore, 1999;Rakos, 2004;Sartre, 1943Sartre, /1972Strawson, 1989), more evidence is needed to explicate the relevance of consciousness to free will in laypeople's understanding of the concept. ...
The existence of free will has been a subject of fierce academic debate for millennia, still the meaning of the term “free will” remains nebulous. In the past two decades, psychologists have made considerable progress in defining lay concepts of free will. We present the first systematic review of primary psychological evidence on how ordinary folk conceptualise free will, encompassing folk concepts, beliefs, intuitions, and attitudes about free will. A total of 1,384 records were identified following a pre-registered protocol. After abstract and full-text screening, 18 articles were eligible for inclusion, comprised of 36 studies and 10,176 participants from regions including the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, and Germany. A narrative synthesis of results showed that for ordinary folk, especially the more educated population from the United States, free will is a dynamic construct centred on the ability to choose following one’s goals and desires, whilst being uncoerced and reasonably free from constraints. Results suggesting metaphysical considerations regarding consciousness, dualism, and determinism were inconclusive. Our findings provided preliminary support for a psychological model of folk conception of free will, and elucidated potential pathways mediating the effects of consciousness and dualism on free will attributions. Further research is needed to explicate the distinction between having free will and having the ability to exercise free will, as well as the cross-cultural validity of findings on folk conceptions of free will.
... On the face of it determinism relies on a fairly straightforward and simple assumption, the assumption that everything in the world has a cause and that because everything has a cause, everything is explainable in principle. That things are explainable in principle does not necessarily mean that this explanation is accessible to us however (Strawson, 1989). One way of explaining the psychological force of the belief in free will is precisely that because we commonly lack these explanations-because we are unaware of them or because their causal history is too complex and far reaching for our cognitive faculties to grasp them-we assume that we act as first causes ourselves. ...
In this Spinozist defence of the educational promotion of students’ autonomy I argue for a deterministic position where freedom of will is deemed unrealistic in the metaphysical sense, but important in the sense that it is an undeniable psychological fact. The paper is structured in three parts. The first part investigates the concept of autonomy from different philosophical points of view, looking especially at how education and autonomy intersect. The second part focuses on explicating the philosophical position of causal determinism and it seeks to open up a way to conceive of education for autonomy without relying on the notion of free will in a metaphysical sense. The concluding part attempts to outline a Spinozistic understanding of education for autonomy where autonomy is grounded in the student's acceptance and understanding of the necessary constraints of natural causation rather than processes of self-causation.
Can we reach a satisfactory conception of free will that is consistent with the current scientific world view? This important problem is the subject of this thesis. It is argued that certain areas of science raise profound problems for libertarian conceptions of free will and moral responsibility. Specifically, it is unclear how libertarian free will can arise from the neuronal processes of the brain; it is unclear how, or why, it has evolved; and it is inconsistent with the physicist's conception of time as it is understood through Einstein's Theory of Relativity. These are problems which do not arise for compatibilist conceptions of free will. Furthermore, there are a number of more philosophical objections which can be raised against libertarianism—including Harry Frankfurt's argument against the principle of alternate possibilities and Galen Strawson's recent objection to ultimate responsibility—which strongly indicate that we do not have free will or moral responsibility in any libertarian sense. As a consequence of this various compatibilist conceptions of free will are considered in order to see if a satisfactory compatibilist account of free will can be reached. It is concluded that an epistemic account of free will based upon Richard Double's autonomy variable account of free will is the most satisfactory. Several libertarian objections to compatibilism are discussed and rejected. Finally, some general objections to free will and moral responsibility that have recently been raised by Ted Honderich, Richard Double, and Bruce Waller are discussed. It is argued that they provide no reason to doubt that we have free will. It is therefore concluded that we can reach a satisfactory conception of free will that is consistent with the current scientific world view.
Although there is debate in the scientific and clinical literature about how much choice addicts have concerning the use of drugs and related activities, this article demonstrates that Anglo-American criminal law is most consistent with the position that addicts have substantial choice about engaging in crimes involving their addiction. It suggests that the criminal law's approach is consistent with plausible and reasonable current scientific and clinical understanding of addiction and is therefore defensible, but it also suggests that the law is unduly harsh and far from optimum.
Recent advances in the brain sciences have dramatically improved our understanding of brain function. As we find out more and more about what makes us tick, we must stop and consider the ethical implications of this new found knowledge. Will having a new biology of the brain through imaging make us less responsible for our behavior and lose our free will? Should certain brain scan studies be disallowed on the basis of moral grounds? Why is the media so interested in reporting results of brain imaging studies? What ethical lessons from the past can best inform the future of brain imaging? These compelling questions and many more are tackled by a group of contributors to this book on neuroethics. The wide range of disciplinary backgrounds that this book represents, from neuroscience, bioethics and philosophy, to law, social and health care policy, education, religion, and film, allow for profoundly insightful and provocative answers to these questions, and open up the door to a host of new ones. The contributions highlight the timeliness of modern neuroethics today, and assure the longevity and importance of neuroethics for generations to come.
This book features collection of essays on consciousness. It is intended as a sequel to the author’s 1991 book, The Problem of Consciousness. Although the author has not modified his views in the last decade, he has included his position under the label ‘mysterianism’, in the canon of positions regarding the mind-body problem. Chapters 1-3 focus on the mind-body problem. Chapters 4-6 deal with the concept of matter. Chapter 7 features a dialogue on consciousness and cosmology. Chapter 8 discusses the problem of philosophy. Chapter 9 questions the first person authority theory. Chapter 10 analyses the objects of intentionality.
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