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197 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
Victims of disasters are disproportionately drawn from the marginalized segments of society. Disaster
victims are marginalized geographically because they live in hazardous places, socially because they are
members of minority groups, economically because they are poor, and marginalized politically because
their voice is disregarded by those with political power. e victims of the July 2000 Payatas trash slide
in the Philippines show all these characteristics. Most of the victims of the disaster were urban migrants
who came all the way from their poor provinces to settle on the lower slopes of the largest dumpsite
of the country. ey scavenged recyclable materials to sell as a way to make a living, but their limited
incomes did not allow them to aord safer locations for their homes, farther removed from the slopes of
the dumpsite. On the morning of 10 July 2000, 300 of them lost their lives when a large section of the
dumpsite collapsed in a massive debris ow which buried their houses. In the aftermath of the disaster,
JC Gaillard
UMR 5194 Pacte – CNRS, Université de Grenoble, France
Department of Geography, University of the Philippines Diliman
Jean-Christophe.gaillard@ujf-grenoble.fr
Jake Rom D. Cadag
EA 3766 Gester, Université Paul Valery – Montpellier III, France
Department of Geography, University of the Philippines Diliman
jrdcadag@yahoo.com
From marginality to further marginalization:
Experiences from the victims of the July 2000 Payatas
trashslide in the Philippines
ABSTRACT
Oh honey when I die
Dress me up in a coat and tie
Give my feet a pair of shoes
at I haven’t wore in a long time
Put me in a golden box
Not a cross on a pile of rocks
Bury me where the grass is green
And the gates are shining
- Ely Buendia, Eraserheads, Poorman’s grave, 1995
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Introduction
Victims of disasters are disproportionately drawn from the marginalized segments of society.
Most victims of disasters are marginalized geographically because they live in hazardous places,
socially because they are members of minority groups, economically because they are poor, and
marginalized politically because their voice is disregarded by those with political power (e.g.
Blaikie & Brookfield, 1986; Wisner, 1993; Wisner et al., 2004). Marginalization usually leads
to high vulnerability in facing natural hazards. Vulnerability refers to the propensity to suffer
from damage should natural phenomena occur or, in other terms, the condition of a society
which makes it possible for a hazard to become a disaster (Cannon, 1994).
Marginalization does not stop with the occurrence of disasters as disastrous events do not
equalise victims in suffering. People who were rich before will still be the most well-off after the
event while the poor are likely to remain poor (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1972; Blaikie et al.,
1994). This of course relates to pre-disaster vulnerability and the extent of resources left to re-
cover. It also pertains to post-disaster aid and relief which is often unfairly distributed to the
benefit of the most affluent segments of society (Cuny, 1983; Middleton & O’Keefe, 1998).
Therefore, disasters frequently lead to more marginalized people as the victims who have lost
their livelihoods are often unable to recover (Walker, 1989; Wisner, 1993; Winchester, 1992).
This process of marginalization, from pre-disaster vulnerability to post-disaster recovery, has
been formalized by Susman et al. (1983) and Wisner (1993) (Figure 1). Both references em-
phasize that increasing marginalization heightens people’s vulnerability in the face of natural
hazards through underdevelopment and environmental degradation. Disasters are thus more
frequent. Eventually relief aid reinforces the status quo and leads to further marginalization
and underdevelopment which pave the way for more disasters to happen. There are a signifi-
cant number of references available on the process of marginalization which leads to people’s
vulnerability in facing natural hazards (e.g. Wisner, 1993; Wisner et al., 2004). Another impor-
tant set of research works address post-disaster relief aid and assistance with the objective of
showing how unfair it often is (e.g. Cuny, 1983; Middleton & O’Keefe, 1998). Yet fewer stud-
ies address the links between pre- and post-disaster marginalization or how people’s vulnerabil-
ity affects their ability to recover in the aftermath of a disaster.
the survivors who used to live on the dumpsite, and who were the poorest victims, were also those who
were relocated by the Philippine government. In the present case, the most vulnerable families in the face
of the trash slide were eventually those who had to suer again from life-disrupting relocation while being
the less able to recover quickly from the disaster. Daily incomes of relocated families are today much lower
than those who remained in the vicinity of the dumpsite. For the victims of the July 2000 Payatas tragedy,
poverty thus acted as a vicious, worsening circle which ranged from vulnerability to poor recovery, or from
marginality to further marginalization.
Disaster, Marginality, Vulnerability, Recovery, Livelihood, Payatas, Philippines.
KEYWORDS
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199 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
The present study is an attempt to fill this gap based on the results of a study conducted among
the victims of the July 2000 Payatas trashslide in the Philippines. It particularly focuses on
people’s livelihoods as an indicator of marginalization, vulnerability and poor recovery. It is
noteworthy that this study does not investigate the root causes of people’s marginalization and
vulnerability in the face of the trashslide hazard. It does, however, address the links between
pre- and post-disaster marginalization or how the victims have been able to recover (or not)
from the perspective of their initial vulnerability. This research encompasses both the people
who chose to remain near their former home and those who accepted relocation in the Kasigla-
han resettlement site. Section I will link people’s livelihood and marginalization based on a
short review of the existing literature. Section II will provide a glimpse on the July 2000 Payatas
tragedy. Section III will describe the methodology used for the study. Section IV and V will
respectively focus on how the victims who chose to remain in Payatas and those who relocated
to Kasiglahan recovered from the disaster. Section VI and VII will finally tie up marginaliza-
tion, pre-disaster vulnerability and post-disaster recovery in the context of sustainable liveli-
hoods.
Marginality and people’s livelihood
Marginality and livelihoods are closely related concepts as marginality reflects poor entitlement
to livelihoods. The concept of livelihood emerged in the 1980s as an alternative to the techno-
Fig 1. Process of marginalization of disaster victims
Source: Susman et al., 1983
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cratic concept of ‘employment’ to better describe how people struggle to make a living. It
emphasizes people’s views of their own needs. Chambers and Conway (1991:1) define sustain-
able livelihoods as follows: ‘A livelihood comprises people, their capabilities and their means of
living, including food, income and assets. Tangible assets are resources and stores, and intan-
gible assets are claims and access. A livelihood is environmentally sustainable when it maintains
and enhances the local and global assets on which livelihoods depend, and has net beneficial
effects on other livelihoods. A livelihood is socially sustainable which can cope with and re-
cover from stress and shocks, and provide for future generations’. Livelihoods thus refer to the
means and capacities required to sustain durably people’s basic needs. Basic needs are vitally
linked to food, but also include shelter, clothing, cultural values and social relationships.
The capacity to meet food and other basic needs depends on assets and capital. The Depart-
ment of International Development (1999) distinguishes five types of capital: natural capital
(land, water, forest, air and other natural resources), human capital (health, skills and knowl-
edge), social capital (kinship, social networks, and associations), financial capital (cash, savings,
credit, jewellery and other valuables) and physical capital (housing, infrastructure, work imple-
ments, livestock and domestic utensils). Wisner (2009) further identifies an institutional capi-
tal which includes the interface with formal governance and government-linked services, infor-
mation and assets. In the present paper, we will refer to this form of resources as political
capital in order to encompass the larger access to the political scene. The extent, strength and
diversity of the various forms of capital condition people’s capacity to produce their own food.
These factors also command the capacity to purchase food should it not be supplied by the
household itself. In the latter case, the availability of food depends on the larger political
economy framework (Start & Johnson, 2004). The availability and extent of capital or assets is
indeed deeply dependent on claims and access. Claims refer to rights and capacities/power to
ask for some external support to sustain basic needs should people be unable to meet them by
themselves. Claims thus depend on the extent of people’s social, economic and political net-
works and relationships. This is complemented by access which is the opportunity to use avail-
able stores and resources or obtain food, employment, technology and information (Chambers
& Conway, 1991). As underlined by Sen (1981a; 1981b), people’s claims for and access to
livelihoods thus go beyond the specific availability or unavailability of livelihoods but encom-
pass the capability or entitlement to use available resources. Watts and Bohle (1993) emphasize
that entitlement to livelihoods reflects people’s empowerment evident in class relationships and
the larger distribution of economic wealth, social opportunities and political power within the
society.
Entitlement and empowerment to access the different forms of capital which compose liveli-
hoods reflect people’s position within the society and the different forms of marginalization
disaster victims suffer from. Geographical marginality which leads people to settle in hazard-
prone areas reflects poor access to natural capital. The inability to access safe lands and other
natural resources forces people to live in hazard-prone areas to sustain their daily needs. Eco-
nomic marginality or the lack of financial and physical capital further prevents people from
accessing the means of protection (resistant housing, warning systems, evacuation routes, safe
shelter, etc) should they be compelled to live in hazardous areas due to insufficient natural
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201 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
capital. This inability to protect oneself in the face of natural hazards also mirrors social mar-
ginality as it may result from poor access to human capital (fragile health status, little knowl-
edge of hazards and protection means) which leads to increased vulnerability. Geographical,
social and economic marginality is ultimately tied to limited social capital and powerlessness,
i.e. political marginality and the lack of political capital, as it prevents access to other forms of
capital. A startling example is provided by Kent (1988:193) in the context of malnutrition:
“Malnutrition is due to poverty, but even more fundamentally to powerlessness. Poverty may
put the family unit at risk of malnutrition, but it does not explain the discrepancies in nutri-
tional status within the family”.
The July 2000 Payatas tragedy
The 20-heactare Payatas dumpsite is located in the municipality of Quezon City, north of the
capital region of Metro Manila in the Philippines (Figure 2).
Early on the morning of 10 July 2000 a huge section of the dumpsite collapsed into a massive
debris flow. Official figures report that 330 people were entombed alive and died in the area
called Lupang Pangako or the “Promised Land”. Hundreds of houses were totally buried under
metres of garbage or burned by subsequent fires. Seeping leachate further flooded the sur-
rounding dwellings (Figure 3). Geotechnical engineers reported that the landfill failure had
been triggered by extremely heavy rainfall caused by two successive typhoons (Merry et al.,
2005). Noteworthy is that the 2000 trashslide was not the first to hit the area. On 3 August
1999 a similar event buried several houses of Lupang Pangako, but fortunately nobody was
killed.
Fig 2. Location of the Payatas dumpsite
Source: Gaillard et al., 2008
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Most of the victims of the July 2000 tragedy were economically marginalized, indigent people,
with poor financial and human capital, who made a living from scavenging into, sorting and
selling the garbage (Table 1). They were geographically marginalized as they used to live at the
bottom or on the lower slopes of the dumpsite in makeshift houses made of scrap materials
reflecting limited physical capital. Lupang Pangako actually grew in the late 1980s as a resettle-
ment site for squatters evicted from other areas of Quezon City. In 1994 the Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) transformed the small local dumpsite into the biggest
dumpsite planned for receiving garbage from the entire capital region. The fast growth of the
Fig 3. Shanties buried by trash at the foot of the Payatas dumpsite on 8 July 2000
Source: M. Lara
Table 1. Daily incomes of households affected by the July 2000 trashslide in Payatas
Source: Data from Quezon City Social Services Development Department – Note: 45 php = ~1US$
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203 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
dumpsite progressively attracted thousands of poor families looking for livelihoods (Bernardo,
2004). Official figures show that the population of the Payatas administrative unit grew by
60% between 1994 and 2000 to reach 112,690 inhabitants (National Statistics Office, 2009).
However, local officials and researchers estimated that 30 to 80% of the actual population
could have been illegal settlers who were not covered by the 2000 census (Pecson, 2000; Ber-
nardo, 2004). They were politically and socially marginalized and thus lacked access to land
(natural capital) and social and political capital.
The scope of the disaster thus mirrors people’s vulnerability, poor livelihoods and marginality
at the start of the event. Families whose houses were buried under several metres of garbage
were illegal settlers living in very poor conditions in the immediate vicinity of the dumpsite.
They reflect the uttermost level of geographical, economic, social and political marginality. On
the other hand, most households who were only flooded by seeping leachate were legal benefi-
ciaries of the 1980s’ resettlement programme who were less marginalized and lived in better off
conditions. The process of marginalization which led people to be highly vulnerable in the face
of the trashslide hazard is a classic story of urban poverty where first-generation migrants are
compelled to live in hazard-prone areas to sustain their daily needs, yet lacking adequate access
to protection means. The root causes of such a process have been thoroughly addressed in the
literature (e.g. Davis, 1987; Wisner et al., 2004).
Immediately after the disaster, 626 affected families living in the immediate surroundings of
the landfill were evacuated to public buildings (schools and gymnasiums). The Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) along with some local and foreign NGOs provided
first aid and support to the victims in the form of medical assistance, food, clothes and other
everyday utensils. Most of the victims stayed for several weeks within the evacuation centres.
Eventually, 58 families accepted to go back to their native province with the financial support
of the DSWD. Altogether 147 other households resettled in the houses of relatives in the vicin-
ity.
Facing the incapacity to send the other victims back to the landfill, the municipal government
of Quezon City entered into negotiations with the National Housing Authority (NHA) for the
relocation of the affected families. The Kasiglahan (literally “Liveliness”) resettlement site in
the municipalities of Rodriguez (Montalban) in the province of Rizal, was considered as a fa-
vourable alternative given its relative proximity to Payatas. Originally, Kasiglahan was devel-
oped as a resettlement site for thousands of illegal settlers from the banks of the Pasig River
which drains, among others, the municipality of Manila. Within a month of the disaster, the
first victims of the Payatas tragedy began to move to their new home in Kasiglahan. Three
kinds of households were eligible for resettlement: 1/ families who had lost some relatives in
the disaster; 2/ families whose houses had been buried by the transhslide and 3/ families who
were living within a newly defined danger zone. Overall, 571 families from Lupang Pangako
received a piece of land of 32 to 40-m2 and a 20-m2 concrete house equipped with sanitary
facilities. Planners acknowledge that the houses were designed to optimize the available fund-
ing. Yet resettlers have to pay back US$ 4,120 over 30 years (plus 6% in yearly interest) for
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receiving the legal title to their new house and lot. As of late 2007, only 108 families had begun
to pay. In parallel, a number of microfinance and livelihood projects were designed by the
DSWD to provide the victims with new jobs near Kasiglahan.
Driven by the lack of livelihoods, an indefinite number of the resettlers of Kasiglahan progres-
sively chose to move back to their original place in Lupang Pangako. They were joined by some
new migrants who came to Payatas in search of economic alternatives to their poor way of life
in remote provinces of the archipelago and other areas of Metro Manila (Bernardo, 2004).
Interviews show that most of these newcomers settled at the foot of the new dumpsite on pri-
vate or governmental lands in exchange of paying small rights to the owner or initial dweller.
Methodology
The forthcoming discussion relies first on an extensive series of interviews with key informants
conducted between August 2007 and July 2009, or between seven and nine years after the
disaster. A number of victims and leaders of associations of victims were interviewed in both
the Kasiglahan resettlement site and Lupang Pangako and neighbouring quarters. These inter-
views provided an initial overview of how people coped with the disaster and its aftermath. In
parallel, interviews were conducted with representatives of the local government, DSWD,
MMDA, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, NHA, the Payatas Opera-
tions Group (POG), local health services, NGOs, associations of scavengers and junkshop
owners and workers. These interviews were aimed at assessing the role of the authorities and
other stakeholders in the management of the crisis and rehabilitation following the disaster. A
large number of useful primary written documents were also collected during visits to these
organizations.
Secondly, a questionnaire-based survey was carried out in Lupang Pangako and Kasiglahan to
validate hypotheses drawn from the interviews with key informants, i.e. that the strength, di-
versity and sustainability of livelihoods were crucial to the ability of victims to recover from the
disaster. Given the lack of reliable census data and other population counts in Payatas, it was
impracticable to rationally use any statistical sampling method. On the other hand, a credible
geography-based sample relying on aerial photographs or satellite images was impossible given
the slum-type nature of settlements in Payatas. Therefore, 30 (the usually accepted statistical
validity threshold) face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted at each site using a 58-item
questionnaire in December 2007. The questionnaire was designed with the objective of assess-
ing victims’ recovery based on their livelihoods before and after the disaster. It included an
initial series of questions concerning personal experience of the tragedy. In a second series of
questions, changes in people’s daily lives following the disaster were addressed. The third part
of the questionnaire was an overall assessment of the post-disaster situation and the future by
the victims. A fourth section on general demographics concluded the questionnaire. In Ka-
siglahan, an additional set of questions addressed the resettlement process. Interviews were
conducted in Tagalog. The selection of interviewees reflected the actual distribution of the
population in terms of age and sex. The limited size of the sample means that the statistical
power of inferential tests and other forms of modelling was reduced. The analysis, therefore,
relies exclusively on descriptive statistics.
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205 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
Fieldwork was completed with the collection of secondary written documents such as journal
publications, conference proceedings, and relevant press clippings from local and national
newspapers. It is particularly noteworthy that a large part of this set of data was initially ex-
ploited in a study using the concept of resilience as conceptual framework (Gaillard et al.,
2008; Le Masson, 2008).
Rising out of the trashes: How to survive in Payatas?
Following the July 2000 tragedy, then President Joseph Estrada decided to close the Payatas
dumpsite. The lack of a viable alternative to accommodate the garbage of Metro Manila forced
the authorities to eventually reopen it four months later. It was then decided to convert the
simple dumpsite into a controlled dumpsite placed under the authority of the POG. The new
facilities include a circumferential fence and a permanent danger zone where any construction
is prohibited. At the same time scavengers were organized into associations which are in charge
of managing working shifts for accessing the dumpsite. The surroundings of the dumpsite also
became the focus of many development projects initiated by the government and local or in-
ternational NGOs. This evolution in the management of the dumpsite and the influx of devel-
opment programmes brought some changes in the way of life of the victims of the July 2000
tragedy.
The families who were not relocated to Kasiglahan were those who were living outside of the
danger zone and whose houses had not been damaged by the trashslide. Seven years after the
disaster, these households managed to upgrade their houses. Before the tragedy, 93% of the
interviewees lived in makeshift houses made of scrap materials. Today, 73% of them occupy
houses which are partially cemented. Yet some of them are still struggling to obtain a title for
the piece of land on which their house is built. Despite some initiatives from the local govern-
ment to help squatters securing legal properties, access to land is still a major issue in Payatas.
In fact, in-migrations have not stopped in the aftermath of the disaster. Thousands of new
migrants coming from poor provinces of the archipelago have settled within the danger zone
over which the government is unable to exert strong control. A female interviewee summarizes
the situation as follows: ‘we are aware of the danger of a possible trashslide but hunger forces
us to settle here to secure enough income to sustain our daily needs without paying expensive
rents’.
The POG’s policy to control access to the dumpsite and impose shifts among scavengers led to
a significant reduction in scavengers’ incomes. Before the disaster, most of them used to resort
to metamphetamine to be able to work sometimes more than 12 hours a day on the dumpsite.
They were further able to sell sorted garbage directly to junkshops which mushroomed in the
surroundings. Today, they work eight hours a day and sell trash to middlemen on the dump-
site. To cope with this situation, most of the scavengers have had to diversify their livelihoods.
Today only 10% of the victims interviewed as part of this study are full-time scavengers. Oth-
ers became street vendors (33%) or engaged in other informal jobs like construction worker,
sweeper, janitor, etc. A significant proportion of the victims (10%) are also jobless and rely on
relatives or friends’ support to sustain their daily needs. Most of the victims of the July 2000
tragedy who remained in Payatas have observed a decrease in their incomes (Figure 4).
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Before the disaster, almost 60% of the interviewees earned between 5 and 10 US$ per day.
Today, 45% earn less than 5 US$ and only 38% between 5 and 10 US$ daily. Overall, 63% of
the victims consider that their standard of living has degraded in the aftermath of the July 2000
tragedy.
To cope with the reduction in daily incomes, the victims of the July 2000 tragedy have exten-
sively relied upon social networks. Social networks include four realms. The first, inner realm
covers the nuclear family. In the aftermath of the disaster, children often engaged in income-
earning activities. In 2007, 33% of the interviewees’ children were contributing to the house-
hold livelihood against only 13% in 2000. The second realm includes the larger circle of rela-
tives. Those provide moral support for 35% of the interviewees and financial assistance for
21% of them. The third realm is composed of friends and neighbours who similarly give
moral (21% of interviewees) and financial (14%) aid in time of difficulties. The fourth and
outer realm includes acquaintances who usually are informal money lenders on whom the
victims increasingly rely for small, high-interest loans (39% of interviewees). All these social
networks were operative before the disaster but to a smaller extent. In the aftermath of the July
2000 tragedy they turned out to be crucial in helping the victims to recover.
Despite the importance of social networks, the sharp decrease in everyday incomes has had a
serious impact on people’s diet. Altogether 56% of the interviewees observed a degradation of
their daily food intake. To accompany their plate of rice, most of the victims today resort to the
cheapest available dishes: vegetables, eggs, dried fishes. Fresh fish and meat have become luxu-
ries. At the same time some families have reduced the quantity of food for each meal. Others
rely on cheaper cooked dishes instead of cooking for themselves. As a consequence, local health
Fig 4. Daily incomes of surveyed households affected by the July 2000 trashslide in Payatas - n=30 in 2000 and
2007 – Note: 45 php = ~1US$
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207 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
workers interviewed as part of this study observed that, in 2007, 10% of the children below 4
years old were underweight.
On the other hand, most of the interviewees noticed an improvement in terms of access to
public services. This is particularly true regarding access to drinking water. Before the tragedy,
most of the victims (93%) relied on deep wells or expensive balloon delivery. Today, 90% of
them have access to the official water network. Access to health care also improved with the
recent construction of a new health centre in Lupang Pangako and the continuous service of
foreign NGOs. According to local health workers, the easier access to health care and the sani-
tary conditions within the perimeter of the dumpsite are responsible for the improvement in
the health status of children although official data show that tuberculosis is spreading among
adults. When questioned on the topic, 50% of the victims actually consider that their health
condition has worsened with frequent coughs, skin diseases, asthma, etc. Finally, 60% of the
victims acknowledge that access to education has improved with new and better facilities in the
vicinity, and a large number of scholarships offered by present President Macapagal in 2001
(e.g. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 2007).
Struggling with a new environment: The fate of the resettlers
The families affected by the July 2000 tragedy who were relocated to the Kasiglahan resettle-
ment site had to face a new environment. They had to adjust to their new house, pay for new
expenses, find a new job and discover new neighbours. Before the disaster, most of the reloca-
tees (56%) were living in makeshift houses. In Kasiglahan, they received sturdy cemented
houses with electricity. Yet almost 13% of the interviewees have not been able to pay their
monthly electricity bill and have been disconnected. Furthermore, they had to wait for a few
years before being connected to the water network. In the meantime, they had to rely on deep
wells, water delivery or support from NGOs or local organizations. The situation is worsened
by the obligation to pay for obtaining the title to their house and lot as their new status of legal
settler forces them to do.
The constraint to pay for amenities, house and lot is particularly difficult given the harsh eco-
nomic environment. Before the July 2000 tragedy, 66% of the relocatees were scavengers on
the Payatas dumpsite. Once relocated to Kasiglahan, they had three choices in order to survive:
1/ to go back daily to Lupang Pangako and continue scavenging on the Payatas dumpsite; 2/
to collect and sort garbage on the nearby San Isidro dumpsite; 3/ to find a new job. Some 50%
of the relocatees decided to make a living from scavenging in San Isidro. Yet this dumpsite
seems to be tightly controlled: scavengers have to follow working shifts of eight hours and
children cannot enter the perimeter of the facilities. Moreover, Payatas victims have to pay for
transport to San Isidro which is a few kilometres away from the resettlement site. Garbage is
also said to be less in quantity than at Payatas. At the same time most of those who chose to
look for a new job did not emerge from the informal sector and ended up as street vendors or
construction workers.
As a consequence of the increase in expenses and reduction in incomes, 72% of the victims
relocated to Kasiglahan consider that their standard of living has sharply decreased since 2000.
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In fact, almost 40% of the interviewees earn less than 2.5 US$ per day, and 70% less than 5
US$ (Figure 5), confirming early data gathered by Campomanes et al. (2002).
To sustain their daily needs, 64% of the families resort to small and informal loans from
money lenders, neighbours or relatives. As in Payatas, social networks have been very impor-
tant in helping the victims recover from the disaster. Relatives are the most often approached
before friends and neighbours. It should be noted that in Kasiglahan the very active July 10
Payatas Victims Organization (Campomanes et al., 2002) plays a significant role in fighting for
the rights of the victims to obtain financial compensation, free education, security of land
tenure and livelihood opportunities. The Organization has filed one criminal case and two
administrative cases with the Office of the Ombudsman against local officials allegedly respon-
sible for the disaster. As of December 2008, however, none of these cases has been resolved.
The victims’ daily diet suffers from their poor incomes. Most of the families often skip a meal
a day. Some reduce the quantity of their food intake or rely on the cheapest food available (egg,
vegetable, dried fish, tofu). As in Payatas, fish and meat are rare pleasures kept for special occa-
sions.
Another consequence of the relocation to Kasiglahan is the poorer access to health care. Alto-
gether 22% of the families declare that they have no access to health centres. NGOs also do not
maintain a permanent clinic as they do in Payatas. In Kasiglahan, only one nurse has to cater
for more than 7,000 families. Yet health problems do not seem to spread because of the clean-
er environment compared with Lupang Pangako. Some 52% of the interviewees further con-
sider that access to educational facilities has remained stable. A significant number of victims
Fig 5. Daily incomes of surveyed households affected by the July 2000 trashslide in Kasiglahan – n=30 - in 2000
and 2007 – Note: 45 php = ~1US$
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209 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
have indeed benefited from governmental scholarships which have helped children in finishing
their primary and secondary education.
Poverty and poor access to livelihoods in Kasiglahan have led 47% of the relocatees to think
that going back to Payatas would be a viable alternative to their miserable life in the resettle-
ment site. Yet 9% acknowledge that it would depend on their ability to secure a house and lot
in Lupang Pangako. A small set of interviews conducted with some of the relocatees who de-
cided to leave Kasiglahan confirmed the crucial role of livelihoods in their choice to settle back
in Payatas. Most consider that it is much easier to secure enough income to cover the needs of
their family in Lupang Pangako despite makeshift houses and poor sanitary conditions. In-
deed, those who went back joined the latest migrants and settled within the danger zone, at the
immediate bottom of the dumpsite.
Marginality and the reconstruction of people’s livelihoods
The ability of the Payatas victims to recover in the aftermath of the disaster was closely depen-
dent on the level of marginality they had experienced before the trashslide as reflected by the
nature, strength, diversity and sustainability of their livelihoods. The victims who lived in the
immediate vicinity of the dumpsite with marginal livelihoods were those who were relocated
and had the greatest difficulty in recovering based on the foregoing results of the survey con-
ducted in Kasiglahan. On the other hand, the people of Lupang Pangako who were less mar-
ginalized and lived further away from the dumpsite with stronger, more diverse and more
sustainable livelihoods proved to be better capable of recovering from the havoc brought about
by the disaster.
The capacity of the victims to recover was first dependent on the nature and diversity of their
pre-disaster livelihoods. Families who had the hardest time in recovering from the havoc
wrought by the trashslide were those who relied on the sole collection of garbage to earn a liv-
ing. When the dumpsite temporarily closed in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the
scavengers were rendered resourceless and had to depend on external aid. It is only when the
dumpsite was reopened that they were able to regain access to livelihoods. Yet it seems that a
large proportion of the victims (32%) were relying on two different livelihoods before the di-
saster. Half of them were scavengers who raised pigs to complement daily incomes from the
dumpsite. Others used to work as construction workers, especially during the dry season (De-
cember to May). Those multi-livelihood victims turned out to be the most able to recover as
other activities allowed them to cope with the closure of the dumpsite.
The strength of livelihoods was another critical factor in recovery among victims of the July
2000 Payatas tragedy. The average pre-disaster daily family income was around 7.5 US$ and a
third of the households relied on less than 4 US$. In such a situation, all incomes were imme-
diately spent on purchasing foods and sustaining other everyday needs. Savings were impossi-
ble and no spare money was available in the aftermath of the trashslide. People’s ability to raise
enough income to recover from the disaster was also constrained by structural forces beyond
the victims’ reach such as inflation. Prices of rice and other food products are soaring in the
Philippines while wages are growing slowly. Today, the incomes of the families relocated to
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Kasiglahan are further cut down by the additional expenses linked to the compulsory reim-
bursement for their new homes which has been confirmed by the officers of the NHA inter-
viewed as part of this study. Alternative sources of support such as loaning money further de-
pend on the extent of social networks and the ability to pay back. The victims who possessed
the larger solidarity networks were those who had been living in Payatas for a long time. On
the other hand, the poorest and late-coming victims who settled at the immediate foot of the
dumpsite had weaker social connections and thus had to resort to high-interest loans from
professional money lenders.
Sustainability of livelihoods also turned out to be essential to the ability of the victims to over-
come the July 2000 Payatas tragedy. Among those who remained in Lupang Pangako, stability
in livelihood prevented a sharp decrease in the household’s income, thus preventing them from
plunging into chronic endebtment. In Kasiglahan, the ability to regain access to livelihoods
was difficult, even among families who relied on several sources of income before the tragedy.
Relocated families are those who lost at least one relative in the disaster. A smaller number of
adult individuals among each household reduced the ability to raise incomes to sustain the
needs of families which included a large number of dependent children. The results of our
survey show that 100% of the households who lost one or more members of their families actu-
ally earned less than 5 US$ a day in 2007. The loss of one or more relatives and continuing
decreases in available social capital therefore turned out to be a key determinant of people’s
ability to recover from the disaster. Furthermore, Kasiglahan is far away from the economic
centre of the municipality of Rodriguez and from the San Isidro dumpsite. Maintaining urban
livelihoods similar to Payatas forced the victims to pay for expensive transport.
This study of Payatas actually emphasizes that assets and capital essential to the sustainability
of livelihoods were crucial in defining people’s capacity to recover from the disaster; they were
further strongly dependant on the pre-disaster setting materialized by the level of marginality
and vulnerability (Figure 6). People’s ability to live in hazard-safe places, or far from the dump-
site in the case of Payatas, depended on access to land (natural capital). Skills and knowledge
(human capital) enabled the diversification of activities and thus lessened households’ depen-
dence on scavenging trash in time of bad weather when trashslides are threatening or when the
dumpsite is closed. Income and savings (financial capital) are obviously important for purchas-
ing food in time of scarcity but also for building resistant houses. Social networks and kinship
(social capital) were critical in providing alternative support in the wake of the disaster. Finally,
the ability to secure access to physical capital (housing, electricity, water networks and trans-
portation) at affordable cost was also important in shaping resettlers’ decision to settle back in
Payatas and was closely dependent on access to political capital. People‘s vulnerability in facing
trashslide hazards and their ability to recover from the disaster can therefore not be dissociated
from livelihood sustainability and marginality. On the other hand, livelihood sustainability is
similarly tied to people’s vulnerability to hazardous phenomena and disasters as the Payatas
trashlide and subsequent relocation ruined resettlers’ access to livelihoods and thus reinforced
their position at the margin of the society.
From marginality to further marginalization: Experiences from the victims of the July 2000 Payatas...
211 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
From marginality to further marginalization
This study of the fate of the victims of the July 2000 Payatas trashslide is a story of marginality
and marginalization. Families who were relocated to Kasiglahan were the poorest based on
their daily incomes before the disaster (Figure 4 and 5). Relocated households were also the
hardest hit by the trashslide because they were living in the immediate vicinity of the dumpsite.
They were living there because their limited incomes did not allow them to afford a safer, dis-
tant location for their homes. Moreover, they were those among the victims who were the most
dependent on scavenging garbage for sustaining their daily needs.
In the present case, the most vulnerable families in the face of the trashslide were eventually
those who had to suffer again from life-disrupting relocation while being the less able to re-
cover quickly from the disaster. Yet it is widely acknowledged (e.g. Davis, 1978; Oliver-Smith,
1991; Quarantelli, 1984) that post-disaster resettlement through geographical relocation is
among the worst alternatives to spur people’s recovery as illustrated in the case of Payatas where
daily incomes of families resettled in Kasiglahan are today much lower than those who stayed
in Lupang Pangako (Figure 4 and 5). Resettlement is a very complex process that goes beyond
the mere rehousing of the victims. It implies the social reconstruction of homes, social and
political ties and livelihoods (e.g. Aysan & Oliver, 1987; Cernea, 1997). These ties are rooted
in long cultural, social, economic and political histories (e.g. Scudder & Colson, 1982; Quar-
antelli, 1984; Aysan & Oliver, 1987) and are often constrained by structural forces (e.g. Wisner
et al., 2004). In the case of the Kasiglahan relocation site, the Philippine authorities largely
focused on the housing dimension of resettlement at the expense of people’s livelihoods.
Re-establishing such a community-place relationship in a new environment further requires a
JC Gaillard and Jake Rom D. Cadag
Fig 6. Livelihoods, pre-disaster vulnerability, post-disaster recovery and the process of marginalization
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JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
long period of time which is often incompatible with the wish of the disaster victims to settle
back as quickly as possible (e.g. Davis, 1978; Scudder & Colson, 1982; Bernardo, 2004). For
these reasons, resettlement often fails to foster sustainable post-disaster recovery (Oliver-Smith,
1991).
The failure of the relocation and overall recovery processes further reflects how marginalized
were the victims of the Payatas trashslide on the political scene before the disaster. Most of the
affected victims were illegal settlers and thus lacked political visibility. Interviews show that
local authorities struggled even to assess their exact number. The official death toll is thus chal-
lenged by the representatives of the associations of victims who claim that the trashslide may
have killed a thousand people. Local authorities eventually felt that providing squatter victims
with permanent and formal resettlement was a favour. It therefore does not come as a surprise
that none of the people interviewed as part of this study had been involved in the decision
making process which led to their resettlement in Kasiglahan. It is widely acknowledged that
the participation of the victims in the planning of the resettlement is a prerequisite to sustain-
able post-disaster recovery (Davis, 1978; Scudder & Colson, 1982; Oliver-Smith, 1991). The
Payatas resettlement program was top-down in nature and few decision-making opportunities
were available to the victims (Campomanes et al., 2002; Bernardo, 2004). In Kasiglahan, the
relocatees were not involved in the choice and layout of the site and in the design of the hous-
es. They were forced to accept the program planned by the NHA. Disaster victims are, how-
ever, capable of much more than usually expected in time of disaster (Quarantelli & Dynes,
1972; Davis, 1978). They are neither passive nor traumatized for a long period but willing to
settle back as quickly as possible. In the case of the July 2000 Payatas tragedy, the intrinsic will
and capacity of the victims to cope and recover from the havoc brought by the disaster have
been overlooked by the Philippine government, thus preventing fast recovery. Considering the
lingering threat in Payatas, relocation may have been a solution, but only should the victims be
strongly involved in the design of the resettlement programme and high emphasis be given to
livelihood-related issues.
Political marginalization before and after the disaster inevitably led to social and economic
marginalization during the recovery process. The victims of the Payatas trashslide who re-
mained in Lupang Pangako benefited from much more sustainable rehabilitation and recon-
struction measures as illustrated by the new school buildings and health centre, and the perma-
nent presence of NGOs. On the other hand, people in Kasiglahan have been the focus of
useful, but short-term and limited social and economic support such as educational scholar-
ships which were also provided in Lupang Pangako. As mentioned above, local authorities fo-
cused on housing. Providing the resettlers with economic and social assistance ranked lower
among the government’s priorities. As a consequence, daily incomes of families resettled in
Kasiglahan are today much lower than those who stayed in Lupang Pangako and access to
services is much poorer. Yet it is today widely acknowledged that ensuring access to sustainable
livelihoods is essential to fast post-disaster recovery (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Coate et al.,
2006; Pomeroy et al., 2006; Régnier et al., 2008).
From marginality to further marginalization: Experiences from the victims of the July 2000 Payatas...
213 JÀMBÁ: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 2, No.3, December 2009
This study emphasizes that it is essential to consider post-disaster recovery in the context of
pre-disaster vulnerability. Victims’ suffering in the aftermath of the July 2000 Payatas trashslide
reflects people’s daily needs and chronic marginalization at the dawn of the disaster (Figure 6).
Relocation in Kasiglahan resulted from poor access to land before the event. Limited skills and
frail health led to an increased fragility in the resettlement site where employment turns out to
be limited and access to health care difficult. Limited social, physical and financial capital be-
fore the disaster forced the victims to rely on professional money lenders or to sell the few assets
they possessed to sustain their daily needs, thus increasing people’s dependence on external
resources and endebtment. Obviously, the July 2000 trashslide did not bring new issues but
increased pre-disaster needs. In that sense, disasters should be considered as the extension of
daily hardship intimately linked to pre-disaster marginalization. For the victims of the July
2000 Payatas tragedy, political neglect and poverty thus acted as a vicious, worsening circle
which ranged from vulnerability to poor recovery or from marginality to further marginaliza-
tion.
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