Content uploaded by Maher Abu-Munshar
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Maher Abu-Munshar on Mar 17, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
Abstract—In 1229 CE, following the signing of the Treaty of Jaffa
by Ayyubid Sultan al-Kamil and Emperor Frederick II, Jerusalem
passed into the hands of the Crusaders who then went on to rule it for
the next ten years. The aim of this article is to present a critical
analysis of the historical narratives of both Muslim and non-Muslim
historians who continue to interpret al-Kamil’s decision to hand the
holy city over to the Crusaders as an act of collaboration with them. I
shall attempt to answer the following questions. Did Sultan al-Kamil
really offer to give Jerusalem to Emperor Frederick II in return for his
support? To what extent was al-Kamil’s decision a strategic attempt to
suppress the Sixth Crusade? What was the outcome of the Treaty of
Jaffa? And how did Muslims and non-Muslims regard it?
Index Terms—Jerusalem, Sultan al-Kamil, emperor frederick II,
the sixth crusade.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jerusalem has a special place in the hearts and minds of
the followers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. During the
course of its history, the followers of these religions have
gone to considerable lengths to conquer it by any available
means and at any cost. On Friday 27 Rajab 583 AH/2
October 1187 CE and after almost 88 years of occupation,
Sultan Salah al-Din liberated Jerusalem from the Cru-
saders.[1] In 1193 CE, when Salah al-Din died, he was com-
fortable in the knowledge that he had realized his aim to
liberate the city and assured that his successors would safe-
guard his achievement. Moreover, he was confident that the
efforts he and other Muslims had made to liberate Jerusalem
would not be lost and would ensure that henceforth only
Muslims ruled the city. Unfortunately, his hopes were short-
lived and Jerusalem once again fell into Crusader hands
when the Ayyubid Sultan al-Kamil and Emperor Frederick
II signed the Treaty of Jaffa in 1229 CE, thereby handing
Jerusalem over to the Crusaders for ten years, five months
and forty days. [2]
Both Muslim and non-Muslim historical literature con-
tains a range of explanations for why al-Kamil may have
been persuaded to return Jerusalem to the Crusaders at a
time when he was in a relatively strong position.[3]
Interestingly, these sources show negative reactions from
Muslims and non-Muslims alike towards the agreement
between al-Kamil and Frederick and its consequences.[4]
Furthermore, a number of historians thought that al-Kamil
underestimated the importance of Jerusalem in the Muslim
consciousness and its strategic significance to the Ayyubid
state. As Little, [5] for example, claimed, ‘but once safely
back in Muslim hands, interest in Jerusalem again dropped;
the simple fact soon emerged that Jerusalem was not
Manuscript received May 15, 2013; revised July 10, 2013.
Maher Y. Abu-Munshar is with the Qatar University, Qatar (e-mail:
m.abumunshar@qu.edu.qa).
essential to the security of an empire based in Egypt or
Syria.’ Along the same lines, Hillenbrand argued that ‘the
fact of the matter was that strategically Jerusalem was not
crucial to [an] Ayyubid ruler whose power base was in
Egypt or Syria. Jerusalem always had its political price so
long as the Franks still desired to possess it.’ [6]
In this article, I aim to present a critical analysis of the
historical narratives of Muslim and non-Muslim historians
who continue to accuse Sultan al-Kamil of collaborating
with the Crusaders by handing the Holy City over to them.
Contrary to the claims of most Muslim and non-Muslim
historians, I shall try to prove that al-Kamil’s decision to
hand over Jerusalem was part of a strategy to protect the
city itself rather than to underestimate its importance to
Muslim hearts and minds. In this article I shall also look at
the circumstances under which al-Kamil agreed to surrender
Jerusalem. I shall attempt to answer the following questions.
Why did Sultan al-Kamil approach Emperor Frederick II in
particular and promise to give him Jerusalem in return for
his support? Can we consider al-Kamil’s decision to hand
Jerusalem over to Frederick as a strategic attempt to stop
further campaigns by the Crusaders? In other words, by
taking this step, did al-Kamil succeed in stopping the
Crusaders going to Egypt, the gateway to Jerusalem? What
was the outcome of the Treaty of Jaffa and how did
Muslims and non-Muslim at that time regard that treaty?
II. THE AYYUBID STATE AFTER SALAH AL-DIN
Shortly before his death in 1193 CE, Sultan Salah al-Din
divided the territories of his kingdom among his relatives;
he assigned the most important and strategic regions and
cities to some of his sons, and the less important ones to his
brothers and remaining sons. [7] By entrusting his sons with
the most important areas, including Jerusalem, which in one
way or another they had helped him to liberate, historians
interpreted Salah al-Din’s act as a way of protecting the
state. Sadly, we read that shortly after Salah al-Din’s death
there were quarrels over his territory and sovereignty and
these caused internal friction among the Ayyubids. In other
words, the unity and loyalty that Salah al-Din had been able
to nurture in the Ayyubids diminished on his death. [8]
His relatives, and these included his sons and brothers,
waged wars among themselves as each tried to wrench as
much territory as possible from the other. [9] This created
deep divisions between Salah al-Din’s heirs, weakened the
state and paved the way for the Crusaders’ return to
Jerusalem, especially given that, at various points, some of
Salah al-Din’s heirs approached the Crusaders for help
against other members of the Ayyubid family. For example,
Sultan al-Kamil offered Jerusalem to Emperor Frederick II
Sultan al-Kamil, Emperor Frederick II and the
Submission of Jerusalem
Maher Y. Abu-Munshar
International
Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 3, No. 5, September 2013
443
DOI: 10.7763/IJSSH.2013.V3.279
in return for the latter’s help and support against al-Kamil’s
brother al-Mu‘azzam Issa, while al-Mu‘azzam sought
Khwarizm’s help against al-Kamil. [10]
Interestingly, in 624 AH/1227 CE, shortly before Emperor
Frederick II’s arrival in Acre, al-Mu‘azzam Issa died. [11]
Logically, there was then no need for Emperor Frederick to
come to the east because the al-Mu‘azzam threat ended on
his death. Moreover, al-Nasir Dawud, al-Mu‘azzam Issa’s
son and successor, was in too weak a position to pose any
real threat to al-Kamil. Nevertheless, al-Kamil embarked on
the long journey, signed the Treaty of Jaffa in 1229 CE [12]
and ceded Jerusalem to Emperor Frederick.
III. EGYPT IN THE EYES OF THE CRUSADERS
After the Third Crusade (1189–1192 CE), there was a
widespread belief in Europe that no benefit would derive
from occupying Jerusalem so long as Egypt remained strong.
The best course of action, therefore, would be to attack and
occupy Egypt before attacking and occupying Jerusalem.
The first opportunity to implement this plan arose during
the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204 CE) when the intention was
to seize Jerusalem from the Muslims through invading
Egypt. In fact, the plan was not achieved because, in April
1204 CE, instead of invading Egypt, the Crusaders attacked
and occupied Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine
Empire. [13] A few years later, however, the goal was
reasserted during the fourth Lateran Council held in 1215
CE in the Lateran Palace in Rome and convoked by Pope
Innocent III.[14] Among the council’s aims was to recover
Jerusalem and ‘eliminate from the Holy Land the filth of the
pagans.’ [15] Consequently, to implement the decisions of
the above council, the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221 CE) was
launched with Egypt as the target. [16] Therefore, it is clear
that the ostensible purpose of the Fifth Crusade was to
facilitate the capture of Jerusalem by attacking the seat of
Muslim power in Egypt (Little 1990: 182). Interestingly, it
seems that Muslim historian Ibn Wasil (d. 697 AH/1298 CE)
was well aware of the Crusaders’ new intention. He clearly
stated that the wise men among the Crusaders insisted on
occupying Egypt as a first step towards occupying
Jerusalem. Quoting the Crusaders, he said that ‘Salah al-Din
was able to seize cities and towns, and to wrest Jerusalem
and the Syrian coast from the Crusaders only after he
controlled Egypt. Therefore, for the Crusaders’ great benefit,
Egypt must be under their control, so they can seize
Jerusalem and other places easily.’ [17]
Despite the Crusaders’ great efforts to occupy Egypt as a
precursor to taking Jerusalem from the Muslims, they
achieved nothing but failure during the Fifth (1217–1221 CE)
and Seventh (1248–1254 CE) campaigns. In both, the
Crusaders’ armies were defeated on Egyptian soil. [18]
IV. JERUSALEM BETWEEN AL-KAMIL AND FREDERICK
II
Interestingly, al-Kamil was able to defeat the army of the
Fifth Crusade with the help of his brothers al-Mu‘azzam
Issa and al-Ashraf Khalil. Clearly, the victory was only
achieved because of the unity and collaboration between the
brothers. Unfortunately, a few years later, a power struggle
emerged between al-Kamil, who sought help from Emperor
Frederick II, and al-Mu‘azzam Issa, who turned to the
Khawarizm.
A contemporary historian, Ibn Wasil, reported an account
of the negotiations between al-Kamil and Frederick in his
book Mufaraj al-Kurub. The following is an extract from it:
‘He who went to and from on embassies between him (al-
Kamil) and the king–Emperor was the Amir Fakhr al-Din
Ibn Al-Shaykh, and discussion on various matters went on
between the two of them. In the meantime the Emperor sent
al-Malik al-Kamil questions of philosophy and difficult
questions on geometry in order to test his men of learning
thereby. So al-Malik al-Kamil passed the arithmetical
questions he has sent him to Shaykh ‘Alam al-Din Qaysar
Ibn Abi al-Qasim, who was foremost in this discipline. He
passed the rest to a company of eminent scholars.’ [19]
From Ibn Wasil’s report above, it seems that negotiations
between Amir Fakhr al-Din and Emperor Frederick went
well from the start. This is clear from the nature of the
questions the emperor sent to al-Kamil about philosophy
and other scientific matters. It seems also that the emperor
was happy with al-Kamil’s offer and therefore could turn to
ask questions about things in which he was interested.
As mentioned earlier, by the time the emperor arrived in
Acre, a new development had already taken place, namely
al-Mu‘azzam’s death in 1227 CE. This negated the need for
Emperor Frederick’s help, but he had already arrived. At
this point, al-Kamil could have withdrawn his agreement
and refused to hand Jerusalem over to the emperor. Al-
Khatib [20] argued that withdrawing the agreement or even
starting a war against the emperor and his men would have
turned al-Kamil into a hero of Islam. Why then did al-Kamil
still agree to yield Jerusalem to Frederick? To answer this
question, it is necessary to point out that, because of the
change in circumstances on the Ayyubid side, al-Kamil had
in fact tried to cancel his agreement with the emperor and
had informed him of this decision. However, Muslim and
non-Muslim historians concur that Frederick was unhappy
about al-Kamil’s change of heart and had started writing to
him to persuade him to change his mind. Ibn al-‘Imad
al-Hanbali reported that the Emperor sent the following
letter to al-Kamil:
‘You have corresponded with me about my coming, and
the Pope and the other kings of the West are acquainted
with my zeal and my goals. But Jerusalem is the root of
their belief and the goal of their pilgrimage. The Muslims
have destroyed it; therefore for them it has no economic
significance. If the sultan, may God strengthen him, could
decide to confer on me the capital of the land with the right
to visit the other Holy places. This would show his wisdom
and I would raise my head among other kings.’ [21]
Later on, Ibn Wasil reported that the emperor had issued
an important statement to Fakhr al-Din, which read as
follows:
‘If I did not fear losing my respect among the Franks I
would not have burdened the Sultan with such. For myself
personally, neither Jerusalem nor anything else in Palestine
is a goal worth struggling for. However, I must preserve my
standing among them.’ [22]
With continual prompting from the emperor, al-Kamil
International
Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 3, No. 5, September 2013
444
apparently began to recall the internal conflict among the
Ayyubids and their inability to form a united front in Syria
and Egypt. He then assured himself that, with this bad
situation on the Muslim side, he would be unable to cope
with a Crusader army within his territories.[23] Therefore,
he decided to come to a peace agreement with the emperor
and, in 626 AH/1229 CE, the two leaders signed the Treaty
of Jaffa. In it, Sultan al-Kamil agreed to hand over
Jerusalem for ten years, with Muslims denied access to all
but the al-Aqsa enclave (the site of the city’s sacred
locations), which was to remain in Muslim hands and where
Muslim religious observances would be allowed to continue
unobstructed. [24]
Little looked at al-Kamil’s reasons for surrendering Jeru-
salem from a different angle and came to the conclusion that
they were the same as those that had led al-Mu’azzam Issa
to dismantle its walls in 616 AH/1219 CE. The seat of al-
Kamil’s kingdom was in Egypt. For him, Jerusalem in
Crusader hands without fortifications would present no
threat to Egypt and would satisfy the Crusaders’ apparent
goals. Moreover, Little claims that Frederick was character-
istically Crusader like, even cynical, in pointing out these
factors to al-Kamil. [25]
V. EMPEROR FREDERICK II IN JERUSALEM
Historical literature provides us with a comprehensive
picture of the incidents of that time. Ibn Wasil, for example,
was one of those historians who made his report on what
had taken place immediately after al-Kamil and Frederick
singed the peace treaty. He wrote that:
‘When the matter of the truce was concluded, the
Emperor sought leave of the Sultan to visit Jerusalem.
Leave was granted to him, and the Sultan commissioned the
judge Shams al-Din, the judge of Nablus, a man of
eminence in the state and in high honour with the Ayyubid
Kings, to attend on the Emperor until he had visited
Jerusalem and retuned to Acre. Shams al-Din told me [Ibn
Wasil] saying, “when the emperor came to Jerusalem, I
attended on him as the Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil had
commanded me, and I entered the al-Aqsa enclave with him,
and he saw the places of pilgrimage [worship] in it.” Then I
entered the Aqsa Mosque with him, and its construction and
the construction of the Dome of the Rock delighted him.
When he reached the mihrab [niche] of the Aqsa, its beauty
and the beauty of the pulpit delighted him. He went up the
stairs to the top. Then he came down, and took my hand,
and we came out of the al-Aqsa. He saw a priest with the
gospels in his hand, who wanted to enter the al-Aqsa, so he
shouted disagreeably to him, “what’s that you have brought
here? By God, if one of you tries to get in here without my
leave, I will have his eyes out. We are the vassals and slaves
of this sultan al-Malik al-Kamil. He has granted these
churches to me and to you as an act of grace. Do not any of
you step out of line.” The priest made off shaking with
fear.’[26]
The above statement by Ibn Wasil is very important
because it gives us a first-hand report of what happened in
Jerusalem during the emperor’s first ever visit. Moreover, it
shows the emperor’s attitudes to Islam and Muslim holy
places. In fact, this report will be very useful later on when I
discuss the reasons why al-Kamil chose Frederick II for the
above mentioned task over and above any other Christian
king or leader.
VI. REACTIONS TO THE AL-KAMIL–FREDERICK
AGREEMENT
As one might expect, the Treaty of Jaffa was unpopular
in the Muslim world. On learning that Jerusalem was back
in Christian hands, Muslims predictably felt intense emo-
tions. [27] Well-known historian Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi reported
that ‘the news of the handing over of Jerusalem to the
Crusaders was received with widespread anger and outrage
amongst Muslims in all the lands of Islam.’[28] Moreover,
Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi added ‘that al-Nasr Dawud, the ruler of
Damascus, asked him to speak in the great mosque
[Ummayed Mosque] about what had happened to Jerusalem
and he waxed lyrical about the recent indignities the city
had suffered.’ [29]
Pernoud assessed the outcomes of this treaty in an
interesting way. He argued that although the Crusaders
achieved their aim, this peace agreement had in fact satis-
fied no one, neither Muslims nor Crusaders. He quoted the
historian al-Maqrizi who said that:
‘The sultan al-Kamil was unanimously blamed for having
acted thus and his conduct was severely judged throughout
the country. As for the Christians, Pernoud claimed that
they blamed the treaty of Jaffa for having left undecided the
essential points, that [of] the restoration of the walls of the
holy city. He justified his claim by staying that “in the
following year, the soundness of this approach was proved
by a raid which caused much causality among the
population of Jerusalem, who had been left without defence
against the incursion of pillages”.’ [30]
VII. AL-KAMIL’S JUSTIFICATIONS
On learning of the Muslims’ widespread anger and out-
rage over the Treaty of Jaffa, al-Kamil tried to justify his act
by minimizing its negative impact on Jerusalem and listing
its benefits to Muslims. Nevertheless, since Sultan al-Din’s
heroic regaining of Jerusalem in 1187, al-Kamil’s task of
trying to convince Muslims that Jerusalem should be
voluntarily traded away forty-two years later was by no
means an easy one. The historian Ibn Wasil set out some of
al-Kamil’s justifications, claiming that al-Kamil said:
‘We have allowed only ruined churches and monasteries.
The al-Aqsa enclave and what is in it consisting of the
Dome of the Rock and the rest of shrines are in the hands of
the Muslims as before and the sign of Islam is on what is
there [al-Aqsa enclave]. [31] Furthermore, to support his
case, al-Kamil explained that Jerusalem had no fortification
to stand against any Muslim attack, and it would easily be
recomputed at a later date. [32]
Commenting on al-Kamil’s above justifications, Hillen-
brand agreed that Muslims would easily be able to conquer
such a defenceless city at a later date. She added that, with
al-Kamil’s power base in Egypt, a Jerusalem bereft of
defences would present no threat to him. Therefore, Jeru-
salem could be handed over to the Crusaders who wanted it
International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 3, No. 5, September 2013
445
as part of a treaty that ensured that Egypt would be left
alone. [33] Now, the question that arises here is, in handing
Jerusalem over to Frederick, did Sultan al-Kamil understate
the city’s religious significance to Muslims? Hillenbrand
tried to answer this question by arguing that al-Kamil
signed the treaty with Frederick out of political expediency.
She further argued that the sultan feared hostilities from
other Ayyubids in Syria, such as al-Mu‘azzam Issa, so
needed the Crusaders’ military support. She concluded by
saying that, for al-Kamil, Jerusalem formed part of the deal
and its religious status was far from uppermost in his mind.
[33]
Although Muslims find is difficult to accept al-Kamil’s
action, I nevertheless disagree with Hillenbrand. I would
like to argue that there is no doubt that al-Kamil was fully
aware of the importance of Jerusalem to Muslims; also, he
was aware of the hard and complicated steps that Salah
al-Din had taken to liberate it from the Crusaders. [32]
Moreover, he was sure of the Crusaders’ ostensible reason,
which was to facilitate the capture of Jerusalem by attacking
and occupying Egypt. Unfortunately, with the dispute
between al-Kamil and his brothers, and the absence of unity
among Muslims, Egypt would sooner or later fall victim to
a Crusader campaign. I shall argue that selecting Emperor
Frederick to carry out this task in exchange for Jerusalem
was not hatched in a vacuum, but inspired by many factors:
z Frederick’s tolerant attitude towards Muslims and
Arabs as a result of having grown up within them in
Sicily. In addition, he was fluent in Arabic and respon-
sive to Arab and Muslim culture. This is evident when
Frederick entered the al-Aqsa enclave and showed his
respect for Islamic rituals. We saw that in Ibn Wasil’s
report above. [34]
z The attitude of Frederick towards Pope Gregory IX and
the latter’s decision to excommunicate him for his
indirect refusal to participate in the Fifth Crusade. [35]
So, al-Kamil was trying to exploit this dispute between
the two men.
z Al-Kamil was sure that sooner or later a new Crusader
campaign would arrive in the east because of the failure
of the Fifth Crusade. Moreover, al-Kamil was aware
that Emperor Frederick II, under pressure from the
pope, was planning a Sixth Crusade.
z By concluding the Treaty of Jaffa, al-Kamil was able to
delay any future Crusade for more than ten years.
These ten years were long enough to allow him to build
up a strong army. This was later proved when the army
of al-Kamil’s son (Najm al-Din) defeated that of the
Seventh Crusade and captured its leader, King Louis IX.
[36]
VIII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, contrary to the claims of most Muslim and
non-Muslim historians, I argue that al-Kamil’s decision to
hand Jerusalem over was part of a strategy to protect the
city rather than a failure to recognize its significance in the
hearts and minds of Muslims. In other words, by taking this
step al-Kamil succeeded in discouraging the Crusaders from
going to Egypt, their prime target and the key to Jerusalem.
Interestingly, quoting Cahen and Chabbouh, Little recounts
Sultan Najm al-Din Ayyub’s advise to his son Turanshah on
the eve of the Seventh Crusade:
‘If you unable to contain the God forsaken enemy and
they march out of Damietta against you [in Cairo] and, if
you lack power to cope with them and help fails to reach
you in time, and they demand from you the cost [of
Palestine] and Bait al-Maqdis, give these places to them
without delay on condition that they have no foothold in
Egypt.’ [37]
Along the same lines, we know that, at the time of the
Fifth Crusade, Sultan al-Kamil and his brother al-Mu‘azzam
Issa had offered to surrender Jerusalem and many other
places, with the exception of al-Karak and al-Shawbak (in
Sothern Jordan), if the Crusaders agreed to leave Egypt.
However, the Crusaders led by the papal legate Pelagius,
refused to accept these terms in the hope that they would
win the battle and take Egypt from the Ayyubids. Finally,
Sultan Najm al-Din’s advice to his son (cited above) and the
brothers’ offer to Crusaders of the Fifth Crusade clearly
showed that Egypt must not fall into Crusader hands. This is
because, if the Muslims lost Egypt, they would definitely
also lose Jerusalem.
REFERENCES
[1] B. A. Asali, Al-Ayyam al-Hasima fi al-Hurub al-Salibiyya, Beirut:
Dar al-Nafa’is, 1978, pp. 130.
[2] I. Y. A. Khatib, al-Quds Bayn Atma Al-Salibiyyn wa Tafrit al-Malik
al-Kamil al-Ayyubi, Amman: Dar al-Manahij lilnashr wa al-Tawzi,
2001, pp. 288–289.
[3] N. Jubran and M. H. A. Amadi, Dirasat fe Tarikh al-Ayyubiyin wa al-
Mamalik, Irbid-Jordan: Mu’assasat Hamada Lidirasat al-Jami’iya wa
al-Nashr, 2000, pp. 159–162.
[4] A. A. Sallabi, Al-Ayyubiyun Ba‘d Salah al-Din: Al-Hamalat al-
Salibiyya al-Rabi‘a, al-Khamisa, al-Sadisa wa al-Sabi‘a, Beirut: Dar
al-Ma‘rifa, 2009, pp. 297–299.
[5] D. P. Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–
1516 AD,” in K. J. Asali, Ed. Jerusalem in History, New York: Olive
Branch Press, 1990, pp. 181.
[6] C. Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2006, pp. 221.
[7] Jubran and A. Amady, Dirasat fe Tarikh al-Ayyubiyin, op. cit.,
pp. 134–135.
[8] Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–1516
AD,” op. cit., pp. 209.
[9] Jubran and A. Amady, Dirasat fe Tarikh al-Ayyubiyin, op. cit.,
pp. 136–206.
[10] A. Khatib, al-Quds Bayn Atma‘Al-Salibiyyn, op. cit., pp. 271–279.
[11] J. I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyub, Cairo: n.p., n.d.,
vol. 4. pp. 204.
[12] J. Phillips, Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades,
London: Vintage Books, 2010, pp. 234.
[13] Phillips, Holy Warriors, op. cit., pp. 190–196.
[14] Phillips, Holy Warriors, op. cit., pp. 206.
[15] Phillips, Holy Warriors, op. cit., pp. 166.
[16] A. Da‘kur, Al-Dawla al-Ayyubiya Tarikhuha al-Siysi wa al-Hadari,
Beirut, Dar al-Mawasim, 2006, pp. 189.
[17] J. I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub, Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Amiriyya, 1957,
vol. 3, pp. 256.
[18] A. Sallabi, Al-Ayyubiyun Ba‘d Salah al-Din, op. cit., pp. 169, 367.
[19] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub, op. cit., vol. 4. pp. 626, English
translation of this text was taken from P. M. Holt, The Age of the
Crusades: The Near East from Eleventh Century to 1517, London:
Longman Group Limited, 1986, pp. 65.
[20] A. Khatib, al-Quds Bayn Atma‘Al-Salibiyyn, op. cit., pp. 302.
[21] I. A. Hanbali, Shatharat al-Dhahab fi Akhbar man Dhahab, Berut:
Dar al-Masira, English translation of this text has been taken from
Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–1516
AD,” op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 183, 1979.
[22] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyub, op. cit., vol. 4,
pp. 243, English translation of this text has been taken from Little,
International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 3, No. 5, September 2013
446
“Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–1516 AD,” op.
cit., pp. 183–184.
[23] Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–1516
AD,” op. cit., pp. 184.
[24] Hillenbrand, The Crusades, op. cit., pp. 216–217.
[25] Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–1516
AD,” op. cit., pp. 183.
[26] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub, op. cit., vol. 4. pp. 244–245, English
translation of this text has been taken from Holt, The Age of the
Crusades, op. cit., pp. 65.
[27] A. Khatib, al-Quds Bayn Atma‘Al-Salibiyyn, op. cit., pp. 294–295.
[28] S. I. A. Jawzi, Mir’at al-Zaman fi Tarikh al-A‘yan, India: Matba‘t
Majlis Dar al-Ma‘arif bihaydar Abad, vol. 8, no. 2. pp. 654.
[29] S. I. A. Jawzi, Mir’at al-Zaman, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 654.
[30] R. Pernoud, The Crusades, translated by E. MacLeod, London:
Secker & Warburg, 1962, pp. 231.
[31] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub, op. cit., vol. 4. pp. 244–245, English
translation of this text was taken from Hillenbrand, The Crusades, op.
cit., pp. 216–217.
[32] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub, op. cit., vol. 4. pp. 243.
[33] Hillenbrand, The Crusades, op. cit., pp. 217.
[34] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyub, op. cit., see also
Phillips, Holy Warriors, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 235.
[35] N. Housley, The Crusaders, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus
Publishing Ltd, 2002, pp. 103.
[36] I. Wasil, Mufarij al-Kurub, op. cit., vol. 4. pp. 247; see also, Al-
Sallabi, Al-Ayyubiyun Ba‘d Salah al-Din, op. cit., pp. 267–268.
[37] Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and the Mamluks 1187–1516
AD,” op. cit., pp. 186.
Maher Abu-Munshar was born in Hebron,
Palestine (1970). He is an assistant Professor of
Islamic History at Qatar University. In 2003 he com-
pleted a Ph.D. in Islamic History (Dundee, UK). In
2008, he was awarded a Postgraduate Certificate in
Teaching in Higher Education (Pg CertTHE) by
Dundee University, UK. Prior to joining Qatar Uni-
versity, he was a visiting Senior Lecturer in the
Department of Islamic History and Civilization at the
University of Malaya–Malaysia and before that he worked as a Lecturer at
the Al-Maktoum Institute (University of Aberdeen, UK) from 2003 to
2009. His teaching and research expertise lies in Islamic history, with a
special interest in the histories of Jerusalem, of Muslim–Christian
relations and of the Crusades. He is author of Islamic Jerusalem and its
Christians: A History of Tolerance and Tensions (I.B.Tauris, 2007 and
2013) as well as many articles on different aspects of Jerusalem, Islamic
history, Christian–Muslim relations and the study of Islam and Muslims.
His most recent articles are “Fatimids, Crusaders and the fall of Islamic
Jerusalem: Foes or Allies?” Al-Masaq: Islam and the Medieval
Mediterranean Journal (Routledge) April 2010; the “Compatibility of
Islam with Pluralism: Two Historical Precedents”, Journal of Islam and
Civilisational Renewal (Pluto Journals) July 2010, “Orientalists and
Israeli Scholars’ Portrayal of Muslim Treatment of non-Muslims in
Islamicjerusalem”, Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies (July 2011) and
“In the Shadow of the ‘Arab Spring’: the Fate of Non-Muslims under
Islamist Rule”, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, vol. 23 (4),
October 2012 (Routledge). In addition, as a mark of recognition for his
scholarly work, he was elected a fellow of the Higher Education Academy
(UK) in May 2008 and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society (UK) in
April 2009.
International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 3, No. 5, September 2013
447
