Article

Tandem Anchoring: Informational and Politeness Effects of Range Offers in Social Exchange

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Abstract

We examined whether and why range offers (e.g., "I want $7,200 to $7,600 for my car") matter in negotiations. A selective-attention account predicts that motivated and skeptical offer-recipients focus overwhelmingly on the attractive endpoint (i.e., a buyer would hear, in effect, "I want $7,200"). In contrast, we propose a tandem anchoring account, arguing that offer-recipients are often influenced by both endpoints as they judge the offer-maker's reservation price (i.e., bottom line) as well as how polite they believe an extreme (nonaccommodating) counteroffer would be. In 5 studies, featuring scripted negotiation scenarios and live dyadic negotiations, we find that certain range offers yield improved settlement terms for offer-makers without relational costs, whereas others may yield relationship benefits without deal costs. We clarify the types of range offers that evoke these benefits and identify boundaries to their impact, including range width and extremity. In addition, our studies reveal evidence consistent with 2 proposed mechanisms, one involving an informational effect (both endpoints of range offers can be taken as signals of an offer-maker's reservation price) and another involving a politeness effect (range offers can make extreme counteroffers seem less polite). Our results have implications for models of negotiation behavior and outcomes and, more broadly, for the nature of social exchange. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

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... When making the first offer, offerers try to pull recipients in the direction of their offers, but risk those recipients reactively devaluing those offers (Curhan, Neale, & Ross, 2004;Ross & Ward, 1995), making aggressive counteroffers (Ames & Mason, 2015) or ending the negotiation in impasse (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Offer recipients are similarly torn, aware that the offer they receive may favor the offerer in ways that disadvantage them ( Curhan et al., 2004; Lee,recipients; we propose that one way to do so is to start negotiations with a choice of first offers. ...
... To explain how choice can influence anchoring, it helps to know how an anchor's features can affect its strength. Weaker anchors produce judgments that adjust more from the initial anchor value, whereas with strong anchors, judgments remain closer to the initial anchor value (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; see also Ames & Mason, 2015;Strack & Mussweiler, 1997;Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001). In standard judgment research, accuracy is presumed to guide the degree to which an anchor affects its strength (Kahneman, 1992). ...
... The more competitively biased that a recipient perceives a first offer to be, the weaker that anchor will be. For example, Ames and Mason (2015) found that extreme first offers often produce extreme counteroffers, i.e., more adjustment from the initial first offer value. Furthermore, extreme first offers increase the risk of impasse ( Galinsky et al., 2002; Schweinsberg et al., 2012). ...
Article
We propose that in dyadic negotiations simultaneously offering multiple package proposals that are of the same value to the proposer (what we refer to as multiple equivalent simultaneous offers, or MESOs), affords a distributive and integrative advantage to that negotiator. Making MESOs has a number of advantages over simply making a single package offer. MESOs are beneficial because they allow negotiators to collect information while being persistent and aggressive at the bargaining table, but also to be perceived as being flexible and accommodating. Four experiments demonstrate the distributive, integrative, and interpersonal benefits of making MESOs. In Experiment 1, respondents receiving multiple offers were likely to accept an offer and more satisfied with the offer than respondents receiving a single offer of the same value. In Experiment 2, negotiators who made MESOs achieved better distributive outcomes and were perceived as being more flexible. In Experiment 3, when both negotiators made MESOs, they achieved more efficient outcomes. In Experiment 4, when both negotiators made MESOs, they were more likely to reach an agreement in a dispute.
... The anchoring effect exists in daily life, and the anchor can become the prejudice and fallacy in decision-making, which in turn influences the decision-making results (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For example, different offer approaches (e.g. point offer ($100) vs range offer ($100-$150)) will affect the result of the final transaction price in price negotiation (Ames and Mason, 2015). If the buyer receives a single price (point offer), they will usually negotiate with the seller by referencing that price (anchor). ...
... If it is a price range, the values at both ends of the range may become anchors. Ames and Mason (2015) proposed point and range offers (including backdown, bolstering and large width ranges) in price negotiation. Compare to a point offer (e.g. ...
... To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior study that investigated the anchoring effect on reward-based crowdfunding utilizing different pledge option designs, and none of the current reward-based crowdfunding platforms employ the range offer pricing. The previous study shows bolstering range offer resulting in the highest final price in price negotiation (Ames and Mason, 2015); hence, we would like to know if the pledge option designs using the "bolstering range offer" raises more funds than the current "point offer" and "adjustable point offer." This study, therefore, utilizes three pledge option designs (point, adjustable point, and bolstering range offers) as anchors to explore which one can raise more funds in crowdfunding campaigns. ...
Article
Purpose Crowdfunding allows enterprises or individuals to collect funds from numerous other individuals. This study applies the anchoring effect and range theory in reward-based crowdfunding to explore how different pledge option designs affect the backers' final pledge amount. Moreover, this study examines whether showing the current average amount pledged in the fundraising process has an anchoring effect on the subsequent backers' pledge amount. Design/methodology/approach Online experiments were conducted, and data were analyzed using the Kruskal–Wallis test and Spearman rank correlation analysis. Findings Results show that among the three pledge option designs, employing the “bolstering range offer” has the highest backing amount. However, presenting the current average amount pledged in the fundraising process has a reversed anchoring effect on subsequent backers' pledge amount only in the case of a crowdfunding project in the physical goods category with a “point offer.” Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, no reward-based crowdfunding platform has yet provided the pledge option design of a “bolstering range offer.” This study reveals that the “bolstering range offer” can significantly increase the amount pledged. This study extends the crowdfunding research area to crowdfunding success and suggests a novel way to set up pledges.
... When making the first offer, offerers try to pull recipients in the direction of their offers, but risk those recipients reactively devaluing those offers (Curhan, Neale, & Ross, 2004;Ross & Ward, 1995), making aggressive counteroffers (Ames & Mason, 2015) or ending the negotiation in impasse (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Offer recipients are similarly torn, aware that the offer they receive may favor the offerer in ways that disadvantage them ( Curhan et al., 2004; Lee,recipients; we propose that one way to do so is to start negotiations with a choice of first offers. ...
... To explain how choice can influence anchoring, it helps to know how an anchor's features can affect its strength. Weaker anchors produce judgments that adjust more from the initial anchor value, whereas with strong anchors, judgments remain closer to the initial anchor value (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; see also Ames & Mason, 2015;Strack & Mussweiler, 1997;Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001). In standard judgment research, accuracy is presumed to guide the degree to which an anchor affects its strength (Kahneman, 1992). ...
... The more competitively biased that a recipient perceives a first offer to be, the weaker that anchor will be. For example, Ames and Mason (2015) found that extreme first offers often produce extreme counteroffers, i.e., more adjustment from the initial first offer value. Furthermore, extreme first offers increase the risk of impasse ( Galinsky et al., 2002; Schweinsberg et al., 2012). ...
... Negotiators are therefore often advised to either claim value or to build relationships (e.g., Keiser, 1988;Thompson, 2011) In contrast to this advice, we propose that claiming more value and having a more satisfied opponent do not need to be mutually exclusive. We base this argument on research suggesting that economic outcomes and subjective evaluations are sometimes disconnected, implying that it is possible to improve both economic gains and relationships (Ames & Mason, 2015;Galinsky et al., 2002;Lee & Ames, 2017;Neale & Bazerman, 1983;Shirako, Kilduff, & Kray, 2015). For example, Lee and Ames (2017) found that using constraintrelated rationales ("I can't pay more"), compared to disparagement rationales ("It's not worth more"), increased both accommodating negotiation behavior and trust by the counterpart. ...
... In contrast, our research contributes to a growing stream of research (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015;Neale & Bazerman, 1983;Shirako et al., 2015) suggesting that even distributive negotiations can create better deals for oneself and more satisfied opponents. We also extend the findings from Galinsky et al. (2002) by showing that shifting a negotiator's attention to their walkaway price a) can be used as an interpersonal strategy, b) is counterintuitive and not naturally used, c) improves economic and relational outcomes when compared to a baseline condition, and d) can backfire when recipients have a lot of power. ...
... The present work also provides exciting opportunities for future research. First, our studies focused on the initial stage of the negotiation (for a similar approach, see Loschelder et al., 2016) as past research has already established strong correlations between offers and negotiation outcomes (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Future research could test the long-term effects of offer framing as research suggests that anchoring effects can persist undiminished for up to a week (Mussweiler, 2001a). ...
Article
Full-text available
In distributive negotiations, people often feel that they have to choose between maximizing their economic outcomes (claiming more value) or improving their relational outcomes (having a satisfied opponent). The present research proposes a conversational strategy that can help negotiators achieve both. Specifically, we show that using an offer framing strategy that shifts offer recipients’ attention to their reservation price (e.g., “How does my offer compare to your minimum price?”) leads to both (a) an assimilation effect whereby recipients make more favorable counteroffers (economic benefit) as well as (b) a contrast effect whereby recipients feel more satisfied with the negotiation (relational benefit). We find evidence for the effectiveness of this conversational strategy across four experiments (N=1,522) involving different negotiation contexts (real estate, restaurant sale) and participant samples (MBAs, sales agents, online participants), and also document negotiator power as an important boundary condition. Overall, our research suggests that economic and relational benefits do not have to be mutually exclusive in distributive negotiations, that the perceived extremity of an offer is subjective and can be strategically influenced, and that assimilation and contrast effects can operate simultaneously when they relate to separate outcomes.
... Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016 for cases when moving first can backfire). Studies on offer extremity have found that overly ambitious first offers can offend recipients, motivating people to walk away from a negotiation (i.e., produce impasses; Ames & Mason, 2015;Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). For example, in a study involving renters and landlords in a simulated marketplace, renters who received extreme first offers, compared to moderate first offers, were more likely to walk away from the negotiation because they were offended by the offer (Schweinsberg et al., 2012; see Mechanism 3 in Fig. 1). ...
... A total of 564 MBA students at a business school in the United States participated as part of a decision-making exercise prior to the first day of class. Ten students were excluded for failing to pay attention to the scenario (i.e., made responses that were beyond the bargaining limits stated in the instructions; see Ames & Mason, 2015), resulting in a sample of 554 individuals (220 females; M age = 27.96, SD age = 2.47). ...
... On the other hand, more recent research has started to examine the disadvantage of extreme offers: This work shows that overly ambitious first offers can backfire and cause a negotiation impasse if the negotiator feels offended by the extremity of the offer (Ames & Mason, 2015;Schweinsberg et al., 2012). We showed a similar effect in that extreme first offers created a barrier-to-entry in Study 3 (Mechanism 3 in Fig. 1). ...
Article
Prior research shows that precise first offers strongly anchor negotiation outcomes. This precision advantage, however, has been documented only when the parties were already in a negotiation. We introduce the concept of negotiation entry, i.e., the decision to enter a negotiation with a particular party. We predict that precise prices create barriers-to-entry, reducing a counterpart’s likelihood of entering a negotiation. Six studies (N=1,580) and one archival analysis of real estate data (N=11,203) support our barrier-to-entry prediction: Potential negotiators were less likely to enter a negotiation with precise- versus round-offer makers. Using both statistical mediation and experimental-causal-chain analyses, we establish that perceptions of offer-maker inflexibility underlie the precision barrier. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the precision mechanism (inflexibility) is distinct from the extremity mechanism (being offended) that produces barriers-to-entry from extreme first offers. The discussion theoretically integrates research on first-offer precision and extremity by offering the Precision-Extremity Model of First Offers.
... Our limited understanding of what happens after a negotiation reflects the dominant experimental paradigm scholars have used to investigate negotiations: unfamiliar counterparts prepare for a negotiation, negotiate, reach an agreement or impasse, and then part ways. Consistent with this transactional approach to investigating negotiations, many studies have focused on negotiations involving goods, such as cars or real estate, rather than services (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015;Anderson & Thompson, 2004;Bear & Babcock, 2017;Loschelder, Trötschel, Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016;Novemsky & Schweitzer, https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.obhdp.2019.09.005 2004). ...
... In general, assertive strategies enabled negotiators to achieve better negotiated agreements in single-shot settings. For example, homeowners negotiating with house painters are likely to obtain a lower price if they start with a low initial offer (Ames & Mason, 2015;Loschelder et al., 2016;Mason, Lee, & Wiley, 2013;Schaerer, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015), display negative emotions (Friedman et al., 2004;Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010;Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006), express aggression and power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006;Kang, Galinsky, Kray, & Shirako, 2015;Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007;Overbeck et al., 2010;Van Kleef et al., 2006), or have a reputation for being strict (Roth & Schoumaker, 1983). Of course, many cooperative strategies have also been linked with better economic outcomes, such as when negotiators approach the situation as a problem-solving task (Kilmann & Thomas, 1977;Pruitt, 1983), ask questions (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999), engage in perspective taking (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011), make concessions (Moran & Ritov, 2002;Ritov & Moran, 2008), display positive affect and cooperative signals (Anderson & Thompson, 2004;Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011;Friedman et al., 2004;Schroeder, Risen, Gino, & Norton, 2014;Shirako et al., 2015), engage in small talk (Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002;Shaughnessy, Mislin, & Hentschel, 2015), or build relationships (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010;Brett et al., 2007;Drolet, Larrick, & Morris, 1998;Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006;Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). ...
... This broadens the scope of our investigation, and enables us to account for the potential influence the first offer may have on the negotiation processes. For example, first offers can anchor subsequent counter-offers (Ames & Mason, 2015;Loschelder et al., 2016;Schweinsberg et al., 2012) and influence perceptions of assertiveness and power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006;Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015;Magee et al., 2007). ...
Article
The negotiation process can harm post-agreement motivation. For example, a homeowner might negotiate with a landscaper, but through the process of negotiating harm the landscaper’s motivation to deliver high quality service. In contrast to prior work that has assumed that negotiated agreements represent the full economic value of negotiated outcomes, we demonstrate that the act of engaging in a negotiation can itself influence post-agreement behavior in ways that change the economic value of an agreement. Across six studies, we demonstrate that negotiations can harm post-agreement motivation and productivity on both effortful and creative tasks. Specifically, we find that wage negotiations can harm post-agreement performance, even when the negotiation has integrative potential or is conducted face-to-face. The negotiation process can increase perceptions of relational conflict, and these conflict perceptions mediate the relationship between negotiation and performance. Compared to not negotiating, individuals who negotiate may secure favorable deal terms, but risk incurring affective, relational, and economic costs after the agreement. Our investigation fills a critical gap in our understanding of post-agreement behavior, and has particular relevance for negotiations that involve services. Our findings suggest that individuals should enter negotiations with caution, and we call for future work to explore not only what happens prior to an agreement, but also what happens after an agreement has been reached.
... Participants learned about a gift card lottery and read that, "the better your individual negotiation outcomes, the higher your chances to win this lottery." Actual chances of winning a €50 gift card were indeed linearly related to participants' claimed value. 1 There are two caveats to this general notion: First, when first-movers start overly ambitious, there is an increased risk that counterparts will be offended and walk away from a negotiation, thus leading to more impasses (Ames & Mason, 2015;Schweinsberg et al., 2012). Second, when first-movers reveal previously unknown interests, cunning opponents can exploit this information to acquire larger shares of the negotiation pie-a firstmover disadvantage emerges (Loschelder, Swaab, Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014;. 2 We grounded the negotiation in a setting that was highly involving and emotionally laden for recruited participants (students and faculty at Saarland University): Due to budget constraints, the state government had informed the university management that expenses needed to be reduced by approximately 12-15% of the total budget (i.e., several million Euros). ...
... Precise and highly ambitious first offers may be more likely to end with impasses (cf. Ames & Mason, 2015;Jäger, Loschelder, & Friese, 2015;Schweinsberg et al., 2012); similarly, a too extreme firstoffer magnitude may undermine all precision benefits because recipients may be reluctant to ascribe more competence to a first-mover who starts clearly outside a reasonable bargaining range. In addition, although highly precise anchors are used rather scarcely in the real world (Mason et al., 2013), the present data suggest that first movers can attain a bargaining advantage from ignoring this norm-provided they start with a sufficiently ambitious first offer. ...
... When recipients perceive a sender to be inflexible, they should anticipate a negotiation to be tougher and consequently should more likely walk away from the bargaining table or not sit down at the table in the first place (cf. Ames & Mason, 2015). One may argue that round rather than precise numbers are preferable whenever firstmovers need to attract customers or face multiple potential counterparts in a marketplace context. ...
Article
A negotiation commonly starts with one party sending and the counterpart receiving a first offer. This first offer anchors recipients and yields higher profits to the sender. Recent research has shown that precise anchors ($28.75) – those fea- turing fewer trailing zeros – are more potent than round anchors ($30.00). The present studies extend this literature in two ways: First, prior research has exclusively focused on anchor recipients while ignoring the sender. Here, we examine precision effects for (1) recipients, (2) senders, and (3) both recipients and senders in a dyadic negotiation. Three experi- ments establish distinct and opposing effects: Whereas increasing precision elevates a first offer's anchoring potency for recipients, it lowers the first-offer extremity that senders opt for. Second, prior research has disagreed upon the theoretical mechanisms behind the precision effect: The scale-granularity account posits that decision-makers adjust in smaller steps on a finer-grained mental scale. The attribution-of-competence account posits that people ascribe more competence to a precise-opening individual. We examine these competing theoretical accounts simultaneously. Multiple mediation analy- ses across all three experiments suggested consistently that the beneficial impact of precise anchors on recipients is due to a social attribution-of-competence, whereas the detrimental impact on anchor-senders is due to a cognitive scale-gran- ularity process. In all, the present findings show (a) that senders and recipients are distinctly affected by anchor precision, and (b) that these opposing effects are due to distinct psychological processes.
... When making the first offer, offerers try to pull recipients in the direction of their offers, but risk those recipients reactively devaluing those offers (Curhan, Neale, & Ross, 2004;Ross & Ward, 1995), making aggressive counteroffers (Ames & Mason, 2015) or ending the negotiation in impasse (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Offer recipients are similarly torn, aware that the offer they receive may favor the offerer in ways that disadvantage them (Curhan et al., 2004;Lee, Loschelder, Schweinsberg, Mason, & Galinsky, 2018;Schweinsberg et al., 2012), making it difficult to consider the offer as a sincere attempt at agreement. ...
... To explain how choice can influence anchoring, it helps to know how an anchor's features can affect its strength. Weaker anchors produce judgments that adjust more from the initial anchor value, whereas with strong anchors, judgments remain closer to the initial anchor value (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; see also Ames & Mason, 2015;Strack & Mussweiler, 1997;Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001). In standard judgment research, accuracy is presumed to guide the degree to which an anchor affects its strength (Kahneman, 1992). ...
... The more competitively biased that a recipient perceives a first offer to be, the weaker that anchor will be. For example, Ames and Mason (2015) found that extreme first offers often produce extreme counteroffers, i.e., more adjustment from the initial first offer value. Furthermore, extreme first offers increase the risk of impasse (Galinsky et al., 2002;Schweinsberg et al., 2012). ...
Article
Full-text available
The tension that negotiators face between claiming and creating value is particularly apparent when exchanging offers. We tested whether presenting a choice among first offers (Multiple Equivalent Simultaneous Offers; MESOs) reduces this negotiator dilemma and increases economic and relational outcomes. Six experiments comparing MESOs to a single package-offer revealed three effects. First, MESOs produced stronger anchors and better outcomes for the offerer because recipients perceived MESOs as a more sincere attempt at reaching an agreement (agreement sincerity). Second, MESOs yielded greater joint outcomes because they were probabilistically more likely to include an economically attractive starting point for recipients (initial recipient-value). Third, MESOs allowed the offerer to secure a cooperative reputation and created a more cooperative negotiation climate. Negotiators who offered MESOs were able to claim and create more economic and relational value. MESOs reduced the negotiator dilemma for offerers by also reducing it for recipients. Weblinks in the appendix give access to supplementary materials, analyses, and data.
... Majer et al. (2020) show that the framing of first offers influences the magnitude of the adjustment of estimations. A number of studies have documented how specifications of numeric reference values (e.g., ranges, irrelevancy, precision) affect the likelihood of assimilating estimates (Ames & Mason, 2015;Englich et al., 2006;Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). Studying the specifications of salary offers should therefore yield insights how effectively salary transparency reforms work for reducing gender disparities in salary estimates. ...
... The four subsequent salary offers display the legally required minimum salary (Bahnik et al., 2017) that varies regarding their "framing" (Majer et al., 2020). The final offer provides participants with a market representative salary range ("tandem anchor") (Ames & Mason, 2015). Our aim here is to successively test the adjustment of participants' estimates to externally provided reference values. ...
... T5 suggests that the referred salary is not relevant and that it should be ignored (Wilson et al., 1996). Finally, T6 concretizes the possible amount of excess payment by defining the salary range (Ames & Mason, 2015). Random The legislator obliges us to inform you of the minimum gross salary, which for this position is X EUR per month. ...
Preprint
Full-text available
This paper examines gender differences in estimating the salaries from job offers after the pay transparency reform in Austria, which aims to reduce the gender pay gap by mandating employers to disclose the minimum salary and negotiation options in their job offers. We address common salary offers in the pharmaceutical industry, where market salaries are substantially higher than the minimum salary. An experiment is conducted with 385 graduate students who estimate the negotiable salary for six salary offers of a chosen job. Our results show that, when salary offers are based on minimum salaries, initial gender differences in estimates remain, irrespective of whether the salary is negotiable or not. When a salary-range is shown, however, gender differences disappear completely. The results imply that, reducing the gender gap in salary estimates in asymmetric labor markets necessitates employers to include not only negotiation options, but also the salary range in their job offers.
... Majer et al. (2020) show that the framing of first offers influences the magnitude of the adjustment of estimations. A number of studies have documented how specifications of numeric reference values (e.g., ranges, irrelevancy, precision) affect the likelihood of assimilating estimates (Ames & Mason, 2015;Englich et al., 2006;Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). Studying the specifications of salary offers should therefore yield insights how effectively salary transparency reforms work for reducing gender disparities in salary estimates. ...
... The four subsequent salary offers display the legally required minimum salary (Bahnik et al., 2017) that varies regarding their "framing" (Majer et al., 2020). The final offer provides participants with a market representative salary range ("tandem anchor") (Ames & Mason, 2015). Our aim here is to successively test the adjustment of participants' estimates to externally provided reference values. ...
... T5 suggests that the referred salary is not relevant and that it should be ignored (Wilson et al., 1996). Finally, T6 concretizes the possible amount of excess payment by defining the salary range (Ames & Mason, 2015). Random The legislator obliges us to inform you of the minimum gross salary, which for this position is X EUR per month. ...
... For example, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) theorized that first offers signal a range of plausible agreements that a negotiator prefers over other agreements. Ames and Mason (2015) showed that range offers (e.g., $600-700) signal a more ambitious bottom line than point offers (e.g., $600). Relatedly, prior research has documented that changes in offers over time (i.e., concessions) can signal information about negotiators' intentions and dispositions (Hamner, 1974;Klimoski & Breaugh, 1977). ...
... First, we extend prior research that documents how contextual cues signal important negotiation information. Whereas past work has primarily shown how static cues (e.g., the first offer) can convey information such as one's reservation price (Ames & Mason, 2015;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;Gunia et al., 2013;Loschelder et al., 2016), our research suggests that dynamic patterns of concessions across multiple rounds matter as well. This is an important insight because negotiations typically involve several rounds across which negotiators make a series of offers. ...
... Because negotiators are motivated to form an accurate perception of their counterparts' reservation prices but are typically unable to obtain such information, they rely on other cues to infer their counterparts' reservation prices. Although most research to date has treated the reservation price as fixed (Blount et al., 1996;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;Kim & Fragale, 2005;Larrick & Wu, 2007;Pinkley et al., 1994;White et al., 1994), more recent research suggests that negotiators gradually form an understanding of their counterparts' reservation prices throughout the negotiation, for example as a function of the counterparts' emotional expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2004) or the type of offers they receive (Ames & Mason, 2015). Building on this research, we argue that perceptions of counterparts' reservation prices are malleable and can be affected by contextual cues that negotiators are exposed to during the negotiation. ...
Article
Full-text available
We propose that making a series of decreasing concessions (e.g., $1,500-1,210-1,180-1,170) signals that negotiators are reaching their limit and that this results in a negotiation disadvantage for offer recipients. Although we find that most negotiators do not use this strategy naturally, seven studies (N=2,311) demonstrate that decreasing concessions causes recipients to make less ambitious counteroffers (Studies 1-5) and reach worse deals (Study 2) in distributive negotiations. We find that this disadvantage occurs because decreasing concessions shape recipients’ expectations of the subsequent offers that will be made, which results in inflated perceptions of the counterparts’ reservation price relative to the other concession strategies (Study 3). In addition, we find that this disadvantage is particularly large when concessions decrease at a moderate rate (Study 4a) and when decreasing concessions takes place over more (vs. fewer) rounds (Study 4b). Finally, we find that recipients can protect themselves against the deleterious effects of decreasing concession by thinking of a target before they enter the negotiation (Study 5).
... SeeKristensen and Gärling (1997);Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001); Van Poucke and Buelens(2002);Mason et al. (2013);Ames and Mason (2015). ...
... SeeKritikos and Bolle (2001);Charness and Rabin (2002); Strobel (2004, 2006);Fehr, Naef and Schmidt (2006);Bolton and Ockenfels (2006); Durante, Putterman and Weele (2014); ElHarbi et al. (2015) 10 For example, economics students are inclined to favor efficiency over equality, females are more egalitarian than males, and political preferences do not seem to have an effect(Engelmann and Strobel, 2004;Fehr, Naef and Schmidt, 2006). 11 SeeYukl (1974b);;;Kristensen and Gärling (1997);Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001); Van Poucke andBuelens (2002);Buelens and Van Poucke (2004);Mason et al. (2013);Ames and Mason (2015). ...
Article
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We study dynamic unstructured bargaining with deadlines and one-sided private information about the amount available to share (the " pie size"). Using mechanism design theory, we show that given the players' incentives, the equilibrium incidence of bargaining failures (" strikes ") should increase with the pie size, and we derive a condition under which strikes are efficient. In our setting, no equilibrium satisfies both equality and efficiency in all pie sizes. We derive two equilibria that resolve the trade-off between equality and efficiency by either favoring equality or favoring efficiency. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we confirm that strike incidence is decreasing in the pie size. Subjects reach equal splits in small pie games (in which strikes are efficient), while most payoffs are close to either the efficient or the equal equilibrium prediction, when the pie is large. We employ a machine learning approach to show that bargaining process features recorded early in the game improve out of sample prediction of disagreements at the deadline. The process feature predictions are as accurate as predictions from pie sizes only, and adding process and pie data together improves predictions even more.
... Selective accessibility relies on the assumption that whenever a value falls outside a plausible range, ''participants test the possibility that the target possesses the anchor value and try to construct a mental model that includes information that is maximally consistent with the anchor value" (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997, p. 444). It is not evident how in the present studies the exposure to additional, less extreme negotiation alternatives would activate this process differentially (see also Ames & Mason, 2015;Mochon & Frederick, 2013). Scale distortion theory, on the other hand, is a novel account that does not rely on the assumption that people test an anchor value against a plausible range or that anchors change the underlying representation of a negotiation item. ...
... In recent years, research on first offers in negotiations has exploded. Although this literature has found that men generally ask for more than women (Barron, 2003) and anxiety negatively affects first-offer aspirations (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011), the majority of studies on first offers have investigated the consequences of first offers (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015;Loschelder, Stuppi, & Troetschel, 2013;Loschelder, Trötschel, Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016). Considering that first offers can explain a significant share of the variance in negotiation outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), we know remarkably little about their antecedents. ...
Article
We challenge the assumption that having multiple alternatives is always better than a single alternative by showing that negotiators who have additional, less attractive alternatives ironically exhibit downward-biased perceptions of their own and their opponent’s reservation price, make lower demands, and achieve worse outcomes in distributive negotiations. Five studies demonstrate that the apparent benefits of multiple alternatives are elusive because multiple alternatives led to less ambitious first offers (Studies 1-2) and less profitable agreements (Study 3). This distributive disadvantage emerged because negotiators’ perception of the bargaining zone was more distorted when they had additional (less attractive) alternatives than when they only had a single alternative (Studies 1-3). We further found that this multiple-alternatives disadvantage only emerges when negotiators used quantitative (versus qualitative) evaluation standards to gauge the extremity of their offers (Study 4), and when they base their offers on own numerical alternative(s) versus on opponent information (Study 5).
... Sinaceur, Maddux, Vasiljevic, Nueckel, and Galinsky (2013) found that the timing as well as the extremity of the first offer mattered: When made later in the negotiation (as opposed to earlier on), it facilitated information exchange, which reduced the likelihood of an impasse. A similar effect occurred when range offers were made (e.g., "I expect to sell the car for $5,000 to $7,000"; Ames & Mason, 2015) and when an extreme offer highlighted the structural limits (Lee & Ames, 2017). In related work in economics on commitment tactics, Schelling (1956) argued that committing to extreme positions in distributive negotiations could help negotiators claim more value but at the increased risk of an impasse. ...
... Negotiators can minimize this risk by understanding that offers are extreme only in relation to other values. Range offers ("I can sell the apartment for $300,000 to $350,000") can be used to anchor the negotiation in their favor, reducing the risk of an impasse (Ames & Mason, 2015). ...
Article
Full-text available
Although impasses are frequently experienced by negotiators, are featured in newspaper articles, and are reflected in online searches and can be costly, negotiation scholarship does not appear to consider them seriously as phenomena worth explaining. A review of negotiation tasks to study impasses reveals that they bias negotiators toward agreement. We systematically organize past findings on impasses and integrate them in the impasse type, cause, and resolution model (ITCR model). Our fundamental assumption is that a positive bargaining zone does not imply symmetric preferences for an agreement. One or both negotiators may prefer an impasse over an agreement despite a positive bargaining zone. We argue that it is beneficial for management research to distinguish between three impasse types: If both negotiators perceive benefit from an impasse, they are wanted; if one negotiator perceives benefits from an impasse, they are forced; and if both do not perceive benefits from the impasse, they are unwanted. We review structural (e.g., bargaining zone, communication channels), interpersonal (e.g., tough tactics, emotions), and intrapersonal (e.g., biases, available information, and framing) factors as the likely antecedents of the three impasse types. We also examine evidence that suggests that wanted impasses can be resolved by changing the negotiation structure for both parties, forced impasses can be resolved through persuasion, and unwanted impasses can be overcome by debiasing both parties. Finally, we review current methodological guidance and provide updated recommendations on how scholars should deal with impasses in both study designs and data analyses.
... The anchoring impact of the first proposal accounts for 50% and up to 85% of variance in final outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;Orr & Guthrie, 2005). However, contrary to estimation tasks, implausible and extreme anchors in a negotiation elevate the risk of impasses because they can offend recipients (Ames & Mason, 2015;Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Although anchoring effects in cognitive estimation tasks and in negotiations are substantially similar to each other, we point to some considerable differences in the following section. ...
... Although motivational processes in anchoring have yet to be systematically examined in mixed-motive settings, some prior studies shed initial light on the important role of adjustment motivation. 2 For instance, research reveals that when a first-mover signals flexibility, responders are less motivated to resist concession making and to counter aggressively (Ames & Mason, 2015). Other studies found that negotiators tend to walk away from the bargaining table when they perceive an opening proposal as too precise or extreme (Lee, Loschelder, Schweinsberg, Mason, & Galinsky, 2018;Schweinsberg et al., 2012). ...
Article
Abundant research has established that first proposals can anchor negotiations and lead to a first-mover advantage. The current research developed and tested a motivated anchor adjustment hypothesis that integrates the literatures on framing and anchoring and highlights how anchoring in negotiations differs in significant ways from standard decision-making contexts. Our research begins with the premise that first proposals can be framed as either an offer of resources (e.g., I am offering my A for your B) that highlights gains versus a request for resources (e.g., I am requesting your B for my A) that highlights losses to a responder. We propose that this framing would affect the concession aversion of responders and ultimately the negotiated outcomes. We predicted that when a first proposal is framed as an offer, the well-documented anchoring and first-mover advantage effect would emerge because offers do not create high levels of concession aversion. In contrast, because requests highlight what the responder has to give up, we predicted that opening requests would produce concession aversion and eliminate and even reverse the first-mover advantage. Across five experiments, the classic first-mover advantage in negotiations was moderated by the framing of proposals because anchor framing affected concession aversion. The studies highlight how motivational forces (i.e., concession aversion) play an important role in producing anchoring effects, which has been predominantly viewed through a purely cognitive lens. Overall, the findings highlight when and how motivational processes play a key role in both judgmental heuristics and mixed-motive decisionmaking.
... For instance, Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) found that highly assertive (i.e., markedly ungenerous) offers in an ultimatum context were often met with anger and rejection, even when that impasse led to an economic cost for the rejector. Elsewhere, Ames and Mason (2015) counseled some negotiators to make a meaningfully more-assertive opening offer than what they had initially planned on asking for; compared with those in a control condition, these more-assertive negotiators evoked substantially higher impasse rates. Other recent research has likewise linked extreme openings to negotiation impasses, finding that acting in a highly assertive way increases the risks of ending up with no deal (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). ...
... Other recent work shows that certain kinds of range offers (e.g., asking for "$5,000 to $5,200" rather than $5,000 for a used car) can be effective, yielding a mix of deal term and relational benefits (Ames & Mason, 2015). This research suggests that range offers may work best when the offer is in the region of being assertive but not unreasonable and when a counterpart is at least somewhat motivated to be polite, or at least avoid being rude. ...
Article
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Whether in everyday disagreements, bargaining episodes, or high-stakes disputes, people typically see a spectrum of possible responses to dealing with differences with others, ranging from avoidance and accommodation to competition and aggression. We believe people judge their own and others' behaviors along this dimension, which we call interpersonal assertiveness, reflecting the degree to which someone stands up and speaks out for their own positions when they are faced with someone else who does not want the same outcomes. In this article, we review long-standing and recent scholarship to characterize the curvilinear consequences of assertiveness (both “too little” and “too much” can be problematic). We consider the sources of accommodating and assertive behavior, such as motivations, expectancies, and failures of self-regulation. We also examine ways in which people can assert themselves effectively, ranging from making precise offers in negotiations to employing rationales as part of their proposals. We conclude by noting promising directions for future research.
... Second, the extent to which the negotiation counterpart makes a range (as opposed to a point) offer might also activate a choice (vs. constraint) mindset, as range offers signal flexibility (Ames & Mason, 2015). When counterparts make a range offer, negotiators might then think that there is a range of possible offers and outcomes that the counterpart might accept, and that could spontaneously trigger the choice mindset. ...
... For example, in one study it was demonstrated that, when sellers made the first offer, settlement prices were significantly higher than when buyers made the first offers (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Based on such evidence, first offers have become an important subject for academic research (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015;Maaravi, Ganzach & Pazy, 2011;Ritov & Moran, 2008;Schaerer, Loschelder & Swaab, 2016). ...
Article
The literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people’s initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2–4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none — it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue. © 2017, Society for Judgment and Decision making. All rights reserved.
... This might not only objectify future results of experiments on the politeness effect, it will also provide a useful instrument for learning designers to detect the cultural appropriateness of their environments. Additionally, it might be helpful to examine if the politeness effect occurs in other areas of learning like mobile learning (Ordóñez de Pablos, Tennyson, & Lytras, 2014), education platforms (Xi, Hui, Wu, & Ordóñez de Pablos, 2014), training of negotiations (Ames & Mason, 2015), and other communication technologies (Drigas, Ioannidou, Kokkalia, & Lytras, 2014). ...
... Previous research has focused on different PLOS dimensions of the negotiation process which may lead to different outcomes, such as the first offer and the way it affects the counteroffer (e.g. [5]), alternatives within the negotiation process [6], cultural differences [7], politeness [8], and reference points, such as the current market data [9]. The current research focuses on the role of language in the context of negotiations, acknowledging its potential as a tool for promoting successful negotiation outcomes. ...
Article
Full-text available
The wording negotiators use shapes the emotions of their counterparts. These emotions, in turn, influence their counterparts’ economic decisions. Building on this rationale, we examined how the language used during negotiation affects discount rate and willingness to engage in future deals. In three studies, participants assumed the role of retailers. Alleged counterparts (actually a computerized program) asked for a discount under three conditions: request, want, and demand. Results show that less extreme language (request/want) resulted in better outcomes than demanding a discount. Moreover, while the language used by the customer had an effect on experienced emotions, the positive emotions (sympathy and empathy) participants felt toward the customer mediated the relationship between the linguistic cue and the negotiation outcome. Our results inform both psycholinguistic research and negotiation research by demonstrating the causal role of linguistic cues in activating concept-knowledge relevant to different emotional experiences, and point to the down-the-line impact on shaping negotiation preferences.
... Since practical negotiation advice often consists of simple heuristics, process data could also be very useful to carefully test them experimentally [Pruitt, 2013]. In particular, initial offers have long been postulated to serve as bargaining anchors, and perspective taking, as well as various other psychological manipulations could potentially bias bargaining outcomes [Kristensen and Gärling, 1997, Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001, Van Poucke and Buelens, 2002, Mason et al., 2013, Ames and Mason, 2015. However, Jeong et al. [2019] show that making first offers in a "warm and friendly" communication style surprisingly leads to less favorable outcomes in buyer-seller bargaining, while Weir et al. [2020] find a null result priming distributive and integrative language in the context of dam maintenance and wildlife preservation. ...
Chapter
We study dynamic unstructured bargaining with deadlines and one-sided private information about the amount available to share (the “pie size”). “Unstructured” means that players can make or withdraw any offers and demands they want at any time. Such paradigms, while lifelike, have been displaced in experimental research by highly structured bargaining because they are hard to analyze. Machine learning comes to the rescue because the players’ unstructured bargaining behavior can be taken as “features” to predict outcomes. Machine learning approaches can accommodate a large number of features and guard against overfitting using test samples and methods such as penalized LASSO regression. In previous research, we found that the LASSO could add power to theoretical variables in predicting whether bargaining ended in disagreement. We replicate this work with higher stakes, subject experience, and special attention to gender differences, demonstrating the robustness of this approach.
... When this occurs, the recipient of the extreme offer may moderate their negotiating objectives and be more inclined to make concessions (Barry and Friedman, 1998;Hamner and Yukl, 1977). However, extreme offers have the potential to limit the politeness of the offeror, leading to anger toward by the other party, which increases the likelihood that the other party will withdraw from the negotiation (Ames and Mason, 2015). Based on the preceding, we propose the following: ...
Article
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Purpose In this investigation, the authors aim to ask whether engineers, as a profession, share distinct characteristics in their attitudes and behaviors relating to negotiations. Based on a review of the literature, the authors answer in the affirmative. Generally speaking, the existing studies on individual differences of engineers conclude that they are more conscientious, more goal-driven, more competitive and less people-oriented than non-engineers. The authors suggest that these differences have significant consequences on how engineers engage in negotiations. In particular, the authors propose that engineers’ approach to negotiation includes differences related to distributive versus integrative negotiation, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking and preferred persuasion techniques. Design/methodology/approach This paper involves an integrated literature review, combining research in management, psychology and engineering to investigate whether engineers approach negotiations differently from non-engineers. Findings The authors suggest that individual differences between engineers and non-engineers have significant consequences for how engineers engage in negotiations. In particular, the authors propose that engineers’ approach to negotiation includes differences related to distributive versus integrative negotiation, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking and preferred persuasion techniques. Research limitations/implications The authors offer 11 research propositions in areas relating to how engineers engage in distributive versus integrative negotiations, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking and their preferred persuasive techniques. Practical implications There are important implications for how engineers and their supervisors should be aware of these differences between how engineers and non-engineers view negotiations and how these differences may affect them and their employing organizations. There are also cultural implications, particularly for organizations for which engineers comprise a majority or a minority of the workforce composition. Social implications There are important implications for diversity in the engineering profession, especially as it relates to the hiring of women in engineering (as they now comprise a small minority of the profession). Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that investigates how engineers negotiate. Because engineering is a hugely important contributor to society, the results of this have important implications for the society.
... Negotiators are routinely advised to make extreme first offers to benefit from the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When sellers make extreme first offers, final prices tend to be high; in contrast, when buyers make extreme first offers, final prices tend to be low (Ames & Mason, 2015;Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Evidence suggests this effect is robust across cultures, issues, and power positions (Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013). ...
Article
To what extent are research results influenced by subjective decisions that scientists make as they design studies? Fifteen research teams independently designed studies to answer five original research questions related to moral judgments, negotiations, and implicit cognition. Participants from 2 separate large samples (total N > 15,000) were then randomly assigned to complete 1 version of each study. Effect sizes varied dramatically across different sets of materials designed to test the same hypothesis: Materials from different teams rendered statistically significant effects in opposite directions for 4 of 5 hypotheses, with the narrowest range in estimates being d = −0.37 to + 0.26. Meta-analysis and a Bayesian perspective on the results revealed overall support for 2 hypotheses and a lack of support for 3 hypotheses. Overall, practically none of the variability in effect sizes was attributable to the skill of the research team in designing materials, whereas considerable variability was attributable to the hypothesis being tested. In a forecasting survey, predictions of other scientists were significantly correlated with study results, both across and within hypotheses. Crowdsourced testing of research hypotheses helps reveal the true consistency of empirical support for a scientific claim.
... An explanation of the contradiction discussed by Röseler, Schütz, Baumeister, and Starker (2020, p. 8) is the use of the dictator game instead of classical anchoring items by and its involvement of social mechanisms, which have been shown to matter for anchoring effects in negotiations (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015). dismiss the possibility that questionable research practices might have led to the contradictory findings (p. ...
Thesis
Anchoring effects, that is, the attraction of numerical judgments toward a previously considered number, are among the most robust findings in social psychology. At the same time, explaining the effect and its nuances such as moderator effects has not yet been accomplished despite numerous different models of anchoring. During the past decade, personality moderators of anchoring effects have gained attention and replications of findings beyond the classical anchoring effects have been conducted. I summarize the state of personality moderator research on anchoring effects. I systematizing the eight most thoroughly investigated personality traits (Big Five, cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, and self-control) into three broad paths (exploratory, based on theories of judgment and decision making, and based on anchoring theories). Meta-analyses for each of the potential moderators revealed that there is currently no evidence of any personality moderator of anchoring. The most plausible reason for the absence of personality moderators is that individuals’ susceptibility to anchoring cannot be measured reliably. I discuss possible solutions, such as parameters derived from the anchoring and adjustment model.
... The past two decades have seen an upsurge in research into the determinants and consequences of first offers in negotiations (e.g., Ames and Mason, 2015;Maaravi and Hameiri, 2019). Previous research has established that first offers determine settlement prices through their anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) on counteroffers (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001), such that the counteroffer and consequent settlement price are closer to the first offer. ...
Article
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The behavioral decision-making and negotiations literature usually advocates a first-mover advantage, explained the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. Thus, buyers, who according to the social norm, tend to move second, strive to make the first offer to take advantage of this effect. On the other hand, negotiation practitioners and experts often advise the opposite, i.e., moving second. These opposite recommendations regarding first offers are termed the Practitioner-Researcher paradox. In the current article, we investigate the circumstances under which buyers would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on low power and anxiety during negotiations. Across two studies, we manipulated negotiators' best alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA) and measured their anxiety. Our results show that, when facing neutral-power sellers, weak buyers who feel anxious would make inferior first offers (Studies 1 and 2). When facing low-power sellers, weak buyers would make inferior first offers across all anxiety levels (Study 2). Our findings shed light on two critical factors leading to the Practitioner-Researcher paradox: power and anxiety, and offer concrete guidelines to buyers who find themselves at low power and highly anxious during negotiations.
... Previously, I had advised my students against providing a salary range to a prospective employer because I assumed that employers would anchor on the lowest figure in that range and then offer something close to that amount. However, recent research has suggested that ranges can be helpful and are associated with positive relational outcomes (Ames & Mason, 2015), which is why the suggested process indicates that students should provide a range in their job offer negotiations. ...
Article
Students who do not negotiate their job offers often leave value on the table, which will compound over time and perhaps throughout an entire career. The purpose of this article is to present a process that has been successfully used to instruct management students regarding what to communicate during their job offer negotiations. Sample statements are provided so that students can communicate with prospective employers in a way that will allow them to maximize the value of their job offers while maintaining the relationship with the prospective employer. The connections between this teaching practice and the extant research literature as well as research questions that emanate specifically from these connections are also discussed.
... For example, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) instructed negotiators to enter their negotiation with an exogenously imposed and fixed reservation price. However, more recent research has suggested that negotiators gradually form an understanding of their counterpart's reservation price throughout the negotiation, for example as a function of how much anger they expressed (Van Kleef et al., 2004) or the type of range offers that they receive (Ames & Mason, 2015). Building on this research, we argue that perceptions of a counterpart's reservation price are malleable and can be affected by contextual cues that negotiators get exposed to during the negotiation. ...
... Negotiators are routinely advised to make extreme first offers to benefit from the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When sellers make extreme first offers, final prices tend to be high; in contrast, when buyers make extreme first offers, final prices tend to be low (Ames & Mason, 2015;Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Evidence suggests this effect is robust across cultures, issues, and power positions (Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013). ...
Article
Full-text available
To what extent are research results influenced by subjective decisions that scientists make as they design studies? Fifteen research teams independently designed studies to answer five original research questions related to moral judgments, negotiations, and implicit cognition. Participants from two separate large samples (total N > 15,000) were then randomly assigned to complete one version of each study. Effect sizes varied dramatically across different sets of materials designed to test the same hypothesis: materials from different teams rendered statistically significant effects in opposite directions for four out of five hypotheses, with the narrowest range in estimates being d = -0.37 to +0.26. Meta-analysis and a Bayesian perspective on the results revealed overall support for two hypotheses, and a lack of support for three hypotheses. Overall, practically none of the variability in effect sizes was attributable to the skill of the research team in designing materials, while considerable variability was attributable to the hypothesis being tested. In a forecasting survey, predictions of other scientists were significantly correlated with study results, both across and within hypotheses. Crowdsourced testing of research hypotheses helps reveal the true consistency of empirical support for a scientific claim.
... On the other hand, the two mechanisms might differ in their mediating influence as a function of decision context-estimation versus negotiation. For a task that involves social interaction such as a negotiation, the social attribution-of-competence account might be relatively more influential in explaining the precision effect than the more cognitive scale-granularity account: In negotiations, information about the negotiation opponent (e.g., the opponent's competence) is essential to tailor one's strategy and plays a crucial role for the first offer's anchoring potency (Ames & Mason, 2015;Loschelder et al., 2017). Although in both contexts the competence of the anchor sender may be relevant to evaluate how strongly one can rely on the anchor value when generating an estimate, it is unique to the negotiation context that participants anticipate thoughts about the other person's reaction and an ensuing negotiation back-and-forth. ...
Article
Nearly 50% of all Earths’ forests have been cleared and considering forests hold 80% of the world’s diversity, it is crucial to support efforts by non-profit organizations (NPO) and government to stop deforestation. Yet, NPOs combat in an increasingly competitive donation sphere, with only 3% of donations going to conservation and animal welfare NPO’s. The present research aims to develop a novel perspective to increase consumer support (financial and time resources) to NPOs by examining the use of emotion (hope vs. fear) and numerical information (range vs. point value). Across three experimental studies, we provide concrete empirical evidence that hope increases the effectiveness of numerical information specified as a point value format, whereas fear will increase the effectiveness of numerical information specified as a range format. Our results provide practical implications for conservation NPO marketers in terms of matching emotion and numerical format.
Article
Negotiation scholars have assumed that participants enter negotiations with the intent to reach an agreement. In addition, negotiation scholars have assumed that negotiators cannot be significantly harmed by the negotiation process itself. We challenge both of these assumptions and identify important implications. We introduce the term insincere negotiations to characterize negotiations that involve one or more negotiators who feign interest in seeking an agreement and enter negotiations to pursue non-agreement motives, such as stalling for time, gaining information, or blocking a competitor from reaching an agreement. We explore how this broader conceptualization of negotiations changes both negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes and makes the decisions to enter and to persist in a negotiation risky and strategic.
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Negotiations are a careful balancing act between cooperation and competition—a successful negotiation requires extracting maximal value without offending and alienating a counterpart (i.e., the negotiator’s dilemma). It is thus surprising that negotiation scholars have largely overlooked a pervasive feature of negotiations: they entail “polite” speech. In this paper, we introduce politeness as a communicative strategy that is critical to solving the negotiator’s dilemma. By strategically adjusting their utterances to signal deference and respect, negotiators can make ambitious requests without derailing the exchange. Starting with an overview of politeness and a review of the relevant negotiation literature, we offer testable propositions regarding how attempts at polite speech manifest in negotiations, who is especially likely to express them, under what conditions, and to what effect. We also consider the conditions under which this communication strategy undermines negotiators. We hope our review and theorizing will open up broader discussions on the role of polite speech in deal making and conversational dynamics.
Conference Paper
Crowdfunding is a practice of raising small amounts of money from a group of people on the Internet platform to back a specific project. All those founders have the same purpose: raising the funds successful. Thus, how to gain more pledges in a limited period becomes an issue that deserves research and practical attention. In this study, we employ anchoring effect theory as a theoretical foundation to explore not only how different presentation ways of pledges on a crowdfunding platform affect the pledge amounts but also explore whether the presence of the average pledge amount will have an anchoring effect on the backers' pledge amounts. The results indicate that if using the bolstering range in the presentation ways of pledges on a crowdfunding platform, backers' pledges will enhance significantly. Anchoring effect exists on the backers' pledge amounts in the presence of the average pledge amount with scenario of single offer, but there is no anchoring effect in the presence of the average pledge amount with scenarios of single offer but can be changed and bolstering range offer. We conclude with a summary of theoretical implications and practical implications, along with an opportunity for IS researchers and practitioners to extend our knowledge of compelling future research possibilities.
Article
Past research paints a mixed picture of rationales in negotiations: Some findings suggest rationales might help, whereas others suggest they may have little effect or backfire. Here, we distinguish between two kinds of rationales buyers commonly employ – constraint rationales (referring to one’s own limited resources) and disparagement rationales (involving critiques of the negotiated object) – and demonstrate their divergent effects. Across four studies, we examined spontaneous rationales and manipulated rationale content, finding that constraint rationales have more positive effects on instrumental (e.g., counteroffers) and relational (e.g., trust) outcomes than disparagement rationales. Mediation analyses suggest constraint, but not disparagement, rationales are taken by sellers as signaling a buyer's limit. We also demonstrate a role for information, showing that the divergence between these rationales’ effects is attenuated when the seller has little information about their object’s value. Overall, our results show how and why rationales can help or hurt negotiators.
Article
Prior research has focused on the influence of emotional expressions on the value of negotiated outcomes. Across three studies, we demonstrate that people interacting with angry counterparts become more likely to walk away from a negotiation, resulting in an impasse. In Study 1, participants who encountered counterparts expressing anger were more likely to choose an impasse, relative to those with neutral counterparts. In Study 2, building on the emotion-as-social-information model, we found that inferences of selfishness mediate the effect of angry expressions on impasses. In Study 3, we found that timing moderates the relationship between angry expressions and impasses. Furthermore, we demonstrated that perceptions of inappropriateness mediate the interactive effect of timing and angry expressions on impasses. Taken together, our work reveals that expressing anger is risky in negotiations because people infer that angry counterparts are selfish and become more likely to exit negotiations.
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Most people believe that negotiators should avoid making the first offer. Yet, decades of research have documented the first-offer effect, wherein the person who moves first achieves a better outcome than the person who moves second. This gap between lay beliefs and research evidence may stem, in part, from the fact that studies on the first-offer effect are scattered across numerous scientific articles and journals. In hopes of bridging the gap and providing useful guidance to negotiators, this installation of Negotiating Life seeks to synthesize the evidence in one place. Reviewing many of the major articles on the first-offer effect, it concludes that negotiators should generally strive to make the first offer for specific reasons, in specific situations, and in a specific fashion.
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This article reviews literature on emotions within communication settings and proposes that emotions serve as motivations to accomplish social action; these motivations also serve as opportunities to negotiate agency within unfamiliar workplace settings. To exemplify the way this process develops, the author presents a case study of a technical communication intern as she works full-time for a German sales and distribution company. Through reflective self-narratives, the intern describes specific emotions she experiences as she adjusts to this German workplace. These emotions connect directly to decisions the student makes that help her negotiate agency from a “powerless” position, resulting in effective workplace relationships and a competent persona.
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Although marketing offers with flexible price options within a range of two endpoints (i.e., range offers) have been frequently used in various contexts, such as discount ranges, flexible pricing, and deal quotations, our understanding of how consumers react to this pricing strategy is rather limited. The current research suggests that consumers’ reaction to range marketing offers may depend on their general sense of scarcity. Eight studies show that reminders of resource scarcity induce a promotion orientation among consumers, which consequently increases consumers’ favorability toward range marketing offers. This effect is found to strengthen when the range of the offer becomes wider, and to weaken when the range offer cannot provide a better-than-reference outcome. These findings result in novel theoretical insights about the ways consumers react to range marketing offers. From a managerial perspective, this research offers tactics that companies can use to potentially increase the acceptance and effectiveness of range marketing offers.
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Bargainers must generally attempt to judge their counterparts' preferences, beliefs, and alternatives to settlement. Both descriptive and prescriptive theorists have assumed that an accurate perception of the other bargainer's reservation price (r.p.) is advantageous. Yet, unbiased judgments are optimal only when the costs of underestimation and overestimation are symmetric. Optimistic bias has been found to have adaptive value in judgments related to other types of tasks. In two studies we examined the relationship between perceptions of the bargaining zone and settlements in essentially distributive bargaining games. In the largely exploratory study one, bargainers were generally optimistically biased (i.e., they thought their counterpart could concede more than s/he really could) and optimism was positively correlated with profitability. In study 2 we manipulated information to induce accurate or biased perceptions. Optimistically biased negotiators again reached more profitable settlements than accurate or pessimistically biased negotiators. Optimism did not increase the likelihood of impasse in either study. Nor did it damage the relationship between the parties. Initial optimism appears to play an adaptive role in bargaining.
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Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling "excess" of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person's character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person's character is eliminated as an issue. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).
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In negotiations, higher first offers from sellers drive up sale prices—reversely, buyers benefit from lower first offers. Whereas abundant research has replicated this robust anchoring effect of opening offers, little is known about the impact of anchors’ precision or the interplay of extremity and precision. We propose that precision moderates the effect of anchor extremity, in that precise anchors gain in plausibility and thereby magnify the first-mover advantage. Two experiments tested this assumption. Study 1 shows that increasing precision strengthens the anchoring potency of first offers—sellers assimilate more to strong and precise anchors, which ultimately results in a particularly pronounced first-mover advantage. Study 2 replicates this moderating effect for buyers and indicates that an increased plausibility of precise anchors accounts for the findings. Implications for anchor theorizing, negotiation research, and the first minutes at a bargaining table are discussed.
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The first-offer effect demonstrates that negotiators achieve better outcomes when making the first offer than when receiving it. The evidence, however, primarily derives from studies of Westerners without systematic power differences negotiating over one issue-contexts that may amplify the first-offer effect. Thus, the present research explored the effect across cultures, among negotiators varying in power, and in negotiations involving single and multiple issues. The first two studies showed that the first-offer effect remains remarkably robust across cultures and multi-issue negotiations. The final two studies demonstrated that low-power negotiators benefit from making the first offer across single- and multi-issue negotiations. The second and fourth studies used multi-issue negotiations with distributive, integrative, and compatible issues, allowing us to show that first offers operate through the distributive, not the integrative or compatible issues. Overall, these results reveal that moving first can benefit negotiators across many organizational and personal situations.
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Most research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation.
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This chapter is about negotiation and has three goals. First, we review recent developments in the social psychological study of negotiation. Second, we develop a set of basic principles that covers current insights into the negotiation process and captures cognitive, motivational, and affective influences on the quality of agreements people reach. Third, we develop the idea that to make strategic decisions, individuals in negotiation need to make sense of their situation and their counterpart. That is, to understand negotiation we need to understand how people search and process information and use the emerging insights to make strategic decisions that, ultimately, affect their own as well as their counterpart's outcomes. We begin this chapter with a brief discussion of the structure of negotiation and argue that individuals in negotiation face fuzzy situations that are full of uncertainties and ambiguities and require sense making on the part of the negotiators. We then discuss the strategies and interaction patterns that characterize negotiation and develop principles about strategic repertoires negotiators have, and about action-reaction patterns across different phases of negotiation. In the third section we discuss the negotiator as motivated information processor, concentrating on the (often detrimental) impact of cognitive heuristics, naive realism, and ego defensiveness. In this section we also discuss work showing that the influence of these information-processing barriers may be countered by the epistemic motivation to process information systematically and deliberately. In the fourth section we view the negotiator as social animal, and focus on impression management motives, and the wealth of research on proself versus prosocial motivation, questioning the rather popular assumption that individuals in conflict and negotiation are self-interested and ignorant of their counterpart's needs and desires. In the fifth section we consider the emotional negotiator and discuss the intra- and interpersonal functions of affect and emotion in negotiation. In each of these five sections we identify one or more basic principles of negotiation. To examine the generality of these basic principles and processes, we review in the sixth section recent research on cross-cultural differences in negotiation. We conclude with a summary and integration of the 10 principles identified in this review and provide some general direction for future inquiry. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Several experiments provided evidence that negotiators make systematic errors in personality-trait attributions for the bargaining behaviors of their counterparts. Although basic negotiation behavior is highly determined by bargaining positions, negotiators primarily interpret their counterpart's behavior in terms of the counterpart's personality, such as his or her level of cooperativeness or agreeableness. Data support a model of 4 processes that contribute to misperceptions: (a) the primacy of situations in determining bargaining behavior, (b) the primacy of personality traits in attributions, (c) the lack of sufficient information about the other's situation to discount personality attributions, and (d) the potentially self-confirming consequences of personality attributions for subsequent interactions. The authors discuss implications for research areas such as social cognition in negotiation, accuracy in social perception, and dynamics of belief confirmation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Three experiments explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across 3 experiments, whichever party, the buyer or seller, made the 1st offer obtained a better outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. However, when the negotiator who did not make a 1st offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of the opponent's 1st offer, the advantageous effect of making the 1st offer was eliminated: Thinking about one's opponent's alternatives to the negotiation (Experiment 1), one's opponent's reservation price (Experiment 2), or one's own target (Experiment 3) all negated the effect of 1st offers on outcomes. These effects occurred for both face-to-face negotiations and E-mail negotiations. Implications for negotiations and perspective-taking are discussed.
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People's motivational states--their wishes and preferences--influence their processing of visual stimuli. In 5 studies, participants shown an ambiguous figure (e.g., one that could be seen either as the letter B or the number 13) tended to report seeing the interpretation that assigned them to outcomes they favored. This finding was affirmed by unobtrusive and implicit measures of perception (e.g., eye tracking, lexical decision tasks) and by experimental procedures demonstrating that participants were aware only of the single (usually favored) interpretation they saw at the time they viewed the stimulus. These studies suggest that the impact of motivation on information processing extends down into preconscious processing of stimuli in the visual environment and thus guides what the visual system presents to conscious awareness.
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Do people know when they are seen as pressing too hard, yielding too readily, or having the right touch? And does awareness matter? We examined these questions in four studies. Study 1 used dyadic negotiations to reveal a modest link between targets' self-views and counterparts' views of targets' assertiveness, showing that those seen as under- and over-assertive were likely to see themselves as appropriately assertive. Surprisingly, many people seen as appropriately assertive by counterparts mistakenly thought they were seen as having been over-assertive, a novel effect we call the line crossing illusion. We speculated that counterparts' orchestrated displays of discomfort might be partly responsible-behaviors we termed strategic umbrage. Study 2 revealed evidence for widespread strategic umbrage in real-world negotiations and Study 3 linked these behaviors to the line crossing illusion in a controlled negotiation. Study 4 showed that this illusion predicted outcomes in a multi-round negotiation.
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Virtually all discussions and applications of statistical mediation analysis have been based on the condition that the independent variable is dichotomous or continuous, even though investigators frequently are interested in testing mediation hypotheses involving a multicategorical independent variable (such as two or more experimental conditions relative to a control group). We provide a tutorial illustrating an approach to estimation of and inference about direct, indirect, and total effects in statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable. The approach is mathematically equivalent to analysis of (co)variance and reproduces the observed and adjusted group means while also generating effects having simple interpretations. Supplementary material available online includes extensions to this approach and Mplus, SPSS, and SAS code that implements it.
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The current research examines the extent to which visual perception is distorted by one's experience of power. Specifically, does power distort impressions of another person's physical size? Two experiments found that participants induced to feel powerful through episodic primes (Study 1) and legitimate leadership role manipulations (Study 2) systematically underestimated the size of a target, and participants induced to feel powerless systematically overestimated the size of the target. These results emerged whether the target person was in a photograph or face-to-face. These findings suggest that the experience of powerfulness and powerlessness leads people to misperceive complementary power cues in others, and in doing so, distorts what they actually see. We discuss how these findings elucidate the interplay between how psychological states influence perception, and through this, facilitate social coordination.
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"Negotiation as a Social Process" covers a wide range of topics, including the role of group identification and accountability on negotiator judgment and decision making, the importance of power-dependence relations on negotiation, intergroup bargaining, coalitional dynamics in bargaining, social influence processes in negotiation, cross-cultural perspectives on negotiation, and the impact of social relationships on negotiation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Most economic models about bilateral monopoly (1 seller sells 1 product to 1 buyer) predict that the amount sold will be determinate at the amount which maximizes joint payoff, but that the price will be indeterminate. Pairs of Ss bargained over prices and quantities of a hypothetical commodity with real payoffs contingent on success in bargaining. The theoretical prediction was confirmed. In spite of severe restrictions on communication, most Ss arrived at prices which produced a 50-50 division of the maximum joint payoff. Variance of prices was reduced as information increased. The member of a bargaining pair with more information was at a disadvantage, because he arrived more quickly at the equitable offer and so was handicapped in subsequent bargaining. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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This paper discusses the causes and consequences of the (surprisingly) limited extent to which social influence research has penetrated the field of negotiation, and then presents a framework for bridging the gap between these two literatures. The paper notes that one of the reasons for its limited impact on negotiation research is that extant research on social influence focuses almost exclusively on economic or structural levers of influence. With this in mind, the paper seeks to achieve five objectives: Define the domain of psychological influence as consisting of those tactics which do not require the influencer to change the economic or structural aspects of the bargaining situation in order to persuade the target; Review prior research on behavioral decision making to identify ideas that may be relevant to the domain of psychological influence; Provide a series of examples of how behavioral decision research can be leveraged to create psychological influence tactics for use in negotiation; Consider the other side of influence, i.e., how targets of influence might defend against the tactics herein considered; and Consider some of the ethical issues surrounding the use of psychological influence in negotiation.
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Social decisions are heavily influenced by emotion. For decades, the dominant research paradigm has been characterized by a focus on the decision maker's own positive or negative mood. We argue that a full understanding of the role of emotion in social decision making requires a complementary focus on interpersonal effects (i.e., the effects of one individual's emotions on the other's behavior); a focus on discrete emotions rather than general mood states; and a distinction between cooperative and competitive settings. To advance insight into these issues, we present the Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model. The model is grounded in two basic assumptions, namely that individuals use others' emotions to make sense of ambiguous situations, and that the effects of others' emotions and the processes that drive them depend critically on the cooperative or competitive nature of the situation. A review of recent research supports our analysis. We demonstrate that the interpersonal effects of emotions are pervasive and can be better understood in terms of the unique social functions of each emotion than in terms of valence. Effects in cooperative settings are best explained in terms of affective reactions (i.e., emotional contagion, affect infusion, and mood management), whereas effects in competitive contexts are better understood in terms of the strategic inferences individuals draw from other's emotions. We conclude by discussing the implications of our model and highlighting avenues for future research.
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Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long noted the impact of face, or social image, concerns on negotiation outcomes. When face is threatened, negotiators are less likely to reach agreement and to create joint gain. In this paper, we explore individual differences in face threat sensitivity (FTS), and how a negotiator's role moderates the relationship of his or her FTS to negotiation outcomes. Study 1 describes a measure of FTS. Study 2 finds that buyers and sellers are less likely to reach an agreement that is in both parties' interests when the seller has high FTS. Study 3 finds that job candidates and recruiters negotiate an employment contract with less joint gain when the candidate has high FTS, and that this relationship is mediated by increased competitiveness on the part of the high FTS candidates. The results support Deutsch's (1961) application of face theory (Goffman, 1967) to negotiation.
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Forty subjects in an automobile-trading game bargained with a programmed opponent. Half the subjects knew the possible range of profits for both themselves and the opponent (completely informed), while half knew only their own possible profits (incompletely informed). Within each of these information conditions, half the subjects received a first bid favorable to themselves from the opponent, while the other half received an unfavorable first bid. Favorable bids led to higher demands, both in counterbids and in contract accepted, among incompletely informed subjects, while unfavorable bids led to somewhat higher bids among completely informed subjects, though value of contract accepted was not affected. Results support the hypotheses that uninformed bargainers use opponents' bids to set their own goals, while informed bargainers use them to assess the reasonableness of the opponent's goals.
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In the global marketplace, negotiation frequently takes place across cultural boundaries, yet negotiation theory has traditionally been grounded in Western culture. This book, which provides an in-depth review of the field of negotiation theory, expands current thinking to include cross-cultural perspectives. The contents of the book reflect the diversity of negotiation—research-negotiator cognition, motivation, emotion, communication, power and disputing, intergroup relationships, third parties, justice, technology, and social dilemmas—and provides new insight into negotiation theory, questioning assumptions, expanding constructs, and identifying limits not apparent from working exclusively within one culture. The book is organized in three sections and pairs chapters on negotiation theory with chapters on culture. The first part emphasizes psychological processes—cognition, motivation, and emotion. Part II examines the negotiation process. The third part emphasizes the social context of negotiation. A final chapter synthesizes the main themes of the book to illustrate how scholars and practitioners can capitalize on the synergy between culture and negotiation research.
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In theories and studies of persuasion, people's personal knowledge about persuasion agents' goals and tactics, and about how to skillfully cope with these, has been ignored. We present a model of how people develop and use persuasion knowledge to cope with persuasion attempts. We discuss what the model implies about how consumers use marketers' advertising and selling attempts to refine their product attitudes and attitudes toward the marketers themselves. We also explain how this model relates to prior research on consumer behavior and persuasion and what it suggests about the future conduct of consumer research. Copyright 1994 by the University of Chicago.
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It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.
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This article examines whether the availability of multiple anchors reduces anchoring induced bias in individual and group judgment. Based on earlier research, it was unclear whether multiple anchors would mitigate anchoring effects. This issue was investigated in the context of a two-party, single issue negotiation. ANOVA revealed that an unreliable anchor introduced just before the negotiation was to occur was sufficient to induce substantial anchoring effects that were as large for groups as they were for individuals. This pattern was equally apparent in the judgments of MBA students (n= 105) and experienced managers (n= 135). Initial offers, aspiration levels, and bottom lines were all affected even though relevant anchors such as information about the certain financial consequences associated with a failure to reach a negotiated agreement were provided. An analysis based on social decision scheme theory suggests that groups did not debias individual judgment because groups did not use anchoring and adjustment to make estimates. Rather, group decisions reflected the majority point of view as it existed at the outset of group discussion. If no majority existed, groups tended to reach consensus by averaging the pre-group estimates of individuals. Implications of these findings for anchoring theory are discussed.
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