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Re-reading both Hegel and Marx: The" new dialectics" and the method of Capital

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Abstract

The “new dialectic” offers a new interpretation of Marx’s method. Its most salient feature is the emphasis on certain aspects of Hegelian logic for the interpretation of Marx’s writings, especially The Capital. This article systematically presents the “new dialectic” argument and the main problems with this approach. The latter derive from the assumption that the richness of the concrete is contained in the commodity and can be revealed only through dialectics. This view is deficient because it neglects the influence of historically contingent elements on concrete reality, and its role in Marx’s analysis.
Re-reading both Hegel and Marx:
The “new dialectics” and the method of Capital
Relendo Hegel e Marx: A “Nova Dialética” e o método de capital
ALFREDO SAAD FILHO*,**
RESUMO: A “nova dialética” oferece uma nova interpretação do método de Marx. Sua
faceta mais saliente é a ênfase em certos aspectos da lógica hegeliana para a interpretação
dos escritos de Marx, em especial O Capital. Este artigo apresenta sistematicamente o argu-
mento da “nova dialética” e os principais problemas dessa abordagem. Os últimos derivam
da presunção de que a riqueza do concreto está contida na mercadoria e pode ser revelada
apenas através da dialética. Essa visão é deciente porque negligencia a inuência de ele-
mentos historicamente contingentes na realidade concreta, e seu papel na análise de Marx.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: História do pensamento econômico; Marx; Hegel; dialética; metodolo-
gia da economia.
ABSTRACT: The “new dialectic” offers a new interpretation of Marx’s method. Its most sa-
lient feature is the emphasis on certain aspects of Hegelian logic for the interpretation of
Marx’s writings, especially The Capital. This article systematically presents the “new dialec-
tic” argument and the main problems with this approach. The latter derive from the assump-
tion that the richness of the concrete is contained in the commodity and can be revealed
only through dialectics. This view is decient because it neglects the inuence of historically
contingent elements on concrete reality, and its role in Marx’s analysis.
KEYWORDS: History of economic thought; Marx; Hegel; dialectics; economic methodology.
JEL Classication: B14; B12; B24: B31; B40.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article evaluates the contribution of the so-called “new dialectics” (Arthur,
1993 b) to the on-going debate about the method underlying the labour theory of
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, vol. 17, nº 1 (65), pp. 115-130, January-March/1997
* School of Business and Economic Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom. E-mail: as59@
soas.ac.uk.
** I am grateful to Chris Arthur, Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas, Fred Moseley, Kathy O’Donnell, Alejan-
dro Ramos Martinezand Ali Shamsavari for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.
They do not necessarily agree with the opinions expressed here, and are not responsible for any errors
or omissions.
115http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31571997-0917 Revista de Economia Política 17(1), 1997
116 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
value. This relatively new interpretation adds much to the previous literature, but
still needs to be adequately systematized and critically examined. The contribution
of the “new dialectics” is important, first, because of the rigour with which it ad-
dresses the complex issues of the structure and logic of the labour theory of value
and, second, because of the emphasis which it places upon the relationship between
the dialectical method and economic analysis.
Even though the roots of the “new dialectics” can be traced back several de-
cades (at least to Lukacs’ work in the early 20s; see, for example, Lukacs, 1971
[1922]), it was only in the late 80s that there was a consistent effort to consolidate
and expand this body of knowledge. The distinguishing feature of the “new dialec-
tics” is its emphasis on the relationship between Hegel and Marx. This includes not
only the attempt to read Marx’s works with a view to Hegel’s method but, also, the
search for a “Marxian” reading of Hegel. This does not imply that Marx’s critique
of Hegel’s idealism is ignored (even though Marx himself never fully developed it),
nor that there is an attempt to produce a synthesis of Hegel ‘s dialectics with Marx’s.
On the contrary, the “new dialectics” emphasizes the need to re-interpret Hegel’s
work with Marxian eyes; on this basis, new insights are sought with regard to the
structure of Marx’s own work, especially Capital.
The early stage of elaboration of the “new dialectics” makes it difficult to
pinpoint the main elements of this line of thought, distinguish it from previous
analyses, and determine the body of work that belongs to it. In spite of this, in what
follows an interpretation of the “new dialectics” is proposed. This is useful not
only because of the careful presentation of the case for the “new dialectics”, but
also because it allows the main problems with this view to be brought to light. In
doing this, I draw heavily upon works by Fred Moseley, Patrick Murray, Ali Sham-
savari and Tony Smith (even though their writings are not necessarily homogeneous
in every respect) and substantiate their claims by recourse to earlier writings by
Karel Kosik, E. V. Ilyenkov, Jindrich Zeleny and others.
This article has four sections. The second, after this introduction, discusses the
case for the understanding of the labour theory of value as a systematic dialectic
theory, which aims at the reconstruction in thought of the essential categories of
the capitalist mode of production. This is one of the main claims of the “new dia-
lectics”, and its implications need to be investigated in detail. The third analyses
one specific issue, the starting point of Capital. The reasons why Marx chose the
commodity as the starting point of the book, and the status of the commodity at
this stage in the analysis, are questions that have been discussed for decades. This
section spells out the perspective of the “new dialectics”, that sheds new light upon
these issues. The fourth section summarizes the claims of the “new dialectics”, and
critically evaluates their consistency and persuasiveness.
117Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
THE LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE AS
A SYSTEMATIC DIALECTIC THEORY
There are widely different interpretations of the method of analysis appropri-
ate to the labour theory of value. Traditional views such as Engels’ logico-historical
approach have been popular for decades (Engels, 1981b [1895]; for a critique, see
Shamsavari, 1991). Althusser’s structuralism has also been influential, especially
between the late 60s and the mid 70s (Althusser, 1969 [1965a], 1970 [1965b]; see,
however, Hunt, 1984, and van Parijs, 1979), and the so-called Analytical Marxism
is now in vogue in the United States and other countries (Roemer, 1986; the claims
of Analytical Marxists are confronted by Lebowitz, 1994a, and Smith, 1993a). The
controversies sparked by different views of Marx’s method have played a significant
role in the development of the labour theory of value, and there are reasons to
believe that they will be at least as lively in the future.
It is doubtful, however, that these disputes would have become as far-reaching,
and developed such a prominence, if Marx had been less cryptic in his writings
(especially Capital) with regard to his own method. In the postface to the second
edition of Capital 1, for example, Marx notes that “the method employed in Cap-
ital has been little understood” (KI1, p. 99). This conclusion is confirmed by the
widely different opinions of translators and reviewers of the book. Unfortunately,
Marx avoids a more detailed analysis of the subject, and modem readers are left
unsure about Marx’s view of his own method.
This reticence can be explained in at least two (not mutually exclusive) ways.
For Arthur (1993a, pp. 63-4), this is due to Marx’ s own lack of clarity on the mat-
ter, especially with regard to his own relation to Hegel. For Smith (1993b, p. 47),
Marx deliberately downplayed the method of Capital to make the book more ac-
cessible to his working-class readers. Therefore, Smith’s conjecture indicates that
the tension between the complexity of the book’s content and Marx’s desire to find
an attractive form of exposition led him to neglect the explicit consideration of
methodological issues and may even have led him to include more historical mate-
rial than would be strictly necessary.
Whilst it is relatively easy to accept Smith’s position, especially in view of some
of Marx’s letters and the Preface to the French edition of Capital 12, Arthur’s argu-
ment demands more careful scrutiny. If it is true that Marx was unclear about
important methodological issues affecting his own work, especially the relation of
his own method with Hegel’s, the consequences would be far-reaching for modern
1 In this article Capital is referred to as K, the Theories of Surplus Value as TSV, and the Grundrisse as
GR. All italics in quotations are original unless otherwise stated.
2 In a letter to Engels on December 8, 1861, Marx says that his new book (Capital) “will nonetheless
be much more popular and the method will be much more hidden than in part 1 [the Contribution]”
(quoted in Murray, 1988, p. 109). In the preface to the French edition of Capital 1 Marx approves of
the transformation of his book into a serial, in which case “the book will be more accessible to the
working class, a consideration which to me outweighs everything else” (K 1, p. 104).
118 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
interpretations of the labour theory of value. This thorny issue cannot be resolved
here. The approach discussed in this article presumes that it is possible to interpret
the labour theory of value as a systematic dialectic theory. This perspective empha-
sizes the relationship between Marx’s method and Hegel’s dialectics, which has
recently been the subject of renewed attention from distinct perspectives.3
This approach does not imply that other interpretations of the labour theory
of value should be rejected, nor does it claim that every aspect of Capital (or of
Marx’s earlier works) is a necessary step for the dialectical reconstruction of the
capitalist mode of production in thought. However, it contends that the main fea-
tures of Capital, and its inner logic as a whole, can be understood from this point
of view (see Smith, 1993b, p. 25).
When considered as a systematic dialectic theory, the labour theory of value is
a theory of categories. These categories belong to distinct analytical levels, some
simpler and relatively abstract (value, labour power, etc.), and others more complex
and concrete (market price, land rent, and so on).4 For Smith (1993a, p. 115), a
theory follows a dialectical logic if: (i) categories that articulate simple and abstract
social structures are ordered prior to categories that define more complex and
concrete structures and (ii) each category fixes a structure that incorporates the
structures presented in the prior categories and in turn is incorporated in the struc-
tures fixed by subsequent categories. JI this sense early categories are principles for
the derivation of later ones.
For the “new dialectics”, scientific investigation should be organized around
the construction of organized systems of categories, because thought cannot im-
mediately apprehend the complex determinations of the concrete. The concrete is
complex for two reasons; first, because the form of appearance of the phenomena
does not immediately reveal their essence, or inner relations.5 For Hegel (1991
[1830], 1993 [1812-1816]), the appearance is the necessary form of manifestation
of the essence because the essence has no immediate existence. As the essence can
3 The Hegel-Marx connection was regarded as highly important by Lenin (1972 [1929]) for whom, as
is well-known, “[i]t is impossible completely to understand Marx’s Capital, and especially its first chapter,
without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel ‘s Logic” (p. 180; see also p.
319). The relationship between Hegel and Marx is discussed by Banaji (1979), Fracchia & Ryan (1992),
llyenkov (1982 [1979]), Moseley (1993), Murray (1988, 1993), Rosdolsky (1977 [1968]), Shamsavari
(1991), Smith (1990, 1993a, 1993 b) and Zeleny (1980 [1972]); for a different opinion, see Colletti
(1973 [1969]).
4 Marx uses the term “concrete” in two distinct circumstances. First, to distinguish the actual from the
conceptual and, second, to distinguish, within the sphere of the conceptual, concepts that are more or
less determinate in thought. The latter meaning is used here; the former is used below; the context should
make the meaning of the term unambiguous. By the same token, the term “abstract” also has two
different meanings: first as an empty, simple or deficient concept, poor in determinations and alienated
from concrete reality; second, as the concept itself, that is determined through reasoning and plays a
necessary role in the identification of the essence of things.
5 Hegel and Marx use the term phenomenon for the merely apparent, that has no relation with the real,
and for the visible side of the essence. The latter is the sense of interest in these pages.
119Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
appear only as phenomenon, its form of manifestation simultaneously conceals it.
The contradiction between immediacy and reflection intrinsic to the essence implies
that the reality is more than a collection of sensous phenomena; on the contrary, it
is the unity of the essence itself and its forms of appearance.6
However, this is not the only justification for the above stance. The second
reason why the concrete is complex is that nothing exists in isolation but only in a
system with other things. In other words, the concrete is a complex whole, and it
has organic unity. Despite the fact that this system is logically prior to each par-
ticular thing, it does not appear as such. The only way to recognize that each thing
is an element (moment) of a concrete system of interacting things, or a concrete
manifestation of a system of relations, is through the progress of scientific analysis
from the abstract to the concrete, or through the step-by-step combination of par-
ticular definitions into an overall picture of reality (see llyenkov, 1982 [1979], p.
57, and Murray, 1993).
For this reason, science is not merely the work of piercing through the exter-
nally given forms of appearance to reveal the underlying essence. There is another
side to it: scientific analysis must also show why the appearances belong to, and
are a necessary aspect of, the essence. This can be done only through the identifica-
tion of the mediations whereby the essence of phenomena is expressed through their
form of appearance:
The concrete and material have a depth level underlying its surface level
of appearances. The task of thought is rst to pierce through the appear-
ances to that depth level ... and then to proceed to the mediations that
connect the depth level with the given appearances. To full this task, it
is not sufcient for thought to assert its independence; it must assert its
primacy over the appearances generated by the real process. A dialectical
reconstruction of categories allows for this ... [Hence, the] intelligibility
of the concrete and material can only be grasped through asserting the
priority of the thought process over how the concrete and material is
given in appearances. (Smith, 1990, p. 37, emphasis omitted.)
Therefore, the concrete understanding of the relationship between essence and
appearance can be achieved only through a two-way process; first, the essence
should be grasped by means of an analysis that departs from the appearance; sec-
ond, the intrinsic relationship between the form of appearance and the essence
should be accounted for. As a result, the features of the appearance are explained
by virtue of the underlying essence, and the reality is recognized as a complex
logical figure that comprises the essence, the appearance which reflects it, and the
6 It follows that, for Hegel, laws derived from the immediate appearances (empirical regularities) lack
explanatory power, because they do not contain the proof of their objective necessity.
120 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
form of their necessary interdependence.7 For the “new dialectics”, this is precisely
the work that Marx sets out to do in Capital. With this aim he took over Hegel’s
dialectical logic, modified it, and developed his own method for the systematic
reconstruction in thought of the essential categories of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction.8
The soundness of this method and the validity of its results are contingent
upon two requirements. First, the contradictions in the simpler concepts should be
the source of the more complex ones. However, the latter should not reject the
former; instead, the more complex forms of the concept should reveal the inner
potential of the simpler ones in a more concrete context. Second, every concept or
category should be introduced by means of the procedure outlined above; in par-
ticular, no assumption should be made with regard to the structure of the inquiry,
the role of each concept in it, or their interrelations, unless it derives from the
process of unfolding of new concepts from more abstract ones. In addition, the
analysis should take into account the fact that, since all concepts are linked, the
sublation9 of a concept by others (or the sublation of a form of the concept by a
more complex one) often changes the meaning of other concepts.10
According to the “new dialectics”, the systematic evolution of the analysis
objectively determines which contradictions or concepts should be developed, or
unfold, at any given point. Because of this intrinsically dynamic framework, con-
cepts at distinct levels of abstraction always coexist in dialectical analyses. More-
7 This approach may be used to shed light on Marx’s critique of Ricardo’s value theory. According to
Marx, Ricardo’s (correct) identification of’ labour as the essence of value is insufficient, because Ricardo
should also have shown why the essence appears as it does, or why and in which circumstances does
labour appear as value. The “Ricardian socialist” idea that a “labour-money” would do away with
economic crises suffers from a similar inability to link essence with appearance (see Saad-Filho, 1993).
In contrast, in his account of the value-form Marx not only identifies the essence of value, but also why
value appears as price.
8 For Smith (1993a, p. 37), Marx’s aim in Capital is “to trace ‘the intrinsic connection existing between
economic categories or the obscure structure of the bourgeois economic system ... [to] fathom the inner
connection, the physiology, so to speak, of the bourgeois system”’ (TSV2, p. 165). This is nothing more
than the Hegelian goal of reconstructing the world in thought through working out a systematic theory
of categories’ (emphasis omitted). See also pp. 15-20, Banaji (1979, pp. 19-20), Kosik (l976, pp. 2-3),
and Murray (1988, pp. 40-5, 158-9).
9 The word “sublate” is used as the English equivalent of Hegel ‘s “Aufhebung” (to preserve the previous
category while clearing away and substituting it). “Supersede” and “suspend” have also fulfilled a similar
role in the literature; see Hegel (1991 [ 1830], pp. xxxv-xxxvi and 154).
10 This complex issue is discussed further by Arthur (n.d.), Engels (1981a [1894]), Murray (1988, 1993),
Shamsavari (1991), and Smith (1990, 1993a, 1993b). This has not escaped the attention of the more
careful analysts of Marx’s work. For example, in their study of the composition of capital, Groll &
Orzech (1989, p. 57) point out that “[t]he basic difficulty in fully grasping the meaning and significance
of the composition of capital is rooted in Marx’s methodological approach to his economic research.
Being strongly influenced by Hegel’s method, Marx’s concepts have a dynamic meaning in their
appearances and transformations. His categories rarely have the straightforward, unequivocal meanings
so familiar to, and expected by, the modem economist. On the contrary, they usually have multiple,
sometimes complementary, and sometimes contradictory, meanings”.
121Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
over, the evolution of the reconstruction of the concrete in thought depends upon
the development of the contradictions within concepts and between interrelated
concepts. Unless these steps are followed at every stage, the analysis becomes prone
to logical faults, which may eventually handicap its development and lead it astray.
As the investigation progresses, successive levels of abstraction are bridged, and
the analysis encompasses more and more concrete features of reality; in other
words, it gradually reconstructs the concrete:
Ascending from the abstract to the concrete is a movement for which
every beginning is abstract and whose dialectics consists of transcend-
ing this abstractness ... Ascending from the abstract to the concrete ...
is the dialectics of the concrete totality in which reality is intellectually
reproduced on all levels and in all dimensions. The process of thinking
not only transforms the chaotic whole of ideas into a clear whole of
concepts; but in this process, the whole itself is outlined, determined and
comprehended, too. (Kosik, 1976, p. l5; see also GR, pp.100-2.)
An inquiry which follows this approach can never be completed, because all
concepts are intrinsically contradictory and subject to further transformation and
greater determination. For the “new dialectics”, this is not a defect of this method
but, rather, one of its virtues, because it recognises that the elements and properties
of the reality are endless. However, it should be pointed out that the construction
of the categories that capture the essential features of the real world is quite distinct
from an attempt to bridge the gap between thought and reality, and present an all-
encompassing explanation of certain aspects of life. This would be a self-defeating
exercise, because thought is unable to overcome the intrinsic autonomy of the
material world, regardless of the complexity of the analysis:
The dialectics of the concrete totality is not a method that would naively
aspire to know all aspects of reality exhaustively and to present a “total”
image of reality, with all its innite aspects and properties ... Rather, it is
a theory of reality as a concrete totality. This [is a] conception of reality,
of reality as concreteness, as a whole that is structured (and thus is not
chaotic), that evolves (and thus is not immutable and given once and for
all), and that is in the process of forming (and thus is not ready-made in
its whole, with only its parts, or their ordering, subject to change). (Kosik,
1976, p. 19.)11
11 In other words, the aim of the exercise is not merely an asymptotic reconstruction of the real per se,
but to use the knowledge thus obtained as a means to intervene in reality. In this sense, Marx’s dialectics
is a philosophy of praxis (see Elson, 1979b, and Sanchez Vazquez, 1977 (1966)).
122 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
3. THE STARTING POINT OF CAPITAL
The systematic reconstruction of the reality in thought requires the identifica-
tion of some starting point for the analysis. This is the single, most abstract and
fundamental concept of the appearances. These characteristics make this concept
a cell-form, whose gradual unfolding should lead, through a series of mediations,
to the reconstruction of the concrete. The identification of this concept is the salto
mortale of Marx’s method, because the failure to select the correct starting point
will prevent the analysis from accounting for important aspects of reality or lead
to inconsistency.
It was seen above that a dialectical theory of categories necessarily departs
from the real and concrete; however, as the immediate perception of the whole does
not lead to knowledge of its inner structure, the sensous experience of the concrete
needs to be theorized. Therefore, the starting point must be an element of reality,
but a very specific one, whose identification is already the first result of the applica-
tion of the dialectical method (see Arthur, 1992, and Smith, 1990).
Marx could not begin Capital with the analysis of value (even though this is
the measure of capitalist wealth), nor with the dissection of the concept of capital
(although this is the subject of the book and the most important relation of produc-
tion in capitalism), because these concepts cannot immediately be grasped from the
inspection of reality; they need to be developed on the basis of other, relatively
simpler concepts. It took Marx many years of study, and several attempts, until he
identified the commodity as the adequate starting point for his book.12 The com-
modity was chosen because it is the immediate, elementary, and actual unit of
wealth in capitalism. As this is a legitimate cell-for, the unfolding of the contradic-
tions in the concept of commodity allows concepts such as value and capital to be
introduced into the analysis (see GR, pp. 100-2, Marx, 1989 [1930], p. 544, and
Campbell, 1993).
The fact that commodities exist in several previous modes of production does
not disqualify this concept as the adequate starting point for a reconstruction of
capitalism in thought. However, it indicates that in Marx’s analysis this term has
two distinct meanings; first, it stands for commodities as the product of commod-
ity-producing labour in general, a form that has existed for millennia and is one of
the historical premises of capitalist production. Second, it means commodities as
the product of labour performed under capitalist social relations. The difference
between these meanings of the term lies on the fact that, under previous modes of
production, the production of commodities does not exist for itself, while in capital-
ism it acquires independence and necessity.13
12 The process of identification of the commodity as the starting point of Capital is retraced in Echeverria
(1978, 1980).
13 “The choice of the capitalist commodity as the starting point of Capital means that the latter is the
most important meaninsurplus value created by it” (TSV3, pp. 112-3).
123Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
The choice of the capitalist commodity as the starting point of Capital means
that the latter is the most important meaning of this concept in Marx’s work. As
the commodity which is the starting point belongs to the mode of production that
is to be explained, this is a legitimate concept, that expresses a concrete universal,
and not an abstract universal or a general notion. The distinction between concrete
and abstract universals is very important and must be scrutinized further.
Abstract universals are determined through empiricist analysis; they are formal
abstractions based on superficial resemblance, and they directly comprehend all
particulars without exception (otherwise they would not be universals). In other
words, they are determined through the investigation of the external relations, or
through abstraction from the phenomena concerned (Gunn, 1992, p. 23). From the
standpoint of dialectics, abstract universals are useful but provide little scientific
understanding, because they cannot account for the specificities of the objects that
they represent.14
Concrete universals are determined through concrete abstraction, or by ab-
straction in and through the phenomena. Concrete universals express the objective
essence of the phenomenon, and have a genetic relation with the particulars (see
below). From the viewpoint of dialectics only concrete abstraction provides real
understanding, because science deals with the actual, and the actual is complex and
determinate. As concrete abstraction points towards the internal relations of the
subject, it allows the identification of the cell-form of the particulars. The cell-form
should be understood in the double sense of expressing the specific concrete content
of the particulars, or their most general characteristic, and of expressing not some
arbitrary form of development of the object, but only that which constitutes the
actual foundation from which the particular forms develop:
A concrete universal concept comprises in itself “the wealth of the par-
ticulars” in its concrete denitions – in two senses ... First, a concrete
universal concept expresses in its denitions the specic concrete con-
tent (the internal law-governed structure) of a single, quite denite form
of the development of an object under study. It comprises in itself “the
whole wealth” of the denitions of this form, its structure, and its speci-
city. Second, it does not express in its denitions some arbitrarily cho-
sen form of development of the object as a whole but that, and only that,
14 “Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out
and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still, this general category, this common
element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into different
determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few. {Some} determinations
will be shared by the most modem epoch and the most ancient. No production will be thinkable without
them; however ... just those things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not
general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so
that in their unity-which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity, and of the object,
nature-their essential difference is not forgotten” (GR, p. 85; the term in curly brackets was added by
the editors).
124 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
form which constitutes the really universal basis or foundation on which
“the whole wealth” of other formations grows. (llyenkov, 1982 [1979],
pp. 84-5.)15
As the categorial reconstruction of the concrete is predicated upon the exis-
tence of the developed system, the logical unfolding of the concepts discloses the
inner logic of development of the concrete, and not the actual process of its becom-
ing (its historical genesis). This indicates that the main objective of Capital is the
reconstruction of the capitalist mode of production in its actuality, and not its
historical genesis – which helps explain why Capital 1 starts with the (capitalist)
commodity, and not with the analysis of primitive accumulation or commercial
capital. In other words:
[I]t is only [the] logical development of categories that is guided by the
relation in which the elements of the analysed concreteness stand to one
another in the developed object, in the object as the highest point of
its development and maturity, that discovers the mystery of the genuine
objective sequence of the formation of the object, of the moulding of its
internal structure ... Logical development of categories in science contra-
dicts temporal sequence exactly because it corresponds to the genuine
and objective sequence of the formation of the concrete structure of the
object under study. Herein lies the dialectics of the logical and the histori-
cal. (llyenkov, 1982 [1979], pp. 218, 221.)
As the stages of theory do not have to coincide with those of history, Capital
1 can start with the analysis of the commodity, without any implication, for ex-
ample, that “simple commodity production” historically preceded capitalism (as is
presumed by Engels, 1981b [1895]; for a critique, see Anderson, 1983, Shamsavari,
1991, and Weeks, 1981). On the contrary, the beginning of Capital 1 implies that
the production of commodities is the most abstract feature of capitalist produc-
tion.16 In other words, the value-form analysis in the beginning of Capital 1 pre-
sumes that value is capital’s most abstract determination, and not that value is the
historical germ of capital. The fact that the starting point of Capital is the capital-
ist commodity has, of course, no bearing upon the existence or the importance of
15 See also pp. 48, 76-83 and Murray (1988, pp. 121-2, 143-4). For a comparison between dialectics
and formal logic, that works with abstract universals, see Gunn (1992) and Kay (1979). For a critique
of the method of classical political economy, that is based upon the search for abstract universals, see
TSV2, pp. 106, 164-5, 191, Murray (1988, pp. 117-23, 144), Pilling (1980, pp. 25-8 and 72-4) and
Shamsavari (1991, pp. 87-90).
16 Capital I begins (p. 125) with the following statement: “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist
mode of production prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities’; the individual
commodity appears as its elementary form. Our investigation therefore begins with the analysis of the
commodity”. The expression “in which the capitalist mode of production prevails” is essential, for it
situates the concrete from which the analysis departs.
125Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
commodity production in other modes of production; more generally, it suggests
that the argument and conclusions of the book do not have immediate application
for modes of production other than capitalism (see Arthur, 1992, p. xiii, and Smith,
1993a, p. 102).
It follows that, for the “new dialectics”, even though large passages of Capital
contain historical analysis the ordering of the categories in the book is essentially
logical, and the role of historical investigation is of secondary importance. On this
issue the “new dialectics” follows the opinion in the Grundrisse:
It would ... be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow
one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically
decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one an-
other in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that
which seems to be their natural order, or which corresponds to historical
development, (Grundrisse, p. 107)17
Therefore, the commodity with which Capital begins is a capitalist (and not
historically general) product, and a concrete universal (and not an abstract univer-
sal or general notion). In other words, the starting point of Capital is the concrete,
but the concrete as a category unifying all particular forms which it may assume in
reality. Because of this, the commodity as the starting point of Capital is not any
particular good, but the manifold of commodities that are produced and exchanged
under capitalism.
However, this raises one problem; if Capital departs from the capitalist com-
modity, and if the most important objective of the book is the reconstruction of
capitalism in thought, how can Marx’s method be distinguished from Hegel’s,
where the last category supposedly validates the choice of the first and, given the
first category, the last logically follows?
For the “new dialectics”, the main difference lies in the criteria for the verifica-
tion of their theories. Hegel’s system is idealist, because it cannot be verified outside
the sphere of ideas, while the results of Marx’s investigation are validated through
material praxis. Therefore, the adequacy of the (capitalist) commodity as the start-
ing point of Capital is granted not only by the power of the labour theory of value
to reconstruct the dynamics of capitalism on its basis, but also by its capacity to
identify the fundamental relations of this system, and the limits of capitalism’s abil-
ity to accommodate economic and social change.18
17 In other words, “the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which
thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means
the process by which the concrete itself comes into being” (GR, p. 101). See also p. 103, K3, p. 400,
Banaji (1979, pp. 29-30), Murray (1988, p. 182), Shamsavari (1991, pp. 73-5), and Smith (1993a, p.
102). For a different view, see de Brunhoff (1973).
18 The ‘distance between thought and reality’ is, of course, bridged by thought in works of theory, since
the formulation of concepts in social science comes by definition through thinking. Whether this distance
126 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
Once the concept of commodity is adequately grasped, the labour theory of
value uses it to construct the concept of capital and many others. The construction
of these concepts is necessarily a gradual process, with several mediations (for
example, before he develops the concept of capital, Marx discusses exchange value,
abstract labour, money and surplus value). Marx held that it could not be otherwise:
To develop the concept of capital it is necessary to begin not with la-
bour but with value, and, precisely, with exchange value in an already
developed movement of circulation. It is just as impossible to make the
transition directly from labour to capital as it is to go from the different
human races directly to the banker, or from nature to the steam engine.
(GR, p. 259.)
Therefore, the “new dialectics” holds that if the starting point of the inquiry is
correctly identified from the analysis of the concrete, it is possible to reconstruct
the original concrete through a rigorous scientific procedure, based upon the gra-
dual unfolding of new concepts from the contradictions in other, relatively less
developed ones. If this procedure is firmly adhered to, it should eventually be pos-
sible to achieve a rich, complex and dynamic (but never complete) representation
of the concrete in thought.
4. CONCLUSION
This article has made a systematic presentation of the principles of the “new
dialectics”. This approach to Marx’s method conceives the labour theory of value
as a systematic theory, whose main objective is the reconstruction in thought of the
essential categories of the capitalist mode of production. This reconstruction should
be achieved through the application of the rules of dialectical logic. It should start
from the identification of the cell-form of the concrete that is to be reconstructed,
which is done through concrete abstraction. The contradictions in the cell-form (in
this case, the commodity) lead to the determination of relatively simple and abstract
concepts (use value, exchange value, money, etc.). Their gradual unfolding unveils
other concepts, more complex and concrete (capital, rate of profit, market price,
and so on). As this process continues, a systematic and consistent reconstruction of
the real gradually develops in the mind.
Because of the method employed, the meaning of the concepts, the level of
abstraction of the inquiry, and the connection between different concepts are ob-
jectively determined. Therefore, no concept can legitimately be introduced into the
analysis except through the development of the contradictions in more abstract
is truly bridged or not, is, as Marx puts it, to be judged in practice, in ‘the general process of social,
political and intellectual life’. The ‘process of knowledge itself does not ... confer ‘validity”’ (Carver,
1980, p. 217-8).
127Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
ones, and no concept or assumption can be arbitrarily imported from the outside
nor imposed by the analyst.
The “new dialectics” holds that the rigorous application of this method should
reveal the links between essence and appearance and, thereby, explain the (decep-
tive) forms of appearance of the phenomena. The ability to reconstruct a complex
reality from the development of the contradictions in its cell-form, through this
procedure, gives scientific character to the inquiry and prevents it from being arbi-
trary. When applied in the context of the labour theory of value, this method should
lead to the identification of the main characteristics of capitalism, the sources of its
dynamics, and the ultimate limits of this system.
This approach is elegant and appealing, and Marx makes extensive use of a
similar procedure; the “new dialectics” has therefore much to add to previous
analyses of the structure and content of Marx’s work. Nevertheless, the analytical
principles espoused by the “new dialectics” are troubled by two fundamental dif-
ficulties, which have neither been clearly spelled out in the past, nor satisfactorily
addressed by its proponents.
The difficulties are the following; first, the “new dialectics” needs to prove that
the unfolding of two distinct concepts, used as alternative starting points, necessar-
ily leads to substantially different outcomes, of which at least one is analytically
unacceptable. In the context of Capital, this question implies that, if the unfolding
of some other concept also led to the reconstruction of the capitalist economy in
thought, there would be no immanent reason to select the commodity as the starting
point of the book. This is a serious problem, that concern the rationale for the choice
of the commodity (and not any other concept) as the starting point of Capital.
The second problem is even more important, and its implications are poten-
tially more far-reaching. The “new dialectics” also needs to prove that the choice
of the correct starting point and the application of the dialectical method are suf-
ficient to reconstruct the concrete. This has to do with the internal consistency of
the approach. This difficulty may also be expressed as follows. If the unfolding of
a relatively abstract concept does not lead to the introduction of the relatively more
concrete concepts necessary for the further progress of the analysis, or if the in-
quiry needs the periodical incorporation of social and historical elements that can-
not be derived from within the analysis, some of the central claims of the “new
dialectics” would be seriously weakened.
The two problems raised above belong to Hegelian studies and cannot be ad-
dressed here in detail. However, it is doubtful whether the “new dialectics” can pass
the test of consistency unscathed. For, as the state derivation debate of the 70s has
shown (see Clarke, 1991, Holloway, 1994, and Lebowitz, 1994b, it is very difficult,
if not impossible, to conceptualize the capitalist state in a strictly logical framework
which departs from the contradictions in the commodity (at least if the charges of
functionalism and/or reductionism are to be avoided). By the same token, it is dif-
ficult to derive the contemporary predominance of inconvertible paper money di-
rectly from the value-forms in Capital 1, which Marx uses to derive the concept of
128 Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
money, or to understand the (changing) limits of state intervention in the economy
purely through the analysis of the logic of capital.
In more general terms, the notion that the wealth of the concrete is contained
in the commodity and can be revealed by the application of dialectics alone smacks
of idealism, because it presumes that capitalism can be reconstructed in thought
purely through abstract analysis, regardless of the historical context. (Even though
the “new dialectics” indicates that historical research may be required at some stage,
its role is little more than to fill out the pre-determined structure of the system.)
This leaves little space for class relations or class conflict to influence the shape and
evolution of the system and raises the question of how capitalism can be tran-
scended – certainly an important issue for Marx (see Bonefeld, 1992, Fracchia &
Ryan, 1992, and Holloway, 1992).
This seems distant from Marx’s own perspective, that presumes that reality
cannot be reduced to concepts. The conceptual presentation that Marx adopts in
Capital is surely necessary in view of his method and goals, but it cannot be argued
that it is sufficient. For one of the most important points of Capital is that the
concrete is specific and historically determinate, and it is in perpetual motion be-
cause it is subject to intervention, and therefore shaped, by conflicting social forc-
es. This constantly alters the original concrete and requires corresponding changes
in the analysis. The need for, and nature of, these changes cannot be grasped by
thought processes alone, but only by the concrete analysis of the (changing) reality.
Hence, unless the limits of the use of dialectics are recognized, and unless historical
analysis is accepted as an intrinsic part of Marx’s method of investigation and of
his method of exposition, the use of dialectical logic in the reconstruction of capi-
talism in thought runs the risk of degenerating into idealist speculation.
It is the (implicit) recognition of these limits that leads Marx to incorporate
periodically masses of social and historical material into his analysis, whose role
cannot be reduced to an accessory. This does not imply any concession to “vulgar”
empiricist analysis but, rather, his admission of the fact that reality cannot be re-
duced to concepts. The neglect of this important aspect Marx’s method shows that
the principles of the “new dialectics” cannot account for all the most important
traits of Capital, as is claimed by its proponents.
In sum, what the “new dialectics” fails to appreciate is that the requirement
that complex concepts should be derived from the contradictions in simpler ones
is not the most important feature of Marx’s method. Rather, what matters most is
why, how and when new concepts and new material should be incorporated into
the analysis, such that it becomes richer, more solid, and better able to reconstruct
the concrete. In my opinion, this complex issue should be at the core of future in-
vestigations with respect to the nature of Marx’s method, in Capital and elsewhere.
Thus, in spite of the substantial contribution that the “new dialectics” has given to
the understanding of Marx’s method and the content of his works, this perspective
seems insufficient to capture either the wealth of the concrete or the wealth of the
analysis in Capital.
129Revista de Economia Política 17 (1), 1997 pp. 115-130
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... These qualifications, however, do not exempt the systematic-dialectical tradition from the charge of idealism (Saad-Filho, 1997). The claim that the real material world has taken an ideal shape under capitalism because of the real abstractive powers of capital does not provide licence to avoid the analysis of the real concrete. ...
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Rafael Echeverria argues (in Economy and Society, Vol. 7 [1978]) that Marx's 1857 Introduction is ‘contradictory’ because in it he uses ‘two different concepts of abstraction’. The contradiction is merely apparent, however, and Marx's reformulation of his plans in 1859 confirms this. His use of the terms abstraction and abstract and his subsequent move towards less ambiguous terminology do not support Echeverria's contentions that the 1859 ‘rectification’ represents a ‘profound’ alteration in Marx's work and that this is a ‘marked change’ in his ‘position’. Echeverria's analysis leads him to an obscure and inaccurate account of Marx's method and an epistemology that is surprisingly un‐Marxian.
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None of the existing English editions of Marx's Capital, Vol. I, including the new Ben Fowkes translation published by Penguin in 1976, fully incorporate the text as revised by the author for his 1872-75 French edition. These omitted or alternate texts cover the subjects of the role of private property in capitalism, alienation and unskilled factory work, capitalist crises, unemployment, and imperialism. Finally, the French edition of Capital is viewed briefly in the overall context of the writings of Marx's last decade, 1873-1883.