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The Husserl Dictionary
... In short, for Heidegger, 4 the practical relationship of"subject-object unification"is the original state of existence, while the theoretical relationship of"subject-object separation"is a derivative form. In pre-reflective practice, the agent is intricately woven into an inseparable relationship with the world: an agent is a living person embedded in a concrete background, not a self-contained subject standing apart from the world; the world is a world reveals itself in a 'profile' or 'adumbration' (Abschattung) 5 (Moran & Cohen, 2012;Zahavi, 2003) from a specific perspective, not an independent world unrelated to the subject. In this direct, non-representational interaction, one comprehends both the world and oneself. ...
In this paper, we explore the question of how manipulative interactions may be transformed to healthier non-manipulative ones—or, in Buber’s terms, move from an “I-It” to an “I-Thou” relationship. To address this question, we draw on Heidegger’s viewpoint of pre-reflective practice, particularly his concepts “readiness-to-hand” and “presence-at-hand”, and analyze the manipulative mode of interpersonal interaction through this lens. Building upon this framework while incorporating relevant psychoanalytic theories and case studies, we then identified boundary-setting as a crucial mechanism for navigating beyond interpersonal manipulation. Furthermore, the paper delves into four specific cases of self-other interaction to provide a deeper understanding of intersubjective dynamics and their implications for relational transformation.
Humanity is currently in the midst of a number of serious ecological crises. Various scientific, philosophical, and religious ideas have been put forth in response to these global crises. Here, I suggest that the solutions to ecological problems can be best achieved when we undergo an essential change in our perspective on the existence and value of the natural world. In this regard, interreligious engagement and research, which address the multiple worldviews that emerge from individual religions and philosophies, have great potential to fundamentally transform our view of ecosystems. The problem is how to conduct such interreligious engagement and research, which has—unfortunately—to this point been overlooked. In this context, I propose the “four-step method of interreligious sympoiesis to address the ecological crisis”. This is a phenomenological–hermeneutic method that involves the following steps: (1) Suspension of Judgment (Epoché): the mind’s performing an epoché, which is taken as an ethical or religious vow; (2) Empathetic Reduction: the mind’s engaging in empathy with non-human beings; (3) Symbiotic Reduction: the mind’s envisioning of proper coexistence between humans and non-human beings in both minimal and maximal ways; (4) Interreligious Hermeneutical Synthesis: the arranging and synthesizing of the ideas obtained from the above reductions in a specific or comprehensive manner from an interreligious perspective. This paper aims to expound and defend these ideas.
Teesid: Artiklis kirjeldatakse, kuidas on võimalik kogeda ontoloogilist diferentsi – oleva suhtes täiesti teist. Säärane ontoloogiline kogemus leiab siinse arutluse kohaselt aset negatiivsuse, ei(miski) kogemises, mis omakorda seisneb tähendusloome luhtumises olulisimate üldisemate probleemide puhul ning sellega kaasnevas negatiivses häälestuses. Ontoloogilise diferentsi kogemine leiab aset afektiivsel väljal, häälestustes, mis toimivad üldjuhul intentsionaalsete aktide taustal horisondina, kuid muutuvad erilistel puhkudel keskseks, halvates sujuva kogemuse, muutes tähenduslikkuse tõrke sedavõrd intensiivseks, et negatiivne häälestus haarab kogeja läbinisti enda võimusesse. The aim of the article is to describe how it is possible to experience an ontological difference —i.e. something completely different from all beings. Such an ontological experience, the author argues, takes place in the experience of negativity, of nothingness, which in turn consists in the failure of meaning-making in the most important general problems and the negative attunements (Stimmung) that accompanies it. Thus, the experience of ontological difference takes place in the affective field. Experiences of this kind have been analysed to some extent in the light of Martin Heidegger’s thought. The originality of this article lies in its attempt to describe the experience of ontological difference in the vocabulary of classic, Husserl-inspired phenomenology. According to the mainstream interpretation, Heidegger’s ontological radicalism abandons the original idea of phenomenology to remain within the boundaries of things themselves (i.e. given to consciousness as intentional objects). This interpretation is also deepened by Heidegger’s post-turning renunciation of the description of his own thinking as phenomenology. Inspired mainly by Husserl (and often also by the sections of Heidegger’s Being and Time devoted to everyday experience), contemporary phenomenology analyses all kinds of phenomena and spheres of subjectivity given to everyday experience, leaving nothingness, ontological difference, etc. as a mystical-paradoxical remnant about which nothing can be said. In the first chapter of the article, ‘The Radical Failure of Significance in the Clash of Horizons’, ontological experience is reconstructed in terms of the concept of the horizon. Already in his late phenomenology of the lifeworld, Husserl pays considerable attention to the horizonal construction of experience. Horizons in experience are either not given intentionally at all or have a weak, background intentionality. It is true that in ordinary perceptions it is possible to transform the horizon into a full-blooded intentional object. However, according to the discussion here, this is not the case for special boundary horizons, for general horizons that maintain the overall coherence of meaning-making, e.g. world, death, infinity. The urge for meaningful fulfilment inherent in consciousness in general (and philosophy in particular) tries to thematise these too, but unsuccessfully, incompletely. While there is much that is horizontally non-intentional in the simple acts of meaning-making, all the parts play together to produce meaning. In the case of a negative boundary experience, it is the failure that becomes the central seized sense (Auffassungssinn), rather than—which is amplified in the absence of meaningful content, in the case of empty intentionality—the attunement. This is the focus of the second chapter of the article, “Ontological Experience in Negative Attunements”. The chapter begins by discussing the question of the intentionality of attunements, and, following Husserl, arrives at the premise that attunements thus constitute a horizon of emotionality and have an ambiguous intentionality inherent in the horizon. As a horizon, attunement not only organises the general palette of conscious sensations, but also ‘colours’ the experience of all objects, even the world as a universal horizon of all experience. In the ontological experience, only a few particular negative attunements, which, using the vocabulary of existentialism, can also be called marginal experiences, are present. In the case of these strange, frightening (unheimlich) states, the affective horizon intrudes, so to speak buries the person under itself, but not in the manner of an emotion (together with the intentional object in relation to which the emotion is felt), but in a non-objective way, without any apparent cause, thus creating—as in the reflection on the universal horizons discussed above—a total repulsion in the movement from object to object. Such an experience also dispels self-consciousness. Regarding the relationship between the themes explored in the two chapters, the article argues that, while it seems that creative activity (including philosophy) inspired by the fundamental problems of a strained ontology, clashing with so-called universal horizons, is often accompanied by a persistent negative attunement, so that the creative person falls out of everyday life, the causal links between these phenomena remain open. The specificity of the human being does not lie in the mere operation of linguistic meanings, but in the fact that it is inherent to him/her to philosophise: to push towards the most important horizons of experience and to experience in relation to them the failure of the creation of meaning, to experience the ontological differentiation of not-ness. Here, the article remains in the position of the phenomenological epoché: it is not possible to know that such a mode of not-ness is something proper (Ereignis), as Heidegger implies throughout. However, the derivation of such experiences from the valorisation of language, as naturalists and pragmatists proclaim, remains equally unproven. It remains the task of phenomenology to bear the human incongruity, to remain—to paraphrase Husserl’s famous slogan—directed towards the things themselves (zu den Sachen selbst).
La influencia Brentano en la fenomenología de Husserl es un hecho establecido. Su primera gran publicación (1891) no ocultaba su adhesión al método de Brentano, contra el cual, sin embargo, se rebela en su siguiente obra, las Investigaciones Lógicas (1900/1901), y de modo más explícito en la segunda edición de ésta (1913). Desde entonces se ha enfatizado que la fenomenología surge contra la psicología Brentano como método, pero con frecuencia se pasan por alto otras críticas no menos importantes. Este trabajo indaga en ellas yendo más allá de la cuestión metodológica. Para ello se exponen las ideas de Brentano y luego las críticas de Husserl, matizándolas o corrigiéndolas, cuando es necesario.
As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking (Stellungnahme) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P. Specifically, such a Stellungnahme is a three-step procedure: the subject, possibly motivated by a passive discordance, starts by questioning P (active doubt); she then seeks to validate P by returning to its originary fulfillment (active search for evidence); finally, she ratifies such a fulfillment in an act of acknowledgment (active decision), thereby making P a permanent personal conviction. In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furthermore, the few existing studies on this topic are limited to the theoretical domain. The aim of this paper is to fill this twofold gap by providing a comprehensive account of critical Stellungnahme in both the intellectual and the axiological spheres, drawing especially on the manuscripts from the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. The first part examines Stellungnahme in the theoretical realm, underscoring its teleological orientation towards justification and the active role played by the subject in it. The second part shows how this procedure can be extended to rationalize value-experiences, by elucidating the nature of affective evidence and approval (Billigung). Finally, the third part demonstrates how a particular value, that of knowledge, can concretely pass the axiological position-taking and thus be recognized as an actual value.
The paper examines the problem of the vertical split in the philosophy of science —whether there is a continuous transition between scientific knowledge and common sense or a radical break. In the first part of the work, the problem is discussed through the French tradition in philosophy of science. Two main solutions are articulated: continualist (Meyerson) and discountinualist (Bachelard). At the same time, its main drawback is revealed — speculative nature of its concept of common sense. In the second part, an attempt is made to solve this problem by correcting this flaw. Thus, it is proposed to rely on data gathered in anthropology of science to develop an empirically grounded concept of common sense. It is connected to folk biology — universal ways of thinking about plants and animals. Main features of folk biology are highlighted and compared with scientific biology. As a result, it is concluded that there are two radical breaks between them. The first one, decontextualization of nature, consists in withdrawing an object of study from the totality of its cultural and environmental relations. The second, deessentialization of nature, implies a transition from essentialist to historicist thinking. A preliminary conclusion is made that there is a break between it and science in general.
Bilginin kaynağı, doğruluğu ve geçerliliği, sosyal bilimler söz konusu olduğunda ayrı bir tartışma konusu olagelmiştir. Pozitivist bir yaklaşımla bilgi elde eden doğa bilimlerinin karşısında sosyal bilimler, nispeten daha geç yöntemler geliştirebilmiştir. Söz konusu yöntemlerin geliştirilmesinde Almanca konuşan coğrafyanın katkısı oldukça önemlidir; zira sosyal bilimlerin kendi yöntemini geliştirmesi için önemli katkılar sağlamıştır. Fenomenoloji, doğa bilimlerinin yöntemi dışında bir yöntem arayışı çerçevesinde felsefi bir tartışmayla başlamış ve daha sonra bir yöntem olarak ortaya atılmıştır. Süreç içinde daha yaygın uygulanır hale gelmiş ve önemli sosyologlara yeni yaklaşımlar için bir zemin sağlamıştır. Günümüzde fenomenolojik çalışmalar oldukça artmış ve birçok disiplinde uygulanır hale gelmiştir. Ancak bazı araştırmalarda fenomenolojiye basit bir veri toplama yöntemi olarak başvurulduğu ve zaman zaman sadece bir mülakat yöntemine indirgenerek uygulandığı görülmektedir. Oysa, fenomenoloji ifade edildiği gibi felsefi bir tartışma içinden doğmuş ve bir araştırma yöntemi olarak ortaya konmuştur. Bu makale, özellikle sosyal bilim alanında bir araştırma yöntemi olarak kullanılan fenomenolojinin kökenlerini, gelişimini ve sosyal bilime yansımasını ele almıştır. Bu bağlamda öncelikle Husserl ve fenomenolojik yaklaşımı ortaya konmuş, ardından Schütz’ün perspektifi, ileri sürdüğü yöntemler ve sosyal bilimdeki yansımaları tartışılmıştır.
Pojam Ja jedan je od centralnih pojmova Huserlove fenomenologije. Glavni problem Ja sastoji se u mogućnosti njegovog zahvatanja. Pristupi li se iz ugla (samo)refleksije, tada pri Ja-refleksiji imamo slučaj javljanja „dva” Ja – reflektujućeg, subjekta refleksije i reflektovanog, objekta refleksije. Pri oslobađanju od objekt-orijentacije toka doživljaja, „upijenosti” u objekte i tematizovanju Ja, suočeni smo sa paradoksom da refleksija „cepa” Ja. Teškoća postaje uspostavljanje (ponovnog) identiteta između reflektujućeg i reflektovanog Ja. Ono, distancirajući se od sebe u samoposmatranju, istovremeno i održava kontinuitet samoidentiteta sa svojim objektom. Time širi problemi transcendentalne fenomenologije, kao što su odnos transcendentalnog i konkretnog ega, te paradoks subjektivnosti, počivaju na dubljoj rascepljenosti između reflektujućeg Ja-Subjekta i reflektovanog Ja-Objekta, odnosno, na paradoksu refleksije. Problem Ja-cepanja biće sagledan u tri distinktna slučaja: aktima osadašnjivanja, refleksiji i s obzirom na nezainteresovanog posmatrača. Rad će zaključiti da uprkos akcentovanju refleksije pri zahvatanju Ja, Huserl pojmom Ja-cepanja nudi jedno potencijalno rešenje kritike modela refleksije, uspostavljenu sa Fihteom.
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