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EEA. Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000

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Editorial team: Poul Harremoës (Chairman) David Gee (EEA editor) Malcolm MacGarvin (Executive editor) Andy Stirling (Editor) Jane Keys (Editor) Brian Wynne (Editor) Sofia Guedes Vaz (EEA editor) Project managers: David Gee and Sofia Guedes Vaz European Environment Agency Environmental issue report No 22
1
Late lessons from early warnings:
the precautionary principle 1896–2000
Editorial team:
Poul Harremoës (Chairman)
David Gee (EEA editor)
Malcolm MacGarvin (Executive editor)
Andy Stirling (Editor)
Jane Keys (Editor)
Brian Wynne (Editor)
Sofia Guedes Vaz (EEA editor)
Project managers:
David Gee and Sofia Guedes Vaz
European Environment Agency
Environmental issue report No 22
2 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
Layout: Brandenborg a/s
Note
The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the
European Commission or other European Communities institutions. Neither the European
Environment Agency nor any person or company acting on the behalf of the Agency is
responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained in this report.
All rights reserved
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or reproduction please contact EEA project manager Ove Caspersen (address information
below).
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It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int).
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001
ISBN 92-9167-323-4
© EEA, Copenhagen, 2001
European Environment Agency
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DK-1050 Copenhagen K
Denmark
Tel: (45) 33 36 71 00
Fax: (45) 33 36 71 99
E-mail: eea@eea.eu.int
Internet: http://www.eea.eu.int
Preface 3
Preface
To know and not to know.
To act or not to act...?
The task of the European Environment
Agency (EEA) is to provide information of
direct use for improving decision-making and
public participation. We often provide
information in situations of scientific
uncertainty, in which the precautionary
principle, enshrined in the Treaty of the
European Union, is increasingly relevant.
The growing innovative powers of science
seem to be outstripping its ability to predict
the consequences of its applications, whilst
the scale of human interventions in nature
increases the chances that any hazardous
impacts may be serious and global. It is
therefore important to take stock of past
experiences, and learn how we can adapt to
these changing circumstances and improve
our work, particularly in relation to the
provision of information and the
identification of early warnings.
Late lessons from early warnings is about the
gathering of information on the hazards of
human economic activities and its use in
taking action to better protect both the
environment and the health of the species
and ecosystems that are dependent on it, and
then living with the consequences.
The report is based on case studies. The
authors of the case studies, all experts in
their particular field of environmental,
occupational and consumer hazards, were
asked to identify the dates of early warnings,
to analyse how this information was used, or
not used, in reducing hazards, and to
describe the resulting costs, benefits and
lessons for the future.
The lessons they drew from their histories
were then distilled into twelve ‘late lessons’
by the editorial team, under the guidance of
the EEA Scientific Committee. In a separate
EEA publication some implications of the
late lessons for the policy process and
associated information flows will be further
explored.
The precautionary principle is not just an
issue for the European Union (EU): its
potential impact on trade means that its
application can have global repercussions.
The current dialogue between the EU and
the United States on the use and application
of precaution is partly affected by confusion
about the meaning of terms used in the
debate. This report should contribute to a
greater and shared understanding about past
decisions on hazardous technologies and
therefore, we hope, to improved transatlantic
agreement about future decisions. It may also
help the dialogue within both the EU and the
United States, where there are healthy
debates about the pros and cons of applying
the precautionary principle.
That we have all acted too late in many areas
is now well known. Over the next 50 years we
will see some thousands of extra skin cancers
as today’s children grow up exposed to the
higher levels of ultraviolet radiation
penetrating the normally protective ozone
layer through the ‘hole’ created by
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other
synthetic chemicals. Over the same period
many thousands of Europeans will die from
one of the most painful and terminal of
cancers, mesothelioma, caused by the
inhalation of asbestos dust. In both cases we
were taken by surprise: the hazards of these
beneficial technologies were not ‘known
about’ until it was too late to stop irreversible
impacts. Both phenomena had such long
latent periods between first exposures and
late effects that ‘pipelines’ of unstoppable
consequences, decades long, were set in
place before actions could have been taken
to stop further exposures.
The first reports of injuries from radiation
were made as early as 1896 (hence the title of
the report). The first clear and credible early
warning about asbestos came two years later
in 1898. A similar signal for action on CFCs
came in 1974, though some may argue that
important clues were missed earlier. Eleven
other well-known hazards are dealt with in
this report. We invite the reader to judge
whether, as in the cases of radiation, asbestos
and CFCs, the early warnings could have led
to earlier actions to reduce hazards, at a
lower overall cost to society.
The costs of preventive actions are usually
tangible, clearly allocated and often short
term, whereas the costs of failing to act are
less tangible, less clearly distributed and
usually longer term, posing particular
4 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
problems of governance. Weighing up the
overall pros and cons of action, or inaction, is
therefore very difficult, involving ethical as
well as economic considerations, as the case
studies illustrate.
A key question arising from the case studies is
how to acknowledge and respond not only to
scientific uncertainty but also to ignorance, a
state of not knowing from which springs both
scientific discoveries and unpleasant
‘surprises’, such as ozone holes and rare
cancers. Socrates had a response to this when
he acknowledged ignorance as a source of
wisdom. Our report shows that this is a lesson
from history that many people have
forgotten. Misplaced ‘certainty’ about the
absence of harm played a key role in delaying
preventive actions in most of the case studies.
However, there is clearly nothing scientific
about the pretence of knowledge. Such
‘certainty’ does little to reduce ignorance,
which requires more scientific research and
long-term monitoring in order to identify the
unintended impacts of human activities.
Could we have known about, or anticipated,
the hazards any earlier? Are there ways of
‘knowing more’ or ‘knowing better’ that
could help justify our self-awarded title of
Homo sapiens — the ‘wise ones’?
Readers of the case studies in Late lessons may
conclude that we have a long way to go. Some
possible directions are indicated in the
chapter ‘Twelve late lessons’, derived from
the case studies.
A phenomenon that Socrates probably did
not know about, but may have suspected, is
that ‘everything connects’ — or at least, so
many things do react with each other that the
simple science of linear, mechanistic
propositions needs to be supplemented with
the dynamic and emergent properties of
systems science. The potential systemic
instabilities of such complex phenomena as
climate change or brain cell behaviour may
be critical yet unpredictable determinants of
our fate, whether they be systems that govern
the stability of the Gulf Stream or that
generate the ‘genomic instabilities’ of
irradiated cells.
Compartmentalised science, no matter how
erudite, is an insufficient base for knowing
enough to anticipate or mitigate the impacts
of such complex systems: integrated and
synthesised knowledge, which pools the
wisdom from many natural and social
sciences, is a necessary condition for being
Homo sapiens. But just knowing enough is not
of itself sufficient: acting wisely, and in good
time, is also necessary. It is part of the EEA’s
task to help expand the knowledge base
through integrated assessments, thereby
assisting decision-makers to foresee the
possible consequences of regulatory and
stakeholder actions and inactions.
Knowing enough, and acting wisely enough,
across the full range of environmental and
related health issues seems daunting. The
interconnections between issues, the pace of
technological change, our limited
understanding and the ‘time to harm and
then to heal’ of the ecological and biological
systems that can be perturbed over decades
by our technologies together present an
unforgiving context. Some people fear or
imagine that a more precautionary approach
to forestalling potentially irreversible hazards
will stifle innovation or compromise science.
However, there are immense challenges and
opportunities in understanding complex and
emergent systems while meeting human
needs with lower health and ecological costs.
Many of the case studies suggest that wider
use of the precautionary principle can help
stimulate both innovation and science,
replacing the 19th century technologies and
simple science of the first industrial
revolution with the ‘eco-efficient’
technologies and systems science of the third.
One final and obvious question arises from
the case studies in Late lessons: why were not
only the early warnings but also the ‘loud and
late’ warnings often ignored for so long? This
question we largely leave to the reader, whilst
noting that the absence of political will to
take action to reduce hazards, in the face of
conflicting costs and benefits, seems to be an
even more important factor in these histories
than is the availability of trusted information.
However, as Aristotle observed, the way we
perceive the world determines in large part
how we act, and information plays a critical
role in how we see the world. But whose
information is received? Is it ‘true, fair and
independent’? And is it understandable to
the politicians and business people who are
rarely experts but nevertheless have to make
the difficult decisions?
This report notes the importance of trusted
and shared information for effective policy-
making and stakeholder participation in
decision-making, especially in the context of
complexity, ignorance, high stakes and the
Preface 5
need for ‘collective learning’. We must not
forget that EU product legislation defines as
safe any product that does not present
‘unacceptable risks’ under normal or
foreseeable conditions of use. Public
acceptability of risks requires public
participation in the decisions that create and
manage such risks, including the
consideration of values, attitudes and overall
benefits. Sound public policy-making on
issues involving science therefore requires
more than good science: ethical as well as
economic choices are at stake. Such matters
concern not only the experts and the
politicians but all of us.
It is therefore my hope that this report
contributes to better and more accessible
science based information and more effective
stakeholder participation in the governance
of economic activity so as to help minimise
environmental and health costs and
maximise innovation.
Decision-makers need not only to have more
and better quality information but also to act
wisely more often so as to achieve a better
balance between the benefits of innovations
and their hazards. Learning and applying
these late lessons from the last century’s early
warnings could help all of us to achieve this
better balance during this century.
I would like to thank the editorial team and
the authors who took up the challenge of
making this report, as well as the peer
reviewers and the EEA Scientific Committee
who also played an important role.
Finally I would like to thank David Gee, who
initiated this report and many EEA staff
whose contributions made this report
possible.
Domingo Jiménez Beltrán
Executive Director
6 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgement is given to the editorial
team for their invaluable help and assistance
in producing this book: Poul Harremoës
(Chairman), Malcolm MacGarvin (Executive
editor), Andy Stirling (Editor), Brian Wynne
(Editor), Jane Keys (Editor), David Gee and
Sofia Guedes Vaz (EEA editors).
Acknowledgement is also given to the
authors and the peer reviewers:
Authors: Malcolm MacGarvin, Barrie
Lambert, Peter Infante, Morris Greenberg,
David Gee, Janna G. Koppe, Jane Keys, Joe
Farman, Dolores Ibarreta, Shanna H. Swan,
Lars-Erik Edqvist, Knud Børge Pedersen,
Arne Semb, Martin Krayer von Krauss, Poul
Harremoës, Michael Gilbertson, David
Santillo, Paul Johnston, William J. Langston,
Jim W. Bridges, Olga Bridges, Patrick van
Zwanenberg and Erik Millstone.
Peer reviewers: Joel Tickner, Richard Young,
Wolfgang Witte, Stuart Levy, Henk Aarts,
Jacques Nouws, Michael Skou Andersen,
Anthony Seaton, Harry Aiking, Leonard Levy,
Ron Hoogenboom, Glen Fox, Andrew
Watterson, Arturo Keller, Finn Bro
Rasmussen, Sandrine Dixson-Decleve, Hilkka
Vahervuori, Grete Østergaard, Erik Arvin,
Eberhard Morgenroth, Guus Velders,
Madhava Sarna, Tom Webster, Niklas
Johansson, Ernst Boersma , Nigel Bell,
Beldrich Moldan, John Seager, Kees van
Leeuwen, Mark Montforts and Robert Luttik.
Finally, acknowledgement is also given to
members of the EEA Scientific Committee,
Philippe Bourdeau, Eileen Buttle, Robert
Kroes, Bo Jansson, and Poul Harremoës, the
Chair of the editorial team.
Contents 7
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1. Late lessons from early warnings: an approach to learning from history 11
1.2. What is the ‘precautionary principle’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3. An early use of the precautionary principle: London, 1854 . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4. Forestalling disasters: integrating science and public policy . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2. Fisheries: taking stock
Malcolm MacGarvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1. Early warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2. 19th century British fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3. Californian sardine fishery 1920s to 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4. Newfoundland cod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5. Precaution becomes explicit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6. The ecosystem approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7. Late lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. Radiation: early warnings; late effects
Barrie Lambert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1. X-rays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2. Radioactivity and radioactive materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3. Early moves towards control of exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4. The post-war watershed: justification, optimisation, limitation . . . . . . . 34
3.5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. Benzene: an historical perspective on the American and
European occupational setting
Peter F. Infante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1. Early warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2. Actions and inactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4. Conclusions and lessons for the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5. Asbestos: from ‘magic’ to malevolent mineral
David Gee and Morris Greenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2. The first ‘early warnings’ of asbestosis and some responses . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3. Early warnings on asbestos cancers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4. Early, devastating warnings about mesothelioma cancer . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5. Actions and inactions by regulatory authorities and others . . . . . . . . . 56
5.6. The costs and benefits of actions and inactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.7. What are the lessons of the asbestos story? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
6. PCBs and the precautionary principle
Janna G. Koppe and Jane Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.2. Growing evidence of persistence, presence and toxicity . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.3. Action from industry and governments in the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.4. Scientific understanding becomes more sophisticated . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.5. Government action in the 1980s and 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.6. Routes of environmental exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.7. The most recent PCB accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7. Halocarbons, the ozone layer and the precautionary principle
Joe Farman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.2. Early history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.3. The 1930s — the CFC industry is born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.4. The 1970s — the seeds of doubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.5. The Montreal Protocol and the ozone hole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.6. Late lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
7.7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8. The DES story: long-term consequences of prenatal exposure
Dolores Ibarreta and Shanna H. Swan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.1. Introduction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.2. Optimistic beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8.3. Tragic consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8.4. DES ineffective for prevention of miscarriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.5. Assessing the extent of the damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.6. Lessons from the DES story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
9. Antimicrobials as growth promoters: resistance to common sense
Lars-Erik Edqvist and Knud Børge Pedersen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
9.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
9.2. The first early warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
9.3. Subsequent action or inaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
9.4. Advantages and disadvantages of the use of growth promoters . . . . . 97
9.5. Conclusions and lessons for the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
9.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10. Sulphur dioxide: from protection of human lungs to remote lake restoration
Arne Semb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.1. Dead fish, dying forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.2. The 1985 CLRTAP Protocol and beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.3. Late lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
10.4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11. MTBE in petrol as a substitute for lead
Martin Krayer von Krauss and Poul Harremoës . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.2. Lead in petrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.3. The MTBE case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.4. The benefits of MTBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Contents 9
11.5. The impacts of MTBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
11.6. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
11.7. Present trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
11.8. Discussion in relation to the precautionary principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
11.9. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
11.10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
12. The precautionary principle and early warnings of chemical contamination
of the Great Lakes
Michael Gilbertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
12.1. The first significant early warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
12.2. Date and nature of subsequent action or inaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
12.3. Consequences of institutional responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
12.4. Costs and benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
12.5. Conclusions and lessons for the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
12.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
13. Tributyltin (TBT) antifoulants: a tale of ships, snails and imposex
David Santillo, Paul Johnston and William J. Langston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
13.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
13.2. The emergence of the TBT problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
13.3. Arcachon Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
13.4. UK harbours and coastal waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
13.5. A global pollutant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
13.6. Effectiveness of controls on small vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
13.7. The significance of seagoing vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
13.8. Progress towards a global phase-out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
13.9. The question of alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
13.10. Late lessons from the TBT story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
13.11. Conclusions: precaution or retrospective action? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
13.12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
14. Hormones as growth promoters: the precautionary principle or
a political risk assessment?
Jim W. Bridges and Olga Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
14.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
14.2. Impacts of oestrogenic compounds on wildlife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
14.3. What were the uncertainties regarding the use of oestrogenic growth
promoters for human health? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
14.4. Has the approach adopted by the European Commission proved to be
sound? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
14.5. Overall conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
14.6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15. ‘Mad cow disease’ 1980s–2000: how reassurances undermined precaution
Patrick van Zwanenberg and Erik Millstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
15.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
15.2. A new cattle disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
15.3. Initial decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
15.4. Expert advice and regulatory controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
15.5. Constructing a house of cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
15.6. The failures and eventual collapse of the policy edifice . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
15.7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
15.8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
10 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
16. Twelve late lessons
Editorial team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
16.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
16.2. Twelve late lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
16.3. The wider implications of precaution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
16.4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
17. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
17.1. Late lessons from early warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Author biographies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Index: Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000 . 200
Introduction 11
1. Introduction
1.1. Late lessons from early warnings:
an approach to learning from
history
In 1898, Lucy Deane, a UK Factory Inspector,
observed: ‘The evil effects of asbestos dust have
also instigated a microscopic examination of the
mineral dust by HM Medical Inspector. Clearly
revealed was the sharp glass-like jagged nature of
the particles, and where they are allowed to rise and
to remain suspended in the air of the room in any
quantity, the effects have been found to be injurious
as might have been expected.’ (Deane, 1898)
One hundred years later, in 1998, the UK
government decided to ban ‘white’ asbestos,
a decision that was echoed by the European
Union (EU) the following year. The current
asbestos-induced death rate in the United
Kingdom is about 3 000 deaths per year, and
some 250 000–400 000 asbestos cancers are
expected in western Europe over the next
35 years, due to past exposures (Peto, 1999).
The hundred years between the 1890s and
1990s is the main focus of this report into the
use, neglect and possible misuse of the
concept of precaution in dealing with a
selection of occupational, public and
environmental hazards. The costs and
benefits of the actions or inactions of
governments and others in responding to
‘early warnings’ about hazards provide us
with its content. The aim of this report is to
see if something can be learnt from these
histories that can help us prevent, or at least
minimise, future impacts of other agents that
may turn out to be harmful, and to do so
without stifling innovation or compromising
science.
The report is an example of the information
needed to help the EU and EEA member
countries to frame and identify sound and
effective policies that protect the
environment and contribute to sustainable
development. Providing such information is
the regulatory duty of the European
Environment Agency (EEA), an independent
Agency of the European Community
established in 1993 to provide objective
information to the policy-making bodies of
the EU and its Member States (Council
Regulations, 1210/90 and 993/99).
In trying to reduce current and future risks
the lessons of history have rarely been used.
The histories of a selection of hazards is
therefore the subject matter of Late lessons.
Fourteen case studies (arranged
chronologically according to the first date of
early warning) have been chosen from a
range of well-known hazards to workers, the
public and the environment, where sufficient
is now known about their impacts to enable
conclusions to be drawn about how well they
were dealt with by governments and civil
society. Such conclusions should be based on
‘the spirit of the times’ and not on the luxury
of hindsight. There are other public health
effects and environmental disasters that have
not been looked at, such as thalidomide
(James, 1965), lead (Millstone, 1997), and
the Aral Sea (Small, 2001) These provide
additional information about unintended
consequences, and the conflict between
economic and social interests, from which
additional lessons from history can be drawn.
The authors of the case studies were asked to
structure their chapters around four key
questions:
When was the first credible scientific ‘early
warning’ of potential harm?
When and what were the main actions or
inactions on risk reduction taken by
regulatory authorities and others?
What were the resulting costs and benefits
of the actions or inactions, including their
distribution between groups and across
time?
What lessons can be drawn that may help
future decision-making?
The case studies and authors have also been
chosen with a transatlantic audience in mind.
Three chapters are focused either on a North
American issue (pollution of the Great
Lakes) or primarily on the North American
handling of issues that are also directly
relevant to Europe (benzene, and DES
administered in pregnancy) and authored by
scientists from North America (Gilbertson,
Infante, and co-author Swann, respectively).
Three chapters cover issues of some conflict
between North America and Europe
(hormones as growth promoters, asbestos,
and MTBE in petrol); and all other chapters
12 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
are as relevant to North Americans, their
public health and their environments as they
are to Europeans.
It is sometimes said that the United States
does not use the precautionary principle, but
it is worth noting (see Table 1.1.) that the
United States has helped to promote what
could be called ‘precautionary prevention’,
without necessarily calling it ‘the
precautionary principle’.
The precautionary principle has become
controversial, not least because of the
disputes between the EU and the United
States over hormones in beef, genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), global
warming and other issues in which
precautionary approaches have been
invoked. There is now considerable debate
(not to say terminological confusion,
particularly between politicians on different
sides of the Atlantic) as to what the
precautionary principle means, and how it
can be implemented. One aim of this report
is to try to improve transatlantic
understanding on the use of precaution in
policy-making.
The authors of the case studies, who
provided their services pro bono, were asked to
keep their contributions brief, which
obviously inhibits detailed treatment of the
issues. However, we wanted to elicit key
conclusions from the histories and not the
detailed post mortems that others have
produced: these can be accessed via the
references in each chapter.
It has been pointed out that the case study
authors are not without strong views, being
for the most part active participants in the
process of making the histories that are
summarised in each chapter. Joe Farman, the
author of the chapter on halocarbons, for
example, discovered the ‘hole’ in the
stratospheric ozone layer; Morris Greenberg
helped to set up the first asbestos
mesothelioma register; Michael Gilbertson
has spent most of his professional life
researching Great Lakes pollution and
advocating its clean-up; and Peter Infante did
the first cohort epidemiological study of
benzene-exposed workers, and has worked
for many years in the US Health and Safety
Department to reduce workers’ exposure to
benzene and other pollutants. All other
authors, to varying degrees, have had
significant involvement in the subject of their
chapters: indeed they would not have been
approached if they had not already
extensively studied the case that they were
asked to write about. All of them, as
respected scientists in their fields, were
expected to be as objective as possible in
answering the four questions put to them.
This involvement of the authors in the
histories of their case studies is therefore
brought to the attention of readers.
The case studies are all about ‘false negatives’
in the sense that they are agents or activities
that were regarded at one time as harmless by
governments and others, at prevailing levels
of exposure and ‘control’, until evidence
about their harmful effects emerged. But are
there no ‘false positives’, where action was
taken on the basis of a precautionary
approach that turned out to be unnecessary?
It was felt necessary to include such
examples, but despite inviting some industry
representatives to submit them, and
discussing these in some detail, no suitable
examples emerged. Attention was drawn to a
US publication, Facts versus fears (Lieberman
and Kwon, 1998), which attempted to
provide some 25 examples of ‘false positives’.
However, on closer examination these turned
out not to be robust enough for those who
recommended them to accept our invitation
to use the strongest half dozen in this report.
The challenge of demonstrating ‘false
positives’ remains: possible candidates that
have been mentioned include the ban on
Table 1.1. Some examples of ‘precautionary prevention’ in the United States
Issue ‘Precautionary prevention’
Food safety
(carcinogenic additives)
The Delaney Clause in the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 1957–96, which banned
animal carcinogens from the human food chain
Food safety
(BSE)
A ban on the use of scrapie-infected sheep and goat meat in the animal and human
food chain in the early 1970s which may have helped the United States to avoid BSE
Environmental safety
(CFCs)
A ban on the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in aerosols in 1977, several years
before similar action in most of Europe
Public health
(DES)
A ban on the use of DES as a growth promoter in beef, 1972–79, nearly 10 years
before the EU ban in 1987
Source: EEA
Introduction 13
dumping sewage sludge in the North Sea,
and the ‘Y2K millennium bug’.
1.2. What is the ‘precautionary
principle’?
Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) may have
been pessimistic when he said ‘Man has lost
the capacity to foresee and forestall... he will
end up destroying the earth’. However, being
wise before it is too late is not easy, especially
when the environmental or health impacts
may be far into the future and the real, or
perceived, costs of averting them are large
and immediate. Forestalling disasters usually
requires acting before there is strong proof
of harm, particularly if the harm may be
delayed and irreversible, an approach to
scientific evidence and policy-making which
is part of what is now called the
precautionary principle.
Precautionary prevention has often been
used in medicine and public health, where
the benefit of doubt about a diagnosis is
usually given to the patient (‘better safe than
sorry’). However, the precautionary principle
and its application to environmental hazards
and their uncertainties only began to emerge
as an explicit and coherent concept within
environmental science in the 1970s, when
German scientists and policy-makers were
trying to deal with ‘forest death’ (Waldsterben)
and its possible causes, including air
pollution.
The main element of the precautionary
principle they developed was a general rule
of public policy action to be used in
situations of potentially serious or irreversible
threats to health or the environment, where
there is a need to act to reduce potential
hazards before there is strong proof of harm,
taking into account the likely costs and
benefits of action and inaction. A
precautionary approach, however, requires
much more than establishing the level of
proof needed to justify action to reduce
hazards (the ‘trigger’ for action). The
Vorsorgeprinzip (‘foresight’ or ‘precautionary’
principle), in the German Clean Air Act of
1974, as elaborated in the 1985 report on the
Clean Air Act (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994)
also included elements such as:
research and monitoring for the early
detection of hazards;
a general reduction of environmental
burdens;
the promotion of ‘clean production’ and
innovation;
the proportionality principle, where the
costs of actions to prevent hazards should
not be disproportionate to the likely
benefits;
a cooperative approach between
stakeholders to solving common problems
via integrated policy measures that aim to
improve the environment, competitiveness
and employment;
action to reduce risks before full ‘proof’ of
harm is available if impacts could be serious
or irreversible.
Since the 1970s, the precautionary principle
has risen rapidly up the political agenda, and
has been incorporated into many
international agreements, particularly in the
marine environment, where an abundance of
ecological data on pollution yielded little
understanding but much concern: ‘huge
amounts of data are available, but despite
these data... we have reached a sort of plateau
in our understanding of what that
information is for... This is what led to the
precautionary principle’ (Marine Pollution
Bulletin, 1997). More generally, Principle 15
of the UN Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development 1992 (see Table 1.2.)
extended the idea to the whole environment.
The use of different terms in these treaties
and agreements such as ‘precautionary
principle’, ‘precautionary approach’ and
‘precautionary measures’ can cause
difficulties for communication and dialogue
on how best to deal with scientific
uncertainties and potential hazards. The
concluding chapters of this report attempt to
clarify some of these ambiguities.
In Europe, the most significant support for
the precautionary principle has come from
the European Commission’s Communication
on the Precautionary Principle (European
Commission, 2000) and the Council of
Ministers Nice Decision, both in 2000. They
have made significant contributions to the
practical implementation of the
precautionary principle, especially
concerning stakeholder involvement and the
avoidance of trade disputes. Some of the
main issues raised by the case studies and by
the European Commission’s Communication
are elaborated in the concluding chapters.
14 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
1.3. An early use of the precautionary
principle: London, 1854
The use of precautionary approaches to
hazards began well before the 1970s,
particularly in the field of public health. One
early application in Europe was by Dr John
Snow, who in 1854 recommended removing
the handle from the Broad Street water
pump in an attempt to stop the cholera
epidemic that was then ravaging central
London. Some evidence for a correlation
between the polluted water and cholera had
been published five years earlier by Snow
himself (Snow, 1849). This evidence was not
‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. However, it
was proof enough for Snow to recommend
the necessary public health action, where the
likely costs of inaction would have been far
greater than the possible costs of action
(see Box 1.1.).
The costs of Snow being wrong in getting the
pump handle removed would essentially have
been angry and inconvenienced citizens who
nevertheless wanted cholera stopped. These
costs were small in relation to the cost of
being wrong in not removing the pump
handle, once the evidence of the link
between the Broad Street pump water and
the cholera was available. His evidence that
there seemed to be a link was reliable
enough to help make a public policy decision
that proved correct: the cholera was being
caused by sewage-contaminated water and
removing exposure helped to remove the
risk.
The story of John Snow and cholera has
sometimes been misinterpreted as an
example of how very strong evidence of harm
and its causes can be used in a relatively
uncontroversial way. However, it was a classic
case of precautionary prevention, containing
several of the key elements of an approach to
scientific uncertainty, ignorance and policy-
making. These elements include the
difference between ‘knowing’ about a hazard
and its likely causes and ‘understanding’ the
chemical and biological or other processes
underlying the link; a focus on the potential
costs of being wrong; and the use of minority
scientific opinions in public policy-making.
These issues are taken up in the concluding
chapters of this report.
There are many differences between cholera,
asbestos (which came into use at about the
Table 1.2. The ‘precautionary principle’ in some international treaties and agreements
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987
‘Parties to this protocol... determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control
equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it...’
Third North Sea Conference, 1990
‘The participants... will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially
damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic, and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is no
scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.’
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992
‘In order to protect the environment the Precautionary Approach shall be widely applied by states according
to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
‘The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at
the lowest possible cost.’
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 1992
‘Community policy on the environment... shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles
that preventive actions should be taken, that the environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source and that the polluter should pay.’
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2000
‘In accordance with the precautionary approach the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an
adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms
resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary
movements.’
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 2001
Precaution, including transparency and public participation, is operationalised throughout the treaty, with
explicit references in the preamble, objective, provisions for adding POPs and determination of best available
technologies. The objective states: ‘Mindful of the Precautionary Approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Convention is to protect human health
and the environment from persistent organic pollutants.’
Source: EEA
Introduction 15
time of Snow’s action), and the other
harmful agents in the case studies, not least
being the time lag between exposure to the
harmful agent and the health damage, which
was hours in the case of cholera but decades
in the case of asbestos and most of the other
agents studied. Yet had governments adopted
a similar approach to precautionary
prevention as Dr Snow, once the early
warnings on asbestos had been published,
much of the tragedy and the huge costs of
asbestos exposure could have been averted.
1.4. Forestalling disasters:
integrating science and public
policy
Snow was working, both as a scientist and
policy-maker, in the conditions of scientific
uncertainty and political stress shared by all
who are charged with responsibilities for
protecting the public and the environment
from potentially harmful economic activity.
Politicians today are working in similar
conditions of scientific uncertainty and stress
as Dr Snow, but now made more difficult by
the higher risks and uncertainties
(economic, health and ecological) of larger-
scale activities (Beck, 1992) and by greater
pressure from the mass media (Smith, 2000).
They also work with more democratic
institutions, and are accountable to a better-
educated and involved citizenry which can
have good access to information from the
Internet. Globalisation and free trade issues
add further complications, as does the
emerging science of complexity and chaos,
which can require more humility and less
hubris in science. It is in these circumstances
of trying to prevent potentially serious and
irreversible effects, without disproportionate
costs, that the precautionary principle can be
useful. It helps policy-makers and politicians,
in circumstances in which waiting for very
strong evidence of harm before taking
precautionary action, may seriously
compromise public health or the
environment, or both.
Achieving consensus on the history of
accepted hazards, such as asbestos,
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the other
case studies, is not easy, but it is easier than
achieving consensus on how to deal with
current controversies such as climate change,
mobile phones or GMOs. There are some
well established criteria for helping scientists
to move from ‘association’ to ‘causation’, in
health hazard identification (Hill, 1965), but
there are no generally accepted criteria for
helping politicians to make sound public
policy decisions in the face of scientific
uncertainty, despite several good proposals
(Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999; Gee,
1997).
There is already a large literature on risk
assessment and hazard reduction which can
assist decision-makers in certain
circumstances, but an historical perspective
might also help. There is a rich history of
hazards covered in this report from which
something of value can be learnt. In chapter
Box 1.1. John Snow’s ‘precautionary prevention’
In a 10-day period from 31 August to 9 September
1854, there were about 500 deaths from cholera in
the parish of St. James, which included the Golden
Square area of Central London. John Snow, a
London physician, investigated the outbreak,
having previously written The Mode of
Communication of Cholera, a pamphlet of 30
pages which he published at his own expense in
1849. Prior to the Golden Square outbreak, Snow
was studying cholera and the water supplies from
two different water companies in South London:
one ‘clean’ and the other ‘polluted’ with sewage.
This incomplete study was already producing data
that supported his theory that cholera was caused
by contaminated water when he went to
investigate the Golden Square outbreak.
A short investigation revealed that virtually all of
the 83 people who had died in the Golden Square
area between 31 August and 5 September had
drawn water from the popular Broad Street water
pump, rather than from the available, and cleaner
yet less popular, piped water supplies. On 7
September, Snow recommended the removal of
the Broad Street water pump on the grounds that
there was ‘no... Cholera... except amongst
persons, who were in the habit of drinking the
water of the (Broad Street) water pump’. The
authorities removed the pump handle the next
day, thereby helping to speed up the declining
cholera outbreak and preventing further infection
from that source.
Snow later produced one of the first
epidemiological maps of disease and possible
causes at a presentation to the Epidemiological
Society of London on 4 December 1854, which
included a map of cholera deaths and the wells
nearest to Broad Street.
Snow’s views on cholera causation were not shared
by the majority of relevant scientists. The Royal
College of Physicians inquiry into the earlier 1853-
54 cholera outbreak had considered Snow’s thesis
and rejected it as ‘untenable’, as had the General
Board of Health in 1854: ‘we see no reason to
adopt this belief’. They believed that cholera was
caused by airborne contamination.
The biological mechanism underlying the link
between polluted water and cholera was unknown
at the time of this successful ‘precautionary
prevention’ in 1854: that came 30 years later, in
1884, when Koch announced his discovery of the
cholera vibrio in Germany.
EEA, based on Brody et al., 2000
16 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
16 lessons are drawn that can help frame and
identify sound and effective public policy
measures. These may help minimise the
future costs of being wrong about
environmental and health risks. There is
particular concern to see fewer ‘false
negatives’ in the future, but the late lessons
should also help reduce the smaller but
commonly feared risk of ‘false positives’.
Public trust in the politicians and scientists
who are trying to protect people and the
planet from hazards is very low, especially in
Europe, where BSE in the United Kingdom
and elsewhere, dioxins in Belgium, and the
HIV-contaminated blood transfusion affair in
France have contributed to a general sense of
malaise. Governments are aware of this and
are developing responses, such as the EU
White Paper on European Governance (July
2001). This includes recommendations for
improving public participation in managing
the inter-reactions between science,
technologies and society. This report aims to
contribute to the debate on the emerging
issue of democratising scientific expertise.
1.5. References
Beck, U., 1992. Risk Society, Sage, London.
Boehmer-Christiansen, S., 1994. ‘The
precautionary principle in Germany:
Enabling government’, in O’Riordan, T. and
Cameron, J. (eds), Interpreting the precautionary
principle’, p. 3, Cameron and May, London.
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Fisheries: taking stock 17
2. Fisheries: taking stock
Malcolm MacGarvin
Fisheries have had to deal with uncertainties
— with attempts made to manage them —
for centuries. The topic is therefore doubly
challenging as, while the underlying
precautionary principle is the same as for
pollutants, the practical approach to
implementation is necessarily very different.
‘Late lessons’ is certainly an appropriate
topic for marine capture fisheries. Awareness
of events such as those described here —
from the Middle Ages, through to 19th
century Scottish fisheries, the mid-20th
century Californian sardine fishery crash and
the collapse of Canadian northern cod stocks
in the 1990s — provide a sometimes gloomy
awareness of history repeating itself. But
there are also positive things to learn from
the past. The need for an explicitly
precautionary approach has been
increasingly recognised in the last decad