Globalization and Culture: Vol. 4. Ideologies of Globalism

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Prilims <i>
GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

Prilims <ii>
The concept of ‘globalization’ has in an extraordinarily short time become the dominant motif of
the contemporary social sciences. Central Currents in Globalization is an integrated
collection of four multi-volume sets that represent the systematic mapping of globalization studies.
The series sets out the contours of a field that now crosses the boundaries of all the older disciplines
in the social sciences and humanities. The result is a gold-standard collection of over 320 of the
most important writings on globalization, structured around four interrelated themes: Violence;
Economy; Culture; and Politics.
The series editor, Paul James (RMIT, Australia), is joined by sixteen internationally-renowned
co-editors from around the globe who bring their subject expertise to each volume, including
Jonathan Friedman, Tom Nairn, R.R. Sharma, Manfred Steger, Ronen Palan and Imre Szeman.
Together the four sets provide an unparalleled resource on globalization, providing both broad
coverage of the subject, historical depth and contemporary relevance.
Paul James is Director of the Global Cities Institute at RMIT in Australia, an editor of Arena
Journal, and on the Council of the Institute of Postcolonial Studies. He has received a number of
awards including the Japan–Australia Foundation Fellowship, an Australian Research Council
Fellowship, and the Crisp Medal by the Australasian Political Studies Association for the best
book in the field of political studies. He is author/editor of many books including Nation Formation:
Towards a Theory of Abstract Community (Sage Publications, 1996). His latest books are Global
Matrix: Nationalism, Globalism and State-Terrorism (Pluto, 2005), and Globalism, Nationalism,
Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In (Sage Publications, 2006). His interests are threefold: first,
globalism, nationalism and localism, including the changing nature of the nation-state and the
effects of an emergent level of global integration; second, social theory with a concentration on
theories of culture, community and social formation; and third, contemporary politics and society
with an emphasis on debates over technology and social change.
Manfred B. Steger is Professor of Global Studies and Director of the Globalism Institute at
RMIT University. He is also Program Leader of ‘Globalization and Culture’, in the Global Cities
Institute at RMIT University. He has delivered many lectures on globalization, ideology, and
nonviolence in the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Australia. He serves on
several editorial boards of academic journals as well as on the advisory boards of several
globalization research centers around the world. His latest books include The Rise of the Global
Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the War on Terror (2008) and
Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (2nd Edn, 2009) and Globalisms: The Great Ideological
Struggle of the 21st Century (3rd Edn 2009).

Prilims <iii>
VOLUME IV
Ideologies of Globalism
Edited by
Paul James and Manfred B. Steger
GLOBALIZATION
AND CULTURE
CENTRAL CURRENTS IN GLOBALIZATION
Los Angeles | London | New Delhi
Singapore | Washington DC

Prilims <iv>
Introduction and editorial arrangement © Paul James and Manfred B. Steger 2010
First published 2010
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Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Volume IV: Ideologies of Globalism
Introduction: Ideologies of Globalism Manfred B. Steger and Paul James ix
XVII. Historical Developments: From Heliocentrism to Globalism
64. Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography 3
Denis Cosgrove
65. How to Judge Globalism 33
Amartya Sen
66. Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections
on some Recent Literature 41
Robert W. Cox
67. ‘Where Ignorant Armies Clash by Night’: Homogeneous Community
and the Planetary Aspect 81
Paul Gilroy
XVIII. Dominant Ideologies of the Present:
From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism
68. Globalization and the Nostalgic Paradigm 97
Roland Robertson
69. Globalization, Literacy and Ideology 115
Ruqaiya Hasan
70. Globalization and Ideology: The Competing Images of the
Contemporary Japanese Economic System in the 1990s 132
Bai Gao
71. The New Feudalism: Globalization, the Market, and the Great Chain
of Consumption 147
Tim Duvall
72. Americans Again, or the New Age of Imperial Reason? Global Elite
Formation, its Identity and Ideological Discourses 163
Jonathan Friedman
73. In the Name of Freedom Comes a Totalizing War-Machine 169
Paul James
74. From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and
American Power after 9/11 178
Manfred B. Steger

vi Contents
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XIX. Alternative Ideologies of the Present:
From Anti-Capitalist Localism to Global Islam
75. Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization Movement 197
Barbara Epstein
76. Anti-Globalization: The Global Fight for Local Autonomy 207
Amory Starr and Jason Adams
77. The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash:
Shifting Debates and Policies 231
Robin Broad
78. Practices of Global Capital: Gaps, Cracks and Ironies in
Transnational Call Centres in India 261
Kiran Mirchandani
79. How Do We Learn to Want Less? The Globe Downshifted 278
Serge Latouche (Translated by Gulliver Cragg)
80. Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological
Frameworks in International Politics 284
Fiona B. Adamson
XX.Debating a World in Cleavage or an Emerging Global Synthesis
81. Jihad vs. McWorld 313
Benjamin R. Barber
82. Between McWorld and Jihad 323
Naomi Klein
83. Hybrid Modernities: Mélange Modernities in Asia 329
Jan Nederveen Pieterse
84. The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis 342
Amitai Etzioni
XXI. Critical Projections and the Future of Globalism
85. Globalism, Ideology and Traditions 373
Interview with Jürgen Habermas
86. Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm? 381
James H. Mittelman
87. The Collapse of Globalism: And the Rebirth of Nationalism 397
John Ralston Saul
88. Theorizing Globalization 409
Douglas Kellner

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Acknowledgements
These volumes are framed by the work of the Global Cities Institute at RMIT Univer-
sity in Melbourne. They were produced in collaboration with the Globalization
Studies Network, an international collection of centres and institutes around the
world, and with the profound intellectual support of individuals in the Globalism
Research Centre at RMIT – in particular, Damian Grenfell, Anne McNevin, Martin
Mulligan, Yaso Nadarajah, Tom Nairn, Heikki Patomäki, Peter Phipps, Andy Scerri,
Victoria Stead, Manfred Steger, Anna Trembath, and Chris Ziguras. The editors
are particularly grateful for the wise counsel of David Mainwaring and orga-
nizational efficiency of Judi Berger at Sage Publications.

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Ideologies of Globalism
Manfred B. Steger and Paul James
Ideologies of globalization now inform social life almost everywhere across the
globe. It sounds tautologous to say so, but that spread is part of a generalized
historical development involving the globalization of ideas and practices.
Indeed, over the last three decades – but ironically going back long before the term
‘globalization’ was first defined and had entered our dictionaries – such ‘globalisms’
have become part and parcel of discursive networks that envelope the entire globe.
Various ideational constellations such as cosmopolitanism, internationalism,
imperialism, transnationalism, and market liberalism have in different ways been
part of the long-term contested terrain of what it means to reach out and speak
across the world.1 And, all of these ‘isms’ make normative claims that reveal both
historical ruptures and continuities.
It is difficult to enter into the discursive frameworks of earlier periods, but in
the late-nineteenth century, for example, imperialism often served as a positive
ideal, presented in mainstream Europe and North America as a ‘way of life’
commensurate with a deeply racialized civilizing mission and a beneficent
colonizing spirit.2 Going even further back to the sixteenth century, an emergent
class of intellectuals – cartographers, philosophers and scribes – used cosmographic
images of the globus in indirectly competing ideologies. Along one lineage, spherical
images were used to link the early Atlantic empires to the cultural glory of Imperial
Rome, and, along another lineages, map-makers projected an early form of
cosmopolitanism with cartouches of cultural difference that might be seen as
stylized precursors to the ‘Family of Man’.3 The difference is that today, in the early
part of the twenty-first century, competing ideologies of globalization articulate a
tangled, but generalizing, global imaginary that, more readily than ever before,
cuts across class, gender, race, and state-based, geopolitical and cultural differences,
postcolonial divides and other social boundaries.
This generality was inconceivable in the nineteenth century and earlier. It is
not that our latest phase of globalization processes is now uncontested, homo-
genous, or totalizing. Nevertheless, for all the debates, and for all the emergence
of new localisms, the global imaginary has become relatively encompassing,
translated into differing political programs by competing globalisms. Perhaps the
most striking illustration of this cultural shift is that many lines of what used to
be called the ‘anti-globalization’ movement now describe themselves as part of
the alter-globalization movement.4They are attuned to we will call ‘justice
globalism’, an alternative vision of globalization based on egalitarian ideals of local-
global solidarities, distributive justice, and ecological sustainability. Since the 1999

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Seattle demonstrations, we have thus seen a major shift in sensibility – but this is
not to make the trite accusation that the ‘anti-globalization’ movement was
hopelessly in tension with itself, in addition to being ideologically incoherent and
self-contradictory as suggested by hundreds of media stories that focused on
‘anarchists’ smashing Starbucks windows or ridiculing anti-globalization protesters
devouring hamburgers from global fastfood chains such as McDonald’s.
Our point is different: firstly, it is only relatively recently that the global
imaginary has congealed sufficiently to provide the deep meaning structures for
various movements for social justice and human rights to recognize themselves
as part of a process of globalization, even as they continue to draw upon older
ideologies such as cosmopolitanism and internationalism. Secondly, the relatively
recent ascent of the buzzword ‘globalization’ (even if the term ought to refer to
longer-term processes unfolding in world history) affects social practices and
sensibilities. Thus, the alter-globalization movement now argues for an alternative
form of globalization, but it is ‘globalization’ nevertheless. And as such, more than
just another description of the world, the core concepts and central claims of justice
globalism constitute, we suggest, one lineage in a family of contesting ideologies.
That makes justice globalism akin to market globalism and religious globalism –
at least in the sense that it draws upon a generalizing, deep-seated imaginary of
global connectedness. These globalisms are, in our argument, part of a complex,
roughly-woven, but patterned ideational fabric that increasingly figures the global
as a defining condition of the present.5
The conceptual complexity and ideational diversity of the emerging ideological
fabric of the global age can be illustrated fairly readily. Sometimes ideologically-
charged statements about globalization come in the guise of gentle defences of
the practice of global interconnection: ‘globalization must be managed so that its
fundamentally benign effects are ensured and reinforced’.6 Sometimes they are
uncompromising and direct: ‘The failure of our world is not that there is too much
globalization, but that there is too little … We need more global markets, not fewer,
if we want to raise the standards of the poor of the world’.7 And sometimes, they
are simply written into seemingly neutral definitions: globalization is ‘the closer
integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about
by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the
breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital,
knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders’.8
All of these examples, including the definition (incidentally, written by Joseph
Stiglitz, a moderate critic of neoliberalism) are instances of what we call ‘market
globalism’. That is, they are claims that the global capitalist market is basically
‘good’ and/or is the given (even natural) outcome of the human condition as it
progresses and perfects itself. (‘Progress’ and ‘perfectability’ are some of the most
ideologically-charged words in the vocabulary of modernity. We will come back
to them later in the chapter.) In the case of Stiglitz’s definition, its ideological
undercurrent can be seen firstly in the way that it implicitly treats boundaries to
global movement as ‘artificial’, and secondly in the implicit treatment of globali-
zation as a phenomenon fuelled predominantly by global market mechanisms. But
where in this definition, one might ask, is there room for the globalization of the
nation-state system, the globalization of culture and values, the globalization of
sport, the globalization of practices of modern temporality, and so on?

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Such globalisms can also confound those who are critical of globalization. One
writer who proclaims to be moving away ‘from acquiescence to the new theology
of globalization’ to rebuilding local communities, distinguishes between
globalization (bad) and internationalization (good), fails to recognize that he is
calling for the globalization of support for the localized development. The twist is
contained unknowingly in the subtitle of his book – Localization: A Global
Manifesto.9 Maybe that is what his publisher decided, but it is indicative that the
significance of the word ‘global’ has been increasing while at the same time the
book industry itself – including the book’s publisher appropriately named Earthscan
– is now globalizing in its aspirations.
In another variation, John Ralston Saul portentously pronounces the collapse
of globalization, thus conflating neoliberalism (a philosophy of market relations
and one strand of globalism among many), other ideologies of globalization
(globalisms such as justice and religious globalism) and globalization (intensifying
social interrelations across world-space and world-time ranging from globalizing
financial exchange to the global movement of tourists). Based on the alleged retreat
of a particular named version of neoliberalism, Ralston Saul thus pronounces dead,
a process and family of ideologies that continue to be embedded deeply in the
practice and ideas of different people across the world. Certainly, one lineage of
neoliberalism that reached a high-point during the administrations of President
George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair has come under intense scrutiny – the
‘imperial globalism’ of the New American Century. However, neoliberalism,
decontested in various ways, has an obvious and continuing hold on corporate
capitalism and nation-state governance across the globe, the global financial crisis
notwithstanding. As a result, Ralston Saul finds himself contorting his own position
to explain how the ideology is not quite dead yet:
We have scarcely noticed this collapse, however, because Globalization has been
asserted by its believers to be inevitable – an all-powerful god; a holy trinity of
bourgeoning markets, unsleeping technology, and borderless managers. Opposition
or criticism has been treated as little more that romantic paganism. It was powerless
before this surprisingly angry god, who would simply strike down with thunderbolts
those who faltered and reward his heroes and champions with golden wreaths.10
Here, in confronting a phenomenon that has many faces, Ralston Saul and others
both overstate the ideological power of a particular ideology of global relations
and understate the generalizing power of both globalization as a practice and as
a patterned cluster of ideas, claims, and meanings. That is often the outcome of
an ideology that elusively both works across a number of different expressions
and reaches deep into the imaginary and ontological constitution of the social. The
two terms – ‘the imaginary’ and ‘the ontological’ – have a special meaning in our
work which require elaboration.
Let us then illustrate and explore three layers of social formations by suggesting
distinct ways toward understanding the complexity of ideas and meanings,
sensibilities and subjectivities: 1. as contested and decontested by various
ideologies; 2. as felt and woven together in social imaginaries; and 3. as lived in
relation to largely taken-for-granted social ontologies. In a sense each of these can
be understood as clusters of lived ideas and meanings, constituted in practice at
an ever-greater generality, durability, and depth. For example, ideologies tend to

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move in and out of contestation; imaginaries move at a deeper level and, in different
ways, enter the commonsense of an age; and ontologies – such as how we live
temporally or spatially – are the relatively enduring ground on which we walk. In
other words, all these ways of understanding the world are changing, and they
can even change at revolutionary speed, but the deeper the process the slower
the tendency for a pattern of change to take hold as dominant and encompassing.
At the risk of oversimplifying these concepts, and opening up debates or
misapprehensions before we have clarified how we are going to use such concepts,
they can be minimally defined as follows: 11
1. Ideologies can be defined as patterned clusters of normatively-imbued ideas and
concepts, including particular representations of power relations, carrying claims
to social truth – as, for example, expressed in liberalism, conservatism, and
socialism.12
2. Imaginaries can be defined as patterned convocations of the social whole. These
deep-seated modes of understanding provide the parameters within which people
imagine their social existence – expressed, for example, in conceptions of ‘the
global’, ‘the national’, ‘the moral order of our time’.
3. Ontologies can be defined as patterned ways-of-being that are lived as the
grounding conditions of the social – for example, modern time, territorial space,
and individualized embodiment.
Globalisms as Ideologies
Globalization, like other material practices, is associated with patterns of ideas
related to and about those practices. As always, the relationship between those
practices and ideas is extraordinarily complicated and mutually constitutive. Just
as the formation of nations is associated with the ideologies of the national
imaginary – that is, politically contested ideas about who should achieve the desired
end of forging the ‘natural’ connection between nation and state – processes of
globalization are associated with ideologies of the global imaginary that both
influence and make sense of practices and patterns of practice. Here a key notion
is that ideologies are patterned and conceptually ‘thick’ enough to form relatively
coherent and persistent articulations of the underlying social imaginary. One or
two statements of contention do not an ideology make.
In this sense, ideologies of globalization are sometimes pressing and have
contested claims about what it means to live in a globalizing world. They become
taken-for-granted through processes of decontestation, that is, attempts to re-
duce the indeterminacy of linguistically expressed meaning to fixed, authoritative
definitions and statements. It may sound counter-intuitive to say that ideologies
of global interconnection were prevalent even before the overt and contested
recognition (the naming) of the importance of globalization as a ‘condition of our
age’. But, that is just to say that ideas are not always directly and reflexively
expressed in relation to a self-reflexively named set of practices. What we can say
in general is that today’s competing globalisms, like the previous ideologies of the
national imaginary, are always contingent, arguable, in tension with each other,
and resistant to easy analysis of their affective power.

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The most effective ‘ideologues’ (we use this term in a neutral way referring to
the elite codifiers of political belief systems) tend to reach across different ideologies
and, at the same time, to draw deeper down in the imaginary and ontological
foundations of the social. For example, when the presidential candidate Barack
Obama spoke as a ‘world citizen’ in Berlin (July 2008), calling for nations to come
together as in a commitment to global progress, he struggled to bring together
different ideologies (from both the national and global imaginaries) into a fragile
singular vision:
Now is the time to build new bridges across the globe as strong as the one that bound
us across the Atlantic. Now is the time to join together, through constant cooperation,
strong institutions, shared sacrifice, and a global commitment to progress, to meet
the challenges of the 21st century. It was this spirit that led airlift planes to appear
in the sky above our heads, and people to assemble where we stand today. And this
is the moment when our nations – and all nations – must summon that spirit anew.13
When does a political belief-system warrant the designation of a separate
‘ideological family’? What criteria should be used to say that a series of ideas
constitutes an ideology? Michael Freeden suggests that ideologies display unique
features anchored in distinct conceptual morphologies.14 Resembling well-
furnished rooms containing various articles of furniture uniquely arranged in
proximity to each other, ideologies come together in creatively-made patterns.15
Freeden provides us with three useful criteria for determining the status of a
particular political belief system: first, its degree of uniqueness and complexity;
second, its context-bound responsiveness to a broad range of political issues; and,
third, its ability to produce effective conceptual chains of decontestation. The
process of ‘decontestation’ – the process by which ideas come to be treated as
natural or commonsensical – is a crucial process in the formation of thought
systems. This is because the process of contestation and decontestation specifies
the meanings of the core concepts by arranging them in a pattern that links them
in an expressive and pointed way with other concepts. Michael Freeden briefly
discusses ‘globalism’ as a possible contender for ideological status, but based on
his rather formalistic approach to ideology, he retreats to the sceptical view that
‘it is far too early to pronounce on globalism’s status as an ideology’.16 While sharing
the British philosopher’s interest in changing ideological systems, this essay seeks
to establish the following counter-proposition:
Proposition 1. The various ideologies in the extended family of globalisms have over
the last couple of decades come to form clusters of political ideas and beliefs coherent
enough to warrant the status of a set of ideologies: market globalism, justice
globalism, religious globalism, and imperial globalism, to name the principal clusters.
We have already defined market globalism as a cluster of ideas which suggest that,
notwithstanding its short-term problems and cyclical down-turns, global laissez-
faire capitalism is fundamentally good and/or is the given outcome (even natural
progression) of the human condition. The ideology of market globalism tends to
build upon a number of interrelated central claims: that globalization is powered
by neutral techno-economic forces; that the process is inexorable; that the process
is leaderless and anonymous; that everyone will be better off in the long run, and
that globalization furthers the spread of equality and democracy. Justice globalism,

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by comparison, is defined by its emphasis on justice, rights, sustainability, and
diversity. It articulates a very different set of claims. It suggests that the process of
globalization is powered by corporate interests; that the process can take different
pathways; that the democracy carried by global processes tends to be thin and
procedural; and that ‘globalization-from-above’ is associated with increasing
inequities within and between nation-states, greater environmental destruction
and a marginalization of the poor. The third cluster, religious globalism (its most
spectacular strain being jihadist Islamism), rests on the populist evocation of an
exceptional spiritual and political crisis – in the jihadist lineage expressed as an
age of jahiliyya (ignorance and pagan idolatry) that calls for a renewed
universalism of a global umma (a reworked meaning of a global Islamic commu-
nity). A fourth cluster, imperial globalism, has faltered over the last year or two
with the fracturing of the Washington Consensus. Developing out of market
globalism and still retaining some of its central features, it is the publicly weakest
of these ideological clusters, even though for a time it informed the so-called ‘Global
War on Terror’ and the joint action of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ led by the
unilateralist Bush administration. Despite its waning influence since the election
of Barack Obama, imperial globalism still operates as a powerful background force
to the extent that its central claim – that global peace depends upon the global
economic reach and military authority of an (informal) ‘American Empire’ and its
allies – is still taken for granted within many governing and elite circles.17
In short, it can be seen that the different ideological clusters associated with
globalization are competing doctrines with very different emphases. This ideational
variance is further enhanced when we take into consideration different settings
and geographical scales. For example, Bai Goa writes about the mainstream
Japanese approach to globalization as diverging from the ‘Anglo-American
approach’ (pre-Global Financial Crisis) in four specific ways:
globalization is perceived as the cause of rather than the remedy for the bubble
economy; the big bang of the finance industry is blamed for driving the economy
into a liquidity trap; the assertion of a universal model of market economy conflicts
with the strong desire for national identity; and the efficiency principle is contested
by the widely shared belief in the ideal of economic equality.18
However, for all their complexity as ideologies, and despite the obvious tensions
between them and the differences across different settings, globalisms have one
thing in common. People who are caught up in them – whether from the political
Right or Left – tend to accept the apparent inevitability and relative virtue of global
interconnectivity and mobility across global time and space. However, one seeks
to understand global history and whatever set-backs we might face in the future,
intensifying social interconnections have come to define the nature of our times.
Even though proponents of justice globalism may insist that ‘another world is
possible’, they hardly question that growing global interconnectivity remains a
central part of most, if not all, alternative futures.
One sign of a maturing ideological constellation is that it comes to be
represented as ‘post-ideological’. In some guises globalism is (mis)presented along
these lines as just the way that things are: a transparent reality. Thus, even for a
sophisticated social theorist like Jürgen Habermas, globalism has been lifted
beyond the capacity of conventional, ‘Frankfurt-style’ Ideologiekritik. As he notes,

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The present situation is, in a way, so transparent that there is, first, no need for a
suspicious disclosure of concealed truths – you need not even read the Financial
Times or the Frankfurter Allgemeine, every middle-brow local paper contains on the
front pages the necessary information. It should be clear for everybody, that the
recent – or not quite so recent – acceleration in transnational trade, direct investment
and flow of capital is the intended result of political agreements that have led – via
several GATT Rounds – to an economic regime which is represented by institutions
such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, etc. That means, secondly, that globalism is not only an ideology. We in fact
observe a shift in the structure of capitalism from an international to a transnational
disposition.19
In short, when a sophisticated philosopher such as Jürgen Habermas says that
globalization is just a ‘fact’ – that ‘we not only need to learn how to adapt to, but
also to cope with the undesired consequences of the globalization processes’ – we
can see how the various ideological translations of the rising global imaginary are
becoming part of the commonsense of the global age. Like the aforementioned
complexity of the naming process, it does not take the active use of words such as
‘inevitable’ to accept globalization culturally as an inexorable force to which we
‘need to learn how to adapt’.
Over the last two decades – and especially since the onset of the 2008–09 global
financial crisis – the public discourse on globalization sketching its projected path
has changed. At the height of the ‘Roaring Nineties’, the master narrative was
saturated with adjectives like ‘inevitable’, ‘inexorable’, and ‘irreversible’. Indeed,
the elite codifiers of market globalism were insistent and blunt. For example, in a
1999 speech on United States’ foreign policy, President Bill Clinton told his
audience: ‘Today we must embrace the inexorable logic of globalization …
Globalization is irreversible. Protectionism will only make things worse’.20 Power
elites in the global South often faithfully echoed the determinist language of
globalism. For example, Manuel Villar, the Philippines Speaker of the House of
Representatives, insisted that, ‘We cannot simply wish away the process of
globalization. It is a reality of a modern world. The process is irreversible’.21
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the claim to
inevitability came under sustained criticism by commentators who read the al-
Qa’ida attacks as exposing the ‘dark side of globalization’. Some writers proclaimed
the imminent ‘collapse of globalism’, worrying that the terrorist attacks would usher
in a new age of cultural particularism and economic protectionism.22 Noted
neoliberal economists like Robert Samuelson argued that previous globalization
processes had been stopped by similar cataclysmic events, like the assassination
of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.23 Despite this fear, and
enacted in the telling of the fear, the unfolding War on Terror allowed for a renewed
semantic intermingling of military and economic inevitability. For example,
Christopher Shays, Republican Congressman from Connecticut and Chair of the
House Subcommittee on National Security, argued that the ‘toxic zeal’ of the
terrorists would eventually be defeated by the combination of military and market
forces – ‘the relentless inevitability of free peoples pursuing their own enlightened
self-interest in common cause’.24 Thus, the capacity of people to revise ideologies
of globalism and to adapt to the new realities of the post-September 11 world gives
ample proof of its responsiveness to a broad range of political issues.

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In the first years of the twenty-first century, the contention that ‘globalization
is inevitable’ has tended to be made with less urgency. The dominant sense became
that we are now simply globalized and the question is what we are going to do
about it. That is until an economic shockwave ripped through global capitalism in
2008. With the realization that the global financial system was in danger of
collapsing, the language changed again. As the repercussions stretched far beyond
Wall Street and Paternoster Square, and as the calamity was christened ‘the Global
Financial Crisis’, the salience of again defending ‘good forms’ of globalization was
renewed. Thus, President Obama sought to convince his global audience that, ‘Not
only is it impossible to turn back the tide of globalization, but efforts to do so can
make us worse off’.25 Or, as he put it in another recent speech:
For two hundred years, the United States has made it clear that we won’t stand for
foreign intervention in our hemisphere. But every day, all across the Americas, there
is a different kind of struggle – not against foreign armies, but against the deadly
threat of hunger and thirst, disease and despair. That is not a future that we have to
accept – not for the child in Port au Prince or the family in the highlands of Peru.
We can do better. We must do better. We cannot ignore suffering to our south, nor
stand for the globalization of the empty stomach.26
From a justice globalism perspective, the idea of inevitablity tends to be put more
tentatively and critically, but the acceptance, albeit reluctantly, of the broader
‘reality’ of a globalized world still remains firmly within the framework of the global
imaginary. For example, coming from this broader stance, Peter Raven in his
Presidential Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science
annual meeting in 2002 says: ‘Globalization appears to have become an irresistible
force, but we must make it participatory and humane to alleviate the suffering of
the world’s poorest people and the effective disenfranchisement of many of its
nations’.27 Similarly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) frames the third
major statement (2008) of its principles since its 1919 constitution was laid out
by representing the view that globalization is the basic context of productive
life. Building upon the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, and the Declaration of
Fundamental Principles 1998, the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization begins with a sentence which frames all others: ‘Considering that
the present context of globalization, … is reshaping the world of work in profound
ways …’28
Globalisms as Woven into a Social Imaginary
Whether or not the buzzword ‘globalization’ is part of common parlance, and
whether or not it is habitually used to frame policy documents, there arose over
the past couple of decades a quiet and generalized recognition that global processes
inform social life: from the way we borrow money and source basic commodities,
to the way in which we choose films to watch, keep in contact with friends and
family, and understand the rise and fall of petroleum prices. This leads us to our
second proposition:
Proposition 2. Globalisms represent sets of political beliefs coherent and conceptually

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rich enough to warrant the status of ‘ideology’. Moreover, a sense of ‘the global’ has
come to constitute the dominant social imaginary of our time (albeit still contending
with the weakening national imaginary) from within which all contemporary
political belief systems must be understood and analyzed.
The various ideologies associated with globalization have thus, over the last two
decades, come to coalesce around a new sense of a social whole – a global social
imaginary of profound, generalizing, and deep impact. At the same time, different
writers have been grappling with the notion that this is more than an ideologically-
contested representation of social integration and differentiation. As Claude Lefort
writes, ‘In this sense, the examination of ideology confronts us with the
determination of a type of society in which a specific regime of the imaginary can
be identified’.29 Charles Taylor perhaps provides the most useful way forward in
defining a social imaginary as ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how
they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows,
the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and
images that underlie these expectations’.30 Our definition is narrower, but it draws
on a similar sense.
Although the concept is not itself developed in sufficient theoretical detail in
Taylor’s writings, his philosophical and historical comments on the subject are very
helpful. In his terms, the modern social imaginary was built on three orientations.
The first is the separating out of the economy as a distinct domain, treated as an
objectified reality. The second is the simultaneous emergence of the public sphere
as the place of increasingly mediated interchange and (counter-posed) the intimate
or private sphere in which ‘ordinary life’ is affirmed. The third is the sovereignty of
the people, treated as a new collective agency even as it is made up of individuals
who see self-affirmation in the other spheres. These are three historical
developments among others that are relevant to what might be called a modern
ontological formation (of which more later), but listing such factors neither help
us to define a social imaginary in general nor to understand what we are calling
the ‘global imaginary’.
The definition that we gave earlier helps to make a couple of further steps –
imaginaries can be defined as patterned convocations of the lived social whole. The
notion of ‘convocation’ is important: it is the calling together, the gathering (not
the self-consciously defending or active decontesting activity associated with
ideologies) of an assemblage of meanings, ideas, sensibilities that are taken to be
relatively self-evident. The concept of ‘the social whole’ points to the way in which
certain apparently simple terms such as ‘our society’, ‘we’, and ‘the market’ carry
taken-for-granted and interconnected meanings. This concept allows us to define
the imaginary as broader than the dominant sense of community. A social whole,
in other words, is not necessarily co-extensive with a projection of community
relations or ‘the ways people imagine their social existence’ (Taylor), nor does it
need to be named as such. It can encompass a time, for example, when there maybe
only an inchoate sense of global community, but there is today paradoxically an
almost pre-reflexive sense that at one level ‘we’ as individuals, peoples, and nations
have a common global fate.
Thirty years ago all of these notions of the social whole, including ‘the market’,
would have been largely seen as co-extensive with the nation-state and were

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stretched across relations between nation-states (hence the use of the narrower
term ‘international relations’). With notable exceptions, even when sociologists
and political scientists analysed a thing called ‘society’, they tended to assume the
boundaries of the nation (in the literature this is now called ‘methodological
nationalism’). In other words, the social whole was a national imaginary that
tended to be equated with the community of the nation. Now we find either that
concepts such as ‘society’ have become terms of ambivalence (Margaret Thatcher
– ‘There is no such thing as society’)31 or that they have become stretched between
two imaginaries: the national and the global.
In The Imaginary Constitution of Society, Cornelius Castoriadis takes the concept
of the ‘imaginary’ in a direction that we do not want to travel. And yet, it provides
a useful means of saying how we are not using the term. In his argument, the
imaginary is that which expresses the creative excess of the human condition.32 It
always exceeds the possibilities of the material conditions of life.33 Our use of the
term ‘social imaginary’ is more akin to Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of the pre-
reflexive habitus – that is, ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles
which generate and organize practices and representations’.34 However, for our
purposes, the concept of the habitus is too normatively-driven, and the concept of
the ‘social imaginary’ has a stronger sense of the social whole or of the general
‘given’ social order. It is not everything. What is important to take from Bourdieu
is the sense of how patterns of practice/ideas can be seen to be objectively outside
of the particular practices/ideas of persons, even as those patterns were constituted
by persons as they subjectively took hold of the possibilities of acting in and through
such a habitus. Drawing on Bourdieu in an article that shows how both
anthropology and geography as fields of enquiry have to respond to issues of
globalization, Katherine Rankin extends the term:
For that part of culture in which hegemony prevails, individuals assume dispositions
and orientations beyond their own horizon of meaning – ‘habitus’ in Bourdieu’s
lexicon – and thus collude, often unwittingly, in the production of a system that
may oppress them. In these circumstances, the practices of individuals, right down
to their bodily comportment, can acquire a unity and consistency without being the
result of conscious obedience to rules. Thus anthropologists have documented the
processes by which abstract ideologies circulating at a global scale – neoliberalism,
political democracy, development, modernization – assume historically and culturally
specific textures and become rooted as common sense in particular societies.35
Thus a social imaginary sets the ‘background’ lived and experienced as ‘common
sense’.36 Put in different terms, the medium and the message – the practice of inter-
relation on a global scale and the content or messages of global interconnection
and naturalized power – have become increasingly bound up with each other.
To summarize thus far, we have suggested there are several ideologies of
globalization – or globalisms – and these not only have a family connection, but
they also translate into concrete political programmes and agendas as a genera-
lizing global imaginary. We can take this a step further, based on the question asked
earlier about what Taylor calls ‘the modern imaginary’. Our deepest assumptions
about globalization, we suggest, are currently grounded in basic categories of time
and space, and more explicitly in the dominance of modern time-space (as such

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understandings have become unsettled by emergent postmodern temporalities and
spatialities).
Contemporary Globalisms as Grounded in
Changing Ontological Forms
The concept of ontologies is used as short-hand term for referring to the most basic
framing categories of social existence: temporality, spatiality, corporeality,
epistemology and so on. These are categories of being-in-the-world, historically
constituted in the structures of human interrelations. To talk of ‘being’ in this way
does not imply a given or unchanging human essence, nor is it confined to the
generation of meaning in the sphere of selfhood. If questions of ontology are about
questions of ‘being’ then in a sense everything to do with ‘being human’ is
ontological. However, we are using the concept more precisely to refer categories
of existence such as ‘space’ and ‘time’ that on the one hand are always talked about,
and, on the other, are rarely interrogated, analyzed, or historically contextualized
except by philosophers and social theorists. Brief illustrations of the themes of time
and space will help bring this largely taken-for-granted connection between
ontological categories and globalization to the surface.
The category of spatiality is crucial – obviously ‘globalization’ is pre-eminently
a spatial concept. However, to be more historically specific, contemporary
globalization is predominantly lived through a modern conception of spatiality
linked to abstracted territory and sovereignty,37 rather than for example as a
traditional cosmological sense of spatiality held together by God, Nature or some
other generalized Being. This is a claim about dominance rather than a simple
epochal shift from or replacement of an older form of temporality. This accords
with Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s notions of ‘hybrid’ or ‘mélange modernities’ (in this
volume).38 For example, those who espouse a Jihadist or Pentecostalist variant of
religious globalism tend to be stretched between a modern sense of space and a
neo-traditional sense of a universalizing umma or Christendom respectively. In
this neo-traditional understanding, the social whole exists in, prior to, and beyond
modern global space.39
On the other hand, we also find instances of ambiguous modern spatialities
sliding into postmodern sensibilities that relate to contemporary globalization. For
example, there are airline advertising maps that are post-territorial (postmodern)
to the extent that they show multiple abstract vectors of travel – lines that criss-
cross between multiple city-nodes and travel across empty space without reference
to the conventional mapping expressions of land and sea, nation-state and
continental boundaries. To such a backdrop and with no global outline, an
advertisement for KLM airlines states ‘You could fly from anywhere in the world
to any destination’.40 The point here is that we comfortably know how to read
those maps despite the limited points of orientation, and we know that they are
global before reading the fine print – ‘anywhere in the world’. While the dominant
representations of global spatiality tend to be highly modern – the prime example
is Google Earth released in June 2005 – we no longer need the 1990s-style icons
of planet earth to know that the local and the global are interconnected.41 For
example, in an advertisement on the next page from the KLM advertisement just

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mentioned, a picture of a country lane and an old British post-box is used as the
backdrop to the words ‘It’s all about picking up your Email anywhere’. Nothing
has to be said about the web being world-wide or the metal post-box with the
royal emblem of ER (Elizabeth Regina II) being anachronistically local-national.
Those of us who live a modern global imaginary just know how to read the imagery.
The category of temporality is also important to the contemporary global
imaginary even if ‘time’ is not relevant to globalization definitionally. Modern time
– the demarcated disciplinary time of the calendar and clock – has been globalized
both in a formal way since the negotiations over world-time in the 1870s, and
informally in how people tend to work, organize their leisure. More generally, we
can say that different social formations live their dominant senses of temporality
in fundamentally different ways. For example, the notion that time passes at one-
second-per-second is a tautological and modern convention rather than being
intrinsically natural, scientifically verifiable, or continuous with older cosmological
senses of time.
Modern time is abstracted from nature, and verifiable only within a particular
mode of modern scientific enquiry – the Newtonian treatment of time as unitary,
linear and uniform. It reached one of its defining moments in 1974 when the second
came to be measured in atomic vibrations, allowing the post-phenomenal concept
of nano-seconds – one-billionth of a second.42 Whether or not this is common
knowledge, this sense of time-precision has been globalized as the regulative
framework for electronic transactions in the global market-place. That then is the
first point: a modern sense of time has been globalized and overlays older
ontologies of temporality. The second point is that assumed connection between
modern time and modern globalization is drawn upon to project contemporary
ideologies, including those of global capitalism – linked to concepts such as
‘progress’, ‘efficiency’, ‘perfectability’, and ‘just-in-time’. Concepts of ‘time’ and ‘the
global’ are commonly used to sell high-end commodities from expensive watches
and clothes to computers, mobile phones and music-listening devices. For example,
an advertisement for Columbus Circle clothing stores, headed by the words
‘6.10pm. Think globally. Act Stylishly’, shows a woman jumping out of a taxi to go
shopping, framed by the lines of a clock.43 This makes sense when you consider
that the eight most commonly-used words in the English language are time, person,
year, way, day, thing, man, world, (emphasis added)44 and English itself is being
globalized.45
By way of background to the present approach, we should add that the concepts
of ‘the traditional’, ‘the modern’ and ‘the postmodern’ are employed as provisionally
useful designations of ontological difference.46 That is, forms of social being are
defined in terms of how basic categories of the human condition are practised,
understood and lived. Those basic categories are provisionally taken to be time,
space, embodiment and knowing.
Traditionalism can be characterized as carrying forward prior ontological forms
from customary tribalism,47 but reconstituted in terms of universalizing
cosmologies and political-metaphorical relations. An example here is the institution
of the Christian Church. It may have modernized its practices of organization and
become enmeshed in a modern monetary economy, but the various denominations
of the Church, and most manifestly its Pentecostal variations, remain deeply bound
up with a traditional cosmology of meaning and ritual. The truth of Jesus is not

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analytically relative or a question of modern proof. In this sense, a ‘return’ to
traditionalism characterizes many of the expressions of contemporary religious
globalisms.
Modernism can in the same way be said to carry forward prior forms of being,
but fundamentally reconstituting (and sometimes turning up-side down) those
forms in terms of technical-abstracted modes of time, space, embodiment and
knowing. Time, in this sense, becomes understood and practised not in terms of
cosmological connection with a capital ‘C’ but through empty calendrical time-
lines that can be filled with the details and wonders of history – events made by
us. Space is territorialized and marked by abstract lines on maps – with places
drawn in by our own histories. Embodiment becomes an individualized project
separated out from the mind and used to project a choosing self. And, knowing
becomes an act of analytically dismembering and re-synthesizing information. In
practice, modernism is associated with the dominance of capitalist production
relations, commodity and finance exchange, print and electronic communication,
bureaucratic-rational organization and analytic enquiry, but there is no necessary
connection here. It is a historical connection that lurches from periods of thriving
to periods of crisis, but in all cases naturalizes itself ideologically as the taken-for-
granted pathway to development.
Postmodernism can thus be similarly defined in much more fundamental ways
than the ‘end of grand narratives’, a descent into disorganization, or the ironical
use of pastiche. In our terms it is a formation characterized by the intersection of
virtual-relativized space-time, corporeality, and epistemology.48 For example as
inferred earlier, space becomes deterritorialized to the extent that its lived
connection to the phenomena of landscape – actual mountains and rivers – becomes
lifted into a relativized aesthetic of practice and representation. In practice in the
world today, what we find are different formations of traditionalism, modernism
and postmodernism in complex intersection with each other.
To bring this discussion to a close and to integrate the three layers of our analysis
– from ideologies to ontologies – we now turn to some prominent themes in
contemporary politics and culture. In what follows, we identify some core themes
of globalism and offer a critical analysis of the political role of these authoritative
but contested semantic chains as they absorb, alter, and rearrange ideas drawn
from established ideologies, imaginaries and ontologies. Market globalism will be
used as the point of departure each time because, contra Ralston Saul’s ‘death of
globalism’ argument, it retains considerable semantic and practical power. Three
interconnected themes will be briefly discussed in turn: globalization and the
market, globalization and development, and globalization, democracy and
freedom.
Globalization and the Market
‘The market’ is one of the core concepts of globalism, whether as described by its
critics or by the proponents of market globalism. The concept of ‘the market’ also
plays an important role in two established ideologies that precede market
globalism: the libertarian variant of liberalism, often referred to as neoliberalism,
inspired by the ideas of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman; and the late-

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twentieth century brand of Anglo-American conservatism, or neoconservatism,
associated with the views of Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher, and Ronald Reagan.
As Robert Cox in his classic article describes,49 they came together as intertwining
ideological positions in the mid-twentieth century around the Trilateral Commis-
sion, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Council on Foreign Relations
in the United States. Since then, issues of globalization, and in particular free trade
within the global capitalist market, have been central to their configuration.
While market globalism borrows heavily from both neoliberalism and
neoconservatism, it would be a mistake to reduce it to either. Moreover, these ‘neo-
isms’ should not be seen as ideological opposites, for their similarities sometimes
outweigh their differences. In general, neoconservatives agree with neoliberals
on the importance of free markets and free trade, but they are much more inclined
than the latter to combine their hands-off attitude towards big business with
intrusive government action for the regulation of the ordinary citizenry, in the name
of public security and traditional values. In foreign affairs, neoconservatives
advocate a more assertive and expansive use of both economic and military power,
although they often embrace the liberal ideal of promoting freedom and democracy
around the world.50
What gives market globalism its uniqueness and morphological sophistication,
then, is not merely its ability to absorb and rearrange ideas from conventional ideo-
logies. Three additional factors must be taken into consideration: the depth of the
concept of ‘globalization’ (no other ideology so directly goes to the heart of onto-
logical claims about condensing time and space – for example, drawing upon an
aphorism such as ‘time is money’); the conceptual shift of ‘market’ from its adja-
cent or peripheral location in liberalism and conservatism to market globalism’s
conceptual core; and the formation of a number of highly original ideological
claims.
Embracing the classical liberal idea of the self-regulating market, one claim
seeks to establish beyond dispute ‘what globalization means’, that is, to offer an
authoritative definition of globalization designed for broad public consumption.
It does so by interlocking its two core concepts and then linking them to the adjacent
ideas of ‘liberty’ and ‘integration’. The following two examples illustrate this
process.51 The first is a passage taken from a leading Business Week article published
in the late 1990s: ‘Globalization is about the triumph of markets over governments.
Both proponents and opponents of globalization agree that the driving force today
is markets, which are suborning the role of government’.52 The same claim is made
over and over again in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman’s best-selling
book on globalization. Indeed, a number of commentators have argued that
Friedman’s writings provide the ‘official narrative of globalization’ in the United
States today.53 At one point in his narrative, the award-winning New York Times
columnist insists that everybody ought to accept the following ‘truth’ about
globalization: ‘The driving idea behind globalization is free-market capitalism –
the more you let market forces rule and the more you open your economy to free
trade and competition, the more efficient your economy will be’.54
By forging a close semantic link between ‘globalization’, the ‘market’ and a
spatially-flattened world, globalists like Friedman seek to create the impression
that globalization represents primarily an economic phenomenon that puts all life
on one spatial plane – The World is Flat.55 Thus unburdened from the complexity

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of its additional non-economic dimensions, globalization acquires the necessary
simplicity and focus to convey its central normative message contained in further
semantic connections to the adjacent concepts ‘liberalization’ and ‘economic
integration’.
Conversely, the notion of ‘integrating markets’ is draped in the mantle of all-
embracing liberty, hence the frequent formulation of globalization as an imperative
anchored in universal reason. Thus (re)presented as an economic project advancing
human freedom in general, globalization must be applied to all countries,
regardless of the political and cultural preferences expressed by local citizens. As
President George W. Bush noted in a key document of his administration, ‘Policies
that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for
all economies – industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the developing
world’.56 In Barack Obama’s words: ‘As Tom Friedman points out in his new book,
The World Is Flat, over the last decade or so, these forces – technology and
globalization – have combined like never before … a quiet revolution has been
breaking down barriers and connecting the world’s economies.’57 Again common
spatial notions are used to naturalize the ideological claims. Upon deeper reflection,
one might wonder how such ideological efforts insisting on a single economic
strategy for all countries can be made compatible with a process alleged to
contribute to the spread of freedom, choice, and openness across the world, but
this is not a query that is usually made.
Finally, the semantic chain ‘globalization-market-liberty-integration’ serves to
solidify as ‘fact’ what is actually a contingent political initiative. It persuades large
segments of the public that its account of globalization represents an objective
diagnosis of the real world, rather than a claim contributing to the emergence of
the very conditions it purports to describe. To be sure, globalists offer plenty of
empirical evidence for the liberalization of markets. Questions that remain are:
does the spread of market principles happen because a natural connection exists
between globalization and the spatial expansion of markets? Or does it occur
because the globalists’ draw upon language that has enhanced their political power
to shape the world largely according to their ideological claim?
Globalization and Development
Market globalism provides an affirmative answer to the crucial normative question
of whether globalization represents a ‘good’ phenomenon by suggesting that it is
intimately connected to development – itself a strongly temporally charged concept.
The adjacent idea of ‘benefits for everyone’ is usually unpacked in material terms
such as ‘economic growth’ and ‘prosperity’. However, when linked to another
related temporal concept, ‘progress’ – the idea of ‘benefits for everyone’ – it taps
not only into liberalism’s progressive worldview of the benefits of ever-expanding
capitalist consumption, but also draws on the powerful socialist vision of
establishing a progressive paradise on earth. This is another bold example of
combining elements from seemingly incompatible ideologies under the master
concept ‘globalization’.
At the 1996 G-7 Summit, the heads of state and government of the world’s
seven most powerful industrialized nations issued a joint communiqué that

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exemplifies the principal meanings of globalization conveyed in the concept of
‘development’:
Economic growth and progress in today’s interdependent world is bound up with
the process of globalization. Globalization provides great opportunities for the future,
not only for our countries, but for all others too. Its many positive aspects include
an unprecedented expansion of investment and trade; the opening up to international
trade of the world’s most populous regions, as well as opportunities for more
developing countries to improve their standards of living; the increasingly rapid
dissemination of information, technological innovation, and the proliferation of
skilled jobs. These characteristics of globalization have led to a considerable
expansion of wealth and prosperity in the world. Hence we are convinced that the
process of globalization is a source of hope for the future.58 (Emphasis added.)
More than a decade later, and after much change including the crisis of the global
financial markets, the official communiqué issued at the end of the 2009 G-20
summit in London said much the same thing except with a stronger emphasis on
global regulation and governance, particularly through the International Monetary
Fund (IMF): ‘We believe that the only sure foundation for sustainable globalization
and rising prosperity for all is an open world economy based on market principles,
effective regulation, and strong global institutions’.59
Globalization, Democracy and Freedom
A further decontestation chain is that which links ‘globalization’ and ‘market’ to
the adjacent concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. It also plays a significant role
in liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Market globalists typically decontest
‘democracy’ through its proximity to ‘market’ and the making of economic choices
– a theme developed through the 1980s in the peculiar variant of conservatism
linked to ‘Thatcherism’. Indeed, a careful discourse analysis of relevant texts reveals
that market globalists tend to treat freedom, free markets, free trade and democracy
as synonymous terms. Phrases such as ‘the space of freedom’ are used across the
ideological spectrum, and tend to be used more commonly by justice globalists,
but a common spatial frame for such discussions remains the global market.
Francis Fukuyama, for example, asserts that there exists a ‘clear correlation’
between a country’s level of economic development and successful democracy.
While globalization and capital development do not automatically produce
democracies, ‘the level of economic development resulting from globalization is
conducive to the creation of complex civil societies with a powerful middle class.
It is this class and societal structure that facilitates democracy’.60 Praising Eastern
Europe’s economic transition towards capitalism, then First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton told her Polish audience that the emergence of new businesses and
shopping centres in former communist countries should be seen as the ‘backbone
of democracy’.61
Fukuyama and Clinton agree that the globalization process strengthens the
existing affinity between democracy and free market. However, their neoliberal
argument hinges on a limited definition of democracy that emphasizes formal
procedures such as voting at the expense of the direct participation of broad

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majorities in political and economic decision-making. This ‘thin’ definition of
democracy is part of what William I. Robinson has identified as the Anglo-American
ideological project of ‘promoting polyarchy’ in the developing world. For Robinson,
the thin concept of polyarchy differs from the thicker concept of ‘popular
democracy’, in that the latter posits democracy as both a process and a means to
an end – a tool for devolving political and economic power from the hands of elite
minorities to the masses. Polyarchy, on the other hand, represents an elitist and
regimented model of ‘low-intensity’ or ‘formal’ market democracy. Polyarchies not
only limit democratic participation to voting in elections, but also require that those
elected be insulated from popular pressures, so that they may ‘govern effectively’.62
This semantic focus on the act of voting – in which equality prevails only in
the formal sense – helps to obscure the conditions of inequality reflected in existing
asymmetrical power relations in society. Formal elections provide the important
function of legitimating the rule of dominant elites, thus making it more difficult
for popular movements to challenge the rule of elites. The claim that globalization
furthers the spread of democracy across the world is thus largely based on a narrow,
formal-procedural understanding of ‘democracy’. The promotion of polyarchy
allows globalists to advance their project of economic restructuring in a language
that ostensibly supports the ‘democratization’ of the world.
After September 11, the notion of global freedom became firmly linked to the
Bush administration’s neoconservative security agenda. The President did not
mince words in ‘Securing Freedom’s Triumph’, his New York Times op-ed article a
year after the attacks: ‘As we preserve the peace, America also has an opportunity
to extend the benefits of freedom and progress to nations that lack them. We seek
a peace where repression, resentment and poverty are replaced with the hope of
democracy, development, free markets and free trade’.63 Fourteen months later,
he reaffirmed his unwavering ‘commitment to the global expansion of democracy’
as the ‘Third Pillar’ of the United States’ ‘peace and security vision for the world’.64
This idea of securing global economic integration through an American-led
military drive for ‘democratization’ around the globe became especially prominent
in the corporate scramble for Iraq following the official ‘end of major combat
operations’ on 1 May 2003. Already, during the first days of the Iraq War in late
March 2003, market globalists had suggested that Iraq be subjected to a radical
economic treatment. For example, Robert McFarlane, former National Security
Adviser to President Reagan and current chairman of the Washington, DC-based
corporation Energy & Communication Solutions, LLC, together with Michael
Bleyzer, CEO and president of SigmaBleyzer, an international equity-fund
management company, co-authored a prominent op-ed article in The Wall Street
Journal bearing the suggestive title, ‘Taking Iraq Private’. Calling on ‘major U.S.
corporations, jointly with other multinationals’, to ‘lead the effort to create capital-
friendly environments in developing countries’, the market globalist duo praised
the military operations in Iraq as an indispensable tool in establishing the ‘political,
economic and social stability’ necessary for ‘building the basic institutions that make
democracy possible’. In their conclusion, the two men reminded their readers that
‘the US must demonstrate that it is not only the most powerful military power on
the planet, but also the foremost market economy in the world, capable of leading
a greater number of developing nations to a more prosperous and stable future’.65

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To be sure, throughout the 1990s there had been sinister warnings on the part
of some cultural theorists that globalization was actually ‘Americanization’ or
‘McDonaldization’ in universalist disguise.66 But, the perceived US unilaterism and
belligerence in the wake of 9/11 appeared to be a much more serious manifestation
of the same phenomenon. In fact, the problem of globalism’s turn toward
nationalism was as much conceptual as political. After all, decontesting
globalization through its proximity to the idea of a necessary ‘Global War on Terror’
created serious logical contradictions. First, the globalists’ reliance on the coercive
powers of the state to secure their project undermined both the idea of the ‘self-
regulating market’ and the claim of historical ‘inevitability’. Second, the belligerent
vision of enforcing ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ at gunpoint conflicted with the
common understanding of liberty as absence of coercion. Third, the Anglo-
American nationalist undertones emanating from the so-called ‘Global War on
Terror’ seemed to contradict the cosmopolitan, universal spirit associated with the
concept ‘globalization’.
Instructive examples of the logical inconsistencies inherent in the ideological
discourse abound, but they are often made sense of through spatial metaphors.
Take Thomas Barnett’s article ‘The Pentagon’s New Map’, first published in the
March 2003 issue of Esquire magazine, and subsequently expanded into a
bestselling book bearing the same title.67 Barnett, then a professor of military
strategy at the US Naval War College, also served at the time as the assistant for
strategic futures in the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformations. In this capacity,
he has been giving his briefings regularly to the US Secretary of Defense, the
intelligence community, and to high-ranking officers from all branches of the US
armed forces.
Barnett argues that the Iraq War marks ‘the moment when Washington takes
real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization’. He breaks the globe
down into three distinct spatial regions. The first is characterized by ‘globalization
thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and
collective security’, yielding nations featuring stable democratic governments,
transparency, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than by murder
(North America, most of Europe, Australia, New Zealand and a small part of Latin
America). He calls these regions of the world the ‘Functioning Core’ or ‘Core’.
Conversely, areas where ‘globalization is thinning or just plain absent’ constitute
a region plagued by repressive political regimes, regulated markets, mass murder,
and widespread poverty and disease (the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa,
the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, the Middle East, and much of
Southeast Asia). The breeding ground of ‘global terrorists’, Barnett refers to this
region as the ‘Non-Integrating Gap’, or ‘Gap’. Between these two regions, one finds
‘seam states’ that ‘lie along the Gap’s bloody boundaries’ (Mexico, Brazil, South
Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Indonesia).
For Barnett, the importance of September 11 is that the attacks forced the United
States and its allies to make a long-term military commitment to ‘deal with the
entire Gap as a strategic threat environment’. In other words, the desired spread
of globalization requires a War on Terror. Its three main objectives are: ‘1) Increase
the Core’s immune system capabilities for responding to September 11-like system
perturbations; 2) Work on the seam states to firewall the Core from the Gap’s worst

Introduction xxvii
Intro-Vol-4 <xxvii>
exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and, most important, 3) Shrink the
Gap . . . The Middle East is the perfect place to start’. The third point is particularly
important, because ‘the real battlegrounds in the global war on terrorism are still
over there’. As Barnett emphasizes, ‘We ignore the Gap’s existence at our own peril,
because it will not go away until we as a nation respond to the challenge of making
globalization truly global’.68
This celebration of globalization in American nationalist terminology invites
the kind of conceptual contradiction that may eventually prove to be fatal to the
‘imperial’ twist on market globalism. On the other hand, if the political issues of
our time indeed call for an ideology that boldly arranges seemingly conflicting
articles of various conventional political belief systems around the novel concept
‘globalization’, then globalism might actually achieve a level of ideological
dominance unprecedented in history. While Islamism, nationalist populism, new
forms of global egalitarianism and other competing thought-systems appear to
make the prospect of market globalism’s undisputed hegemony highly unlikely,
their unrelenting focus on countering the claims of their ideological nemesis
highlights its abiding semantic and political power.
Conclusion
Ideologies of globalization are neither consistent within a particular political
perspective nor across the ideological spectrum. However, we have argued that
they make up an ideological family which, despite continuing points of contestation,
has become naturalized within an emergent global imaginary, which, in turn, is
anchored in deeply embedded ontologies. We contend that there is an emerging
and increasingly dominant sense that different social categories in the world
including ‘the person’ and ‘the nation’ exist most obviously in a social whole called
‘planet earth’, ‘the world’ or ‘the globe’. This global imaginary remains in continuing
intersection with prior dominant imaginaries such as ‘the national’ and ‘the sacred
order of things’, but it is coming slowly to reframe them. This is not to suggest, as
Amitai Etzioni argues, that we are seeing an ‘emerging global normative
synthesis’.69 Our point is much simpler and less utopian. Normative contestations
continue, but they tend to have a common implicit point of reference – the global.
Beyond that, we suggest that different globalisms gain part of their power to
the extent that they draw on deeper taken-for-granted and dominant modern
notions of time, space, embodiment and so. Again, this is not to suggest a
homogenizing modernism. Older traditional and tribal ontological formations
continue to ground the lives of many people and a postmodern layer of temporality-
spatiality has recently emerged. Thus, while it is accurate to say that ‘the modern’
– read and reinterpreted through the lenses of globalization as both an objective
and a subjective set of social processes – provides the dominant social frame
through which across the globe people make sense of their complex lives, this is
hardly a satisfactory description of the world today. A fuller understanding requires,
among other things, a sense of the intersection of ideologies and imaginaries as
they play across the complexities of intersecting formations from the tribal to the
postmodern.

xxviii Introduction
Intro-Vol-4 <xxviii>
Notes
1. See Paul Gilroy, ‘When Ignorant Armies Clash at Night: Homogenous Community and
the Planetary Aspect’, International Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp.
261–76 (reproduced in the present volume).
2. The phrase comes William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1980), writing about the United States. On the racial dimension in the
relation between empire and civilization see Paul Gilroy, ‘When Ignorant Armies Clash
at Night: Homogenous Community and the Planetary Aspect’, International Journal of
Cultural Studies, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 261–76, reproduced in the present volume.
3. Denis Cosgrove, ‘Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography’, Annals of the
Association of American Geographers, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 852–70, reproduced in the present
volume. The ‘Family of Man’ was a photographic exhibition first displayed at the Museum
of Modern Art, New York, in 1955. It comprised photographs of the human condition
from 68 countries. It toured the world for eight years.
4. See Set 4 in the current series, Globalization and the Political: Volume 2: Globalizing
Movements and Global Civil Society (forthcoming).
5. This argument was first developed in Manfred B. Steger, Globalisms: The Great Ideological
Struggle of the Twenty-First Century, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 3rd Edn 2009.
Significantly, this third edition of Globalism presents a broader framework than the first
edition (2002) which as its subtitle suggested (The New Market Ideology) had previously
equated globalism with the Anglo-American free-trade doctrine. This rethinking was
further developed in Steger’s The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from
the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
6. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defence of Globalization, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004,
p. 35.
7. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2005, p. 4.
8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, W.W. Norton, New York, 2002, p. 9.
9. Colin Hines, Localization: A Global Manifesto, Earthscan, London, 2000. For a book which
does not succumb to this tension, see Tim O’Riordan, ed., Globalism, Localism and Identity,
Earthscan, London, 2001.
10. John Ralston Saul, ‘The Collapse of Globalism: And the Rebirth of Nationalism’, Harpers
Magazine, March 2004, pp. 33–43, republished in the present volume. See also his The
Collapse of Globalism, and the Reinvention of the World, Overlook Press, Woodstock, 2005.
11. At least one of the concepts, ideology, is understood as an ‘essentially contested concept’.
The phrase, attributed to Walter Bryce Gallie writing in the 1950s, refers to open-ended
and normatively-charged notions in general use such as ‘democracy’, ‘art’, ‘justice’, and
‘ideology’, where there is general agreement about their salience, but deep contention
about the realized meaning and conceptual boundaries of the term.
12. On the debates in this area see for example, Jorg Lorrain, The Concept of Ideology,
Hutchison, London, 1979; John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Polity
Press, Blackwell, 1984; David McLellan, Ideology, Open University Press, Buckingham,
2nd Edn 1995; Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short
Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
13. Cited from www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/24/obama.words/index.html, accessed
23 April 2009.
14. These are terms employed by Freeden in Ideology, p. 98.
15. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, pp. 86–7.
16. Freeden, Ideology, p. 5.
17. See Jonathan Friedman, ‘Americans Again, or the New Age of Imperial Reason? Global
Elite Formation, its Identity and Ideological Discourses’, Theory, Culture and Society, vol.
17, no. 1, 2000, pp. 139–46 (reproduced in the present volume) and Robin Broad, ‘The

Introduction xxix
Intro-Vol-4 <xxix>
Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash’, Globalizations, vol. 1, no. 2 2004,
pp. 129–54 (also reproduced in the present volume).
18. Bai Gao, ‘Globalization and Ideology: The Competing Images of the Contemporary
Japanese Economic System in the 1990s’, International Sociology, vol. 15, no. 3, p. 437
(reproduced in the present volume). Ironically the global financial crisis of 2008–09
has given rise to a convergence on these themes.
19. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Globalism, Ideology and Traditions’, Thesis 11, no 63, 2000, p. 2
(reproduced in the present volume).
20. W. J. Clinton, ‘Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy’, San Francisco, 26 February
1999, <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gove.us/
1999/3/1/3.text.1.html>.
21. M. Villar, Jr., ‘High-Level Dialogue on the Theme of the Social and Economic Impact of
Globalization and Interdependence and their Policy Implications’, New York, 17
September 1998, <http://www.un.int/philippines/ villar.html>.
22. J. Gray and S. Roach, cited in ‘Is it at risk? – Globalisation’, The Economist, 2 February
2002, p. 65.
23. R. J. Samuelson, ‘Globalization Goes to War’, Newsweek, 24 February 2003, p. 41.
24. C. Shays, ‘Free Markets and Fighting Terrorism’, Washington Times, 10 June 2003.
25. Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Competitiveness’, speech in Flint, Michigan, 16
June 2008, available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-
Speeches.ask (last accessed 7 June 2009).
26. Barack Obama, ‘Renewing US Leadership in the Americas’, speech in Miami Florida, 23
May 2008, available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-
Speeches.ask (accessed 1 June 2009).
27. Peter H. Raven, ‘Science, Sustainability, and the Human Prospect’, Science, vol. 297. no.
5583, 2002, pp. 954–8.
28. International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization, ILO, Geneva, 2008, p. 5.
29. Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986,
p. 197. He is quoted here without necessarily accepting the position that frames his
approach.
30. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Duke University Press, Durham, 2004, p. 23.
31. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, interviewed by Women’s Own magazine, 31 October
1987.
32. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Constitution of Society, Polity Press, Cambridge,
1991.
33. See the discussion of Castoriadis in Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, ch. 1.
34. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 53.
35. Katherine N. Rankin, ‘Anthropologies and Geographies of Globalization’, Progress in
Human Geography, vol. 27, no. 6, 2003, p. 715.
36. This finds an intersection without being the same as the Gramscian notion of ‘cultural
hegemony’. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and
translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith), International Publishers, New
York, (1929–1935) 1978.
37. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 2006.
38. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Hybrid Modernities: Mélange Modernities in Asia’, Sociological
Analysis, vol. 1, no. 3, 1998, pp. 75–86 (reproduced in this volume).
39. See Gerry Gill, ‘Landscape as Symbolic Form: remembering Thick Place in Deep Time’,
Critical Horizons, vol. 3, no. 2, 2002, pp. 177–99, for a discussion of different dominant
sensibilities of space in relation to Heidegger’s distinction between ‘world’, ‘earth’ and
different ontologically framed ‘worldviews’.
40. Holland Herald, May 2002.

xxx Introduction
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41. Front-page stories about the race between Google, Microsoft and Yahoo to transform
two-dimensional on-line maps into global browser-systems started to come out in late
2005. See for example, Technology Review, October 2005.
42. Postmodern time, including the time of relativity and quantum physics does not move
in this way. According to Einsteinian relativity, for example, it moves in relation to the
speed of the participant through space.
43. Where New York, May 2005.
44. As found in an Oxford English Dictionary project ‘English Corpus’, Australian, 23 June
2006.
45. See Ruqaiya Hasan, ‘Globalization, Literacy and Ideology’, World Englishes, vol. 22, no.
4, pp. 433–48 (reproduced in the present volume).
46. The levels approach touched upon here is the subject of Paul James’s, Globalism,
Nationalism, Tribalism, Sage Publications, London, 2006.
47. Customary tribalism is defined by the dominance of particular socially-specific modalities
of space, time, embodiment, and knowing that can be characterized by analogical,
genealogical and mythological practices and subjectivities. This, for example, would
include notions of genealogical placement, the importance of mythological time
connecting past and present, and the centrality of relations of embodied reciprocity.
48. For example, whereas Lyotard reduces the definition of postmodernism to one of the
modes of being – that is, knowledge or epistemology, with postmodernism being used
to describe a condition of knowledge that is incredulous about grand narratives (Jean-
François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1984) – the present approach defines postmodernism as
an ontological formation formed in the systematic abstraction of all categories of being,
including knowledge. Similarly, whereas Fredric Jameson defines postmodernism as the
cultural logic of late capitalism – with capitalism understood as a mode of production
(Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London,
1991) – the present approach does not reduce the definition of an ontological formation
to a single determinative mode of practice from which all else follows.
49. Robert Cox, ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic Order’, International
Organization, vol. 33, no. 2, 1979, pp. 357–402 (reproduced in the present volume).
50. See A. Wolfson, ‘Conservatives and Neoconservatives’, The Public Interest, Winter, 2004,
<http://www.the publicinterest.com/current/article2.html>. See also M. Lind, ‘A
Tragedy of Errors’, The Nation, 23 February 2004, pp. 23–32.
51. For many more textual examples of these core claims see Manfred Steger, ‘From Market
Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and American Power After 9/11’,
Globalizations, vol. 2, no.1, 2005, pp. 31–46 (reproduced in the present volume).
52. Business Week, 13 December 1999, p. 212.
53. W. Bole, ‘Tales of Globalization’, America, vol. 18, no. 4, 1999, pp. 14–16.
54. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Farrar,
Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1999, p. 9.
55. Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005.
56. George W. Bush, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’, 2002, <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html>.
57. Barack Obama, ‘Knox College Commencement’, speech in Galesburg, Illinois, 4 June
2005, available at http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-
Speeches.ask, accessed 20 May 2009.
58. Economic Communiqué, Lyon G7 Summit, 28 June 1996, <http:// library.utoronto.ca/
www/g7/96ecopre.html>.
59. http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-
020409 accessed, 7 June 2009.
60. ‘Economic Globalization and Culture: A Discussion with Dr Francis Fukuyama’, http://
www.ml.com/woml/forum/global2.html>.

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61. H. Rodham Clinton, ‘Growth of Democracy in Eastern Europe’, Speech in Warsaw,
5 October 1999, <http:/www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/First Lady/html/
generalspeeches/1999/19991005.html>.
62. W. I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 56–62.
63. George W. Bush, ‘Securing Freedom’s Triumph’, New York Times, 11 September 2002.
64. George W. Bush, Transcript of Address in London on Iraq and the Middle East, New York
Times, 19 November 2003.
65. R. McFarlane and M. Bleyzer, ‘Taking Iraq Private’, Wall Street Journal, 27 March 2003.
66. See, for example, Serge Latouche, The Westernization of the World, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 1996; and George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation
into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life, Pine Forge Press, Thousand
Oaks, 1993.
67. T. P. M. Barnett, ‘The Pentagon’s New Map’, Esquire, March 2003, http://www.
nwc.navy.mil/newrulessets/ThePentagon’sNewMap.htm>; and The Pentagon’s New Map:
War and Peace in the 21st Century, Putnam, New York, 2004.
68. Barnett, ‘The Pentagon’s New Map’.
69. Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis’, The Journal of Political
Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 2, 2004, pp. 214–44 (reproduced in this volume).

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