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Channelled Policy Transfers:
EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters
Jean-Pierre Cassarino
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute,
Via delle Fontanelle 19, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (), Italy
e-mail: jpcassarino@eui.eu
Abstract
This study analyses how the migration policy options of the Government of Tunisia
have been codied by repeated interactions with the European Union () and its
Member States. It argues that these interactions have been shaped by the gradual con-
solidation of a hierarchy of priorities where the drive for operability and security pre-
dominates. A hierarchy of priorities delineates the contours of the perceived top
priorities that should be tackled rst and foremost, while hiding or dismissing others.
Having historicized the origins of this hierarchy, the study sets out to show that the
prioritization of security concerns in bilateral and multilateral migration talks allowed
the leadership of former President Ben Ali to skilfully readjust or channel transferred
rules and policies on migration matters with a view to strengthening its own domina-
tion. This had serious implications for human rights observance in Tunisia. Today, after
(or despite) the radical transformations that took place in Tunisia in early 2011, the
same hierarchy of priorities continues to exist. However, its resilience may raise a host
of complicated issues, given the empowered advocacy role of civil society organiza-
tions and the manifest alertness of Tunisian population.
Keywords
Migration – policy transfer – Tunisia – beliefs – governance –
1 Introduction
Has the newly elected government of Tunisia factored into its current migra-
tion priorities the need to respond to the inescapable domestic social claims
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and economic exigencies that have appeared so glaringly since the fall of
President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali? Given the strength of these exigencies, have
past paradigms and patterns of bilateral cooperation on migration manage-
ment been reconsidered, over the last three years, by European and Tunisian
decision-makers in order to address them?
This study sets out to reply to these two interrelated questions. To do
so, we have to realize that, over the last decades, the migration policy options
of the Government of Tunisia (GoT) have been codied by repeated inter-
actions with the European Union () and its Member States, where the
vast majority of Tunisian migrants are living. In turn, these interactions
have been shaped by the gradual consolidation of a hierarchy of priori-
ties strongly inuenced by the international agenda for migration manage-
ment (). In Section 2, the rationale for and origins of this hierarchy are
historicized.
Section 3 looks at the ipside of these developments. It explains the reasons
for which the former regime opted for a strategic alignment with the .
The reinforced managerial centrality of the state and its law-enforcement
bureaucracy were, de facto, perfectly congruent with the desire of the GoT to
buttress its regulatory and disciplinary functions on society at large and the
economy. Actually, far from internalizing the norms and principles set by the
, the former Ben Ali administration skilfully responded to them with a view
to boasting its own credentials at international level. The adaptive resilience
of authoritarianism and domination in Tunisia can also be addressed through
the lens of ‘migration management’ transfers. While recognising the norm-
setting function of the in its external action, this study qualies the oft-cited
efectiveness of external transfers by showing how rules, practices and policies,
once agreed upon and transferred, may be readjusted, if not channelled, by the
borrowing country to further other ends.
Finally, having highlighted the impact of a hierarchy of priorities on
Tunisian-EU interactions, as well as the aptitude for readjustment of the GoT,
the study examines whether the current historical context is ripe to create the
conditions needed to undo the paradigms that, over the last twenty years or so,
have shaped -Tunisian interactions and patterns of interdependence in the
eld of migration management.
2 The ‘Sources of Established Beliefs’
Frequent intergovernmental interactions may be addressed as a way of over-
coming the asymmetric costs and benets that characterize the cooperation
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on migration management. This may account for their recurrence and global
expansion. At the same time, the proliferation of intergovernmental con-
sultations in the framework of regional consultative processed (s) on
migration issues results from their inherent capacity to promote and sustain
mutual interactions able to enlist an array of contradictory points of view and
contrasting interests under the same umbrella: The International Agenda for
Migration Management.
Clearly, this oft-cited agenda results from a form of consensus that would
never have made sense, to those who professed the fundamentals of this inter-
national agenda or to those who repeated it, without the use of a shared lexi-
con and the denition of perceived contingencies linked with the mobility
of persons. At the same time, the gradual establishment of this agenda stems
from repeated calls for a ‘new global migration regime’ that, from the 1990s
onwards, dened the top priorities that had to be considered in the eld of
migration, human tracking and asylum.
Additionally, it has to be said that the recurrence of such intergovernmental
meetings have contributed to persuading ocials, the media and public opin-
ion that major international organizations dealing with asylum and labour
migration could no longer respond adequately to new global challenges in
the eld of migration, mobility and asylum. The rationale for s was not to
question in a bold manner internationally recognised standards aimed at pro-
tecting the fundamental rights of migrant workers as well as those of refugees
and asylum-seekers. Their rationale was to show that existing global organ-
isations dealing with labour migrants’ rights and refugees’ protection had to
review their own undertakings or terms of reference with a view to complying
with a set of commonly agreed principles and newly adopted top priorities
dened in the International Agenda for Migration Management. This provok-
ing argument is further explained.
As Edward Bernays wrote a long time ago in his seminal book on how to
engineer public support:
C. Thouez and F. Channac, ‘Shaping International Migration Policy: The Role of Regional
Consultative Processes’, 29 West European Politics (2006) 370–387.
A. Klekowski von Koppenfels (2001), The Role of Regional Consultative Processes in Managing
International Migration. Migration Research Series 3, Geneva: ; R. Hansen (2010),
An Assessment of Principal Regional Consultative Processes on Migration. Migration Research
Series 38, Geneva: .
J. Widgren (1994), Multilateral Co-operation to Combat Tracking in Migrants and the Role of
International Organizations. 11th Seminar on Migration, Geneva: , p. 10.
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It is seldom efective to call names or to attempt to discredit beliefs them-
selves. The counsel on public relations [or spin doctor], after examina-
tion of the sources of established beliefs, must either discredit the old
authorities or create new authorities by making articulate a mass opinion
against the old belief or in favour of the new.
Bernays’ point is inspiring to understand that pre-existent channels of inter-
actions had to be studied carefully in order to reorient policy debates on
migration and asylum towards the acceptance of new priorities. This did
not occur overnight. ‘Discredit of old authorities’, to rephrase Bernays, took
various forms.
2.1 Discredit
Following the 1993 entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, the
European Commission envisaged to turn migration into an issue of ‘common
interest’. This attempt was logically contingent on the adoption of suprana-
tional common standards on legal immigration in order to ‘enhance the
social integration of legally resident immigrants through equal opportuni-
ties in employment, education, housing, social policy and health care’. The
attempt of the Commission to spread its inuence into areas viewed by some
Member States as being under their sovereign preserve was met with strong
reluctance, if not stark criticisms on the part of the Council.
Moreover, these criticisms reected an old contention that became more
and more explicit in European circles between some Member States and the
Commission, particularly regarding issues of competence on migrant afairs
and respect for minorities’ civil rights.
E. Bernays (2011) [1923], Crystallizing Public Opinion, New York, : Ig Publishing, p. 92.
Excerpt from the speech by Mr. Pádraig Flynn – Joint Meeting of the European Parliament,
Committee on Civil Liberties and the Migrants’ Forum, 15 December 1993, Strasbourg,
available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-93–151_en.htm?locale=en
(retrieved 7 November 2013).
J. Niessen, ‘European Community Legislation and Intergovernmental Cooperation on
Migration’, 26 International Migration Review (1992) 676–684, at 681.
‘The Commission has developed a distinct philosophy with regard to matters concerning
migration into the Community, and the status of migrant individuals, which has brought it
into conict with Council of Ministers, who do not like to see trespasses into what they
regard as their right to discuss these matters intergovernmentally and in private’, see J. King,
‘Communautés ethniques minoritaires et politiques européennes: Le cas de la Grande-
Bretagne’, 10 Revue européenne des migrations internationales (1994) 59–71, at p. 68. On the
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In July 1998, a strategy paper on immigration and asylum policy, prepared
by the then Austrian Presidency, emblematically reected such criticisms
towards the full harmonization of migration laws in Europe. It is important to
stress that such criticisms were not aimed at jeopardizing the harmoniza-
tion project per se which covered issues pertaining to the rights of legal for-
eign residents, minorities’ rights, reinforced integration policies, and tougher
measures against unauthorised migration. Rather, through the Council, the
Member States’ criticisms were directed towards the capacity of the insti-
tutions to deal ‘efectively’ with such sensitive issues as integration of foreign
residents, labour migrants’ rights, asylum-seeking, the ght against unauthor-
ized migration, border controls and last but not least the thorny issue of read-
mission. In other words, the ‘established beliefs’ remained untouched, unlike
the ‘authorities’.
Against this backdrop, there is no surprise in noting that the adoption of
the International Agenda for Migration Management (), following the
2001 Berne Initiative, was positively viewed by the Member States, for this
agenda was explicitly presented by its advocates as being both non-binding
and respectful of their sovereignty. The was promoted in a European
regional context marked by resilient tensions between supranationalism and
intergovernmentalism in the eld of migration and asylum issues. Today,
such tensions continue to exist, although their strength and impact on policy
debates have declined substantially as a result of the gradual alignment of
the European Commission with the security-oriented demands of the
Member States.
2.2 A Gradual Alignment
With hindsight, this alignment resulted from the combination of four factors.
The rst one pertained to the consequences of the 9/11 war on terror which
reinforced a process of containment as applied to migration and asylum in the
West; a process that, as explained above, was already in the pipeline back to
the mid-1980s.
The second factor was linked with the proliferation of regional sub-groups,
including regional consultative processes gathering all countries of migration
at a global level. These regional sub-groups of countries were created with a
view to opening and sustaining state-to-state informal consultations on border
issue of competence, see Coleman, N. (2009) European Readmission Policy: Third Country
Interests and Refugee Rights. Leiden: Martinus Nijhof Publishers.
European Council (1998), Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy. 9809/98, 1 July
1998, Brussels.
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controls, asylum, human tracking, border surveillance, and the ght against
unauthorized migrants. However, some of these ‘new authorities’, as Edward
Bernays would probably coin them, went much further than the mere promo-
tion of intergovernmental consultations and dialogues. Indeed, in Europe,
some of them were explicitly meant to inuence policy-making at a time
when the management of the post-2004 eastwards enlargement of the and
the rejection of Europe’s Constitutional Treaty were stirring populist and pro-
tectionist discourses in Europe. For example, the May 2005 Prüm Convention
and the Group of 6 (or G6) epitomized the desire of some Member States
to collectively exert their leverage on the institutions, namely the European
Commission, particularly in the eld of Justice and Home Afairs.
The third factor is that proliferation of ‘new authorities’ never led to
cacophony or chaos, as one would expect. In reality, it could not be otherwise
when considering that their recurrence and expansion have, as it were, been
disciplined by an articulate script, namely the international agenda for migra-
tion management (). This agenda has not only contributed to shaping
perceptions, reifying the centrality of the (sovereign) state and its law-enforce-
ment agencies in all countries of migration, it has also generated unprece-
dented patterns of interdependence among highly diverse regimes, whether
these have poor human rights records or not. This agenda has also been an
opportunity for major European destination countries to recongure, if not
reinforce, state–citizen relationships in a neo-liberal context marked by the
resilient crisis of the welfare state, industrial delocalisation, the drive for job
exibility and competitiveness on domestic labour markets. It could even
be argued that market deregulation has gone hand in hand with migration
regulation.
2.3 Top and Dismissible Priorities
One important implication of these developments lies in having built a hierar-
chy of priorities aimed at best achieving the objectives set out in the migration
management agenda. This is the fourth factor. A hierarchy of priorities could
be dened as a set of policy priorities whose main function is to delineate the
Among many others, I am referring to the 1991 Budapest Process, the 2001 Söderköping
Process, the 2002 5+5 dialogue on migration in the Western Mediterranean, the 2000
Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa, the 2003 Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue,
the 2000 Migration Dialogue for West Africa, the 2009 Prague Process, and the Global Forum
on Migration and Development.
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contours of the issues that should be tackled rst and foremost, while hiding
or dismissing others.
The drive for operability (in dealing with border controls and the swift and
‘cost-efective’ removal of undesirable migrants and denied asylum-seekers)
added to the drive for exibility (in brokering exible deals or arrangements
with non- countries with a view to containing unauthorized migration)
have been established at the top of the hierarchy of priorities. Concomitantly,
such top concerns have cohabited with other priorities such as the oft-cited
‘nexus’ between migration and development, migrants’ skills acquisition and
portability, and migrants’ rights. However, their relevance and criticality have
hardly been considered by policy-makers owing to their low position in the
hierarchy. This does not mean that these other priorities have not been dealt
with at all. This means that they have been viewed as dismissible priorities,
even if they have been presented as priorities tout court.
Admittedly, the reference to a hierarchy of priorities may carry to many
minds a sense of discomfort. The most immediate reaction would be to iden-
tify the architect who skilfully structured this hierarchy. It is possible that that
this hierarchy results from exceptional epistemic conditions that consoli-
dated through the sharing and repetition of plausible truths and unquestioned
apodictic statements which shaped the perceptions, attitudes and policy
options towards migrants and asylum-seekers of all actors involved, whether
these were from countries of destination, or from countries of transit and ori-
gin, from governmental and non-governmental organizations. The governance
of migration, through the broad lexical repertoire contained in the interna-
tional agenda for migration management, has been built on the barely veiled
discredit of any attempt aimed at fully harmonizing migration policies
and on the profusion of new institutions and sub-regional groups of countries
designed to protect intergovernmental practices.
Manifestly, times have changed since the 1980s, when regional consultative
processes (s) were viewed as ordinary patterns of state-to-state interac-
tions in world politics. However, over the last three decades, s on migra-
tion management have actually become quite extraordinary in creating public
J.-P. Cassarino (2012), Reversing the Hierarchy of Priorities in -Mediterranean Relations,
In: J. Peters (ed.), The European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and
Human Rights in the Middle East, New York, : Lexington Books, pp. 7–9.
Of course, the reference to dismissible priorities is oxymoronic. I use it in order to address
the gap between capabilities and outcomes.
By epistemic conditions, I refer to the role of power in knowledge construction as applied
to migration and asylum, from a Foucauldian viewpoint.
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acceptance for overriding paradigms shared by state actors having contrast-
ing interests. Thanks to their recurrence, they have succeeded in instilling in
the minds of participants categories of thought able to shape their percep-
tions and priorities. They have produced and reproduced the same hegemonic
knowledge and lexicon as applied to migration, asylum and border manage-
ment and without any dissonance.
Of course, non- countries never adhered passively to the script. For their
responsiveness was driven by a strategic alignment on which they could capi-
talize when needed. For some of them, playing the eciency card in migra-
tion talks was a way of acquiring enhanced credibility and, by the same token,
regime legitimacy. Tunisia is a case in point.
3 Tunisia’s Aptitude for Readjustment
As early as the 2000s, Tunisia became a proactive participant in informal
inter-state dialogues on migration and border management. There is no need
to describe in detail their respective scope and aims. Suce it to say that the
rationale behind these dialogues was shaped by the drive for operability and
exibility as applied to three basic pillars: the temporary and selective accep-
tance of legal foreign labour, the ght against unauthorized migration (includ-
ing enhanced cooperation on deportation) and the oft-cited ‘mobilization of
the diaspora’ added to ‘the need to lower the costs of remittances for devel-
opmental ends’. Moreover, the recurrence of these consultations has contrib-
uted to creating links of interdependence on which the GoT capitalized to
further other (more) crucial political ends, particularly in the eld of border
management.
Boasting the credentials of an ecient actor in the eld of border manage-
ment and raising the international credibility and legitimacy of the regime
constituted drivers explaining the proactive responsiveness of the GoT. These
drivers reected the quest for foreign alliances of the former regime with stra-
tegic European partners (particularly, France and Italy), above all, in a con-
text marked by growing social discontent in Tunisia and vocal political secular
and religious dissent abroad (i.e., among members of the Tunisian émigré
communities).
At the same time, the quest for external alliances was not the sole factor
that motivated the GoT to be proactively involved in s on migration man-
agement and reinforced border controls. The reinforced managerial centrality
of the state and of its law-enforcement bureaucracy, enshrined in the inter-
national agenda for migration management (), was perfectly consistent
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with the ways in which the GoT and its ruling party (the Rassemblement
Constitutionnel Démocratique, ) had been dealing with society at large.
Long before the global acceptance of the , the GoT under the leader-
ship of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had already reinforced its
own centrality in all spheres of private initiatives. The ocial adherence of
the Tunisian authorities to the may be explained by the fact that it also
ofered an opportunity to exert stronger legitimate coercive power and control
over Tunisian society both at domestic and international levels, in the guise of
‘migration management’.
3.1 Buttressed Regulatory and Disciplinary Functions
Whoever is familiar with the extraordinary adaptive resilience of authoritari-
anism in Tunisia, in a context of increased exposure to economic openness and
globalization, would easily understand that the regime and the ruling party
viewed positively the possibility of reinforcing their own command for the
sake of ‘social stability’ and ‘eciency’. In other words, the drive for migration
management, sustained by the recurrence of s and the sharing of ‘common
security challenges’, was reinterpreted by the regime with a view to buttress-
ing its regulatory and disciplinary functions. As one can imagine, control of
dissent under the Ben Ali regime took various forms. One of them consisted
in hindering the delivery or renewal of passports to Tunisian nationals who
were not members of the or who were suspected of political insubordi-
nation by the ruling party’s sections scattered all over the national territory.
Of course, this was not a general practice. Rather, this was a highly selective
practice designed to tame social discontent domestically. It was also, if not
above all, designed to discipline any independent (or uncontrolled) behaviour
in Tunisian society with a view to preventing disorder and social protests, par-
ticularly in depressed areas hit by rising youth unemployment, underemploy-
ment, social inequalities, and poverty.
The criminalization of ‘illegal’ migration constituted one of the many ways
to ‘legally’ conceal the root causes of social discontent in depressed areas and
to tame, at the same time, the aspirations and behaviours of those left behind.
The was not the only structure of state control over Tunisian society. Béatrice Hibou
clearly showed that a network of informants, civil society organizations co-opted by the
ruling party (among many others, the Union Tunisienne de Solidarité Sociale’), social work-
ers, civil servants in the public administration, neighbours were all involved directly or
indirectly in what Hibou referred to as ‘a supervision from below’, see B. Hibou (2011)
[2006], The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia. Cambridge:
Polity Press, pp. 93–109.
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This double-edged efect became particularly evident following the adop-
tion of Law 2004–6, dated February 3rd 2004. On the one hand, this law con-
demned ‘whoever facilitates, helps, or organizes in any manner whatsoever,
even for free, the illegal entry or exit of a person (italics added) out of the
Tunisian territory, by land, sea or air transport’. The legal provision also sanc-
tioned with several years of detention and nancial compensation ‘whoever
has participated or formed an organization aimed at preparing or committing’
(italics added) unauthorized border-crossing. The adoption of Law 2004–6
was ocially aimed at tackling unauthorized migration to and from Tunisia
by sanctioning smugglers and trackers. However, its concrete implementa-
tion and scope have been highly contingent on the discretionary power of the
judiciary, given the denitional ambivalence of the meaning of ‘participating’,
‘preparing’ and last but not least ‘whoever’ and a ‘person’. The ambiguity inher-
ent in the wording of Law 2004–6 ‘was used to repress migrants in the rst
place, which was at variance with the Palermo Protocol’.
On the other hand, the provisions contained in Law 2004–6 were also used
by the GoT, through its co-opted judiciary power, to discipline those left behind.
The latter could be punished because of the suspicion that they were allegedly
informed about the ‘crime’ committed and that they never denounced it to
the public authorities (art. 45). It also encouraged all Tunisian citizens to act
as informers, even if they were bound by professional condentiality, and to
denounce ‘criminal acts’ in order to avoid any ‘legal’ responsibility.
The adoption of Law 2004–6 by the Ben Ali administration was certainly
intended to respond (in appearance) to the expectations of the EU and its
Member States regarding concrete legal steps aimed at tackling unauthorized
migration. In practice, however, its use and implementation by the Tunisian
judiciary and executive powers allowed the GoT to reinforce its own moni-
toring and control over society at large. As Hamza Meddeb explained, this
situation:
generates deviance, because it broadens the scope of the law by includ-
ing any social category living at the margin of legality [...] The adoption
Article 38 of organic Law 2004–6, dated 3 February 2004. , 6 February 2004, n. 11,
pp. 252–253, available online at http://www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/jortsrc/2004/2004f/jo0112004
.pdf.
Article 41 of organic Law 2004–6, dated 3 February 2004. Ibid.
S. Ben Achour and M. Ben Jemia (2011), Révolution tunisienne et migration clandestine
vers l’Europe: réactions européennes et tunisiennes. , n°65, RSCAS/EUI, p. 15.
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of Law 2004–6 allowed the domination of the regime to be reproduced
while reinforcing its own clout through fear.
The history of the Ben Ali regime is full of publicly declared intentions aimed
at responding to external transfers that subsequently turned out to be reinter-
preted or readjusted by the regime with a view to ensuring its political survival
and domination. Moreover, until January 2011, as long as it could be viewed
as a strategic partner acting as the bulwark against religious extremism, for the
sake of stability and security, the GoT knew that its aptitude for readjustment
could benet from the silent acquiescence, if not the assent, of the and its
Member States.
Admittedly, during bilateral and multilateral talks on migration with its
neighbours, the ght against unauthorized migration was taken seriously
by the Ben Ali regime as a key security issue. Domestically, however, the o-
cial discourse rarely presented the issue of ‘illegal migration’ as a key security
issue. Emigration (whether authorized or not) has always been viewed by
the GoT and its public administration as a safety valve to relieve pressure on
youth unemployment and social discontent, let alone as a source of nancial
remittances.
3.2 Between Sanctions and Forgiveness
Those who tempted to cross the straits of Sicily irregularly could be arrested
and tried in court. At the same time, they were often depicted by Tunisian o-
cials as persons full of illusion, attracted by the ‘dream of European Eldorado’.
The rationale behind this patronizing rhetoric, often echoed by the Tunisian
media, consisted in deecting policy attention (in both Tunisia and abroad)
from the severe and impoverished living conditions faced by a growing seg-
ment of the population and the youth in depressed areas. In other words, to
account for the resilience of illegal migration, the explanation of the GoT
compassionately referred to externalities (i.e., European pull factors) that con-
cealed domestic push factors (poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment,
Author’s translation. H. Meddeb (2012), Courir ou Mourir: Course à el Khobza et domina-
tion au quotidien dans la Tunisie de Ben Ali. PhD Thesis, Paris: Institut d’Etudes Politiques,
p. 389, available online at http://www.fasopo.org/reasopo/jr/th_meddeb.pdf (retrieved on
7 November 2013).
M. Camau and V. Geisser (2003), Le syndrome autoritaire : politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba
à Ben Ali. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. See also Hibou (2011) [2006]; E.R. Bellin (2002),
Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development.
Ithaca, : Cornell University Press.
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repression and political violence). Against this backdrop, the generously
-sponsored information campaigns addressed to ‘potential migrants’ in
Tunisia, which were subcontracted to intergovernmental agencies, constituted
a perfect alibi for the Ben Ali regime. Such campaigns were congruent with
the victimizing and infantilizing discourse of the presidential leadership with
regard to Tunisian citizens who attempted to escape the so-called ‘Tunisian
miracle’ at their own risks, attracted by the ‘illusion of better living condi-
tions in Europe’.
3.3 Reinforced Interference
In a similar vein, the need ‘to reinforce the mobilization of diasporas in the
development of their countries of origin’, professed among others by the World
Bank, the European Union, the United Nations agencies, the International
Organization for Migration and the International Centre for Migration Policy
and Development, certainly constituted another opportunity for the GoT to
foster the participation of its expatriates in the development of their homeland.
At the same time, however, the fashionable ‘diaspora’ discourse contrib-
uted to reinforcing the interference of the leadership and the ruling party in
the lives of Tunisian expatriates with a view to social and political control.
A network of state-sponsored associations and amicales established in major
destination countries, and inltrated by members of the ruling party, acted
like the catalysts of expected overriding loyalties towards the regime and its
leadership. This does not mean, however, that the inltration by the Tunisian
state apparatus and the ruling party was pervasive and omnipresent. The vis-
ibility and media coverage of these state-sponsored associations established
abroad were critical in mystifying the inuence and control of the regime and
the ruling party over the destiny of all Tunisian expatriates. Consequently, it
is important to understand that, when the diaspora-and-development mantra
was introduced as a central pillar of the international agenda for migration
management (), the Tunisian authorities gladly welcomed this vaguely
dened topic which, de facto, allowed established channels of control over
Tunisian expatriates to be further structured and strengthened.
For a critical analysis of the ‘Tunisian-miracle’ rhetoric, see B. Hibou, ‘Tunisie: le coût d’un
‘miracle’’, 4 Critique Internationale (1999) 48–56.
For a comprehensive study of the interference of the GoT in the afairs of its expatriates,
see L. Brand (2006), Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North
Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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3.4 The Other Face of Deportation
In contrast with border management, Tunisia’s bilateral cooperation on depor-
tation has been extremely erratic. The presence of irregular nationals abroad
and their re-acceptance on the Tunisian territory were not consistently viewed
as a key priority by the former regime. Nor did their irregular presence abroad
constitute a threat to its legitimacy, at least until 2008.
The year 2008 marked a watershed not because of repeated European calls
for enhanced cooperation on deportation and the ‘ght against illegal migra-
tion’, as rationalists would emphasize. Nor was the GoT’s responsiveness moti-
vated by some sort of leverage exerted by the Member States, particularly
by France and Italy. The regime started to view the management of emigration
(both legal and unauthorized) as a key concern when it realized that the voice
of dissidence abroad could gather momentum and jeopardize its credibility.
In January 2008, social protests took place in the mining area comprising the
cities of Redeyef, M’dhila, Um Laarayes and Metlaoui (southwest Tunisia). The
massive mobilization of the local population against the corruption of local
authorities, youth unemployment, job precariousness, poverty and social mar-
ginalization was brutally repressed by the police and the army. Violence and
repression lasted for months. Numerous demonstrators were killed, placed in
detention or tortured. Some of those who escaped violence crossed the neigh-
bouring Algerian-Tunisian border, others ed to Europe.
Clearly, the 2008 uprisings were not unprecedented in the history of social
movements in Tunisia. What made the 2008 social movements quite specic
was that their expression and organization took place without the involve-
ment of the local representatives of the national union, the Union Générale
des Travailleurs Tunisiens (). Despite or perhaps because of the lack of
O. Lamloum (1999), Janvier 1984 en Tunisie ou le symbole d’une transition, In: D. Le Saout
and M. Rollinde (eds), Emeutes et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb. Paris: Karthala,
pp. 96–104. See also V. Geisser and E. Gobe (2006), Des ssures dans la ‘Maison Tunisie’?
Le régime Ben Ali face aux mobilisations protestataires. L’Année du Maghreb, Année 2005,
pp. 353–414; Camau and Geisser (2003).
Larbi Chouikha and Éric Gobe provide a detailed analysis of the reasons for which local
representatives of the were reluctant to express their support to the 2008 social
protests. The authors explain that some of them were co-opted by the ruling party or
managed the private companies which sub-contracted cheap labour to the public com-
pany the Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa (). See L. Chouikha and E. Gobe (2009),
La Tunisie entre la ‘révolte du bassin minier de Gafsa’ et l’échéance électorale de 2009,
L’Année du Maghreb V, pp. 387–420. See also A. Allal, ‘Réformes néolibérales, clientélismes
et prestations en situation autoritaire, les mouvements contestataires dans le basin
minier de Gafsa en Tunisie (2008)’, 109 Politique africaine (2010) 107–125.
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support from the and the ocial political ‘opposition’, the 2008 social
movements gained in popularity in various southern cities. Such words as
karamat (dignity), ‘adl (justice), horrya (freedom), muqawama (resistance)
and sharaf (honour) could be voiced in public, at least for some time.
This aspect also explained the ensuing desire of the GoT to contain the
potential consequences of the 2008 social movements both in Tunisia and
abroad. In Tunisia, numerous protestors were harassed, arrested and tried in
court. Abroad, the sections of the established in France and Italy were
mobilized to contain mounting dissent, particularly in European cities where
a large number of Tunisian immigrants originate in the southern cities where
social protests took place.
To strengthen its control, the GoT set out to conclude on 28 January 2009
a new bilateral arrangement with Italy on the swift removal of unauthorized
Tunisian migrants. Hundreds of young Tunisian migrants had crossed the
straits of Sicily in late 2008. Those who survived were put in detention centre
on the island of Lampedusa.
The January 2009 bilateral arrangement was somewhat unique compared
with the previous agreements that Italy and Tunisia had concluded in the past
to deal with deportation. This arrangement provided for ‘simplied or accel-
erated procedures of identication’, in close collaboration with the Tunisian
consular authorities established in Italy. Tunisian migrants placed in detention
centres were removed following procedures that were vehemently criticized
by human rights associations, including Amnesty International. Concerns
were expressed over the fate and safety of the Tunisian migrants and denied
asylum-seekers subjected to a removal order by the Italian authorities, who
had taken part in the repressed social movements in early 2008.
Against this backdrop, the January 2009 bilateral arrangement was arguably
shaped by give-and-take. Whereas the Italian authorities positively viewed and
rewarded the proactive involvement of the GoT in ‘tackling illegal migration’
by responding to a ‘state of emergency’ on the Italian territory, the Tunisian
regime succeeded in tackling the side-efects of the 2008 social movements
while containing their potential impact and expansion abroad. Additionally,
the GoT knew that the reinvigorated cooperation with Italy in the eld of
migration and border control would foster its regime legitimacy and reliability
in European political circles while deecting political attention from resilient
human rights violations in Tunisia.
On these past bilateral agreements, see J.-P. Cassarino, ‘Hiérarchie de priorités et système
de réadmission dans les relations bilatérales de la Tunisie avec les États membres de
l’Union européenne’, 4 Maghreb et Sciences Sociales (2012) 239–255.
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3.5 Rapprochement
On 11 May 2010, the and Tunisia agreed to set up an ad hoc group to dene a
roadmap leading to an advanced status or a privileged treatment as applied to
reinforced trade relations and concessions, security, migration management,
human rights and political reform and democratization. This roadmap to the
advanced status with the EU, which Morocco obtained on 13th October 2008,
had been sought for long by the Tunisian regime.
The main if not the most plausible explanation of the reinforced rapproche-
ment that took place in May 2010 between the and the GoT, in a context
marked by tough and unveiled repression of dissent and resilient violations
of human rights in Tunisia, lies at the intersection of factors which I anal-
ysed in the second chapter of this study. It is crucial to realize that when the
-Tunisia dialogue on an advanced status started in May 2010, a hierarchy
of priorities was already deep-rooted in the relations between the and its
Member States, on the one hand, and Tunisia, on the other. The drive for oper-
ability and stability constituted top priorities shaping the perceptions of all
actors involved as applied to the containment of migration ows, the coopera-
tion on deportation and reinforced border controls.
Under these circumstances, neither the numerous resolutions adopted in
the past by the European Parliament to denounce the perceptible demeaning
of political dissent in Tunisia and the brutal repression of human rights activ-
ists, nor the numerous actions undertaken by the and the communi-
qués of associations in Europe and in Tunisia could have a meaningful impact
on the decision of the Commission and the Council to reward Tunisia with the
prospect of an advanced status.
Under these circumstances, and given the perceptible alignment of
Home with the security concerns of the Member States, no ocial was
in a position to cast doubt on the hierarchy of priorities that codied the bilat-
eral relations with the GoT. The latter skilfully played the eciency card in
migration and border management (particularly after 2008) to conceal rising
domestic discontent and repression.
Under these circumstances, no one could expect that the democratic sig-
nicance of the December 2010 uprisings, leading to the ousting of President
Ben Ali one month later, would have been valued properly by ocials and
policy-makers in the Member States. Nor were they willing to do so, given
On the advanced status see K. Kausch, ‘EU Incentives Contributing to New Repression’,
IPRIS Maghreb Review (2010) 1–2.
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the disruptive consequences on the ‘sources of established beliefs’, to rephrase
E. Bernays.
4 Channelled Policy Transfers
Aren’t the abovementioned circumstances illustrative of a gap between policy
transfers and outcomes? Do not they raise signicant questions when it comes
to concretely understanding the conditions under which the GoT channelled
policy transfers?
To be clear, policy transfers sustained by interdependence did occur, at vary-
ing degrees. What really matters is the extent to which some policy transfers
have been performed as well as the reasons for which the GoT was motivated
to respond to them.
In this connection, David Dolowitz and David Marsh convincingly argue
that ‘in order to understand policy transfer it is necessary not only to see
what was transferred but also to consider the motivations involved’. Having
identied various degrees of policy transfer, the authors also lay emphasis on
the concomitant existence of motivations that vary and develop over time
depending on the type and number of actors involved in the transfer process.
This point is crucial to understand that there is no linear development when
dealing with external transfers and that actors’ responsiveness will vary with
their own motivations and perceived interests over the long run and under
certain conditions. This means that, as external transfers develop and take
shape, goals and contingencies may change over time having an impact on
actors’ degree of compliance with reciprocal commitments; thus, on what is
concretely transferred.
The gap between transfer and outcomes may be wider when the political
system of the borrowing country (i.e., the one where policies are transferred)
is signicantly shaped by the centrality of the leadership and the pervasive
control by the state apparatus over domestic social and economic afairs. This
hypothesis may hold true regarding Tunisia under the leadership of Ben Ali.
However, the type of political system in the borrowing country constitutes one
explanatory variable. As mentioned before, motivations need to be considered
in order to understand why repeated interactions at bilateral and multilateral
D.P. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in
Contemporary Policy-Making’, 13 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and
Administration (2000) 5–24, at 16.
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levels have been conducive to policy transfer that did not alter the calculation
of the GoT, nor its skilful aptitude for readjustment. Moreover, one could even
argue that policy transfer drifted away from its primary goal, as already shown
in Section 3, leading to ‘inappropriate transfer’.
Externally, stimuli for borrowing based as they are on emulation, learning,
incentives or coercion existed. However, these remained too weak when con-
fronted with the powerful and pervasive command of the former ruling party
(the ) and the presidential leadership. The latter structured all aspects of
the social, political and economic life in Tunisia. They acted like a ubiquitous
referent that no external model was able to fully penetrate, let alone jeopardise.
Internally, neither the local political opposition, nor the co-opted national
union (the ) and the national employers’ association, nor (state-
controlled) civil society organizations and the Tunisian media could alert to or
act against the ‘inappropriateness’ of the ’s policy transfer, as Dolowitz and
Marsh would probably put it.
The combination of these external and external factors possibly afected the
transfer process as well as its penetration in Tunisia. Permeability to external
transfer has been a constant feature of Tunisia’s interactions with its European
neighbours, more intensely since the conclusion of its Association Agreement
with the in July 1995 (or EuroMed Partnership, ) and since its adherence
to the European Neighbourhood Policy () in 2005. From a realist viewpoint,
one would argue that such repeated and intense interactions had an inuence
on the costs and benets of the GoT and on its vulnerability to external lever-
age. In other words, as the network of interdependence becomes stronger, the
vulnerability of the borrowing country to external leverage (whether volun-
tary or coercive) may increase. This assumption may be accurate for countries
belonging to a compact network of interdependence. Conversely, when the
compactness of the network is not or no longer efective, owing to disrup-
tive events (within or outside the network), vulnerability may decline. These
basic considerations, which certainly deserve much more nuance, make sense
a priori in the history of international relations and political systems.
‘Insucient attention may be paid to the diferences between the economic, social, polit-
ical and ideological contexts in the transferring and the borrowing country: we call this
‘inappropriate transfer’, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), at 17.
For example, the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (), see H. Starr, ‘Democratic
Dominoes: Difusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International
System’, 35 The Journal of Conlict Resolution (1991) 356–381, at 378.
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However, what has been shown in this chapter is that transfer, even when
performed in the framework of structured networks of interdependence
(e.g. the , the ), turned out to be often readjusted and channelled by
the GoT in order to solidly safeguard the centrality of the presidential leader-
ship and the ruling party, both domestically and internationally. This readjust-
ment process was possible domestically, just like it was known internationally.
As early as the 1990s, it resulted from key priorities which strongly codied
the relations between Tunisia and its European neighbours, namely the ght
against religious extremism and international terrorism, security, and the drive
for regime stability. These concerns have ranked high in the hierarchy of pri-
orities that shaped bilateral interactions and ltered, by the same token, policy
transfer.
Later, the capacity to readjust policy transfer from the gained further
momentum when the GoT capitalized on its empowered position with regard
to the and its European neighbours (particularly France and Italy) follow-
ing its proactive involvement in the reinforced control of the external bor-
ders. This empowerment was inseparable from the way in which negotiations,
dialogues and multilateral talks on the ght against corruption, privatization,
respect for human rights, the independence of the judiciary, the need for an
efective asylum system in Tunisia, and last but not least (what is referred to as)
the rule of law have been poorly dealt with. Admittedly, these issues were all
cited as priorities in the framework of the Association Agreement and the .
For these reasons, bearing attention to the hierarchy of priorities that sus-
tains policy transfer mechanisms is crucial to study the process by which
transfer is, as it were, channelled. Certainly, this statement makes sense once
‘a move away from an excessive preoccupation with Western countries’ is
performed. At the same time, it results from a holistic approach that seeks to
shed light on a sophisticated process underpinning transfers from the to
its neighbours. Recognizing the capacity of a hierarchy of priorities to chan-
nel transfer processes does not only explain the oft-cited ‘discrepancy [...]
between rule adoption and rule application’. It also allows the substance of
The word ‘structured’ instead of ‘compact’ is used here purposely.
During the 1990s, in a regional context marked by rising violence and guerrilla conict in
Algeria, and later, in a global context marked by the 2001 War on Terror.
D. Marsh and J.C. Sharman, ‘Policy Difusion and Policy Transfer’, 30 Policy Studies (2009)
269–288, at 270.
S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External
Governance in European Politics’, 16 Journal of European Public Policy (2009) 791–812,
at 809.
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the ‘external governance’, including the rationale for policy transfers, to be
properly assessed.
When south Mediterranean countries were called in the framework of the
to enhance their cooperation on migration controls with EU countries, as
of 2003/2004, the GoT responded by selectively internalizing internationally
recognised norms and standards. Law 2004–6 constitutes merely an example
(see Chapter 3). When the GoT adhered to the international agenda for migra-
tion management (), it did so because, as explained above, some pro-
visions included in this agenda buttressed its own interference in migrants’
afairs. When the GoT responded to the need for reinforced border controls
in the Western Mediterranean, it did so because, among others, it empowered
its strategic position with regard to the and its Member States. Moreover,
its proactive response contributed, at the same time, to sidelining democratic
reforms for the sake of stability and operability; two major issues located at the
top of the hierarchy of priorities codifying its interactions with the .
Apart from its capacity to shape the substance of policy transfers, one major
implication of a hierarchy of priorities lies in rendering durable and accept-
able ‘inappropriate transfers’ through the lens of the necessary evil.
5 Avoidance of Disruptive Courses of Action
Given the radical transformations that have taken place in Tunisia, since
January 2011, including the rst free and fair elections in the history of Tunisia
in October 2011, one is entitled to ask whether there exist today adequate con-
ditions to question the hierarchy of priorities that has shaped policy options as
well as -Tunisian interactions, over the last twenty years or so.
This question is all the more relevant when considering the increased
accountability of the newly elected government towards its own citizens and
the need to respond to the clearly formulated aspirations of vibrant civil soci-
ety organizations (s). These were epitomized by the revolutionary triptych
‘khobza, khidma wa horrya’ (‘bread, job and freedom’) which, since 2011, has
often been referred to as the ‘objectives of the Revolution’ guiding the action of
the newly elected government.
Just after the revolution, numerous contradictory and lively debates took
place mobilizing ocials, journalists, lawyers and an array of s to reect
on the actual social and economic situation of the country left after the col-
lapse of the Ben Ali regime. The myth of the Tunisian economic ‘miracle’ and
the drive for stability, professed by ocials since the mid-1990s and subtly
reinterpreted (with the silent acquiescence of the latter) by the former regime
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as the drive for stability at all costs, were vehemently denounced by the public,
the media and new political leaders. Decades of political strategic alliances
and opaque collusion between Tunisian and foreign business actors were
brought to light to denounce the corruption of the regime, the marginalization
of a large segment of the population living in depressed areas, poverty, youth
unemployment and pervasive job precariousness.
For the whole year 2011, as a result of strong tensions between political par-
ties during the interim governments of Mohammed Ghannouchi and Beji Caïd
Essebsi, social protests and powerful strikes led by trade unions took place. The
and its Member States found it dicult to establish new talks on migra-
tion issues with their Tunisian institutional interlocutors. Moreover, faced with
the mass arrival in Southern Tunisia of more than half a million of foreigners
and tens of thousands of Tunisian nationals eeing conicts in neighbouring
Libya, the Tunisian interim government had to tackle humanitarian emergen-
cies that lasted for months. Nor could the interim government take rm politi-
cal commitments in the eld of migration, in the ong of the elections of the
National Constituent Assembly in October 2011.
These exceptional domestic social and political conditions had arguably an
impact on the reluctance of the Tunisian interim government to cooperate on
migration controls. For example, in April 2011, the Tunisian interim govern-
ment was pressed by Italy to conclude a bilateral agreement aimed at ensur-
ing the cooperation of the Tunisian interim authorities on the swift removal
of unauthorized migrants. Beji Caïd Essebsi pragmatically explained to his
Italian counterpart the pressing priorities of the ‘new Tunisia’ and the eco-
nomic and social challenges inherited from the past regime. He called on the
Italian government to nd a ‘satisfactory solution’. Eventually, the bilateral
talks led to an arrangement, not a binding agreement. It did foresee deporta-
tion, but for a limited number of Tunisian irregular migrants. Moreover, the
Italian authorities opted for the delivery of ‘temporary humanitarian stay per-
mits’ to all the Tunisian migrants who arrived irregularly in Italy since early
January 2011.
In early 2011, more than 22000 Tunisian nationals arrived on vessels of fortune on the island
of Lampedusa. Former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi made an ocial visit to Tunisia on
4 April 2011 to meet the head of the Tunisian interim government, Beji Caïd Essebsi.
See the Tunisian newspaper Le Temps (2011), Pas d’accord entre Berlusconi et Caïd Essebsi
sur les immigrés de Lampedusa. Mésentente ‘cordiale’?, 5 April 2011, available online at
http://www.turess.com/fr/letemps/54748 (retrieved on 7 November 2013).
The Tunisian press reported unanimously that the Italian government did not obtain
what it expected from the Tunisian interim government. It was reported that Béji Caïd
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The reference to the Italian-Tunisian arrangement is not fortuitous. Firstly,
its scope and political impact fuelled populist and protectionist behaviours in
various Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Malta, and Austria) heighten-
ing tensions in Europe. Secondly, the actual responsiveness of the Tunisian
interim government to European calls for enhanced cooperation on the ‘ght
against illegal migration’ and border controls reected a course of action that
radically contrasted with the last period of the Ben Ali regime. It could even be
argued that the pragmatic response of the Tunisian interim government was
viewed as being disruptive by its European neighbours. Of course, the quest for
international legitimacy and political support has been a source of concern for
the new Tunisian administration. However, the need to respond to the aspira-
tions of Tunisian society and to strengthen domestic political legitimacy and
social stability, in accordance with the aforementioned objectives of the revo-
lution, has become an inescapable top priority.
Against this background, how were the EU and its Member States respon-
sive to these unprecedented uncertainties? Rather, were they ready to factor
the strong signicance of these conditions into their own policy options?
5.1 Responding to Uncertainties: Extreme Profusion
A lot has been written on the ‘Partnership for democracy and shared prosper-
ity’ that was presented in March 2011 by the European Commission. Numerous
studies and reports have already addressed the review of the European
Neighbourhood Policy that was put forward one month later paving the way
for the adoption in November 2011 of the Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility. My point here is not to analyse in detail all the communications
that have been presented by the institutions on migration issues since early
2011. Rather, I prefer to focus on their extreme profusion and their rationale.
There is no question that the intensity with which the institutions publi-
cized their communications on any aspects of the cooperation with the south-
ern Mediterranean ‘neighbours’ (ranging from economic and political reforms
to trade, nancial reforms, human rights, civil society, border controls and
migration) was reective of the need to provide a clear and comprehensive
Essebsi also addressed the institutions by emphasizing that Tunisia accepted on its
territory a much more substantial number of people seeking refuge on its territory from
Libya. See Le Temps (2011), Les autorités italiennes vont délivrer un permis temporaire de
séjour à des centaines de clandestins tunisiens, 7 April 2011, Tunis.
European Commission (2011), Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, (2011) 743
nal, 18 November 2011, Brussels.
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response to the radical transformations taking place in various Arab countries.
We could not agree more.
At the same time, however, their extreme profusion shares something in
common with the repetition of plausible truths that I analysed in the second
chapter. Extreme profusion, in this specic context, draws on Axelrod’s power
to ‘shape the characteristics of the interaction’ not because of the need to
ensure a modicum of ‘reciprocity’; rather, because of the desire to avoid disrup-
tive courses of action.
Avoidance of disruptive courses of action is linked with mechanisms sus-
taining external transfer. To be clear, it has nothing to do with explicit forms
of coercion (e.g., conditionalities); rather with implicit forms of leverage and
pressures. It pertains to techniques aimed at modelling actors’ perceptions
and language by frequently providing advice or disseminating data, informa-
tion and policy reports produced and reproduced by ocial bodies and their
‘expertise’.
The ow of data and communications is so intense that it may generate a
sense of unpreparedness and bewilderment among those who are confronted
with it. Of course, through repeated interactions, doubts regarding the verac-
ity of the reiterated data and information may vanish gradually, as we already
showed with reference to s (see Section 2). However, doubts rarely vanish
completely and teaching key interlocutors turns out to be the most common
option to model perceptions. In both cases, the strategy is the same: decisions,
R. Axelrod (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, : Basic Books, p. 141.
The reference to ‘expertise’ partially draws on Peter Haas’ ‘epistemic communities’ in that
it pertains to a ‘network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue-area’ (see P.M. Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination’, 46 International Organization (1992) 12–35, at 3. Haas mentions that profes-
sionals are linked together by ‘their shared belief or faith in the verity and the applicabil-
ity of particular forms of knowledge or specic truth’ (see footnote n. 4 in his text on p. 3).
Professionals are described by Haas as a ‘knowledge elite’ with a ‘common faith in scien-
tic method’. In other words, they are expected to provide objective and independent
scientic evidence to decision-makers. Haas observes, however, that ‘that scientists
working within the bureaucracy have a common faith in the scientic method does not
guarantee their solidarity, nor does it make them immune to pressures from the institu-
tions in which they work or from political temptation’ (p. 11). His qualication is crucial to
understand the heterogeneity inherent in ‘epistemic communities’. Today, Haas’ qualica-
tion strongly resonates given the growing contractualization of scientic research,
the drive for ‘evidence-based policy-making’, and last but not least the perceptible de-
professionalization of what is referred to as ‘research’.
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even when imposed by others, are subtly transformed into shared options
or values.
2011 was a year of intense talks on migration and border controls, both in
Tunisia and in Europe. This was also a year of extreme profusion when one
considers the impressive number of reports, studies, communiqués and public
statements made by ocials and their subcontracted expertise on the ‘Arab
Spring’ and its manifold implications.
Teaching Tunisian key interlocutors became logically stronger as of
December 2011, when the provisional government of Hamadi Jebali came to
power. Concomitantly, the rst State Secretariat for Migration Afairs and the
Tunisians Living Abroad was set up under the aegis of the Ministry of Social
Afairs. Seminars, training courses and ‘capacity-building’ initiatives spon-
sored by the and its Member States and other agencies in Tunisia and in
Europe have proliferated, mobilizing numerous Tunisian stakeholders from all
ministries and public bodies.
Of course, their proliferation is far from being neutral. Avoidance of dis-
ruptive courses of action is probably the major, though not the only, driver
guiding such ‘capacity-building’ initiatives. As mentioned before, they are not
only aimed at shaping perceptions and subjectivities. In the Tunisian context,
their rationale lies in using techniques aimed at reducing uncertainties and at
engineering a form of consensus by delimiting a domain where doubts about
the drive for operability can barely be expressed.
Avoidance of disruptive courses of action is symptomatic of the desire to
channel any policy development in the eld of migration and border manage-
ment that would challenge the way in which issues have been prioritized and
dealt with for decades. It is also symptomatic of how the interactions on migra-
tion and border management between the and its Member States, on the
one hand, and the GoT, on the other, have developed since late 2011.
5.2 Enhanced Exposure
Against this backdrop, it is likely that the newly elected provisional govern-
ment of Tunisia (PGoT) led by Hamadi Jebali became more vulnerable to
external pressures in the eld of migration management. This argument may
be plausible if one considers that the reinforced cooperation on readmission
as well as the need to tackle irregular migration were presented as priorities
conditioning the bilateral ‘Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security’
Such dialogues cover regular and irregular migration, human tracking, readmission,
visa issues, asylum and international protection. Tunisia and Morocco engaged in ‘mobil-
ity partnership dialogues’ in October 2011, see European Commission and High
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between the and Tunisia. The door was wide open to external pressures
when the provisional government of Tunisia (PGoT) – run by a ruling coali-
tion (or Troika) comprising the Islamic party En-Nahdha, the Congress for the
Republic () and the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties ( or
Ettakatol) – opted to boast its political credentials with its European neigh-
bours strongly concerned about the Islamic political landslide at the October
2011 elections (particularly when poll results showed that En-Nahdha obtained
a good share of Tunisian expatriates’ votes).
Despite or perhaps because of these external pressures, high expecta-
tions were placed on the establishment of the Tunisian State Secretariat for
Migration Afairs. As early as January 2012, the State Secretary for migration
(Houcine Jaziri, a member of En-Nahdha) declared to the media his intention
to consolidate a ‘new migration policy’, and to sustain consultations between
his government and the numerous associations of Tunisian expatriates estab-
lished abroad and civil society organizations (s) in Tunisia. Few months
of intense communication with Tunisian expatriates and migrants’ associa-
tions abroad were enough to realize that the latter’s demands and claims were
not strictly limited to their own conditions abroad. They also encompassed
additional critical issues including political leaders’ accountability, reform
of the Tunisian justice system, transparency, respect for human rights, free-
dom of expression, employment, and, last but not least, the drafting of a new
Constitution reecting the ‘objectives of the Revolution’ and radical change.
This point is crucial to understand that, from its inception, the mission
of the State Secretariat for Migration Afairs was to be assessed against the
responsiveness of the ruling coalition (controlled by En-Nahdha) to the count-
less domestic challenges facing the new PGoT. Consequently, it comes as
no surprise that domestic policy developments in Tunisia have in some way
reverberated through the consultations between the State Secretary, s and
Representative (2012), Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy, (2012) 14
nal, 15 May 2012, Brussels, p. 13. For a comprehensive analysis of mobility partnerships
and their conditionalities, see, among others, S. Carrera, L. den Hertog and J. Parkin (2012),
EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern
Mediterranean Relations?, Technical Report n. 15. Brussels: ; S. Lavenex and
R. Stucky (2011), ‘Partnering’ for Migration in External Relations, In: R. Kunz, S. Lavenex
and M. Panizzon (Eds), Multilayered Migration Governance: The Promise of Partnership,
London: Routledge, pp. 116–142.
La Presse de Tunisie, ‘Deux priorités, une nouvelle politique migratoire et la réforme des
structures’, 16 January 2012, available online at http://www.lapresse.tn/19022013/43640/
deux-priorites-une-nouvelle-politique-migratoire-et-la-reforme-des-structures.html
(retrieved on 7 November 2013).
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Tunisian migrants’ associations established abroad. For example, the violent
repression of the yearly celebration of Martyr’s Day on 9th April 2012, tensions
with the and the national press union on freedom of expression, the con-
troversial and divisive debates on religion and secularism, the appointment of
governors linked with En-Nahdha, cronyism, the postponed completion and
ratication of the new Constitution, the resumption of violence by extrem-
ist religious groups, arm-tracking, the fragile economic and monetary out-
look, the political killings of Lot Naguedh, Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed
Brahmi constitute, among many others, events and factors that critically
impacted on the opportunities to promote a ‘new migration policy’ based on
consultations with Tunisian s.
Still, a ‘national strategy on migration’ (not a policy) was presented on the
occasion of the August 2013 Forum for Tunisians living abroad, organized
in Hammamet. The Tunisian authorities (including the Prime Ministry,
the State Secretariat for Migration Afairs and the Oce for Tunisians liv-
ing abroad) adopted a joint programme based on four key points: (1) pro-
moting capacity-building and the good governance of the migration system’;
(2) reinforcing the relationships between the émigré community and
A political gure belonging to the opposition political party ‘the Call of Tunisia’ (Nida’
Tuness). Naguedh was killed in October 2012 during a clash with supporters of En-Nahdha
in the southern city of Tatawin.
Lawyer and Secretary General of the United Party of Democratic Patriots (Hizb al-
watanyyn al-dimokratyyn al-muwahad) killed in February 2013 in Tunis.
Leader of the Popular Front (Aj-jabhat ach-cha’byya) and member of the Constituent
Assembly killed in July 2013 in Tunis.
This forum was organized from 19 to 21 August 2013. A number of associations (under the
umbrella Coordination des Assisses de l’Immigration Tunisienne), as well as the Ligue
Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme and the national trade union abstained from tak-
ing part in the forum. The national press reported that they ‘denounce the organization of
this event (i.e., the forum) when, under these exceptional circumstances, people call for
the dissolution of the government and the Constituent Assembly. This kind of initiative
has lost its legitimacy owing to the lack of credibility [of the government] [...].
Consequently, the organization of the governmental conference in Hammamet is just a
strategy, commonly used during the former regime, aimed at generating subordination.’
La Presse de Tunisie, ‘Politique nationale migratoire: Le désespoir gagne la société civile’,
20 August 2013, http://www.lapresse.tn/20082013/71390/le-desespoir-gagne-la-societe-
civile.html (retrieved on 7 November 2013).
Translation by the author. The Tunisian national strategy on migration is available on the
website of the Oce for Tunisians living abroad (): http://www.ote.nat.tn/index.php?
id=18&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27&cHash=e6ef50c7a12a9b5c574aa9fa1736e21 (retrieved on
7 November 2013).
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their motherland’; (3) fostering the involvement of Tunisian expatriates in
democracy-building and global development’; and (4) building a legal and
organizational framework aimed at dealing with migration issues, asylum and
residence while developing a system aimed at tackling illegal migration’.
6 Conclusion
Admittedly, it is too early to evaluate the impact of this newly adopted national
strategy. Yet, it is already possible to note that the lexical repertoire used in
the text as well as its rationale extensively draw on priorities that have been
for long anchored in the past patterns of cooperation on migration manage-
ment between Tunisia and its European neighbours. These priorities continue
to inuence the rationale for the current Dialogue on Migration, Mobility
and Security in which Tunisia is involved since the conclusion of a Privileged
Partnership () with the in November 2012.
The prospect of concluding a , combined with the ‘avoidance of disrup-
tive courses of action’, has arguably inuenced the perceived priorities of the
current Tunisian government when drafting its national strategy. Some would
claim ‘efectiveness’ or success for external transfers. Others may argue that its
motivations foresee an alignment on which the government intends to capi-
talise at a certain point with regard to its European neighbours. This is indeed
possible if this alignment is viewed as a means to reach other ends.
Before concluding, it is important to stress that the current Tunisian govern-
ment can no longer readjust external transfers to buttress its own regulatory
and disciplinary functions on society at large (as the former Ben Ali regime
did for its own survival and supremacy) without facing s’ empowered
advocacy, as well as the manifest alertness of the Tunisian population and the
response of domestic political opposition. This unprecedented sense of advo-
cacy, self-awareness and entitlement are probably the strongest markers of
today’s Tunisian society.
The Privileged Partnership constitutes a political agreement between the and Tunisia.
It was concluded during the 9th -Tunisian Association Council, dated 19 November
2012. A ve-year action plan (a roadmap) was recently agreed upon. It is aimed at orien-
tating the bilateral cooperation in the framework of the . The conclusion of a mobility
partnership, conditioned by efective cooperation on readmission, is part and parcel of
the priorities contained in the 2013/2017 action plan. The full text of the action plan is
available online at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/documents/press_corner/
plan_action_tunisie_ue_2013_2017_fr.pdf (retrieved on 7 November 2013).
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In sum, the hierarchy of priorities that has codied for decades the interac-
tions between Tunisia, on the one hand, and the and its Member States, on
the other, continues to orient policy concerns on migration matters. Of course,
these unchanged conditions may raise a host of new challenges, particularly
given the unprecedented sense of advocacy that today characterises Tunisian
society. In fact, one is entitled to believe that Tunisian society’s new markers
will be instrumental in assessing the success or failure of future transferred
policies as well as their concrete impact on development, social justice, mobil-
ity rights and social aspirations, to mention just a few.
Acknowledgements
I thank Michel Camau, Sergio Carrera, Paul Copeland, Rafaella Del Sarto,
Elspeth Guild, Béatrice Hibou, Florian Trauner, Sarah Wolf, and especially
Kevin Köhler for excellent suggestions and critiques. I also received very help-
ful comments from audiences at the European University Institute (),
the International Studies Association (), the European Union Studies
Association () and Queen Mary University (London). The usual dis-
claimer applies.
