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The Dispositional/Categorical Distinction
... If his claim can be made to stick, then Mellor's argument may be used by the dispositional monist against the attack based on structural properties. In rooting for Mellor the dispositional monist will decry his opponent in the ensuing debate, Elizabeth Prior (1982), who argues that Mellor's alleged entailment does not hold Elizabeth Prior (1982). (It should be pointed out that Mellor's aim is not to defend dispositional monism; rather it is to undermine the prejudice against dispositions that says they are not real or that if they are real that is only because they are identical to or supported by a basis composed entirely of categorical properties. ...
... If his claim can be made to stick, then Mellor's argument may be used by the dispositional monist against the attack based on structural properties. In rooting for Mellor the dispositional monist will decry his opponent in the ensuing debate, Elizabeth Prior (1982), who argues that Mellor's alleged entailment does not hold Elizabeth Prior (1982). (It should be pointed out that Mellor's aim is not to defend dispositional monism; rather it is to undermine the prejudice against dispositions that says they are not real or that if they are real that is only because they are identical to or supported by a basis composed entirely of categorical properties. ...
... And so the entailment does not seem to refl ect the metaphysics of the property of being a triangle. Rather it depends only on analytic relations and so Mellor's argument falls foul of Rule 1. Prior (1982) notes that Mellor states in a footnote that 'correctly' is intended to refer not to the result of counting but rather to the manner of counting. But she thinks that if this is so, then the entailment fails, since if it is only the manner of counting that is invoked, then counting in the unusual world with systematic error may be carried out in the correct manner without getting the correct result. ...
... 4 The debate about whether, and in what sense, spatial properties are dispositional has cropped up in various guises over recent decades. See, for example, Mellor 1982, Prior 1982, Molnar 2003Ch. 9 and 10, and Bird 2003 erature (e.g. ...
Dispositional realism, as we shall use the term, is a non-reductive, anti-Humean approach to dispositions which says that natural properties confer certain dispositions as a matter of metaphysical necessity. A strong form of dispositional realism is known as pan-dispositionalism, which is typically interpreted as the view that all natural properties are identical with, or essentially dependent on, dispositions. One of the most serious problems facing pan-dispositionalism is the conceivability objection, and the solution commonly offered by essentialists employs the so-called redescription strategy. In this paper I argue that this orthodox strategy fails in certain cases. This argument, in turn, shows that essentialist forms of dispositional realism are implausible. The discussion points us towards an improved version of dispositional realism. According to this new version, natural properties are not essentially dispositional but necessarily ground dispositions.
... Categoricalism is argued by many philosophers (for example, Armstrong (1968Armstrong ( , 1973Armstrong ( , 1983Armstrong ( , 1986Armstrong ( , 1997Armstrong ( , 2012, Mackie (1973Mackie ( , 1974aMackie ( , 1977, Pargetter and Prior (1982), Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982), Prior (1982)) as a theory about the nature of properties. In this subsection, I will explain categoricalism by 46 I will use ordinary quotation marks where, strictly, corner quotes are required as far as there is no danger of confusion. ...
In this thesis, I critically discuss rationalism in epistemology of modality. Rationalism claims that our a priori intuition or conceivability gives us knowledge about metaphysical possibility. I examine this claim by considering Bealer’s moderate rationalism and Chalmers’s modal rationalism. In particular, I argue that Bealer’s moderate rationalism is not successful in responding to Kripke’s and Putnam’s counterexamples which sever the link between a priori intuition and modal knowledge. Also, it is argued that given Chalmers’s modal rationalism, our a priori conceivability entails more than metaphysical possibility from the perspective of our world. After providing some preliminary points in Introduction, I assess Bealer’s moderate rationalism in Chapter 2. Specifically, I argue that our a priori intuition about epistemic possibility concerning property-identities does not give us knowledge about metaphysical possibility. In arguing this point, Russellian and Fregean theories of phenomenal content are discussed. Also, a priori unknowability of necessary properties of a substance is examined. In Chapter 3, I discuss an issue untouched by Bealer’s moderate rationalism: a priori knowability of metaphysical possibility concerning property-possession of a substance. I argue that given Bealer’s moderate rationalism, our a priori intuition does not give us knowledge about metaphysical possibility concerning that. In arguing this point, categoricalism and dispositionalism about the nature of properties are discussed. I examine Chalmers’s modal rationalism in Chapter 4 and argue that our a priori conceivability can entail metaphysical possibility from perspectives of other worlds. Then, I derive a claim that we must be cautious not to commit a modal error of regarding what is not metaphysically possible from the perspective of our world as possible when we depend on a priori conceivability to know metaphysical possibility.
... Recall that a categorical property is a characteristic of an object that concerns what quality the object has. By contrast, a dispositional property involves what the object can do [11,12]. For example, a side showing up after the landing is a categorical property of the coin, while the electrical conductivity of the coin is its dispositional property. ...
Construal of observable facts or events, that is, the manner in which we understand reality, is based not only on mathematical formulas of a theory suggested as a reasonable explanation for physical phenomena (like general relativity or quantum mechanics), but also on a mathematical model of reasoning used to analyze and appraise statements regarding the objective world (for example, logic of one type or the other). Hence, every time that a certain construal of reality encounters a problem, there is a choice between a modification to the mathematical formalism of the physical theory and a change in the model of reasoning. A case in point is negative construal of quantum superposition causing the problem of definite outcomes. To be sure, according to the said construal, it is not the case that a system being in a superposition of states is exclusively in one of the states constituting the superposition, which in turn implies that macroscopically differing outcomes of observation may appear all at once. The usual approach to the problem of definite outcomes is to modify the quantum mathematical formalism by adding to it some extra postulates (for instance, the postulate of wave function collapse). However, since none of the extra postulates proposed so far has gained broad acceptance, one may try another avenue to resolve the problem, namely, to replace logic with an alternative mathematical model of reasoning. This possibility is studied in the present paper.
... Why is triangularity categorical? The brief debate in Mellor (1974Mellor ( , 1982 and Prior (1982) on "counting corners correctly" offered perhaps the first instance in which the dispositional/categorical divide (in this case, subjunctive conditional entailment) did not respect a prior demarcation; and Mellor's conclusion-that insofar as all property ascriptions entail conditionals, all properties are dispositional-could be reversed so as to cast some doubts on the idea that conditional entailment is indeed the way to go. 2 This difficulty has not been solved. Quite the contrary: the chaos is now so rampant that even amongst friends of powers there are those who consider dispositionality and categoricity mutually exclusive categories (viz., dispositional properties cannot be categorical, and vice versa), and those who don't. ...
Discussions about dispositional and categorical properties have become commonplace in metaphysics. Unfortunately, dispositionality and categoricity are disputed notions: usual characterizations are piecemeal and not widely applicable, thus threatening to make agreements and disagreements on the matter merely verbal—and also making it arduous to map a logical space of positions about dispositional and categorical properties in which all parties can comfortably fit. This paper offers a prescription for this important difficulty, or at least an inkling thereof. This will be achieved by comparing pairs of positions and exploring their background metaphysics to discover where alleged agreements and disagreements concerning dispositionality and categoricity really lie; more specifically, the Pure Powers view (according to which properties are just dispositional) and the Powerful Qualities view (according to which properties are also categorical) will be under scrutiny. Over this background, the prescription functions by isolating a successful identity-based characterization of categoricity, while abandoning the correspondent identity-based characterization of dispositionality. On the contrary, according to this prescription a property is dispositional if and only if it is solely in virtue of possessing that property that its bearer is assigned a certain dispositional profile. A crucial consequence of this prescription is that, while supporters of the Pure Powers view often characterize their position as an essentialist one, the dispositionality of properties needn’t always be a matter of essence.
... See the discussion inMellor 1974, Prior 1982, Prior 1985, Mumford 1998, and, for an up to date overview, the article by Schrenk in this volume. ...
Dispositional Realism is the view according to which some denizens of reality – i.e., dispositions – are properties, that may exist in the natural world and have an irreducible modal character. Among Dispositional Realists, Charlie Martin, Ullin Place and George Molnar most notably argued that the modal character of dispositions should be understood in terms of their intentionality. Other Dispositional Realists, most notably Stephen Mumford, challenged this understanding of the modal character of dispositions. In this paper, I defend a fresh version of the intentional understanding of dispositions. I start by distinguishing two questions about properties, respectively addressing their identity conditions and their individuation conditions. I, then, define categorical and dispositional properties in terms of their qualitative character, and examine their identity and individuation conditions. I conclude that the attribution of intentions is a conceptual tool: it was introduced in order to help specifying the conditions of individuation of a disposition; however, such attribution does not affect the identity of a disposition. Nominalists believe that there are no properties, but only particulars. Realists, instead, believe that, among the denizens of reality, some are properties. Among the Realists, some are Dispositional Realists: they believe that, among the properties, some are dispositions. Roughly, allegedly these are entities with an irreducibly modal character and that may be instantiated by objects in the natural (i.e., spatio-temporal) world. Other Realists deny the existence of dispositional properties, thereby denying Dispositional Realism. In this paper, I will assume Realism. My aim will be to provide a fresh understanding of Dispositional Realism, which gives some merit to the view according to which dispositions have intentions.
... If this is right, then we are free to associate dispositions with categorical bases according to how the laws are in each possible world, thus ensuring that objects which are disposed to behave in a particular way in a given world are ascribed the dispositional properties which correctly describe their behavionr. 6 For a general defence of categorical realism, see [1], [2], [20], [23], [24]. 7 Prior [22] is among those who argue that this is one characteristic of dispositions which distinguishes them from categorical properties. ...
According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel about properties, I draw on the categorical / dispositional distinction to discuss this non-reductive claim. Typically, non-reductionism entails a categorical view of phenomenal properties. Contrary to this, I will argue that phenomenal properties, usually characterized by what it is like to have them, are mainly the manifestation of dispositional properties. This paper is thus divided into two parts. In the first part, after tracing a working distinction between categorical and dispositional properties, I argue that there is a form of incoherence looming behind the idea of taking phenomenal properties as categorical. In the second part, I argue in favor of the view that phenomenal properties are dispositional properties with an essential manifestation. This interpretation allows us to broaden dispositionalism so as to include the sciences of mind, thus ultimately favoring a physicalist view on the mind.
Contemporary metaphysics of properties and laws is dominated by two worldviews. According to the neo-Humean view, fundamental properties and relations in the actual world are intrinsically causally inert, while their transworld identity (or, more generally, their de re modal representation) is completely independent of their actual causal/nomic roles. The relationship between the kinds of property an object possesses and its specific behaviour in a possible world w is determined by the metaphysically contingent laws of w and so is itself contingent. Defenders of the neo-Humean view are reluctant to accept any primitive modal facts about the actual world (i.e., facts related to possibilities, necessities, etc.) and try to metaphysically analyse them in terms of the actual (and in some cases possible) fundamental categorical properties and the (nomic) relations holding between them.
Virtue attribution has four distinctive purposes, namely, to describe how a person differs from others; to explain his or her beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, and behavior; to predict what he or she would do – and how he or she would do it – in the circumstances in question; and to evaluate him or her as a person. The explanatory and predictive powers of virtue have been recently under attack. In this chapter, I shall consider the notions of explanatory and predictive power, critically examine the empirically based claim that the virtues are explanatorily and predictively weak, and conclude that virtue can indeed be meaningfully and successfully used in explanations and predictions of behavior.
Extended simples are physical objects that, while spatially extended, possess no actual proper parts. The theory that physical reality bottoms out at extended simples is one of the principal competing views concerning the fundamental composition of matter, the others being atomism and the theory of gunk. Among advocates of extended simples, Markosian’s ‘MaxCon’ version of the theory (Aust J Philos 76:213–226, 1998, Monist 87:405–428, 2004) has justly achieved particular prominence. On the assumption of causal realism (i.e., on the assumption that a Humean account of causation is false), I argue here that the reality of MaxCon simples would entail the reality of irreducible, intrinsic dispositional properties. The existence of dispositional properties in turn has important implications for another central debate in metaphysics, namely that between two major competing views concerning the ontology of laws: dispositionalism versus nomological necessitarianism.
What are the laws of nature, and what explains their existence? This book develops the proposal that the laws of nature are grounded in the essences of properties. It is argued that fundamental natural properties have dispositional essences - they are potencies (pure powers). After explaining this proposal, the book goes on to show how this accounts for the existence of the laws of nature. A distinctive feature of this account is that it ensures that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. This account has advantages over the regularity and nomic necessitation accounts associated with Lewis and Armstrong, while the dispositional essentialist view of properties has corresponding advantages over the categoricalist view of properties, according to which properties are quidditistic and do not have qualitative essences, merely primitive identity and difference. The relationship between potencies and modality, and also intentionality is explored. Other potential criticisms are raised and the view defended against them. For example it is claimed that if all properties are potencies, then a vicious regress ensues; it is shown that this does not follow. Geometrical and other 'structural' properties are raised as counterexamples, being properties that seem categorical; it is argued that this is the case only if one takes a particular view of the role of spacetime in physical theories. It is held that laws are metaphysically contingent whereas dispositional essentialism makes them necessary; it is argued that the contingency of laws is an illusion. An account of laws is developed in the face of Mumford's claim that neither dispositional essentialism nor science has need of laws.
This book puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role in metaphysics and philosophy of science is. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties - from the spin of a subatomic particle and the solubility of sugar to a person's belief that zebras have stripes. The book discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. They have seemed too many to reside on the fringes of actuality, waiting to manifest themselves; the book's realist account reveals them to be far less enigmatic, and shows that an understanding of dispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientific laws.
This book develops the theory of causal dispositionalism. Others have already suggested that a theory of causation would follow from an ontology of real dispositions or powers. This book attempts to show how. The book argues that powers come together in complex partnerships producing something together that they could not have produced alone. They will do so in a distinctly dispositional way that is not reducible to necessity. The mode of composition of causes can vary and is sometimes non-linear. The book calls this view compositional pluralism. The book argues for the simultaneity of cause and effect as causation is the process that occurs when partnered powers produce their effect. It begins once those partners are together and ends either when the process is complete or is interrupted. The theory explains how causal claims are distinguished from others and why there is no causation by absence. The book distinguishes the distinct, sui generis dispositional modality of causation and show how it can be known directly through experience. The book applies the theory to the science of biology, where it is corroborated. © Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum 2011. All rights reserved.
The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to the conclusion that fragility is not a real property and that, while both temperature and its bases are, this does not generate any problem of overdetermination.
Suppose dispositions bear a distinctive connection to counterfactual facts, perhaps one that could be enshrined in a variation on the well-worn schema ‘Necessarily, x is disposed to in ψ iff x would in ψ’. Could we exploit this connection to provide an account of what it is to be a disposition? This paper is about four views of dispositionality that attempt to do so.
Soulevant la question du critere de verite de la loi naturelle dans le cadre du debat opposant les partisans de la theorie de Dretske, Tooley et Armstrong (DTA), d'une part, et l'analyse conceptuelle de S. Mumford, d'autre part, l'A. defend la these selon laquelle le concept de loi de la nature est une verite ultime et inexplicable, contrairement a la notion de disposition qui repond a mecanisme explicatif. Examinant la distinction entre loi derivee et loi elementaire, l'A. developpe un nouvel argument en faveur de l'essentialisme dispositionnel
Stephen Mumford, in his book on dispositions, argues that we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties
in terms of entailing his ‘conditional conditionals’, which involve the concept of ideal conditions. I aim at defending Mumford's
criterion for distinguishing between dispositional and categorical properties. To be specific, no categorical ascriptions
entail Mumford's ‘conditional conditionals’.
AbstractI develop a new theory of properties by considering two central arguments in the debate whether properties are dispositional or categorical. The first claims that objects must possess categorical properties in order to be distinct from empty space. The second argument, however, points out several untoward consequences of positing categorical properties. I explore these arguments and argue that despite appearances, their conclusions need not be in conflict with one another. In particular, we can view the second argument as supporting only the claim that there is not a plurality of categorical properties, and not the stronger claim that there are no categorical properties whatsoever. I then develop a new account of properties which capitalizes on this insight.
Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a single notion of property is capable of supporting the various distinctions.
It is generally agreed that dispositions cannot be analyzed in terms of simple subjunctive conditionals (because of what are
called “masked dispositions” and “finkish dispositions”). I here defend a qualified subjunctive account of dispositions according
to which an object is disposed to Φ when conditions C obtain if and only if, if conditions C were to obtain, then the object
would Φ ceteris paribus. I argue that this account does not fall prey to the objections that have been raised in the literature.
KeywordsDisposition–Mask–Fink–Subjunctive–Counterfactual–
Ceteris paribus
I argue that categorical realism, contrary to what most believe today, holds for quantum (and indeed for all) objects and substances. The main argument consists of two steps: (i) the recent experimental verification of the AB effect gives strong empirical evidence for taking quantum potentials as physically real (or substantival), which suggests a change of the data upon which any viable interpretation of quantum theory must rely, and (ii) quantum potentials may be consistently taken as the categorical properties of quantum objects so that categorical realism can be restored.
A range of easily identifiable characteristics is often used by researchers and general practitioners to categorise primary care practices. In the United Kingdom, for example, practices can be defined as dispensing, single-handed or training. The availability of routinely collected data has led to a growing research literature that links practice characteristics to their workload, performance and costs. This paper examines the use and limitations of this 'characteristics approach' and argues that this type of research is often undertaken because it is easy to perform rather than because it is the most appropriate way to study primary care. Using this approach may lead to failure to do the following: to account for the environmental factors that determine the effects particular characteristics manifest; to identify the true relationships between the observed characteristics; to control for changes in the effects of characteristics over time; to differentiate between the behaviour of individual members of a group with the same characteristic and that of the group as a whole; to assign the correct causality to relationships between practice characteristics, workloads, performance, and costs. The characteristics approach should be used with great caution by general practice researchers.
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