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The Psychology of Imagination
... Like a rhizome, imagining unfolds through perpetual motion and complete interconnectedness among heterogeneous constitutive elements (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). That is, we view imagining as an active, generative, embodied, situated activity that is deeply intertwined with perceiving and thinking (Thompson, 2018a): as an ability to integrate sensory experience, memory, and emotions, it facilitates perceiving and interpreting the world (Sartre, 1978); as an abstract cognitive activity, it sparks thinking and paves the way to creative outcomes (Arnheim, 2004). Extant entrepreneurship literature identifies critical roles of imagination, such as for creating new venture ideas (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010), devising resource combinations needed to actualize entrepreneurial ideas (Dolmans, van Burg, Reymen, & Romme, 2014), and driving disequilibrium in market processes (Chiles et al., 2010a). ...
... On the advice of a theoretically diverse panel of three senior organizational scholars, we selected seven books as a theoretical foundation for generating our model. These texts contain both canonical (Arnheim, 2004;Jung, 1997;Sartre, 1978;Shackle, 1979) and more recent (Dyer, 2012;McGinn, 2006;Modell, 2006) efforts to explore imagination; they span art/design, cognitive psychology, economics, evolutionary biology, linguistics, neurobiology, neuroscience, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and spirituality. ...
... The rapid links across perception and thought allow entrepreneurs to interpret impressions from their surrounding world, resulting in what Shackle (1979) calls reports from the field. But perceiving does not entail solely a focus on the external world (or external perceiving), because entrepreneurs also gather information from their bodies (internal perceiving) (Modell, 2006), become aware of their affective reactions to the surrounding world, and project meaning onto it (Sartre, 1978). ...
Although imagination has been recognized as essential to entrepreneuring, the processes by which entrepreneurs imagine and generate novelty remain insufficiently understood. To begin addressing this oversight, we propose a rhizomatic process model of entrepreneurial imagining that comprises five elements: experiencing, early creating, reaching an impasse and gestating, (re)creating and evaluating imagined futures, and choosing and enterprising. To generate this dynamic process model, we undertook an abductive, 25-month case study, guided by enactive research, to investigate how a small team of arts entrepreneurs created the world’s largest traveling carillon. Our primary contribution is to offer new theoretical insights into entrepreneurial imagining as a complex, situated, relational performance that unfolds through conscious and unconscious, self-reflective and embodied processes.
... this is crucial for opportunity identification and exploration, which often involves reading between the lines. sartre [32] who was influenced by Heidegger, saw spontaneous image representation of experience, as a powerful way of changing the course taken by social actors living in the world with each other, always leaping into the future, amidst world time. ...
... Authenticity and representational spontaneity the entrepreneur who provides creative resolve breaks away from the they (the social mass) into which individuals have fallen to conform to social identities, rules and norms [31] . We propose based on Heidegger and his contemporary sartre [32] that images one imagines are spontaneous representations [50] . these can enable the entrepreneur to be partially authentic and to stand outside institutional frames to reconfigure them. ...
Entrepreneur's imagination has crucial implication on business success and management. Despite its espoused importance, imagination is still undervalued and deserves more academic attention. The current article aims to provide a novel perspective on imagination informed by Heidegger (1889-1976; widely acknowledged to be one of the most original philosophers of the 20th century). Specifically, the article has clarified the definition of imagination in entrepreneurship and risen constructs align with the proposed conception. Under the microscope of Heidegger’s theory, entrepreneur’s imagination co-operates ventures successfully by incorporating notions of webs of significance, authenticity, spontaneity, heroes and moods, which guide opportunity identification and exploration in markets. The article has offered new insights to the knowledge of entrepreneur's imagination. From a pragmatic viewpoint, inferential leaps are possible because entrepreneurs practice against a background of webs of significance they own - which they relationally, linguistically and pragmatically - share across institutional frames. Implications of the findings on management are discussed.
... 2. To establish the Implications of Sartre's ontology of being on Educational aims and practice. 3. To interrogate Sartre's concept of Freedom and its implication to education in Kenya. ...
Jean Paul Sartre, a French philosopher, was a prolific author of over 50 literary works. Some of his Philosophical essays include; The Transcendence of the Ego (1936), Imagination: A Psychological Critique (1936), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1939), The Imaginary (1940), Being and Nothingness (1943), Existentialism and Humanism (1946), Existentialism and Human Emotions (1957), Search for a Method (1957), Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960, 1985), Notebooks for Ethics (1983) and Truth and Existence (1989). Sartre is considered to be the first Philosopher to use the term existentialism as a philosophical system. Existentialism in education is a teaching and learning philosophy that focuses on the student’s freedom and agency to choose their future (Ginny, 2012). Sartre first used it to describe his life and that of the postwar literary and philosophical output of his associates. Sartre argued for the different themes across his literary works, yet the bottom line of his thought was not only based on his ‘lived-experiences’ but also his view of reality, better considered as Sartre’s ontology. This paper therefore discussed Sartre’s ontology and its implication to educational practices and policies in Kenya.
... Simondon's theory of technical mediation is further developed in his 1965-66 lecture series on imagination and invention (Simondon 2014). His approach to images and imagination differs from established approaches (e.g., Sartre 1962Sartre , 1972 in that it refuses to identify images with human consciousness and intention. In Simondon's view, images are external (or at least partly so) to the thinking subject, being concerned, rather, with the action potentials of living bodies. ...
This article outlines an eco-operational theory of technical mediation that centers on Gilbert Simondon’s notion of technicity. The argument is that technical apparatuses do the work of concepts. However, the eco-operational viewpoint completely alters the status of concepts: what they are, where they are, and what they do. Technicity, as understood here, concerns the efficacious action and operational functioning of a broad range of apparatuses (including living bodies and technical machines), which are conceived as adaptive mediators. The focus on technicity provides a new notion of the virtual, that of the operationally real, which resonates with Gilles Deleuze’s while also marking a new direction. What is more, by approaching mediation in terms of technicity, the eco-operational framework offers a novel understanding of concept or generality that stakes out a middle path between Kantian representational generality and Deleuzian concrete singularity.
... In everyday usage, facticity means 'factuality', 'demonstrability', 'givenness of a thing or a state of affairs'. In a philosophical interpretation, following the existentialism of Heidegger (2010) and Sartre (2001), facticity can also denote being thrown into the world as a fact or basic condition of human existence, out of which only everything else arises. This perspective emphasizes the defenselessness and powerlessness of human beings and develops a perspective that is important for understanding the Anthropocene. ...
... At the same time, I suggest that imagination's productive force emanates from its infinite temporality. That is, one can imagine the past, present, and future (see Cocking, 1991;Levy, 2012;Sartre, 1948). An aspect of this infinite temporality is imagination's subjunctive property-the what if, as if, once it is, maybe (see Turner, 1990). ...
Community psychology is deeply committed to the liberation and wellbeing of communities. Seemingly missing from the discipline, however, is an explicit interrogation of coloniality. In keeping with the decolonial process, one paradigm that allows for the disruption of hegemonic knowledge is Participatory Action Research (PAR). PAR facilitates opportunities for critical consciousness, self and collective determination, shared decision-making, and social change as defined by communities. This chapter engages two questions: What does it mean to decolonise PAR within community psychology? What are key elements toward the development of a decolonial PAR praxis? Pursuing these questions requires centering decolonial Global South and Indigenous cosmologies in relation to a PAR paradigm. PAR in community psychology must disrupt the coloniality of power. Thus, to engage with elements of decoloniality this chapter proposes ten axioms toward a decolonial PAR praxis in community psychology that align with the decolonial turn.
... The view that we can't be mistaken about what we imagine features in the epistemology of modality (Kind, 2016;Tidman, 1994) and Kung (2010Kung ( , 2016 uses it to motivate his account of the imagination. Both views crop up in debates about how imagination differs from other mental faculties, especially perception and memory (Sartre, 2004;Wittgenstein, 1980;McGinn, 2004;Langland-Hassan, 2016;Balcerak Jackson, 2018;Kind, 2019), and in arguments for "actuality-oriented imagination" being a cognitive capacity distinct from other kinds of imagination (Munro, 2021). 31 As in the introduction, here we follow intentionalists in linking the view to the freedom to choose what we imagine (see especially Langland-Hassan, 2016;Balcerak Jackson, 2018, p. 223). ...
It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what we choose. This paper explores a thesis—what we call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides a way of making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According to intentionalism, the contents of your imaginings are simply determined by whatever contents you intend to imagine. Thus, for example, when you visualize a building and intend it to be of King’s College rather than a replica of the college you have imagined the former rather than the latter because you intended to imagine King’s College. This is so even if the visual image you conjure up equally resembles either. This paper proposes two kinds of counterexamples to intentionalism and discusses their significance. In particular, it sketches a positive account of how many sensory imaginings get to be about what they are about, which explains how the causal history of our mental imagery can prevent us from succeeding in imagining what we intended.
... Similarly, Illouz (2009, p. 398) suggests that symbols and images propel individuals into "a realm of possibilities entertained through the exercise of imagination". For Sartre (1948Sartre ( [original 1940, the act of imagination is like an incantation, which gives meanings to objects that do not have innate meanings. Imagination also presents 'an escape from worldly constraints' and an alternative version of the world (Sartre ibid.,p. ...
Social work plays a crucial role in defending the human rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from systems of oppression. This paper explores the meanings and challenges of human rights activism and its driving forces among North Korean refugees in the UK. The data are drawn from life history interviews with 10 participants, together with two activists' public speeches. The findings suggest that gaining awareness of human rights after their escape had significant implications for the activists, giving meaning to their life and sparking on their activism. Simultaneously, they expressed misconceptions and criticisms from other fellow North Korean refugees as one of the greatest difficulties they encountered in their work. I argue that to overcome such challenges human rights activism requires altruism and a creative imagination that envisions better future lives for other North Korean people. Based on this, I propose altruistic political imagination (API) as a concept that captures North Korean activists' experiences, built on Passy's (2001) notion of political altruism, to put emphasis on the visionary aspect of their activism. I maintain that the concept of API potentially has a wider appeal to those activists who face similar situations to North Korean activists, as well as social work practitioners who work with forced migrants and/or marginalised communities.
... This will govern our ability to discover the differences and similarities between those two types of communication. However, in our opinion, the main issue should be to explore what lies beyond the dualism that has characterized Western culture, between the inner and outer, the real and unreal worlds, with reference to 'the two kinds of thinking' of C.G. Jung (1967), Sartre (1972) and Bachelard (1988). ...
Most of the clinical experiences discussed in this article arose from monthly Zoom meetings at Rome's Italian Centre of Analytical Psychology (CIPA). We set up a discussion group in April 2020, one month after lockdown began in Italy, and these monthly online meetings continue to this day. All senior analysts and analysts-in-training at Rome's CIPA, whose backgrounds range from child and adolescent psychotherapy to adult psychotherapy and analysis, to sandplay therapy and medicine and psychiatry, have been participating in these meetings. The group discussions focus on the present time and its impact on us, as well as on our relationships with patients. By further developing these reflections during the lockdown in Italy (9 March - 3 May 2020), it is fair to ask whether a sense of unreality, depersonalization, or derealization has occurred, either in the therapist or patient, and if so, whether it is possible that therapists miss the human contact more than clients. We will mainly refer to clinical and personal experiences as our most precious guidelines.
... "The act of imagination is a magical act. It is an incantation, intended to make the object one thinks of, the thing one desires, appear in such a way that one can take possession of it" (Sartre, 2001). In relation to emotions this means: the act of imagination helps to visualize an emotion, to make it available to the consciousness, to make it appear in such a way that it can be visualized. ...
... The representations we encounter on the screen are still just props (Walton, 1990) that we need to invest with our imagination in order to interpret meaningfully as story--worlds we can inhabit and exert our agency in. Sartre (1995) calls the process of investment of a perceivable analogue with the imagination as "synthesis". Sartre (1967) and later, Iser (1991) have both commented on the importance of considering the role of the imagination to complete the creative act started by the author or designer: ...
... At the same time, I suggest that imagination's productive force emanates from its infinite temporality. That is, one can imagine the past, present, and future (see Cocking, 1991;Levy, 2013;Sartre, 1948). An aspect of this infinite temporality is imagination's subjunctive property-the what if, as if, once it is, maybe (see Turner, 1990, pp. 11-12). ...
I inquire into how memory-work can be a decolonial praxis by looking at Moro Islamic Liberation Front adherents' will to remember atrocities committed against Muslims in the Philippines as well as stories of survivance, and how these shape their struggle for the right to self-determination. I discuss how memory-work plays a significant role in their struggle, which can be seen as a movement towards what Adolfo Albán calls "re-existence." I further suggest that one way to consider the decolonial potential of memory-work is to be attentive to the co-implication of the past, present, and future in people's narratives and lives, and the dynamics of collective memory formation. This attentiveness would necessitate looking into the entanglement of memory with imagination, and how this entanglement implicates temporality, fellow-feeling, and action. Coming from anthropology, I look as well at some convergences between community psychology and anthropology in understanding the decolonial praxis of memory-work.
... This objection is most forcefully argued for byShannon Spaulding (2016). A similar point is made bySartre (1948).11 One example from the empirical literature is the availability heuristic, where how easy a certain scenario is to imagine is used as a heuristic for how likely that scenario is to obtain. ...
Imagination plays a rich epistemic role in our cognitive lives. For example, if I want to learn whether my luggage will fit into the overhead compartment on a plane, I might imagine trying to fit it into the overhead compartment and form a belief which is justified on the basis of this imagining. But what explains the fact that imagination has the power to justify beliefs, and what is the structure of imaginative justification? In this paper, I answer these questions by arguing that imaginings manifest an epistemic status: they are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. This epistemic status grounds their ability to justify beliefs, and they accrue this status in virtue of being based on evidence. Thus, imaginings are best understood as justified justifiers. I argue for this view by way of showing how it offers a satisfying explanation of certain key features of imaginative justification that would otherwise be puzzling. I also argue that imaginings exhibit a number of markers of the basing relation, which further motivates the view that imaginings can be based on evidence. The arguments in this paper have theoretically fruitful implications not only for the epistemology of imagination, but for accounts of reasoning and epistemic normativity more generally.
... Second, an abstract stimulus induces some sense of distance and dissociative feelings (Lindaeur, 1983) because it does not quite represent an object as it is seen in the real world. Some distance and dissociative feelings provide a condition conducive for symbolic imagination elicitation, where one needs to transcend the objective stimuli and create one's own interpretations of the product (Sartre, 1972). Therefore, the use of abstract stimuli in ads will generate more symbolic imagination. ...
This research builds on a study of advertisement-evoked imagination scale developed by Dewi and Ang (2015). The imagination scale contains four types of imagination, that is, benefit-anticipatory imagination, emotional-bonding imagination, symbolic imagination, and mind-wandering imagination.In this paper, the proposed constructs of the imagination types are related to other relevant constructs existing in marketing literature.The purpose of this research is twofold. First, it establishes the nomological validity of the imagination measures by placing it in the context of hedonic-utilitarian concepts proposed by Holbrook and Hirschman (1983). Second, the research empirically studies the effect of situational factor, that is concrete versus abstract advertisement execution, on imagination elicitation. The study is an experiment which employs mixed factor design involving eight sub-groups of participants. Results of the research demonstrate the nomological validity of the imagination scale where the four types of imagination were elicited in response to hedonic/utilitarian product depicted in the ad and situational factors (that is, abstract versus concrete ads).
... Determination, patience, and tenacity are characteristics of the courage to persevere through the paradoxical burden of being at ease with what is and what might or could be, "being-in-the-world" (HEIDEGGER, 1927) yet "withdrawingfrom-the-world" (SARTRE, 1948), and being patient with the emergent process of that which is yet-to-become. Peirce affirms that thoughts are enveloped in signs, where representamen, object, and interpretant are a triadic relation and mutually exchangeable. ...
Conhecer qualquer coisa sobre a realidade é fiar-se em signos, e viver a vida semioticamente é transformar a realidade através do design. De-sign é uma noção cunhada para introduzir a fusão de design e signos. No processo reiterativo de de-sign, não há separações ou limites absolutos entre o pensar e fazer como formas de conceber uma ação possível ou desenvolver ações posteriores. O livre movimento dentro de multiplicidades simultâneas, transcendendo a aparência das coisas e manipulando criativamente uma variedade de polaridades, é inerente ao design thinking e à interpretação semiótica. Envolver-se no processo de de-sign é perseverar por vários paradoxos. Crenças contraditórias e antinomias desconcertantes são intrínsecas ao De-sign; elas não são apenas aceitáveis, como também bem-vindas, se pudermos desenvolver a capacidade de perseverar através deles. Paradoxos não são resultado de um erro em nosso raciocínio, mas de um defeito na nossa capacidade de lidar com uma dissonância cognitiva. Através da máxima do pragmatismo, nossos pensamentos e ações podem ser determinados e podemos avaliar quão apropriadas são suas consequências. É aqui que o pragmatismo, como método de determinar o significado do De-sign, determina a congruência entre a intenção de nossos pensamentos e a adequação de nossas ações. Como o pragmatismo é um método de experimentação que revela a eficácia do pensamento e da ação, o De-sign exige perseverança. Perseverar nos paradoxos do De-sign é estar à vontade com o que é e o que pode ou poderia ser, estar à vontade com a ambiguidade e a incerteza e ter paciência com o processo emergente daquilo-que-ainda-está-tornando-se e, assim compartilhar com a Divindade o ato agapástico da criação.
... Jean Paul Sartre likewise argues that works of art are imaginary entities and holding an aesthetic object requires imaginative act of consciousness. However Sartre does not think works of art as imagined activities but rather unreal objects created and sustained by acts of imaginative consciousness, and existing only as long as they remain objects of such acts [5]. ...
Philosophers of different ages have made rigorous attempts to define art aiming to establish a set of characteristics applicable to all kinds of fine arts. However to point a definite meaning of art is elusive task. Similarly the question whether art can be didactic to provide knowledge, or insight is as old as philosophy itself. Art can be appreciated, enjoyed and loved for the powerful emotional values it reflects to the beholders. The production of art deals with creativity, imagination and innate ability of an artist. Art evolves from the culture that inspires artistic expression and art is born from the inner necessity of the artist. To determine the coherent ontological status of works of art has been a problematic issue despite the consistent philosophical practices. The metaphysical categorization of art as “the imaginary experience of the total activity" of the artist recreated by competent viewer is not all inclusive perception of art. The more liberal outlook of art as abstract cultural entities that are created at certain time through human activities seems convincing and relevant.
... Nevertheless, cultural psychology has developed an important reflection on imagination as developmental and social dynamic over the last five years. At the basis of creativity, imagination represents an ongoing process, a 'zone of proximal development' (Vygotsky, 2004) and 'expansion of human experience' (Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013), through which people can move from the immediate environs and present, distort what is the case (Preston, 1991) and reconfigure the world into what is not the case (Sartre, 1963). ...
... The treatment focused on developing effective emotional coping skills. All three participants reported decreased dissociative, PTSD, and depressive symptoms on the Dissociative Experiences Scale, 84 Impact Of Events Scale, 87 and the Beck Depression Inventory. 88 All participants also reported reduced panic and improved selfesteem, social life, and motivation to gain employment in the community. ...
Developmental trauma is associated with an increased risk of psychosis and predicts poor prognosis. Despite this association, little is known about which treatments work best for survivors of developmental trauma with psychosis. We sought to do the first review, to our knowledge, to investigate treatments for people with psychotic and dissociative symptoms who have a history of developmental trauma. We searched MEDLINE, PsychINFO, and Google Scholar for studies reporting psychological and pharmacological treatments of psychotic or dissociative symptoms in adult survivors of developmental trauma. We identified 24 studies, most of which investigated various modalities of psychotherapy with two case reports of pharmacological treatments. There is preliminary evidence in favour of third wave cognitive therapies. However, because of low methodological quality and reporting in most of the studies found, it remains unknown which treatments are most effective in this clinical group. Nonetheless, our findings of potential treatment targets, including emotion regulation, acceptance, interpersonal skills, trauma re-processing, and the integration of dissociated ego states, could guide future work in this area. Methodologically rigorous studies are needed to enable clinicians and patients to collaboratively form evidence-based treatment plans. Our Review is registered with PROSPERO, number CRD42018104533.
... looking at an image for as long as I wish: I will never find anything but what I put there" (Sartre, 1948). To the contrary, psychedelic imagery entails novelty, and many users are surprised to experience visions that they have never seen before (Shanon, 2002a). ...
Psychedelics can induce eyes-closed imagery in which various visions can be experienced. These visions vary from simple geometrical patterns, to more complex imagery, to full immersion within “other realms”. Past studies suggest that the visual cortex is involved in processing these visions, yet these studies were limited into investigation of activity. In this thesis, the aim was to expand on the involvement of the visual cortex by investigating processes that are beyond simple activation maps, such as functional connectivity and dynamics. In study 1, it was hypothesized that the visual cortex will show increased functional connectivity with many cortical and subcortical regions. This was investigated with 15 subjects that were scanned using fMRI under the influence of 75 µg of LSD or placebo. The results of this study showed increased resting state functional connectivity (RSFC) between the primary visual cortex and many cortical and subcortical regions. This result correlated with subjective ratings of psychedelic imagery and with occipital alpha power suppression measured with MEG, which is a reliable neural correlate of the intensity of the psychedelic state. It study 2, it was hypothesized that connectivity within the visual cortex would match its retinotopic architecture. Retinotopic mapping is the representation of the visual field (the world we observe) in the visual cortex – e.g. areas which are near to each other in the visual field will be near each other in the visual cortex. In this study, it was found that under LSD (same procedure as study 1), with eyes closed, connectivity patterns between different subregions of the visual cortex matched the retinotopic mapping of these regions, suggesting that the visual system behaves as if it is seeing spatially localized input, with eyes-closed under LSD. In study 3, it was hypothesized that during the onset phase of psychedelic imagery, the activation of subregions of the visual cortex will be from low level to high level areas, which is according to the subjective dynamics of the experience – i.e. from simple to complex. This was tested in 9 subjects that were scanned in the fMRI during the onset or “come-up” phase - i.e. 3 minutes post (1 min) infusion of 2mg psilocybin IV - which has a particularly fast onset. Results in this study revealed that during the onset phase the BOLD dynamics of regions within the ventral stream are organized by the hierarchy of regions. Overall, study 1 and 2 revealed that, with eyes closed, under LSD, communication patterns between visual cortex and the rest of the brain and within the visual cortex match the kind of processing known to occur during regular vision. This adds to a body of knowledge supporting the view that the visual cortex is particularly engaged under the influence of psychedelics, and by measuring patterns of connectivity, we were able to provide strong support for the view that abnormal activity in the visual cortex underlies psychedelic imagery.
What is the epistemic function of imagination? Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that the epistemic function of imagination is exhausted by its ability to provide justification for modal beliefs, or that it is epistemically irrelevant. However, in recent years a number of philosophers have broken with the tradition by arguing that imagination can generate justification or knowledge about contingent empirical facts. This paper argues against this view by developing a new dilemma. The upshot of the argument is that although imagination does have an important epistemic function that has evaded the traditional view, it cannot give rise to new empirical justification or knowledge.
The need to explore free will arises from continuous reflection and discussion about the nature of human existence and the ability of humans to make free decisions. This need is compounded by ambiguity in views and approaches to this concept and its meaning for various aspects of life. The examination of free will becomes relevant due to the need to understand the causes of actions, moral responsibility, and the possibilities of human influence on the world. This study was devoted to the disclosure of key aspects of free will through the analysis of historical and modern theories. In the course of the study, a literary analysis was involved, which included work with papers on related subjects. The conceptual analysis allowed defining and understanding the main concepts and terms of the subject under study. Comparative analysis was applied to the papers of other researchers who worked on the same or similar subjects to identify similarities and differences and determine prospects for future research in this area. The study shows that there are two main directions in this discussion: determinists believe that all events, including human actions, are predetermined, and compatibilists state that free will is compatible with determinism. The study provides a detailed analysis of deterministic and compatibilist concepts of free will. Arguments for and against free will, which indicate the influence of external factors on human choice, are considered. Through the analysis of historical and modern theories, the examination of various concepts and argumentation, this study identifies the main approaches to the interpretation of the concept of free will in the context of philosophical thought. The main results indicate the complexity and versatility of the concept of free will and the importance of considering various factors that influence human choice
The focus of the compositional approach presented in this folio is the sounding environment. The term sounding environment is used in this context to refer to the whole of our living experience in the world which we might register as relating to sound. It might include everything that is sounding, seemingly sounding, imagined sounding, remembered sounding, sensed as sounding, composed to sound. It includes thus the actual sound environment, all that is sensed or interpreted as sound and imaginary sounds. This dissertation accompanies the seven acousmatic and the two sound installation works included in the folio. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, relevant ideas and theories both from the literature of electroacoustic music composition and soundscape composition are discussed while in the second the compositional approach to the sounding environment is presented as applied to the works. 3
New Orleans jazz, Dixieland, Chicago jazz, swing, bebop, cool jazz, hard bop, and free jazz: up until today, the history of jazz is told as a “tradition” consisting of fixed components including a succession of jazz styles. How did this construction of music history emerge? What were the alternative perspectives? And why did the narrative of a fixed tradition catch on?
In this study, Mario Dunkel examines narratives of jazz history from the beginnings of jazz until the late 1950s. According to Dunkel, the jazz tradition is simultaneously an attempt to approach historical reality and the product of competition between different narratives and cultural myths. From the middlebrow culture of the 1920s to the New Deal, the African American civil rights movement and the role of the U.S. in the Cold War, Dunkel shows in detail how the jazz tradition, as a global narrative of the twentieth century, is intertwined with greater social and cultural developments.
Presentation context of the 2052 Report
Titanic implications?
Recognizing hidden dimensions -- the missing links?
Confidence and despair as existential indicators
Failure to integrate real-world dynamics
Global sensemaking and collective self-reflexivity
Misrepresentation of the 2052 Report?
Building with what is missing?
From appreciative inquiry to imaginative inquiry
Memetic warfare with aesthetic weapons?
Imaginative consciousness required to engage with the future?
Reframing the 2052 Report through imaginative inquiry
Re-imagining the future through the present: re-engaging Dreamtime
Extant criticism of crime and mystery fiction has indicated how protagonists have freedom of choice in dealing with difficult situations in different forms of risky or challenging settings. In this article, previous criticism is evaluated in terms of its reflection of an essential element of the human condition: the Self’s free will to construct the existential and spatial meanings of its phenomenological existence in relation to the Other. The article further indicates that protagonists tend to disregard their freedom and responsibility for their actions, especially when they make existential choices in traumatic or critical situations. Additionally, the dominance of others and variously suppressive spatial contexts can inhibit the protagonists from acknowledging their free will to act responsibly in order to reach their authentic existence. This article integrates Jean Paul Sartre’s concept of the human condition and the corresponding interpretative framework of spatial concepts from different thinkers, such as Edward Relph, Arnold van Gennep, Victor W. Turner and Mikhail M. Bakhtin, who emphasize the significance of places in the meaning-construction of the Self’s identity and its existence in relation to the Other. Through the integration of these theoretical frameworks, the portrayal of protagonists in contemporary crime and mystery novels is examined in order to illustrate individuals’ senses of freedom and responsibility for their own actions in existential and spatial contexts.
In this article, my purpose is to explore conversion in its onto-phenomenological structure. To this end, in the first section, I develop a notion of form of life as an ontological unit. That is, the totality of the possible actions of a subject according to the principle that drives him/her. In this way, the subject is the result of the actions that constitute the adopted form of life. In the second section, I hold that all conversion is precisely the passage from one form of life to another triggered by a crisis, and that if this requirement is not met, neither is there a conversion. This makes it possible to reduce any type of conversion, whether religious, moral, or intellectual, to a single onto-phenomenological structure based on the form of life as an ontological unit. And it even allows for the analysis of other phenomena in terms of conversion, such as the passage from one social group to another.
Visual perspective (first-person vs. third-person) is a salient characteristic of memory and mental imagery with important cognitive and behavioural consequences. Most work on visual perspective treats it as a unidimensional construct. However, third-person perspective can have opposite effects on emotion and motivation, sometimes intensifying these and other times acting as a distancing mechanism, as in PTSD. For this reason among others, we propose that visual perspective in memory and mental imagery is best understood as varying along two dimensions: first, the degree to which first-person perspective predominates in the episodic imagery, and second, the degree to which the self is visually salient from a third-person perspective. We show that, in episodic future thinking, these are anticorrelated but non-redundant. These results further our basic understanding of the potent but divergent effects visual perspective has on emotion and motivation, both in everyday life and in psychiatric conditions.
This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistemic relevance of imagination "under constraints" and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson's argument for justification by imagination.
How tight is the conceptual connection between imagination and perception? A number of philosophers, from the early moderns to present-day predictive processing theorists, tie the knot as tightly as they can, claiming that states of the imagination, i.e. mental imagery, are a proper subset of perceptual experience. This paper labels such a view ‘perceptualism’ about the imagination and supplies new arguments against it. The arguments are based on high-level perceptual content and, distinctly, cognitive penetration. The paper also defuses a recent, influential argument for perceptualism based on the ‘discovery’ that visual perception and mental imagery share a significant neural substrate: circuitry in V1, the brain’s primary visual cortex. Current neuropsychology is shown to be equivocal at best on this matter. While experiments conducted on healthy, neurotypical subjects indicate substantial neural overlap, there is extensive clinical evidence of dissociations between imagery and perception in the brain, most notably in the case of aphantasia.
In this paper we explore the notion of rehearsal as a way to develop an embodied and enactive account of imagining. After reviewing the neuroscience of motor imagery, we argue, in the context of performance studies, that rehearsal includes forms of imagining that involve motor processes. We draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of imagining which also suggests that imagining involves motor processes. This research in neuroscience and phenomenology, supports the idea of an embodied and enactive account of imagination.
The students of the present generation are the first in a long time who will not take their cultural identities from books. Statistics reveal that film, museum, concert, and sports attendances are up but that fewer and fewer people are reading books. Those strange moments in nineteenth-century novels when young heroes strike poses, dress, coif, and woo by the book are gone, perhaps forever. Our students are more likely to take their models from television, films, glossy magazines, video games, or the Abercrombie and Fitch catalog. My colleagues in the profession report that, thanks to the expansion of visual culture, students now possess an enviable talent for decoding images, often to the detriment of reading ability. To be frank, I am not so convinced: in my experience, the most literate students continue to be the best readers of images. But I agree that we are in the midst of an unprecedented explosion of visuality. A new era has dawned, and we are not prepared for it. We need to change our teaching and scholarship to keep up with our students.
This article proposes the vernacular as a discursive methodological entry point to Memory Studies. A bottom-up approach, this article theorizes memory and time starting from a close-reading of signifiers from the Filipino language, thus allowing its culture to be considered in its own terms first. The first part of the essay examines a set of terms that show equivalences with Western conceptions of memory. The second set of signifiers—( ma)tandà(an), agam, limot/limót and panahon—reveal that they are actually more illustrative of the current trend of movement in Memory Studies; and that they translate more accurately both the non-linear and linear dimensions of time. The third part of the article considers cultural concepts namely, kapwa, utang-na-loob, bayanihan, Manilaner, and desaparesidos, which challenge and enrich Trauma Studies’ Freudian and Holocaust-based history. With a perspective of memory and time from the Global South, this study also demonstrates how one can share space and time with (the wrath of) nature in a society of impunity while emphasising the importance of spirituality, humour, group culture, and hospitality. The existence of the Manilaners and the desaparecidos also shifts the perspective and experience of the Holocaust and the disappeared to a Filipino context.
Cultural sociologists have devised numerous theoretical tools for analyzing meaning making among individuals and groups. Yet, the cognitive processes which underpin these theories of meaning making are often bracketed out. Drawing on three different qualitative research projects, respectively on activists, religious communities, and gamers, this article synthesizes work in sociology, psychology, and philosophy, to develop a sociology of imagination. Current work highlights that (1) imagination is a higher order mental function, (2) powerful in its effects, which (3) facilitates intersub-jectivity, and (4) is socially constructive. However, sociology can additionally contribute to scholarly understandings of imagination, which have often focused on individ-ualistic mental imaging, by highlighting the degree to which (a) imagination allows individuals and groups to coordinate identities, actions, and futures, (b) imagination relies on widely shared cultural elements, and (c) imagination is often undertaken collectively, in groups. The article concludes with suggestions for future sociological work on imagination.
This article analyzes some of the advantages of corpus-based technology, one of the most modern methods of teaching, as an example of teaching Nouns in the Uzbek langguage. The results of the study show that the use of the electronic corpus gives more opportuneties for learners to learn Uzbek as a second language or as a foreign language, and the acquired knowledge is reinforced by the contextual patterns in the text. The learner also strengthens his /her knowledge by analyzing the content of the speech and communicating it in the context of the live speech before acquiring theoretical impression for language competence. The main purpose of our research is to propose the benefits and uses of corpus technology to create a pedagogical environment for language learning and teaching the language as an example Noun.
This introduction offers an editorial context and positioning for the collection of essays. It defines key terms such as exploring what is meant by ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’ in Rudolf Steiner’s and the editor’s thinking, and traces the beleaguered history of arts education in the UK from its inception to the present doldrums. Steiner’s commitment to interdisciplinary, ‘situated practice’ is then explored in relation to each chapter’s perspective within the book as a whole.
A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual condi-tionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can help us take advantage of justification that we already have, thereby enabling us to form new doxastically justified beliefs. More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition-which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification-but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position.
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