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31
Finnish Yearbook of Population Research XLIX 2014, pp. 31–55
Childlessness Intentions and Ideals in
Europe
ANNELI MIETTINEN
The Population Research Institute, Väestöliitto, Helsinki, Finland
IVETT SZALMA, Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS),
Lausanne Switzerland
Abstract
Using data from Eurobarometer Surveys 2001–2011 we examine trends and correlates
of childlessness intentions and ideals across Europe over the past decade. We
distinguish childlessness as a personal preference (personal ideal number of children
is zero) from intended childlessness (intention to have no children) as these reect
somewhat different dimensions of childlessness as a conscious decision. We nd
that, on average, childlessness as a personal preference is relatively rare in Europe,
although in some western European countries a sizeable proportion of young adults
express a desire to have no children. Intentional childlessness is slightly more common
than ideal childlessness is, since about 11% of currently childless young adults aged
18 to 40 years in Europe intend to have no children. We analyse factors related to
childlessness intentions and ideals on the individual and country levels. A weaker
individual socioeconomic position inuences the intention to remain childless through
various channels, such as unemployment or low socioeconomic status. Associations
between individual’s social position and ideal childlessness are less clear. Results also
indicate that macro-economic conditions do not have a direct impact on intentional
childlessness, whereas a higher prevalence of traditional family values in a country
is related to a lower likelihood of individuals considering childlessness to be their
ideal family form.
Keywords: childlessness, fertility intentions, fertility ideals, childfree, Euroba-
rometer
Introduction
Although an increasing number of studies focus on low fertility or postponement of
childbearing in contemporary Europe, studies on childlessness remain scarce. It is
widely assumed that childlessness among young adults is temporary, and is mainly
based on a decision not to bear children at a certain time while still planning to have
children at some point (Billari, Liefbroer & Philipov 2006; Kohler, Billari & Ortega
2002). Recent decades have witnessed, however, a marked increase in lifetime child-
32
lessness in many countries. Studies from the Netherlands, the UK, US, and Germany,
for instance, show that childlessness among women aged 45 or above is close to 20%
for cohorts born in the end of the 1960s (Dye 2010; Frejka 2008; Rowland 2007;
Smallwood 2002). In the younger cohorts, who have not yet passed their reproductive
ages, childlessness has increased considerably in the past two decades, reaching over
40% for women and 60% for men in their early thirties in some European countries
(Miettinen et al. 2014). Although many of the currently childless young adults will go
on to have children later, panel studies have shown that a considerable proportion of
such “postponers” fail to realize their reproductive plans (Spéder & Kapitàny 2014;
Szalma & Takàcs 2012; Lainiala 2012).
Most research has related delaying of parenthood to the increase of years spent in
education, the difculties to combine work and family life, or to growing economic
uncertainty in Europe, and often assumed that once the obstacles for childbearing
are removed, fertility will rise (Billari et al. 2006; Mills & Blossfeld 2005; Sobotka
2004). Less attention is paid to the role of childlessness as a conscious decision not
to have children in explaining fertility differentials. Some scholars do argue that as
childbearing decisions are increasingly based on individual preferences and choices,
also those who do not wish for children of their own can now more freely express their
preferences, leading to higher levels of voluntary childlessness (Tanturri & Mencarini
2008; Hakim 2000). Recent empirical research suggests that voluntary childlessness
is increasing among young adults (Sobotka 2009; Tanturri and Mencarini 2008; Abma
& Martinez 2006; Rindfuss et al. 1988). However, quantitative studies on trends or
correlates of voluntary childlessness are still scarce, and in most cases concern only
women (Tanturri & Mencarini 2008; Keizer, Dykstra & Jansen 2007; Gillespie 2003;
Hakim 2000; McAllister & Clarke 1998).
Here, we focus on childlessness intentions and ideals among young Europeans and
report ndings from the recent Eurobarometer survey in 2011. We distinguish child-
lessness as a personal preference (personal ideal number of children is zero) from
intended childlessness (intention to have no children) as these reect somewhat dif-
ferent dimensions of childlessness as a conscious decision. We compare the results
for 2011 with those of the previous Eurobarometers from 2001 and 2006 in order to
investigate changes in childlessness intentions among Europeans. Previous studies on
fertility ideals and intentions have suggested a gradual (Sobotka & Beaujouan 2014)
or marked decline (Testa 2012; Testa 2006; Goldstein, Lutz & Testa 2003) in average
family size ideals over the past two-three decades, but have not specically looked
at childlessness intentions and ideals, or factors related to them. Although the two-
child norm is rmly rooted in Europe and most other developed societies (Sobotka &
Beaujouan 2014; Testa 2012), persisting low fertility levels in many countries calls for
attention also on fertility desires which diverge from the two-child norm. In a recent
study Testa and Basten (2014) examined life-time fertility intentions among childless
33
men and women and one-child parents paying attention to the role of perceived eco-
nomic uncertainties in lowering fertility intentions or increasing their uncertainty. We
explore the association of several indicators of individuals’ socioeconomic position on
intended and ideal childlessness and investigate whether poorer social and economic
resources correlate with voluntary childlessness. We also ask how social context and
macro-economic conditions inuence childlessness intentions and ideals in Europe.
Current fertility trends suggest that childlessness is likely to have a greater role in
explaining low fertility levels in many European countries (Miettinen et al. 2014). In
the long run, the growing proportions of childless persons will pose extra challenges
for future ageing generations, a signicant minority of whom will have no adult chil-
dren or grandchildren to assist them and take care of them. Unwanted childlessness
can cause psychological distress and increase loneliness, affecting overall happiness
and wellbeing. However, it is not clear to what extent increases in childlessness rates
among young adults result from a deliberate choice to remain childless or from post-
ponement of parenthood, nor do we know much about factors contributing to voluntary
childlessness. In order to evaluate the potential scope for policy interventions aimed
to promote childbearing among young adults, it is important to gain information about
trends in voluntary childlessness, as well as understand reasons behind it.
Childlessness intentions and ideals
Childlessness in contemporary societies is a relatively new research topic and there is no
established theoretical framework for studying it. Previous studies have distinguished
childlessness as a voluntary decision from involuntary childlessness, although there is
considerable ambiguity in how these two are dened. Sometimes the latter is dened
narrowly as a physiological inability to have children (infecundity), leaving the former
to cover all other variants of childlessness. Some researchers understand voluntary
childlessness to mean a conscious decision never to have children, which may or may
not be tied to physiological infecundity, or to living in a union (Carmichael & Whittaker
2007; Park 2005; Hakim 2003; Veevers 1980), while others view not living in a union
as one form of involuntary childlessness (Bongaarts 2001). The role of physiological
infecundity in distinguishing involuntary from voluntary childlessness has also become
less clear with the increasing availability of infertility treatments.
Factors related to lifetime childlessness may differ from those which explain con-
scious decision not to have children while still being biologically able to have them.
Traditional reasons – permanent sterility or living without a partner – may still affect
childlessness intentions among young adults, although today’s pathways to choosing
childlessness can vary considerably (Tanturri & Mencarini 2008; Keizer et al. 2007).
Some may forgo parenthood after a series of decisions to postpone childbearing, since
the appropriate moment for a child never arrives. Childlessness may originate from
34
postponing parenthood in order to avoid conicts between parenthood and education
or employment, and only gradually evolve into a conscious decision not to have chil-
dren (Berrington 2004; Smallwood and Jeffries 2003; McAllister & Clarke 1998). For
some, a decision to have no children can be the consequence of considering the current
life situation unsuitable for, or incompatible with having children – such as not living
in a union, or living with a same-sex partner, or due to health reasons – while others
believe that parenting would conict with other goals in life or life style (Carmichael
& Whittaker 2007; Park 2005; Hakim 2003; Hakim 2000). In these cases, the decision
whether to have children or not may be shifting and persons may situate themselves in
the middle of the continuum of parenting choice (Letherby 1999). For others, on the
other hand, a preference for a child-free life style or an intention to remain childless
may be more constant, originating already at an early age (Gillespie 2003; Hakim
2003; Hakim 2000).
Quantitative studies on voluntary childlessness are scarce and information on demo-
graphic or social factors associated with it remains scattered and sometimes contradic-
tory. Previous research has suggested that childlessness as a conscious choice is more
common among men, highly educated women, urban residents, higher income groups,
and among persons who are less religious and hold less traditional family views, or live
in more egalitarian relationships (Tanturri & Mencarini 2008; Abma & Martinez, 2006;
Hakim 2003; Heaton et al. 1999). A preference for childlessness has also been found
to be linked with own childhood experiences, living without siblings in particular (Mi-
ettinen 2010; Tanturri & Mencarini 2008; Parr 2005; Kiernan 1989). The role of early
socialization in explaining voluntary childlessness is also stressed in Hakim’s preference
theory (2003; 2000) which maintains that individuals develop already at an early age
preferences regarding family and work, and those who are more work-oriented are more
likely to choose childlessness. Recently, some studies have stressed the role of structural
factors and experiences during (young) adulthood, such as increasing difculties to
combine work and family, or increasing opportunity costs related to childbearing as well
as growing uncertainty of employment, for explaining childlessness (Testa & Basten
2014; Miettinen 2010; Tanturri & Mencarini 2008; Weston & Qu 2001).
We distinguish intentional childlessness and childlessness as a personal preference (ideal)
although we regard them both as dimensions of childlessness by choice. Fertility ideals
are considered to reect personal attitudes and disposition towards (having) children, as
well as general societal acceptance of a “childfree” lifestyle, whereas fertility intentions
are presumed to reect actual reproductive behavior, taking into account both individual
desires and perceived opportunities and constraints (Hagewen & Morgan 2005; Schoen
et al. 1999; Rindfuss, Morgan & Swicegood 1988). By separating childlessness inten-
tions and ideals we can evaluate if these two dimensions of voluntary childlessness are
associated with the same socio-demographic factors. In most societies, childlessness as a
personally preferred life choice has been stigmatized, which is likely to create normative
35
barriers for expressing zero children as personal ideal (Merz and Liefbroer 2012; Park
2002; Letherby 1999). Thus we expect that preferences for childlessness are likely to
be inuenced more by individual and societal norms and values than by the economic
or employment situation of an individual. In contrast, socio-economic resources may
be more important in predicting intentions to remain childless.
Data and methods
Fertility preferences have been measured in international social surveys including the
ISSP, the Eurobarometer, and in panel studies such as the European Household Panel
(Sobotka & Beaujouan 2014; Testa 2012; Goldstein et al. 2003). In this study, we use
the family planning module of the Eurobarometer survey to study childlessness inten-
tions and ideals among men and women aged 18–40 years. Eurobarometer surveys are
particularly well-suited for the international comparison on fertility issues as the survey
design is controlled and the wording of questions on fertility desires and intentions is
equivalent over the years and across countries. Although the number of respondents
from each country is not very high, around 1,000 persons, stratied sampling and the
use of weights allow us to have fairly reliable estimates on childlessness intentions
for all countries as well as for sub-groups broken down by sex, age and parity. For
the descriptive part of our study, we have included data from the Swiss Household
Panel (SHP, 2011) for Switzerland. SHP2011 survey contained a module on fertility
and family planning so that comparable estimates on the prevalence of childlessness
desires and intentions for Switzerland could be obtained.
Childbearing (and childlessness) intentions were measured with the Eurobarometer
question on the number of children intended. Respondents who did not have children
and did not intend to have children (but whose personal ideal may or may not have
been zero children) represent intended childlessness. Question on personal ideal family
size was used to measure childlessness as a preferred family form, i.e. respondents
who regarded zero children as their ideal number of children represent childlessness
as ideal. Childlessness ideal (personal ideal 0 children) represents relatively stable
(negative) attitudes towards childbearing, which often (but not necessarily) result in
a decision not to have children. By contrast, childlessness intentions are assumed to
be more reective of life circumstances, such as poor economic conditions, health
concerns, or not living in a (heterosexual) union, which may inhibit childbearing. A
person may also prefer childlessness but still have children. The proportion of these
‘reluctant parents’ among Eurobarometer 2011 respondents was very low, less than
1
%, and are not further analysed here.
Obviously, using only two survey questions to measure ideal/intentional aspects of
childlessness does not provide a full picture of how individuals end up choosing
childlessness. We nevertheless expect that the ability to present comparable
36
gures for childlessness intentions and ideals across a number of countries and
over time will partly compensate for the limitations in our dependent variables.
Although the questions on personal ideal family size and intention to have (more)
children have been almost identical in the Eurobarometer 2001–2011 family planning
modules, the response options and their impact on our intended or ideal childlessness
estimations deserve some attention. Firstly, it is not always self-evident how uncertainty
in intentions and preferences should be treated. Eurobarometer surveys have provided
the option “don’t know” in the question on personal ideal number of children. In
EB2006 and EB2011 surveys an additional option “there is no ideal number, it depends”
was included. This diminished somewhat the proportions of “don’t know” responses
in EB2006 and EB2011 compared to EB2001. Over the survey waves, however, the
proportion of ambivalent respondents (either “don’t know”, or “it depends”) in the age
group 18–40 years has remained below 10%. In the question concerning childbearing
intentions, “don’t know” responses are more frequent, or 12–14% in EB2006 and
EB2011, and as high as 17% in EB2001. We decided to include uncertain responses
into our analyses, regarding them as ideals or intentions above zero. Since our focus
is on the explicit ideal or intended childlessness, we assumed that an interpretation
of uncertainty as an expression of a preference for, or intention to have children (vs.
not to have) but unable to say how many, could be justied. In practice, this reduces
the proportions of intended/ideal childlessness in EB2011 and EB2006 a little, and
somewhat more in EB2001. We also conducted additional analyses excluding uncertain
respondents to examine robustness of our results.
Secondly, EB survey documents do not provide any information on how the interview-
ers were instructed to treat responses providing a range for an ideal or intended number
of children instead of a single value. It is possible that if respondents were pushed to
pick only one number, they were more likely to choose socially acceptable values,
thus again diminishing the proportions of ideal/intended childlessness.
For analysing our data sets, multiple methods were applied. First, we provide descriptive
statistics comparing the frequencies of childlessness ideals and intentions by gender across
countries using data from Eurobarometer waves 2001, 2006 and 2011. At the next stage,
explanatory models were constructed by applying multilevel logistic regression. Here, we
investigate the impact of demographic and social factors on childlessness intentions and
ideals using data from Eurobarometer 2011. The argument for using multilevel regression
models is that citizens of a given country would not necessarily form views independent
from each other according to the dimension of the dependent variable. Applying multilevel
models have the advantage of recognizing the partial interdependence of individuals within
the same group, or citizens within the same country in our case. In addition, they allow
us to investigate the impact of contextual (here country-level) factors on our outcome
variables. The analyses are carried out using xtmelogit procedure with STATA12.
37
Childlessness ideals in Europe
We rst look at the prevalence of childlessness ideals in Europe. As seen from Figure
1, childlessness as a preferred family form is relatively rare among 18–40-year old
adults in Europe, ranging from below 1% to around 6% in most countries, with an
overall average of 4.2% for men, and 2.9% for women in EB2011. Childlessness is
rarely considered ideal in many eastern European countries and relatively infrequently
(<=2%) in Ireland, France and Portugal. In contrast, the proportion of young adults
who consider zero children their ideal is considerably higher, around 10%, among
men in East-Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, and around 8% among women in
East- and West-Germany and Switzerland. Dutch men show the highest rates of child-
lessness preferences in Europe in 2011, with 16% of men in the age group of 18–40
years indicating that they would prefer to have no children. On average, men consider
childlessness ideal only a little more often than do women in EU15 countries (6% vs.
4%), while there is no difference between sexes in eastern European countries (men
2%, women 1.6%).
The average proportions of young adults who prefer childlessness were almost the same,
or 4.3% for men, and 3.2% for women in the 2006 Eurobarometer survey (EU27, results
not shown). Most of the countries exhibiting higher rates of preferred childlessness in
EB2011 (Austria, Netherlands, Luxembourg, West- and East-Germany) had also higher
proportions of young adults who considered childlessness ideal in one or both of the previ-
ous Eurobarometer surveys in 2001 and 2006 (see also Testa 2006; Goldstein et al. 2003).
Figure 1. Childlessness ideals among 18–40 year old men and women (% of
all men/women in the age group 18–40 who considered zero children their ideal
family size). Eurobarometer 2011.
Source: Eurobarometer 2011 and Swiss Household Panel (for Switzerland). Authors’ calculations.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Bulgaria
Latvia
Lithuania
CzechR
Slovenia
Romania
Ireland
France
Estonia
Portugal
Hungary
Cyprus
Greece
Slovakia
Denmark
Malta
Sweden
Italy
Poland
Germany‐W
Spain
Finland
Germany‐T
Belgium
UK
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Germany‐E
Austria
Netherlands
%of18‐40‐yearoldpersons
Men Women
38
Intended childlessness in Europe
In Table 1 we present gures for intended childlessness across countries in Europe,
and over the consecutive Eurobarometer surveys. On average, intentional childless-
ness is not very common among young adults in Europe, although it is more common
than childlessness as a preferred family form. Figures from the recent Eurobarometer
survey from 2011 show that in most European countries 90–95 % of men and women
aged 18–40 years either already have children or intend to have children sometime in
the future. On average (EU27), 7% of men and 5.2% of women in the age group 18–40
years intend to remain childless. There is, however, considerable country variation in
childlessness intentions. The proportion of men in the age group 18–40 years who in-
tend to remain childless is above 10% in Austria, Spain and Sweden. In East-Germany,
Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands the rates of intentional childlessness
among 18–40-year old men exceed 15% in EB2011. For women, the highest rates of
intended childlessness are observed in Belgium, East-Germany, Luxembourg, Swit-
zerland, the Netherlands, and the UK, with values varying between 10% and 14%.
Intentional childlessness is relatively low in eastern and central-Europe, ranging from
below 1% to around 5% for both men and women. In this region, only Romanian men
show somewhat higher childlessness intentions (7.3%, EB2011).
There is no clear trend in the rates of intended childlessness in Europe over the past
decade. On average (EU27), the rates of intended childlessness vary around 7% for
men and around 5% for women in EB2011 and in EB2006. For EU15, the average
rates of intended childlessness are slightly higher, or around 9% for men and around
7% for women with no marked change across the three Eurobarometer waves. As with
childlessness ideals, countries with high proportions of intentional childlessness in the
previous Eurobarometer surveys from 2006 and 2001 (Austria, East and West Germany,
and the Netherlands, and in EB2006 Luxembourg) continue to show clearly above-
European average proportions of young adults who do not plan to become parents.
However, for men and women Austria and men in West-Germany, rates of intentional
childlessness seem to have decreased since the 2006 survey, whereas in Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg intended childlessness has increased since 2006.
Despite considerable economic and political changes in recent decades there is no sign
of an increase in childlessness intentions in the eastern European countries. Rather, as
suggested also with the very low levels of childlessness ideals (Figure 1), young women
and men in eastern European countries seem to have preserved the social norm that
every person (woman) should have at least one child (Regusevskaya et al 2013; Merz
& Liefbroer 2012). The overall decline in mean ideal family sizes (see Testa 2012)
in many of these countries thus appears to be a consequence of a decrease in higher
parity ideals rather than of an increase in ideal, or intended childlessness.
Southern European countries do not exhibit any clear trend in intended childlessness
either. In Greece, a slight upward trend over the past decade appears, and also men
39
in Italy and Spain show relatively high values in intended childlessness in the recent
EB2011 survey. Intentional childlessness has remained on a relatively low level in
northern European countries, with the exception of Swedish men, among whom in-
tended childlessness reached 11% in the EB2011 survey.
Table 1. Intention to have no children among 18–40-year old persons by gender and country
(% of the age group). Eurobarometer surveys 2001, 2006 and 2011.
Men Women
2011 2006 2001 2011 2006 2001
Central Europe
Austria 13.4 22.4 11.7 9.2 16.6 13.5
Germany-T 10.0 10.1 19.4 9.2 8.5 8.9
Germany-W 8.5 11.2 20.5 8.6 8.4 9.3
Germany-E 15.1 5.9 15.3 11.2 8.6 7.0
Switzerland 15.0 14.6
West Europe
Belgium 9.8 6.2 14.2 11.7 9.8 3.9
France 4.5 5.3 5.4 2.4 3.8 1.5
Ireland 3.7 7.8 13.0 3.7 7.4 10.5
Luxembourg 16.3 7.4 6.9 12.9 8.9 5.2
Netherlands 19.1 13.1 11.1 10.2 5.4 13.5
UK 9.8 11.6 4.6 10.0 4.7 3.0
Central-East Europe
Bulgaria 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.9
Croatia 2.5 1.1
Czech R 3.7 6.1 2.6 1.2
Hungary 5.9 5.0 5.6 2.4
Poland 5.6 2.5 2.6 1.8
Romania 7.3 6.6 4.8 7.6
Slovakia 3.6 6.2 1.6 6.2
Slovenia 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.0
North-East Europe
Estonia 4.0 5.1 0.5 1.9
Latvia 4.8 6.9 3.4 6.7
Lithuania 4.7 0.8 2.0 1.5
South Europe
Cyprus 2.9 4.7 6.0 1.4
Greece 5.7 2.6 2.6 8.5 2.3 2.4
Italy 9.3 6.1 5.2 4.2 7.6 5.9
Malta 6.4 10.2 3.7 4.6
Portugal 5.0 8.1 5.8 4.9 4.9 3.5
Spain 10.7 8.3 7.1 4.0 7.6 4.1
North Europe
Denmark 6.1 4.6 8.4 5.5 4.8 4.4
Finland 7.0 3.2 7.3 5.3 7.9 4.6
Sweden 11.2 4.7 3.3 5.2 2.9 4.2
N 4373 4332 3180 4959 5620 3495
EU15 9.1 8.4 9.1 7.0 6.9 6.1
EU27 (excl. Croatia and Switzerland)
7.0 6.8 - 5.2 5.4 -
Note: EU-averages are calculated by using weights for individual countries, not EU27 or EU15 total.
Source: Eurobarometer 2001, 2006 and 2011, and Swiss Household Panel (for Switzerland). Authors’
calculations.
40
Data from the Swiss Household Panel suggest that the central-European pattern of
high rates of childlessness intentions is particularly manifest in German-speaking
countries. It has been suggested that the low fertility desires observed in these countries
could result from the almost three-decades-long period of markedly low fertility in
the late 20th century, with young generations growing up in families with only one or
two children, and thereby adopting a small-family preference themselves (Lutz et al.
2005; Goldstein et al. 2003). While this socialization hypothesis may in part explain
the recent increase of childlessness intentions also in Italy (men), Spain (men) and
Greece (women) – countries in which fertility levels fell considerably in the 1980s and
have remained low ever since – it is less likely to explain the increase in childlessness
intentions in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Sweden (for men) where a similar
drop in fertility has not been observed.
The relatively small increases in proportions of intended childlessness may reect
variation in the share of childless respondents in the surveys over time. Since our
measure of intended childlessness included persons who did not have children and who
did not intend to have any, underestimation of actual childlessness in the surveys can
depress rates of intended childlessness in the total population aged 18–40 years. The
Eurobarometer 2006 is considered to potentially underestimate actual childlessness
among respondents especially in Germany, pushing up the values of ideal number of
children (Testa 2006). Thus the marked decrease in the intended childlessness rates
in EB2006 as compared to EB2001 in Germany (men) could be a consequence of dif-
ferences in the sample composition. For East-Germany, differences in the sample size
(1,000 persons in EB2001, but 500 in the later surveys) may have also contributed to
the considerable uctuation in the rates of intended childlessness (see also Testa 2006).
Compared to the EB2006 survey, the proportion of actual childless respondents has in-
creased in most western European countries in the recent EB2011 survey. This concerns
also East- and West-Germany, Luxembourg, the UK and the Netherlands and, to a lesser
extent, Austria and Sweden. The growth of intentional childlessness from 2006 to 2011
(in East-Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but not in Austria or West-
Germany (men), where intended childlessness has decreased since the EB2006 survey) may
thus partly result from changes in the sample composition. Likewise, substantial decreases
in the proportions of currently childless respondents in the EB2011 survey compared to
the previous EB2006 survey may contribute to the fact that intended childlessness has
remained low or even decreased in Ireland, Hungary, Poland and Portugal since 2006.
Given that the proportions of intentionally childless are likely to reect in part differenc-
es in the proportions of childless respondents in each national surveys, in Figure 2 we
depict the proportions of currently childless women and men (of all respondents aged
18–40 years) in EB2011 as well as the proportions of persons (of all respondents in the
age group) who do not intend to have any children. This allows us to see how large a
fraction of current childlessness is explained by denitive (intentional) childlessness.
41
For the majority of childless young Europeans, current childlessness appears to be
temporary, caused by a postponement of childbearing to a more suitable time (Figure
2). On average (EU27), 11% of currently childless women and men aged 18–40 years
intend to remain childless. Among EU15 countries, denitive childlessness is somewhat
on a higher level, with 14% of childless men, and 15% of childless women intending
never to have children. The share of intentional childlessness is notably high among
childless women in the UK, Belgium, East-Germany, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg, where 17–27% of the currently childless women intend to have no children.
For men, denitive childlessness among currently childless persons reaches 17–27%
in East-Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, and Sweden.
Figure 2. Proportions of currently childless women and men of all women/men
aged 18–40 years, divided into temporary and denitive childlessness, Euroba-
rometer 2011.
(Countries are arranged in accordance with the proportion of childless women among the
respondents)
Denitive childlessness = proportion of childless persons who intend to have no children (of
all persons in the age group)
Temporary childlessness = proportion of childless persons who intend to have children in the
future (of all persons in the age group)
Source: Eurobarometer 2011 and Swiss Household Panel 2011 (for Switzerland). Authors’
calculations.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Hungary
Portugal
Bulgaria
UK
Ireland
CzechR
Latvia
Poland
France
Slovakia
Lithuania
Finland
Spain
Denmark
Romania
Belgium
Malta
Luxembourg
Sweden
Slovenia
Germany‐E
Germany‐T
Germany‐W
Austria
Greece
Italy
Cyprus
Switzerland
Netherlands
%
Wome n
Definitivechildlessness Temporarychildles sness
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Hungary
Portugal
Bulgaria
UK
Ireland
CzechR
Latvia
Poland
France
Slovakia
Lithuania
Finland
Spain
Denmark
Romania
Belgium
Malta
Luxembourg
Sweden
Slovenia
Germany‐E
Germany‐T
Germany‐W
Austria
Greece
Italy
Cyprus
Switzerland
Netherlands
%
Men
Definitivechildlessness Temporarychildles sness
42
The impact of individual and country-level factors on child-
lessness intentions and ideals
Next, multilevel logistic regression random intercept models were applied to investigate
the effects of individual- and country-level factors on intended and ideal childlessness
among 18–40-year old childless adults, using data from the Eurobarometer 20111. Mul-
tilevel models are appropriate because of the hierarchical data structure with individual
respondents being nested within countries. Given that national samples in the Euroba-
rometer surveys are relatively small, and rates of intended and ideal childlessness are
low in most countries, performing separate analyses to investigate factors associated
with childlessness intentions or ideals for each country would not be meaningful. While
allowing us to draw conclusions on individual characteristics related to intentional/ideal
childlessness using pooled data, multilevel models provide an opportunity to incorporate
country-level factors into our analyses. Our analytical sample consists of 2,701 childless
men and 2,131 childless women from 27 countries (Germany is here treated as united).
By including contextual data we aim to investigate whether macro-economic conditions
or normative climate on societal level inuence young adults’ childbearing intentions
and ideals over individual-level effects of own employment situation, socioeconomic
background or education. It has been suggested that poor economic conditions on
macro-level could depress fertility intentions among all young adults in a country, not
only those who are themselves affected by unemployment or temporary employment
contracts (Testa & Basten 2014; Goldstein et al. 2003). Likewise, a societal accept-
ance of non-traditional family forms should provide more freedom to express fertility
attitudes and desires which diverge from the general norm, manifested in higher levels
of voluntary childlessness in countries with less conservative family ideologies (Merz
& Liefbroer 2012).
As individual-level demographic factors, we use gender, age, union status (living in
marital/cohabiting union – not in union), and place of residence (large town/city –
other) which previous research has frequently shown to affect fertility behavior and
attitudes. Individual-level socio-economic indicators include educational attainment
(low= ISCED 0–2; middle-level=ISCED 3–4; high=ISCED 5–6), self-assessed so-
cioeconomic status (5 categories from low to high) and a measure of the nancial
situation of the household (4 categories ranging from “very good” to “very bad”, a
higher value indicating poorer conditions). We created a four-category measure for
employment status to cover different kinds of uncertainties related to employment.
Our measure combines information about the economic activity of the respondent as
well as about perceived uncertainty of personal employment situation differentiating
between those who are employed and who regard their employment situation as good
1 We could not use pooled data from the EB waves 2001, 2006 and 2011 because they did not include
all variables of interest, and the educational level was measured differently.
43
or rather good (1), those who are employed but regard their employment situation as
bad or rather bad (2), unemployed or inactive persons (3), and students (4). We expect
that poorer socioeconomic resources, measured by a lower educational level, lower
socioeconomic status, poor attachment to the labour market (not being employed, or
employment situation poor), and dissatisfaction with the nancial resources of the
household are associated with a higher likelihood of intending to remain childless
as well as preferring childlessness (voluntary childlessness). However, since we pre-
sumed that fertility intentions are likely to reect perceived opportunities and costs
of childbearing more than fertility ideals do, we expect that the association between
poor socioeconomic resources and childlessness intentions is stronger than their as-
sociation with childlessness ideals. Previous research has suggested that the effects of
economic activity and educational attainment, in particular, on childbearing intentions
and behaviors vary between men and women, and therefore we tested for interactions
between gender and socioeconomic resources.
As country-level factors, we incorporated information about the rates of female ter-
tiary education, the economic situation of the country, and prevalence of traditional
family values (see Table 2 for country-level factors). The proportion of women with
tertiary level education in 2010 (in the age group 25–34 years, drawn from Eurostat
Educational Attainment Statistics) measures overall levels of educational attainment
among young adults, as well as women’s position in a country. We expect that a high
overall level of educational attainment in a country is related to a higher acceptance
of non-traditional family forms, including childlessness as a conscious choice, and
thus, is positively associated with the intention to remain childless, as well as with
the preference of 0 children. In addition, increasing female education is also likely to
increase general awareness of the (potential) conict between work and family life,
which in turn can decrease childbearing desires and intentions among young adults.
Unemployment rates for 15–39-year olds in 2011 (drawn from Eurostat Labour Force
Statistics) measure both the economic situation of a country as well as, specically,
the employment situation of young adults. We assume that a higher unemployment
rate in a country is related to increased likelihood of individuals deciding to remain
childless, while its association with preferring childlessness is likely to be less strong.
In preliminary analyses we also tested a more direct measure of the economic situa-
tion in a country (change in GDP during 2008–2010), but found no signicant effects.
The prevalence of traditional family values is measured by the proportion of respond-
ents agreeing with the claim “children are important for a successful marriage”, in
European Values Study 2008–2010. We expect that this measure is positively related to
childbearing intentions (e.g. intention to have at least one child) and ideals above zero.
We also included a fourth country-level factor, a dichotomy for state-socialist countries
and others, to control for the low prevalence of intentional or ideal childlessness in
eastern European countries and to study independent effects of other country-level
44
factors. We assume that the impacts of unemployment rates and the level of female
tertiary education are more apparent for birth intentions rather than for fertility ideals
while at the same time social norms are more important predictors of childlessness
ideals than they are for intended childlessness.
Table 2. Overview of the country-level factors used in the multi-level analyses.
Source: Eurostat Educational Attainment 2010 (the proportion of women with tertiary level education
in the age group 25–34); Labour Force Statistics 2011 (unemployment rate of 15–39-year olds);
European Values Study 2008–2010 (the proportion of respondents agreeing with ‘children are
important for a successful marriage’). Authors’ calculations.
Women with tertiary
level education, %
(in age group
25-34 years)
Unemployment
rate among
15-39-year
olds
Importance of
children for a
successful
marriage, %
agreeing
Central Europe Austria 22.6 5.9 51.4
Germany-T 27.5 8.2 45.6
West Europe Belgium 49.4 11.4 49.0
France 47.2 12.4 63.6
Ireland 54.7 17.1 58.0
Luxembourg 46.0 5.6 55.3
Netherlands 43.6 5.4 45.4
UK 43.6 10.9 50.2
Central-East Europe Bulgaria 35.6 12.6 78.1
Czech R 25.4 8.7 62.8
Hungary 31.2 13.5 77.9
Poland 44.7 11.9 57.9
Romania 22.6 10.0 68.5
Slovakia 29.8 17.3 80.9
Slovenia 40.3 9.7 68.9
North-East Europe Estonia 48.3 18.6 61.2
Latvia 45.6 22.7 65.6
Lithuania 54.8 20.8 58.4
South Europe Cyprus 53.7 8.0 81.7
Greece 36.0 17.6 77.2
Italy 25.1 12.7 60.6
Malta 28.1 8.0 55.9
Portugal 31.5 12.9 48.0
Spain 46.4 24.0 62.8
North Europe Denmark 44.3 9.8 34.8
Finland 47.8 11.1 45.7
Sweden 48.9 12.4 45.9
45
Table 3a presents the estimations obtained from multilevel models for intended child-
lessness. Our dependent variable is dichotomous with 0=respondent intends to have
children, 1=intends to have no children. Table 3b shows the same for childlessness
ideals, with a dichotomy 0=respondent’s ideal 1+ children, 1=ideal 0 children. Model
0 is the intercept-only model, testing for the country-level variance, and in the column
“Model I” we present the effects of each individual socioeconomic and country-level
variable on fertility intentions and ideals on their own, adjusting for demographic fac-
tors (gender, age, place of residence, union). Model I thus summarizes results from
several models. As the socioeconomic factors are likely to overlap at least partly,
Model I allows us to see their independent associations with childbearing intentions
and ideals. Model II then includes all individual-level factors in the same model, and
Model III and Model IV further include country-level factors.
For childbearing intentions, Model 0 shows a statistically signicant country-level
variance (0.292, p<0.01), justifying also the use of multilevel models (Table 3a). Model
II shows which of the individual-level characteristics predicted the intention to remain
childless once they were included in the analyses jointly. Increasing age and not liv-
ing in a union increased the odds for intending to remain childless while differences
between men and women or between urban or non-urban residents were not, or only
marginally statistically signicant. Education was negatively associated with the odds
of intending to remain childless, i.e. less-educated persons were more likely to intend
to remain childless compared to middle-level or highly educated persons. Once we
controlled for self-assessed social status, the impact of middle-level education became
statistically insignicant. Since the effect of education reects also differential pace in
the postponement of parenthood, the negative effect of higher education on childless-
ness intentions is partly a result of selection. In each age group, there are more persons
who are yet to start their family formation process, and intend to have children among
the highly educated persons compared to less-educated men and women, among whom
many who intended to have children have already become parents.
Uncertainty of employment was signicantly related to birth intentions. Unemployed
or inactive persons had lower odds of intending to become parents compared to em-
ployed persons who regarded their work situation as good. The negative impact of a
bad employment situation (employed but perceiving own employment situation poor)
on childbearing intentions was statistically signicant only among men (results from
a model including gender interactions are not shown), and its impact diminished after
including measures for nancial situation of the household and social strata in the
model. This suggests that uncertainties related to employment among those who are
employed inuence birth intentions through their impact on household nances, which
in turn are related to how people position themselves in the social scale. However,
higher socioeconomic position increased intentions to become a parent independently
of the nancial situation of the household (Table 3a shows only the nal models). We
46
also tested for gender differences in the impacts of socioeconomic status, education
and employment situation, but found no signicant effects besides the above men-
tioned difference between men and women in the impact of bad employment situation
on childlessness intentions (results not shown). Thus, controlling for country-level
variance in childlessness intentions, we found that poor individual socio-economic
resources, measured by lower educational level, low socioeconomic position or not
being employed, or for men, employment situation being poor, were associated with
an increased risk of intending to remain childless.
In Model III we included country-level factors (Table 3a). Inclusion of these reduced
the level 2 variance (variance between countries) substantially. Somewhat surprisingly,
country-level unemployment rate was negatively associated with intentions to remain
childless. Thus, although the impact of one’s own unemployment on childbearing in-
tentions was negative as we had expected, higher unemployment among young adults
in a country did not depress individual childlessness intentions. On the other hand, the
share of tertiary-level educated women failed to have any signicant association with
individual childbearing intentions. We had expected that a higher (female) educational
level would be related to more liberal norms and awareness of work and family incom-
patibility and hence to higher odds of intentional childlessness, but found no such effect.
Country-level adherence to traditional family values, measured by the importance of
children to a marriage, was associated with lower odds of intending to remain child-
less. Controlling for state-socialist countries (Model IV, Table 3a) made the impact of
unemployment rates statistically insignicant.
47
Table 3a. Differences in intended childlessness explained by individual characteristics and country-level factors, multilevel
logistic regression (random intercept model). Childless men and women aged 18–40 years, Eurobarometer 2011 (N=4,553)
Childbearing intentions (0=intends to have children, 1=doesn’t intend to have children). Estimates above 0 indicate a higher likelihood of
intending to remain childless.
Model 0 Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se
Intercept -2.122 0.116 -2.360 0.166 -2.213 0.223 -2.216 0.205 -2.032 0.215
Fixed effects: Individual char
acteristics
Sex: Female 0.115 0.096 0.167+ 0.098 0.164+ 0.098 0.160 0.098
Age: 18-26 -0.685*** 0.112 -0.761*** 0.129 -0.760*** 0.129 -0.755*** 0.129
Age: 35-40 1.024*** 0.125 1.023*** 0.128 1.023*** 0.128 1.021*** 0.128
Union status: Not in union 0.346*** 0.104 0.319** 0.106 0.317** 0.106 0.312** 0.106
Urban: Small town/rural area 0.166 0.102 0.076 0.105 0.077 0.105 0.077 0.105
Education: middle level -0.282* 0.125 -0.179 0.129 -0.176 0.128 -0.178 0.128
Education: high level -0.674*** 0.152 -0.479** 0.160 -0.478** 0.160 -0.482** 0.160
Economic activity: employment situation poor 0.253 0.157 0.099 0.170 0.120 0.170 0.123 0.170
Economic activity: unemployed 0.536*** 0.135 0.304* 0.152 0.306* 0.152 0.310* 0.152
Economic activity: student 0.096 0.147 0.071 0.151 0.065 0.151 0.073 0.151
Financial situation of the household 0.231*** 0.069 0.013 0.080 0.033 0.080 0.030 0.080
Socioeconomic strata: lowest 1.149*** 0.273 1.004*** 0.283 0.976*** 0.283 0.978*** 0.283
SES: second lowest 0.609*** 0.134 0.523*** 0.140 0.516*** 0.140 0.528*** 0.140
SES: second highest -0.066 0.129 0.012 0.131 0.011 0.131 0.015 0.130
SES: highest -0.315* 0.160 -0.278+ 0.163 -0.278+ 0.163 -0.278+ 0.162
Fixed effects: Country-level factors
Unemployment rate -0.047* 0.020 -0.041+ 0.022 -0.033 0.021
Female tertiary education 0.002 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.010
Traditional family values -0.029*** 0.007 -0.026** 0.009 -0.018* 0.009
Country group: East-Europe -0.705*** 0.199 -0.487* 0.221
Random effects: Country-level variance 0.292 0.103 0.367 0.128 0.165 0.070 0.128 0.059
-2 LL -1664.48 -1509.35 -1501.60 -1499.35
Note: Reference categories are: male, 27-34-years, married/cohabiting, large city, low education, employed+employment situation good, socioeconomic position:
middle group. Country-level factors and nancial situation of the household are centered to their grand means. Model I summarizes results from several models
in which we estimate the effects of each individual-level socioeconomic variable and country-level variable separately, adjusted with demographic controls.
+ = p<=.10; * = p<=.05; ** = p<=.01; *** = p<=.001.
48
Table 3b presents the results for childlessness ideals. The intercept-only model (Model
0) shows the country-level variance (0.434), which is statistically signicant (p<0.01).
Model II includes all individual-level characteristics at the same time in the model. As
was the case with childbearing intentions, gender and place of residence had no signi-
cant effect on the odds of preferring childlessness, while increasing age and not living
in a union were associated with ideal childlessness (Model II, Table 3b). Educational
differences in childlessness ideals were smaller than in intentional childlessness and
diminished considerably once other measures of socioeconomic position were included
in the model (Model I and Model II). Perceived job uncertainty was not statistically
signicantly related to preferring a childfree life, while being unemployed or inactive
was. Low socioeconomic position was also associated with considering childlessness
ideal. However, in contrast to intended childlessness, the impact of socioeconomic
position on childlessness ideals was statistically signicant only in the second lowest
group. In this group, the impact was related to uncertain employment situation and
poor nancial resources, and controlling for these diminished the negative impact of
low socioeconomic position on fertility preferences (Table 3b Model II shows only
the nal model). Independently, the nancial situation of the household was only
weakly associated with childlessness preferences (Model I). Once we controlled for
other socioeconomic measures, a poor nancial situation of the household had no
signicant effect on preferring childlessness. We again tested for gender differences
in the impact of socioeconomic variables, but did not nd any statistically signicant
effects (results not shown).
Of country-level factors, the unemployment rate was signicantly associated with
fertility ideals (Model III, Table 3b). As with childbearing intentions, women and men
were less likely to prefer childlessness in countries with higher levels of unemployment
among 15–39-year olds. The effect of unemployment was reduced marginally signi-
cant when we controlled for other country-level variables (Model III and IV). Again,
a higher level of female tertiary education was not associated with individual fertility
ideals, while traditional family values were. Men and women living in countries with
a more traditional social climate were less likely to desire childlessness compared to
respondents living in countries where family values were less traditional. The positive
impact of a traditional value climate on fertility ideals remained even when controlling
for the state-socialist countries.
We examined the robustness of our results by excluding uncertain respondents (those
who answered ‘it depends’ or ‘don’t know’ to the question on ideal number of children
or ‘don’t know’ to the question on intended number of children) from our analyses.
However, this did not change our results markedly, and while some of the effects be-
came somewhat stronger, conclusions drawn on the basis of the statistical signicance
tests remained the same.
49
Model 0 Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se
Intercept -2.934 0.148 -3.093 0.213 -3.135 0.288 -3.123 0.268 -2.870 0.275
Fixed effects: Individual characteristics
Sex: Female 0.025 0.125 0.062 0.128 0.059 0.128 0.054 0.127
Age: 18-26 -0.605*** 0.145 -0.571*** 0.162 -0.574*** 0.162 -0.572*** 0.162
Age: 35-40 0.659*** 0.163 0.638*** 0.166 0.637*** 0.166 0.632*** 0.166
Union status: Not in union 0.378** 0.136 0.363** 0.138 0.362** 0.138 0.353 0.138
Urban: Small town/rural area 0.131 0.132 0.100 0.136 0.100 0.136 0.097 0.135
Education: middle level -0.171 0.163 -0.068 0.168 -0.064 0.168 -0.068 0.167
Education: high level -0.340+ 0.195 -0.164 0.206 -0.165 0.206 -0.176 0.206
Economic activity: employment situation poor 0.183 0.208 0.137 0.223 0.165 0.222 0.170 0.222
Economic activity: unemployed 0.540** 0.171 0.444* 0.193 0.444* 0.193 0.447* 0.193
Economic activity: student -0.121 0.193 -0.103 0.198 -0.108 0.197 -0.097 0.197
Financial situation of the household 0.166+ 0.090 -0.016 0.104 0.012 0.103 0.008 0.103
Socioeconomic strata: lowest 0.528 0.392 0.368 0.404 0.338 0.404 0.346 0.404
SES: second lowest 0.460** 0.176 0.405* 0.184 0.396* 0.184 0.414* 0.183
SES: second highest -0.143 0.169 -0.078 0.171 -0.082 0.172 -0.077 0.171
SES: highest -0.232 0.199 -0.179 0.201 -0.177 0.201 -0.173 0.200
Fixed effects: Country-level factors
Unemployment rate -0.061* 0.025 -0.051+ 0.028 -0.044+ 0.025
Female tertiary education -0.002 0.014 -0.000 0.013 -0.003 0.011
Traditional family values -0.037*** 0.010 -0.032** 0.011 -0.020* 0.011
Country group: East-Europe -0.899*** 0.249 -0.646* 0.268
Random effects: Country-level variance 0.434 0.161 0.522 0.194 0.225 0.103 0.151 0.082
-2 LL -1071.84 -1010.36 -1002.57 -999.98
Table 3b. Differences in childlessness ideals explained by individual characteristics and country-level factors, multilevel logistic
regression (random intercept model). Childless men and women aged 18–40 years, Eurobarometer 2011 (N=4,641.
Fertility ideals (0=personal ideal 1+ children, 1=personal ideal zero children). Estimates above 0 indicate a higher likelihood of regarding
childlessness as ideal
Note: Reference categories are: male, 27-34-years, married/cohabiting, large city, low education, employed+employment situation good, socioeconomic position:
middle group. Country-level factors and nancial situation of the household are centered to their grand means. Model I summarizes results from several models
in which we estimate the effects of each individual-level socioeconomic variable and country-level variable separately, adjusted with demographic controls.
+ = p<=.10; * = p<=.05; ** = p<=.01; *** = p<=.001.
50
In sum, our ndings from multilevel analyses support our expectations that intentional
childlessness is related to perceived opportunities and costs of childbearing more than
childlessness ideals are. A weaker social position also inuenced intentions to enter
parenthood through various channels. The negligible effect of the household’s nancial
situation on childlessness intentions once other measures of socioeconomic resources
were included in the model may be related to how these variables were measured in
the survey. It is possible that self-assessed socioeconomic position captures the effect
of nancial resources – perceiving household nancial resources poor correlated with
positioning oneself to lower socioeconomic groups.
Associations between socioeconomic indicators and childlessness ideals were less
clear, although it seems that a preference for childlessness was more frequent in the
lowest socioeconomic groups, among whom poor economic resources intertwine with
unemployment. Given that childlessness as a preferred family form was relatively
rare in our sample, however, caution in the interpretation of the results is warranted.
Conclusion
This article examined childlessness intentions and ideals in Europe using data from
three waves of Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2001, 2006 and 2011. Results
showed that for most young Europeans childlessness is not based on a deliberate in-
tention or desire to remain childless, but on a temporary postponement of parenthood
for various reasons. This is in line with previous studies on fertility trends in Europe
(Billari et al. 2006; Sobotka 2004). We also did not discern any apparent increase in
ideal or intentional childlessness over the past decade. On average, 4% of men, and 3%
of women in the age group 18–40 years considered zero children their personal ideal.
Considering childlessness a personal ideal was slightly more common in the EU15
countries, with 6% of men and 4% of women preferring childlessness, than in many
Eastern European countries where it remained below 3% for both genders. Compared
to childlessness preferences, a somewhat higher proportion of young Europeans intend
to remain childless. In the age group of 18–40-year old, 7% of men and 5% of women
intended to have no children. Once we controlled for differences in the proportions
of childless respondents between countries and focused on childbearing intentions
among the currently childless, intended childlessness accounted for around 11% of
childlessness among young adults. Again, intentional childlessness was on a higher
level among the EU15 countries (14–15% of currently childless men/women in EU15
intended to remain childless) than in the eastern European countries.
We examined correlates of intentional and ideal childlessness using data from the
recent Eurobarometer 2011. Contrary to previous studies, we did not nd any signi-
cant differences between men and women, or between urban and rural residents in
childlessness intentions or ideals. Living in a union appears to be strongly related to
51
fertility intentions and desires, in that men and women were more likely to intend to
remain childless, or to regard zero children as their preferred family size if they did
not have a partner. On the other hand, our study supported previous ndings in that
existing social norms and values in a given society were found to be associated with
individual fertility preferences and intentions (Merz & Liefbroer 2002). In addition, we
found that poor socioeconomic resources inuenced childlessness intentions through
various ways. Lower educational attainment or lower socioeconomic position, being
unemployed or in less secure employment situation were all negatively related to child-
bearing intentions, while their role was not as clear in explaining childlessness ideals.
Particularly in the post-socialist countries, where unemployment is a relatively new
phenomenon, employment uncertainty may be perceived more threatening (Murinkó
& Spéder 2009).
The negative effect of poor employment and socioeconomic situation on childbear-
ing intentions did not seem to hold on a country level. It seems that the contextual
economic situation does not impede childbearing intentions, when it comes to having
a rst child. Our results are thus in line with Testa and Basten (2014) who also found
little evidence of country-level effects on fertility intentions among childless persons.
It is possible, however, that a poor overall economic situation in a country has more
inuence on later childbearing decisions, i.e. whether to have a second, or a third child
(Harknett, Billari & Medalia 2014; Testa & Basten 2014; Tanskanen & Rotkirch 2014).
Our ndings suggest that there are at least two demographically distinctive groups in
Europe with respect to intentional childlessness. Relatively high rates of intentional
childlessness (both desired and intended childlessness) characterize the German-speak-
ing countries Austria, Germany and Switzerland. This group includes also the Nether-
lands and Luxembourg, and perhaps also Belgium, a country with only slightly lower
rates of intended childlessness. In contrast, and despite profound cultural, economic
and political changes, the eastern European countries still exhibit very low levels of
intentional or ideal childlessness. This is one of the aspects which question the suitability
of the concept of the second demographic transition in describing demographic trends
in post-socialist countries (Coleman 2004). The group of low intended childlessness
also includes France and Ireland, both of which have also shown high overall fertility
levels during recent decades, although Ireland also has high childlessness (Miettinen et
al. 2014). It is possible that the inuence of Catholicism in these two countries partly
explains why only a small fraction of young adults are deliberately choosing childless-
ness, although the relatively high levels of intended childlessness in Italy and Spain
seem to refute this hypothesis.
The rest of the countries form a diverse group, comprising countries from southern,
northern, and western Europe with intentional childlessness rates falling between the
two extremes. Among them, southern European countries appear to have gradually
52
moved from low levels of intentional childlessness in the beginning of the 2000s
towards the middle group with average rates of intentional childlessness, whereas
countries from the north have exhibited more stable, average-level rates of intended
childlessness over the past decade. Although we have here included the UK in the
middle-level group, recent data from EB2011 suggests that rates of intended child-
lessness in the UK may be moving towards the higher rates observed in some central-
European countries.
Among the limitations of our study is the cross-sectional nature of the Eurobarometer
data. For instance, although older age and not living in a union were consistently
found to decrease childbearing intentions and desires, a cross-sectional study cannot
determine whether this is due to selection – older childless respondents are a more
selected group – or from gradual adjustment of intentions and ideals to suit one’s
own life situation. Some postponers, or people who originally considered themselves
only temporarily childless but have run out of time and can no longer have children,
or failed in nding a suitable partner, may retrospectively re-interpret their previous
preferences and present themselves as always having been voluntarily “childfree”
(Kneale & Joshi 2008; Gillespie 2003; Heaton, Jacobson & Holland 1999).
Harmonized Eurobarometer data allowed us to conduct an international comparison
but the small national sample sizes prevent more comprehensive multivariate analyses.
While multilevel analyses provide a possibility to include country-level characteristics
into the analyses, larger data sets would allow investigations of cross-level interactions
as well as gender- and age-specic effects of factors associated with childlessness
intentions. Although we did not nd any strong evidence of increasing rates of inten-
tional childlessness, it would be valuable to do a more in-depth study of childless-
ness choices among young adults in their late twenties or early thirties to be able to
detect emerging trends in voluntary childlessness. In addition, since the EB2011 data
includes only a limited number of background characteristics of the respondents, we
were only able to pay attention to socioeconomic resources in explaining differences
in childbearing intentions or ideals. In the future it would be necessary to include
information on religiousness, family values or other attitudes of the respondents to be
able to explore to what extent childlessness intentions or ideals are driven by structural
or normative forces.
Acknowledgements
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement no. 320116
for the research project FamiliesAndSocieties and from the Academy of Finland (re-
search project 266898).
53
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