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Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design
... The changes of the electoral system of 1998 and 2004 were supposed to reduce the number of the parties in the parliament and bolster the party system in general. D'Anieri (2007)believes that a weak parliament was the main culprit for Ukraine's plight in its transition to democracy. The reason for this weakness of the parliament was its inability to forge stable majorities that might have stood up to the president regarding the composition of the government/cabinet. ...
... Stable majorities could not be achieved because many parties and independent candidates entered the parliament after the elections, and because the organization of the legislative body compounded the negative effects of this fragmentation. The fragmentation itself was a consequence of the electoral law which enabled a big number of parties and independent candidates to get a seat in the Verkhovna rada, and also because the party system was weak and unconsolidated, and the citizens mistrusted the political parties (D'Anieri, 2007). Due to the unpopularity of the first freely elected Verkhovna rada of 1994, President Kuchma succeeded to broaden his already considerable constitutional powers in two ways: first, he forced the parliament to adopt the legal acts – first the Constitutional Agreement of 1995 and then the new Constitution of 1996 – that made for a strong position of the president in Ukraine's political system; secondly, he exploited the state's cadre and economic resources in achieving his political objectives. ...
... The president's domination might have been undermined had the Verkhovna rada been able to challenge his strongmanship 10. D'Anieri (2007)shows how the high fragmentation of Ukraine's parliament enabled President Kuchma to blackmail the parliament and the cabinet/government and strong-arm the concessions that augmented his strength in relation to them. After 2004 and the " Orange Revolution " , the constitutional changes strengthened the parliament and fortified the party system. ...
The concepts of semi-presidentialism by Robert Elgie and Mat-thew S. Shugart differ greatly. When applied to Ukraine and Slove-nia, this shows how a country can be categorized differently depending on the author's understanding of what the defining properties of semi-presidentialism are. Elgie's minimalist concept classifies both countries as semi-presidential, while Shugart's concept points out major differences between the systems of government of these two countries. According to the Shugart's concept, Ukraine is a semi-presidential regime; Slovenia is not. These two concepts illustrate the divergences in defining semi-presidential systems and, consequently, the differences in the understanding of the properties and the functioning of political systems in various countries. By comparing the systems of government in those two countries and by the application of Robert Elgie's minimalist and Matthew Shugart's non-minimalist concepts I will test the usefulness of the minimalist concepts in a theoretical and practical way.
... However, it was mainly the gradualist approach that inspired politics adopted in EPSCs. Economic transition needed many years and privatization of State-owned firms in Ukraine and Moldova was still incomplete in the early 2000s (Gorton and White 2003;D'Anieri 2007;Åslund 2009). In Belarus, it had never been completed because President Lukashenka blocked privatization and transition to market economy in the mid-1990s (Ioffe 2004;Korosteleva et al. 2003;Mihalisko 1997). ...
... Ukraine remained a semi-authoritarian State under its first two presidents -in particular, under Kuchma. He was the one able to create a superpresidential regime, reducing the parliament's powers to increase those of the president (Way 2005a and2005b;D'Anieri 2007;Kuzio 2005). Finally, since the early 1990s Moldova has remained in a limbo as a non-democratic regime which is difficult to classify as authoritarian. ...
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, liberal democracy remained the only ideal model of a political regime applicable worldwide. Then, various students and politicians saw the end of communism as the final and definitive victory of democratic ideology and imagined a future in which democracy would spread everywhere. Democracy spread widely during the 1990s and the early 2000s. The fall of various South American dictatorships and the European Union enlargement caused a transition to democracy in many countries. However, important areas in Eurasia, in particular Russia, China and Iran, resisted democratization and reformed authoritarian regimes rose and consolidated in the region. These regimes proved their ability to survive and influenced their neighbours proposing political models that attracted neighbouring countries’ leaders. Thus, new kinds of authoritarian regimes challenged the idea of the unavoidability of the spread of democracy.
... After 1991 most of the old apparatchiks remained in power who, together with the criminals-turned-oligarchs, who will constitute the fractioned and rivaling ruling bloc and whose task it will be to maintain the façade of democracy and effectively destabilize the political order to the point of making an insurrection, and now armed conflict possible. Political disempowerment and the crisis of representation in Ukraine are amply evidenced by the declarative nature of Ukraine's party programs and politics and thus virtual rather than tangible performance which led to a general lack of trust in politicians and voter apathy (D'Anieri, 2007;Kuzio, 1999Kuzio, , 2005Wilson, 2005). The latter is being "resolved" by "winning" voters for the oligarch-associated parties and politicians through bribes, which in conditions of economic deprivation is relatively cheap and is certainly cheaper than life quality improving reforms. ...
... Capital accumulation ambitions of fractions of the competing, rulingand eventually capitalist-class of the newly emerged kleptocratic regime were services by specially designed political shell parties (D'Anieri, 2007;Wilson, 2005). Survival of both depended on virtual politics and on materializing the next two myths-of the "two Ukraines" and of "the Other". ...
By the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in most parts of Eastern Europe, high expectations associated with postsocialist transition have been substituted by disillusionment. After 1990, Eastern Europe has been internationally treated with a low-interest acknowledgement of what was understood as a slow and erratic, but unquestionable process of integration in a Western-dominated world order. In the context of today’s geopolitical reorganization, East European examples of authoritarian politics once again become discussed as significant reference points for Western and global politics. This book represents a contribution to this debate from a distinctive East European perspective: that of new left scholars and activists from the region, whose lifetime largely corresponds to the transformations of the postsocialist period, and who came to develop an understanding of their environment in terms of its relations to global capitalist processes. A both theoretical and empirical contribution, the book provides essential insights on topics conventionally associated with East European transition from privatization to the politicized slogans of corruption or civil society, and analyzes their connection to the newest reconfigurations of postsocialist capitalist regimes. As a contribution to contemporary debates on the present global socio-political transformation, this collection does not only seek to debate analytical statements, but also to change the field where analytical stakes are set, by adding perspectives that think Eastern Europe’s global relations from within the regional context and its political stakes.
Agnes Gagyi works on East European politics and social movements from the perspective of the region’s long-term global integration. She is researcher on East European social movements at the University of Gothenburg, and member of the Working Group for Public Sociology “Helyzet” in Budapest.
Ondřej Slačálek is a political scientist and journalist, he focuses on East European politics, nationalism and social movements. He works at Charles University, Prague. He is a regular collaborator of Czech new left journal A2/A2larm.
... After 1991 most of the old apparatchiks remained in power who, together with the criminals-turned-oligarchs, who will constitute the fractioned and rivaling ruling bloc and whose task it will be to maintain the façade of democracy and effectively destabilize the political order to the point of making an insurrection, and now armed conflict possible. Political disempowerment and the crisis of representation in Ukraine are amply evidenced by the declarative nature of Ukraine's party programs and politics and thus virtual rather than tangible performance which led to a general lack of trust in politicians and voter apathy (D'Anieri, 2007;Kuzio, 1999Kuzio, , 2005Wilson, 2005). The latter is being "resolved" by "winning" voters for the oligarch-associated parties and politicians through bribes, which in conditions of economic deprivation is relatively cheap and is certainly cheaper than life quality improving reforms. ...
... Capital accumulation ambitions of fractions of the competing, rulingand eventually capitalist-class of the newly emerged kleptocratic regime were services by specially designed political shell parties (D'Anieri, 2007;Wilson, 2005). Survival of both depended on virtual politics and on materializing the next two myths-of the "two Ukraines" and of "the Other". ...
This chapter analyses the causes of the crisis of democracy in the Czech Republic and the possibilities of a chronological analysis of the transformation decades. The crisis of democracy is manifested in the Czech Republic above all by mass disillusionment with democratic politics, and by the open access of oligarchs to political power. Unlike approaches that see this turn as a discontinuity, the chapter describes it as one of the possible and logical results of the whole transformation process. This process is reconstructed as a competition between two capitalist factions and respective political projects: neoliberal nationalism and liberal globalism. The chapter presents a chronological analysis of the three post-communist decades based on the three periods of rule of various factions (1992–1998 neoliberal nationalist rule, 2002–2010 globalist rule, 2013–? oligarchic rule), and three interregna (1990–1992, 1997–2002, 2008–2013). The chapter describes the interests and composition of the factions which competed for power in the transformation decades, analyses the main problems they dealt with during the interregna (economic transformation, democracy, economic dependence) and then looks at the characteristics of the main competing discourses (the naturalness and morality of the market, civil society, democratic majoritarianism, discourse of colony, discourse of corruption).
... After 1991 most of the old apparatchiks remained in power who, together with the criminals-turned-oligarchs, who will constitute the fractioned and rivaling ruling bloc and whose task it will be to maintain the façade of democracy and effectively destabilize the political order to the point of making an insurrection, and now armed conflict possible. Political disempowerment and the crisis of representation in Ukraine are amply evidenced by the declarative nature of Ukraine's party programs and politics and thus virtual rather than tangible performance which led to a general lack of trust in politicians and voter apathy (D'Anieri, 2007;Kuzio, 1999Kuzio, , 2005Wilson, 2005). The latter is being "resolved" by "winning" voters for the oligarch-associated parties and politicians through bribes, which in conditions of economic deprivation is relatively cheap and is certainly cheaper than life quality improving reforms. ...
... Capital accumulation ambitions of fractions of the competing, rulingand eventually capitalist-class of the newly emerged kleptocratic regime were services by specially designed political shell parties (D'Anieri, 2007;Wilson, 2005). Survival of both depended on virtual politics and on materializing the next two myths-of the "two Ukraines" and of "the Other". ...
The concluding chapter discusses five nodes of postsocialist ideological struggles that the book’s authors addressed: anticommunism, Westernism, nationalism, irrationalism and antipolitics (through its three aspects of anti-corruption, civil society and technocratism). Slačálek characterizes these as discourses that are applied to obscure real social conflicts, but which at the same time rely on elements of real experience which can be critically reconstructed, and which can contribute to left-wing analyses and programs. He addresses anticommunism’s paralyzing effect on the local left together with the traps Ostalgia presents for new left politics; speaks of nationalist ideology as a means of autocratic and xenophobic politics, yet also a prism through which essential global power relationships become visible in popular politics; and investigates irrationalism as a powerful tool of neoliberal and neonationalist politics, yet also a ground of conflict that makes visible the political usages of reason and the need for the Left to develop a dialectical and self-critical rationality as a basis for its politics.
... Ukrainian Studies scholarship acknowledges the salience of the national and subnational cleavage for voting behavior but explores this matter only with respect to parliamentary elections (DʼAnieri 2007;Way 2015). Romanova (2022) extends this analysis to study the interplay between the national and subnational cleavage in three types of electoral contests: ...
... Even despite the fact that many researchers have handled the investigations in Eastern Europe, they usually had nothing to do with the government cabinets activities. Among such investigations it is necessary to distinguish such personalities as: R. Fawn 1 , H. Giliomee and C. Simkins 2 , A. Arian and S. Barnes 3 , S. Cornell 4 , U. Backes and P. Moreau 5 , K. Dawisha and B. Parrott 6 , A. Kulik and S. Pshizova 7 , G. Nodia and A. P. Scholtbach 8 , P. Lewis 9 , P. Culeac 10 , J. Bugajski 11 , S. Ramet 12 , J. Hahn 13 , J. Löwenhardt 14 , J. K. White 15 , M. Bader 16 , S. Birch 17 , P. D' Anieri 18 and others. Also it is significant to take into consideration general and theoretical ideas, dedicated to the scientific analysis of party ideological influence on the government cabinets activities (in particular beyond the borders of Eastern European countries). ...
The article is dedicated to theoretical, methodological and empirical analysis of the ideological component of government cabinets in Eastern European countries (in 1991–2014). The author analyzed the essence of the phenomenon of political ideology and party polarization, singled out and verified the families of ideological parties as a component of cabinet activity across Eastern European countries, determined how party and non-party governments correspond with ideological determinants of parliamentary parties that support them.
... Американський професор політології П.Д 'Аньєри, ґрунтуючись на значному теоретичному й емпіричному матеріалі, виділив і проаналізував причини, що не дали Україні змоги розвинути достатній рівень демократичних процедур і піти шляхом № 19 ♦ ліберальної демократії. У праці «Зрозуміти українську політику: влада, політика й інституціональний дизайн» [9] він називає такі причини неуспіху української політичної стратегії та, як наслідок, української демократії: фрагментарність і неефективність парламенту (нездатність парламенту сформувати одновекторний курс державної політики, нездатність політичних сил до компромісів), інституціональний дизайн (недосконалість усієї системи політичних інститутів) і «політику сили» (авторитарність влади), що, по суті, означає певну дискредитацію самої ідеї демократії. ...
... It has tended to focus on formal institutional development (Wise & Brown 1996;Whitmore 2004;Khmelko & Beers 2011) with an emphasis on decision-making (Herron 2002;Whitmore 2004;Chaisty & Chernykh 2015), though this is often not the main function of a modern legislature (Packenham 1990). Scholarly research on informal practices in Ukraine has tended to focus on covert activities related to neopatrimonial aspects of the political system more broadly (Zimmer 2006;D'Anieri 2007;Pleines 2016) and attention to overt, public parliamentary rule-breaking and protest was, at best, peripheral (Whitmore 2004, pp. 178-79) until Shukan's (2013) ethnographic study of the 2006-2012 period. ...
Protest performances inside parliament during 2012–2016 articulated claims to uphold democracy that contributed to the maintenance of pluralism in Ukraine during attempted authoritarian consolidation. Simultaneously, such protests were para-institutional instruments in the ongoing power struggle engendered by a patronal system where formal institutions and norms weakly constrained actors. A diverse repertoire of protest, including rostrum-blocking, visual protest, withdrawal, auditory disruption, somatic protest and spectacle, was used frequently and adapted in response to changes in the political opportunity structure. Innovations to the repertoire drew on and modified performative methods used by social movements.
... Drawing on the popular protests under the slogan 'Ukraine without Kuchma!', the opposition bloc of Viktor Yushchenko won the party list vote in the 2002 parliamentary elections, albeit it failed to form a parliamentary majority in coalition with other opposition blocs. This signified the rise of a real rival for the ruling patronal network of President Kuchma, who practiced power politics without any significant constraints imposed on him by the courts, and tended to lean on the judiciary to consolidate his own power through appointments, patronage, and strategic pressure (D'Anieri, 2007;Popova, 2012) (see Figure 1 above). ...
How and why do networks of judges make a difference in judicial politics in patronage-based systems? Judicial networks provide important benefits to both patrons and judges by sharing information about the exchange of concrete rewards and sanctions, generating expectations about the staying power of the patrons and mobilizing judges when needed. These informational and mobilizing practices are at the heart of collective judicial autonomy. Yet judges exercise this autonomy in different ways depending on the presence of a dominant patronage network, the rigidity of the judicial hierarchy with the supreme court on top, and the intensity of intra-judicial conflict. I explore the informational and mobilizing practices of judicial associations – the most visible judicial networks – in post-Soviet Ukraine, a country with a large number of these associations, varying numbers of ruling patronage networks and two attempts at the abolition of the supreme court. Lessons from Ukraine’s judicial clientelism may help explain why competitive politics with vibrant judicial associationalism fail to entrench judicial independence.
... This result demonstrates the significant disproportionalities in the SMD elections. 3 For much of Ukraine's post-communist history, political parties were considered`w eak'' or``poorly institutionalized''(Wilson and Bilous, 1993;Moser, 1999;Diuk and Gongadze, 2002;Kuzio, 2003;Protsyk, 2003;Whitmore, 2004;D'Anieri, 2007). However, by 2012, there is good evidence of the strengthening of parties. ...
Comparative research on mixed-member systems suggests that parties have an incentive to nominate nominal-tier candidates in as many districts as possible, as placing candidates in even marginal districts can increase parties’ list-tier vote. Yet studies have documented many instances where parties fail to field candidates. We examine stand-down agreements—where parties coordinate the withdrawal of candidates—to understand why parties forgo a party vote bonus. Our interviews document that Ukrainian politicians—while acting strategically—were not concerned over the loss of a party vote bonus when they negotiated the withdrawal of candidates from districts. Our theoretical discussion explains that the incentive for parties to field candidates to obtain a party vote bonus is often insufficient. Using district data from the 2012 Ukrainian elections, we measure the party vote bonus. We show that the bonus gained by parties was small, dependent upon the quality of the candidate, and varied by party.
... To ensure the division of powers in the democratic state, the judiciary and legislature should be independent and able to exercise effective checks on the government. In this light, the incomplete division of power and the strong presidency in Ukraine 3 seem to be inherently problematic for the establishment of the democratic norms, including the rule of law (D'Anieri, 2006). It affects not only the independence of institutional domains, but also distorts the rules according to which they operate. ...
... Much of the research on Ukraine during this period posits that like many post-Soviet political systems, Ukraine has suffered from weak, poorly institutionalised political parties (Wilson & Bilous 1993;Moser 1999;Diuk & Gongadze 2002;Kuzio 2003;Protsyk 2003;Whitmore 2004;D'Anieri 2007). The social cleavages that were to form the basis for party politics in many countries remained 'de-politicised' throughout the Soviet period (Birch 2000, p. 12). ...
Since the end of Communist rule, Ukraine has undertaken three major electoral reforms, moving from a single-member district majoritarian system, to a mixed-member system, to a closed-list proportional representation system, and back to the mixed-member system. Some argue that political parties are primarily motivated by the desire to maximise seats or improve their ability to impact on policy. I argue that existing theories of electoral reform often assume that parties are unitary actors during electoral reform. My analysis of electoral reform in Ukraine clearly demonstrates significant intra-party dissonance on electoral system preferences. This result questions the usefulness of the party unity assumption.
... At least four intersecting divisions have been discussed: a regional divide (between 'east' and 'west' or distinctions between four macro-regions: centre, east, west, south) often illustrated by electoral maps ( Birch 2000;Kubicek 2000;Barrington & Herron 2004;D'Anieri 2011;Osipian & Osipian 2012); a linguistic divide between Ukrainophones and Russophones ( Arel 1995;Wolczuk 2006;Colton 2011;Kulyk 2011); an ethnic divide between Ukrainians and Russians ( Arel 1993;Bremmer 1994;Beissinger 1998;Hale 2008;Shkolnikov 2012;Rampton 2014); and regional identities based on distinct historical legacies of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires ( Darden & Grzymala-Busse 2006). Identity cleavages are generally portrayed as the best predictors of political preferences and behaviour ( Hesli et al. 1998;Haran 2001;Riabchuk 2002;D'Anieri 2006). However, we still do not know much about how such identities are formed and whether and how they shape political patterns, including protest behaviour. ...
The Maidan protests provide us with insights into Ukrainian society and the dynamics of mobilisation more generally. Based on the EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey, on-site rapid interviews with protesters, interviews with politicians, activists and journalists, and focus groups with ordinary citizens and activists, this essay maps the actors, claims and frames of each phase in the protest cycle. It highlights the diversity of actors and the inability of activists and party leaders to coordinate as the central features of the protests. Our analysis reveals the fluid and contingent nature of cleavages commonly portrayed as fixed and politically salient.
The Russian-Ukrainian crisis, unfolding since 2014, has dramatically impacted the economic rapport between Russia and India. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review exploring the economic repercussions of the crisis on Russian-Indian relations. The crisis, originating from Ukraine's pursuit of EU integration and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, has catalyzed protracted conflict, economic sanctions, and diplomatic tensions between Russia and the West. This study elucidates the crisis's profound global economic ramifications, particularly for nations closely aligned with Russia, such as India. India, a pivotal trading partner and investor in Russia, has been directly ensnared in the crisis fallout. The imposition of sanctions by Western nations has critically impaired the Russian economy, inducing diminished foreign direct investment, ruble depreciation, and dwindling trade ties with the West. Concurrently, Ukraine grapples with economic upheaval, manifested through industrial and agricultural losses, dwindling foreign investments, and energy supply disruptions, precipitating inflation and diminished purchasing power. The spillover effects of the crisis extend to India, as EU and US sanctions on Russia impede access to global financial markets and technology transfers. Despite these challenges, potential avenues for growth and collaboration persist in various sectors. Energy cooperation, trade and investment diversification, defense collaboration, and infrastructure development emerge as promising domains for bolstering economic ties. Nevertheless, the crisis poses multifaceted challenges and risks to Russian-Indian economic relations, including geopolitical instability, trade barriers, currency fluctuations, regulatory hurdles, and energy dependency. Addressing these challenges necessitates proactive measures, policy reforms, and steadfast bilateral commitment. In conclusion, while the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has engendered profound economic implications for Russian-Indian relations, opportunities for economic cooperation endure. By navigating challenges, fostering diplomatic dialogue, diversifying trade, easing investment barriers, and fostering innovation collaboration, Russia and India can fortify their economic partnership amidst crisis-induced adversity.
The Russian-Ukrainian crisis, unfolding since 2014, has dramatically impacted the economic rapport between Russia and India. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review exploring the economic repercussions of the crisis on Russian-Indian relations. The crisis, originating from Ukraine's pursuit of EU integration and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, has catalyzed protracted conflict, economic sanctions, and diplomatic tensions between Russia and the West. This study elucidates the crisis's profound global economic ramifications, particularly for nations closely aligned with Russia, such as India. India, a pivotal trading partner and investor in Russia, has been directly ensnared in the crisis fallout. The imposition of sanctions by Western nations has critically impaired the Russian economy, inducing diminished foreign direct investment, ruble depreciation, and dwindling trade ties with the West. Concurrently, Ukraine grapples with economic upheaval, manifested through industrial and agricultural losses, dwindling foreign investments, and energy supply disruptions, precipitating inflation and diminished purchasing power. The spillover effects of the crisis extend to India, as EU and US sanctions on Russia impede access to global financial markets and technology transfers. Despite these challenges, potential avenues for growth and collaboration persist in various sectors. Energy cooperation, trade and investment diversification, defense collaboration, and infrastructure development emerge as promising domains for bolstering economic ties. Nevertheless, the crisis poses multifaceted challenges and risks to Russian-Indian economic relations, including geopolitical instability, trade barriers, currency fluctuations, regulatory hurdles, and energy dependency. Addressing these challenges necessitates proactive measures, policy reforms, and steadfast bilateral commitment. In conclusion, while the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has engendered profound economic implications for Russian-Indian relations, opportunities for economic cooperation endure. By navigating challenges, fostering diplomatic dialogue, diversifying trade, easing investment barriers, and fostering innovation collaboration, Russia and India can fortify their economic partnership amidst crisis-induced adversity.
The Russian-Ukrainian crisis, unfolding since 2014, has dramatically impacted the economic rapport between Russia and India. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review exploring the economic repercussions of the crisis on Russian-Indian relations. The crisis, originating from Ukraine's pursuit of EU integration and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, has catalyzed protracted conflict, economic sanctions, and diplomatic tensions between Russia and the West. This study elucidates the crisis's profound global economic ramifications, particularly for nations closely aligned with Russia, such as India. India, a pivotal trading partner and investor in Russia, has been directly ensnared in the crisis fallout. The imposition of sanctions by Western nations has critically impaired the Russian economy, inducing diminished foreign direct investment, ruble depreciation, and dwindling trade ties with the West. Concurrently, Ukraine grapples with economic upheaval, manifested through industrial and agricultural losses, dwindling foreign investments, and energy supply disruptions, precipitating inflation and diminished purchasing power. The spillover effects of the crisis extend to India, as EU and US sanctions on Russia impede access to global financial markets and technology transfers. Despite these challenges, potential avenues for growth and collaboration persist in various sectors. Energy cooperation, trade and investment diversification, defense collaboration, and infrastructure development emerge as promising domains for bolstering economic ties. Nevertheless, the crisis poses multifaceted challenges and risks to Russian-Indian economic relations, including geopolitical instability, trade barriers, currency fluctuations, regulatory hurdles, and energy dependency. Addressing these challenges necessitates proactive measures, policy reforms, and steadfast bilateral commitment. In conclusion, while the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has engendered profound economic implications for Russian-Indian relations, opportunities for economic cooperation endure. By navigating challenges, fostering diplomatic dialogue, diversifying trade, easing investment barriers, and fostering innovation collaboration, Russia and India can fortify their economic partnership amidst crisis-induced adversity.
This thesis examines the strategic implications of energy security in Europe, with a focus on natural gas supplies. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has highlighted the vulnerabilities of Europe’s energy infrastructure and exposed the risks of overreliance on a single supplier. The thesis analyzes the geopolitical dynamics of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the impact on energy security, as well as Europe’s response options to enhance energy security through diversification of natural gas supplies, acceleration of the energy transition, and coordination of strategic policy responses.
Part A’ provides an in-depth assessment of the strategic context, including the historical background, triggering events leading up to Russia’s 2022 invasion, key actors’ positions and interests, implications for European security, and Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas imports. It details the infrastructure linking Russian gas fields to European markets and risks exposed by supply disruptions.
Part B' explores Europe’s options to respond as of late 2023, including diversification of pipeline supplies and growth of liquefied natural gas imports. It examines pathways for reducing natural gas import dependence through renewable energy deployment, increased efficiency, power market reforms, and electrification. Coordinating a policy response across the EU, NATO and global partners is analyzed regarding mechanisms, funding, and key bilateral relationships.
In conclusion, findings are summarized and recommendations made for preventing energy-related crises, managing emergency response, accelerating clean energy transitions, and strengthening resilience through coordinated action. The analysis provides an interdisciplinary perspective grounded in geopolitics, sustainability, and security research with relevance for real-world developments.
Keywords: energy security, natural gas, geopolitics, Europe, Ukraine, Russia, infrastructure, energy transition, decarbonization, renewable energy, efficiency, climate change, liquefied natural gas (LNG), crisis response, resilience, NATO, EU policy.
Many democracies with high levels of corruption are also characterized by low levels of women's political representation. Do women candidates in democracies with high levels of corruption face overt voter discrimination? Do gender dynamics that are unique to highly corrupt, democratic contexts influence citizens’ willingness to vote for women? We answer these questions using two separate sets of experiments conducted in Ukraine: two vignette experiments and a conjoint analysis. In line with existing cross-sectional research on Ukraine, our experiments reveal little evidence of direct voter bias against women candidates. Our conjoint analysis also offers novel insights into the preferences of Ukrainian voters, showing that both men and women voters place a great deal of value in anti-corruption platforms, but voters are just as likely to support women and men candidates who say they will fight corruption. Our analysis suggests that women's political underrepresentation in highly corrupt contexts is driven more by barriers that prevent women from winning party nominations and running for office in the first place, rather than overt discrimination at the polls.
The present article explores the problem of interpretation of the dual electoral polarisation along the ‘east-west’ line during the national electoral campaigns in Ukraine. In particular, the study of the problem is conducted versus the attempts of some experts and analysts to explain the appearance of such pattern by a hypothetical disunion of the Ukrainian society. The advocates of the idea of Ukraine divided between provisional ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ parts often indorse the spatial east-west polarisation line appearing in the results of several national electoral campaigns as an argument in favour of their position. Nevertheless, the analysis in this article demonstrates that evoking of such an argument is futile due to the east-west electoral axis’s volatility, vagueness and phantom-like quality. The current research has attested that the academic and expert studies and discussions on the question of Ukraine’s disunity particularly among the supporters of this idea has been tidal in character. The ultimate periods of attention towards the problem correlated with the repercussions of certain political events in contemporary Ukrainian history and several polarising national elections in the first place. In contrast to these studies a more comprehensive analysis that accounts for a dynamics of the electoral process throughout the entire period of Ukraine’s independence points to an at best limited validity of the allegation about the disunity or split in the Ukrainian society. The spatial line of the east-west political polarisation in the electoral process of Ukraine has been characterised by instability, has gradually shifted eastwards and, most importantly, has been not recorded during many parliamentary and presidential elections. Therefore, this refutes the conclusion about Ukraine’s east-west societal cleavage as a decisive, insurmountable or unique case, but instead points to the existence of other politically important societal cleavages typical for today’s modern societies.
У статті досліджується проблема трактування дуальної електоральної поляризації за схемою «схід-захід» під час загальнонаціональних електоральних кампаній в Україні. Розгляд цієї проблеми здійснено, зокрема, у контексті спроб окремих експертів та аналітиків пояснити появу такої схеми гіпотетичною роз’єднаністю українського суспільства. Прихильники ідеї про роз’єднаність України на умовні «східну» і «західну» частини нерідко використовують просторову поляризаційну вісь «схід-захід», що фіксувалась за результатами деяких загальнонаціональних виборчих кампаній, як аргумент на підтвердження своєї позиції. Однак, як засвідчує аналіз, здійснений у цьому дослідженні, використання такого аргументу є суперечливим, оскільки електоральна вісь «схід-захід» характеризується непостійністю, розмитістю і «фантомністю». Встановлено, що наукові та експертні дослідження та дискусії з питання роз’єднаності України, надто серед прихильників цієї тези, мають «хвилеподібний» характер. Пікові періоди зацікавленості проблемою корелюють з відлунням певних політичних подій в Україні, зокрема, окремих поляризуючих загальнонаціональних виборчих кампаній. На противагу цим дослідженням, більш комплексний аналіз, який бере до уваги динаміку електорального процесу протягом усього періоду незалежності України, вказує на, щонайменше, обмежену валідність ідеї про роз’єднаність чи, тим більше, розкол українського суспільства. Просторова вісь політичної поляризації «схід-захід» в електоральному процесі України характеризувалась непостійністю, поступово зміщувалась на схід та, головне, не фіксувалась протягом багатьох парламентських і президентських виборів. Відтак, це спростовує висновок про визначальність, непереборність чи, тим більше, унікальність відповідного соціокультурного поділу, та, радше, вказує на існування поряд із ним й інших, не менш політично вагомих, суспільних поділів, характерних для багатьох сучасних країн.
The Evolution of Institution of Presidency in Political History of Ukraine: Incipience, Powers, Role and Place in the System of Government
The author determined phases of formation, powers, role and place of presidency in the government system of Ukraine at different stages of its political development, outlined historiography of presidency’s researches in Ukraine, incrementally structured the evolution of political and legal views about the nature and purpose of the presidency in Ukraine, outlined the factual authority, role and place of presidency in the government system of Ukraine (on Ukrainian ethnic territories) in the first decade of the twentieth century. He also described the influence of the USSR presidency on the characteristics of formation and role of the presidency in post‑Soviet Ukraine as well as revealed the dynamics of presidency in the independent Ukraine, 1991‑2014. The author also found out the problem of institutional inheritance of presidency (including his powers, role and place in system of government) in the context of impact of some historical milestones of Ukrainian statehood in the following historical milestones. As result, the researcher argued that the institution of presidency in Ukraine (including the government system at all) needs to be reformed because of the past institutional, legal and political legacy of the presidency in Ukraine, and given to the experience of presidency in Central and Eastern Europe countries.
Can an ideational shift towards judicial empowerment germinate from institutional reforms? Or is significant turnover in the judicial corps necessary to produce new professional norms? These questions are both theoretically important and policy relevant as rule of law reformers struggle to create powerful and independent judiciaries. Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan revolution and the comprehensive judicial reform adopted in its wake allows us to explore these questions empirically. The centerpiece of the reform was a judicial lustration law, which sacked all court chairs and gave Ukrainian judges the right to elect new chairs in a secret ballot. This paper analyzes the court chair elections using an original dataset with individual‐ and court‐level data. The key finding is that less than a fifth of Ukrainian judges embraced their newly‐granted agency, whereas the overwhelming majority followed professional norms of deference and re‐elected the sacked court chairs. The finding holds for all court levels and for all regions of Ukraine. Beyond Ukraine, these results suggest that empowering judges in a civil law judiciary is unlikely to lead immediately to a judicial behavior shift. Regardless of how auspicious the strategic environment is, professional norms are sticky and civil law judges may inertly follow their superiors.
Зміцнення незалежності української держави пов’язане з необхідністю вирішення низки нагальних економічних, політичних, соціокультурних проблем. У царині політики ці проблеми концентруються навколо поняття «демократія». Зміцнення демократії неодмінно посилить відкритість українського суспільства, сприятиме звеличенню свободи. Автор статті обгрунтовує тезу, що коли йдеться про утвердження в Україні демократично-правового суспільства, інститутів, правил і процедур, одним з фундаментальних питань є повноцінне закріплення європейських демократично-гуманістичних цінностей у суспільній свідомості, ментальності українців. Відзначається, що історично українці є європейською нацією, однак протягом тривалого часу перебували у складі державного утворення, в якому аксіологічні орієнтири значно різнилися від європейських, що, звісно, гальмувало інтеграцію України в єдину сім’ю європейських народів. У статті аналізуються різні проблеми світоглядно-аксіологічного стану українського суспільства, які перешкоджають поступу до європейських цінностей демократичного суспільства.
This study examines hegemonic personalist regimes (HPRs) and argues that semi-presidential dictatorships are more likely to evolve into HPRs than parliamentary systems or presidential autocracies. In presidential autocracies, elites delegate power to dictators who control the military to eliminate threats from the opposition. In parliamentary systems, elites are more likely to build power-sharing parties through which parliamentary opposition can be defeated, often evolving into single-party regimes. In semi-presidential autocracies, elites delegate power to dictators in exchange for investments, support of their agendas, or defeat of the opposition, which can lead to personalist rule supported by a dominant party or HPR. This study verified this phenomenon using logistic regression. In addition, this study examined three possible challenges: unstable equilibrium, reverse causality and institutional variation within semi-presidentialism. In sum, the incentive structure inherent in semi-presidential systems paves the way for the rise of HPRs.
The article systematically analyses the Ukrainian behaviour within the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004). As it is shown, this was a period to which the origins of many recent, and tumultuous, developments can be traced. We utilise an interdisciplinary Foreign Policy Analysis role theoretical framework, and through the means of triangulated content analysis apply it to the empirical material containing, inter alia, primary data in the Ukrainian language. As we demonstrate empirically, Ukraine followed a certain behavioural pattern of roles based on its national characteristics, collective cognition, discursive uses of historical developments, and specific internal political, economic and social considerations. An extensive analysis of presidential speeches reveals that the prominent role of 'Internal Development' had fluctuating levels of intensity and multiple manifestations. Taking advantages of conceptual vocabulary and theoretical subtleties associated with role theory, we conclude that the performed research of these sets of behavioural norms and their dynamics allows for better understanding of Ukrainian collective identity and behaviour within this strategic complex.
Исследуются механизмы взаимодействия правительства и парламента согласно с Конституции Украины в редакции 1996 и 2004 годов. Сформулированы предложения по усовершенствованию существующей модели взаимодействия Верховной Рады Украины и Кабинета Министров Украины. Ключевые слова: взаимодействие органов государственной власти, механизмы государственного управления Svitlana S. V. Аnalysis of the interaction mechanism of the Verhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine in the context of contemporary constitutional development of the country The article is devoted to research of cooperation mechanisms of government and parliament in obedience to Constitution of Ukraine in a release 1996 and 2004 years.
This article concerns stability and change in the ranks of the Ukrainian political elite from 1990 to 2014. We use East European Parliamentarian and Candidate (EAST PaC) data for Ukraine as a detailed, longitudinal source of information on the evolution of candidates and members of parliament (MPs). In particular, we focus on the degree of reshuffling represented by reproduction and replacement. This is especially intriguing in the context of three recent revolutionary events: Independence in 1991, the Orange Revolution in 2004, and Euromaidan in 2014. We follow the shifts in support for different political forces (the “demand” side of political representation) vis-à-vis strategies employed and efforts made by different parties and blocs (the “supply” side of political representation). We closely examine the electoral results of parties that later proved to be key players in the unfolding of the most important turns in Ukraine’s political life.
Electoral politics in post-Independence Ukraine shows how mass revolutions do not necessarily translate into deep changes to the political elite. Revolutionary events, both in 2004 and 2014, have not brought sudden and substantial replacement in the Verkhovna Rada (VR) ranks. Theoretically, the outcomes can be characterized as quasi-replacement (Higley and Pakulski 1999 Higley, John, and Jan Pakulski. 1999. “Elite Power Games and Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.” Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 26:115–37. doi:10.1163/187633299x00057.[Crossref] [Google Scholar]).
The preponderance of minority presidents in modern democracies has concentrated the attention of researchers on the multiparty coalitions that presidents form to govern in legislative assemblies. This analysis of “coalitional presidentialism” has focused almost exclusively on presidential systems in Latin America, and Brazil in particular. It has understood multiparty presidential coalitions as cabinet-level constructs, which bind the support of parties in legislatures through portfolio payoffs. In this article, we explore this analysis in a non-Latin American context: postSoviet Ukraine. Using original quantitative and qualitative data, we find that portfolio payoffs are an important tool for managing Ukrainian coalitions. But we also find that minority presidents have relied systematically on the support of legislative parties outside of the cabinet and have used different payoffs to manage their support. Given that this complexity also exists in other new democracies, we argue that there is a need to distinguish between cabinet-level and floor-level coalitions in minority presidential systems.
The massacre of the protesters and the police during the “Euromaidan” mass protests on February 18-20, 2014 in Ukraine contributed to the overthrow of the Ukrainian government and ultimately to a start of the civil war in Donbas, Russian military interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the annexation of Crimea and an international conflict between the West and Russia. However, in spite of its importance to the politics of Ukraine and global politics this mass killing have been central subject of only a couple of studies. These studies concluded that the Maidan massacre of the protesters was a false flag operation and that far right organizations were involved in the mass killing of both police and the protesters. However, the dominant narrative promoted by the governments and the media in Ukraine and the West attributed the Maidan massacre of the protesters to the government forces and mostly ignored killings of the police. The official investigation by the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine charged Berkut special police commanders and members with the massacre of the Madian protesters on Viktor Yanukovych orders and publicly stated that Berkut policemen and Internal Troops servicemen were killed by unknown persons of unknown allegiance.
The research question is as follows: What does a large volume of various evidence made public for the first time by the Maidan massacre trials and government investigations reveal about which of the political forces were involved in this politically crucial case of mass killing? This paper analyzes more than 350 hours of video recordings of the Maidan massacre trials and information concerning investigations of this massacre in over 2,000 official court decisions in Ukraine, media interviews of prosecutors, Maidan and Berkut lawyers, and Ukrainian media reports about these trials and investigations. It examines court testimonies of wounded protesters and relatives of the killed protesters, results of forensic ballistic and medical examinations and investigative experiments, and videos and photos of the Maidan massacre shown during the trials. A video appendix includes brief relevant videos of the Maidan massacre and information from the recordings of the Maidan massacre trial. The 55 minute long online video appendix with added English-language subtitles is compiled from brief synchronized segments of on-site reports by American, Belgian, Belarusian, British, Finish, French, Dutch, German, Polish, Russian, Spanish, and Ukrainian TV correspondents and social media videos by various Maidan protesters who filmed this massacre on February 20, 2014.
The study finds that the Maidan massacre investigations and trials revealed a variety of evidence, such as results of forensic examinations and testimonies of many wounded protesters, which shows that at least the absolute majority of the protesters were killed and wounded from Maidan-controlled locations and that the investigation and trials were for this reason stonewalled. The analysis shows patterns of ineffective and delayed Maidan massacre trials and the GPU investigations, trumped-up charges, and ignoring, reversing, and covering-up of the evidence, which was revealed by the GPU own investigation and which pointed to the massacre of the protesters and the police by “snipers” in the Maidan-controlled buildings and not by the Berkut police. The paper discusses implications of this study for understanding the Maidan massacre and the conflict in Ukraine and the international conflict over Ukraine.
What are the reasons for change of electoral system in a country in transition?
Who are the actors involved and how they do that? What consequences it has
for parliament and the party system? This paper attempts to provide answers
to these questions in the case of Ukraine. In that country, in less than two decades
three types of electoral systems have been implemented: majority system
in 1994, mixed system in 1998, 2002 and 2012, and proportional system
in 2006 and 2007. Such frequent changes occurred due to elite-manipulation
which aimed at satisfying self-interests of political elites. Both parliamentary
and non-parliamentary elites have been involved in that process, and the most
important actors among them have been oligarchs and the President. When the
Ukrainian oligarchs as veto-players began to intensively participate in parties’
activities, parties began to play a more important role than they did before.
We conclude that the type of electoral system and oligarchic influence on parties
and elections impacted the way how the party system has been shaped.
We show that this system has been instrumentalised to achieve particular objectives
of the dominant segments of political and business elites in Ukraine.
Keywords: Ukraine, Electoral System, Party System, Oligarchs, Non-democratic
Regime
Die Ukraine, das Land mit der größten Fläche in Europa nach der Russischen Föderation, ist ein multiethnischer Staat. Ihre Bevölkerung – 48,5 Millionen Menschen – setzt sich der Volkszählung von 2001 zufolge aus etwa 78 % Ukrainern zusammen, 17 % Russen, 0,6 % Weißrussen, und jeweils 0,5 % Moldauern und Krim-Tataren. Entsprechend der nationalen Zusammensetzung ist die Ukraine zwar konfessionell gemischt, Zweidrittel der Ukrainer sind jedoch orthodoxer Glaubenszugehörigkeit. Bei einer 2007 in der Ukraine vom angesehenen Razumkov- Zentrum durchgeführten Umfrage erklärten 40 % der Befragten, sie seien religiös, ohne einer Denomination anzugehören, während sich 36,5 % einer bestimmten religiösen Gemeinschaft zugehörig fühlten. Von Letzteren bekannten sich 33 % zur Ukrainischen Orthodoxen Kirche Kiewer Patriarchats (UOK-KP), 31 % zur Ukrainischen Orthodoxen Kirche unter Moskauer Jurisdiktion (UOKMP), 18 % zur unierten (griechisch-katholischen) Kirche und 2,5 % zur Ukrainischen Autokephalen Orthodoxen Kirche (UAOK). Weniger als 5 % der Befragten bezeichnen sich als römisch-katholisch, protestantisch, als muslimisch und jüdisch; dazu kommen weitere kleinere Denominationen.
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire afer the second partition of Poland in 1793.
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
Kyiv (formerly Kiev) was the centre of the Rus principality in the 11th and 12th centuries and is still known as the Mother of Russian cities. The western Ukraine principality of Galicia was annexed by Poland in the 14th century. At about the same time, Kyiv and the Ukrainian principality of Volhynia were conquered by Lithuania before being absorbed by Poland. Poland, however, could not subjugate the Ukrainian cossacks, who allied themselves with Russia. Ukraine, except for Galicia (part of the Austrian Empire, 1772–1919), was incorporated into the Russian Empire after the second partition of Poland in 1793.
How do diverse EU strategies used to integrate less developed economies in the Eastern peripheries of
Europe effect local development? Introducing the distinction between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ EU integration
regimes, we compare the evolution of the automotive sectors in four European countries (Poland, Ukraine,
Romania, and Turkey). We show that diverse EU modes of integrating potential member states and economies
without the clear prospect of membership create very different constraints and opportunities for
developmental pathways. The shallow mode of integration used for countries lacking a (credible) membership
perspective combines trade liberalization and selective rule imposition with very little assistance. It
results in rather divergent developmental pathways for the EU ‘outsiders’ – depending on the stronger or
weaker capacities of the domestic public and private actors. In contrast, we found that the deep mode of
integration used for would be member states created more opportunities for convergence towards competitive
industries, even in countries with weak initial domestic capacities.
Our insights imply that encompassing deep integration may yield not only superior developmental results,
but may also increase the potential for further economic integration. In the shallow mode of integration
the EU may, however, loose support for European integration among rule taking countries once citizens
realize they cannot count on measures mitigating and/or compensating for present economic hardships. In
countries like Ukraine, the EU therefore risks to become a factor of economic and political destabilization.
This paper examines the implications of Ukraine’s move from a mixed electoral system to one of proportional representation in the 2006 parliamentary elections. In particular, it seeks to understand how the elimination of district contests affected the two major parties’ strategies in selecting candidates. Two strategies are outlined: prioritizing inclusion and prioritizing cohesion. Under the former, parties co-opt unaffiliated district deputies to improve their electoral fortunes despite potential costs to party discipline. The latter involves parties selecting affiliated deputies on the expectation of greater loyalty if elected. The analysis reveals that while the ruling party, Our Ukraine, employed a cautious version of inclusion, its opponent, the Party of Regions, emphasized cohesion. The findings show that “one size does not fit all” when it comes to how parties react to the introduction of list-only systems. Furthermore, given the greater subsequent success of The Party of Regions in gaining office, the results question the degree to which ruling parties benefit electorally from greater inclusion when responding to the advent of more proportional electoral rules.
This chapter discusses constitutional developments in Ukraine, a country that since its independence in 1991 has struggled with crucial constitutional questions, notably on how to balance the offices of the president, prime minister and chairman of parliament. A mixed system with a focus on presidential powers was put in place in 1996, but this did not significantly stabilize institutional relationships. The results so far have been three rounds of constitutional turns (the fourth is in the making). Nevertheless, the mixed system enshrined in the document continues to have serious shortcomings, which is one of the reasons why constitutional discussions have not ceased in Ukraine.
Deeply divided societies like Ukraine seem to be infertile terrain for inclusive mass deliberation. First, it may not even be possible to get people on opposing sides to sit in the same room, and even if they do meet, they may not really deliberate (Luskin et al., 2013). However, the promise of deliberative democracy that will bring about a transformative change in social relations remains attractive.
Abstrakt
This article addresses the problem of the ongoing constitutional transition in Ukraine that has been revived by the Maidan revolution of 2013–2014. The constitutional transition is increasingly seen as being key for solving what is apparently the greatest political crisis in the country’s history, for providing long-term stabilization of Ukraine’s constitutional order and ensuring democratic development. The article sheds light on a series of revolutionary causes of the current constitutional reform, against a broader context of preceding instrumentalization of constitutional politics and volatility of the constitutional process. Pre-revolutionary (presidential-parliamentary) and post-revolutionary (parliamentary-presidential) constitutional settings are compared, whilst the ramifications of re-transition to parliament- -dominated rule are also scrutinized. Finally, against the backdrop of an unfinished constitutional reform, the argument developed in the of the constitutional setting of Ukraine as both a desirable and necessary development to stabilize social-political and constitutional orders of the county.
To what extent do electoral institutions influence positions on same-sex marriage? Debates over same-sex marriage legislation have increased globally for the past 20 years, yet little research focuses on either debates in East Asia or the affect of electoral institutions. Using an original dataset on Taiwanese legislators and their public stances on same-sex marriage, this research finds that legislators elected under proportional representation (PR) are consistently more likely to support same-sex marriage laws than their counterparts elected in single-member districts (SMDs), even after controlling for partisanship. The results here not only highlight overlooked institutional influences on support, but also tie the broader literature on mixed-member systems to the growing research on same-sex marriage rights.
Ukraine’s policy towards Russia since independence in 1991 has been characterised by a predicament: how to preserve its statehood in the context of its heavy economic dependence on Russia, which was intent on Ukraine’s participation in Russian-led integration projects. In this essay we argue that only by understanding the complexities and seeming contradictions in Ukraine’s positioning vis-à-vis Russia can a full understanding of Ukraine’s commitment to Russia’s integration projects be attained. This essay systematically examines Ukraine’s responses to Russia’s initiatives and illuminates the strategy of the Ukrainian elites to extract economic benefits while minimising commitments.
The objective of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it explains why the “first transition” in Ukraine from a planned economy to a market economy failed. On the other, it suggests policy changes for the “second transition” that Ukraine is facing today from an oligarch-based economy to a more sustainable model able to bring about development and growth.
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