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Pro-Integration: Disengagement from and life after extremism
Kate Barrelle
Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC), School of Social Sciences, Monash
University, Melbourne, Australia
kate.barrelle@pro-integration.net
Article accepted for publication in:
Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression
Forthcoming in 2015
Bio
Dr Kate Barrelle is an Australian CVE consultant with almost 20-years of experience as
an applied forensic and clinical psychologist in community, government and research
arenas. Her PhD research was on disengagement from violent extremism and
subsequent societal integration. In the past Kate has worked in private practice where
she also undertook forensic assessments and treatment, and was a frequent expert
witness in court. She also worked for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs &
Trade in the Counter Terrorism Branch before co-founding a social enterprise for
disengaged youth called STREAT. Kate is a Vincent Fairfax Fellow (Ethical
Leadership) and participated in the ‘2020 Summit’ convened by the then Australian
Prime Minister. She consults to community as well as government CVE projects, and
conducts applied research in this area.
Pro-Integration: Disengagement from and life after extremism
This paper presents new findings about individual disengagement from violent
extremism in a Western context. Despite enormous investment of the last two
decades into responses to terrorism, the exit and reintegration processes of
extremists back into the community are not well understood. Whilst most
extremists struggle with the transition back into society, most eventually to
move on with their lives, becoming citizens again. Most do so unassisted.
Therefore, studying the phenomenon of natural disengagement is a critical
avenue to understanding why people choose to leave, how they leave, how
they reconnect and what areas of their lives undergo change in doing so.
Fifteen themes emerged directly from the transcripts of 22 interviews with
former extremists from a range of different ideological backgrounds. These
themes clustered into five domains which collectively represent the
phenomenological essence of disengagement from extremism, including
subsequent re-engagement with society. A key finding is that sustained
disengagement is actually about the proactive, holistic and harmonious
engagement the person has with wider society afterwards. Building on
existing empirical research, this paper proposes a tentative five domain, three
level model of disengagement called the Pro-Integration Model (PIM).
Keywords: disengagement, re-integration, Pro-Integration Model, violent
extremism, social identity, radicalisation
The purpose of this article is to propose a new conceptualisation of disengagement
called the Pro-Integration Model (PIM). Based on new empirical data gathered in a
Western democratic context, PIM comprises five domains and three levels of
engagement that provide a framework for understanding core aspects of subsequent
societal reintegration after disengagement from violent extremism
1
. A sub-set of the 22
participants interviewed were non-violent extremists, in order to provide a comparison
and deepen our understanding of disengagement. After a brief overview of the
knowledge gap regarding disengagement, a summary of the PhD research underpinning
the new findings and the PIM model will be presented.
What we do not know about disengagement from violent extremism
Most people who join extremist groups eventually leave (Bjorgo, 2013, p. 86). Despite
this, we do not possess a good understanding of how or why people leave extremism
behind, or what triggers an early voluntary exit, rather than a delayed or forced one
(Horgan, 2009b). Nor do we have sufficient knowledge of what is necessary to facilitate
a sustained return to society. There are less than 20 empirically based publications on
individual disengagement in a Western democratic context; a precariously thin evidence
base for understanding this phenomenon (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Nonetheless it is
well accepted that disengagement is one of the three broad phases in the life-cycle of
radicalisation – ‘Becoming’, ‘Being’ and ‘Leaving’ – highlighting the relevance of
identity in and the normality of disengagement (Horgan, 2008a, p. 3). Radicalisation
spans the first and the second of these phases, whilst disengagement, as it is
conceptualised in this paper, occurs during the third phase of ‘Leaving’ and extends
beyond. Almost every first-hand account testifies to the problems of being involved
with extremism (Bjorgo & Carlsson, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Ilardi, 2013;
Jacobson, 2010; Kassimeris, 2011; Reinares, 2011; Siegel, 2003; Wahlstrom, 2001).
The personal damage suffered by extremist group members can be significant: including
anxiety, paranoia, trauma, poor physical health, drug/alcohol abuse, physical injury, loss
of relationships with family and friends, disrupted education and career, criminal
charges, and/or imprisonment leading to limited future employment, housing and social
opportunities. The damage inflicted on a person’s community as a result of their
involvement in political extremism can be enormous, ranging from economic
disruption, to hate crimes, to large-scale attacks, as well as the significant policing and
social resources that go towards preventing and responding to acts of political violence.
Clearly, it is desirable to minimise the impact of violent extremists on society;
less obvious is that if former members are to disengage sustainably, it is necessary to
support them as they reintegrate. Therefore, it is critical to understand under what
conditions former extremists disengage and reconnect with society. Whilst
disengagement is not simply the reverse of the radicalisation, there is some evidence of
a thematic relationship for each individual between the entry and exit experiences
(Bjorgo, 2012; 2013, p. 44). In practice however, there are many variations on what
disengagement might look like. In this vein, the primary goal of this research is to gain
a better appreciation of the phenomenon of individual disengagement from violent
extremism, with a focus on the Australian context. In contemplating this issue, many
questions are raised. How and why do some people change their action orientation such
that they no longer use or endorse violence as a method to achieve their ideological
end? How and why do some people change their ideological beliefs such that they no
longer have radical ideological goals? How any why do some former members of
extremist groups successfully reintegrate into wider society and some do not? It is
highly significant that pioneers of this field who have conducted hundreds of interviews
with former extremists, are forced to conclude that, “there is no clear sense to date of
what disengagement even implies” (Horgan, 2009b, p. 29). Disengagement might
involve a “complete break with the social norms, values, attitudes, relationships and
social networks” if a person has made a complete split with the group (Horgan, 2009b,
p. 30). Or it might be a more subtle disengagement where they have changed their
position or responsibilities in the group, or even left, but maintain relationships with the
group along with its beliefs, values and norms (Horgan, 2009a, 2009b).
Understanding the phenomenon of disengagement
To investigate why people leave extremist groups, 22 former extremists from a range of
ideologies and backgrounds were interviewed about their disengagement and
reintegration experiences. There were 14 former members of violent extremist groups
and 8 former members of nonviolent extremist groups. Inclusion criteria required that
they were an active member of an extremist group for more than a year, and that they
had left over a year ago, and had no outstanding legal proceedings.
The former violent extremists interviewed included former jihadists, former far-
right extremists, and former militant Tamil separatists. The former nonviolent
extremists were previously members of direct-action radical environmentalist groups.
Inclusion of the latter was in order to explore disengagement from extremism across the
spectrum from nonviolent to violent. The inclusion of these participants enabled
discussion of 'extremism' as a whole. Participants had been involved with their
respective groups for an average of seven, a mode of two years, and a maximum of 20
years. The longest duration since leaving was 20 years, with a mean of 11, and a mode
of six years.
As has been demonstrated repeatedly in the terrorism literature, there is no
distinguishing profile of those who radicalise towards violent extremism (Horgan,
2008b; Silke, 1998). The sample used in this study was no different in its heterogeneity.
The majority of the sample (74%) were male. Sixty-nine percent were under the age of
25 when they became involved, and 17% were even younger than 15. Females were
interviewed from all but the neo-jihadist ideology type, which is consistent with other
findings (Taylor & Jacques, 2013; Zedalis, 2004). It was expected that there might be
greater female representation in the other ideology categories, though overall numbers
are far too small to expect any kind of proportional representation as seen in large
random samples.
Regarding commitment and personal investment, each participant was asked to
give a percentage to indicate how strongly they identified with their group at the time of
involvement. Despite hardships implicit in being a member of a radical group as well as
the social hostility that some groups experienced, plus scrutiny from authorities, the
participants nevertheless reported extraordinarily high levels of identification at the time
of their involvement. Sixty-one percent of participants indicated that during their group
involvement their sense of self was almost totally merged with the group (rated as 90–
100% identified). A further 22% rated their group identification to be very high (rated
as between 81–90%), with the remaining 17% giving a high rating (between 70–80%).
No participant rated themselves as below 70%, which is extraordinary in itself. The high
ratings were consistent across all types of ideology groups.
The present study approached disengagement from extremism as a phenomenon
in itself, as opposed to a series of case studies. Interpretative Phenomenological
Analysis (IPA) is a very effective form of analysis for ideographic qualitative data and
the most appropriate method for “looking in detail at how someone makes sense of a
major transition in their life” (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 3). The outcome or
‘results’ of a phenomenological study are the “structural invariants of a particular type
of experience” that emerge from the “instantiations of the same experience and must
effectively make sense of the experience” (Dukes, 1984, pp. 200-201; see Smith et al.,
2009, for detailed instructions). The 22 in-depth interviews of were analysed using IPA,
and the remainder of this paper is dedicated to presenting the high level findings.
Why did they leave?
Participants were interviewed about how and why they stopped their involvement, how
their sense of self and identity changed, as well as how they coped afterwards and
renegotiated their relationship with mainstream society. Each participant described
multiple reasons for leaving. Several cited the ineffectiveness and/or the horror of
violence, whilst some burnt-out. Overall disillusionment was the most common trigger
for eventual disengagement. Once disillusioned ‘pull factors’ such as having a family or
a career became attractive. Most reported a delay between early doubts and actual exit,
and most experienced a difficult transition out. Some had longer-term difficulties.
In the sample of 22 former extremist group members, there was enormous
variation in how and why the participants left their respective groups. There were also
enormous differences in the extent to which they remained disengaged over time,
whether they changed their views as well as their behaviour, and whether they
integrated positively into wider society. In almost every case there were multiple
reasons given for leaving, reflecting the complexity of this major decision in a person’s
life. A simple system was employed of allocating three points per person for their
primary reason for leaving, two points for their secondary reason and one point for their
tertiary reason. The per person weighted average for each reason was calculated across
all participants, and is presented in Figure 1.
Disillusionment with the behaviour of group leaders was the most commonly
cited reason for leaving, followed closely by disillusionment with the behaviour of
group members and then physical/psychological burnout. Closely related but separately
referenced was the detrimental impact of using violence. Once disillusioned by in-group
behaviour, burnt-out, repelled by violence, or frustrated with the lack of impact from
radical method, other activities and roles became relevant and attractive. Examples
include paid employment, returning to a career, having a relationship or family and/or
pursuing other interests. Amongst former jihadists and former far-right extremists,
Figure 1. Reasons for leaving
disappointment in the leadership and fellow group members led swiftly to a dismissal of
the group narrative, and departure soon after. Given these participants largely joined for
personal and social reasons, not for political or ideological reasons, it is consistent that
their reasons for leaving related more to social dimensions rather than ideological ones.
The fact that multiple reasons were provided by every participant indicates
complex non-linear motivations, belying any simplistic 'reason' for leaving. In most
cases there were major delays between an awareness that the fit was not so good
anymore and their actual departure. In most cases there was significant distress after
leaving, and a period of months to years of adjustment before finding a sustainable way
of living in the non-radical world. The experiences of the participants in this study make
it clear that a core aspect of disengagement is a realignment of personal and social
identity as they reconnect with society. Most of the participants underwent some
combination of three related identity processes as they left: a reduction in the intensity
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Forced out by group
Don't feel belong in group anymore
Forced out by arrest or defeat
Pulled towards other roles
Radical methods ineffective
Disillusionment with radical ideas
Excessive violence
Burnout
Disillusionment with group members
Disillusionment with leadership
of their connection to the extremist group, an emergence of their personal self, and
finding something else to do or identify with. These processes involves the reshaping of
identity as a person moves from being a member of a marginal or separatist group to
finding a place inside society where they fit and can speak out for the things that are
important to them. In short, disengagement is actually about engagement somewhere
else. Conceptualising this process required the creation of a new analytical model.
Pro-Integration Model (PIM)
The Pro-Integration Model (PIM) is a new conceptualisation of disengagement from
violent extremism and reintegration into society that combines the relevant empirical
and theoretical literature with five emergent themes resulting from this project. PIM is a
preliminary attempt to construct a holistic framework of disengagement and
reintegration after violent extremism in a Western democratic environment. The model
recognises that genuine engagement in mainstream society after leaving is the key to
enabling individuals to move on with their lives and/or progress their goals and beliefs
in a nonviolent way.
Collectively, the participants’ accounts give rise to 15 distinct but interconnected
disengagement themes, which cluster into five domains. The domains are: ‘Social
Relations’, ‘Coping’, ‘Identity’, ‘Ideology’, and ‘Action Orientation’, and are listed
with their themes in Table 1.
Ultimately disengagement is an identity transition from being an outsider to
belonging. This transition is predicated on change across five areas of an individual's
life that correspond to the emergent themes. In one form or another, these themes have
been noted in other research but the limited, disparate and dispersed nature of the
literature has made it difficult to make sense of it all. The findings support the idea that
Domain
Theme
Social Relations
Disillusionment with Group Members
Disillusionment with Leaders
Relations with ‘Others’
Coping
Physical and Psychological Issues
Social Support
Resilience, Skills and Coping
Identity
Reduction in Group Identity
Emergence of Personal Identity
Alternate Social Identity
Ideology
Disillusionment with Radical Ideas
Find Own Ideas
Acceptance of Difference
Action Orientation
Disillusionment with Radical Methods
Stop or Reduce Radical Methods
Prosocial Engagement in Society
Table 1. Domains and themes for leaving extremism and subsequent social integration
disengagement is not linear. Instead, it involves an interconnected process of change
across five key areas of a person's life, and in many cases development within these
areas occurs naturally over a period of years. Former extremists who report feeling the
most connected in mainstream society are those who have made significant changes in
each of the five domains: ‘Social Relations’, ‘Coping’, ‘Identity’, ‘Ideology’, and
‘Action Orientation’. These five themes relevant to sustained integration comprise the
five domains of PIM.
The term ‘pro-integration’ is used to capture the full potential of societal
engagement across these five domains. Proactive self-development across the domains
moves a person towards a state of connectedness and wellbeing as indicated by the
presence of: a range of supportive and meaningful relationships in the community;
psychological and physical health; the personal/social resources to participate in life; a
stable sense of self; a range of social identities; a coherent set of ideas and beliefs that
enable peaceful cohabitation; and nonviolent action orientation such that the individual
can participate in their own life, or wider community life to the full extent that they
wish without hurting others. Actual departure from an extremist group is just the
beginning of the next phase in a person’s life.
For conceptual clarity the model posits three levels of societal engagement,
though in reality there are infinite possible gradations within each domain, as evidenced
by the variation across former extremists in real life. PIM is neither linear nor staged. It
is not intended to prescribe a pathway or an outcome, merely to map out the full range
of pathways and possible outcomes for those reconnecting into society after disengaging
from a radical political or religious group. Each person has a different starting and a
different finishing point, and any given individual is not expected to be at the same level
across all domains. In fact, it appears normal to have differences in levels across
different domains. There is a clear parallel regarding achievement of personal wellbeing
and social engagement for all people. The five domains and the three levels result in a
multi-level multi-domain model, illustrated in Figure 2.
Some people simply do not wish to engage with mainstream society, even if
they have stopped using violence or other radical methods. This is termed a Minimal
level of engagement. The Cautious level of engagement with society after exiting
extremism means a person is engaged in a limited or hesitant manner. By their own and
any objective assessment they are not reaching their full potential for happiness or
wellbeing. A Positive level of engagement represents full integration, and this occurs
when a person enjoys healthy and functional relationships with people around them,
irrespective of their group categorisations. Following IPA, the emergent structural
properties of each domain were identified and will now be briefly summarised.
Figure 2. The Pro-Integration Model (PIM)
Social Relations
The participants in this study indicated that in a tight-knit, underground, mission-
oriented radical group, social relationships within the group and with out-group
members are absolutely critical. Social relationships are critical not only to the
formation and maintenance of the group as demonstrated by existing research, but also
in the motivation for disengagement. Further, social relations are at the heart of how a
person renegotiates relationships with the rest of society, especially if they belonged to
a separatist group or one that promoted hatred towards out-groups. The first two themes
of the ‘Social Relations’ domain, ‘Disillusionment with Leaders’ and ‘Disillusionment
with Group Members’ were two of the most commonly cited reasons for actually
leaving. The third theme, ‘Relations with ‘Others’, can be viewed as a partial proxy for
deradicalisation in that having positive or neutral relations with previously hated others
is an indication of pluralism, as well as desistance from radical methods.
A young former right-wing extremist participant recollected the disillusionment
she felt and how her social relationships began to change in the group when she realised
her peers were way out of step with their very own ideology. It was when she concluded
that probably did not even believe in the principles at all, that, in combination with the
in-fighting, internal violence and alcohol abuse that her disillusionment peaked and she
decided to leave.
I got really upset when I actually realised that many of them didn’t believe the
ideas at all, they just didn’t have anywhere else to go so they stayed put
anyway. But then the lifestyle that we had, because it was a lot of partying, it
was a lot of drama all of the time, and people fighting with each other and
stuff like that, that also took its toll, and that’s when I sort of decided that I
had to leave, I couldn’t stay there because my life would just go “poof” if I
didn’t.
Coping
Being in an extremist group, of any form, is generally not good for a person’s mental
health in the long-term. Anxiety, depression, trauma, paranoia, burnout, psychotic
breakdown and emotional breakdowns were reported by at least one member in every
type of ideology group. It was more prevalent in groups that used coercion and violence
for internal discipline, such as the RWE groups and some of the neo-jihadist groups.
Former extremists who experienced physical hardship also reported a higher incidence
of mental and physical issues, implicating former radical environmentalists and LTTE
soldiers. A minority of participants reported that they joined their extreme or radical
groups with existing problems. For these people, aggressive relations with out-groups,
strong expectations of conformity, in combination with disconnection from external
social supports frequently contributed to deterioration of existing issues.
The themes that make up the ‘Coping’ domain are ‘Physical and Psychological
Issues’, ‘Social Support’, and ‘Resilience, Skills and Coping’. These are closely related
to the ‘Social Relations’ domain themes already presented, but sufficiently independent
to warrant their own inclusion. Most people seek support from other people to deal with
personal problems, and additionally, many problems arising within an extremist group
are related to relationships with other members. Individuals come with their own
particular combination of psychological and physical vulnerabilities, as well as with
their own suite of existing social support. A similarly wide variation of resilience and
coping skills means these elements combine in unique ways to assist or hinder
reintegration. One former Tamil Tiger participant reported how her family attended to
her physical injuries, whilst her sister provided critical emotional support.
[We would] go out for walks in the tea bushes and I would just keep talking to
her, and she did nothing but just listen. And she just was wonderful ... I was
unloading this stuff onto her but she didn’t say much. But she had also gone
through terrible trauma with the Army coming, and so she sort of said about
that to me.
Identity
Identity is core to who we are, and this is no different for extremists; indeed, as already
foreshadowed, disengagement from extremism and engagement with mainstream
society can be viewed as the ultimate identity transformation. As already noted, the
participants identified very highly with their respective groups at the time of
involvement. Just as the dominance of a single social identity over other social
identities, and over a person’s personal identity is characteristic of the radicalisation
process, the experiences of these 22 participants makes it clear that a core aspect of
disengagement is a realignment of personal and social identity as they reconnect with
society. Most of the participants underwent some combination of three related identity
processes: a reduction in the intensity of their connection to the extremist group, an
emergence of their personal self, and finding something else to do or identify with.
Some participants reported that a critical incident triggered the re-emergence of
their personal views and values, following which they felt less connected and as though
the extremist group fit was not so good any more. Others reported a reduction in group
identification after being disillusioned by some aspect of the group’s ideas, actions or
leadership, and this led to separation which was followed by the gradual emergence of
personal identity. In a small number of cases, involvement with outside people or
activities led to a distancing from the extremist group and a parallel emergence of
personal identity, resulting in reduced identification with the group. There was large
variation in what people did after they left and whether they could find other activities
or people with which to spend their time. In most cases there were delays between
noticing they did not belong in the group anymore, and having options or resources to
enable an exit. The three ‘Identity’ domain themes are ‘Reduction in Group
Identification’, ‘Emergence of Personal Identity’ and ‘Alternate Social Identity’.
One former radical environmentalist rated his identification at the time as 100%,
defining himself entirely by this group involvement: “[It was] everything, my whole life,
it was all consuming”. He went on to say, “activism became my identity, it consumed
my whole life and it became completely intertwined with my identity as a person”.
Ideology
Participants varied enormously in terms of how they perceive the legitimacy of the
democratically elected government, and in social identity terms, who they see as worthy
of reward or punishment based on any belief or ideology. These findings support the
notion that even if a former extremist has stopped their involvement in violent or illegal
activities to advance their political goals, they may or may not have moderated their
views. The findings also support the importance of pluralism in re-engagement with
society. It is possible for a person to moderate their own views without necessarily
accepting that other people, especially those who disagree with them directly, have a
legitimate right to hold their divergent beliefs and practices. On the other hand,
participants who were able to cultivate a pluralist attitude seem to have fared better in
their re-engagement with society. The three ‘Ideology’ domain themes are
‘Disillusionment with Radical Ideas’, ‘Find Own Beliefs’ and ‘Acceptance of
Difference’. As noted, not everyone modifies their beliefs. One former neo-jihadist,
fully disengaged in a behavioural sense, was adamant that he had not changed his
views.
I left the group, but my views that I held within the group at the time, actually
haven’t really changed that much since I left the group. I left the group for
really, personal reasons ... I couldn’t do what it was that they requested of me,
I couldn’t do that. In myself I couldn’t do it. But my beliefs are still pretty
much the same; they haven’t changed.
On the other hand, a different former neojihadist explained just how different his
views were now.
No! I threw all that belief away, and you know, I don’t think it was like a
belief anyway. I think it was a power trip, you know. In my belief, I come to
understand it is just a power trip. It is a political move power trip. For all the
activities now, like thank God that I still have a bit of brains to think of what
happened, you know what I mean. I just truly think it was nothing but a power
trip, because Sheikh wasn’t ever a person that has any fairness in him.
Action Orientation
A defining element of violent or radical extremism is the orientation towards action. A
former extremist might no longer use violence or radical methods but this could be
because they have been forced to desist by force of arrest, overt surveillance, incapacity,
or expulsion from the group. It may be voluntary but reluctant, as in the case of
someone who needs to earn money, or leave to keep family safe. Based on participant
reports, and reflected in the three themes of this domain, a distinction can be drawn
between no longer using radical methods, no longer endorsing or supporting the use of
such methods, and actual prosocial engagement in the community. These three aspects
overlap to some extent, but the examples provided in this section will illustrate the
distinctions between them and how different combinations can result in vastly different
outcomes for former extremists. The three ‘Action Orientation’ domain themes are
titled ‘Disillusionment with Radical Methods’, ‘Stop Using Radical Methods’, and
‘Prosocial Engagement in Society’.
Former extremists of the right-wing, the neojihadist and the militant Tamil
separatists ideology groups referred to the ineffectiveness of violence. However it was a
former (non-violent) radical environmentalist participant who best articulated the sense
of futility in using direct action or illegal methods outside the democratic process. Here
she reflects on the lack of connection of direct action to a broader movement of social
change.
I think that direct-action is only, it’s either a stop gap so it will temporarily
hold something maybe, very temporarily. While you get all your other ducks in
line and you know you can rely on people who have access to politicians,
people who are doing perhaps kind of campaigning around kind of jobs and
you know economic factors and so forth. I think it had to be kind of some
multipronged campaign, I think by itself it doesn’t do very much.
Bringing it all together
Overall disengagement can be viewed as an identity transformation from outside to
inside mainstream society across the five domains of the PIM. Social relations are the
vehicle through which most change occurs, so consideration of who a person spends
time with is critical. Coping skills and self-care are necessary for an individual to move
from surviving to thriving in society, this is especially so for former extremists and
needs to be incorporated into any referral and support programs aimed at assisting or
accelerating disengagement from violent extremism. Identity is core to who we are and
where we belong, therefore safe opportunities need to be provided for disengaging
individuals to explore their personal values and test out new places in society they
might want to belong; this is best achieved through mediators that the person identifies
with on some level. If beliefs, ideas and narratives remain important to the disengaging
person then they will need to be learn how to respectfully challenge and question ideas,
as well as educate themselves in their faith/ideology tradition in order to live
harmoniously in wider society without hatred or conflict. Finally, action orientation
typically changes when the person removes themselves from the radical social
environment because the group influence no longer dominates, and generally results in a
cessation of violence. How long this remains so depends entirely on the changes in the
other domains.
The essence of these five domains, at each level of societal engagement is
summarised in Table 2.
Domain
Minimal societal engagement
Cautious societal engagement
Positive societal engagement
Social
Relations
Negative interactions with most people and no
wider societal engagement unless necessary. May
still be in contact with radical group members, or
else feel in a social vacuum — out of the group
but mistrusting of, and/or mistrusted by society.
Caution or restraint in relationships is typical.
This may be because of health obstacles, or
because they are not comfortable interacting with
previously hated groups. If a person has cut ties
with family or previous friendship circles then it
can be a slow journey to build new relationships.
Positive relationships with family and others in the
immediate community. Can access services and
have neutral or friendly interactions with people
who used to be the ‘enemy’. Their relationships
reflect their sense of connectedness in the
community.
Coping
Many people leaving extremist groups have
mental or physical personal health issues to
deal with. In the absence of sufficient personal
or social support resources, these issues remain
a barrier to wellbeing and societal integration.
Surviving but not thriving with respect to
personal issues because of a lack of social
support. Once connected to suitable support
services gains are often made. Much depends on
pre-existing resilience and skills as to how fast
they gain traction in their new life.
Able to address personal issues. Able to draw on
suitable social support networks. Function in
society with independence and dignity, and have
sufficient resilience and vocational skills to work,
study, or undertake family duties or other
meaningful activities.
Identity
Identity may still be fused with the radical
group, or the person feels lost without this
group identity. They feel even more “at sea” in
the absence of a stable personal identity, and
may have trouble feeling connected to any
other meaningful identity groups.
Do not feel they belong fully in society, but have
reduced identification with radical group and
spend time with others. Beginning to explore
personal sense of self. This can be difficult if they
were immersed in a separatist radical group for a
long time, especially if they joined as a teenager.
Probably have stopped identifying with the former
extremist group. Stable and clear sense of personal
identity. Likely to identify with several meaningful
social groups. No longer view others solely in
terms of in- and out-group, and consider all people
worthy of respect and human rights.
Ideology
May still hold radical ideas and remain hostile
in attitude towards society. May have modified
views to exclude violence as an option for
themselves anymore. Intolerance of different or
dissenting beliefs.
Have probably modified their ideological beliefs
and rejected violence. They may have searched
for and settled on a belief system or they may be
disinterested in formal ideology or faith
traditions. They may start to increase tolerance
for difference because of wider social interactions
and exposure.
Unlikely to hold radical views, though this is
possible. If so, the ideology will be nonviolent.
Level of hostility towards society is reduced
significantly, if present at all. Tolerate or respect
others’ beliefs and practices. Accept society and
the system as legitimate. Able to disagree with
someone politically without aggression or hatred.
Action
Orientation
No longer using violence but this may be
involuntary or conditional. Probably supportive
of others using violence. Reject system and
society as illegitimate so do not think
mainstream laws and social norms should apply
to them. May grudgingly comply.
Do not use violence at all. Probably reject it as
a legitimate method for achieving goals. May
still think the system is broken but accept a
slower pace of change. Active in their own life,
but health and identity issues dominate so it is
hard to get engaged in wider community
activities.
Do not consider violent, illegal or anti-social
methods legitimate for anyone. Actively
involved in their own life and probably their
immediate community to some degree. May
participate in mainstream social change for their
group, and possibly in altruistic prosocial
activities.
Table 2. PIM domains across the three levels of engagement
Conclusion
This research aimed to elicit the essence of disengagement as a phenomenon, by
understanding the experience directly from the perspective of people who have lived
this experience. The scope was deliberately restricted to consideration of individual
voluntary disengagement in a Western context. By delving deeply into the phenomenon
through the 22 disengagement-focused interviews with former extremists, and building
on the foundation of existing empirical work, greater insight to the understanding of
disengagement is gained. Disengagement from violent extremism is ultimately about
finding somewhere else to belong. Interventions and support to assist those who want to
leave violent extremism to do so, and to facilitate robust pro-integration for those who
have already left, can be informed by this research.
Given the paucity of empirical data on this topic, the primary purpose of this
PhD research project was to generate such data. The second goal was to analyse the
empirical data from the perspective of participants themselves, addressing the question:
'What is the experience of disengagement from the perspective of extremists
themselves?' The final aim of this study was to integrate any new findings with current
literature to advance the state of knowledge about disengagement from violent
extremism.
Fifteen themes emerged directly from the transcripts of the 22 participant
interviews. These themes clustered into five domains which collectively represent the
phenomenological essence of disengagement from extremism, including subsequent re-
engagement with society. The domains are Social Relations, Coping, Identity, Ideology,
and Action Orientation, each with three component themes. A key finding was that
disengagement is an identity transition and that sustained disengagement is actually
about the proactive, holistic and harmonious engagement the person has with wider
society afterwards. This has been termed 'pro-integration'.
Finally, this research project went further than anticipated and, building on
existing empirical research, proposed a tentative five domain, three level model of
disengagement called the Pro-Integration Model (PIM). It is suggested that
incorporating pro-integration into the research, policy and intervention agenda is a
strengths-based way of assisting people to genuinely connect with civic society after
their involvement into extremism. The essence of pro-integration is well captured by the
words of a former Tamil Tiger fighter participant who, despite having many friends
killed by the Sinhalese majority government military, sees himself and all other people
as part of the same overarching social identity group of humans.
So when I came out of it I realised, no, a human being is a human being
wherever you go. At the end of the day you speak one language, I speak
another language but it’s just a language that’s different: we are all human
beings.
It is concluded that for former extremists to identify with, and have a sense of
belonging in mainstream society is not only good for them as individuals, but
advantageous for a resilient society, and as a side-effect, cultivates strong protection
against re-involvement in violent extremism.
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Endnotes
1
. Where grammatically sensible the term ‘extreme’ will be used in this paper as an adjective,
for example ‘extreme ideology’ or ‘extreme methods’. On its own, the term ‘extremist’ or
‘extremism’ will be used to mean a person or movement endorsing extreme political ideas.
There is no necessary or simple correlation between extreme views and violence. Whilst it
might be slightly lengthy, the nomenclature of ‘a nonviolent extremist’ or conversely ‘violent
extremism’ provides clarity and reduces unnecessary concern regarding intolerance of extreme
or radical ideas that are not accompanied by violence, which is not of legal concern in Australia.
The phenomenon of radicalisation is broad and complex but for the purposes of this article, the
word ‘radical’ will be used to mean the same as ‘extreme’.
