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Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy.
... Conflict is ubiquitous in American politics (Jamieson, 1992). During the run up to the 2016 presidential election, for instance, it was not uncommon to see candidates and their supporters attacking their opponents (Jaffe, 2016;Chozik, 2016). ...
... The participatory nature of politics in the U.S., particularly, necessitates the ability to make informed decisions through the civil exchange of differing opinions (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Yet the U.S. party system additionally creates an adversarial political environment that may intensify disagreements between opposing parties (Jamieson, 1992;Kagan, 1991), which may foster incivility (Herbst, 2010;Vargo & Hopf, in press). ...
... Furthermore, given that political activities frequently occur in conflict-laden situations (e.g., Jamieson, 1992), those apt to avoid volatile situations may choose not to participate through self-censorship (Hayes et al., 2006). Research indicates that conflict avoidance decreases interpersonal political discussion and expression (e.g., Ulbig & Funk, 1999). ...
In this chapter, we expand the idea that conflict avoidance (CA) inhibits online political participation. We specifically propose that CA has a direct negative link with traditional online political participation and online political expression, and an indirect negative link with these two forms of participation when mediated by political interest and internal political efficacy. We test our propositions through analyzing data from a survey of young adult college students residing in a battleground state in the U.S. Midwest conducted during the weeks prior to the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Our results showed that CA has a direct negative association with both traditional online political participation and online political expression. CA also has a negative relationship with political interest and internal political efficacy, which in turn, are positively linked with traditional online political participation and online political expression. We discussed implications.
... With the advent of television, came adwatches in their more traditional form. Indeed, Johnson's 1964 "Daisy Girl" spot aired only once, yet the press reacted immediately re-broadcasting the spot in its entirety (Jamieson, 1992;West, 1993). ...
... Adbites are equivalent to soundbites and fit easily into the news format. Thus, adbites have the power to shape the language and visual imagery of the news (Jamieson, 1992). ...
... Although most adwatches cover issue oriented spots (Kaid et al., 1993;McKinnon et al., 1996), media commentators focus on image characteristics by emphasizing the drama and suspense of the advertising campaign (West, 1993). Indeed, journalists give the most attention to ads that are evocative, humorous, and controversial (Jamieson, 1992). Content analyses also show that adwatches cover more negative ads than positive ones (Kaid et al., 1993;McKinnon et al., 1996;Jamieson, 1992;West, 1993;. ...
The current study examined the effectiveness of retirement financial services advertising (RFSA) in consumer intertemporal choice. When consumers make decisions on retirement savings, they face trade-offs: when should they start saving, how much do they need to invest, and how much do they need to retire? Specifically, this study explored the effectiveness of a financial services advertisement stressing the investment process for retirement savings (that is, process framing) and a financial services advertisement emphasizing the outcome of investment (that is, outcome framing) in combination with gain and loss frames. The obtained data indicated that people in the process framing condition had a stronger tendency to choose the earlier saving option over the delay option when an ad was presented in terms of losses versus gains. In contrast, the advantage of gains (vs. losses) was found in the outcome framing condition. Some implications for strategic advertising messages to promote early retirement savings were discussed.
... This, we believe, has led research to overestimate the influence of emotional appeals and underestimate the rationality and interpretative involvement of the viewer. The language describing the role of emotions in political advertising often uses words such as 'trigger' , 'cue' , 'tapping into' , or 'manipulate' the emotions (Brader, 2005(Brader, , 2006Jamieson, 1992), thereby painting the viewer as a passive recipient of a rhetorical stimulus. This, as our interviews demonstrate, is not the case. ...
... Through rhetorical reception studies, we examine the incongruities affecting our informants' reception of political commercials and explore how the rational and the emotional work in unison when viewers process such multimodal rhetoric. We agree that emotional appeals may sway, distract and confuse viewers (as suggested by, for instance, Jamieson, 1992). However, our study also shows that the emotional is closely integrated with the rational: viewers make sense of and feel the commercials in a rhetorical working through (for an elaboration on working through, see Kjeldsen, 2018d) that combines the two. ...
Research into visual and multimodal rhetoric has been dominated by social scientific and textual perspectives that may not be able to provide documented understandings of how rhetorical objects are actually experienced by an audience. In this study, the authors engage in rhetorical protocol analysis through 10 in-depth interviews asking informants to make sense of selected political advertisements in the 2020 US election campaign. They examine the types of competing sensory elements found within the campaign texts and situations, which they term ‘multimodal incongruity’ and establish two types of cognitive frameworks informants use when engaging in the political rhetoric of the commercials: personal experience and cynicism. Personal experience allowed the informants to make sense of and argue against campaign messages. Cynicism often guided participants to unpack the generic conventions of political advertising, politics more generally, and opposing partisan strategies. Both interpretive frames – but the frame of cynicism, in particular – enable participants to critically distance their reading of and emotional response to the campaign commercials. This critical distancing reveals connections between rationality and emotionality through ‘deliberative embedding’, meaning that the emotional is understood in terms of and negotiated in relation to already established cognitive frameworks of information, opinions and cynical readings of the genre. The authors conclude the essay by reflecting on their methodological and theoretical insights regarding multimodal rhetoric.
... In the latter notion, dirty campaigning is defined as "namecalling, contempt, and derision of the opposition" (Brooks & Geer, 2007, p. 1) or includes attributes such as insulting language, profanity, stereotypes, or discriminative terms (Chen, 2017). One of the first and most prominent books in this research strand is Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy by Jamieson (1993). The author argues that the 1988 United States presidential election campaign advanced new advertising techniques to attain news coverage, such as using more subtle rhetoric, vivid language, or inflammation. ...
... We contribute to the previous literature by showing that negative campaigning cannot serve as an umbrella term that subsumes dirty campaigning. Also, our conceptualization of dirty campaigning is multi-faceted because it goes beyond the incivility concept (Jamieson, 1993;Mutz, 2015) and encompasses the use of unfair campaign methods, such as techno-distortions, deepfakes, or voter suppression tactics (Kaid, 2001;Newman et al., 2018). Thus, our findings show that dirty campaigning as a broader and multi-faceted concept has the potential to undermine trust in politicians. ...
Negative campaigning is a central concept in political communication research. However, most conceptualizations of the term are rather broad, summarizing all kinds of negativity such as substantial criticism and offensive behaviors. In this paper, we distinguish negative, dirty, and positive campaigning. While negative campaigning refers to critical, civil, and non-disrespectful arguments, dirty campaigning, by contrast, is defined as “below-the-belt” attacks including incivility and unfair campaign methods. In a two-wave Austrian national election panel study, we tested the reciprocal effects of perceived negative, dirty, and positive campaigning on distrust in politicians. Using auto-regressive models, we found that perceived dirty campaigning positively predicted distrust in politicians over time. Furthermore, distrust in politicians led to increased perceptions of dirty campaigning over time, suggesting a reciprocal relationship. However, perceived negative and positive campaigning were unrelated to distrust in politicians. Theoretical and methodological implications of distinguishing negative, dirty, and positive campaigning are discussed.
... Noris (2010) defines political communication as a subfield of communication and political science, concerning itself with the spread of information and its influence on politics, policy makers, news media, and citizens. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, who has spent her career studying, amongst other subjects, political communication and campaign communications, believes that political communicators are obliged to tell the truth, to be reasonable and civil, while citizens have an obligation to exercise their influence directly or indirectly to make sure that standards of political practice are upheld (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978;Campbell & Jamieson, 1990;Jamieson, 1984;Jamieson, 1988;Jamieson, 1992;Jamieson, 2000;Jamieson & Birdsell, 1988;Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Jamieson's expectation of citizens to exercise their rights is very close to the informal definition of active citizenship. ...
... Noris (2010) defines political communication as a subfield of communication and political science, concerning itself with the spread of information and its influence on politics, policy makers, news media, and citizens. Kathleen H. Jameson believes that political communicators are obliged to tell the truth, to be reasonable and civil, while citizens have an obligation to exercise their influence directly or indirectly to make sure that standards of political practice are upheld (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978;Campbell & Jamieson, 1990;Jamieson, 1984;Jamieson, 1988;Jamieson, 1992;Jamieson, 2000;Jamieson & Birdsell, 1988;Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Jameson's expectation of a citizen is close to the informal definition of active citizenship which has four parts: (1) Bulgaria falls under "Patrimonial communism" which is largely based on personal networks combined with low levels of formal organization based on the types of post-communist regimes outlined in Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka (1999). ...
The goal of the project was to give a perspective into the voting behaviour of young Bulgarians. Literature on the subject shows that political communication concerns itself with the spread of communication and its influence on media, citizens, and government. Furthermore, active citizenship is considered an important aspect of political communication. Because mass media influences public opinion, marketing and advertising strategies have become prevalent in political communication, and the successful running for office has now been tied with various aspects of marketing.
Bulgaria is a country of “Patrimonial communism” according to Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka (1999). Pehlivanova (2009) explains what this means by pointing out that interpersonal relationships generate more trust than institutions do due to low levels of bridging and out-group trust that have resulted in family bonds becoming the new source of trust. Other researchers recognize that young people tend to be a group that is separated from the rest of society and positively discriminated against; therefore, young people are an important group to be studied.
The paper studied individuals’ opinions, in order to better understand how they perceive different problems relating to political efficacy. The research was conducted as a qualitative work, through an in-depth interview process. The population of interest for this study were young Bulgarians, between the ages of 18 and 30.
Findings revealed that the barriers to voting for young people are (1) despair and disappointment in the current political climate; (2) the feeling of corruption; and (3) a lack of political education. The communication strategies that work best for the target audience were identified as: (1) having younger people in political parties; (2) the use of accessible language and use interesting formatting; (3) offer realistic solutions to existing problems; and (4) more effective use of social media through personalization of parties and candidates. The paper concluded that in the current political climate young Bulgarians are not finding political communication effective as they do not feel that they are the target of said communication. They would like to feel listened to and understood and to clearly see that their problems are being addressed in an adequate way, where the politicians fully understand both their concerns but also the type of media best suited for them.
This study has two main limitations – time and sample size – due to these, future research would be required.
... En estos estudios se observaba cierta priorización por parte de las noticias electorales por el juego estratégico, más aún por la denominada carrera de caballos (Iyengar et al., 2004;Kahn, 1991;Patterson, 1994;Russonello y Wolf, 1979;Sigelman y Bullock, 1991); estos estudios mostraban la ventaja que podría ir teniendo algún candidato. Jamieson (1992) contribuyó señalando que este esquema de cubrir las noticias utilizaba lenguaje de guerras y deporte. A esto también habría que añadir que, De Vreese y Semetko (2002) incluyeron aspectos relacionados a las cualidades o al desempeño personal de los candidatos. ...
Este artículo compara las publicaciones en redes sociales de las candidatas Verónika Mendoza y Keiko Fujimori en los procesos electorales de 2016 y 2021, únicas candidatas que participaron en ambos procesos. Para esta comparación se utilizó la teoría del framing, teniendo como cortes periodos previos y posteriores a los debates electorales. Las publicaciones en redes sociales se clasificaron en frames temáticos, estratégicos y posicionales. El interés de la comparación radica en observar si el debate electoral, evento privilegiado para mostrar propuestas y planes de gobierno, avizora un cambio en el tipo de enmarcamiento de las candidatas. Se observa que las publicaciones de las candidatas muestran diferentes posiciones de enmarcamiento, pero el debate no cambia el tenor de las publicaciones, privilegiándose los frames estratégicos sobre los posicionales y temáticos.
... Historically, each major movement to improve the position of Black people in American society has been met with White countermobilization and backlash (Alexander, 2020). Importantly, while pre-Civil Rights era White countermovements were explicitly and transparently motivated by White supremacy and racism, the norm of racial equality in the post-Civil Rights era inaugurated a shift to more subtle and race-neutral or "coded" expressions of racism by elites (Gilens, 1996(Gilens, , 1999Jamieson, 1993;Mendelberg, 2001) and the public (Kinder & Sanders, 1996;Schuman et al., 1997). In the post-Civil Rights era, scholarship firmly documents the ever-morphing coded vehicles through which Americans express racial animus, including support for the "Official English" movement (Citrin et al., 1990), "three strikes" laws (Johnson, 2008), "Southern heritage" (Strother et al., 2017), the birther conspiracy (Pasek et al., 2015), the Tea Party movement (Parker & Barreto, 2014), and opposition to the Colin Kaepernick NFL protests (Stepp & Castle, 2021). ...
In this article, we develop and test three propositions related to the status of a primary counterpoint of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement—“Blue Lives Matter” (BlueLM). Employing correlational and causal analyses on a wide array of data, including public opinion, news and social media, internet searches, and merchandise sales, our findings are threefold: first, we offer evidence that Whiteness is associated with attitudinal and behavioral indicators of support for BlueLM; second, we present evidence that support for BlueLM is systematically linked to White racial prejudice; and third, we demonstrate that BlueLM activity is caused by BLM protest following a high-profile police killing of a Black man, which comports with the conceptualization of BlueLM as engaging in a process of “competitive victimhood” against BLM. Together, these findings suggest that BlueLM is a new incarnation of an ongoing history of White countermobilization against organized Black claims-making activity.
... Nevertheless, there is another concept regarding media coverage of politics, which has also been associated with changes in political communication, and which we want to measure here: coverage of campaign' strategies. Cappella and Jamieson (1996) summarized the characteristics of strategic media coverage described by Jamieson (1992) in five points: winners and losers as the main concern; language of warfare, games and competition; a story with actors/performers, critics and audience (voters); emphasis on performance, style and perceptions of the candidate; and the significant importance attributed to surveys and the position and evaluation of candidates and their campaigns. Moreover, Patterson (1994) describes a similar situation under the concept "game stories", which frames the campaigns within the context of the strategies and tactics followed by the candidates and their possible successes and failures in the opinion polls, a concept whereby the author broadens his previous definition of "horse race journalism" (Patterson, 1977). ...
We investigate the evolution of the coverage of political campaigns in Chile, through a content analysis of the issues highlighted in four national newspapers in the 1989 and 2009 campaigns. We seek to determine the increases of two types of personalization and the coverage of the candidates’ strategies. We focus on personalization, understood first as “competences” (the coverage of political-personal characteristics of the candidates) which differ from the “privatization” (highlights the private lives of the candidates). Results show an expected increase in the space allocated to privatization and strategies, but no change in the coverage of the political traits of the candidates.
... Respecto a la investigación sobre los frames en las noticias periodísticas, ésta se concibe como el tratamiento informativo y la cobertura que hacen los medios a los acontecimientos sobre los que informan (Sádaba, 2001;Jamieson, 1993;Lamuedra, 2012). ...
Based on the framing of the news of the Peace Dialogues in La Havana that the newspaper El Tiempo produced between 2012 and 2016, the media memory that the newspaper built on the internal Colombian conflict between the State and the FARC guerrillas was analyzed. Three frames were established: an error that should not be repeated, a senseless tragedy and a past that has been overcome. Based on these three frames, the newspaper not only recalled the past in light of a present event, but also promoted its own political position on the conflict over the legitimacy of the Dialogues.
... Falsehood in the public arena has been fed by political confrontation, for which election campaigns represent a crucial event on the national calendar. For several years, scholars have warned of increasingly dirty campaigning (Goldman 2008) that resorts to a strategy of intensively negative or false advertising (Hasen 2013) and deception (Jamieson 1992). The media have also contributed to perpetuating political misinformation (Amazeen 2019) by means of superficial coverage (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996) and loss of contact with the truth (Adatto 1990). ...
This chapter analyzes the focus and scope of three collaborative projects aimed at verifying electoral campaigns, in France (2017), Brazil (2018), and Spain (2019), all of which took place in a polarized scenario with a distinct rise in populism. The Trump presidential election also illustrates the link between populism and alternative facts. Populist parties have gained momentum in most countries around the world, or have maintained their strength in those where they already existed, as in the case of France's National Front. The combination of a polarized political climate fueled by populist candidates, together with the involvement of social media actors in a complex ecosystem resulting from digitization, has transformed elections into a breeding ground for disinformation. The high percentage of disinformation detected by the fact-checking initiatives confirms the relevance of these projects that were launched in several countries, with the involvement of different media, academic, and technological partners, in fighting the problem.
... Persuasion, compromise, and the sense that the other side won the argument in good faith, give way to the sense that the fight should be won at all costs (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). The result is an unwillingnes to compromise, and even an inability to engage in a reasoned discussion (Jamieson, 1992;Massaro & Stryker, 2012). In an uncivil political environment, talented candidates may be discouraged from seeking election (Maisel, 2012). ...
A great deal of experimental research has focused on how political incivility affects ordinary citizens. A common finding is that incivility reduces political trust. Effects on political participation have also been investigated, but seem less consistent across studies. The results of a systematic review and meta-analysis, including a total of 24 manuscripts containing 35 studies, revealed that the estimated effect of political incivility on political trust was significant, Hedges’ g = −0.19 [95% CI: −0.30, −0.09]. The effect was small, however, and some indication of publication bias was found. The effect was stronger when the incivility was communicated through video versus other media, and for studies conducted in the United States versus Europe. The estimated effect of political incivility on political participation was almost non-existent, g = −0.02 [−0.11, 0.08], although it was significantly stronger (more negative) for studies conducted in Europe rather than in the United States.
... Otro de los aspectos que caracteriza a este rol es la dependencia de las encuestas de opinión (Banducci y Hanretty, 2014), las que otorgan datos, en apariencia, objetivos y que permiten fácilmente construir una narrativa de la campaña como si se tratara de una carrera de caballos o competencia deportiva, jerarquizando la relevancia de cada candidato dentro del proceso de cobertura (Kraus, 2000;Jamieson, 1992). Entonces el trata hacia los candidatos y la profundidad con la que se abordan sus ideas pasa a depender de ese potencial éxito o fracaso (Jamieson y Waldman, 2003), lo que limita el conocimiento que puede tener la audiencia sobre los candidatos y sus propuestas (Coleman y Ross, 2010;Herbst, 1996). ...
Más allá de la importancia indiscutida que han adquirido los debates televisivos en las campañas electorales alrededor del mundo, este trabajo parte del hecho de que no se ha estudiado suficientemente el rol de los periodistas que los conducen y su incidencia en el desarrollo y contenido del debate. Ante la ausencia de un marco que permita comparar la actuación de los periodistas en diferentes países, proponemos un esquema de 30 indicadores, agrupados en torno a cuatro roles que un periodista puede asumir en un debate, de acuerdo a la bibliografía consultada (Adversario, Estratégico, Perro Guardián y Cívico). Aplicado este esquema a una muestra de siete debates presidenciales que utilizan el formato del “panel de periodistas”, los resultados muestran que la variación más sustancial respecto del uso de diferentes opciones de roles para formular preguntas está dada por la posición en las encuestas de los candidatos interrogados.
... Seguindo adiante, a observação das estratégias persuasivas (V3), em conjunto com os recursos linguísticos (V4 a V15), é importante para este capítulo Gentzkow, 2017;Tandoc;Lim;Ling, 2018;Dourado, 2020). Ao mesmo tempo, o problema começou a ser compreendido em diálogo com a conjuntura comunicacional marcada pela exposição de mensagens antissistemas e antidemocráticas na esfera de visibilidade pública política (Gomes, 2006) (Jamieson, 1992;Borba, 2017), distribuição de boataria (Koidl;Matthews, 2017;Rojecki;Meraz, 2016), táticas de propaganda política computacional (Gorrell et al., 2019;Woolley;Howard, 2017) e engajamento político coordenado por vias orgânicas e artificiais (Arnaudo, 2017;Azzimonti;Fernandes, 2018;Bessi;Ferrara, 2016;Ruediger, 2017), baseado em repertórios de confronto Freitas, 2018), dissenso e antagonismo agravados diante da competitividade de processos eleitorais. Percebe-se, portanto, que "Bolsonaro" e "Haddad" são os principais vetores de narrativas falsas nos três principais meses das eleições de 2018 no Brasil. ...
... Seguindo adiante, a observação das estratégias persuasivas (V3), em conjunto com os recursos linguísticos (V4 a V15), é importante para este capítulo Gentzkow, 2017;Tandoc;Lim;Ling, 2018;Dourado, 2020). Ao mesmo tempo, o problema começou a ser compreendido em diálogo com a conjuntura comunicacional marcada pela exposição de mensagens antissistemas e antidemocráticas na esfera de visibilidade pública política (Gomes, 2006) (Jamieson, 1992;Borba, 2017), distribuição de boataria (Koidl;Matthews, 2017;Rojecki;Meraz, 2016), táticas de propaganda política computacional (Gorrell et al., 2019;Woolley;Howard, 2017) e engajamento político coordenado por vias orgânicas e artificiais (Arnaudo, 2017;Azzimonti;Fernandes, 2018;Bessi;Ferrara, 2016;Ruediger, 2017), baseado em repertórios de confronto Freitas, 2018), dissenso e antagonismo agravados diante da competitividade de processos eleitorais. Percebe-se, portanto, que "Bolsonaro" e "Haddad" são os principais vetores de narrativas falsas nos três principais meses das eleições de 2018 no Brasil. ...
... Seguindo adiante, a observação das estratégias persuasivas (V3), em conjunto com os recursos linguísticos (V4 a V15), é importante para este capítulo Gentzkow, 2017;Tandoc;Lim;Ling, 2018;Dourado, 2020). Ao mesmo tempo, o problema começou a ser compreendido em diálogo com a conjuntura comunicacional marcada pela exposição de mensagens antissistemas e antidemocráticas na esfera de visibilidade pública política (Gomes, 2006) (Jamieson, 1992;Borba, 2017), distribuição de boataria (Koidl;Matthews, 2017;Rojecki;Meraz, 2016), táticas de propaganda política computacional (Gorrell et al., 2019;Woolley;Howard, 2017) e engajamento político coordenado por vias orgânicas e artificiais (Arnaudo, 2017;Azzimonti;Fernandes, 2018;Bessi;Ferrara, 2016;Ruediger, 2017), baseado em repertórios de confronto Freitas, 2018), dissenso e antagonismo agravados diante da competitividade de processos eleitorais. Percebe-se, portanto, que "Bolsonaro" e "Haddad" são os principais vetores de narrativas falsas nos três principais meses das eleições de 2018 no Brasil. ...
Capítulo publicado no livro "Impactos político-comunicacionais nas eleições brasileiras de 2018", organizado por Emerson Urizzi Cervi e Maria Helena Weber (2021).
... Its most prominent subfield is negative campaigning (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995;Lau and Brown Rovner, 2009;Nai and Walter, 2015;Haselmayer, 2019;Haselmayer and Jenny 2018;Haselmayer, Hirsch and Jenny 2020), but also includes forms of incivility (Stryker et al. 2016) in the media (Jamieson, 1992;Mutz and Reeves, 2005;Mutz 2007), on the internet (Anderson et al 2014) or in parliamentary debates (Brooks and Geer, 2007;Herbst, 2010;Dodd and Schraufnagel, 2013). A recent addition is the use of rhetorical outrage by political actors (Sobieraj and Berry, 2011;Berry and Sobieraj, 2013). ...
Parliamentary debates sometimes see uncivil behavior by MPs and parliamentary rules of procedure provide instruments such as Calls to Order to sanction uncivil behavior. Incivility is an extreme form of negativity encountered in parliamentary debates. The varied forms of negativity found in parliamentary debates has made them a popular test field for sentiment analysis, the systematic measurement of valence in statements. This chapter describes a sentiment analysis procedure which combines context-sensitive word representations, crowdcoding of negativity in training sentences and a neural network classifier to establish the level of negativity in debate statements. To validate the procedure we try to predict Calls to Order in the Austrian parliament. We find that we can predict Calls to Order from a statement’s degree of negativity reasonably well. The procedure therefore offers great potential for a valid and reliable measurement of incivility in parliamentary debates.
... While critical journalism research focuses primarily on the traditional relationship between journalists and their source or social reality, Edelman emphasized the relevance of the audience. This paved the way from fact-oriented journalism toward impact-oriented journalism with a focus on drama and strategic intent (Jamieson, 1993), which ultimately no longer reports on events, but instead builds the world as it suits (Rosen, 1999). ...
Approaches to post-truth society describe a shift in societies towards non-binding communication. There are at least two problem inherent to these approaches. On the one hand, there is no plausible explanation as to why a shift from a truth-based to a post-truth society is now apparent. On the other hand, the blanket assumption that the truth is completely unimportant today is not plausible either. This is the starting point for this article. We begin with a concept frequently found in journalistic descriptions: politics as a play and politicians as players. A theoretical approach is presented that conceives political strategic communication as a play. Elaborating on this, the acceptance of lies and bullshit is the result of political self-staging. To this end, the theory of strategic communication plays based on Bateson and Goffman will be presented and developed further into staging and truth plays in politics. The proposition: strategic political communication is increasingly – but not always – being played and perceived as a play in which the entertainment character is more important than the binding nature of the staging and the statements.
... Political rumours arise around topics of national importance and are driven by feeling of uncertainty and anxiety (Rosnow, 1998). This makes it possible for political rumours to flourish during political campaigns by disseminating unverified claims concerning the opposition party or candidates in a bid to mislead the public and affect voting choice (Jamieson, 1992). The spread of political rumour for selfish and negative reasons dates backs to various form of elections in different countries and continents, as seen in the election of Thomas Jefferson as President of the United States (Shibutani, 1996, Weeks & Garrett, 2014 and has continued in recent election in the United States (Garrett, 2011). ...
In this paper a rumour propagation model with conditional latent period and varying population is considered. In the literature, classical model assume that an ignorant individual enters the latent period and decide whether to become a spreader or stifler. In our model we introduce a new compartment called the blackmailers, another type of spreaders who spread the rumour for selfish reason. The model equations are first transformed into proportions, thus reducing the model equations from five to four differential equations. The model exhibit two equilibra, namely the Rumour Free Equilibrium (RFE) and the Rumour Endemic Equilibrium (REE). Using the method of linearized stability, we establish that the RFE state exist and is locally asymptomatically stable when 0 < 1 and that when 0 > 1 the endemic state exist. The model allows us to discuss the relationship between spreaders and blackmailers, and the effect of blackmailers on the stiflers. Finally, we present numerical simulations that show the impact of political motivated rumours and how its control can be achieved.
... Political rumours arise around topics of national importance and are driven by feeling of uncertainty and anxiety (Rosnow, 1998). This makes it possible for political rumours to flourish during political campaigns by disseminating unverified claims concerning the opposition party or candidates in a bid to mislead the public and affect voting choice (Jamieson, 1992). The spread of political rumour for selfish and negative reasons dates backs to various form of elections in different countries and continents, as seen in the election of Thomas Jefferson as President of the United States (Shibutani, 1996, Weeks & Garrett, 2014 and has continued in recent election in the United States (Garrett, 2011). ...
In this paper a rumour propagation model with conditional latent period and varying population is considered. In the literature, classical model assume that an ignorant individual enters the latent period and decide whether to become a spreader or stifler. In our model we introduce a new compartment called the blackmailers, another type of spreaders who spread the rumour for selfish reason. The model equations are first transformed into proportions, thus reducing the model equations from five to four differential equations. The model exhibit two equilibra, namely the Rumour Free Equilibrium (RFE) and the Rumour Endemic Equilibrium (REE). Using the method of linearized stability, we establish that the RFE state exist and is locally asymptomatically stable when 0 < 1 and that when 0 > 1 the endemic state exist. The model allows us to discuss the relationship between spreaders and blackmailers, and the effect of blackmailers on the stiflers. Finally, we present numerical simulations that show the impact of political motivated rumours and how its control can be achieved.
... al., 2011;Iyengar, 2011;Jamieson y Waldman, 2003), al chequear la información que emiten las personas en una situación de poder, con fuentes primarias y abiertas. Lo que exige una rendición de cuentas a las autoridades, que la literatura en inglés llama accountability (Jamieson, 1992), en que ...
El artículo presenta la metodología docente aplicada en un proyecto de fact checking para verificar la campaña presidencial y el debate televisado de las elecciones de 2017 en Chile, en un curso de estudiantes de pregrado de Periodismo. Se explica el diseño y desarrollo de ese proyecto. Se analizan sus resultados periodísticos y de aprendizaje, entre los que está haber sido preseleccionado en un premio de Periodismo de excelencia profesional. Se expone la valoración que hicieron los estudiantes de su aprendizaje al verificar el discurso público de las autoridades, y de su aporte a la democracia en un rol de perro guardián o watchdog.
... At the mass level, scholarship finds that awareness of these norms, along with concerns about behaving in a socially desirable manner, have played an important role in suppressing the expression of overt prejudice in the post-Civil Rights era (Kinder and Sanders 1996;Schuman et al. 1997). At the elite level, we have seen these dynamics play out on the campaign trail, as elite communication has substantially gravitated away from the use of explicit racial appeals (Jamieson 1992;Mendelberg 2001). While norms are generally entrenched, the preservation of a 'norm environment' requires continued reinforcement of the norm, especially by authoritative societal actors like political elites. ...
This article explores the effect of explicitly racial and inflammatory speech by political elites on mass citizens in a societal context where equality norms are widespread and generally heeded yet a subset of citizens nonetheless possesses deeply ingrained racial prejudices. The authors argue that such speech should have an ‘emboldening effect’ among the prejudiced, particularly where it is not clearly and strongly condemned by other elite political actors. To test this argument, the study focuses on the case of the Trump campaign for president in the United States, and utilizes a survey experiment embedded within an online panel study. The results demonstrate that in the absence of prejudiced elite speech, prejudiced citizens constrain the expression of their prejudice. However, in the presence of prejudiced elite speech – particularly when it is tacitly condoned by other elites – the study finds that the prejudiced are emboldened to both express and act upon their prejudices.
... Political issues, in contrast, tend to have a much higher profile. Candidates regularly use evidence in misleading ways in order to advance their political agenda [35]. Misleading claims about campaign issues can influence voters, altering their perception of, or support for, a policy decision. ...
There is considerable concern about the role that social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, play in promoting misperceptions during political campaigns. These technologies are widely used, and inaccurate information flowing across them has a high profile. This research uses three-wave panel surveys conducted with representative samples of Americans during both the 2012 and 2016 U.S. Presidential elections to assess whether use of social media for political information promoted endorsement of falsehoods about major party candidates or important campaign issues. Fixed effects regression helps ensure that observed effects are not due to individual differences. Results indicate that social media use had a small but significant influence on misperceptions about President Obama in the 2012 election, and that this effect was most pronounced among strong partisans. Social media had no effect on belief accuracy about the Republican candidate in that election. The 2016 survey focused on campaign issues. There is no evidence that social media use influenced belief accuracy about these topics in aggregate, but Facebook users were unique. Social media use by this group reduced issue misperceptions relative to those who only used other social media. These results demonstrate that social media can alter citizens’ willingness to endorse falsehoods during an election, but that the effects are often small.
... TV debate su postale retke. Zbog površnih predizbornih kampanja mnogi glasači bojkotuju izbore (Bode 1989;Border 1990;Jamieson 1992;Neale 1991). ...
Public opinion is important for political decisions. Politicians change public attitudes. They often turn public disagreement to predominant support for some policies (Mutz, etal. 1996). Long term change of political attitudes is caused by slow development of personality types (Riesman 1950). Research efforts in the field of political persuasion were based on personality stability, rather than media influence. On the other hand, changes in public opinion and social conditions occur frequently. According to Lewin (1936) attitudes are function of people and circumstances. If individual attitudes change according to the circumstances it makes no sense to perceive their dependance on slow personality change. In recent times researchers have been measuring attitudes as specters of possible acceptance and rejection of ideas, not as points of estimates. Starting point of political attitude change research is variability of public opinion. Research examine how politicians use media for framing and priming. They use chosen arguments to change public perception. Thus, changing the balance of arguments is essential for attitude change. Power of media is not telling the citizens what to think , but rather what to think about. Dealing with public matters politicians often behave strategically, rarely sincere. They speak about general issues, not concrete political decisions. Citizens form their attitudes based on cues. They are aware of main media messages, while ignoring most of news and reports. Citizens interpret interpretations. Politicians think ahead about interpretations, shaping their messages to achieve desired effects.
... Television pushed this development forward, leading to studies of televisual rhetoric in politics and political adverts (Jamieson, 1988(Jamieson, , 1992. Today the Internet, online communication, and social media have emphasized the importance of the multimodal in rhetoric. ...
This chapter explains the role of visual and multimodal communication in organizations and provides an account of the research in this field. While organizations appear to be verbally dominated, they never communicate in just words. Visual and multimodal elements are widely present in all aspects of organizational rhetoric. The chapter introduces the notion of the multimodal organization and provides an account of research in visual rhetoric in general and in organization research specifically. Since imagery and pictures are dominant in almost all forms of organizational communication, the chapter then explains the rhetoric of pictures as being both event and language. Finally, the chapter points to the future research agenda.
... The characterization of racist appeals as fundamentally negative, implicit, subtle, and stereotype--referencing in nature (Caliendo & McIlwain, 2006;Huber & Lapinski, 2006;Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, & White, 2004;Reeves, 1997;Slocum, 2001;Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002;Valentino, Traugot & Hutchings, 2002) had much to do with the prevailing sense that a dominant culture rendered such stereotype--based appeals as norm--violating. As such, attempts to subtly appeal to negative stereotypes for political gain in this way were seen as violations of democratic norms of political behavior (Jamieson, 1992;Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Many of these studies demonstrated that beyond violating democratic principles, implicit race-based cues actually influenced potential voters (Clawson, 2002;Domke, 2001;Gilens, 1996;Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005;Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002;White, 2007). ...
... Trump's assertions about high crime rates being at unprecedented levels should be considered in the context of previous research on politicians who have used racial cues to prime and frame crime and law and order issues for electoral advantage (Jamieson 1992). In past elections, these efforts proved successful because the media infused crime with subtle-and at times not so subtle-racial undertones, which make the process of tinging crime with race for politicians a more plausible proposition (Entman 1992;Entman and Rojecki 2000;Barlow 1998). ...
This study examines the relationship between support for excessive use of force by the police and support for Trump during the 2016 primary election cycle. Findings suggest that White Americans’ support for Trump among primary voters is partly explained by negative racial stereotypes of Black Americans and support for excessive use of force by the police in their dealings with members of the Black community.
... Scholars uncovered the substantial effects of implicit and explicit racial attitudes on individual judgments of and reactions to the political world long before Obama erupted onto the political stage (Huddy & Feldman, 2009;Krysan, 2000). Furthermore, elites have effectively employed implicit racial cues as part of a political strategy (Edsall & Edsall, 1992;Jamieson, 1993;Mendelberg, 1997) to sway White voters' evaluations of even White candidates in previous elections (Stephens-Dougan, 2016;Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002). Finally, direct comparisons of the 2008 and 1988 elections reveal much more stability than change when it comes to Whites' racial attitudes (Hutchings, 2009). ...
In this article, we examine the relationship between racial resentment and a host of political attitudes, predispositions, and behaviors across 28 years and 7 presidential elections. We find, contrary to the suggestions of recent work of the role of race in the Obama era, that the racialization of seemingly nonracial political issues began many years before the debut of Barack Obama and extends beyond his presidency. More specifically, we find, controlling for other factors, that the relationships between racial resentment and partisan and ideological self-identifications, evaluations of the major party presidential candidates, and attitudes about health insurance and governmental services have strengthened each subsequent year beginning in 1988 through 2016. This trend reflects the growing extent to which racial considerations are brought to bear on individual evaluations of and orientations toward the political world.
This study contributes to the relatively limited body of knowledge regarding sex work and the limited progress in the decriminalization of sex work as paid labour, which impacts the inclusion of sex workers in epidemic response. Since sex workers form part of vulnerable populations, the Covid 19 pandemic has also affected their socioeconomic status, further displacing them into poverty and exacerbate existing inequalities. In particular, South Africa has made great progress towards equality for all groups, such as the legalization of same-sex marriages in its Constitution. In spite of this, sex workers remain an underrepresented group of workers, since sex work is not legalized as a profession, which negatively impacts their representivity in epidemic responses. In this context, there is an abundance of literature on sex work, which has led to the development of theory and conceptual frameworks. Within the context of the Covid 19 pandemic, this study presents the context of sex workers in South Africa. Additionally, the study examines the barriers faced by sex workers as well as their legalization and professionalization as workers. There are numerous instances of the violation of sex workers and given that sex work isn't legalized they are not protected by the law and often find themselves confronted with criminals who break laws against them. Furthermore, the study critically examines how sex workers have professionalized their industry during the Covid 19 pandemic and in the age of 4IR. Last but not least the study concludes on the challenges that hinder the legalization of sex workers in South Africa. It would seem that the state should consider reviewing how it caters to severely socially excluded populations if they fail to represent, participate, or protect sex workers.
Se realiza una reconceptualización de los enmarcamientos de juego y estrategia por separado según la literatura internacional y se construyen subindicadores para obtener una medición más precisa de cada uno de ellos. Se analiza la cobertura de las elecciones presidenciales peruanas de 2016 en 20 programas de radio, prensa y televisión, tres días antes del debate presidencial, tres días posteriores y tres días previos a la votación a modo de comparación. El objetivo es identificar la incidencia que tiene el debate presidencial en la prevalencia del uso de los tres enmarcamientos periodísticos en cada una de las vueltas electorales presidenciales. El debate electoral influye en el incremento del enmarcamiento temático en la primera vuelta, pero no en la segunda vuelta electoral. El enmarcamiento posicional se reduce después del debate electoral en ambas vueltas, mientras que el enmarcamiento estratégico no se ve afectado. Los resultados demuestran que las dinámicas del sistema electoral, como el debate presidencial, influyen en la prevalencia del uso de los enmarcamientos. Se resalta la necesidad de estudiar la influencia de las dinámicas políticas en los enmarcamientos, descentrando el análisis en torno a la producción periodística. Esto amplía la forma de ver los enmarcamientos como estrategias discursivas para influir en la audiencia y los sitúa como parte de un complejo proceso de comunicación política que involucra también a las instituciones políticas.
Since the ancient rhetoricians, humans have awarded imagery, the visual, and the vivid an extraordinary effect on emotions and memory. Such assumptions have led to iconophobia, iconoclasm, and myths about the special power of images. The issue of the power of pictures, however, is more complicated. As all other kinds of rhetorical utterances, the visual can be both powerful and powerless depending on the circumstances. For many pictures, the rhetorical power lies not mainly in their political deliberation, but instead in their nature as demonstrative or epideictic rhetoric: a rhetoric that does not primarily advocate immediate change, but tries to increase adherence to existing view-points, attitudes and values. Even though visual rhetoric may perform a powerful address to those who are already convinced, it does not necessarily hold much power over adversaries and sceptics. This article argues that when teaching visuality and the power of imagery, educators ought to help young pupils – and the citizenry in general – not only to decode visual communication, but also to interpret and evaluate it. The first requires knowledge about rules of visual literacy, the second requires not only critical thinking, but also situational and cultural knowledge, as well as sound judgment.
The effects of news coverage on political attitudes in election campaigns have been widely studied in academic research. In particular, a fertile branch of the literature investigated the impact of news media negativity on turnout. To date, however, findings are mixed, precluding to state a clear relationship. This paper aims to shed a light on this topic by testing whether negative coverage may affect voters' turnout and to what extent. It approaches this research question by accounting for two different dimensions, controlling whether the interplay of media negativity (press and TV coverage) with the type of election (first-vs. second-order elections) has an impact on citizens' propensity to turnout. We test our hypotheses by taking Italy as a case study because it offers a combination of systemic and media characteristics that allows addressing properly the topic. We rely on four datasets covering the 2018 Italian general elections and the 2019 European Parliament Elections in Italy, respectively, with opinion data (2018 ITANES survey and 2019 ITANES-University of Milan survey) and two datasets measuring media negativity by means of a human content analysis carried out on media coverage during the 7 weeks before the election days (2018 and 2019 ITEM data). Our findings show that individual exposure to negative coverage leads to an increase in turnout mainly to the detriment of indecision. This pattern holds both in first-and second-order elections.
Politicians frequently use uncivil and even aggressive tactics in political appeals. Aggressive behavior and personality code as masculine, and voters generally value masculine traits in leaders. However, extreme displays may be off‐putting to all but the most aggressive voters. In this article, we theorize how aggressive political displays interact with gendered personality traits to shape candidate evaluations. Which voters punish candidates for aggressive behavior, and which voters give which candidates a pass? We leverage two survey experiments to investigate how voters judge intensely uncivil candidates in a political debate—verbal aggression and a physical dominance display. We find voters penalize (or even reward) candidates differently for aggressive behavior depending on their own aggressive personality traits. Our findings advance research on the distinct effects of gender over sex in politics and studies of aggression dynamics in mass politics. Our results also speak to work on the strategies available to male and female candidates with broader implications for representation and norms in democratic politics.
The aim of this project is to investigate if the participation allowed to citizens by the websites of Portuguese political parties meets citizens’ expectations. In fact, with the advent of the Web 2.0, the websites of the political parties started offering a wide range of tools and forms of participation that allow citizens to create and share contents, and get involved in social networks.
Please go to https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192844118.013.4 for published version
(with Jennifer Saul) The concept of dogwhistles has been examined by philosophers of language, without reference to the fact that dogwhistles are frequently presented with a visual component. This article explores the interconnectedness between speech (whether written or spoken) and the visual in different registers, from "high" art to memes. It posits four main ways in which imagery can convey visual dogwhistles.
This is a draft version. For the final version, please cite chapter 24 in Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore (Eds) (2024), Oxford Handbook of Applied Philosophy of Language, pp 546-70 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ISBN: 9780192844118. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192844118.013.4
Does exposure to social media polarize users or simply sort out like-minded voters based on their preexisting beliefs? In this paper, we conduct three survey experiments to assess the direct and unconditioned effect of exposure to tweets on perceived ideological polarization of candidates and parties. We show that subjects treated with negative tweets see greater ideological distance between presidential nominees and between their parties. We also demonstrate that polarization increases with processing time. We demonstrate a social media effect on perceived polarization beyond that due to the self-selection of like-minded users into different media communities. We explain our results as the result of social media frames that increase contrast effects between voters and candidates.
This monograph is devoted to the questions of information security of the contemporary states in the context of information society and the rapid development of Internet technologies in political communication. The main features of the Internet as a global space of political communications are considered in this book, and the analysis of contemporary informational and communicational online-technologies used for the destabilization of national political regimes, including technologies of mass political propaganda and manipulation of public consciousness in the cyberspace, is given. The practice of using the mechanisms and methods of external informational aggression in cyberspace with a purpose of transformation of traditional national axiological spaces is shown in this monograph; special attention is paid to the role of political Internet communication technologies in the latest revolutionary events in the Arab world and Ukraine.
Keywords: political management, political communication, Internet space, public consciousness, information security, national security, political propaganda, political manipulation, cybersimulacra, cyberdatocracy, digital democracy, political stability, “color revolution,” Internet communication, axiological space
Building upon interdisciplinary scholarship, I posit a normative role of journalistic institutions as “civil gatekeepers” articulating a society’s core values and keeping figures and ideas that threaten those values from the centers of power. Through mixed-method analyses of 2016 press endorsements of U.S. presidential candidates, I investigate how American newspapers’ editorial boards fulfilled this civil gatekeeping role to evaluate the threats these candidates posed to democratic values and institutions. While editorial boards attempted to convey the unprecedented threat they believed Donald Trump posed to democracy, endorsements elicited nuanced patterns of moral equivalence as they simultaneously excoriated Trump’s competence while questioning Hillary Clinton’s integrity. This research contributes to a broader understanding of the civic and moral roles of journalistic institutions, and their enactment of cultural codes that give shape to, and help to protect, a society’s normative values. I argue journalistic institutions are capable of serving as a powerful force for the preservation and communication of these values, possessing the unique ability to close the “gates” of the civil sphere to the ideas and figures representing the greatest threats to them.
This chapter analyzes how Facebook worked as an environment for negative campaigning in the 2014 Brazilian presidential elections. More specifically, we investigate the Facebook posts published by the two leading candidates – Dilma Rousseff (Workers’ Party) and Aécio Neves (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) – in order to answer the
following questions: 1) What were the most common rhetorical appeals used by the candidates during the dispute? 2) How did the use of these appeals vary throughout the dispute? 3) How may the attacks have influenced voters’ perception over the candidates
considering the results of the opinion polls? The results indicate that Rousseff and Neves preferred to use emotional appeals in their publications. Moreover, Neves may have been a victim of the so-called “boomerang effect” – especially in the second round, when he faced a decrease in his voting intentions after deciding to sponsor more negative ads on Facebook.
Research indicates that the reach of fake news websites is limited to small parts of the population. On the other hand, data demonstrate that large proportions of the public know about notable fake news stories and believe them. These findings imply the possibility that most people hear about fake news stories not from fake news websites but through their coverage in mainstream news outlets. Thus far, only limited attention has been directed to the role of mainstream media in the dissemination of disinformation. To remedy this, this article synthesizes the literature pertaining to understand the role mainstream media play in the dissemination of fake news, the reasons for such coverage and its influences on the audience.
Uma das grandes preocupações de Afonso de Albuquerque relacionada à pesquisa é questionar a apropriação de modelos norte-americanos e do ocidente europeu por outros países, principalmente pelo Brasil, para com isso propor modelos alternativos a essa conduta. Em entrevista à Reciis, o pesquisador discute como a incorporação desses modelos estrangeiros impacta a mídia, o jornalismo, a política e os estudos acadêmicos brasileiros. Alguns desses movimentos de apropriação, denominados ‘reformas’, serviram como base para escamotear ações autoritárias entre governos. O professor relaciona esta questão com o fenômeno das fake news, que se refere a um discurso de reivindicação de monopólio da verdade em um contexto de deslegitimação das instituições, no qual, cada vez mais, se adotam comportamentos autoritários. Sob a perspectiva da democracia, ao se pensar o discurso das fake news, feito pelas agências de fact checking, pela mídia e por corporações de pesquisadores, vê-se que ele se soma aos ataques contemporâneos às instituições. Afonso de Albuquerque é professor titular do Departamento de Estudos Culturais e Mídia e do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Comunicação da Universidade Federal Fluminense.
The quality of political reporting in the news media is a focal point of communication research. Politics, however, is not only conveyed via traditional sources of information, but via fictional sources. In particular, political dramas (e. g., The West Wing, Borgen) enjoy great popularity and are often acknowledged for their realistic depiction of politics. Still, little is known about the democratic quality of such fictional depictions. This paper aims to fill the gap by contrasting the depiction of politics in the fictional TV series Borgen with political reporting in a traditional TV magazine (Berlin direkt). The comparative content analysis is based on ten issues that are covered in both formats and focuses on the quality criteria of relevance, pluralism, and democratic discourse norms. Findings show no significant differences between Borgen and Berlin direkt for any of the three criteria, clearly indicating that fictional TV series can offer the same content quality as political reporting.
One of the main challenges facing a universal journalism education is in developing journalism curriculum resources that truly reflect diverse national and regional journalism cultures. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to this ‘universalising’ project debate by extending the theoretical criticism of the so-called ‘convergence hypothesis’ by Hallin and Mancini (2004), informed by their argument that the Western liberal democracy (WLD) model of journalism cannot be applied globally, to underpin recent calls for the ‘glocalisation’ rather than ‘globalisation’ of the Journalism Education Model Curricula in the developing and emerging world. To do so, the chapter draws on the UNESCO Model Curricula for Journalism Education and attempts a double interrogation: First, it seeks to problematise the branding of the ‘liberal democracy model’ of journalism as a western model and proposes instead for it be rebranded as the ‘liberal free market’ model. Second, it seeks to interrogate the ‘modernism’ thesis, what Hallin and Mancini (2004) called the convergence hypothesis, framing it as nothing more than a myth; and it goes on to make the argument that rather than converging towards a single modern universal business model, journalism and journalism education, including the so-called WLD model, are diverging towards distinct relativist geo-cultural or ideological identities. In keeping with the former interrogation, therefore, we should be talking about ‘de-marketising’ rather than ‘de-westernising’ journalism; while with the latter, we should be talking about a divergence hypothesis (postmodernism) rather than the convergence hypothesis (modernism). Moreover, by comparing and contrasting the WLD model with other models in Europe and the rest of the world, within a critical historical context, this chapter seeks to contribute fresh insights into the broader understanding of the historical and epistemological importance of the increasing divergence or glocalisation seen in modern journalism.
In the last decades, electoral volatility has been on the rise in Western democracies. Scholars have proposed several explanations for this phenomenon of floating voters. Exposure to media coverage as a short-term explanation for electoral volatility has of yet been understudied. This study examines the effect of media content (issue news and poll news) on two different types of vote change: conversion, switching from one party to another, and crystallization, switching from being undecided to casting a vote for a party. We use a national panel survey (N = 765) and link this to a content analysis of campaign news on television and in newspapers during national Dutch elections. Findings reveal that exposure to issue news increases the chance of crystallization, whereas it decreases the chance of conversion. Conversely, exposure to poll news increases the chance of conversion, whereas it decreases the chance of crystallization.
Now in its third edition, Political Campaign Communication: Inside and Out examines the intricacies of political campaigning through the eyes of both an academic and a political consultant. Unlike others in its field, this text takes a broad view of political campaigning, discussing both theories and principles, along with topics such as political socialization, the role of money, ethics, and critical events. This new edition delves into ongoing changes in the American political environment, with fuller examinations of women and gender, the involvement of social media in political campaigning, political money, and ethics. Advanced undergraduate and graduate students of political communication can make use of updated chapter-by-chapter discussion questions and online practice quizzes.
Visual argumentation is studied in an examination of the visual discourses and visual modes of viewer engagement structuring negative political commercials. Using strategies of pictorial direct address and pictorial narrative, these texts construct their visual arguments by intentionally creating ambiguity around the natural vs. symbolic status of pictorial expression. This study in pictorial narrative shows that the power of pictorial realism, in collaboration with a compelling camera metaphor, can blur distinctions between an act of constructing images in a fictional world and an act of constructing images in a real world.
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