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Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure
... The resolution specifically instructed the UN Secretary-General "to seek economies" and "to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR, in particular through phased deployment" (United Nations Security Council, 1993, Section 9). As well, there was a lack of continuity in leadership and strategic coordination during the transfer of responsibility from the regional OAU to the international UN (Jones, 2001). Furthermore, the UN came into the scene only after the Arusha mediations had concluded, and thus had no in-depth knowledge of the sensitivities involved (such as the presence of spoilers). ...
... Furthermore, the UN came into the scene only after the Arusha mediations had concluded, and thus had no in-depth knowledge of the sensitivities involved (such as the presence of spoilers). All of these factors contributed to making the UN security guarantee contained within the Arusha Peace Agreement highly problematic (Jones, 2001). ...
... Surrounding the churches were church-run schools, health clinics and printing presses that all enforced a quota system that restricted Tutsi participation within these social structures (Melvern, 2000). Promotion to the level of bishop was also based on race (Jones, 2001). Catholic support for Hutu nationalism was so overt that the archbishop of Kigali was closely linked to the Hutu Power inner circle (Melvern, 2000). ...
... In the end, peacekeeping may reinforce previous rivalries that sparked the conflict in the first place (GREIG; DIEHL, 2005). Drawing on blatant failures of the United Nations, such as in Rwanda and Somalia, many authors argue that peacekeeping operations are in practice underfunded, tied by bureaucratic procedures, poorly equipped and manned, or simply asked to do too much (HOWE, 1995;CLARKE;HERBST, 1996;JETT, 2001;JONES, 2001;DALLAIRE, 2004). ...
... As it relates to security sector reform, most of the criticism on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations draws on interstate conflicts (LUTTWAK, 1999;SMITH;STAM, 2003;GREIG;DIEHL, 2005;WERNER;YUEN, 2005), thus not being relevant for the context in which SSR usually takes place. Moreover, the criticism on the effectiveness and efficiency of operations often refer to the lack of a clear mandate, rules of engagement and resources to protect civilians (particularly DALLAIRE, 2004 andJones, 2001). This has significantly changed and evolved since the early 2000s with the concept of "robust" peacekeeping (UNITED NATIONS, 2008b). ...
Post-conflict societies struggle with several interlocking problems that often relate to security and legitimacy. To address these issues, the international community has often turned to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) or Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs. In this article, the authors present different aspects of these evolving concepts and what theoretical problems each tool aim to resolve. Furthermore, a symbiosis is found to exist between the ability of PKOs to provide protection in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the long-term benefits that SSR provides through the creation of accountable, efficient and professional security institutions. PKOs contribute to creating necessary preconditions successful SSR implementation, namely a safe environment. However, four additional preconditions must be met: a common vision, external support, local ownership and donor collaboration. Inability to provide these conditions will lead to a sub-optimal implementation and a security sector reform failing to deliver legitimate and professional institutions.
... As the UN is increasingly asked to shift from peacekeeping to more robust mechanisms of peace enforcement, it becomes important to understand why resource shortfalls within missions occur. While a small body of research examines factors relating to peacekeeping resource deficiency (Bratt, 1997;Jett, 1999;Jones, 1999Jones, , 2001Skogmo, 1989), little empirical work addresses how these factors contribute to the UN's ability to acquire personnel in a systematic fashion, and to date, no study has examined why numerical personnel shortfalls occur in missions. ...
... Factors frequently considered by scholars to influence peacekeeping support include economic interests (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009;Stojek & Tir, 2015), the prospect of obtaining a seat on the Security Council (Benson & Kathman, 2014;Smith & Boutellis, 2012;Perry & Smith, 2013), and the scale of the conflict Gilligan & Stedman, 2003). A number of studies also emphasize that peacekeeping missions' effectiveness requires adequate resources, particularly in terms of personnel numbers and equipment (Bratt, 1997;Feil, 1998;Findlay, 2002;Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009;Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013, 2014Jett, 1999;Jones, 1999Jones, , 2001Kreps, 2010;Skogmo, 1989). ...
Is the acquisition of personnel for UN peacekeeping missions susceptible to free-riding by UN member states? If so, what drives this behavior and what impact does this have on obtaining required personnel for the mission? Using data from 21 missions in 13 African countries between 1990 and 2010, this article addresses whether UN peacekeeping missions experience a shortfall in personnel due to incentives to free-ride by contributing states. It argues that as the number of states contributing to a mission increases, contributors have a greater incentive to free-ride and make suboptimal personnel contributions, leading to greater overall shortfall in the mission’s personnel. However, this free-riding behavior can be mitigated by the economic incentives of contributor states. The findings support two central tenets of collective action theory: that free-riding by member states contributing to the mission is more prevalent when the number of contributors is larger, and when selective incentives such as economic gains are lower. These findings have implications for the strategic composition and efficacy of peacekeeping forces. More broadly, the results underscore the struggle of international organizations to obtain compliance from member states in achieving their international objectives.
... The agreement included plans to merge the armies, and a ceasefire agreement banning the importation of more weapons into the country. It also included a provision for all Rwandan refugees to be allowed to return, and for ethnic designations to be removed from identity cards (Jones, 2001). However, RTLM broadcasted its disapproval of the Accords, and continued to oppose the Tutsi as well as the UN peacekeeping mission that had recently begun. ...
... More extremist members of Habyarimana's party quickly organized the execution of the Tutsi population in Kigali. The Prime Minister and many politicians and civil society leaders, most of them moderate Hutu (meaning those Hutu who were interested in power sharing with the Tutsi and opposed the violence against them), were quickly slain as well (Jones, 2001). ...
... The overall aim of this study was to investigate the prevalence and dominant forms of traumatic experiences of refugee men in WA, from the top ten WA migrant African countries of birth whose wars ended between 1990 and 2009 [29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37]. The secondary aim of the research was to identify differences in traumatic experiences for men from the different countries. ...
Background
As people from the African continent continue to settle in Australia, exposure of men from African refugee backgrounds to potentially traumatic events not only impact negatively on their settlement but have also been linked to increased mental health issues and family and domestic violence. This study aims to describe the prevalence and dominant forms of potentially traumatic experiences of African men from a refuge background in Western Australia.
Methods
Survey data from 421 African men from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Republic of Congo–Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan, Burundi and Somalia were analysed using descriptive statistics.
Results
The study showed that 81% of the participants experienced at least one potentially traumatic event either in their home country or in a refugee country. However, the prevalence of potentially traumatic events in their home country ranged from 45% (Somalia) to 95% (Democratic Republic of Congo) while in refuge countries, the potentially traumatic experience prevalence ranged from 17% (Somalia) to 51% (Sudan and South Sudan). The majority of the participants (64%) experienced "War at close quarter" in their home country. In comparison, the dominant potentially traumatic experience in refuge countries was "Forced Separation" (28%). The study showed that 53% of the participants who experienced one or more potentially traumatic events in their home country also experienced one or more potentially traumatic events in the refugee country.
Conclusions
This study will provide baseline data on the prevalence and dominant forms of potentially traumatic events of African refugee men now resident in WA. The impact of potentially traumatic events should be addressed in counselling, and other interventions developed and delivered by both government and non-government agencies.
... Despite this reality on the ground, the UN remained confident that its strategy was a success (Kleck 2006). It is surprising, or perhaps not, that the UN had held itself to such a low standard of success, considering that previously mismanaged repatriation protocols as part of the UN-supervised Arusha Accords had demonstrably exacerbated local rifts, leading up to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide (Jones 2001;United States Holocaust Memorial Museum [USHMM] 2014). In 2002, return migration of Burundians was jointly facilitated by UNHCR and the governments of Burundi and Tanzania. ...
When violent conflict flares up, forced migration often follows. Ethnographic data shows that forced migrants remain attached to their places of origin and often express a desire to return once conflict has abated, be it after weeks, months, or years. Conversely, peacebuilders in the homeland have not effectively integrated displaced persons within their strategic programming. This is cause for concern considering the literature connecting the collapse of fragile peace to 'refugee spoilers.' There is a critical gap in peacebuilders' commitment to understanding refugees' needs and claims, and the implications these pose on peace stability following repatriation. This article argues that ethnography of refugees still living in exile can generate rich datasets useful to the development of peacebuilding programming. More than this, it proposes a methodology-ethnographic mapping-that can collect both spatial (maps) and narrative (descriptions) information in tandem and across cultural groups living in refugee camps.
... During the negotiation process between the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the delegation representing the former consisted of three separate factions (1. The President Habyarimana's ruling political party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND); 2. Members of Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) -the most extreme, far rightwing faction; 3. Representatives of various opposition parties in government) all reporting to different centres of power (Jones, 2001). Two main interrelated endogenous problems emanated from this division at the negotiation stage; a weakened bargaining power and a one-sided concession. ...
Why Waning Wars Wax; a Relook at the Failure of Arusha Peace Accord, the Peace Agreement-Implementation Gap and the Onset of the Rwandan Genocide.
Edwin Wuadom Warden
Abstract
African societies and the developing nations have been undergoing difficult times in terms of ethnic conflicts and antagonisms. The Northern part of Kenya is known for infamous attacks between communities since the pre-colonial times. These conflicts seem to be increasing range and magnitude. The study explores the causes of contributing of colonialism to the conflicts among communities of Marsabit County between 1960 and 2011. A descriptive survey design was used targeting community conflicts in Marsabit North Sub-County. Purposive sampling technique was employed in this study to get the location or district in which the units of observation had required characteristics, along with snowball sampling which is useful when the population that possess the characteristics under the study is not well known and therefore need to find subjects. Secondary information was obtained from books, journals and news papers. The study revealed that creation of colonial administrative boarders led to competition for scarce resources was a major cause of violent conflict between the communities living in Marsabit county of Kenya.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jgpc.v4n1a2
Why Waning Wars Wax; a Relook at the Failure of Arusha Peace Accord, the Peace Agreement-Implementation Gap and the Onset of the Rwandan Genocide.
Edwin Wuadom Warden
Abstract
African societies and the developing nations have been undergoing difficult times in terms of ethnic conflicts and antagonisms. The Northern part of Kenya is known for infamous attacks between communities since the pre-colonial times. These conflicts seem to be increasing range and magnitude. The study explores the causes of contributing of colonialism to the conflicts among communities of Marsabit County between 1960 and 2011. A descriptive survey design was used targeting community conflicts in Marsabit North Sub-County. Purposive sampling technique was employed in this study to get the location or district in which the units of observation had required characteristics, along with snowball sampling which is useful when the population that possess the characteristics under the study is not well known and therefore need to find subjects. Secondary information was obtained from books, journals and news papers. The study revealed that creation of colonial administrative boarders led to competition for scarce resources was a major cause of violent conflict between the communities living in Marsabit county of Kenya.
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jgpc.v4n1a2
... In some cases, planners have excluded parties with extreme preferences, at least until after an initial smaller agreement has been implemented. Arguably, the 1993 Arusha Agreement over Rwanda could not have been attained with the inclusion of the Akazu (i.e., future génocidaires), as the mediators had wanted (Jones 2001). The decision whether to include "spoilers" depends on the degree or type of spoilers and their ability to upset an agreement if excluded compared with their ability to prevent an agreement if included (Leeds 1999;Calvert 1985). ...
This chapter synthesizes key insights and findings from research on negotiating international agreements conducted by several academic disciplines. It also provides templates for the study of domestic political negotiation. As democratic parliaments around the world struggle to create institutions that facilitate successful negotiation, they can learn from what has been already established in the study of international negotiation.
Like all chapters in this book, this one concentrates on findings relevant for reaching joint-gain agreements, and less on how states have deterred or claimed value from one another. A first section identifies underlying conditions that have proven positive and negative for agreements of this type. It merges insights from rationalist, psychological, cultural, and institutional theories. A second longer section shows concretely how international negotiators and mediators have actually operated to produce agreements in situations with conflicting preferences and even intense hostility. This section is organized according to a typology of stages useful for analyzing many international negotiations: diagnosis and other preparation; negotiating a formula; negotiating details. Many historical examples are given. These findings illustrate ways in which the inhibiting conditions of part one have been addressed. An appendix illustrates four types of opportunities for new research that could further improve this large literature: research on empirical questions and problems. methodological questions and problems; theoretical questions and problems; and normative or prescriptive questions and problems.
... Although many sing the praises of Mpungwe's success of the negotiations due to his consensus nursing, backroom diplomacy as well as channelling the ideas of the observer teams, critics often argue that the collapse of the agreement was due to the mediator's absence of anticipating the spoiler role of Hutu extremists (CDR) due to their exclusion in the power-sharing (Khadiagala 2007, 51). The successes of the developments gave rise to momentum in the talks in the second phase of Arusha (August 7-18, 1992) as the Protocol on the Rule of Law was signed on the 18 th of August 1992 (Jones 2001).Arusha III took place from 7-18 September 1992 and pursued the settling of issues of a new Broad- Based Transitional Government (BBTG) whereby the powers of the President would be effectively reduced to only ceremonial ones (Scorgie 2004, 68). The concessions from the GoR throughout Arusha III became a consistent tendency even later on in the other phases that were to follow, examples include the insistency of the RPF in the Arusha VI phase for the CDR which was the extreme right-wing faction within the GoR delegation to be excluded from the negotiations as well as any future government (Scorgie 2004, 68). ...
This is a paper which seeks to briefly describe the Arusha Peace Agreement that was agreed upon between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Arusha peace process unfolded during the Rwandan Civil War and its aim was to put an end to the conflict that permeated throughout the country. The paper seeks to inform the reader of the different aspects of negotiations which can have an impact on the outcome of negotiations.
... As Anglin denounces, "restoring the ceasefire rather than focusing on the genocide was to put saving money ahead of saving lives." 238 Foreign government with no interests in the region favored less risky and less costly solutions, 234 which also turned out to be highly ineffective and reflected a total disregard for the onesided nature of the killings (Jones 2001, Power 2002 In Rwanda, apart from limited actions such as the creation of safe areas, the international community's attempts at settling the conflict were limited to diplomatic embargo, economic sanctions and no-fly zones; weak and hesitant actions. As discussed in Richard Bett's article "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," "the logic behind such actions is that even-handedness will encourage the fighting factions to negotiate a settlement." ...
... First, one has to make the parties agree to a cease fire and start negotiating. Reaching this mediation process in itself may be difficult, which the case of Rwanda shows (Jones 2003). Moreover, the entire peace making process is vulnerable to set-backs, including a return to conflict. ...
... In Rwanda, for example, the crisis that snowballed into one of the worst genocides in our recent history started brewing in the late nineteenth century and climaxed to a Hutu extinction campaign against the Tutsi tribe in 1994 (Grunfeld and Huijboom 2007; Musa 2011). But the international media, oblivious of the underlying factors, mistook the genocide for ethnic conflict, focused on the evacuation of expatriates, and missed a golden opportunity to steer the world towards saving the lives of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed within 100 days (Dallaire 2008;Jones 2001;Thompson 2007). At a time when the international media are becoming conglomerates, media owners are cutting back on the number of bureaus across the world, as they describe foreign bureaus as artefacts of a bygone era like typewriters and rotary telephones (Ricchiardi 2006). ...
The violent insurgence in Northern Nigeria linked to the group ‘Jama’atu Ahlussunna Lidda’wati wal Jihad’, also known as ‘Boko Haram’, has since its outbreak in July 2009 attracted a lot of international media attention. Two notable media channels that have consistently reported it are CNN and Al Jazeera English. By applying the critical discourse analysis technique this article focuses on how these reputable media organizations often rely on parachute reporting – whereby correspondents are only dispatched to the scene of the conflict from their offices or beats abroad – and the consequences. This tradition has a tendency to raise questions on the credibility of the reports as the correspondents’ access to local sources is hindered and their understanding of the local terrain and context of the conflict could be problematic. This article, therefore, postulates that CNN and Al Jazeera reportage of the Boko Haram conflict using reporters not fully based in the affected areas leads to misunderstanding and misreporting the crisis and misinforming the audience. This type of reporting is also found to lead to inadvertent polarization of the conflict due to the use of assumptions and stereotypes in news reporting, which questions the media’s role as neutral observers/reporters of the conflict.
... Contemporary peace processes are not events that take place at a single point in time because negotiations to end wars can and do falter at any of these several stages of negotiation. Fighting, as we have noted, reemerges easily, particularly in civil wars, and even seemingly well-managed peace processes can have catastrophic outcomes, as the Rwanda case shows, since the genocide took place just after a fi nal agreement had been reached between the government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (Jones, 2001). The Palestinian-Israeli peace process, so promising at its initiation, quickly fell prey to spoilers, antipeace constituencies, and delays and disagreements in the implementation of its various stages (Wanis-St. ...
... Fortna (2007) (chapter 4) describes four causal mechanism, three of which we interpret to be special cases of the commitment problem. The fourth is that peacekeepers can prevent accidental violations of peace agreements from reigniting the war 5 See, for example, Jones (2001) and Dallaire (2003) on Rwanda and Clarke and Herbst (1997) and Howe (1995) on Somalia that evaluate the performance of missions once deployed. ...
Previous statistical studies of the effects of UN peacekeeping have generally sug- gested that UN interventions have a positive effect on building a sustainable peace after civil war. Recent methodological developments have questioned this result because the cases in which the United Nations intervened were quite different from those in which they did not. Therefore the estimated causal effect may be due to the assumptions of the model that the researchers chose rather than to peacekeeping itself. The root of the problem is that UN missions are not randomly assigned. We argue that standard approaches for dealing with this problem (Heckman regression and instrumental variables) are invalid and impracticable in the context of UN peacekeeping and would lead to estimates of the effects of UN operations that are largely a result of the assumptions of the statistical model rather than the data. We correct for the effects of nonrandom assignment with matching techniques on a sample of UN interventions in post-Cold-War conflicts and find that UN inter- ventions are indeed effective in the sample of post-civil-conflict interventions, but that UN interventions while civil wars are still ongoing have no causal effect.
... The RPF's initial invasion was repelled by the Forces Arme´es Rwandaises (FAR) assisted by troops sent by France, Belgium and Zaire. 74 The RPF troops, however, continued to occupy northern Rwanda, initiating an ongoing civil war. Within this climate of growing insecurity, northern Hutu elites turned towards ethnicity to rearticulate the 'Tutsi' as including the RPF, Tutsis living within Rwanda, all opposition parties and moderate Hutus. ...
Most academic work on the genocide in Rwanda uses either a methodologically social scientific or historical approach to explain the genocide's root causes. These causal stories most often focus on ethnicity and, in doing so, understate how structured economic-material relations made the conditions for genocide possible. Turning to Louis Althusser's concept of structural causality, I form an alternative method for narrating the genocide which treats the genocide as the result of highly complex and over-determined social relations. The paper then re-examines the structural causality of the genocide, focusing on how the coffee economy intersected with the economic, cultural, state, and ideological registers at which the genocide was produced. Representing the genocide in terms of structural causality addresses how over-determined exploitative relationships—between Hutu, Tutsi, coloniser, colonised, rich, poor, farmer, évolué, northerner, southerner, coffee producer, coffee consumer, etc—produced the genocide.
... 21 The failures of the UN throughout the 1990s have led to questions about the commitment of Security Council members to peace in terms of a more interventionist mandate and the availability of resources for conflict management. 22 Peace and security is high on the agenda of many international development agencies and Western governments, some of whom have peace initiatives outside of the UN and AU peace process, trying to broker deals that will increase their influence with the post-conflict regimes. Regional states acting unilaterally, the European Union, the USA, Canada, European countries, religious organisations such as the Catholic Church and international and regional NGOs are all active in the negotiations. ...
Efforts to bring peace and reconstruction to the Central African region have been fashioned by contemporary conflict resolution models that have a standard formula of peace negotiations, with a trajectory of ceasefire agreements, transitional governments, demilitarization, constitutional reform and ending with democratic elections. Local dynamics and the historical and multifaceted nature of the conflicts are rarely addressed. Furthermore, participants in the peace process are restricted to representatives of political parties, the state and rebel movements, to the exclusion of civil society. Using as examples the conflicts and peace processes in three Great Lakes countries—Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo—the paper contends that contemporary global frameworks for peacemaking and peace building that rest on the acceptance of neoliberal political and economic models cannot lay the foundations for the conditions necessary for sustainable peace. This necessitates the utilisation of a more inclusive concept of peace, the starting point of which has to be the emancipation of African humanity.
هدفت هذه الدراسة إلى الوقوف على احدى أفضل التجارب التنموية في عصرنا الحديث، وهي تجربة دولة رواندا إحدى أهم الدول الإفريقية لما حققته من نهضة رائدة وواعدة في مسارها التنموي رغم ضعف الإمكانيات ولما تمثله من نموذج رائد في مجال حوكمة التنمية في إفريقيا، تناولت الدراسة تأثير الميزان التجاري متمثلا في كل من (الصادرات والواردات) على النمو الاقتصادي في رواندا من خلال التركيز على نمو الناتج المحلي. اذ تلعب التجارة دوراً مهماً في اقتصاد رواندا، من خلال تأثيرها على مستوى النمو الاقتصادي وميزان المدفوعات ت والعمالة. لذا شُرعت العديد من الاصلاحات للسياسة التجارية والتي تهدف إلى تعزيز التجارة، من خلال دراستنا والعمل على تحليل سلسلة زمنية امتدت من العام (1980-2020)، تم الاعتماد على بيانات البنك الدولي وكذلك بيانات كلا من وزارتي المالية والتخطيط الاقتصادي في رواندا، حاولت الإجابة عن عدد من الأسئلة ومنها هل الصادرات والواردات والنمو الاقتصادي مترابطان؟ هل توجد علاقة سببية فيما بينها؟ هل هناك علاقة طويلة أو قصيرة المدى بين هذه المتغيرات؟ وقد توصلت لدراسة إلى نتائج وهي أن هناك علاقة سببية بين الصادرات والواردات من جهة والناتج المحلي من جهة أخرى في المدى المتوسط والطويل ووجود علاقة ارتباط وبالتالي هناك تأثير معنوي على النمو الاقتصادي في رواندا في المدى القصير والطويل، وهذا التأثير له دلالة إحصائية حيث إن كافة المتغيرات التي تم إدراجها بالنموذج المطبق كان لها تأثير في كل من الأجلين القصير والطويل. كما أن النموذج مستقر ولا يعاني من مشكلات قياسية، ويمكن الاعتماد عليه في التنبؤ، تم استخدام برنامج (EViews 12) في ادخال وتحليل بيانات البحث.
William Zartman’s ‘ripeness’ theory says that parties to a violent conflict will not negotiate sincerely in the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). In such circumstances, Zartman recommends a mediator employ coercion by escalating the conflict into a MHS, but the concept is not fully elaborated. Building on Zartman, this article specifies a new theory of ‘muscular mediation’, defined as a powerful mediator using coercion to achieve a mutual compromise that it formulates. The theory is evaluated in three cases from the 1990s: Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. The article finds that muscular mediation can work but also may backfire by magnifying violence against civilians, especially when all of three adverse conditions are present: (1) the coerced agreement threatens a vital interest of a party; (2) that party has the potential to escalate violence against the opposing side’s civilians; (3) the muscular mediator does not deploy sufficient military forces to deter or prevent such escalation. The article also explores why muscular mediation has been pursued under such adverse conditions. It concludes with advice for prospective muscular mediators.
Why do warring parties turn to United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking even when they think it will fail? Dayal asks why UN peacekeeping survived its early catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, and how this survival should make us reconsider how peacekeeping works. She makes two key arguments: first, she argues the UN's central role in peacemaking and peacekeeping worldwide means UN interventions have structural consequences – what the UN does in one conflict can shift the strategies, outcomes, and options available to negotiating parties in other conflicts. Second, drawing on interviews, archival research, and process-traced peace negotiations in Rwanda and Guatemala, Dayal argues warring parties turn to the UN even when they have little faith in peacekeepers' ability to uphold peace agreements – and even little actual interest in peace – because its involvement in negotiation processes provides vital, unique tactical, symbolic, and post-conflict reconstruction benefits only the UN can offer.
This study is a multi-level development history analysis of Rwanda, wherein "development" is defined in accordance with Amartya Sen's holistic approach. It takes into account social, physical and economic variables, and considers how they impact individuals' capacity to live freely. The objectives of the paper are: 1) to investigate how global, regional, national and local events have interplayed to shape the development process over time in Rwanda, 2) to discover Rwanda's unique contribution to present day development discussions, and 3) to see how development should best proceed in Rwanda today. The study was quantitative in nature. Through a brief historical survey, six key turning points have been identified as critical to Rwanda's development history: 1) the adoption of identity cards in 1926, 2) the Hutu Revolution of 1959, 3) independence from Belgium in 1962, 4) the coffee crisis of 1987-1989 and resultant SAPs, 5) the 1994 genocide, and 6) the new constitution in 2003. These turning points have helped us to understand Rwanda's development in six areas more clearly. These areas are: economic considerations, agriculture and land scarcity, gender, education, good governance and the reconciliation process. We have chosen these areas over others due to their prominence in literature surrounding Rwandan development. Despite being portrayed as a success story, the developmental situation in Rwanda is falling short in some areas. The profound structural transformation, which needs to occur in both economic and societal terms, makes future development success uncertain.
While much literature on peacekeeping seeks to determine the effect of United Nations (UN) intervention on post-conflict peace processes, most peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are deployed to active conflicts. The limited research on peacekeeping in active civil conflicts suggests that robust PKOs reduce hostilities. Yet, if PKOs serve to extend conflict duration, even lowered hostilities can yield greater destruction over time. We thus explore the effect of peacekeeping on conflict duration. We argue that PKOs with larger troop deployments are better able to increase the cost of combat, improve information sharing between belligerents, and provide security guarantees, thus reducing the time to negotiated resolutions. Using fine-grained data on monthly peacekeeping personnel commitments and observations of ongoing conflict between combatants, we examine how variations in mission deployments affect the success of UN peacekeeping in ending civil conflicts. As expected, our findings indicate that larger troop deployments shorten war duration to negotiated resolution.
In order to understand the key features of the Rwandan Genocide and the debate surrounding it, this chapter provides an overview on both the concept of genocide and its evolution in international law. The challenges posed by the protection of ethnic minorities within sovereign states are highlighted, as well as the contribution of Raphael Lemkin to the emergence of the concept of genocide in international law. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is analysed, with particular attention to the objective and subjective element of the crime. The contribution of the jurisprudence of the international tribunals and in particular the ICTR to the interpretation of the meaning of the concept of genocide is also in the spotlight. The key features of the Rwandan genocide are discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of Belgian colonization, which significantly contributed to the ‘ethnicisation’ of the categories of Hutu and Tutsi, a factor that played a major role in the violent dynamics triggered in 1994. In addition, the careful preparation of the genocide by the regime of Juvenal Habyarimana and the indifference of the international community are emphasised. Finally, the constitutional transition and the challenges that post-genocide Rwanda faced in terms of reconstruction of the rule of law and of the social fabric are highlighted, with particular emphasis on the issue of post-genocide justice.
The evolution of the regional system of cooperation for peace and security in Africa led to the formation of institutionalized methods and forms of cooperation within the framework of regional international organizations (Organization of African Unity, African Union) and the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture. One of the important forms of activity within it became peacekeeping operations. Maintenance, building and peace enforcement missions have become part of the strategy to shape the international environment in which security is a prerequisite for the smooth implementation of development goals. African international forces heretofore have participated in stabilization operations in countries such as Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, the Comoros, Sudan, Somalia and the Central African Republic.
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A CASE-STUDY ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING Dennis N. Ricci Doctoral Dissertation Department of Political Science University of Connecticut Storrs, CT ABSTRACT The primary focus of this study is to explain presidential decision making, specifically whether to intervene militarily or not in a given circumstance in the Post-Cold War era. First, we define military intervention as the deployment of troops and weaponry in active military engagement (not peacekeeping). The cases in which we are interested involve the actual or intended use of force (“boots on the ground”), in other words, not drone attacks or missile strikes. Thus, we substantially reduce the number of potential cases by excluding several limited uses of force against Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given the absence of a countervailing force or major power to serve as deterrent, such as the Soviet enemy in the Cold War period, there are potentially two types of military interventions: (1) humanitarian intervention designed to stop potential genocide and other atrocities and (2) the pre-emptive reaction to terrorism or other threats, such as under the Bush Doctrine. Therefore, we need to understand the logic of unipolarity and how the hegemonic power can be drawn into actions, especially in the absence of a great power rival. The theoretical puzzle we seek to solve comprises the competing explanations for why a presidential administration will decide to intervene in one situation and not in another. This is the normative question on which we focus from the outset in order to solve the theoretical puzzle. Since both the situations and decision makers vary across cases, we need to know precisely what is driving the outcome. Therefore, our theoretical perspective and goal-driven research objective are focused on standardized, generalized questions: Why intervene? Why use force or not? Under what conditions or circumstances are intervention decisions made? Do outcomes depend primarily on presidents making decisions as the all-important dynamic versus other variables and different measurements as to what drives the “go” or “no-go” decisions? Our examination of the phenomena of interest will lead us to a generalized theory as well as a typology of military intervention in the post-Cold War era. KEY WORDS: International Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Presidential Decision Making, Military Intervention.
Recent research demonstrates that larger and better-equipped United Nations peacekeeping missions more effectively ensure peace and security. This raises an important question: what explains the willingness of member-states to contribute the substantial numbers of troops needed to achieve peacekeeping goals? We argue that narrow member-state security interests offer an important explanation. We find that states embroiled in an ongoing rivalry with another state in the international system contribute more personnel to ongoing missions. Additionally, we find that regimes concerned about coup attempts increase deployments to peacekeeping operations. In a more general sense, this article suggests that the provision of security by peacekeeping operations to their host states is partially dependent upon higher levels of insecurity elsewhere in the international system.
What explains decisions taken by states around the world to prosecute members of their own armed forces for human rights violations? The dominant trend in existing literature suggests that a “justice cascade” best explains the growing prevalence of human rights trials. However, while norm diffusion offers some explanatory power in the contemporary era, other mechanisms are necessary to explain many early human rights trials. Through an analysis of one of the first recorded instances of what we now term “human rights trials” - the court-martial of six British Empire officers for the murder of POWs, civilians, and a missionary in the Second Boer War - this article identifies other crucial mechanisms driving prosecutions that retain relevance in the contemporary era. I find that signaling to domestic audiences, both at “home” and in recently conquered territories, can be critical motivators in elite or government decisions to pursue human rights trials.
The discourse of conflict resolution in recent years has shifted to the idea of “regional solutions for regional problems,” a shift largely driven by the dampening of an initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for greater UN action worldwide. Despite undeniable success in Mozambique, optimism for UN-led multilateral efforts began to wane following the UN’s ineffectiveness in Somalia in 1993, its inaction in Rwanda in 1994, and its sidelining by the overwhelming NATO interventions in the Balkans starting in 1995.
August 2011 marked twelve years since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that ended the second Congo war. It also marked the twelfth anniversary of the establishment of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, Mission de l’Organization des Nations Unies en République Democratique du Congo). Yet, the root causes of the wars persist—access to land in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains contested, and control over revenues from natural resources remains in the hands of a few. Armed groups, both foreign and domestic, continue to operate with impunity in the eastern DRC and are the source of much of the insecurity in the region. And state institutions remain weak and resource-starved.
On 1 October 1990, a 4000-strong division of the national army of Uganda calling itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)1 invaded northern Rwanda.2 Three days later they were within seventy kilometres of the capital, Kigali.3 Belgian and French paratroopers were dispatched to Kigali but did not engage in combat. It was the intervention of 500 elite forces of the Presidential Guard of former Zaïre that helped the Rwandan army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), to turn the RPF back over the Ugandan border.4 A cease-fire was agreed in late October, and by the end of that month Radio Rwanda announced that the war was over and victory achieved.5 The victory announcement proved to be premature.
This edited collection explores the fruitfulness of applying an interpretive approach to the study of global security. The interpretive approach concentrates on unpacking the meanings and beliefs of various policy actors, and, crucially, explains those beliefs by locating them in historical traditions and as responses to dilemmas. Interpretivists thereby seek to highlight the contingency, diversity and contestability of the narratives, expertise and beliefs that inform political action. The interpretive approach is widespread in the study of governance and public policy, but arguably it has not yet had much impact on security studies. The book therefore deploys the interpretive approach to explore contemporary issues in international security, combining theoretical engagement with good empirical coverage through a novel set of case studies. Bringing together a fresh mix of senior and junior scholars from across the fields of security studies, political theory and international relations, the chapters explore the beliefs, traditions and dilemmas that have informed security practice on the one hand, and the academic study of security on the other, as well as the connections between them. All contributors look to situate their work against a broader historical background and long-standing traditions, allowing them to take a critical yet historically informed approach to the material.
The ethno-national wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were a test of the will of the international community to prevent or stop tragedy. The subsequent international embarrassments placed international credibility in question. As usual, politics and strategic interests overrode legal principles when the international community sought to resolve conflicts in neglected parts of the world. The United Nations, as well as the United States and the EC countries, were remarkably timid when it came to dealing with the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts before and during the crises. This ignominious failure was due to the superpowers’ lack of political will and diminished strategic interests in both countries, particularly after the end of the Cold War and the enforcement of the New World Order. This chapter critically scrutinizes the international community’s humanitarian and diplomatic failure in dealing with the crises in both countries.
Although transitional justice (TJ) has been an area of significant donor engagement for more than a decade, little is known about the scope, trends, and experiences of that engagement. This study examines patterns and priorities of the aid that was given from 1995 through 2005 in support of transitional justice in Rwanda and Guatemala. It is based on statistical data from 15 donors and on interviews with 20 donor officials. The size of the TJ aid to the two countries in this period was modest, only accounting for about 5% of total development aid. While security sector reform received the bulk of the TJ assistance, the distribution of the remaining assistance was diverse. In Rwanda it targeted retributive justice processes including criminal courts and gacaca, while in Guatemala it focused on restorative justice institutions such as truth commissions and reparations. In Rwanda most of the TJ aid went directly to the government, and donor priorities by and large reflected government priorities. In Guatemala donor loyalties first and foremost lay with the peace accords, and donor commitment to certain TJ mechanisms was often not matched by a similar commitment on the part of the government. While Guatemala received more TJ support immediately after the end of the conflict, in Rwanda aid levels rose most prominently in the last half of the post-genocide period. While identifying trends such as these is a vital first step to fill the knowledge gap, further research is required to understand how transitional justice aid works across cases, over time and for different actors.
While United Nations peacekeeping missions were created to keep peace and perform post-conflict activities, since the end of the Cold War peacekeepers are more often deployed to active conflicts. Yet, we know little about their ability to manage ongoing violence. This article provides the first broad empirical examination of UN peacekeeping effectiveness in reducing battlefield violence in civil wars. We analyze how the number of UN peacekeeping personnel deployed influences the amount of battlefield deaths in all civil wars in Africa from 1992 to 2011. The analyses show that increasing numbers of armed military troops are associated with reduced battlefield deaths, while police and observers are not. Considering that the UN is often criticized for ineffectiveness, these results have important implications: if appropriately composed, UN peacekeeping missions reduce violent conflict.
1. Interpreting Global Security - Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall 2. The Rise of Security Governance - Mark Bevir and Ian Hall 3. An Interplay of Traditions: The 'Return of Uncertainty' and Its Taming in Post-9/11 US Security Thinking - Sabine Selchow 4. Interpreting George W. Bush's Foreign Policy - Daniel Zoughbie 5. From Value Protection to Value Promotion: Interpreting British Security Policy - Oliver Daddow and Jamie Gaskarth 6. Negotiating the Global Security Dilemma: Interpreting Russia's Security Agenda - Aglaya Snetkov 7. Interpreting Missile Defence: A Comparative Study of European Reactions - Jocelyn Mawdsley 8. Framing the Sovereignty-Intervention Dilemma: The Strange Omission of the Genocide Convention - Adrian Gallagher 9. Writing the Threat of Terrorism in Western Europe and the European Union: An Interpretive Approach - Christopher Baker-Beall 10. Security Politics and Public Discourse: A Morgenthauian Approach - Hartmut Behr
How do the qualities of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) influence the duration of peace after civil wars? Recent work shows that UN peacekeeping extends the duration of peace. However, this work has only been able to assess whether the presence or absence of UN missions affects post-conflict peace processes. Such analyses offer little in the way of policy prescriptions for planning and structuring PKOs to effectively pursue their goals. By employing fine-grained data on the personnel composition of PKOs, and generating expectations from rationalist bargaining models of civil war, we argue that the number and type of personnel deployed to a PKO influence the UN’s ability guarantee peace by addressing the information and commitment problems that so often lead to the collapse of post-conflict peace. We analyze how the composition of missions influences the duration of peace, finding that, as the number of UN military troops deployed increases, the chance of civil war recurring decreases. However, other personnel types do not have the same effect. We conclude that the effectiveness of post-conflict peacekeeping lies in the ability of PKOs to alleviate commitment problems through the deployment of military troops that are able to defend the peace.
This article explores the various legal responses to the genocide in Rwanda through the lenses of trauma, memory and performance, and addresses thequestion of whether trials as performance and methods of legal recourse including international courts, national prosecutions and traditionally adaptedmechanisms of transitional justice such as the gacaca courts are effective inreconciling trauma and establishing collective memory. This piece argues thatof the available methods of legal redress in post-genocide Rwanda, the gacaca courts are most effective in performing the function of reconciling trauma and establishing collective memory.
This article examines three levels – policies, programs, and philosophies – and two types – cognitive and normative – of ideas in the policy discourse around the formation of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), using discursive institutionalism. This study of ideas helped explain this important global policy change and identify causal factors behind it. Underlying the policy ideas for the PBC and several antecedents, failed peacebuilding proposals were programmatic ideas about what peacebuilding was, whether it was relief, development, or security, and whether it should include prevention. A major questioning of ideas at the philosophical level, sparked by the 9/11 attacks and the 2002–2003 Iraq crisis, created the conditions under which the PBC policy idea could be brought forward. Tracing normative as well as cognitive ideas also helped explain policy change, by identifying policy actors’ motivations behind the policy proposals. Normative ideas were about what was wrong in post-conflict countries, including peacekeeping disasters, large-scale refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) situations, a purportedly high rate of relapse into conflict, northern concerns about failed states, and southern concerns about a strong UN Security Council (UNSC). They also drove the particular policy proposals, including that for a small PBC with preventive functions and reporting only to the UNSC, and for the later removal of preventive functions, addition of General Assembly members to the PBC, and reporting to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The ongoing crisis in Syria helps responsibility to protect (R2P) analysts identify what evidence scholars and policymakers base judgements of a ‘manifest failing’ on. This is particularly relevant as the multifaceted crisis in Syria underlines the complexity and confusion that scholars and policymakers face when analysing overlap between atrocity crimes and armed conflict. The article draws on interdisciplinary research into mass violence in order to put forward five key indicators of a ‘manifest failing’ and applies them to Syria: (i) government intentions, (ii) weapons used, (iii) death toll, (iv) number of people displaced, and (v) the intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and the elderly. In so doing, the article contributes to an emerging research agenda which may aid policymakers and scholars in their assessment of a ‘manifest failing’ but also has scope for helping those outside government to hold decision-makers to account by creating a framework against which political [in]action can be judged.
Considering the increase and complexity of internal and international conflicts in the international scenery, the United Nations had to realize that their capacities to protect international peace and security have been beaten by the characteristics and dynamics of the conflicts. In this context the regional organizations had to assume a number of tasks autonomously or in cooperation with the United Nations with the final objective to keep international peace and security.
This work addresses questions about why the United States did not get involved in intervention efforts during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. To answer this, the work will analyze the history of Rwanda leading up to and through the genocide and changes in American policy towards Africa and military intervention. After presenting and analyzing the information, this work will argue that the United States did not send military aid to Rwanda because American policy makers did not hold Rwanda as a key foreign interest, there was no large-scale call to assist the Rwandans coming from the American public and that American policy makers did not want to involve American combat personnel in future civil wars after the devastating failure of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The conclusion of the paper will analyze how American-Rwanda relations have changed in the years since the genocide.
Preventive diplomacy does not always work because it is completely dependent on the intervener's national interests, priorities, and ability to interpret the situation correctly. However as civil wars continue to devastate populatiobns and threaten regional security, preventive diplomacy might offer the best chance at peace building, as conflict resolution and management become more difficult once the fighting starts. Recent work completed to date on preventive diplomacy in general and on early warning systems in particular is reviewed. Cases that challenged the success of preventive diplomacy in the first years of the post-cold war era are outlined with the aim of making causal inferences about the type and timing of the strategy employed. Comparative patterns across the cases are assessed to provide better understanding of why preventive diplomacy works in certain situations and not in others. Based on the case study evidence, conditions that must be in place in order for preventive strategies to succeed are posted.
Books and Articles in the Field of the Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes Published in 2001–2002 - Volume 15 Issue 2 - Ingrid Kost
This paper addresses the question of why ethnic genocide oc- curs in certain situations and the process through which geno- cide is made possible in previously unsusceptible societies. I assess how myths and memory lower the level of tolerance towards a target ethnic group and how this influences a coun- try's ability to implement policies of genocide. I conclude that political elites are able to manipulate nationalist sentiments and raise hostilities among contending ethnic groups. My study identifies the mechanisms through which myths and memory are used to affect intolerance or hostility, using the case studies of Jewish Holocaust, the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, and the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda to explain the roots of extreme ethnic violence.
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