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Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World
... The theory was introduced into International Relations literature in the 1980s. There have been numerous studies on Democratic Peace after the pioneering studies of Small & Singer and Doyle (Russet, 1993). Even though the reasons underlying this type of peace are still being criticized, it is mostly accepted by scholars and experts that democratic states rarely wage war against each other. ...
... Since the decision-making process in democratic states is translucent, the contentious behaviors will be deescalated by these supranational arrangements. Citizens are also able to participate in the process and correct the wrong decisions owing to the translucency of hostile decision-making attitudes (Russet, 1993). ...
... Democratic countries will only exercise the right of self-defense. However, the culture and norms of the autocratic country will not be peaceful since these features will be based on cruelty and oppression (Russet, 1993). ...
Democratic Peace Theory has been one of the most hotly debated topics ever since the 1980s. From Kant to the present day, the meaning of Democratic Peace Theory has changed, while the theory nowadays claims in principle that democratic states wage war against each other less often owing to their institutions’ and citizens’ abilities to urge their governments to establish a peaceful foreign policy. At this point, the critical theory offers an alternative explanation for the behaviors of democratic countries. This study was designed as a theoretical discussion utilising the analysis of primary and secondary sources in the field, both in printed and electronic materials. Employing the viewpoint of the critical theory, this paper argues that Democratic Peace is the disguise of hegemonic relations and the product of the historical block. This study revealed that democracies are not pacifist actors in the international realm. As articulated by the critical approach, the study also puts forth that the concept of Democratic eace facilitates the expansionist ambitions of hegemonic powers in the international system by utilizing various humanitarian interventions and serves as a means to maintain imperialist peace. Empirical evidence from the military intervention in Libya further reinforces this argument. Thus, this study asserts the idea to be cautious against the propositions of the Democratic Peace Theory because any activities done in the name of spreading democracy may involve a hidden agenda and disrupt the internal stability of non-democratic countries.
... В книзі «Розуміння демократичного миру. Принципи для світу після холодної війни» (Russett, 1993) він розглядає дві основні моделі мирного співіснування демократичних держав. У підґрунті першої, «культурно-нормативної» моделі лежить твердження про те, що коло інститутів та осіб, які ухвалюють в демократичному суспільстві державні рішення з питань зовнішньої політики, керується тими самими нормами, цінностями та досвідом культури політичної поведінки, які вкоренилися за умов мирного, компромісного розв'язання конфліктів у сфері внутрішньої політики. ...
... На завершення Расет висловлює застереження, що демократичний мир може бути порушений появою низки нових демократій, які виникають після холодної війни, де демократія пов'язана з націоналізмом та етноцентризмом (нагадаємо, що книжку написано у розпал конфлікту в колишній Югославії). Незважаючи на ці застереження, вчений стверджує, що демократичні інституції можуть убезпечити «демократичний мир» після розпаду комуністичної системи та закінчення холодної війни (Russett, 1993). ...
The article is devoted to I. Kant's views on the problem of war and peace and the possibility of achieving "perpetual peace" on the basis of the pamphlet "To Eternal Peace" and some other late works of the thinker. In particular, attention is paid to the historical background of the appearance of the work as a certain completion of moral philosophy and philosophy of law in the context of developing one's own project of "eternal peace" taking into account the solution of specific problems of foreign policy at the end of the 18th century. The article examines a kind of Kantian "formula of peace", which claims universal significance. It is laid out in the preliminary and especially in the definitive articles of the imaginary contract. It is argued that it is based on three main principles: republicanism, federalism and the presence of a cosmopolitan citizenship limited to hospitality. These principles are complemented by the so-called "guarantees" of "perpetual peace": the progress of law and the spirit of international trade. The article analyzes apologetic and critical responses to Kant's work and its subsequent interpretations in European philosophy and political thought. In particular, special attention is paid to the interpretation of his work as a "pacifist manifesto". Based on this, it was argued that Kant was one of the founders of secular pacifism. The article reasonably refutes such a position on the basis of its anachronism and inconsistency with the views of Kant himself, who considered "eternal peace" only as a higher normative ideal of foreign policy. The influence of Kantian ideas on the formation of modern philosophy of international relations, in particular the theory of democratic peace (DPT), is indicated. It is indicated that the three main principles of Kant's formula of "eternal peace" found their embodiment in the postulates of this theory. At the same time, it is noted that the practice of implementing DPT in US foreign policy has not always had positive consequences. In this regard, the problem of its application to the analysis of the causes and course of the Russian-Ukrainian war is analyzed. There are different positions on this matter, but based on the latest publications and the real course of events. It is concluded that the "militant" version of DPT can be useful for achieving our victory and a just, fair and worthy peace.
... Most students of world politics, I am well aware, do not tell stories of war and peace; they yield scientific explanations of it. Prominent among those is the theory of democratic peace, which is mostly an empirical theory in political science (Russett 1993;Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1996;Rosato 2005; but compare Knutsen 2002). ...
... Michael Doyle's (1983a,b) two-part essay in Philosophy & Public Affairs confirmed the remarkably peaceful relations among liberal states and gave theoretical depth to the finding by interpreting it as a vindication of Immanuel Kant's arguments in his 1795 essay on eternal peace. Doyle's essay resonated and gave occasion to a flurry of scholarship in political science, of which Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett's (1993) article in the American Political Science Review proved especially important. It confirmed again the validity of the core finding and elaborated two causal arguments linking democracy to peace. ...
... The simple official preeminence of the "democratic political system" does not seem to be sufficient for analyzing the endogenous dynamic of conflict resolution, nor for identifying perspectives for the prevention of new disputes. The democratic peace premise has strong empirical support but shaky theoretical foundations (Russett, 1993). Skeptical authors such as , affirm that Western democracies are as war-prone as non-democracies and more likely to fuel interstate wars (Elman, 1999). ...
... New times create new challenges to the structures of politics, bringing further questions about the forms of representation and demanding innovative solutions for the opportunity of legitimate governance. As some would argue, all this might indicate that, despite strong statistical evidence, the core of democratic peace theory is not iron law but maybe just a causal assumption (Gärtner et al., 2015;Russett, 1993). Another critical issue regarding democratization is "how" it should be implemented. ...
... Но разум, подкрепленный доброй волей, вопреки надеждам И. Канта, не одержал верх над иными составляющими мировой политики. В этих условиях представители современной школы теории «демократического мира», такие как Майкл Дойл [Doyle 1983], Брюс Рассет [Russet 1993] и др., подошли с новых позиций к старой идее о том, что демократии не вступают в вооруженную конфронтацию друг с другом и разрешают имеющиеся противоречия исключительно мирным путем. Например, М. Дойл в статье «Кант, либеральное наследие и международные дела» [Doyle 1983] предложил развернутое объяснение внутренних причин демократического мира. ...
... Развивая идеи М. Дойла, Б. Рассет в книге «Понимание демократического мира» [Russet 1993] попытался доказать, что даже в случае возникновения конфликта между демократиями существует много возможностей для мирного урегулирования споров. Вместе с тем он указывал на преобладающую роль общественного мнения и политических партий, способных в определенных условиях сдерживать возможные агрессивные наклонности политиков. ...
The author analyzes three waves of the crisis of democracy during the 20 th and early 21 st centuries. The first crisis of democracy in the early 20 th century is caused by the emergence and development of public politics, which challenged the possibility to govern the masses having conflict potential, it balanced the power of the people and universal suffrage with the control of the media in order to maintain the stability of political system. The second wave of the crisis of democracy (the last third of the 20 th century) is associated with the destruction of the conventional world and the weakening of the nation-state; and its markers were: the imbalance between the branches of government, the domination of economics over politics, the predominance of equality over freedom, the problematic implementation of human rights, and, as a consequence, the inability to put into practice the national form of democracy. The third wave of crisis (early the 21 st century) is accompanied by the transformation of democracy into post-democracy, in which the power of the people is replaced by the power of global capital, and the illusion of consent is reinforced by the prohibition of alternative points of view and the narrowing of the space of issues allowed for discussion in the name of public security. The crisis of the policy to achieve peace through the transformation of the balance of powers into a balance of interests called into question the principles of democracy. On the contrary, post-democracies justify the use of force to spread democracy around the world, and they take an active part in contemporary military conflicts, which can rightly be defined as hybrid proxy wars. Drawing on J. Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality, the author concludes that to overcome the crisis of democracy it is necessary to accept the very possibility of an alternative to this form of government and allow to discuss these previously marginalized issues as well as to maintain the return of the majority to genuine communication and politics, contribute to its enlightenment.
... As argued above, the two clusters appear to form two distinct citation communities with little overlap between them. At the same time, the twenty-two bridging sources between the two clusters are also quite revealing (see appendix, table 2, and Havemann 2020, file 2, table 5) 11 : here, we find (qualitative) methodological work (George and Bennett 2005;King et al. 1994), various theory-building IR scholarship (e.g., Huntington 1996; Kaldor 1998;Axelrod 1984;Schelling 1980;Russett 1993), and general political science and sociological literature (e.g. , North 1990;Tilly 1995;Von Clausewitz 1980[1832). Kant's Perpetual Peace also constitutes such a bridging source (Kant 1795(Kant /1983. ...
... Note, however, that most of these bridging sources are heavily tilted toward one of the two clusters. Only few are quoted in a balanced way by authors from both clusters (e.g., Russett 1993;Schelling 1980). This indicates further that the two clusters refer to two rather distinct scholarly communities with few connections between them. ...
This article contributes to two debates about international relations (IR) as a discipline: first, how global is IR, and how is it structured? Second, what is the state of theory in IR? We conducted (co-) citation analyses of both Web of Science (WoS) and—for the first time— non-WoS publications from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. With regard to the first question, we find that global IR resembles a core–periphery structure as a “hub and spoke” system whereby transatlantic core nodes are interconnected to each other and to some periphery nodes, while the periphery nodes are connected to the core but not to each other. IR scholarship in the periphery quotes the transatlantic theory cluster but is not linked to each other, not even in the same region. Knowledge produced in the periphery has to go through the transatlantic core in order to be recognized globally. As to the transatlantic core, we identify two major (co-) citation clusters: one committed to IR theory-building across issue areas from a variety of perspectives and the other focused on security studies with a strong emphasis on quantitative methods. With regard to the second question, global IR hangs together through references to the IR theory cluster consisting of North American and European authors who appear to define what IR theory is. Scholars in the periphery refer to this transatlantic IR theory cluster when engaging in theory-building. IR theories have become rather diverse and pluralistic, even in the core. While scholars still refer to the big “isms,” they use them around the globe in a synthesizing manner.
... This critique is given organizational bite through reference to political democracy and federalism, wherein citizen-state accountabilities combine with competitive political checks and balances to suppress Leviathan's inclination to undermine peaceableness. This discussion complements the rich scholarly discussions surrounding the peacebuilding implications of democracy and federalism (e.g., Russett 1993;Prichard 2013;Keil 2019). ...
Peace is commonly viewed in social theory as a necessary task for the state. But is there a pathway to promote peace without undue reliance upon vulnerable, if not failure-prone, state-centric law and order mechanisms? This paper responds in the affirmative by presenting a framework of “polycentric peace.” Inspired by the works of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, polycentric peace identifies the indispensable and often everyday roles of individuals and non-state groups in resolving conflicts and creating pathways for peaceful relationships. The promotion of peace through settings as diverse as civic associations and markets will be highlighted. Emphasizing human interactivity as instrumental to realizing peaceful outcomes, polycentric peace underlines the discovery of and learning about peacebuilding processes relevant to circumstances of time, place, and context. Polycentric interpretations of peace processes can be a viable alternative to centralized, state-sponsored efforts to facilitate peace.
... The prevailing narrative shifted with the emergence of the myth of the "victory of liberal democracy" as an expression of the "soft power" of the United States and the other Western powers (Fukuyama, 1992). The theory of the "democratic peace," advocated by scholars like Bruce Russett, propagated the idea that the ideological hegemony of the West, based on liberal democratic values, was continuously consolidating (Russet, 1993). ...
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shocked the member states of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and led to the reconsideration of its Strategic Concept as regards “mission”, “capacity”, and “role-share”. In 2014 NATO started facing the “Ukrainian Dilemma” through the “hybrid warfare”. Since then, NATO has been struggling to support Ukraine without directly confronting Russia. This is a fundamental challenge to the concept of the alliance. There are critical implications in the efforts of NATO for the future of Japan and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
... The hegemon benefits all countries by providing public goods that few countries have the resources or the willingness to provide. Political scientists, more than economists, have subsequently investigated the view that hegemony provides international stability by supplying public goods and facilitating cooperation (Gilpin, 1982;Russett, 1993); ; . However, Keohane (1984) has argued that a hegemon may not be necessary if countries are already operating in an international system set up by a previous hegemon. ...
This paper sets out a simple model of political realism where a nation’s security is deemed primary and examines the actions of a hegemon in seeking to protect its hegemony. Contrary to the received view that the presence of a hegemon is beneficial to the world in promoting prosperity and peace, in the contemporary scenario in which there has been a unipolar hegemon in the last three decades, it is in the interest of the hegemon to stir up instability elsewhere. The presence of a military-industrial complex is shown to benefit the hegemon through this instability, even at the expense of its allies. First, it induces greater defense expenditures on the part of its allies, which the hegemon can free-ride on and, second, it earns profits for the hegemon from the sale of weapons to its allies. The validity of the theory is shown in the case of the Ukraine-Russia war, in which NATO (comprising the hegemon, United States, and its allies in the European Union) are pitted against Russia. The paper casts serious doubt on the neoliberal justification that NATO offers for its expansionary actions eastward in Europe.
... Liberalism gives more importance to economic and trade relations that compel states to choose interdependence and collective security in order to prevent the outbreak of war (Keohane 1984; see also Russett 1993). A liberal explanation of the Quad is more likely to focus on the economic ties between and among the member states. ...
... Ancak Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimi bu durumu çok da değiştirmemiştir. Realist kuramların yanı sıra (David, 1992), özellikle liberal Uİ kuramlarının etkinliğinin artması ile bu sefer Soğuk Savaş sonrası dünya düzeni yeni bir ikili ayrım üzerinden okunmaya başlanmıştır (Doyle, 1983;Russett, 1993). Disiplindeki liberal yaklaşıma, özellikle Demokratik Barış Kuramına göre Soğuk Savaş sonrası uluslararası ilişkiler 'barış kuşağı' (zone of peace) ve 'çatışma kuşağı' (zone of conflict) olmak üzere iki kuşaktan oluşur. ...
‘Batı-dışı’ amillik Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinindeki önemli eleştirel kavramlardan biridir. Bu çalışmanın amacı disiplinde 2000li yıllarda başlayan ve günümüzde Küresel Uluslararası İlişkiler oluşumunun önemli bileşenlerinden olan ‘Batı-dışı’ amillik tartışması yapmaktır. Bunu yaparken çalışma özellikle disipline getirilen Avrupa-merkezcilik eleştirisini temel çıkış noktası olarak alır ve disiplindeki önemli temel kuramlara, çalışmalara ve tarih-anlatılarına odaklanır. Bu Avrupa-merkezcilik eleştirisi Avrupa-merkezciliği modernitenin yapısal bir unsuru olarak ele alır ve epistemolojik bir problem olarak görür. Çalışmanın temel argümanı Batı-dışı amillik tartışmasının Batı’dan farklılık üzerinden bir alternatif arayışı üzerinden değil, disiplinde Avrupa-merkezciliğin yarattığı bu farklılık söylemi ve ikiliğinin ortaya çıkarılması için önemli olduğudur. Nitekim, bu farklılık söylemi hiyerarşik bir uluslararası anlayışını da birlikte üretmektedir. Bu tartışma günümüzde disiplinde Küresel Uluslararası İlişkiler anlayışının temel hatlarının ortaya konulması ve Türkiye’deki akademisyenler tarafından gelişmekte olan bu literatüre nasıl katkı sağlanabileceğinin tartışılması için önemlidir.
... Why conflict while the economy is flourishing and every person is gaining rich? At last, based on these theorists, democratic nations are rarer interested in fighting but more likely to collaborate, and the massive tides of democracy all around the world in the last seven decades have transformed the world into a pretty pleasant place to live (Russet, 29 November 1994). ...
The current world order is declining. The rapid decrease in US control and the concurrent expansion of China altered the liberal, rules-based system when first ruled by the Americas and their allies. Frequent financial meltdown, wage stagnation, revived protectionist policies, the COVID-19 disease outbreak and increasing dependence on sanctions imposed have carried the post-cold War era of internationalization to a finish. Moscow's attack on Ukraine might have revived NATO but also reinforced the East and West divisions. In the meantime, transferring national preferences in several states and intense competition in world affairs have stopped the desire for economic cooperation and censored collaborative initiatives to deal with rising worldwide risks. The global system that will originate from such trends is difficult to forecast. However, it is simple to imagine a much less flourishing and much more dangerous globe defined by incredibly aggressive America and China relations in coming years. The Russian-Ukrain war also brought a remilitarized Europe, more forward geographic and financial alliances, a technology-based real-world split across geostrategic boundaries, and the increasing militarization of trade cooperation for geopolitical endpoints...
... године суверенитет, аутономију и територију једна друге (нпр. Оwen, 1994;Russett, 1993;Milner, 1997). Kада наведене теоријске парадигме посматрамо кроз дјеловање Вилсона и Рузвелта, с једне стране имамо заговорника међународног система колективне безбједности заснованог на моралним принципима и осуди јавног мњења (Лига народа), а с друге систем колективне безбједности који има "зубе" и ослања се на "наоружане најмоћније актере међународног система" (Уједињене нације). ...
Spoljnopolitičko odlučivanje Vudroa Vilsona i Frenklina Delano Ruzvelta, kao državnika ali i kao ličnosti, predstavlja srž fokusa interesovanja, istraživanja, analize i komparacije Dragana Simića sadržane na 190 strana knjige u izdanju izdavačke kuće "Кlio" pod nazivom "Svetski poredak". Interesantna je činjenica da ova knjiga izlazi 2022, u godini početka rusko-ukrajinskog rata i preoblikovanja evropskih odnosa, posebno u svijetlu inflacije i ekonomske krize, ali i ublažavanja dvogodišnje epidemije izazvane koronavirusom.
... 10 Gleditsch et al. 2002;Sarkees and Wayman 2010;Palmer et al. 2022;Brecher et al. 2021. 11 See, for example, the large literature sets on democratic peace (Russett 1994;Braumoeller 1997;Ray 1998;Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001), commercial peace (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001;Bearce 2003;Gartzke and Westerwinter 2016) and capitalist peace (Schneider and Gleditsch 2010;Powell and Chacha 2016;Burns 2017 substantive or procedural, and so on. In doing so, it is useful to look at the dimensions of conflict identified in frequently cited interdisciplinary scholarship on conflict and then to ask how these dimensions of conflict map onto dimensions of peace. ...
This article introduces the concept of diplomatic peace. It starts by developing a heuristic frame for identifying understandings of peace embraced by the actors we study. This frame encompasses three faces of peace — restraint, compromise and polylogue — and further differentiates different degrees of each of these faces (induced, co-operative and categorical restraint; profitable, principled and iterated compromise; extended, communal and deliberative polylogue). Then, this heuristic is applied to key United Nations General Assembly declarations and conventions that have passed unanimously since 1946. Studying how diplomats define peace yields remarkable results. Diplomats make far-reaching promises about the kind of peace they purport to pursue, strongly endorsing co-operative restraint, principled compromises and deliberative polylogues. The added value of this article is threefold: it systematically enquires into the nexus of diplomacy and peace, develops a multifaceted concept of peace, and reminds scholars and practitioners of how far-reaching already existing diplomatic promises of peace are.
... Second, the general country explanations reflect the nature of the domestic institutions. First, democratic governments are more interested in international cooperation (Mansfield et al., 2002;Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006) as they are more familiar with the democratic norms of negotiation and compromise (Russet, 1993), or they want to commit their successors to democratic principles (Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006). The existing evidence from the climate change regime supports the positive effect that democracy has on the size of national delegations (Kaya & Schofield, 2020). ...
The UN General Assembly is the central forum of world politics. While it formally allows the member states to delegate up to five representatives, the size of the national delegations is generally larger and significantly increases over time. In this paper, I explore the size of the national delegations to the General Assembly from 1993 to 2016. Generally, the major powers (USA, Russia) send the biggest delegations. Surprisingly, China sends significantly smaller delegations than it used to before 2008. Big delegations are also sent by some small (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Switzerland) or developing countries (Nigeria, Bangladesh). My analysis shows that national capacities and issue‐specific motivations drive up the delegation size. Although the issue‐specific explanations are relatively rare in UN‐related research (due to the general‐purpose nature of the organisation), I argue that human rights, international security, economic development, and UN governance are the agendas for which states care about the General Assembly.
... The theories of Bruce Russett on the relationship of democracy with international peace are an example of wrapping US pragmatism with a cover of values. The core of his theory has two bases: 3 1. Somatic violence between democracies is less than nondemocracies. ...
... Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 April 2021 bors or engage in military planning to prevent it (Kacowicz, 1998). Consolidated liberal democracies seem rarely, if ever, to fight one another (Doyle, 1986;Russett, 1993;Weart, 1998;cf. Rosato, 2003). ...
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... However, in Dixon's (1994) should not be counted as wars in the true sense, moreover such interventions were not regarded as publicly pursued policies in the United States, so this was not an example of wars between democratic countries (Doyle, 1983). Russett (1994) defined the war as the scale of the death toll of more than excluded because of the insufficient scale of the war. Even though both sides of the war were democratic countries at the time. ...
The West has been discussing the relationship between democracy and peace for a long time. The “Democratic Peace Theory” was put forward as early as Kant’s period, furthermore, this theory flourished again after the Second World War. After the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama and other scholars reinterpreted the “Democratic Peace Theory” and had a profound impact on the foreign policies of today’s Europe and the United States. The purpose of this article is to analyze the theoretical logic of the “Democratic Peace Theory” and its application in reality, as a consequence to examine how this theory provides an ideological excuse for the intervention and expansion of the world war situation.
... Num mundo dividido em dois -zonas de paz e zonas de fiii!II0/1 !S1ngcr & Wildavsky, 1996)-a conceptualiza~ao das normas sii o l'\ lt)ll '-l)l'S das normas e regras de politicas internas (Russett, 1993). No l'"'li do\o das rela~oes externas e internacionais, num mundo heterogl' lll 11 11 II!IIIIIHS assumem um canicter cada vez mais local/regional, c111 llln,, ll" d,, , ,ua difusao, seja em termos de conftito, integra~ao ou dc moCiill iilld iH t<:ll•ditsc h, 2005). ...
... La finalización de la Guerra Fría significó una serie de cambios en la manera de comprender el mundo y, en ello, de desenvolverse políticamente por parte de los tomadores de decisiones. La disolución de la Unión Soviética trajo consigo una reformulación en las amenazas percibidas por los Estados Unidos (Huntington, 1996) -ahora establecido como potencia global-, la desaceleración de la producción armamentista a gran escala (Lodgaard, 2011), la exaltación del triunfo de los valores democráticos y liberales (Russett, 1994), etc. En ese marco, las relaciones entre Washington y América Latina pasarían de una marcada intervención política y militar, del primero sobre los segundos -sin que ello signifique la eliminación de ese tipo de medidas en la actualidad-, a la priorización de las inversiones y lazos comerciales (León-Manríquez y Álvarez, 2014, p. 10). ...
El 4 de julio de 2021 se cumplieron 30 años de la promulgación de la Constitución de 1991: un hecho histórico que marcó el renacer de una Colombia enfrentada a crisis políticas, económicas, sociales, culturales, territoriales, regionales e internacionales. La instauración de un nuevo ordenamiento jurídico se materializó con el objetivo de hacer frente a la debilidad institucional del Estado, la visión centralista y de corto plazo de las élites, la ausencia de procesos de industrialización, la exclusión a minorías sociales y la aparición emergente del narcotráfico y actores armados ilegales.
... Hoje em dia os estudos tradicionais do fenómeno da transição democrática ponderam também o contexto da dimensão internacional, que envolve a análise do papel desempenhado pelos atores externos, e a influência exercida por fatores exógenos no processo da democratização. Nesta dissertação, baseada no contexto da dimensão internacional na democratização, serão referidos, na abordagem teórica, os estudos de Pires de Lima e de Moreira de Sá (2005), Severiano , McFaul, Magenand Stoner-Weiss (2008) (com enfoque nas teorias da transição democrática e nas peculiaridades da atuação dos atores domésticos e estrangeiros), Carothers (1999), Doyle (1983), Russett (1993), Rustow (1970), Mansfield e Snyder (2005) etc. Além disso, importa distinguir e explicitar outros autores que se destacam ao nível do estudo da relação entre o fenómeno da democratização e o da globalização (Pereira, 2008) e na ligação do contexto da democracia à segurança (Whitehead, 2008). ...
The phenomenon of “international intra-state armed conflicts” poses serious challenges to the theory and practice of conflict resolution. The distinction between intra-state armed conflicts and international wars has created a strong perception that, while international wars were dominant in the past, most contemporary armed conflicts are intra-state. The disciplinary demarcation between Conflict Resolution and International Relations has resulted in biases that overlook “international intra-state armed conflicts.” Given the growing number of such conflicts, the theory and practice of conflict resolution need to transcend the bias stemming from the artificial distinction between international wars and “international intra-state armed conflicts.” Integrating deterrence into conflict resolution strategies is essential, as is the combination of international and domestic monitoring mechanisms with the mediation of conflicting parties. Furthermore, peacebuilding assistance should be globally reinforced by incorporating lessons learned from the end of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. Adopting flexible perspectives, such as those promoted by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework, can enhance international partnerships. For instance, Ukraine has the potential to emerge as a maritime power in the Black Sea, connecting the Indo-Pacific region through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.
US-Icelandic Relations 1945-2006
Since the end of the Cold War, Iceland’s approach toward the Arctic has been driven by two central concerns: that it be counted as a legitimate Arctic state and that its geostrategic location be used to promote political and economic aims. It partly explains the belabored status-seeking attempts to define Iceland’s Arcticness as being exceptional or privileged—whether to buttress the questionable claim that it is the only coutry situated as a whole within the Arctic region or to push, until recently, for external recognition of its status as an Arctic coastal state. As we have seen here, this national narrative was met with skepticism by some other Arctic states. To be sure, despite strong Soviet and, later, Russian reservations, Iceland was included in the Arctic institutional arrangements that were formed in the 1990s, notably, the Arctic Council, but also other regional organizations—where its stakeholding role or interests were minimal—such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and the Northern Dimension. Yet the Arctic Five were initially not prepared to accept Iceland’s coastal state aspirations, even if they belatedly recognized its maritime interests in the Arctic by including it in the negotiations on the fishing moratorium in the Arctic Ocean.
This study investigates whether the political regime affects internal conflicts and specific types (e.g., civil war, political violence, and civil disorder). The study reveals that even incremental movements toward democracy are associated with reduced internal conflict, challenging some elements of the inverted U hypothesis. Moreover, factors such as government stability are better indicators of smaller-scale forms of internal conflict than the political regime type. Finally, scenarios of acute internal conflict, cultural tension, and government instability serve as more reliable indicators, implying that these elements eclipse the stabilizing influence of a regime's progression toward a more inclusive government.
This article aims to elucidate the varying effects of democratization in ASEAN members on the normative changes in the core principles of the “ASEAN Way.” Utilizing a regional-centric approach that emphasizes ASEAN members’ agency, the article posits that two critical variables shape the changing trajectory of ASEAN norms: ASEAN members' democratic performances and their regional status. While an ASEAN member’s democratic performance influences its willingness to advocate for normative changes, its regional status is also crucial in determining its capability to implement changes by navigating the divergent interests among ASEAN members. Only the ASEAN member with a high-quality democratic performance at home and recognized regional leadership can effectively bring about normative changes to ASEAN norms. Otherwise, either the domestic democratic deficit or a lack of leadership status will hinder the ASEAN members’ efforts to promote normative changes. Using the process-tracing method, the article empirically focuses on the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia for comparative case studies. The findings reveal that the Philippines’ poor democratic performance since the democratic restoration in 1986 has hindered its motivation to push for normative changes in ASEAN, rendering the Philippines a reluctant promoter. Although Thailand has made notable achievements in democratic consolidation since the downfall of junta rule in 1992, its lack of regional leadership has greatly limited its capability to reconcile the divergent interests among ASEAN members, resulting in the failure of its “flexible engagement” initiative. Conversely, Indonesia, with a high-quality democratic performance at home and bolstered by its regional leadership status, successfully brought significant changes to ASEAN norms by facilitating the ASEAN Charter signed in 2007.
While the Biden administration has framed US–China relations as part of a broader contest between democracy and autocracy, the potential international repercussions of this stance remain unclear. How will other democracies and, in particular, the citizens of key democratic US allies respond to a world characterized by increasing rivalry between dictatorships and democracies? We seek to answer this question through survey experiments in Japan and South Korea. We randomly assign information to respondents, highlighting the differences in democracy and human rights practices in the US–China relationship. Despite prior research and recent US policy documents suggesting that increasing tension over democracy and human rights in US–China relations will lead to democratic US allies moving even closer to the United States, our findings diverge from this expectation. When provided with information about this tension, the level of support for more cooperation with Washington decreases in both Japan and Korea. Our findings point to the need to revisit an assumption in much of the academic literature: Given a choice between cooperation with authoritarian and democratic countries in conflict, democracies—and their publics—will gravitate toward the latter.
The issue of rapprochement between former adversaries has received scant scholarly attention meaning there is little understanding of why some foes reconcile quickly, while others remain hostile for decades. Moreover, a specific facet of reconciliation, diplomatic normalization, while a crucial part of diplomacy, has not been explained by scholarly work. This study advances research on diplomatic normalization while proposing a novel theory of reconciliation involving Kantian elements: commerce, democracy, and law. Specifically, the paper proposes that significant economic incentives generate domestic lobbies in favour of normalization, while democratic norms and international institutions generate trust and transparency. This theory is tested on a new dataset that includes all potential cases of reconciliation after warfare since World War II. Survival analysis shows that market size, shared democracy, and joint international organization membership are significantly related to faster reconciliation. The causal mechanisms are examined in a case study of US—Vietnamese rapprochement. The policy implications for these findings and the limitations for political leaders are also discussed.
Casi la mitad de los acuerdos de paz fracasan durante los cinco primeros años de implementación. Cuando esto sucede, hay una tendencia a culpabilizar en exclusiva a los actores locales, en lugar de cuestionar también el impacto de la intervención exterior. Esta omisión tiene serias consecuencias para la seguridad de grupos marginados, como las mujeres y niñas. En África, lo que han ganado las mujeres después del conflicto queda lastrado por los altos niveles de violencia de género. El artículo afirma que existe una correlación directa entre los fallos de la construcción de la paz neoliberal en general, y el modo “liberal” en que el género se integra en las sociedades post-conflicto. Los enfoques inapropiados de las políticas de género pueden contribuir a la violencia estructural. El objetivo de esta aportación es cuestionar el modo en que los actores internacionales estructuran los procesos de paz y los elementos constitutivos de género. El artículo empieza con una crítica de la construcción de la paz neoliberal, para después centrarse en la crítica feminista a estos procesos y presta atención especial a los conceptos de agencia, local, protección y representación. Concluye ofreciendo algunas reflexiones desde una alternativa crítica feminista, más atenta a las relaciones de poder y mejor reflejo de la interpretación original de la seguridad humana no vinculada al estado.
The article examines the notion of security as an interdisciplinary notion in the conceptual and categorical apparatus of jurisprudence. The article determines the approaches of domestic and foreign researche to understanding this category from the point of view of politics, economics, sociology, law, etc. It is emphasized that the intensification of scientific interest to the security issue led to the identification of a few main directions of research on it, in particular: theoretical and methodological comprehension of the modern foundations of the human security issue, of the sources and prerequisites of all kinds of threats to its existence, of the possible scenarios of the development of social processes, etc.; theoretical and applied research on the most important components of the security issue, such as economic, political, military, technogenic, ecological, social and other types of security, that is, the entire complex of national security issues that are recognized as a priority in any civilized society, any modern state; specific research on the state of social objects in the subject field of the security issue, determination of parameters of stability of social systems, of possible structural deformations at various societal levels, of social reflection of an individual on the impact of threats, etc. The research on the notion of security has initially developed within the framework of the theory of international relations and is based on three main approaches, the ideas of which were established as early as the New Age. Scientific approaches to the analysis of security in democratic states are based on the study of systemic elements of security: interests, values, threats, objects, subjects, tools and the correlation of their content with democratic ideals. A comprehensive systemic approach allows determining the elements of the security maintenance system and their features in political systems of various types, finding rational and effective solutions to security maintenance issues, taking into account human interests, ensuring their rights and freedoms. However, under the influence of external and internal factors, in various types of democratic regimes, such systems of national security and methods of its maintenance are formed, which do not always correspond to ideal perceptions of democracy and of protection of human rights. At the same time, it is emphasized that new dangers and threats force even established democratic states to limit freedoms and human rights and to derogate from democratic ideals. Derogation from democratic principles for the sake of security ultimately creates dangers and threats for the individual, society and the state. Therefore, modern security researchers face the task of finding a balance between democracy and security, as well as identifying the features of its maintenance systems in democratic states.
¿Hay más conflictos que hace cinco décadas? ¿Los intereses de los países son los mismos? ¿Las guerras afectan por igual a las mujeres y a los hombres? En esta publicación, que apunta a un público diverso, interesado en los conflictos internacionales, su desarrollo y sus repercusiones, se tratará de resolver estas y otras interrogantes. Seguridad internacional: una introducción crítica nos acerca a temas como el terrorismo, los conflictos armados, la guerra y otras amenazas a la seguridad de los países, con ejemplos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la Guerra Fría, el surgimiento de Al Qaeda, entre otros. El enfoque principal es el de la política internacional, pero también se incorporan perspectivas y aportes de otras disciplinas, como la psicología o la teoría organizacional.
Employing a theory from the natural sciences to analyze a topic of social sciences is a procedure that can benefit decision makers, who can avoid mistakes by testing their decisions with the help of mathematical models. This thesis provides an overview of Chaos Theory—why it has been accepted in the natural sciences, specifically in physics—and whether it can be relevant for the IR domain of social sciences. The applicability of Chaos Theory to the physics domain is examined through the OGY (Ott,
Grebogi, Yoke) method and its applications. For the international relations domain, Chaos Theory is modeled in two specific international relations puzzles, bipolarity and democratic peace, to show the utility of the theory in this social science field. The results of the model are compared with the conventional international theories of Liberalism and Realism. The comparative analysis between the use of Chaos Theory in physics and in international relations issues, respectively, shows that for the former, we have controllability of chaotic phenomena, and for the latter, it is applicable and helpful. This thesis concludes that the theory of Chaos is a universal theory that is applicable to both the natural and political sciences.
Fully engaging with the power of love and the transformative paradigm expands our understanding of peace and conflict studies. In this chapter, “The Power of Love: Love in Peace and Conflict Studies,” Joyce extends traditional definitions concerned with efforts to end war, structural violence, and establishing strong values within civil society structures towards including the importance of the individual and their inner transformation. The micro and the macro are woven together and interconnected. The cultivation of a consciousness of love potentially entrains a society to value character, values, and behavioural changes which contribute to building cultures of peace. This chapter explores the role of peace education practices, including Yogic Peace Education and its intrinsic links to love studies. It considers the bridge towards love studies within conflict.KeywordsLovePeace/conflict studiesYogic Peace EducationTransformationJustice
Diplomasi teorisinin kökeni Antik döneme uzanır. Antik Yunan'da Herodotos ve Platon'un yazılarında theoria, dünyayı yukarıdan gözlemlemek ve yabancıla-rın değerlerini, fikirlerini ve eylemlerini anlamak için tanrılara gönderilen kutsal elçiler anlamında kullanılırdı. Yabancı olanı keşfetme ve izah etme; teorileştirme ve diplomasi arasındaki bağlantıyı gösterir. Sokrates'in theoria terimini varlıkla-rın özünü kavrama, felsefi tartışma yürütme, anlamlandırma ve çıkarımlar yapma olarak kullanması diplomatik teori sürecinde önemli bir aşamaya işaret eder. Bil-me ve izah etme işleviyle birlikte müzakere ve arabuluculuk diplomasi kavramı içinde başlangıçtan itibaren var olmuştur. İlk çağlardan itibaren diplomasi güç ve çıkarların müzakeresi kadar, bilginin, değerlerin ve anlamlandırmaların da müzakeresidir. Klasik dönem ve Orta Çağ'da diplomasiyi teorileştirme çabalarında, diplo-matik işlevleri ve bunları yerine getirmek için gerekli koşulları ve normları ta-nımlamaya çaba harcandı. Bu çabalar içinde toplumlar arasında ve insanlıkla tanrı (lar) arasındaki arabuluculuğu kavramsallaştırma uğraşları da dikkat çeker. Rönesans'la birlikte iletişim ve ikna başta olmak üzere diplomatların nitelikleri üzerinde yoğunlaşıldı. Aynı dönem diplomasinin siyasi birimler arasında müza-kere boyutunu gündeme taşıdı. 17. yüzyılda, ulus-devletler ortaya çıkarken ve Avrupa'da siyaset alanında egemenlik kullanan siyasi aktör sayısı artarken Kardinal Richelieu, savaşta ve barışta kesintiye uğramaması gereken sürekli bir müzakerenin ve dolayısıyla he-nüz tanımı yapılmamış diplomasinin ateşli savunucusudur. 18. ve 19. yüzyıllarda diplomasinin teorileştirilmesinde önemli bir değişim, strateji ile kurulan bağlantıdır.
Bu etkileşim diplomasinin etikle olan ilişkisini baskılarken araçsallığını öne
çıkarmış ve devlet merkezli uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin kavramsallaştırma
sürecine kapı aralarken bir boyutuyla da ihmalin nedeni olmuştur.
Avrupa’nın büyük güçleri arasında güç mücadelesinin hâkim olduğu 19. yüzyıl
ile 20. yüzyılın iki dünya savaşına ilaveten Soğuk Savaş’ın önemli bir bölümü
diplomasiyi strateji, devlet idaresi sanatı (statecraft) ve propaganda arasında bıraktı.
Bu dönemlerde devletin varlık nedeni (raison d’etre) diplomasiyi devlete/
hükümete bağımlı kılan temel kavramdır.
Diplomasinin uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde ihmal edildiği sıklıkla dile getirilir.
Gerçekten de uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininde diplomasi teorisi, az sayıdaki
özgün çalışmanın dışında nispeten marjinal konumdadır ve kuramsal bir
yalnızlık içindedir. Bu önermenin, inşacı ve eleştirel teorilerden ziyade, devlet
merkezli klasik uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinde doğruluk payının yüksek olması
şaşırtıcı ancak karmaşık bir konudur. Karmaşanın ilk boyutu diplomasinin
uluslararası ilişkileri analiz ederken gerek duyulan özerk bir kuram ve ayrı bir
alan olarak ele alınıp alınmayacağı ile ilişkilidir. Karmaşanın diğer boyutu ise
gerçekte klasik realistlerden ve liberallerden günümüze diplomasinin sözcük ve
eylem olarak sıklıkla başvurulmasındadır. Nitekim realist bakış açısına sahip olduklarından şüphe duyulmayan Morgenthau’nun ve Kissenger’in diplomasiye
yer veren kitapları alanın klasikleri arasında öne çıkar. Bu derece sık kullanıma
karşın diplomasinin ihmali şaşırtıcıdır.
Diplomasinin disiplindeki marjinalliği uluslararası politikanın ve olgularının
aşağıdan yukarı ya da tikelden tümele kavramsallaştırılması ile de ilişkilidir. Geleneksel
uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi, devletleri ya da devletleri oluşturan daha alt
düzeyde aktörleri temel aldığından dünya politikasına aşağıdan bakar. Toplumsal
sözleşme ile yaratılan ve şiddet kullanma tekeli dahil olmak üzere olağanüstü
yetkilerle donatılan ve egemen olan devletler daha geniş bir düzlemde (uluslararası
ortam) etkileşime geçtiklerinde uluslararası davranış ortaya çıkar. Bu
noktada siyasi alanda ikilik başlar. İç siyasi alan, devletin tam egemen olduğu,
kurumlar ve kurallar bir düzen yarattığı için hiyerarşik; dış siyasi alan ise, çok
sayıda egemen bir arada olduğundan ve tek egemenin kontrolünde kurumlar ve
kurallardan bahsedilemeyeceğinden anarşiktir. Mücadele, çatışma, güvenlik ikilemi
ve kendi başının çaresine bakma (self-help) ile betimlenen anarşik ortamda
devletler için iki temel araç savaş ve diplomasidir. Ancak bu iki araç uluslararası
politik sistemi inşa edici değildir; inşa edenlerin, yani devletlerin, aracıdır. Bu
tür bir sistemde, sistemin kendisi ve devletler karşılıklı inşa edici özellikler taşır.
Bu temel çerçevede makalede iki ana akım uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinin realizm
ve liberalizm- farklı tipleriyle birlikte, diplomasiyi nasıl kavramsallaştırdığı
tartışılmakta, ihmalin varlığı, derecesi ve nedenleri araştırılmaktadır.
Makalede realizm ve liberalizm, bünyelerindeki farklı türlerle birlikte ontolojik
varsayımları, epistemolojik birikimleri ve metodolojik duruşlarının diplomasiyle
bağıntısı boyutuyla ele alınmaktadır.
Introduzione
Sin dall'Ottocento, l'economia politica dei classici ha prodotto modelli del commercio internazionale per spiegare tanto i vantaggi derivanti dall'apertura agli scambi, quanto la struttura dei flussi commerciali tra i diversi paesi. A tutt'oggi, gli assunti avanzati dal modello ricardiano del commercio internazionale e dal modello Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson, che spiegano i flussi di scambi commerciali rispettivamente basandosi sui concetti di vantaggio comparato e di dotazione di risorse, forniscono strumenti ampiamente utilizzati nella spiegazione dell'insorgenza e del mantenimento di rapporti commerciali tra stati. A differenza della letteratura economica, che si è concentrata in buona misura sulle cause dell'apertura commerciale e sulla spiegazione delle direzioni dei flussi di scambio, spesso limitandosi a individuare i fattori costanti nelle politiche protezioniste o liberiste degli stati, la letteratura politologica ha puntato il proprio interesse sulla spiegazione delle variazioni nella scelta degli stati di promuovere, oppure limitare, il grado di apertura agli scambi con l'estero.
Regionalism is defined as a reasonably shared unity, with the mix of harmony and disharmony among their geographical unit, indicated by a reasonable degree of (a) domestic stability, i.e., aggregated satisfaction with quality of life composed of housing, friendships, marriage, standard of living, household income, health, education, job, neighbors, public safety, the condition of environment, social welfare system, the democratic system, family life, leisure, and spiritual life, amidst “hyperdemocratization”; (b) simultaneous adaptability, assigning the six policy priorities to the six global six policy tasks: human rights, peace and disarmament, commerce, trade and communications, the environment, intellectual property, labor and health amidst “hyperglobalization.” Here, in the Asian context, regionalism is broadly defined as above because regionalism in Asia has not produced such regionalism as cohesive as the European Union, and yet at the time of “hyperdemocratization” and “hyperglobalization”, impetus to regionalism are abound amidst many kinds of perils. In the new discipline of global politics, both domestic stability and external adaptability are not defined as normative terms but in terms of the consequences of the global politics mixture, i.e., domestic and global levels of interactions of many kinds.
War as an institution of international society seems counterintuitive at first; war, after all, involves opposing goals between adversaries and practices causing substantial death and destruction. Yet, the management of violence is a key function of any political order and war can thus be both a threat to the international order and an instrument to maintain said order. This chapter investigates what this tension means for the resilience of war as an institution of today’s international society. On the one hand, the right to go to war is highly limited and the means, methods and actors in war are subject to substantial restrictions; but on the other hand, new actors and technologies bring a high degree of contestation of when and how war can be fought. The result of these diverging tendencies is that the resilience of war as instrument to maintain order is put into question and far from guaranteed for the future.
The return of authoritarian great powers, the slowing of the democratic wave, and outright reversion to authoritarian rule pose important questions for international theory. What are the implications of an international system populated with more autocracies? This question was posed by a diverse array of social scientists, public intellectuals, and policy analysts in response to the autocratic wave in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. We show that a series of conversations emanating from quite diverse intellectual priors – from Christian realists to international lawyers and disaffected Marxists – converged on the risks these autocratic regimes posed to democratic regimes and the international order they sought to forge. These risks included unconstrained rulers, an inability to sustain international commitments and political processes that undermined rational deliberation at home and spread disinformation abroad. The reading of this work suggests an under-appreciated strand of liberal international relations theory, and these debates have direct implications for liberal arguments about the democratic peace. Rather than theorizing why democracies avoid war, they underscore the importance of understanding why authoritarian and democratic countries are particularly prone to conflict.
Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders’ domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader’s international reputation. We theorize that certain domestic choices can inform expectations about future international crisis behavior based on the extent to which (1) the costs at stake are similar to those of an international crisis and (2) the domestic issue is salient relative to foreign policy. We use conjoint experiments and other evidence to show that many domestic choices have significant international reputational effects. There is some evidence that the reputational effect of certain domestic choices may equal that of fighting in a previous international crisis.
Roland Czada fordert in seinem Leviathan-Beitrag, dem (neo)-realistischen Paradigma in den Internationalen Beziehungen den ihm zustehenden Raum zu geben. Der „normative Institutionalismus“ - so der Name des imaginierten Gegners - beruhe auf naiven Annahmen und führe die Politik in die Irre. Wenn man die Lakatos-Kriterien für ein progressives Forschungsprogramm heranzieht, ergibt sich ein anderes Bild. Das (neo-)realistische Forschungsprogramm erklärt den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine kaum, hat Schwierigkeiten, die Reaktionen auf diesen Krieg zu verstehen, und bleibt bei vielen anderen wichtigen Fragen der Weltpolitik seltsam leise. Auch kann man nicht darauf bauen, dass eine (neo-)realistisch angeleitete Politik klüger wäre, weil die Verbindung von Theorie und ihren realen politischen Empfehlungen nur sehr lose ist.
This chapter outlines the general features of a logic of risk and how it can be distinguished from other logics of security. Here, the chapter focuses on key criteria that can be employed to identify and highlight different security or strategic logics. These criteria include representation of security issues, measures and effects, and objectives. The chapter then provides a brief discussion of Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis and governmental or post-structuralist approaches to risk, and how they have been applied to the study of security. The final two sections of the chapter outline the conceptual framework that is applied to the analysis of Trump’s travel ban and wall. The first outlines the framework of riskisation; the second considers the concept of situational risk management.
Since the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war, successive governments have designated youth as a priority area of policy intervention and proposed numerous programmes to deal with the so-called ‘idle’ youth problem in the country. This focus on youth as objects of policy concern partially owes to contemporary discourses about the relationships between youth and conflicts, and especially, the idea that the existence of a large youth population represents a threat to domestic and international security, and thus functions as part of a larger global governance mechanism that targets societies as part of a liberal interventionist and conflict containment strategy. This paper uses the Sierra Leonean example to stage a broader critique of these interventionist and conflict containment strategies and the ideological schemas that make them possible. It suggests that these programmes are circumscribed epistemically by evolutionist preconceptions that construct the targeted populations as objects of power to be reproduced as neoliberal cosmopolitan subjects as a way of transcending the purported threat they represent. However, that these policies are incapable of transforming the structures within which the so-called ‘idle’ youth problem is produced. Rather, they reproduce, in other guise, the very conditions of precarity that they aim to address.