Бариери пред ефективния институционален избор: Защо невинаги се налагат икономически най-целесъобразните институции (Obstacles to the Effective Institutional Choice: Why Do Economically Expedient Institutions Not Always Get Implemented)

Abstract

This article examines the theoretical arguments in D. North’s theory of institutional change for why effective social rules and norms do not always succeed to replace economically inexpedient ones. An institutional development path which clearly diverts from the notion of evolution toward a more effective set of rules is seen as the main reason for the unequal economic performance of nations. Path dependence, informal norms which contradict better regulation of social and economic processes as well inefficiencies in the political markets hinder the efficient institutional choice. In-depth understanding of the above factors can become the basis for a more sophisticated macroeconomic policy aimed at increased economic growth, especially in transition societies.