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Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea
Abstract
Can a constitutional amendment be unconstitutional? Prima facie, this seems like a paradox. This vexing issue has attracted increased attention in recent years. Whereas the definition of the nature of constitutional amendment power is among the most abstract questions of constitutional theory, the question of limits on constitutional amendments is not purely of academic interest. It has practical application; the issue has already been adjudicated in numerous countries and is likely to arise, sooner or later, in other countries as well. This issue of limits is a fundamental one and much could be gained from comparative study. This Article aims to trace the migration of limited amendment power and of judicial review of constitutional amendments through different jurisdictions and to paint a broad pattern of "constitutional behavior." It appears that the global trend is moving towards accepting the idea of limitations explicit or implicit on constitutional amendment power. Bearing in mind the difficulties of borrowing (or transplanting) constitutional ideas from different jurisdictions into other legal cultures, this Article claims that limitations upon the amendment power is just one example of the larger phenomenon of the migration of legal ideas. At times, the notion of limited amendment power migrated intact into other jurisdictions, but on other occasions it also absorbed local content, primarily to acknowledge prior events and past experiences. The fact that this concept traveled across continents and entered different legal systems shows that borrowing a constitutional idea can be successful, even within very dissimilar legal systems. This comparative investigation into the origins and the migration of the idea of limits to the amending power will highlight the uniqueness of each legal system and unravel the conundrum of unconstitutional constitutional amendments itself.
... Esses percentuais se referem a declarações de inconstitucionalidade em geral, e não especificamente ao controle judicial de emendas. Eles são preliminarmente úteis, porém, se assumirmos a posição corrente na teoria constitucional de que o poder de controle judicial de emendas à Constituição é excepcional (e.g., Roznai, 2013), em dois sentidos. Primeiro, do ponto de vista descritivo, a maioria das constituições em vigor hoje no mundo não preveem limites materiais a emendas constitucionais, e um número ainda menor de textos constitucionais confere expressamente a tribunais o poder de fazer esse controle. ...
... Em obra recente e abrangente sobre "cláusulas pétreas" em sistemas jurídicos ao redor do mundo, Yaniv Roznai registra o Brasil como um caso em que mesmo sem "autoridade expressa", no texto, para realizar controle de emendas, essa atuação judicial teria se tornado uma "prática estabelecida" (Roznai, 2017, p. 204 (2019), por exemplo, argumentam que emendas constitucionais que afetem a independência judicial deveriam estar sujeitas a um controle de constitucionalidade mais intenso. Por outro lado, da mesma forma que há uma tendência global à crescente aceitação de limites materiais ao poder de emenda (Roznai, 2013;Comissão de Veneza, 2016), parece haver uma tendência global entre os constitucionalistas de reconhecer que juízes deveriam ter, em princípio, esse poder, e que o texto constitucional deveria reconhecê-lo (Albert, Nakashidze e Olcay, 2019; para uma posição contrária, ver Albert, 2018; ver ainda Pereira, 2017, para uma discussão dos fundamentos teóricos por trás dessas diferentes posições). ...
... 14 Ver, p.ex., Scotti, 2018, pp. 63-64;Roznai, 2013 Esses resultados apontam para um tribunal ativo no uso do poder de controle de emendas. Os dados também sugerem que as principais entidades beneficiadas por esse mecanismo de controle e pela reação do tribunal no período analisado foram as associações profissionais de carreiras públicas da Justiça. ...
Resumo Este artigo discute a mudança constitucional, no Brasil, a partir da formação de agenda e do processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal em Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade (ADIs) contra emendas constitucionais. A metodologia adotada foi a análise de conteúdo das petições iniciais e das decisões (quando existentes) em 115 ADIs, ajuizadas no tribunal entre 1988 e 2018, visando responder a três questões descritivas: 1) quais emendas foram questionadas, e quais aspectos dessas emendas foram contestados; 2) quais atores buscaram limitar e modular a mudança constitucional; 3) quais respostas o tribunal forneceu. Os resultados mostram que o Supremo tem participado de forma significativa no processo de mudança constitucional, interferindo na produção legislativa. Em 20% das vezes em que foi chamado a se posicionar, em ADIs, sobre emendas à Constituição, o Tribunal interferiu, suspendendo efeitos de dispositivos ou modulando as mudanças legislativas por meio da adoção de uma interpretação conforme a Constituição. Esses resultados apontam para um tribunal ativo no uso do poder de controle de emendas. Os dados também sugerem que as principais entidades beneficiadas por esse mecanismo de controle e pela reação do tribunal no período analisado foram as associações profissionais de carreiras públicas da Justiça.
... As per the judgment given by the Tribunal, twelve of the people imputed were given death sentence out of which ten were executed on October 16, 1946 while one of the remaining two committed suicide before the sentencing could be carried out and the other went missing. 48 Three were punished with life imprisonment 49 and another four with rigorous imprisonment for time periods of ten to twenty years. 50 Three others who were also tied for the war crimes were acquitted by the tribunal. ...
... 52 The Nuremberg trials established that all of humanity would be protected by an international legal shield which would allow even a Head of State to be held as criminally responsible and punished for aggression and Crimes against Humanity. 53 The efficiency of this newly formed International Criminal Law (ICL) was seen when the world was shocked by the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda where in 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was made 48 Supra n. 15. 49 Id. 50 Supra n. 13. 51 Supra n. 18. 52 53 Id. functional as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established to bring the offenders to justice for their crimes. ...
... But by envisaging the nonabrogability of the basic structure of the Constitution from within the existing amending mechanism under Article 368 he locates the legal sovereignty in the Constitution itself and held that the latter envisages the non-juridical power in the nature of revolution to abrogate the Constitution. 44regard to the Constitution47 The Supreme Court of Pakistan had in one of its judgments in the year 1980 clearly stated that the Parliament cannot amend the Constitution at its whims and fancies.48 ...
... Salah satu alasan untuk mengadopsi amandemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional adalah adanya unamendable clauses dalam konstitusi suatu negara. Dapat dilihat bahwa pada tahun 2011, sekitar 42% negara di dunia memiliki konstitusi yang memuat ketentuan yang tegas bahwa konstitusi suatu negara adalah tetap dan tidak dapat diperbaharui (Roznai, 2013). ...
... Ada ketentuan substantif dalam Konstitusi ini yang melarang atau mengecualikan hal-hal tertentu untuk diubah, yang dapat disebut "ketentuan invarian". Sebaliknya, ketentuan yang tidak dapat diganggu gugat ini biasanya terkait dengan bentuk negara dan bentuk pemerintahan, seperti bentuk republik; kesatuan; ataupun federal (Roznai, 2013). Mengenai revisi konstitusi, Amerika Serikat mengatur cara mengubah konstitusi dalam Pasal 5 UUD AS, sedangkan berbeda dengan Indonesia, tata cara revisi ini dimuat pada Pasal 37 UUD Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. ...
Konstitusi dalam suatu negara merupakan suatu hukum dasar yang mengatur berbagai hubungan antara pemerintah dengan warga negaranya dalam berbagai aspek mulai dari bentuk negara, bentuk pemerintahan, lembaga negara, hak asasi manusia, hingga cita-cita negara. Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk mengkaji perbandingan konstitusi negara Indonesia dengan Amerika Serikat yang kerap dijadikan cerminan konstitusi oleh banyak negara. Fokus kajian adalah bentuk negara dan sistem pemerintahan, kelembagaan negara, dan pengaturan hak asasi manusia. Penelitian ini dilaksanakan dalam bentuk yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan komparasi Pengumpulan data dilakukan secara studi kepustakaan lalu akan disajikan secara kualitatif dengan pendekatan deskriptif-analitis. Hasil penelitian yang ada menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia dengan Amerika Serikat memiliki banyak kesamaan seperti bentuk pemerintahan, beberapa lembaga negara, aturan mengenai hak asasi manusia, dan mekanisme perubahan konstitusi. Perbedaan tampak pada bentuk negara, beberapa lembaga negara, hak asasi dalam aspek kepemilikan senjata, dan keterlibatan peradilan dalam mengubah konstitusi.
... The political debate of the doctrine of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment was evolved from the United States and France, but its doctrinal origins belong to Germany. Further, it has traveled progressively to the democratic countries having modern constitutions in every part of the entire world (Roznai, 2013). In the view of this modern concept, some countries have inserted unamendable provisions in their Constitutional text (i.e., supra-Constitutional provision, which implies express limitation upon the Parliament in respect of amending the Constitution), which cannot be amended even by the subsequent Parliaments (Abeyratne & Bui, 2021). ...
... Still, over the entire world, it has become a most relevant issue on a practical level because of the enactment of amendments in their respective Constitutions. Therefore, the issue has already been discussed in various States and continued to be debated and is likely to be rising its significance, sooner or later, in numerous other States (Roznai, 2013). Resultantly, the doctrine of limited sovereignty of the Constituted Parliament has been acknowledged in an imposing manner across the globe. ...
The legal fraternity and some political parties around the country challenged the twenty-first constitutional amendment, enacted by the Parliament of Pakistan. The petitioners contended that the Legislature amended the basic features of the Pakistan Constitution beyond its scope of amending power and liable to be declared unconstitutional. However, some of the judges of the apex Court of Pakistan adopted the former judicial approach. They ruled that the apex court had no authority to annul any amendment when it became a formal part of 1973’sConstitution. The apex court further stated that the impugned amendment might be taken under consideration if it was found that the required constitutional procedure for amendment did not comply with it. This research aims to critically analyze observations of the apex court about examining the constitutional amendment on the yardstick of repugnancy with the basic features of the Constitution of Pakistan. For achieving the proposed objective, this study adopts a doctrinal research method. It carries out an in-depth analysis from the perspective of modern Constitutionalism, juristic literature, and judgments of the superior courts of various States to support the study.
... The Chief Justice of Pakistan and the provincial Chief Justices held pivotal roles in this process. 31 In the landmark Judges' Case 1996, the Supreme Court significantly limited the President's executive discretion in judicial appointments, rendering it nearly ineffective. The Court ruled that the President was generally bound by the Chief Justice's recommendations. ...
In Parliamentary form of Government, the independence of judiciary is just a dream, as direct involvement of politicians and other established institutions can be observed in it. The concept of separation of powers given by Montesquieu though based upon logics but cannot be implemented without the principle of check and balance. The notion of term ‘justice’ generally springs the idea of court and notion of term ‘court’ brings about the concept of a ‘Judge’; a neutral, un-biased, upright, honest, a person of integrity presiding the court chair. Judge is a protector of public’s interest and a canon of hope in demise. Appointment of judges is a primary factor which effects the independence and performance of judicial bodies. This appointment should be free from every kind of influence and interference so that the administration of justice is not hindered. Any external influence in the appointment procedure automatically makes the appointed judge slightly biased, which may be due to various factors like fear, favor, and indebtedness. The appointment procedure which the law gave after 18th and 19th amendment may be such that it gives an influence-free effect but practical applicability differs from the provisions in law due to some prevalent informal practices. The recent 26th amendment has paved way to more interference from the executive branch in the appointment procedure, resulting in curtailed independence of judiciary. A scrutinized and transparent system of appointment based on merit and certain legislative reforms needs to be introduced and implemented in the society to foster justice system and ensure independence of judiciary.
... Preserve Protect ….. and Defend the constitution is main and basic responsibility of judiciary so the word preserve means that safeguard an to prevent from injury or destroy the constitutions provisions by any amendment in which parliament used its excessive powers (Roznai, 2013). ...
Constitution means that principles on which state regulate organized and determine relationship through their subjects of states. Constitution may in form of written and unwritten to some extend we can say that Constitution of Pakistan and America are written Constitutions but United Kingdom’s Constitution is unwritten Constitution. Constitution is a comprehensive code which consists on Preamble, introduction, parts that parts consist on chapter and Constitution also define the fundamental right of subjects of state, Principals of polices, mechanism of election and procedure of Amendment into the Constitution by legislation. Judicial Review is of one the impressive and incomparable silent feature of the Constitution. According to this principle no one use Excessive power regarding his authority.
... A growing range of situations may activate 33 There may be differences in the formal recognition of the state as a single entity or distinct authorities, but within constitutional democracies the responsibility to adhere to the constitution will be shouldered by all public powers. 34 Roznai (2013). 35 See Thomas (2000), p. 16, arguing that in continental Europe, "[i]n particular, the principle of proportionality is used to ensure sensitivity in public administration." ...
This contribution examines the relationship between automation, discretion, and proportionality. It argues that automation efforts in public administration need to be further discussed and analyzed in relation to requirements of proportionality flowing from both national and European law, as the principle carries important implications for both the implementation of automated systems and the responsibilities of decision-makers within those systems. The different facets of proportionality flowing from, inter alia, constitutional, and human rights law, administrative law, and data protection law are explored, with four distinct stages of proportionality analysis identified: legislative, system, decision, and ex post proportionality. These stages all carry different implications for discretion and the prospects of automation. Through the requirements in these different stages, the authors conclude that proportionality ought to act as another driver of keeping human oversight of automated systems. This human oversight will however, in relation to proportionality, require further contextual awareness and control of correct output proportionality, a role which may be significantly more demanding than a more limited oversight implied by current legal discussions on “humans in the loop”.
... 13 Beaud 1994. 14 On the successful migration of the concept, see Roznai 2013;Perju 2012;Perju 2020, p. 256. 15 The three models are confrontational with EU law (Germany), confrontational individualistic detachment (Hungary), and cooperation with embedded identity (Italy); the two attitudes are EUfriendly (Germany and Italy) and antagonistic (Hungary). ...
This chapter examines the concept of constitutional identity of the EU from the perspective of public law. As the term appears in the TEU and, in the last 15 years, has been used by different apex courts, it draws on the trend of using constitutional identity as a legal argument against EU obligations or creating constitutional law arguments for this purpose. Thus, the chapter claims that the mandate to respect constitutional identities, as stated in Article 4(2) TEU, finds a limit in the respect for EU constitutional identity. The chapter argues that the EU constitutional identity could be identified in the same manner most Member States identify constitutional identity. Therefore, it argues that constitutional identity is a concept both applicable to the EU and the EU Member States, and to make these concepts compatible, Member States’ constitutional identities are to be respected as long as they are not incompatible with EU constitutional identity, consisting of fundamental principles of constitutionalism.KeywordsConstitutional identityEuropean UnionDemocratic backslidingRegressionAbuseMisuse
... For example, there are studies that consider the global diffusion of jurisprudential doctrines, 114 such as proportionality 115 or the basic structure doctrine within the courts. 116 Comparisons also tend to focus on courts within similar institutional settings, thus leading to an overemphasis on a handful of courts (such as separate constitutional courts or activist courts). This leads to a sidelining of jurisdictions with otherwise vibrant constitutional activity, like those featured in Section 3 above. ...
The purpose of the symposium on pluralizing constitutional interpretation was to reflect upon the multiple sites at which interpretative activities take place, their real-world significance, and the methodological implications of expanding our scholarly lens beyond court rulings and beyond legal materials for a more complete understanding of how constitutions are engaged with. In this introductory article, we propose at least three directions for diversification. The first is the pluralization of actors beyond the courts, attention being drawn to the diverse range of institutions, entities, and individuals involved in giving meaning to the constitution. The second is methodological and disciplinary in nature; it addresses the manner in which this plurality of interpreters relates to nonlegal methods and sources, as compared to classic legal methods and sources. The third is about orientation and entails a shift from the study of doctrines, precedents, and conceptional analysis to a more dynamic approach to interpretation, as defined by intersecting viewpoints, coinciding sites of interpretation, and a shifting of institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Taken together, these directions hold out the promise of arriving at a more complete understanding of how constitutional law is engaged with as a lived reality.
... 13 Beaud 1994. 14 On the successful migration of the concept, see Roznai 2013;Perju 2012;Perju 2020, p. 256. 15 The three models are confrontational with EU law (Germany), confrontational individualistic detachment (Hungary), and cooperation with embedded identity (Italy); the two attitudes are EUfriendly (Germany and Italy) and antagonistic (Hungary). ...
... bkz. (Roznai, 2013), (Roznai, 2017). manipülasyon yöntemleri Tablo-1 içerisinde sunmuş bulunuyoruz. ...
Anayasacılık aydınlanma çağında mutlakiyetçiliğe karşı bir düşünce akımı olarak ortaya çıkmış, daha sonra toplumsal mücadele hareketine dönüşmüş ve devrimlere kaynaklık etmiştir. 1215 tarihli Magna Carta doğrudan bir anayasacılık hareketi olmamakla birlikte mutlakiyetçiliğe karşı ilk önemli hak ve özgürlük mücadelesidir. Anayasacılığın ortaya çıkışında asıl etkili olan aydınlanma çağındaki felsefi görüşlerdir. John Locke, David Hume, Montesquieu, Jean Jacques Rousseau gibi fikir adamlarının görüşleri mutlakiyetçiliği kesin ve keskin bir dille bir dille eleştiren, hak ve özgürlüklerin korunması ve güvence altına alınmasını savunan ilk tohumlardır. İskoç, İngiliz, Amerikan ve Fransız aydınlanması netice olarak hak ve özgürlüklerin bir anayasa içerisinde güvence altına alınması ve keyfî iktidarın güç ve yetkilerinin sınırlandırılmasını içermektedir.
Mutlakiyetçilik aydınlanma çağındaki fikirler karşısında zayıflamış ve sonuçta “aydınlanmacı mutlakiyetçilik” (aydınlanmacı despotizme) adı verilen bir değişime ayak uydurmak zorunda kalmıştır. Ardından Amerikan Anayasası’nın kabul edilmesi ve onaylanması anayasacılık hareketlerine ivme kazandırmış ve anayasal demokrasi yolunda ilerlemeler kaydedilerek mutlakiyetçi rejimler tek tek yıkılmış ve yerini modern temsili demokrasilere bırakmıştır.
Öte yandan 19. ve 20. yüzyıl demokratikleşme dalgalarının hız kazandığı bir çağ olmuştur. Ancak 20. Yüzyılın sonlarına doğru dünyanın birçok ülkesinde seçime dayalı demokratik rejimlerde bir gerileme eğilimi ortaya çıkmıştır. Seçimle işbaşına gelmiş olan bazı güçlü liderler daha uzun süre iktidarda kalmak için bizzat anayasal kurallar ve sosyal kurumlar (yargı, medya, din-diyanet, eğitim vs.) üzerinde dizayn ve manipülasyonlar yapmak, yürürlüğe koymak ve uygulamak suretiyle iktidarlarını kalıcı hale getirme mücadelesine yönelmişlerdir. Adına “istismarcı anayasacılık” ya da “suiistimalci anayasacılık” adı verilen bir akım dünyanın farklı coğrafyalarında otoriterleşme eğilimini hızlandırmıştır.
Bu çalışmamızda geçmişten anayasacılık hareketlerinin doğuşu ve gelişimi kısaca özetledikten sonra günümüzde anayasacılığın karşı karşıya bulunduğu açmaz ya da çıkmazları değerlendirmeye ve tahlil etmeye çalışacağız.
... It is a frequently voiced opinion that the Basic Law was drafted with memory of the failure of the Weimar Republic (Lapčáková, 2009). Many famous decisions of the Indian Supreme Court and the entire Indian approach to this issue have been inspired by the German legal environment (Roznai, 2013). ...
This article aspires to shed more light on the understanding of the notions of the
constitutional identity, the material core of a constitution and unamendable elements of a
constitution (eternity clauses) and on the concept of essential elements of a democratic state
governed by the rule of law as reflected in the practice of the Czech Constitutional Court.
The Czech debate is not centred on the use of constitutional identity as a shield protecting
local specifics. Quite the opposite. With a certain degree of generalization, we can conclude
that the Czech notion of constitutional identity is, at least in the view of the Czech
Constitutional Court, deeply grounded in such general concepts as democracy and the rule
of law and connected with the material core of a constitution and unamendable elements
of a constitution. However, this „legal“ concept of constitutional identity may easily conflict
with a „popular“ constitutional identity based primarily on traditional narratives about
the formative events of Czech history as perceived by the Czech people and their elected
representatives.
... De la nueva disposición no solo se infiere la prohibición de reelección, sino que se agregó un elemento de rigidez constitucional escalonada (Albert 2015). En efecto, se estableció que la prohibición de reelección solo podía ser reformada por un referendo de iniciativa popular o por una Asamblea constituyente (Roznai 2013). Esto significa que no se puede volver a establecer la reelección por el mecanismo de la simple enmienda constitucional o acto legislativo. ...
Sumario: I. Introducción. II. Primer momento constitucional: la tradición constitucional reafirmada en la Constitución de 1991. III. Segundo momento constitucional: la consolidación del hiperpresidencialismo. 1. Los argumentos ciudadanos frente a la reelección presidencial inmediata por una sola ocasión. 2. La decisión de la Corte
Constitucional: permitir la reelección presidencial inmediata y fijar el mecanismo de protección de la democracia constitucional. 3. Corolarios de la decisión de la Corte Constitucional C-1040/2005. IV. Tercer momento constitucional: el constitucionalismo abusivo y la segunda reelección consecutiva del presidente de la república. 1. ¿Por qué se
trata de un momento de constitucionalismo abusivo? 2. Episodios importantes en el control automático de constitucionalidad de la Ley núm. 1354 2009. V. Cuarto momento constitucional: la consolidación y el retorno a la prohibición de reelección. VI. Conclusión.
... 112 In addition, the high level of involvement of the Court has depended on the existence of doctrinal tools, such as domestic incorporation of international law and an unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, that have become more popular globally. 113 A high level of judicialization of a peace process raises obvious risks: judicial decisions may destabilize agreements that have been hard-won through negotiations. But I have argued here that at least in the Colombian case, the involvement of the Constitutional Court has been a net benefit, at least so far. ...
This article focuses on one striking feature of the Colombian peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC): a very high level of judicialization, as shown through the many decisions issued by the Colombian Constitutional Court that have examined core elements of the process. It argues that this high level of judicialization is explained not only by the generally activist role conception of the Court, but also by specific doctrines it developed, including a robust incorporation of international law and an unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, which essentially made judicialization inevitable. Since these doctrinal devices are spreading, they may portend increasingly judicialized peace processes in other countries as well. Normatively, judicialization of ongoing peace processes raises clear risks, particularly of destabilization. But for the most part, the Colombian Constitutional Court has avoided these risks and instead has stabilized the process in important ways, by insulating it from both international pressure and domestic political shifts. The Court has also injected important values into the process, especially regarding the rights of victims of the internal armed conflict. Thus, the case study demonstrates that at least under certain conditions, judicialization may have a beneficial impact on the substance and durability of peace processes.
The rise of populism and its consequences – such as democratic backsliding, the erosion of constitutional principles, and the weakening of the rule of law – are among the most pressing issues facing comparative constitutional scholars today. To address these emerging challenges, the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine (UCAD) has emerged as the most promising remedy for the “third counterwave of de-mocracy”. However, a fundamental problem with UCAD is how to apply it effectively without undermining constitutional democracy, as it is often criticised and deemed illegitimate from the perspective of democratic principles.
Son yıllarda anayasanın üstünlüğünü benimseyen bazı ülkelerin yargı organları tarafından ortaya konan “temel yapı doktrini”, anayasa hukuku gündeminde önemli bir yer bulmuştur. Bu doktrini kullanan mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerinin içeriğine bakarak denetim yapma konusunda kendilerine olağanüstü bir yetki tanımaktadırlar. Bangladeş Yüksek Mahkemesi “temel yapı doktrini”ni ilk kez, 1989 yılında karara bağlanan Anwar Hossain Chowdhurdy davasında benimsemiştir. Bu tarihten sonra uzun bir zaman boyunca temel yapı doktrini, Bangladeş’te anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde tek ölçü olarak kullanılmıştır. Bangladeş Anayasasında 2011 yılındayapılan On Beşinci Anayasa Değişikliği ile getirilen geniş kapsamlı 7B maddesi, Anayasanın önemli sayıda hükmünün değiştirilemeyeceğini açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışmada, 7B hükmünün getirilmesiyle birlikte temel yapı doktrininin, Bangladeş Anayasasında gelecekte yapılacak olan anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde en önemli ölçü olma özelliğini yitireceği ifade edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Yük- sek Mahkeme yargıçlarının görevden alınmasına ilişkin parlamento mekanizmasının Anayasanın 7B maddesine dayanılarak anayasaya aykırı bulunduğu Asaduzzaman Siddiqui davası ise bu iddiayı kanıtlar niteliktedir.
The present article consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the concept of constitutional identity in a general comparative perspective and its connection with constitutional philosophy. In the second part, these premises are applied to the Constitution of the Czech Republic, specifically its core values denominated by the Czech Constitution as the essential elements of the democratic rule of law in order to analyze whether they can be used to define Czech constitutional identity and what specific principles constitute the constitutional identity of the Czech Constitution.
A problemática da normas constitucionais inconstitucionais ainda hoje divide a doutrina portuguesa. No Acórdão n.º 480/89, apesar de não ter considerado que a proibição do lock-out (n.º 4 do artigo 57.º da Constituição) era inconstitucional, o Tribunal Constitucional dedicou inúmeras e preciosas páginas a apresentar a temática. O tema das normas constitucionais inconstitucionais está cada vez mais presente nos debates académicos internacionais, com particular enfoque na América Latina e na Europa de Leste. Importa olhá-lo não apenas à luz dos limites da justiça constitucional, mas também não perdendo de vista o risco de derivas autoritárias pela mão dos poderes constituintes originário e derivado.
Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetimi, anayasa hukukunun en tartışmalı konularından biridir. Esas denetiminin iki koşulu vardır: İlk olarak, anayasa değişiklikleri için öngörülmüş açık veya örtülü sınırlar bulunmalıdır. İkinci olarak, yargı organı, anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetlemek için yetkilendirilmiş olmalıdır. Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetime tabi tutulduğu ülkelerde, yargısal denetim açık veya örtülü sınırlara dayandırılmaktadır. Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetiminin söz konusu olmadığı ülkelerde mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetlemeye yetkili olmadıklarını kabul etmektedir. Bu makalede, mahkemelerin anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetleyebilmek için anayasa tarafından açıkça yetkilendirilmiş olmaları gerektiğine vurgu yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, anayasa ile açıkça yetkilendirilmediği halde anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetleyen mahkemeler eleştirilmiştir.
Comparative law is a common subject-matter of research and teaching in many universities around the world, and the twenty-first century has aptly been termed 'the era of comparative law'. This Cambridge Handbook of Comparative Law presents a truly global perspective of comparative law today. The contributors are drawn from all parts of the world to provide different perspectives on how we understand the 'law' and how it operates in practice. In substance, the Handbook contains 36 chapters covering a broad range of topics, divided under the following headings: 'Methods of Comparative Law' (Part I), 'Legal Families and Geographical Comparisons' (Part II), 'Central Themes in Comparative Law' (Part III); and 'Comparative Law beyond the State' (Part IV).
The Procedure of Poland’s Withdrawal from the European Union: Unconstitutionality of the Art. 22a para. 1 and 2 of the Act of April 14, 2000 on International Agreements *** Art. 22a para. 1 and 2 of the Act of April 14, 2000 on International Agreements stipulates that supplying the President, by the minister responsible for foreign affairs, acting on the basis on the resolution of the Council of Ministers, with a draft decision on Poland’s withdrawal from the EU is possible only with prior consent granted in a statute enacted by the Sejm and the Senate with a simple majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory members of each chamber. This provision, adopted in 2010, has been reminded with fear in last years, due to the consistent anti-constitutional and anti-European policy applied by the Sejm’s prevailing political parties, by the government and by the President alike, supported by the subordinate organs and institutions of the state, including the Constitutional Tribunal, which is sometimes aptly named as an actual and even legal gradual polexit. The first objective of the paper is to reconstruct the legislative history of the aforementioned regulation on the procedure of Poland’s withdrawal from the EU and the competing legislative proposals in that matter that were formulated parallelly. The second objective is to defend the thesis stating that for the decision on Poland’s withdrawal from the EU, Art. 90 of the Constitution, construed a contrario (and not Art. 89), should apply, where in order to pass the statute granting consent for renunciation of an international agreement referred to herein, it is necessary to have a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers, in the presence of at least half of their statutory numbers, and where granting of such a consent may also be passed by a nationwide referendum.
Progress in the Constitutional Theory. Evolution of Doctrine on (un)Constitutional Change of Constitution *** This paper is an attempt to characterize the phenomenon of a scientific progress in jurisprudence on the example of the evolution of the ideas on the conditions and scope of the allowable constitutional amendments of the 1997 Constitution of Poland. Explaining the notions of formal and material limits of amending a constitution, we show that those limits are constituted not only by the explicit constitutional regulations but also by the practical context of constitution’s functioning and doctrinal assumptions being the fundaments of a political or social system that it realizes. In the final part of the paper the identified elements of the progress in constitutional law are seen in the light of the theories of scientific progress formulated in the literature, with the conclusion that the described change of the ideas on material amendments of the Polish Constitution bears the marks of a scientific progress.
A group of scholars has shown that the theory of constituent power—which seeks to describe and justify the dismantling of the constitutional order and its replacement with a new constitution—is flawed. The analytical tools the theory deploys fail to explain how constitution-making processes unfold. Also, the theory has been subject to normative challenges that question its democratic nature. However, the theory remains a mainstream idea in many countries, and some academics have attempted to defend its democratic nature. I claim that those attempts have rendered the theory meaningless or failed to address all of its problems. I then raise two objections. First, the constituent power theory cannot be used to justify most—if any—constitution-making processes without an excessive idealization of the founding moment, but we are yet to understand the actual costs of that idealization. Second, redeemers of the theory need to decide whether constitution-making can operate under reasonably favorable electoral and democratic conditions or not. Ideal conditions are improbable when constitutional change is carried out in response to a crisis. In the unlikely case that these conditions can be met, using an idea of constitutional change as radical as the constituent power theory is not warranted from a normative perspective. I call this the dilemma of constituent power redemption.
This book bridges the study of European constitutionalism with the study of 'fiscal federalism' – the subfield of public economics concerned with structuring public finances between different levels of government in federal states. On one axis, this book delves into European Union and Member State constitutional law from all EU Member States in order to investigate and identify the existence of permanent constitutional boundaries that will impinge upon the selection of proposed models for EU fiscal federalism. On the second axis, this book engages the study of fiscal federalism in order to determine which institutional configurations known to that field remain legally and economically implementable within those boundaries. It provides a far-reaching investigation of which models of fiscal federalism are compatible with the constitutional boundaries of the European legal order.
En los diseños constitucionales contemporáneos suelen imponerse límites al poder de reforma constitucional. Aunque no todas las constituciones vigentes establecen nor- mas o disposiciones inmodificables, algunos tribunales constitucionales han derivado del texto restricciones implícitas para el poder de reforma. La Constitución Política de 1991 no posee cláusulas pétreas o normas intangibles y autoriza a la Corte Constitucio- nal para controlar la constitucionalidad de las reformas a la constitución solo por vicios de procedimiento, no por vicios de contenido. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional definió que el poder constituyente derivado está sujeto a límites competenciales, los cuales se proyectan sobre el contenido de la constitución. A fin de establecer en qué casos el poder de reforma excede el ámbito de su competencia, la Corte creó una me- todología denominada test de sustitución. El propósito de este capítulo es reconstruir la estructura del test de sustitución y evaluar la capacidad de respuesta que posee frente a la identificación de los elementos definitorios de la constitución. En términos generales, se sostiene que el test de sustitución evade el problema de la identidad de la constitución y profundiza las objeciones que se han formulado contra la autoridad del juez para definir sus elementos esenciales.
This chapter describes and assesses the procedures, norms and practices pertaining to constitutional advice in Cyprus. The chapter also examines the development of constitutional advising in the Cypriot setting, taking into account the comparative dimension and the influences from the civil law and common law traditions. Finally, the chapter focuses on the rationale behind the isolationist Cypriot approach and the institutional and substantive gaps that are formed. It is argued that there is an overlap of functions concentrated in the institution of an all-powerful Attorney-General that blurs the line between advising and reform. The Attorney-General is the exclusive legal advisor for the executive in a rigid presidential system. The law of necessity has removed the internal counter-balancing element and the progress of time has magnified the reliance on one official. There is need for reform that must touch upon the role of the Attorney-General. The reform can include the institutional setting-up of an advising body for the legislature, the institutional separation of the advising and wide prosecutorial roles of the AG, as well as the introduction of pluralism in constitutional advising through the distinction between concrete specific advice and abstract advice aiming at reforms.
Ustav Republike Hrvatske izražava predanost konceptu socijalne države i načelu socijalne pravde kao zajedničkim vrijednostima europskog konstitucionalizma, a iz ustavnosudske prakse proizlazi njihov obvezujući značaj te njihova pripadnost nepovredivoj srži Ustava, tzv. ustavnom identitetu. Stoga bi odustajanje od tih temeljnih i “vječnih” vrijednosti značilo prekid dosadašnjeg i uspostavu novog ustavnog poretka. S obzirom na prepoznati socijalni deficit Europske unije, zaštita socijalne ukorijenjenosti hrvatskoga Ustava ističe se nužnom u kontekstu pojačane integracije. Pritom inzistiranje na zaštiti ustavno-identitetskih odrednica socijalne države i socijalne pravde ne stremi narušavanju europskog zajedništva, već izgradnji socijalno pravedne ujedinjene Europe.
With its emphasis on emerging and cutting-edge debates in the study of comparative constitutional law and politics, its suitability for both research and teaching use, and its distinguished and diverse cast of contributors, this handbook is a must-have for scholars and instructors alike. This versatile volume combines the depth and rigor of a scholarly reference work with features for teaching in law and social science courses. Its interdisciplinary case-study approach provides political and historical as well as legal context: each modular chapter offers an overview of a topic and a jurisdiction, followed by a case study that simultaneously contextualizes both. Its forward-looking and highly diverse selection of topics and jurisdictions fills gaps in the literature on the Global South as well as the West. A timely section on challenges to liberal constitutional democracy addresses pressing concerns about democratic backsliding and illiberal and/or authoritarian regimes.
Celem opracowania jest przybliżenie problematyki formalnych i materialnych ograniczeń zmiany obecnie obowiązującej, uchwalonej prawie 30 lat temu, Konstytucji Ghany, będących interesującym wyrazem transformacji z autorytaryzmu do demokracji. Ponieważ Ghana to państwo, które w zachodnich rankingach stanu demokracji, praworządności i przestrzegania praw człowieka od lat sytuuje się w ścisłej czołówce afrykańskiej – a w najnowszych osiąga wyniki bardzo podobne do Polski – warto tym bardziej przyjrzeć się jej bliżej. Na artykuł składają się: krótka charakterystyka historii ustroju Ghany, jej Konstytucji i systemu politycznego; szczegółowe omówienie zagadnienia wewnętrznej hierarchii postanowień konstytucyjnych oraz kolejnych etapów – w znacznej mierze oryginalnej – procedury ich zmiany; próba identyfikacji granic zmiany Konstytucji, w tym analiza będących wyrazem sprawiedliwości tranzytywnej niezmienialnych postanowień amnestyjno-indemnizacyjnych; przedstawienie i ocena toczącej się w ubiegłej dekadzie debaty nad zmianą Konstytucji, obejmującej również problematykę zasad i granic jej zmiany. Tekst kończą wnioski dotyczące sztywności tej Konstytucji, wynikającej z czynników zarówno prawnych, jak i pozaprawnych.
“Structural political and legal approaches in opposition to populist governance”, could be verified in the theoretical and practical studies presented, to identify some guidelines to contain the populist movement and that can lead to reflection for a more integrated and cooperative process in a liberal democracy in crisis. Despite offering indications for the emancipation of the constitutional subject and politics, it is necessary to accommodate the propositions taking into account the specific characteristics of each state, cultural and political contexts, historical traditions, ethnicities, religion, the type of constitutionalism employed, legal training, to existing institutions, marginalized groups, in short, their characteristics as a nation.
Dalam studi perbandingan hukum tata negara, doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional telah banyak menarik perhatian para sarjana dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Konsekuensi dari doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional adalah adanya pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi. Artikel ini bermaksud untuk menjelaskan doktrin amandemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional yang berimplikasi pada pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi. Selain itu, artikel ini juga membahas praktik pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi di beberapa negara seperti Jerman, India dan Kolombia. Berdasarkan teori dan praktik atas pembatasan kekuasaan amendemen konstitusi, artikel ini berupaya untuk menjawab apakah doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional dapat diterapkan di Indonesia. Dalam artikel ini dikemukakan bahwa dalam UUD 1945 terdapat ketentuan yang tidak dapat diubah. Oleh karenanya, Mahkamah Konstitusi dapat mengadopsi doktrin amendemen konstitusi yang inkonstitusional jika amendemen konstitusi dilakukan terhadap ketentuan yang tidak dapat diganggu gugat dalam konstitusi. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum doktrinal dengan menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif dan komparatif.
Se adelanta un balance general sobre el ejercicio del control de constitucionalidad sobre los denominados “vicios de competencia”, por parte de la Corte Constitucional colombiana, a lo largo de casi dos décadas. En tal sentido, se plantea que, contrario a lo que podría pensarse, la realización del referido control de constitucionalidad no ha inhibido el espíritu reformista del Congreso de la República. Sin embargo, paradójicamente, algunos fallos de la Corte Constitucional, en especial referidos a temas de estructura del Estado (v. gr., administración de justicia), pueden introducir algunas rigideces inconvenientes al Texto Fundamental de 1991. Por último, se pretende demostrar que la realización del test de sustitución resultó ser extremadamente severo en materia de implementación del Acuerdo de Paz, lo cual no deja de ser sorprendente, dado el carácter temporal de estas reformas constitucionales.
This paper aims to rethink the idea of constitutional renewal through a dissection of Richard Albert’s ground-breaking concept of constitutional dismemberment. It is contended that under the rubric of constitutional dismemberment are two exceptional constitutional phenomena: the ought-to-be declared nullity of unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional expression of what Hannah Arendt called “natality” in political action. The thesis is that attempts to tame revolutionary constitutional alteration with designed rules as to formal constitutional change as Albert’s illustrates are missing the meaning of constitution-making for a natality-driven constitutional renewal characteristically defies designed constitutional form. The concept of constitutional dismemberment is first dissected in light of Arendt’s idea of natality. With constitutional dismemberment unpacked, it is further observed that the constitution-making transmutes into the formal pronouncement of a new codified constitution in Albert’s rigid tripartite classification of constitutional changes into amendment, dismemberment, and enactment. Albert therefore inadvertently reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment of a new codified constitution with constitutional natality dismembered and constitutional renewal hollowed out. It is concluded that Albert’s formalistic conceptual framework of constitutional change reflects the centrality of comparative written constitutions in the place of comparative constitutional phenomena in current comparative constitutional studies.
This chapter focuses on economic/financial emergency. The chapter begins by noting that the Indian Constitution, like its US counterpart, secures independence of the judiciary by providing for, inter alia, financial independence of the judiciary. Just like the Compensation Clause in the US Constitution, its Indian counterpart the Salary Clause provides that judicial salaries cannot be decreased during the time a judge is holding judicial office. But the Economic Emergency Clause of the Indian Constitution also provides that the President, during the time an economic emergency is proclaimed, can, inter alia, reduce judicial salaries. Whereas the power to proclaim economic emergency is subject to periodic Parliamentary review, the power to reduce judicial salaries is not subject to any such or other kind of independent review. Judicial independence is an extremely important constitutional value and the need to protect it has been accepted globally for a very long time now. In India, it is a settled proposition of constitutional law that an independent judiciary is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. Other provisions of the Constitution that conflict with the idea of judicial independence have been so interpreted in order to avoid the conflict. The Presidential power to reduce judicial salaries during an economic emergency presents just such a conflict and this article is an attempt to resolve it. This chapter argues that the Presidential power to reduce judicial salaries during an economic emergency is subject to judicial review and provides three independent grounds that justify such review. This chapter also lays down the basis of further work on financial emergency provisions in the Indian Constitution by attempting to briefly distinguish between “financial stability of India,” and “credit of India,” the two grounds on which an economic emergency can be invoked.
An account of the process of drafting Nepal's new democratic constitution, which was finally promulgated in November 1990, with an analysis of its content and of the roles played by various actors, including the royal palace.
Introduction
My aim in this paper is to provide an overview of John Rawls’s project in Political Liberalism.1 I sketch how this book is designed to respond to certain problems internal to Rawls’s argument in A Theory of Justice.2 Political Liberalism is a development and extension of Rawls’s original project, as stated in A Theory of Justice, to work out “the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society” (TJ, viii/ xviii rev.). A Theory of Justice itself invokes assumptions and arguments that are at odds with Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism. It is to respond to these internal tensions that Rawls recasts not the substantive content of justice as fairness or its principles but how we are to conceive of their justification.
To say this recasting is internal to Rawls’s original project means that Political Liberalism is not motivated by external criticisms.3 There is a widespread perception that the revisions Rawls has made to A Theory of Justice leading up to Political Liberalism have come largely in response to communitarian criticisms.4
https://ojs.mruni.eu/ojs/jurisprudence/article/view/1026/981
Since ancient Athens, democrats have taken pride in their power and inclination to change their laws, yet they have also sought to counter this capacity by creating immutable laws. In Democracy and Legal Change, Melissa Schwartzberg argues that modifying law is a fundamental and attractive democratic activity. Against those who would defend the use of 'entrenchment clauses' to protect key constitutional provisions from revision, Schwartzberg seeks to demonstrate historically the strategic and even unjust purposes unamendable laws have typically served, and to highlight the regrettable consequences that entrenchment may have for democracies today. Drawing on historical evidence, classical political theory, and contemporary constitutional and democratic theory, Democracy and Legal Change reexamines the relationship between democracy and the rule of law from a new, and often surprising, set of vantage points.
This book contrasts the European “centralized” constitutional court model, in which one court system is used to adjudicate constitutional questions, with a decentralized model, such as that of the United States, in which courts deal with both constitutional and nonconstitutional questions. The book's systematic exploration of the reasons for and against the creation of constitutional courts is detailed and it offers an ambitious theory to justify the European preference for them. Based on extensive research on eighteen European countries, the book finds that centralized review fits well with the civil law tradition and structures of ordinary adjudication in those countries. It concludes that, while the decentralized model works for the United States, there is more than one way to preserve democratic values and that these values are best preserved in the parliamentary democracies of Europe through constitutional courts.
In his case note on the famous Bergmann decision of the Supreme Court, Professor Akzin wrote: While the Court's conclusions seem to be perfectly justified and went so far as they could in the circumstances, the reasoning in its decision shows serious flaws… [others] seem to have sprung from the Court's unwillingness to look for help to the very thorough discussion of the issues by several Israeli scholars, notably Messrs. Sternberg, Akzin, Klinghoffer and Rubinstein. The dignity of the Court would not have suffered if the opinion-writing judge had taken a look at academic writing in a case where precedents offer little or no guidance.
These remarks probably express the most original view ever put forward on this land mark case. They emphasize the crux of the complex constitutional problem discussed in the Bergmann case, i.e., the definition of the legal nature of the basic laws in the legal order of Israel. The extremely abstract questions involved in that discussion, indeed, the most abstract that exist in public law, concern the definition of the nature of the power which adopts the Constitution and more specifically, of the power which amends the Constitution.
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in Turkey: The Question of Unamendability
This article deals with the judicial review of constitutional amendments, which has been a hotly debated constitutional and political issue in Turkey, particularly with regard to the unamendable provisions of the constitution. Since its creation by the Constitution of 1961, the Turkish Constitutional Court has followed a markedly activist and tutelarist approach regarding this issue and annulled several constitutional amendments arguing that they violated the unamendable provisions of the Constitution. Recently, however, the Court adopted a self-restraining approach. This shift can be explained as part of the political regime’s drift towards competitive authoritarianism and the governing party’s ( AKP ) capturing almost total control over the entire judiciary.
This paper deals with the question of an amendment to the constitution that has been made pursuant to the formal requirements of the constitution but deviates from its basic structure. The paper explores different views regarding this question in comparative law. It also examines the applicability ofthe doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in Israel.
This paper explores the conceptual possibility and implications of the concept of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. In the first section, the author argues that unconstitutional constitutional norms are conceptually impossible within the conventional hierarchical model of norms. In the second section, the author discusses the normative particularity of the amending power and concludes that an unlimited power may endanger the constitution. In sections III and IV, the author explains why so-called “eternity clauses,” in order to fend off such a danger, have been designed to place certain immutable elements of the constitution beyond the limits of the amending power. The paradigmatic case is the German Basic Law and a recent decision by the Federal Constitutional Court that discusses the implications of the “eternity clause” with reference to the distinction between constituent power and the constituted amending power. The author develops an alternative understanding of that distinction and its consequences for the amending power. The possible adverse effects of “eternity clauses” on the normality of the constitution are briefly considered in the final section.
The world's second-oldest written constitution (1814) still existing presumably also contains the world's oldest substantive “supra-constitutional” or “eternity” clause. According to its text, the “spirit “ and “principles” of the Constitution cannot be amended.
However, it is less than clear that the clause is meant to exclude not only “amendments” but also the adoption of a brand new constitution. Moreover, the meaning of the clause two centuries later cannot be determined without regard to subsequent changes to other parts of the Constitution. The examples discussed include the constitutional monarchy, affected not only by the radical shift in our perception of the role of a hereditary king but first and foremost by formal amendments. In this way, “principles” that may initially have been protected may no longer enjoy a similar status.
Who has the last word as to the substantive limits to amendments? The widely held view in Norway is that the judiciary should stand back. While judicial review of legislation leaves the last word about what norms to apply in the future to the constitution-amending power, judicial review of constitutional amendments would leave the last word about the future meaning of the Constitution itself to judges. Another argument refers to our inherent right as human beings to resist oppression. This argument deserves attention even if it is not substantiated in the text of the Constitution.
Are the “spirit” and “principles” of the Constitution of Norway well protected? If the clause is understood as a contribution to the smoothness of constitutional development over time and thereby to the relative success of the Norwegian Constitution, the assessment is likely to be rather positive.
Since the concept of democracy made its premiere, popular sovereignty has always been one of its fundamental characteristics. Nevertheless, many democracies have adopted eternity clauses (non-amendable constitutional provisions) as well as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine (the judicial power to strike down amendments to the constitution on substantive grounds), seemingly betraying the established democratic tradition. Including eternity clauses in a constitution certainly poses a challenge to any democracy, namely that of resolving the tension between their freezing effect on the legal system and the democratic notion of popular sovereignty. The intuitive question is why bother? Why address this challenge in the first place rather than uprooting eternity clauses from the constitutional system altogether, thereby resolving the inner tension they generate? One answer is that eternity clauses are presumably here to stay. More to the point, however, is that their presence in a legal system is desirable, since their absence would leave a modern democracy vulnerable to irresponsible normative acts by an incompetent body of representatives. Although Israel's Basic Laws do not include formal eternity clauses, its legal system tends to limit the scope of amending power where the Zionist project is concerned, thereby freezing the imperfect founding formula of the Jewish state. As a result, Israel as a Jewish democratic state faces the same challenge of resolving the tension between the freezing effect and popular sovereignty. This article argues that this challenge can be successfully met as soon as eternity clauses are integrated within a three-track democracy—a holistic constitutional system and theory. As a constitutional system, it distinguishes between three decision-making tracks and identifies the basic norm of the legal system with a nation's collective will or dynamic founding narrative. As a constitutional theory, it justifies constitutionalism and judicial review mainly for the purpose of regulating a nation's evolution. Eternity clauses play a pivotal role in three-track democracies by blocking the first decision-making two tracks in order to force revolutionary movements to engage in the consensual third track. This protects society from a unilaterally-imposed revolution—an act liable to be detrimental to the delicate evolutionary process.
Professor Herdegen assesses constitutional problems resulting from German reunification and the corresponding extension of the Constitution of the Federal Republic (Grundgesetz or Basic Law) to East Germany. He focuses on recent judicial treatment of two particular problems: how the criminal system should treat former East German soldiers who shot fleeing citizens along the inner-German border, and demands for restitution for property expropriated by the East German regime. These two problems demonstrate the positivist dilemma of "unjust law" and constitutionally imposed limits on the government's ability to address these problems. That dilemma has led to an increasing tendency in rights-driven constitutional jurisprudence to resort, sub silentio, to notions of natural law. This is an unwelcome development, because there is currently no fully functional way to make principled judgments about which values are implicated in fundamental natural law norms.
The frontier between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ is not always clear-cut. A large area exists where courts operate, but where governments and parliaments also make decisions. Tim Koopmans compares the way American, British, French and German law and politics deal with different issues: in many instances subjects which are highly ‘political’ in one country constitute legal issues in another. Is there, for example a ‘sovereign Parliament’ (as there is in Britain), or will courts control the compatibility of statutes with the Constitution (as in the United States and Germany)? How far can courts go in controlling the legality of administrative action? Are there general legal theories about the frontier between what courts and what politics can do? Koopmans considers case law on a range of issues, including human rights protection, federalism, separation of powers, equal protection and the impact of European and international law.
The migration of constitutional ideas across jurisdictions is one of the central features of contemporary constitutional practice. The increasing use of comparative jurisprudence in interpreting constitutions is one example of this. In this 2007 book, leading figures in the study of comparative constitutionalism and comparative constitutional politics from North America, Europe and Australia discuss the dynamic processes whereby constitutional systems influence each other. They explore basic methodological questions which have thus far received little attention, and examine the complex relationship between national and supranational constitutionalism - an issue of considerable contemporary interest in Europe. The migration of constitutional ideas is discussed from a variety of methodological perspectives - comparative law, comparative politics, and cultural studies of law - and contributors draw on case-studies from a wide variety of jurisdictions: Australia, Hungary, India, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. © Cambridge University Press 2006 and Cambridge University Press, 2009.
The central role that good, effective and capable governance plays in the economic and social development of a country is now widely recognised. Using the Commonwealth countries of eastern and southern Africa, this book analyses some of the key constitutional issues in the process of developing, strengthening and consolidating the capacity of states to ensure the good governance of their peoples. Utilising comparative material, the book seeks to draw lessons, both positive and negative, about the problems of constitutionalism in the region and, in doing so, critically addresses the legal issues involved in seeking to make constitutions ‘work’ in practice.
The decade-long constitutional reform process in Kenya spans two phases. The first ended with a High Court decision that the
constitution-making process was unconstitutional because it failed to provide an opportunity for the exercise of constituent
power by the Kenyan people. In the second phase Parliament sought to shield substantive questions of constitutional design
from the reach of the constituent power. Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory, this article argues that although
paradoxical, such treatment of the constituent power is theoretically coherent. Reading Schmitt’s theory closely reveals that,
despite himself, Schmitt accepts limitation of the constituent power where the nature of law and liberal constitutionalism
demand it. The article does not apply Schmitt’s constitutional theory, so much as read it against itself to suggest that it
bears close resemblance to Fuller’s and Dworkin’s jurisprudence. At the same time, the article seeks to understand the Kenyan
constitutional reform process, and ultimately questions whether the limitations placed on the constituent power in Kenya are
consistent with theoretically acceptable limitations.
Can elements of the “Constitution” be unconstitutional and what would be the legal consequences? Several courts have considered such hypotheses but few of them have nullified provisions pertaining to the formal constitution. Scholarly debates remain highly controversial and convincing explanations for one or another solution seem to be wanting.
This paper addresses the puzzle from both the point of view of legal theory and at the level of comparative constitutional law in the perspective of analytic normativism. It makes the claim that this approach allows to better analyse the underlying question as a problem of complex hierarchies, which can provide solutions to cases in legal orders as different as Austria, France, Germany or Israel.
Traditionally, the constitution is seen as one bloc on top of the legal system. But what this means remains often mysterious or unclear. If there could be something above this highest element, it could be considered from a moral perspective or in line with legal realism, a mere question of case-law.
According to the conception set forth here, whether different levels of legal norms exist and what normative relations apply between them, is a question of positive law. Hence there may be several layers above what is usually considered primary legislation, if there are several legal forms, differentiated by their mode of production. The truly difficult problem, then, is to find out whether these differences are related to organized derogatory superiority, such that lower deficient norms can be nullified. Such structures appear more and more frequently in contemporary law. To better grasp this, we use the concept ofnon-equivalent polymorphism.
The problem of whether courts are competent to annul lower level constitutional provisions is presently not explicitly settled in formal constitutions. It can—and should—nonetheless be solved through means of constitutional interpretation.
In this Comment, Professor Tribe takes issue with Professor Dellinger's defense of nondeferential judicial review of constitutional amendment process questions. Following this Comment, Professor Dellinger responds to Professor Tribe's criticisms.
