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Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics
... The notion of reflective equilibrium as developed by its most influential proponents, such as Goodman and Rawls-and, more recently, Daniels (1979) and Tersman (1993)-remains open-ended along several dimensions. Moreover, we should be prepared to consider the possibility that some of the features attributed to reflective equilibrium by its most influential proponents are peripheral or even dispensable. ...
... 23 21 As I explain in detail below (see Sect. 5.3), OMRE does not in any way require agents to revise their credences in light of what they accept, e.g. by setting the credences in accepted propositions to 1. 22 That reflective equilibrium involves an holistic evaluation of theories is a point made explicitly by, among others, Nielsen (1994), Føllesdal (2005), Elgin (2017), and Baumberger and Brun (2021). It is also implicit in the writings of, e.g., Goodman (1952), Rawls (1999), and Daniels (1979). 23 That reflective equilibrium should be taken to involve evaluating theories holistically also with respect to background theories from other domains is a point influentially made by Daniels (1979), who labels the resulting idea 'wide reflective equilibrium'. ...
... It is also implicit in the writings of, e.g., Goodman (1952), Rawls (1999), and Daniels (1979). 23 That reflective equilibrium should be taken to involve evaluating theories holistically also with respect to background theories from other domains is a point influentially made by Daniels (1979), who labels the resulting idea 'wide reflective equilibrium'. OMRE provides a particularly satisfying explanation of this holistic nature of reflective equilibrium. ...
This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences, on the one hand, and what the agent accepts, on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or being prepared to accept, all and only claims that follow from a maximally comprehensive theory that is more probable than any other such theory. Drawing on previous work, the paper shows that when an agent is in reflective equilibrium in this sense, the set of claims they accept or are prepared to accept is bound to be logically consistent and closed under logical implication. The paper also argues that this account can explain various features of philosophical argumentation in which the notion of reflective equilibrium features centrally, such as the emphasis on evaluating philosophical theories holistically rather than in a piecemeal fashion.
... The moral remainder that arises indicates a unique loss that does not have to be borne-the corresponding moral imperatives are non-negotiable: of responsibility ethics, it therefore seems questionable to leave decisions about human lives to chance. 19 Secondly, the use of a random generator can be seen as an attempt to evade a conscious, ethically sound decision. However, this is not a way out of the necessity to make a decision because a decision is made in any case; namely, that of refusing to deal with it ethically. ...
... In this state of equilibrium, the derived judgments are finally regarded as stable and offer a consistent practical orientation. 25 However, Rawls' concept is primarily interpreted as a 'recipe' for individual decision-making [19], which needs to be extended with regard to practical application problems with social dimensions. Savulescu et al. [92] demonstrate that the core of Rawls' approach can be useful for crash algorithms if empirical data on public preferences instead of individual intuitions serve as starting points. ...
How should self-driving vehicles react when an accident can no longer be averted in dangerous situations? The complex issue of designing crash algorithms has been discussed intensively in recent research literature. This paper refines the discourse around a new perspective which reassesses the underlying dilemma structures in the light of a metaethical analysis. It aims at enhancing the critical understanding of both the conceptual nature and specific practical implications that relate to the problem of crash algorithms. The ultimate aim of the paper is to open up a way to building a bridge between the inherent structural issues of dilemma cases on the one hand and the characteristics of the practical decision context related to driving automation scenarios on the other. Based on a reconstruction of the metaethical structure of crash dilemmas, a pragmatic orientation towards the ethical design of crash algorithms is sketched and critically examined along two central particularities of the practical problem. Firstly, pertinent research on the social nature of crash dilemmas is found to be merely heuristic. Secondly, existing work from ethics of risk hardly offers explicit ethical solutions to relevant and urgent challenges. Further investigation regarding both aspects is ultimately formulated as a research desideratum.
... By adding necessary premises (Bowell et al., 2020), the first task is to reconcile moral evaluations and obligations (Rechnitzer, 2022;Scanlon, 2003), e.g., to leave an aggressor state, with the current state of normative theories (e.g., complicity theory). In addition to this intratheoretical coherence, intertheoretical coherence (Daniels, 1979;Rechnitzer, 2022) should establish alignment with other relevant normative theories (e.g., sanctions theory). A reconstruction of arguments thus helps provide adequate normative argumentation to reveal missing statements, present crucial normative premises, and expose conflicting normative claims (Bowell et al., 2020;Feldman, 2014). ...
... Therefore, I demonstrate how extending complicity theory is necessary to justify the general demand for leaving the aggressor state. However, this intermediate result corresponds to a comprehensive sanction regime, shifting the analysis to an external coherence test (Daniels, 1979;De George, 1990;Scanlon, 2003) of sanction theory, a part of just war theory. ...
In response to Russia’s war of aggression and the accompanying human rights violations in Ukraine, several scholars have called for all multinational companies to divest and leave the country; otherwise, they become accomplices to the aggressor. This article reconstructs the arguments in favor of this general call. The first contribution of this article is to extend complicity theory to the context of crimes of aggression and atrocities to promote this demand. Although this extension of complicity theory ensures internal coherence, the call for a general divestment of all companies is tantamount to comprehensive economic sanctions. In contrast, recent developments in sanction theory as part of just war theory suggest that targeted sanctions are the legitimate sanctions that states prefer. Therefore, the second contribution is to evaluate sanctions morally and analyze and discuss the moral implications of three categories of goods and services (sanctioned, essential, and nonessential). This discussion shows no moral justification for a general call for all companies to leave an aggressor state. Companies have moral obligations to comply with legitimate sanctions, moral duties concerning essential goods, and moral permissions concerning nonessential goods.
... 8 According to the second quote and insofar as arguments are ultimately based on premises that may be considered hypotheses or parts of theories, it is necessary to include in the RE process all beliefs, theories and hypotheses that are relevant in light of the current inquiry. This requirement is commonly referred to as the need to strive for a wide RE (in contrast to an overly narrow RE) 9 (Rawls, 1999(Rawls, , p. 43 f., 1974Daniels, 1979). The requirement for a wide RE can be interpreted in two non-exclusive but rather complementary ways: 8 This might not seem a very informative point, since most philosophers today think that most judgements are revisable (Hetherington, 2019). ...
... Daniels contends that we should do the latter, since we should only accept an equilibrium as adequately wide if the set of beliefs that support a theory in the background is somewhat distinct from the set of beliefs that are directly connected with the theory. This is the independence constraint (Daniels, 1979(Daniels, , p. 259ff, 1980; see also Knight, 2023). Though Daniels is concerned primarily with MRE in normative and applied ethics, one can conceive of the independence constraint as a constraint on general inquiry via MRE. ...
The method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) is a method of justification popularized by John Rawls and further developed by Norman Daniels, Michael DePaul, Folke Tersman, and Catherine Z. Elgin, among others. The basic idea is that epistemic agents have justified beliefs if they have succeeded in forming their beliefs into a harmonious system of beliefs which they reflectively judge to be the most plausible. Despite the common reference to MRE as a method, its mechanisms or rules are typically expressed in a metaphorical or simplified manner and are therefore criticized as too vague. Recent efforts to counter this criticism have been directed towards the attempt to provide formal explications of MRE. This paper aims to supplement these efforts by providing an informal working definition of MRE. This approach challenges the view that MRE can adequately be characterized only in the negative as a set of anti-essentialisms. I argue that epistemic agents follow MRE iff they follow four interconnected rules, which are concerned with a minimalistic form of foundationalism, a minimalistic form of fallibilism, a moderate form of holism, and a minimalistic form of rationality. In the critical spirit of MRE, the corresponding working definition is, of course, provisional and revisable. In general, the aim is to contribute to a reflective equilibrium (RE) concerning MRE. If it is successful, this working definition provides a better grasp of the most basic elements of the method and thereby enhances our understanding of it.
... For instance, early on, Daniels tried to disentangle the method from the specific application in Rawls's 1971 classic. He also promoted the idea of a wide reflective equilibrium that examines theories not just in view of commitments but also using background theories (Daniels, 1979). Elgin (1993Elgin ( , 2017 developed a comprehensive account of the method, suggesting it as an account of epistemic justification in general. ...
... How could we reach overlapping consensus across varying situated values and situations? From philosophy, we could draw from Rawl's idea of wide reflective equilibrium to encourage the iterative adjustment of beliefs to align with shared values (Rawls 2017;Daniels 1979Daniels , 1996. On the other hand, insights from participatory design could offer methodologies for negotiating diverse viewpoints, fostering dialogue and collaboration (Björgvinsson, Ehn, and Hillgren 2012). ...
Work on value alignment aims to ensure that human values are respected by AI systems. However, existing approaches tend to rely on universal framings of human values that obscure the question of which values the systems should capture and align with, given the variety of operational situations. This often results in AI systems that privilege only a selected few while perpetuating problematic norms grounded on biases, ultimately causing equity and justice issues. In this perspective paper, we unpack the limitations of predominant alignment practices of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for LLMs through the lens of situated values. We build on feminist epistemology to argue that at the design-time, RLHF has problems with representation in the subjects providing feedback and implicitness in the conceptualization of values and situations of real-world users while lacking system adaptation to real user situations at the use time. To address these shortcomings, we propose three research directions: 1) situated annotation to capture information about the crowdworker’s and user’s values and judgments in relation to specific situations at both the design and use-time, 2) expressive instruction to encode plural values for instructing LLMs systems at design-time, and 3) reflexive adaptation to leverage situational knowledge for system adaption at use-time. We conclude by reflecting on the practical challenges of pursuing these research directions and situated value alignment of AI more broadly.
... In essence, the Original Position models certain'background theories'about justice (Daniels, 1979b). It reflects what Rawls takes to be plausible conceptions of personhood, a fair contract, impartiality etc.; impartiality in particular will be important for this paper. ...
This paper aims to discuss the current criteria for municipal priorities in municipal healthcare services in Norway in light of major theories from political philosophy on social justice, such as John Rawls's theory of justice and utili-tarianism. Our first goal is to show that perspectives from political philosophy could prove useful for increasing our understanding of the current priority-setting criteria in municipal healthcare services. Decision-makers in municipalities often have to exercise discretion in their decisions. We argue that the current criteria of health benefit, resource use and severity can introduce some indeterminacy in certain situations where municipalities have to make priorities. This is important, as municipalities are experiencing an increase in demand coupled with a decrease in capacity due to an ageing population, leading to a stronger need for prioritization between services. Our last goal is to provide a heuristic based on Rawls's Original Position that may help to narrow indeterminacy in choice situations. We have included a case of municipal decision-making that focuses on municipal priority-setting in home care services, including assisted living facilities, nursing homes and preventative measures.
... The AGD, drawing on the methodologies of applied ethics, is a more bottom-up, open-ended approach, in which the very definition of the problem is still up for discussion. It involves a process of wide reflective equilibrium, in which our considered judgments about specific cases, the principles derived from our normative theories, and other relevant background theories are brought into coherence through a process of mutual adjustment (Arras, 2007;Daniels, 1979;Tillson, 2018, p. 207). An ethical theory that coheres with our intuitions in a highly abstract thought experiment may still face challenges when applied to a concrete, real-world case with numerous morally salient details. ...
The Gamer's Dilemma is a much-discussed issue in video game ethics which probes our seemingly conflicting intuitions about the moral acceptability of virtual murder compared to virtual child molestation. But how we approach this dilemma depends on how we frame it. With this in mind, I identify three ways the dilemma has been conceptualized: the Descriptive Gamer's Investigation, which focuses on empirically explaining the source of our intuitions; the Gamer's Puzzle, which uses the dilemma to explore and test moral or metaphysical theories; and the Applied Gamer's Dilemma, which reconstructs the moral commitments underlying the intuitions to provide action-guidance. Clearly distinguishing these framings allows us to identify the distinct methodologies and criteria of success for each approach. This tripartite framework helps resolve confusions in the debate, highlights the need for experimental philosophy to test proposed resolutions, and opens space for a serious reconsideration of consequentialism. The paper thus provides conceptual clarity to move the discussion forward productively.
... The keel (keel) symbolizing the axiological foundations of understanding the subject security through the frames attached to it, and the stringers and planking to the frames (see Figure 2) allows for a better understanding, or even discovering the relationships between the impact of the axiological foundations on all other elements of the cognitive foundations of the subject security. Norman Daniels' method of broad reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1979), adopted for the purposes of making propositions creating a balanced system of values of subject security, basically establishes the rules of reasoning when assigning true or false values to propositions about subject security and its environment (Glen, 2021, pp. 26-27). ...
Andrzej Glen1
Siedlce, Poland
Epistemological Determinants of Cognition of Subject Security
The article addresses the issue of useful -
ness of pyramid and boat epistemological metaphors
in the process of cognition in security sciences, with
the aim of creating a coherent epistemological theory
of subject security. This usefulness was examined for
the sake of the basic components of epistemology:
the truth and its sources, the scope of cognition, and
the specificity of the subject of cognition – subject
security. A deductive method with syllogistic drawing
of conclusions leading to the solution of the general
problem and the probability of the working hypoth-
esis was used. As a result, it was established that
understanding the truth and its sources, methods of
finding the truth, and determining the scope of cog-
nition of subject security are supported by an epis -
temology subordinated to the boat metaphor. This
metaphor allows for a less fundamental, but more
systemic, look at the subject security. The holistic
nature of the boat metaphor results from the over -
lapping of concepts (parts of the planking) built on the
skeleton, the core of which is formed by the axiology
of the security of the subject (keel), and the shape is
given by ontology, epistemology, and methodology
of the security of the subject (frames) and paradigms
(stringers)
... One could even say that the problem of arriving at consistent judgment after beginning with inconsistent premises is one of the most central problems in modern Moral Philosophy [127,626,563]. Thus, how could the model decipher this tangle of norms in a "coherent" form? ...
The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.
... One could even say that the problem of arriving at consistent judgment after beginning with inconsistent premises is one of the most central problems in modern Moral Philosophy [127,626,563]. Thus, how could the model decipher this tangle of norms in a "coherent" form? ...
The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.
... The resulting coherent position is called a reflective equilibrium. In the more complex model, wide reflective equilibrium, considered judgments, ethical theories, and background theories are all weighed and made to cohere (Daniels, 1979). Background theories are not necessarily ethical theories and may include theories of human nature, rationality, cooperation, well-being, and (other) scientific or metaphysical theories. ...
It has become increasingly common to conduct research on popular views on ethical questions. In this paper, we discuss when and to what extent popular views should be included in a reflective equilibrium process, thereby influencing normative theory. We argue that popular views are suitable for inclusion in a reflective equilibrium if they approximate considered judgments and examine some factors that plausibly contribute to the consideredness of popular views. We conclude that deliberation and familiarity contribute to the consideredness of popular views, whereas prevalence does not. Furthermore, we raise the “fair trial” objection: that expert deliberation on popular views might fail to respect the consideredness of these views. Eliciting views approximating considered judgments directly from participants is therefore preferable to refining popular views or treating them as “bare” intuitions in the reflective process. These conclusions have important implications for which research methods will likely elicit popular views suitable for a reflective equilibrium process. Research focusing on the prevalence of views is unlikely to yield popular views suitable for a reflective equilibrium, whereas deliberative and in-depth work is more promising.
... While this more detailed understanding of the relation between moral and empirical beliefs within RE might be interesting in its own right from a purely descriptive standpoint, it can also, as I will argue in Sect. 4, contribute to evaluating the overall philosophical appeal of RE: first, by demonstrating the empirical adaptability of RE, which in turn 1 On Daniels's (1979) influential account, WRE aims at producing coherence between an ordered triple of sets of beliefs, namely (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories. The latter encompasses both moral and empirical bodies of theory (Arras, 2009, p. 52;Daniels, 1979, p. 260). 2 Most philosophers agree with Rawls that for the justification of moral claims, "[w]ide and not narrow reflective equilibrium is plainly the important concept" (Rawls, 2001, p. 31). ...
What exactly is the role of empirical beliefs in moral reflective equilibrium (RE)? And if they have a part to play, can changes in our empirical beliefs effectuate changes in the moral principles we adopt? Conversely, can empirical beliefs be adjusted in light of certain moral convictions? While it is generally accepted that empirical background theory is of importance to the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE), this article focuses on a different aspect, namely the role of empirical beliefs that is intrinsic to the coherence relation of moral beliefs in any (narrow or wide) conception of RE. First, it is shown that in the application of RE, empirical beliefs are crucial to the procedure of matching principles to considered judgments. Changes in our empirical beliefs may therefore upset the relevant coherence relation and motivate changes in the moral principles we adopt. This more detailed account of the interplay between empirical and moral beliefs can help evaluate the overall philosophical appeal of RE. Finally, it is argued that, at least in WRE, the relation between empirical and moral beliefs need not be a one-way street, that is, moral convictions can provide us with some epistemic means of adjudicating between competing empirical descriptions of the world.
... Establishing equilibrium across the relatively narrow realm of priority-setting policy and practice falls short of the wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) that Rawls strove towards. Unlike WRE, narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) generally does not defend the credibility of its content with reference to relevant background theories and wider perspectives and it is therefore acknowledged that NRE carries less justificatory power than its wide counterpart [33,34]. However, on the view that moral justification is a matter of degree, establishing NRE is nevertheless a worthwhile aim and would represent a significant achievement that would bolster a priority-setter's claim to moral legitimacy. ...
Background
As the UK’s main healthcare priority-setter, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has good reason to want to demonstrate that its decisions are morally justified. In doing so, it has tended to rely on the moral plausibility of its principle of cost-effectiveness and the assertion that it has adopted a fair procedure. But neither approach provides wholly satisfactory grounds for morally defending NICE’s decisions. In this study we adopt a complementary approach, based on the proposition that a priority-setter's claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the coherence of its approach and that the reliability of any such claim is undermined by the presence of dissonance within its moral system. This study is the first to empirically assess the coherence of NICE’s formal approach and in doing so to generate evidence-based conclusions about the extent to which this approach is morally justified.
Methods
The study is grounded in the theory, methods and standards of empirical bioethics. Twenty NICE policy documents were coded to identify and classify the normative commitments contained within NICE technology appraisal policy as of 31 December 2021. Coherence was systematically assessed by attempting to bring these commitments into narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE) and by identifying sources of dissonance.
Findings
Much of NICE policy rests on coherent values that provide a strong foundation for morally justified decision-making. However, NICE’s formal approach also contains several instances of dissonance which undermine coherence and prevent NRE from being fully established. Dissonance arises primarily from four sources: i) NICE’s specification of the principle of cost-effectiveness; ii) its approach to prioritising the needs of particular groups; iii) its conception of reasonableness in the context of uncertainty, and iv) its concern for innovation as an independent value.
Conclusion
At the time of analysis, the level of coherence across NICE policy provides reason to question the extent to which its formal approach to technology appraisal is morally justified. Some thoughts are offered on why, given these findings, NICE has been able to maintain its legitimacy as a healthcare priority-setter and on what could be done to enhance coherence.
... These arguments can be construed as inferences from some set of relevant background theories… In this way [one] arrives at an equilibrium point that consists of the ordered triple (a), (b), (c). 38 It was Rawls' view that only WRE, and not NRE, could be used to justify moral theory. However, he acknowledged that 'it is doubtful whether one can ever reach this state' of coherence in practice. ...
Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice.
... osing perspectives, new experiences, and background information about the nature of our attitudes, to name a few). In this way, it is similar to the process of Wide Reflective Equilibrium, which philosophers have used to justify logical systems (Norman Daniels 2016) and to develop and test theories of right conduct and justice (Norman Daniels 2016;N. Daniels 1979). ...
Despite increased philosophical and psychological work on practical wisdom, contemporary interdisciplinary wisdom research provides few specifics about how to develop wisdom (Kristjánsson 2022). This lack of practically useful guidance is due in part to the difficulty of determining how to combine the tools of philosophy and psychology to develop a plausible account of wisdom as a prescriptive ideal. Modeling wisdom on more ordinary forms of expertise is promising, but skill models of wisdom (Annas 2011; De Caro et al. 2018; Swartwood 2013b; Tsai 2023) have been challenged on the grounds that there are important differences between wisdom and expert skills (Hacker-Wright 2015, p. 986; Kristjánsson 2015, pp. 98, 101; Stichter 2015, 2016, 2018). I’ll argue that we can both vindicate the promise of skill models of wisdom and begin to specify practically useful strategies for wisdom development by attending to a reflective process that I call Case-Based Critical Reflection. I begin by demonstrating the process as it arose in a notable example from everyday life, illustrating how the process can be usefully applied to a case study of interest to wisdom scientists, and explaining its philosophical pedigree. After isolating the key features that make it relevant to wisdom development, I argue that attending to the importance of Critical Reflection can defuse prominent objections to skill models of wisdom.
... Wolff and de-Shalit (2007) and de-Shalit (2020, 17) expand Rawls' reflective equilibrium to public reflective equilibriuminvolving the public's intuitions as well as theories. I would add the importance of an inter-/multidisciplinary approach to form a robust understanding of 'relevant background theories' that figure in wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels 1979), which is in line with Rawls' (1975, 225) own brief remark that philosophers should not turn away from the inquiry into the structure of moral conceptions and of their connections with human sensibility merely because it appears to belong to psychology or social theory rather than philosophy. 4. For example, Ackerly and colleagues (2021, 11, 1) rightly criticize Wolff and de-Shalit's methodology for focussing too much on the views of those who work with people who are disadvantaged (for example, providers of social services) rather than those who experience disadvantage. ...
... Dalam konteks hasil penelitian ini, diskusi mengarah pada implikasi temuan terhadap pemahaman konsep keadilan dalam filsafat hukum serta relevansinya terhadap dinamika masyarakat modern. Analisis filosofis mendalam menunjukkan bahwa konsep keadilan tidak dapat diabaikan dalam pengembangan sistem hukum, melainkan harus menjadi panduan moral dan etis yang membentuk dasar normatifitas hukum [17]. ...
Penelitian ini mengkaji konsep keadilan dalam filsafat hukum dengan fokus analisis filosofis, kontekstualisasi sosial, dan studi kasus konkrit. Melalui pendekatan filosofis, kami menggali ide-ide tokoh seperti John Rawls, H.L.A. Hart dan Martha Nussbaum memberikan wawasan mendalam tentang dimensi moral, etika, dan nilai yang menjadi dasar konsep keadilan. Pendekatan kontekstualisasi sosial melibatkan analisis pengaruh nilai-nilai sosial terhadap dinamika perubahan sosial dan perkembangan konsep keadilan. Studi kasus terapan memberikan gambaran konkrit implementasi konsep keadilan dalam putusan hukum nyata. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa konsep keadilan tidak hanya bersifat teoritis tetapi juga mempunyai implikasi praktis bagi perkembangan sistem hukum. Signifikansi penelitian ini mencakup perlunya sistem hukum yang dinamis dan responsif terhadap perubahan nilai-nilai sosial, serta pentingnya pemahaman konsep keadilan ketika merumuskan kebijakan hukum yang adil dan tepat. Sebagai kontribusi terhadap pemikiran filosofis hukum, penelitian ini merangsang diskusi lebih lanjut tentang peran dan evolusi konsep keadilan dalam memandu pengembangan sistem hukum yang menjawab tantangan masyarakat yang terus berkembang. Kata kunci: Filsafat hukum, keadilan, filosofis, normatifitas hukum
... To the extent that we can capture this with our model, we interpret this functionally as meaning that all agents have the same initial conditions: they have the same principle, same intuitions, and the same 32. See Daniels (1979) for a discussion of the difference. Some have argued that the difference is overstated (Holmgren 1989). ...
We build a model of the reflective equilibrium method to better understand under what conditions a community of agents would achieve a shared equilibrium. We find that, despite guaranteeing that agents individually reach equilibrium and numerous constraints on how agents deliberate, it is surprisingly difficult for a community to converge on a small number of equilibria. Consequently, the literature on reflective equilibrium has underestimated the challenge of coordinating intrapersonal convergence and interpersonal convergence.
... ). Ver, também, MacAskill (2016, p. 969). 14 VerRawls (1971),Daniels (1979) e Scanlon (2003). portamento humano. ...
O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre a necessidade de contarmos com padrões morais para orientar os veículos autônomos (VAs) e propor o procedimento do equilíbrio reflexivo (ER) para tal fim. Com isso em mente, inicio com uma investigação sobre o desacordo moral para saber como devemos decidir em casos de incerteza, argumentando que devemos fazer uso de um procedimento que congregue diferentes critérios normativos. Após, apresento uma rota interessante de investigação, que é o método de equilíbrio reflexivo coletivo na prática (CREP) como proposto por Savulescu, Gyngell e Kahane (2021), que corrige os resultados do experimento Moral Machine e propõe princípios de uma política pública para regular os VAs. O próximo passo é analisar o procedimento do ER, identificando suas características básicas de consistência, reflexividade, holismo e progressividade. Com isso, será possível na sequência apontar os limites do CREP, em razão dele deixar de fora o critério normativo das virtudes e não formar um sistema coerente de crenças amplo o suficiente. Por fim, apresento a sugestão do equilíbrio reflexivo amplo coletivo (ERAC) de forma a dar conta da pluralidade normativa que é base de nossa sociedade e propor uma metodologia para identificar o padrão moral para os VAs.
... Despite consensus that empirical research is relevant to bioethical argument (Mihailov, et al. 2022;Musschenga 2005;Sulmasy and Sugarman 2010;Rost and Mihailov 2021), integrating empirical research with normative analysis remains challenging. An often and long discussed way of integration is the (wide) reflective equilibrium (Daniels 1979), which has been tailored to serve empirical bioethics projects by several scholars (Ives and Draper 2009;Van Thiel and Van Delden 2010;de Vries and van Leeuwen 2010). Briefly, (wide) reflective equilibrium is a two-way dialogue between ethical principles/ values/judgement and practice (empirical data). ...
The integration of normative analysis with empirical data often remains unclear despite the availability of many empirical bioethics methodologies. This paper sought bioethics scholars’ experiences and reflections of doing empirical bioethics research to feed these practical insights into the debate on methods. We interviewed twenty-six participants who revealed their process of integrating the normative and the empirical. From the analysis of the data, we first used the themes to identify the methodological content. That is, we show participants’ use of familiar methods explained as “back-and-forth” methods (reflective equilibrium), followed by dialogical methods where collaboration was seen as a better way of doing integration. Thereafter, we highlight methods that were deemed as inherent integration approaches, where the normative and the empirical were intertwined from the start of the research project. Second, we used the themes to express not only how we interpreted what was said but also how things were said. In this, we describe an air of uncertainty and overall vagueness that surrounded the above methods. We conclude that the indeterminacy of integration methods is a double-edged sword. It allows for flexibility but also risks obscuring a lack of understanding of the theoretical-methodological underpinnings of empirical bioethics research methods.
... This moving back and forth between principles and particular judgements is a key part of MRE, so that a main aim is to arrive at the best fit between sets P and J. But, according to MRE-theorists, this fitting-state-defined as narrow equilibrium point-doesn't suffice. Instead, we should seek after a wide equilibrium state (Daniels 1979;DePaul 1993), taking into account all of our relevant background beliefs. These beliefs-call their set B-provide the basis for the advancement of arguments aimed at revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed principles. ...
The Scientific Realism Debate (SRD) has been accused of going around in circles without reaching a consensus, so that several scholars have advocated its dissolution in favor of reformed projects that are eliminativist towards the distinctively philosophical aims and methods. In this paper, after outlining the project that SRD-participants have been involved in for some time now—which we call the Received View—we discuss two dissolution-proposals: sociological externalism and localism. We argue that these projects are incomplete and that, even when judged in themselves, they cannot flourish without the ‘traditional’ philosophical reflection they wish to get rid of. However, although not substitutes for the Received View, those projects have some insightful features. These are assigned their proper place in the dialectics of SRD, which is shown to be an instance of the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE). Lastly—based on Michael DePaul’s work—we provide a response to the well-known concern that MRE is epistemically circular, by claiming that MRE is the only rational method of inquiry. Overall, our goal is ‘therapeutic’: we try to mitigate the anxiety caused by simultaneously believing that SRD is circular and suspecting that there is a good way out of the circle that we just haven’t found yet. For, having dismissed the suspicion that there might be a good trick to dissolve the circle, one may learn to live in it and be more calm in carrying on with what one has.
... In this paper, we will use a reflective equilibrium approach, where considered judgements and arguments concerning severity in preventive situations will be related to overall normative judgements and background theories in priority setting, aiming at consistency [10]. The paper will have the following outline: first we outline the arguments for and against risk-sensitive severity, then we examine the arguments for and against time-sensitive severity, and finally we examine potential systemic effects. ...
Background:
Severity plays an essential role in healthcare priority setting. Still, severity is an under-theorised concept. One controversy concerns whether severity should be risk- and/or time-sensitive. The aim of this article is to provide a normative analysis of this question.
Methods:
A reflective equilibrium approach is used, where judgements and arguments concerning severity in preventive situations are related to overall normative judgements and background theories in priority-setting, aiming for consistency. Analysis, discussion, and conclusions: There is an argument for taking the risk of developing a condition into account, and we do this when we consider the risk of dying in the severity assessment. If severity is discounted according to risk, this will 'dilute' severity, depending on how well we are able to delineate the population, which is dependent on the current level of knowledge. This will potentially have a more far-reaching effect when considering primary prevention, potentially the de-prioritisation of effective preventive treatments in relation to acute, less-effective treatments. The risk arguments are dependent on which population is being assessed. If we focus on the whole population at risk, with T0 as the relevant population, this supports the risk argument. If we instead focus on the population of as-yet (at T0) unidentified individuals who will develop the condition at T1, risk will become irrelevant, and severity will not be risk sensitive. The strongest argument for time-sensitive severity (or for discounting future severity) is the future development of technology. On a short timescale, this will differ between different diagnoses, supporting individualised discounting. On a large timescale, a more general discounting might be acceptable. However, we need to also consider the systemic effects of allowing severity to be risk- and time-sensitive.
... DeGrazia, David and Millum, Joseph. (2021) A Theory of Bioethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 13. 121 Cummins, Robert. (1998) 'Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium' in DePaul, Michael R and Ramsey, William (Eds) Rethinking Intuition. Lantham MD, Rowman & Littlefield. p. 113. 122Daniels, Norman. (1979) 'Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics' The Journal ofPhilosophy, Vol. 76, No. 5, p. 259. Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...
I explore the relevance of reflective equilibrium to aesthetic experience, judgement, and appreciation, framing this project in both descriptive and normative terms. I begin with an exposition of reflective equilibrium, construed as a theory of epistemic justification, and of aesthetic appreciation, characterised as an activity with an epistemic goal—namely, achieving an optimal understanding of an artwork or aesthetic object. I stress the broad purview of reflective equilibrium, as well as Rawls’ arguments on the importance of aesthetic activity in human experience, and thus its place in a theory of justice. These preliminary considerations set up a more detailed exploration of reflective equilibrium in action in the aesthetic domain. I develop the argument with reference to a range of cases, from mainstream filmmaking to twelve-tone composition, considering the place of reflective equilibrium in aesthetic appreciation in both its individual and collective guises, as well as its “wide” and “narrow” forms. I demonstrate how the application of reflective equilibrium in the context of the critical appreciation of art relates to a range of significant issues in aesthetics, via the examination of arguments from Sontag, Sibley, Walton, Carroll, and Gaut (among others). Finally I assess various objections to, and extensions of, the main argument, including the objection that aesthetic appreciation does not aim at understanding, and the proposal that the embodied, emotional dimension of aesthetic experience, which must be accommodated by reflective equilibrium in the context of aesthetics, may shed light on its nature and operation in other domains.
Consider a seemingly fruitful ordering of our intellectual labours: think in ideal terms about justice and legitimacy, then bring our ideas and arguments to bear upon messy (and very much nonideal) real-world complications. This ordering is most often associated with John Rawls, but this was not his actual practice. That is no vice: Rawls took wide reflective equilibrium seriously as a philosophical method, moving back and forth from ideal to nonideal considerations in ways that belie the usefulness of any priority claims. We do not gain much insight by asserting the priority of either ideal or nonideal theorizing. Indeed, we could stop using those terms altogether, and theory might be none the worse, if we embrace something like Rawls' constructivist method. Normative political theory should, then, reject certain methodological conceits lurking in some of the philosophical work we otherwise embrace.
In normative ethics, a small number of moral theories, such as Kantianism or consequentialism, take centre stage. Conventional wisdom has it that these individual theories posit very different ways of looking at the world. In this book Marius Baumann develops the idea that just as scientific theories can be underdetermined by data, so can moral theories be underdetermined by our considered judgments about particular cases. Baumann goes on to ask whether moral theories from different traditions might arrive at the same verdicts while remaining explanatorily incompatible. He applies this idea to recent projects in normative ethics, such as Derek Parfit's On What Matters and so-called consequentializing and deontologizing, and outlines its important implications for our understanding of the relationship between the main moral traditions as well as the moral realism debate. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Background/aims
Although diagnostic uncertainty is common, patient-focused research examining its communication is lacking. We aimed to determine patient preferences for the communication of diagnostic uncertainty, and examine the effects of such communication on patients.
Methods
We applied an empirical ethics approach, integrating the data collected with ethical analysis to form normative recommendations about diagnostic uncertainty communication. In this randomised crossover study, n=111 members of the public sequentially watched two video vignettes depicting either high or low communicated diagnostic uncertainty, in one of two clinical scenarios. After watching videos, participants completed online questionnaires. Primary outcome was preferred video (high vs low communicated uncertainty); secondary outcomes included satisfaction, trust, worry and understanding. Quantitative data were analysed using logistic regression and a linear mixed effects model; qualitative data were analysed thematically.
Results
Quantitative analysis demonstrated that participants preferred greater diagnostic uncertainty communication, even though these vignettes were more worrying. Qualitative data revealed heterogeneous participant views justifying their communication preferences. These data raise issues relating to how doctors might balance harms versus benefits in diagnostic uncertainty communication and how doctors might communicate in the face of heterogeneous patient information preferences.
Conclusions
We argue that doctors should err on the side of greater diagnostic uncertainty communication: to not do so (eg, based on benign paternalistic ideas about avoiding patient worry) or to do so variably (eg, based on unevidenced assumptions about patient information preferences) risks depriving patients of information they may value and may create or exacerbate inequalities.
A major development in world history was witnessed in the 1980s, as anticipated by Friedrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century; viz. the death of God and the rise of Ubermensch [Superman]. This new version of being human, Homo-Deus, is a product of globalisation relentlessly imposed through our current age of electronic communications. The internet has become of a crucible where Homo-Deus’ isolated, subjective a-moral values are imposed, absorbed by a boundless society through the influence of anonymous repetitions performed in isolation, and thus the world wide web creates a-moral and uncritical modes of life, embraced by everyone without any reflective vetting process. Without location in any cultural heritage, and no identity with any community, the anonymity of Homo-Deus leaves every individual aimless and without a cogent, collectively approved set of values to guide their social interactions. The Superman needs to be redirected morally, in order to pre-empt the emergence of a totally chaotic society.
Is it fair to punish for events over which the perpetrator has no control? How do we assess culpability when the ultimate effect of actions is due to chance? The book The Paradox of Legal Luck in the Context of Criminal Responsibility addresses these fundamental questions, exploring the extent to which criminal law is susceptible to the influence of happenstance and the moral problems and challenges this raises. Philosophical reflection is combined with legal analysis in the book, leading to new conclusions about the moral justification of criminal sanctions. The author shows that the paradox of legal trafficking goes beyond purely theoretical considerations, touching the core of the debate on individual subjectivity from the perspective of legal responsibility. In the book, he challenges traditional theories of responsibility and shows how complex it can be to try to reconcile the law with unpredictable reality.
This paper discusses the importance of return of clinical trial data to patients in the context of the FACILITATE project that aims to develop a participant-centric approach for the systematic return of individual clinical trial data. It reflects on the need for an ethical framework to support the return of clinical trial data. The discussion revolves around the developing FACILITATE ethical framework, specifically focusing on the ethical principles that form the foundation of the framework and guidance on how to implement those principles into practice.
The philosophical heart of this book is embodied in the Philosophical Personality Argument, which is: Philosophically relevant intuitions are used as some evidence for the truth of some philosophical claims.
Some differences in philosophically relevant intuitions used as evidence for the truth of some philosophical claims are systematically related to some differences in personality.
If philosophically relevant intuitions are used as some evidence for the truth of some philosophical claims and those intuitions are systematically related to some differences in personality, then one’s endorsement of some philosophical claims is at least partially a function of one’s personality.
Therefore, one’s endorsement of some philosophical claims is at least partially a function of one’s personality.
In this chapter, we provide reasons to think (1) is true. We review evidence from Chaps. 2 – 4 providing reasons to think (2) is true. We discuss how premise (3) seems to capture standard ways that intuitions could be used as evidence. We then argue that the conclusion (4) poses substantial challenges to some philosophical projects (e.g., Neo-Platonic projects) but not necessarily others (e.g., conceptual analysis). We then defend premises 1–3 from several objections.
We begin this paper by defining the antecedents of the English term dialectics, and then proceed to trace and summarize its entire history in a nutshell. We also then explain how great Greek thinkers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle understood the term, and also contributed in no small measure, to dialectical thought. We then proceed to examine the contributions made by other great European thinkers, particularly the Germans to this entire philosophy and school of thought. We also review the contributions of other "non-orthodox" cultures to dialectics including the Indian school of thought. We also evaluate the Marxian school of material dialectical thought, and examine some of its weaknesses and shortcomings. We also review and summarize all other different schools of thought associated with dialectics, and the potential downstream uses and implications of dialectics. We also present and review some limitations of dialects, and their common criticisms. We also review our core philosophy of neo-centrism and the position of "Reflective equilibrium through role swapping" (or RERS) advocated by us several years ago, and then build upon the core and key concepts and tenets of this approach to formulate what we call auto-dialectics. We also propose and evaluate some key benefits and downstream benefits and implications of this technique, and explain how it can lead to better quality science. 2
How is Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality relevant to his revaluation of values? I consider and reject three accounts: contingency accounts, pedigree accounts, and unmasking accounts. I then propose an alternative account. On this view, Nietzsche provides a ‘deconstructive genealogy’ that indicates whether and where we should expect to find unity in our current moral practices. Moreover, Nietzsche’s history contributes to a critique of contemporary morality because it reveals that morality is unlikely to have the kind of unity required by many of its defenders. After explaining and defending this account of genealogical critique in GM, I show how it can be generalized to domains besides morality.
This chapter discusses the political recognition of needs and the role of expertise in allocation decisions. It reviews three aspects of the political recognition of needs: First, it presents two alternative politico-economic decision frameworks for studying the behavioral consequences of need-based justice. Second, it discusses the scope and differentiation of the principle of need-based justice. Specifically, it explores the conditions under which voters’ social identity may lead to an exclusive or inclusive application of the need principle. Third, this chapter will elaborate on the role of expertise in the political recognition and collective satisfaction of needs. Expertise can either help with problem-solving by objectifying needs or provide some moral authority that increases the chances of a collectively agreed allocation satisfying needs. The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications for developing a concise theory of need-based justice.
The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based, how it can be answered and which features RE must have to meet the objection. We find that there is a conception of RE that promises to withstand all objections. However, this conception has some features that may be unexpected: it aims at a justification that is tailored to understanding and it is neither tied to intuitions nor does it imply coherentism. We conclude by pointing out a cluster of questions we think RE theorists should pay more attention to.
Among the areas of knowledge that the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) has been applied to is that of logical validity. According to RE in logic, we come to be justified in believing a (deductive) logical theory in virtue of establishing some state of equilibrium between our initial judgements over the validity of specific (natural language) arguments and the logical principles which constitute our logical theory. Unfortunately, however, while relatively popular, RE with regards to logical theorizing is underspecified. In particular, it’s unclear what constitute: (1) the relevant logical “data”, (2) logical theories, so that they can be suitably tested, and (3) the mechanisms under which such theories are tested. Considering the various options for how to interpret the position, we argue that in order to be workable the advocate of RE about logic must embrace what we call an operationalised, wide and communal version of RE with a rich understanding of logical theories. Fortunately for the advocate of RE, there is an available account of logic’s epistemology which possesses just these properties, logical predictivism. However, equally unfortunately, logical predictivism commits the advocate of RE to certain further claims that they have historically been weary of holding. Consequently, it is unclear whether RE about logic itself is a viable proposal, or rather a similar but distinct epistemology of logic.
A light versus dark spectrum is a common tool to conceptualize dark tourism. The existing spectrums, however, have a clear focus on destinations and attractions and leave the tourist and in particular ethical aspects of the travel decision aside. As an answer to this shortcoming, the following proposes a different approach. With this newly developed spectrum, both motive and ethical aspects are put into the forefront to determine the shades of darkness. It is removing intuitive inconsistencies of the existing models by assessing the shade of darkness based on either eudaemonic or hedonic motives. In addition, the availability of motives is also assessed, considering the framing impact of travel planning activities and time consideration on the planning process. With this new spectrum, academia and practitioners have a conceptual basis for discussions and research about the important aspects of ethics in dark tourism.
I address the worry that reflective equilibrium is too weak as an account of justification because it fails to let differing views converge. I take up informal aspects of convergence and operationalise them in a formal model of reflective equilibrium. This allows for exploration by the means of computer simulation. Findings show that the formal model does not yield unique outputs, but still boosts agreement. I conclude from this that reflective equilibrium is best seen as a pluralist account of justification that cannot be accused of resulting in an “anything goes” relativism.
In recent years an increasing number of political philosophers have begun to ground their arguments in empirical evidence. I investigate this novel approach by way of example. The object of my case study is David Miller’s renewed empirical argument for a needs-based principle of justice. First, I introduce Miller’s argument. Then I raise four worries about the application of his methodology that give rise to corresponding general recommendations for how to do empirical political philosophy. Proponents of this approach should take care to (1) check for inappropriately narrow (and broad) samples, (2) verify studies’ relevance for their empirical hypotheses, (3) adjust their confidence to the available empirical evidence, and (4) properly integrate their hypotheses into their philosophical theorizing.
Reflective equilibrium is overdue a twenty-first century update. Despite its apparent popularity, there is scant evidence that theorists ever thoroughly implement the method, and fewer still openly and transparently publish their attempts to do so in print—stymying its supposed justificatory value. This paper proposes digitising reflective equilibrium as a solution. Inspired by the global open science movement, it advocates for coupling a novel, digital implementation of the equilibrating process with new publication norms that can capitalise on the inherent reproducibility of digital data. The argument is structured around three main claims: that digitising will make it easier to (a) methodically construct, (b) widely disseminate, and (c) thoroughly critique reflective equilibria. Practical guidance is also provided throughout. Altogether, it is argued that digitisation will not only help theorists to better realise reflective equilibrium’s latent theoretical potential, but also greatly extend its value as a justificatory device in contemporary academic discourses.
Ιn this MPhil dissertation, we will attempt to find a connection (or to build a combinatorial meta-ethical theory) between Moral Realism, Moral Anti-realism and Meta-ethical Quietism in order to support Moderate Moral Realism. To provide a universal idea of the following subject (or to briefly describe the following methodology), we will explain some of the meta ethical perspectives as derived from Rawls’s, Nozick’s, Nagel’s, Dworkin’s, Popper’s, Formosa’s, Bagnoli’s, Habermas’s, Kant’s, Virvidakis’s and Anapolitanos’s philosophical theories. More specifically, in this philosophical context, we will strategically utilize, among others, some metaethical arguments which generally support the importance of Rationalism, Moral Intuitionism and Moral Sentiments. Finally, we will use some focal and vital platonic thoughts based on Philosophy of Mathematics.
The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent within the procedure of reflective equilibrium by adding a disposition for identifying reasonable beliefs. This can be seen as the starting point of the method, and would safeguard against the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. In order to do this, I will begin by analyzing the core characteristics of the method and its main weaknesses. I will then investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition for identifying an adequate means for achieving a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure which is carried out by an agent who deliberates well and can identify reasonable moral beliefs. These beliefs must be justified according to their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be interpreted as a kind of moral knowledge.
As Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies continue to advance at a rapid pace,
ethical considerations become increasingly important, such as information privacy
concerns, biases, intellectual property rights, disinformation and fake news. The
potential risks and challenges of AI systems have prompted companies, organizations,
and governments to develop AI Ethics policies to address these concerns. Analyzing
these policies through content analysis can provide valuable insights into the ethical
principles and values underlying AI development and use, therefore, this research
uses AI-aided content analysis approach to explore the current practice of the AI
Ethics policies with the moral philosophy lens of wide reflective equilibrium, and
compares how different countries enact their own policies, and how different
industries and sectors respond to the new wave of challenges. This approach involves combining human and machine coding from DiVoMiner® to analyze the policy
documents, to identify and analyze trends and themes in AI Ethics policies across
different organizations, sectors, and countries, with the intention to contributing to
understanding AI Ethics from a moral philosophy perspective.
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