Traditionally, Demea is considered to be the weakest part in Hume's famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion; the stage is completely dominated by Cleanthes' optimistic theism and by Philo's sceptical moves already critical of the former. Contrary to this traditional approach, however, the >orthodox< Demea will be defended here in maintaining: Demea contributes - neither consciously intended nor recognized by Hume - the most interesting observations concerning religious belief; in him a position is at least alluded lying beyond the metaphysical fantasies of theism (in league with its successors, the »friends of Cleanthes«) on the one hand and Philo's destructions which seem to amount to a moral minimal version on the other hand. It will be clear that this defense is not exegetically orientated; rather, it reacts to a constellation just personalized by Hume's »casting« letting us see at which topics we shall continue to work theologically as well as philosophically today. Accordingly and following a conceptual critique of Cleanthes and Philo it will be elaborated by three concrete examples how a picture of religious belief could look like located beyond metaphysical hopes turning God to a (quasi)person and reductivist concessions regarding »God« as a mere expression of a moral attitude. Demea, however, represents a postmetaphysical picture of religious belief - and we are invited to belong to the »friends of Demea«.