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Risk Management with Hard-Soft Data Fusion in Maritime Domain Awareness

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Enhanced situational awareness is integral to risk management and response evaluation. Dynamic systems that incorporate both hard and soft data sources allow for comprehensive situational frameworks which can supplement physical models with conceptual notions of risk. The processing of widely available semi-structured textual data sources can produce soft information that is readily consumable by such a framework. In this paper, we augment the situational awareness capabilities of a recently proposed risk management framework (RMF) with the incorporation of soft data. We illustrate the beneficial role of the hard-soft data fusion in the characterization and evaluation of potential vessels in distress within Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) scenarios. Risk features pertaining to maritime vessels are defined a priori and then quantified in real time using both hard (e.g., Automatic Identification System, Douglas Sea Scale) as well as soft (e.g., historical records of worldwide maritime incidents) data sources. A risk-aware metric to quantify the effectiveness of the hard-soft fusion process is also proposed. Though illustrated with MDA scenarios, the proposed hard-soft fusion methodology within the RMF can be readily applied to other domains.
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Risk Management with Hard-Soft Data Fusion
in Maritime Domain Awareness
Rafael Falcon, Rami Abielmona, Sean Billings, Alex Plachkov and Hussein Abbass
Abstract—Enhanced situational awareness is integral to risk
management and response evaluation. Dynamic systems that
incorporate both hard and soft data sources allow for compre-
hensive situational frameworks which can supplement physical
models with conceptual notions of risk. The processing of widely
available semi-structured textual data sources can produce soft
information that is readily consumable by such a framework. In
this paper, we augment the situational awareness capabilities of a
recently proposed risk management framework (RMF) with the
incorporation of soft data. We illustrate the beneficial role of the
hard-soft data fusion in the characterization and evaluation of
potential vessels in distress within Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) scenarios. Risk features pertaining to maritime vessels are
defined a priori and then quantified in real time using both hard
(e.g., Automatic Identification System, Douglas Sea Scale) as well
as soft (e.g., historical records of worldwide maritime incidents)
data sources. A risk-aware metric to quantify the effectiveness of
the hard-soft fusion process is also proposed. Though illustrated
with MDA scenarios, the proposed hard-soft fusion methodology
within the RMF can be readily applied to other domains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) can be understood
as the situational knowledge of physical and environmental
conditions that exist within or influence a maritime region. The
intended scope of this awareness includes all behaviors that
could, directly or indirectly, affect the security of the region,
its economic activity or the local environment [1].
Accurate situational awareness requires the integration of
multiple types of information that are extracted from different
data sources. High-Level Information Fusion (HLIF), defined
as Level 2 Fusion and above in the Joint Director of Labo-
ratories (JDL)/Data Fusion Information Group (DFIG) model
[2] [3], has proven to be a useful tool for the characterization
of vital MDA processes and behaviours such as anomaly
detection,trajectory prediction,intent assessment, and threat
assessment. HLIF techniques are much better positioned to
cope with the overwhelming volume of the data from a variety
of sources that flows to the maritime operations center at in-
creasingly high velocity with sometimes questionable veracity.
Maritime operators often rely on hard data sources (i.e.,
structured, quantitative, more objective, usually sensed data)
R. Falcon and R. Abielmona are with the Research & Engineering
Division, Larus Technologies Corporation, Ottawa ON, K1P 5V5 Canada
{rafael.falcon,rami.abielmona}@larus.com
S. Billings and A. Plachkov are with the School of Electrical Engineering
& Computer Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa ON, K1N 6N5 Canada
{sbill042, aplac099}@uottawa.ca
H. A. Abbass is with the University of New South Wales at
the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia ACT 2600
h.abbass@adfa.edu.au
generated by vessel traffic in order to identify suspicious
events at sea. However, a wealth of relevant information can
be extracted from soft data sources (i.e., unstructured/semi-
structured, more subjective, qualitative data, such as textual
reports on vessel sightings or marine incidents). As demon-
strated in [4], Natural Language Processing (NLP) methods
can draw meaningful information that is representative of
human intuition, which is often not captured by hard data
sources. These pieces of soft information can then supplement
the existing hard information in order to provide a more
comprehensive situational awareness.
A risk-aware view of the system, its units and the surround-
ing environment will help identify the existing vulnerabilities
in a proactive rather than reactive fashion, which will con-
tribute to the design of effective countermeasures to mitigate
the perceived threats and assess their impact on the system.
With this goal in mind, the authors in [5] put forth a generic,
multimodular risk management framework (RMF) architecture
for real-time processing of distributed systems. The RMF
is capable of: (1) extracting a parallel risk stream from the
regular data flow periodically reported by the system units;
(2) dynamically visualizing the risk landscape of each system
unit; (3) assessing the local and global risk levels for all units
and the system as a whole and (4) producing a limited set of
promising candidate responses that can be effectuated on the
system/environment.
In this paper, we augment the HLIF capabilities for situa-
tional awareness (Level 2 JDL/DFIG) of the RMF in [5] with
the incorporation of soft data. We illustrate the beneficial role
of the hard-soft data fusion (HSDF) in the characterization
and evaluation of potential vessels in distress within MDA
scenarios [6]. Risk features pertaining to maritime vessels
are defined a priori and then quantified in real time using
both hard (e.g., Automatic Identification System, Douglas Sea
Scale) as well as soft (e.g., historical reports of worldwide
maritime incidents) data sources. A geographic and descriptive
representation of the incidents contained within these reports is
used to characterize the regional hostility and risk of attack for
vessels actively monitored by the RMF, hence enhancing the
overall maritime picture presented to the operator. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that an RMF featuring
an HSDF component is presented and then applied to the
maritime world. Additionally, the effectiveness of the fusion
process is quantified via a newly proposed metric. Finally, the
proposed methodology is easily applicable to other domains
provided the necessary customizations are in place.
978-1-4799-5431-5/14/$31.00 c
2014 IEEE
A. The Role of Computational Intelligence (CI)
CI techniques permeate the entire RMF design (fuzzy logic
and granular computing are used for risk feature extraction;
clustering techniques for risk visualization; fuzzy inference
systems for risk assessment and evolutionary optimization
for response selection). The new fusion effectiveness metric
proposed in Section V also employs fuzzy reasoning.
B. Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II briefly reviews relevant works. Section III unveils the
proposed HSDF scheme for risk management and Section IV
illustrates its application within MDA. A risk-aware Measure
of Effectiveness (MoE) is put forth in Section V. Section VI is
the empirical evaluation and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RE LATE D WOR K
This Section briefly reviews several relevant studies con-
cerning maritime risk analysis, HLIF for MDA as well as
existing HSDF maritime systems.
A. Maritime Risk Analysis
The ISO 3100 [7] standard for risk management defines
risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives. Two primary
objectives within the maritime domain are safety and secu-
rity, while uncertainty classically reflects a lack of the right
information to support the commanders intent. Consequently,
an important dimension of risk management in the maritime
domain is to provide the set of processes and tools that
support and enhance the commanders situational awareness
picture (SAP). Improving the SAP can be categorized into a
number of sub-problems, from improving the collection and
transmission of information through the fusion of data, to the
provision of intent, projection and consequence cues to support
the commanders intent. Many tools have been proposed in
the literature to provide a system-level risk picture. Hidden
Markov Models [8][9] (HMMs) are common techniques used
in this domain that rely on latent states to approximate the
dynamics of the system-level risk picture. Technically, HMMs
provide an effective method for tactical risk but can be unstable
in a dynamic environment when evaluating system-level risk.
The inter-dependency from one model to another, arising
from the interdependency of assets, makes the system stability
vulnerable when confronting a change in the environment.
Practically, the cost to sustain the integrity of large systems
composed of many interconnected HMMs is large. The same
issue arises when relying on other probabilistic models such
as Bayesian networks [10].
Complex systems research generated another line of risk
assessment methodologies for the military domain including
computational red teaming [11][12] and adversarial modelling
[13]. Practical risk-aware decision support systems have been
developed by industry such as the ATHENA Integrated De-
fense System by Raytheon [14], which is designed to search
for suspicious behaviors in the search-and-rescue division.
Two US-based projects are also worth mentioning here.
The first is the one entitled Maritime Automated Super Track
Enhanced Reporting (MASTER), which is an integrative re-
porting project supported by the Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) [15] and the Comprehensive Maritime
Awareness (CMA) [16] programs. The second project is the
Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment Activities (PANDA)
[17], which is a case-based reasoning system that models
context using ontologies and business rules.
B. HLIF for Maritime Domain Awareness
Recent efforts in performing HLIF for MDA have made use
of clustering techniques to process the data sources. Clustering
is a pattern classification technique used to group similar
points; this method is widely employed due to its unsupervised
learning nature. In 2007, Laxhammar [18] tackled anomalous
vessel detection via two clustering techniques operating on Au-
tomatic Identification Systems (AIS) data, namely the Mixture
of Gaussians (MoG) model and the Fuzzy Adaptive Resonance
Theory (FuzzyART) self-organizing neural network. The data
generated by a vessel was transformed into a data point
belonging to two feature spaces: F1= (Velx, Vely) and F2
= (Velx, Vely, Lat, Lon). Both MoG and FuzzyART were
trained only on data containing normal vessel activities, and
later tested on anomalous data. The MoG is more tolerant to
noisy (anomalous) training data than FuzzyART. Due to their
unsupervised nature (which implies no need for any domain
knowledge), the two approaches are flexible enough that they
could be employed in different domains dealing with two-
dimensional motion. The limitation in the proposed solutions
is that they can detect only elementary types of anomalies (e.g.,
sea lane crossed by a vessel). The author discovered that the
inclusion of the coordinates in the second feature space did
not improve the anomaly detection capabilities.
More recently, Blasch et al. [19] explored the potential of
fusing information scattered over multiple data sets containing
hard (e.g., imagery) and soft (e.g., textual labels) data. The
authors note that the challenges at hand are mainly due to no
standardized ontological representation (i.e. no shared domain
vocabulary) used by the different data collection agencies to
describe the real-world objects contained within their data sets.
They claim that ontological alignment allows for the successful
aggregation of the information contained in the dispersed data
sets and proceed by providing a maritime example in which
the overall situational awareness was augmented by combining
vessel traffic pattern information into one fused data set.
Finally, Shao et al. [20] successfully correlated vessel con-
tacts from AIS, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), and Ground
Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data via Fuzzy K-Nearest
Neighbor classification; furthermore, the authors were able to
associate the information from the three different sources by
performing Fuzzy C-Means clustering. Lastly, they improved
vessel trajectory prediction by enhancing the performance of
the Kalman Filter in nonlinear cases with the help of an Echo
State neural network.
III. RMF WITH HSDF
This Section sheds light on the extension of the RMF in
[5] and [6] with HSDF for JDL/DFIG Level 2 (situational
assessment) and Level 3 (impact assessment).
Fig. 1 displays an augmented version of the risk feature
extraction module that accounts for both hard and soft data
sources. Sensor modalities like AIS, radars, video cameras,
and weather gaugers, as well as other unsensed yet quantitative
and structured information such as oil price indicators or
dynamic country demographics are all examples of hard data
sources DS1, . . . , DSkthat can be ingested by the RMF.
Tweets, blogs, webpages, or other forms of textual reports
illustrate soft data sources DSk+1 , . . . , DSn.
To be assimilated by the RMF, the original content of these
soft data sources will have to be converted to a Common
Textual Risk Representation (CTRR). This will involve typical
NLP tasks such as tokenization, named entity recognition,
part-of-speech tagging, model representation and term an-
notation that may span both lexical and syntactic analyses.
The most important step in the CTRR transformation is the
elicitation of a risk lexicon (possibly encompassing multiple
textual sources), i.e. a dictionary of keywords that symbolizes
risk factors in the domain of interest. The soft risk feature
extractors will then use the lexicon generated by the CTRR
module to identify risk spans in the soft data, instantiate
them and use them as building blocks for the creation of soft
risk features, whose outputs must be quantitative in order to
seamlessly blend them with those of the hard risk features. The
lexicon-building process is often guided by domain experts.
Notice that in Fig. 1 the CTRR module feeds two soft risk
feature extractors: one in the object (system unit) space and
one in the response space. That is, the textual risk mined
from the soft data sources could be used to enhance the
initial characterization, provided by the hard data sources, of
an object (Level 2 JDL/DFIG, situational assessment) or a
candidate response (Level 3 JDL/DFIG, impact assessment)
needed to mitigate a perceived threat. In both spaces, the hard
risk feature extractors could choose to ingest the information
granules produced by their soft counterparts.
The rest of the RMF modules retain their original function-
ality as described in [5] and [6]. In the next section, we will
illustrate how these HSDF concepts (in the object space) are
applied to MDA scenarios.
IV. CAS E STU DY: MARITIME DOMAIN AWARE NE SS
This Section illustrates the application of the risk-aware
HSDF framework to MDA.
A. Data Sources
The following data sources were used in this study:
AIS [Hard] - A 5-day ExactEarth1feed of 227,299
AIS contacts along the northeastern coast of Canada and
USA. AIS reports include crucial information pertaining
to the vessel like its unique identifier (MMSI), type,
1http://www.exactearth.com
current location, intended course, speed, etc. We use the
vessel’s identifier, type and location in our risk-aware
fusion framework2.
SAR [Hard] - This feed contains 188 contacts from
Canada’s RADARSAT-23satellite for the same area
(northeast Canada/USA) and period of interest (POI). It
is an active tracking modality that can be used to sup-
plement AIS feeds, but it can also be used independently
to locate vessels. Given the scarce number of contacts
available, a SAR-contact-to-AIS-track association is con-
ducted as shown in [20].
Sea State Reports [Hard] - Describes the motion of
the sea waves produced by the joint effect of wind and
swell. This information is used in conjunction with the
Douglas Sea Scale4in order to compute the Sea State risk
feature. The sea data for the East Coast of Canada was
obtained from Fisheries and Oceans Canada5. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no available sea state dataset
for the Horn of Africa region, so the sea scale values
were randomly generated for that scenario.
NGA WWTTS Maritime Incident Reports [Soft] - The
Worldwide Threats to Shipping Reports (WWTTS)6is a
publicly available, semi-structured textual source main-
tained by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA). Relevant maritime crime and piracy incidents
around the globe are compiled weekly and freely dissem-
inated. The textual description of each incident includes,
among other things: the kind of threat, the vessel in
question and the location where it occurred. Structured
data is extracted from this database through NLP and then
used to compute the regional hostility metric and augment
the degree of distress of a vessel [6]. Our POI goes
from 2011/01 to 2013/01, totalling 107 reports describing
2,200 incidents (732 were duplicates and hence removed).
GeoNames geographical database [Soft] - This source7
is used to extract textual repositories of city/location
names and their respective geographical coordinates to
complement NGA WWTTS incident reports where a
specific latitude and longitude is not provided.
B. MDA Scenario
An MDA scenario Sconsists of a predefined maritime area
of interest (AOI) and a group of vessels transiting through
those waters which are tracked via either passive (like AIS) or
active (e.g., SAR) sensing modalities. As a result, periodical
data about each vessel XS(e.g., position, type, heading
or speed) arrives at the maritime control center, where the
maritime operators continually monitor their statuses. This is
2AIS contacts around the Horn of Africa were synthetically generated as
we did not have access to the AIS feed of that region
3http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/radarsat2
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas Sea Scale
5http://www.meds-sdmm.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/isdm- gdsi/waves-vagues/
search-recherche/index-eng.asp
6http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal? nfpb=true& pageLabel=msi
portal page 64
7http://www.geonames.org/
Fig. 1. The RMF’s architectural blueprint showcasing hard/soft risk extractors in both the object and response spaces. Gray boxes indicate external RMF
elements. Green boxes indicate Level 2 RMF capabilities and yellow boxes indicate Level 3 RMF capabilities.
TABLE I
REPORTED MARITIME INCIDENTS AND THEIR SEVERITY
Incident Category Incident Keywords Severity Value
Bomb Threat bombed 1.0
Terrorism terrorist, terrorism 0.9
Hostage Scenario hijacked, abducted, kidnapped, hostage, kidnapping 0.8
Crew Damage fired, tied up with rope 0.7
Theft robbed, attacked, robbers, criminals, robbery, theft, stole Equipment 0.6
Invasion Boarded, clashed with, boarded the vessel, knives, invaded, trespasser 0.5
Near Invasion attempted boarding, forced, crime, threat, surrender 0.4
Threatened chased, threatened, threat, suspect, escape, blocking, risk 0.3
Approach suspicious approach, suspiciously approached, approached 0.2
Crew Error crashed, negligence 0.1
Unknown other risks 0.05
the external environment module in Fig. 1. As mentioned in
Section I, a risk stream is extracted from this original data
flow through the RMF’s risk feature extraction module.
Like in [6], maritime vessels are characterized in
terms of four risk features: (i) collision factor indicates the
likelihood of the vessel colliding with another object in the
sea; (ii) degree of distress subsumes different distress factors
such as the danger to human lives aboard the vessel, the
environmental impact of a catastrophe caused by the vessel
and the risk of running out of fuel and hence being stranded;
(iii) sea state models the distress posed by the prevalent sea
conditions (calm, moderate, rough, etc.) and is drawn from
the Douglas Sea Scale based on the vessel’s reported location
and (iv) regional hostility captures the danger of the region
where the vessel is transiting.
C. Hard-Soft Risk Feature Extraction
In the MDA scenario, a vessel Xperiodically reports its
position (latitude, longitude) and its vessel type as part of the
AIS message. The position field is used to calculate the n
closest maritime incidents to X’s current location while the
vessel type is employed to determine the similarity of X
to the other vessel types reported in the maritime incidents
repository. These two fields contribute to the calculation of
the Regional Hostility Metric for a vessel. Furthermore, the
vessel type is used to define the Risk of Attack of any vessel,
which augments the Degree of Distress risk feature.
1) Regional Hostility Metric: This risk feature, denoted by
µ(X), quantifies the perils associated with the geographical
region through which vessel Xnavigates based on historical
data in the form of maritime incident reports. Equation (1)
formalizes its modeling.
µ(X) = α M I P (X) + β MI S(X) + γ V P I (X)(1)
where αweighs the significance of X’s proximity to known
maritime incidents, βweighs the significance of the severity of
the incidents reported around the vicinity of Xand γdenotes
the significance of the pertinence of those reports to X. A
suggested weighting is α= 0.4,β= 0.3and γ= 0.3;
however, these weights could vary according to the maritime
operator’s preferences.
The mean incident proximity M IP (X)quantifies the risk
induced by the proximity of the vessel Xto reported maritime
incidents. It is defined as an average over the risk values asso-
ciated with the proximity of the nclosest maritime incidents:
M IP (X) =
n
X
i=1
θ(xi)
n(2)
where xi=dist(X.location, vi.location)is the geospatial
distance (in nautical miles, nm) from the vessel Xto the
i-th closest maritime incident and θ(xi)is termed the incident
proximity risk and defined as a fuzzy set over the domain
of distance values. Depending on the vessel’s speed, the
trapezoidal membership function that models this fuzzy set
will adopt the following parametric configurations:
A= 0; B= 0; C= 5; D= 10 for slow vessels;
A= 0; B= 0; C= 21.6; D= 43.2for medium-speed
vessels; and
A= 0; B= 0; C= 40; D= 80 for fast vessels.
The mean incident severity MI S(X)quantifies the risk
induced by the severity of the reported maritime incidents.
It is defined as an average over the risk values associated with
the severity of the nclosest maritime incidents
MIS(X) =
n
X
i=1
ψ(yi)
n(3)
where yi=vi.incidentType is the type of incident in the i-th
closest report and: ψ(yi)is a mapping, termed the incident
severity risk, from an incident type to a numerical value
between 0 and 1, as shown in Table I.
The victim pertinence index V P I (X)quantifies how perti-
nent the nclosest maritime incidents are for this vessel. It is
defined as the maximum similarity between the vessel’s type
and those involved in the nclosest maritime incidents.
V PI (X) = max
i{δ(X.vesselType, vi.vesselType)}(4)
where δ(X.vesselType, vi.vesselType)is computed as fol-
lows
δ(X.vesselT y pe, vi.vesselT y pe) =
1if X.vesselType is the same as vi.vesselType
0.5if X.vesselType is similar to vi.vesselType
0if X.vesselType is unrelated to vi.vesselType
Table II defines the similarity matrix for vessel categories
while Table III maps a vessel type to its category.
TABLE II
SIMILARITY MATRIX FOR VESSEL CATEGORIES
Cargo Transport Tanker/Industrial Warship Small Military Vessel Small Transport/Utility
Cargo Transport 1 0.5 0 0 0.5
Tanker/Industrial 0.5 1 0 0 0
Warship 0 0 1 0.5 0
Small Military Vessel 0 0 0.5 1 0.5
Small Transport/Utility 0.5 0 0 0.5 1
TABLE III
VESSEL TYPES AND THEIR CORRESPONDING CATEGORY
Cargo Transport Tanker/Industrial Warship Small Military Vessel Small Transport/Utility
bulk carrier chemical tanker warship coast guard boat fishing trawler
car carrier heavy lift vessel naval patrol vessel japanese harpoonists
cargo ship lpg tanker militant anti-whaling group
carrier ship mother vessel skiff
container ship oil tanker speed boat
dry cargo vessel product tanker tug boat
general cargo ship tanker dredger
livestock carrier fishing vessel
lng carrier vessel
refrigerated cargo ship
merchant ship
2) Degree of Distress: As mentioned in Section IV-B, the
Degree of Distress risk feature quantifies the combined effect
of multiple distress factors acting upon the vessel, such as
those affecting people aboard, the environment or the vessel
itself in case it runs out of fuel. In this paper, we are expanding
the formulation in [6] with another distress factor, Risk of
Attack, that will be derived from textual information mined
directly from the semi-structured NGA WWTTS maritime
incident reports, as displayed in Equation (5):
µDD (X) = 0.3µRP (X)+0.2µRE (X)+0.2µRF (X) +
0.3µRA(X)
(5)
where µRP (X),µRE (X)and µRF (X)are defined as in [6]
and µRA(X)is the probability that vessel Xwill be attacked
due to the category it belongs to. This value is based on
the maritime incident reports compiled in the NGA WWTTS
repository. More formally, µRA(X)is the square root of the
conditional probability that X.category would be the subject
of a maritime incident I.
µRA(X) = pP(X.category|I)(6)
where P(X.category|I)is the fraction of the total number of
reports (over a user-specified time period) where the vessel’s
category appears involved in the incident categories 1–8 listed
in Table I. Taking the square root increases the probability so
as to more uniformly distribute the Risk of Attack over [0; 1].
V. A RIS K-AWAR E FUSION EFFECTIVENESS METRIC
Despite the sound interest and rapid research developments
in the HLIF arena, the literature on MoE for HLIF is still
in its infancy. Blasch et al [21][22] were among the first
ones to propose an indicator that quantifies the degree of
effectiveness in any HLIF process. Their metric is based on
three components: (1) the information gain, measuring the
value added by the content contributed by new sources; (2)
the information quality, which reflects several facets of the
data at hand, such as its reliability and credibility and (3)
the robustness, gauging the consistency over the testing and
application domains. The authors claim that the product of
these three components is a domain-agnostic, valid strategy
for estimating HLIF effectiveness.
We formulate the information fusion effectiveness (IFE),
depicted in Equation (7), as a more tailored version of the
above general MOE by injecting risk into its components.
I F E =IBR ×RAL
| {z }
Information Gain
×IC ×OIT
| {z }
Information Quality
×R
|{z}
Robustness
(7)
In our MDA scenario S, the Information Gain (IG) is
a measure of the number of vessels that make use of the
available data sources (Information Benefit Ratio,IBR) and
the overall risk alertness they provide (Risk Awareness Level,
RAL). More formally:
IBRH=1
|S||{XS:X.AIS 6=∅}| for hard sources
only and
IBRS=1
|S||{XS:Nn(X.Loc)6=∅}| for soft
sources only and
IBRH S =
IBRSif X.AI S =∅ ∀XS
IBRHif Nn(X.Loc) = ∅ ∀XS
SRHI BRH+SRSIBRSotherwise
where |S|is the number of vessels in S,X.AIS denotes an
active AIS transceiver in vessel X,Nn(X.Loc)is the set of
the nclosest maritime incident reports to X’s current location
(see Section IV) and SRH,SRSare the relevance values of
the hard and soft data sources, respectively. In this study, we
used SRH= 0.6and SRS= 0.4
The RAL is defined as the extent to which the vessels in
the scenario Sare aware of the existing risks. This variable
is computed as the average overall risk (i.e., across all risk
features) of the vessels in Sat any time instant.
RAL =1
|S|X
XS
OR(X)(8)
The Information Quality (IQ) is defined as the product of
the Information Confidence (IC) and the Overall Information
Timeliness (OIT ). I C is in turn calculated as the mean of the
product of the Reliability of Information (ROI) and Reliability
of Source (ROS) for all participating data sources:
ICH=ROSHROIH(9)
ICHS = (ROSHROIH+ROSSROIS)/2(10)
The reliability values were defined according with the US
Military Standard 640 (MIL-STD-640). Both ROSHand
ROSShave been set to 1.0 given that the two sources
(ExactEarth for AIS and NGA for WWTTS reports) are
quite reputable private and governmental entities, respectively.
ROIHwas fixed to 0.75 (fairly reliable) since AIS can be
intentionally spoofed whereas ROISwas set to 0.85 (very re-
liable) because the maritime incident reports are peer reviewed
by knowledgeable operators prior to their online disclosure.
The OIT is a function of the Information Timeliness (IT ).
ITHcan be expressed as the average, across all vessels, of the
average delay (in seconds) between consecutive AIS reports
for each vessel. On the other hand, ITSis the average, across
all vessels, of the average age (in days) of each vessel’s n
closest maritime incident reports. The next step is to model
the hard information timeliness (HI T ) and soft information
timeliness (SI T ) fuzzy variables, whose respective crisp in-
puts are ITHand ITS. These two variables have the following
linguistic terms: HITRecent (trapezoidal, A= 0,B= 0,
C= 180,D= 540); HITO ld (trapezoidal, A= 360,
B= 540,C=,D=); SI TRecent (trapezoidal, A= 0,
B= 0,C= 500,D= 732) and SI TOld (trapezoidal,
A= 500,B= 732,C=,D=). OITHS is then
determined as the center of gravity of the fuzzified output of
the Mamdani fuzzy inference system (FIS) below:
IF HIT is H ITRecent AND SIT is SITRecent THEN
OITHS is OITRecent
IF HIT is H ITRecent AND SIT is SO ld THEN OITHS
is OITAcceptable
IF HIT is H ITOld THEN OI TH S is OITOld
The set of membership functions associated with the
OITHS fuzzy variable are as follows:
OITOld :triangular (A= 0, B = 0, C = 0.5)
OITAcceptable :triangular (A= 0, B = 0.5, C = 1)
OITRecent :tiangular (A= 0.5, B = 1, C = 1)
In the case where only hard sources are available, OITH S
is computed by fuzzifying ITHvia a triangular membership
function with parameters A= 0,B= 180 and C= 540.
Finally, the robustness Rof the system is set to 1 since the
system can cope with real-time variations [21] [22].
VI. EX PE RI ME NTAL EVAL UATION
In this Section, we empirically validate the proposed risk-
aware HSDF framework described in Sections III and IV. To
evaluate and contrast the effectiveness of the RMF with hard-
soft HLIF, we leaned on two scenarios: the east Canada coast
(ECC) outlined in [6] and a new one modeled around the Horn
of Africa (HOA).
A. Maritime Incident Reports
Fig. 2 reveals the distribution of worldwide maritime inci-
dents per vessel category in the POI under discussion. Trans-
port/utility and cargo vessels are nearly equally the subject
of maritime lawlessness given their strategic importance. As
expected, incidents related to military vessels are scant due to
their defensive capabilities.
The distribution of worldwide maritime incidents per in-
cident category is reflected in Fig. 3. Vessel boarding and
tresspassing (like in piracy cases) are responsible for 40%
of the criminal activity reported in the POI. The combined
effect of theft and crew damage accounts for almost the same
degree of unlawfulness. These facts underscore the importance
of automated HLIF solutions for a more effective MDA.
Cargo
34%
Industrial 29%
Military
1%
Transport or Utility
36%
Fig. 2. Maritime incident distribution per vessel category
Hostage
9%
Crew Damage
20%
Invasion 40%
Theft
17% Near Invasion
5% Threatened
3% Approach
6%
Fig. 3. Maritime incident distribution per incident category
B. ECC Scenario Analysis
The ECC scenario consists of 14 maritime assets. An
extension of this scenario was tested successfully in [6]. The
Canadian maritime shoreline is clearly characterized by low
regional hostility as displayed in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Overall risk for all vessels in the ECC scenario (2 coast guard vessels,
2 medical vessels, 4 tugs, 1 oil tanker, 4 speed boats and 1 cruise)
TABLE IV
ECC HLIF EFFE CTI VEN ES S
Scenario IBR RAL IC OIT IFE
ECCH1 0.163 0.600 0.833 0.0815
ECCHS (n= 10) 1 0.164 0.640 0.833 0.0874
ECCHS (n= 9) 1 0.164 0.640 0.833 0.0874
ECCHS (n= 8) 1 0.164 0.640 0.833 0.0874
ECCHS (n= 7) 1 0.164 0.640 0.833 0.0874
ECCHS (n= 6) 1 0.164 0.640 0.833 0.0874
ECCHS (n= 5) 1 0.164 0.640 0.833 0.0874
The overall effectiveness of the hard fusion scenario
(ECCH), as calculated by the metric in Section V, was 8.15%.
For the hard-soft scenario (ECCHS ) and despite the lack
of reported maritime incidents in the Canadian coastline,
the I F E value is slightly superior, around 8.74%. This is
caused by the minor increase in the IC indicator due to the
ingestion of a fairly reliable soft data source. Notice that
OITH=OITHS given that no compiled incident reports
apply to the ECC dataset. In this case, varying the number
of closest reports ndid not impact the RAL indicator at all.
C. HOA Scenario Analysis
The coast off the Horn of Africa is notorious for piracy,
as confirmed by the data extracted from the NGA WWTTS
reports. As seen below in Fig. 5, the density of maritime
incidents in this region is staggering.
Fig. 5. Horn of Africa maritime incidents
We created a simulated scenario of this volatile trade route
in order to test the HSDF capabilities of the RMF. The scenario
portrayed in Fig. 6 consists of 43 maritime units.
Fig. 6. Horn of Africa maritime scenario (4 medical vessels, 14 tugs, 11 oil
tankers, 12 speed boats and 2 cruises)
In this scenario, the risk evaluation process clearly benefited
from the incorporation of soft data. In Fig. 7, we find that the
regional hostility metric and risk of attack (as part of degree of
distress) soft risk features have a visible effect on the overall
risk of vessels.
For the HOAHS scenario, we find that the proposed HSDF
system improves on the HOAHscenario by around 16.89%
19.17%, as shown in Table V. The IBR value of 0.983 in the
TABLE V
HOA H LIF E FFE CTI VE NES S
Scenario IBR RAL IC OIT IFE
HOAH1 0.163 0.600 0.833 0.0816
HOAHS (n= 10) 0.983 0.524 0.640 0.826 0.2723
HOAHS (n= 9) 0.983 0.526 0.640 0.826 0.2733
HOAHS (n= 8) 0.983 0.514 0.640 0.826 0.2671
HOAHS (n= 7) 0.983 0.511 0.640 0.826 0.2655
HOAHS (n= 6) 0.983 0.485 0.640 0.826 0.2520
HOAHS (n= 5) 0.983 0.482 0.640 0.826 0.2505
Fig. 7. HOA risk assessment. Left: hard scenario. Right: hard-soft scenario
hard-soft case indicates that a few vessels were still far away
from the nearest reported incidents. Furthermore, the RAL
of the HOAHS scenario experiences a drastic improvement
over its hard-only counterpart. This significant increase in
risk awareness is both accurate and useful for navigation in
such conflict-laden region. The downside of bringing soft data
into the fusion framework is expressed in the OIT indicator,
owing to the age of the available textual incidents (1.3 years
preceding the actual scenario date).
Overall, the HOA scenario provides useful information that
stimulates discussion on the cost/benefit of HSDF systems.
In our case study, we realized that the amalgamation of hard
and soft data can produce significant leaps in terms of IG.
Another lesson learned is that HSDF systems may not exhibit
the same IQ as hard fusion systems, as reliability/timeliness
may decline when ingesting soft sources.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have augmented the RMF proposed in
[5] and [6] with an HSDF module as part of the risk feature
extraction and modeling. We tested our scheme with two MDA
scenarios where the number of maritime incident reports varies
substantially. In either case, our HSDF system has proven
effective in accurately translating hard and soft information
into a quantitative structure for risk analysis that correlates
with and confirms human intuition. Further still, our I F E
measure has proven to accurately translate important quali-
tative factors into relevant quantitative terms. This measure
could be applied to any data fusion system that deals with
risk. Even risk-agnostic systems could profit from the building
blocks behind the metric formalization provided that the
necessary customizations to the domain of interest are made.
Future work is concerned with HSDF in the response space
(Level 3 RMF, see Fig. 1) and the study of the dynamic nature
of the reliability of the data sources and their information.
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