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Heidegger’s Transcendental Phenomenology in the Light of Husserl’s Project of First Philosophy
... Contrary to an introspective practice, phenomenology is concerned-among other things-with analyses of the conditions of the possibility of phenomena. This evaluation is echoed by many phenomenologists (Zahavi 2005(Zahavi , 2010(Zahavi , 2013bMoran 2007;Luft 2008;Ratcliffe 2012;Fernandez 2017;Jeuk 2017a, b;Vörös and Prosen 2018). There is an overwhelming consensus that Husserl in particular is not satisfied with merely providing descriptions of phenomena, let alone with making ontological statements based on those descriptions without prior analysis. ...
... That means, he does not explicitly claim that he is justified in formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on description; yet, that is exactly what he does, as I will show in Sections 3 and 4. Importantly, Dreyfus' introspective method is simply false. Neither can the practice of introspection be attributed to Heidegger (Moran 2007;Ratcliffe 2012;Fernandez 2017), to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, as I show in Section 2.1. Nor does this introspective procedure yield justified results, as I demonstrate in Section 2.2 with the help of two examples. ...
I argue that Hubert Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background as well as his anti-representationalism rest on introspection. I denote with ‘introspection’ the methodological malpractice of formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on descriptions. In order to illustrate the insufficiencies of Dreyfus’ methodological strategy in particular and introspection in general, I show that Heidegger, to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, derives ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena not merely from descriptions, but also from analyses. I further show that deriving ontological statements directly from descriptions entails implausible results. I do so by discussing representative cases. Based on these general methodological considerations, I show that Dreyfus’ work on action, skill and understanding is introspective. First, I demonstrate that Dreyfus’ influential claim that rules and representations do not govern skillful actions is the result of introspection, because it is merely founded on the absence of rules and representations in representative descriptions of skillful actions. Second, I show that Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background is also based on introspection. These ontological structures are merely reifications of descriptions and are not further substantiated by analyses.
An attempt to coherently present a philosophy of radical beginnings will have to account for the reasons for undertaking a new beginning, and for the nature of its radicality. For most philosophies, it is the latter part of the account that proves to be difficult. For transcendental phenomenology, as we have tried to show in the previous chapter, the difficulty is in fact inverted. And even though Husserl’s project sits comfortably in the tradition of Descartes and Kant, his notion of radicality sets it apart from them significantly. Husserl’s phenomenology operates with concept of radical investigation so strong – based on his notion of the absolute epoché – that it becomes all-pervasive, and consequently results in a global dichotomy of the natural and transcendental attitude. The famed paradox of subjectivity is one direct consequence of this dichotomy. But the latter results in a more practical problem as well. Given that the logical conclusion of ‘phenomenology of phenomenology’ is that the transcendental undertaking is, in fact, unnatural, a straightforward problem of motivation immediately springs forth. Why would anyone choose to leave the natural attitude? This is quite a complex problem, because the motivation to do so cannot even appear as a miracle, to use Sartre’s expression; heavy philosophical machinery must first be developed, and then employed, in order for the transition between the attitudes to even be possible. But that can only be done in advance then, hoping that there is a transcendental attitude or realm of some sort to be transitioned into. It is only after all of these practical problems have been acknowledged that it even makes sense to ask who is then doing phenomenology. Again, it is only because Husserl works with such a strong conception of radicality that this even becomes an issue in the first place, and that the seemingly absurd conclusion, that phenomenology is not a human activity, becomes understandable, albeit contestable.
The phenomenological concept of the world has emerged as central for our discussion so far; however, its place and role turned out to be difficult to pinpoint. Husserl and Fink agree that the world is, in a qualified way, both the starting point and the end point of phenomenological research. A conceptual tool utilized by both is the notion of ‘pregivenness’ of the world, and we have provided some general context for its appearance and role in Fink’s formulation of the problem of beginning of phenomenology. However, this notion, entailed in his concept of Weltbefangenheit, ultimately led us to a curious doctrine we referred to as epistemological anti-humanism.
This study examined the manner in which students enrolled in the Honors program at Indiana State University responded to intensive, seminar-based exploration into the life and writing of George Orwell. A common trend among those who teach Orwell, especially at the high school level, is to teach the man’s literature while focusing little attention upon his life. How much more valuable can Orwell scholarship be for students when they study his work in relation to the author’s unique lived experience? Can a more thorough study of this life and literature inspire students to draw more from their own experiences, or become more aware and more critical of the world around them?
This research was conducted on the campus of Indiana State University, in Terre Haute, Indiana, and used participants who were enrolled in the Honors program at that university. Specifically, participants who had enrolled in a 300-level Orwell course taught by Dr. Michael Shelden were recruited for the study, which then ran concurrently with that course. Qualitative methods used to gather data from those participants included a questionnaire, seminar sessions, and individual interviews.
This study indicated that George Orwell’s biography, i.e., his “lived experience,” is a very important part of Orwellian scholarship, one that allows students to appreciate and understand his writing on a much more meaningful level. The study also provided valuable insights as to Orwell’s continued relevance for students of today, as well as the manner in which studying Orwell—with the proper context—can influence and empower students.
Over the past decades there has been increasing interest in the idea that Heidegger was a “transcendental philosopher” during the late 1920s. Furthermore, a consensus has started to emerge around the idea that Heidegger must be thought of as a transcendental thinker during this time. For the most part this means to first experience how Heidegger's work inherits this term from Kant or Husserl so that one can then experience how Heidegger creatively adapts this inheritance. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach is unhelpful. The aim of this paper is instead to show that transcendental philosophy bears a wholly renewed meaning in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and that this meaning must be understood in an intrinsic connection with the fundamental-ontological problem of transcendence. Articulating this connection will show how Heidegger makes transcendental philosophy properly phenomenological.
Edmund Husserl’s seminal work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy deals extensively with psychology. He even titled his Prague lecture of November 1935—which served as the basis of the book—The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology. Husserl’s work is undoubtedly one of the most important critical assessments of psychology. Husserl criticized not only psychology’s methods (i.e., for mimicking the hard sciences), but also the very place of the discipline. His argument can be condensed as follows: the objectivization of science engendered a problematic subjectivity which, in turn, created a need for a psychology. The very paradox of this, viewed from the perspective of the interwar period, led Husserl to declare a crisis of the sciences and, especially, of psychology. Surprisingly, until now Husserl’s critique and defiance have been rarely discussed within the psy-sciences. This paper aims to reopen the debate, beginning with the concept of the life-world, the main concept developed in Crisis. However, as will be argued, that very concept is also the place where Husserl refrains from a radical critique of psychology and where his supposed phenomenological vantage point eventually facilitates the transition from psychologism to psychologization.
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