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Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.

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... Counterinsurgent writers frequently expressed a degree of respect for their opponents that would be quite unusual in the terrorism literature. As the preface to one of the classic works of modern counterinsurgency, Roger Trinquier's (1964) Modern Warfare, would put it, the author approached the insurgents with "the cold respect of a professional warrior. He describes an enemy who is deeply committed to his cause, and ingenious in its pursuit" (Trinquier 2006(Trinquier (1964:xii). ...
... As the preface to one of the classic works of modern counterinsurgency, Roger Trinquier's (1964) Modern Warfare, would put it, the author approached the insurgents with "the cold respect of a professional warrior. He describes an enemy who is deeply committed to his cause, and ingenious in its pursuit" (Trinquier 2006(Trinquier (1964:xii). Within the counterinsurgency discourse, "terror" was viewed as but one stage in a broader process of insurgency or revolutiona stage through which groups could pass without permanently tainting their reputations. ...
... As the preface to one of the classic works of modern counterinsurgency, Roger Trinquier's (1964) Modern Warfare, would put it, the author approached the insurgents with "the cold respect of a professional warrior. He describes an enemy who is deeply committed to his cause, and ingenious in its pursuit" (Trinquier 2006(Trinquier (1964:xii). Within the counterinsurgency discourse, "terror" was viewed as but one stage in a broader process of insurgency or revolutiona stage through which groups could pass without permanently tainting their reputations. ...
... For example, regular troops could face difficulties in establishing a permanent presence within contested communities and might not necessarily be in the position to address the problem of identifying insurgents (hidden within a domestic population) that any counterinsurgency campaign faces, since they lack the local knowledge of the marginalized population that has given rise to the rebel movement in the first place (Byman, 2007;Celeski, 2009;Kalyvas, 2006;Lyall, 2010;Galula, 2006;Kilcullen, 2010;Trinquier, 2006;Pilster, Böhmelt and Tago, 2016). Intelligence problems are compounded by troop rotation, which further undermines the development of any local intelligence capability (Janowitz, 1964). ...
... Civil conflict, in which one or more than one rebel group fights against the government to gain concessions on territory, power, or influence (Gleditsch et al., 2002), is arguably the most severe domestic threat. Paramilitaries and PGMs are usually more suitable than the regular military to address civil conflict as they are better equipped and trained to solve the identification problem (Kalyvas, 2006;Galula, 2006;Lyall and Wilson III, 2009;Kilcullen, 2010;Trinquier, 2006;Pilster, Böhmelt and Tago, 2016). ...
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Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and pro-government militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states' selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, while PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal-agent framework, we argue that a state's investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis in 1981-2007 find that (1) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs, (2) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict, and (3) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.
... Consequently, these studies generally imply that modern battlefield effectiveness requires a complex pattern of force employment, which Biddle (2004) terms the "modern system." In the range of possible types of conflict, many scholars argue that counterinsurgency is particularly complex (see, for example, Galula (1964); Jones (2017); Kilcullen (2010); Trinquier (1961)). In his classic treatise on insurgency, Mao describes the importance of adaptation as such: "Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, and to prevailing local conditions. ...
... Trinquier, who served as a member of the GCMA/GMI in Indochina and also in the Battle of Algiers, would publish Modern Warfare in 1961, which helped inform French thinking about counterinsurgency in the Algerian War and influenced subsequent counterinsurgency theories. In his book, Trinquier emphasizes important points about counterinsurgency, such as the need for a military to adapt to new conditions, but he also devotes an entire section to explaining and justifying the use of torture against prisoners during interrogation (Trinquier, 1961). ...
Thesis
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of military commitment problems and evaluates how they impact military effectiveness. Military organizations regularly encounter dynamic, heterogenous environments in which conditions can change both quickly and substantially over time, which can give rise to commitment problems. I investigate three factors necessary for military organizations to be effective in such situations: resolve—the willpower to continue with a course of action despite setbacks; adaptation—the ability to learn from and adjust to novel situations; and flexibility—the ability to respond quickly to different situations. Each of these factors is related to a different commitment problem that military forces often have to confront. First, high signals of resolve within an army can make the commitment to fight credible, such that commanders and troops believe fighting in combat is their best option, rather than fleeing or surrendering. Second, a high level of commitment to a conflict by political leaders can create better conditions for the military to adapt to novel situations and improve their doctrines. Finally, high flexibility through improved force projection capabilities can make security commitments to other states credible, as it allows military forces to respond to crises more quickly and efficiently. I demonstrate that organizational solutions to commitment problems are directly tied to military effectiveness, and along with other types of commitment solutions, provide a better framework for understanding military effectiveness than existing approaches.
... Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) (Gómez de la Torre, 2009) durante la dictadura represiva de Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, entre otros.Los inicios de la inteligencia militarLuego de la revolución china de 1949, pero especialmente tras el triunfo de la revolución cubana en 1959, y por consiguiente del derrocamiento del dictador Fulgencio Batista, los militares latinoamericanos, asesorados fundamentalmente por los ejércitos de Francia y Estados Unidos, comenzaron a otorgar suma importancia al estudio del fenómeno de la guerra no convencional (GNC), revolucionaria, subversiva e insurgente. Los servicios de inteligencia y los Estados Mayores militares tomaban con suma alarma y preocupación la hipótesis y el posible y real escenario de una suerte de efecto dominó, y réplica como resultado, del victorioso esquema del foquismo guerrillero guevarista aplicado en la isla caribeña que lleva a Fidel Castro y al Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) a la toma del poder.Hubo una clara tendencia en el continente por el empleo de la inteligencia militar en modo represivo contra los desafíos que planteaba la subversión, particularmente por el hecho de que los instructores militares franceses transfirieron, con mayor intensidad inicial en Brasil y Argentina principalmente, su modelo de la guerra de Argelia ejecutado contra el Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN), y las técnicas con base en el coronel Roger Trinquier con su célebre obra La guerra moderna(Trinquier, 1985), difundida ampliamente en la milicia latinoamericana (Brasil, Argentina, Chile y Perú principalmente).La represión interna contra las disidencias y oposiciones políticas con base a una superficial y muy generalista interpretación del «peligro comunista» en el continente fue otra característica de la inteligencia militar latinoamericana, particularmente con el golpe militar en Brasil de 1964 que instauró un Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI) en reemplazo del antiguo Serviço Federal de Informações e Contra-Informações (SFICI) (Gómez de la Torre, 2009) de 1947, implementado por el general Gaspar Dutra ...
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El objetivo de este libro es poner de manifiesto cómo la fortaleza del Estado de Derecho incide directamente en la capacidad para hacer frente a las nuevas amenazas a la seguridad y, a su vez, cómo la seguridad lo fortalece. La visión dominante y más generalizada entre los expertos es abordar por separado ambos ámbitos, sin pensar –en esta aproximación– en su relación existente. Se propone entender el Estado de Derecho no sólo como un valor en sí mismo, sino de manera instrumental. Si no se garantiza la superioridad de la ley, la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas, no es posible proporcionar seguridad. Esta propuesta se ha contemplado analizando amenazas y regiones, América Latina, Europa y el Sahel africano. Este libro suma el esfuerzo de seis instituciones de América y Europa ocupadas en comprender las políticas de seguridad desde una perspectiva del Estado de derecho: el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército del Perú, el Real Instituto Elcano de España, la fundación alemana Friedrich Naumann, el Centro de Estudios sobre Crimen Organizado Transnacional del Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata de Argentina y la Universidad de las Américas Puebla de México.
... veka pruski general i vojni teoretičar Karl fon Klauzevic u svom kapitalnom delu O ratu. 35 Navedeno poimanje rata, izražavalo je stanovište političkih, intelektualnih i vojnih lidera još tokom 17. i 18. veka, i održalo se, u gotovo nepromenjenoj formi, sve do današnjih dana. 36 Međutim, kako je čovečanstvo zakoračilo u 20. ...
Article
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„Hybrid Warfare“ is the mostly used term at the beginning of the 21st century to explain the new changes in the physiognomy of war. Due to many conceptual ambiguities related to its use, the term has undergone considerable criticism, but nevertheless it continues to be used within academic and military circles with the same purpose. The paper, however, does not represent a critical approach to the conceptual definition of the „hybrid warfare“ phenomenon, nor does it aim to achive the final, objective truths in order the term to be explained. Since this is a relatively new and insufficiently investigated phenomenon, it is necessary to explain the broader context of the origin of the term referring to it. Likewise, it is necessary to point out the change in the meaning of the term that was timely created by its use in various circles such as military, political, academic, and others. For these reasons, authors use a discursive analytical framework to identify and explain different interpretations of the „hybrid warfare“ phenomenon. This creates the conditions for defining a wider problem framework necessary for routing further directions of research of this phenomenon, but also of research of contemporary war in general. Although the term „hybrid warfare“ is used in many discourses, special attention is given to military and academic discourse, which have essential meaning for its understanding. Key words: hybrid warfare, military discourse, academic discourse, political discourse.
... French and British military personnel that fought against colonial era insurgents. 9 With experience fighting in the Algerian War, David Galula (1962) and Roger Trinquier (1964) sought to understand what conditions allowed insurgencies to thrive. They described the various ways in which insurgents were recruited and considered what particular actions would be needed to counter them. ...
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This article probes ideas considered central to the study of how insurgencies are fought, centering on the way in which insurgencies recruit and how a new globalized environment has changed these dynamics. To establish our argument about insurgent recruitment being different in these ‘new’ wars, we survey the way in which political scientists and non-traditional scholars have analysed insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Moreover, we identify continuity in ‘old’ and ‘new’ civil wars, but also contend that collapsed states and the ascent of new types of insurgents with different power bases is markedly different from a pre-globalized era. These ‘new’ insurgents thrive in failed states, creating new pathways in which to recruit, which has undergone a transformation since the end of the Cold War era. We find that that while there is nothing new about the concept of contemporary insurgent recruiting processes, recruitment efforts have shifted towards a global audience, drastically changing the context and character of these types of wars and the ways in which they are waged. Our views on these shifts are based on decades of combined experience in conflict zones, with one author as a traditional academic and the other author as a practitioner-scholar.
... The significance of mobilizing popular support for insurgents is not only emphasized in more modern texts (Lynn, 2005;Galula, 2010;Trinquier, 2008;Jardine, 2004;Kilcullen, 2006), but revolutionary leaders. Mao Zedong and Che Guevara repeatedly highlighted the role of the people in insurgent warfare. ...
Article
The Balochistan Insurgency is an enduring armed and nationalist struggle between Baloch Insurgents and the Pakistani government, embroiling Pakistan in five insurgencies since 1948. This research aims to analyze why the current insurgency has outlasted its predecessors by over two-fold, with over fifteen years passing since the most recent conflict erupted. Using historical primary source news articles from 1973-1977, secondary research, insurgency trend data, and the data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD); this study examines the evolution of the current conflict and analyzes how and why the contemporary insurgency is far more resilient. This study finds that the support base for the ongoing insurgency has become more robust and expansive, and suggests that this aspect unique to the current conflict is the major contributor to the insurgency’s endurance. The findings suggest the following reasons for an increased support base that in turn contribute to the resilience of Balochistan insurgence: first, the movement is now lead by an expanding middle class; second, there is no violent inter-group rivalry among the separatist actors; third, the support platform has expanded to include cyberspace and social media; fourth, the current insurgency adds the Gwadar Port as an additional and urbanized grievance; and fifth, pre-existing grievances have yet to be resolved. The current insurgency’s distinct manifestation reflects a change in Balochistan’s status quo through a wide-ranging engagement of popular support in contrast to the past.
... Instead, the main idea that seems to direct both the contemporary military agenda and the counterinsurgency frameworks problematizes the notion of the enemy as part of o broader terrain-population nexus and within a field of human relations, social networks, and spaces. This leads to a specific understanding of the operational environment that focuses on the forms and functions of the socio-spatial environment in which the enemy lives and circulates (Kilcullen, 2013: 16;Trinquier, 2006: 52-53). It leads, in other words, to an operational approach that cannot perceive the enemy but as a symptom of the urban environment itself, converting, after all, entirely the city, its functions, and its social frameworks into a military object par excellence. ...
Article
Today, urbanization is described as one of the major global challenges. The rapid demographic transformations taking place in certain regions of the Global South — especially in countries of Africa and Southeast Asia — bring a sense of urgency to the discussion on cities. Rapid and uncontrolled urbanization in Global South, combined with social inequalities, poverty and environmental degradation, renders many urban populations vulnerable and precarious. With an emphasis on the urban expansion of the Global South, an international agenda is formed nowadays, focusing on the structural functions of the cities and their shielding against the negative effects of the current global crisis; a crisis taking today the form of an economic, environmental, and migration crisis. Thus, sustainability and resilience of the cities, and especially of those in the Global South, are turned into the key questions of urban planning and urban governance policies. Yet, they are also gradually turned into an object of military problematizations, as Western armed forces are strongly interested today in the urban phenomena and the functions of the cities, perceiving urban environment not only as a potential field of military operations but as a source of irregular threats; describing, in other words, the cities of the Global South not only as sites that host potential enemies but as enemies per se. More specifically, from the end of the 20th century U.S. military focuses on urban informality and its security implications, imposing a new understanding of the urban world. This is today more evident, as rapid demographic changes render urban systems and informal urban settlements in particular more vulnerable, and this vulnerability is directly problematized in public security terms. Through the relevant anti-urban theoretical frameworks, the cities of the Global South are conceived as feral systems that have to be tamed; and this taming calls for direct intervention. Military imposes, in this way, its presence in the field of urban problematizations, and building on the deception of contemporary neoliberal narratives calls today for urban resilience. As the world urbanizes rapidly and the notions of crisis and emergency are shaping the dominant social imaginary and the modern governmental agenda, urban sustainability, adaptability, and resilience are turned into an overall public security issue and eventually into an object of military interest. Hence, when the military theorists wonder how to make contemporary “fragile” urban systems more “resilient”, they actually wonder how to build forcibly resilient subjectivities and impose, after all, resilience and patience against an inescapable oppression.
... Counterinsurgency experts agree that approaches that are primarily concerned with solving acute security problems with military force inevitably remain piecemeal, as it does not address the underlying problem (e.g. Kitson, 1971;Paret, 1964;Trinquier, 1964). A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy must tackle the ideological roots of the rebellion: "the main emphasis should be given to defeating subversion, not the guerrillas" (Thompson, 1966: 111). ...
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Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military’s disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our suggested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects.
... Kiképzésük ne legyen három hónapnál hosszabb, alaprendeltetésük pedig a helyi gerilla befolyás megszüntetése. 28 ...
... Other scholars, however, maintain that there is a strategic logic to targeting civilians and that, sometimes, "barbarism works" (Arreguín- Toft 2001, 41). Or even that using overwhelming force against civilians is necessary for COIN success (Hazelton 2017;Luttwak 2007;Trinquier 1964). As Valentino (2014) notes, "scholars have increasingly come to recognize that large-scale violence against civilians during interstate and civil wars is neither arbitrary, unintended, nor distinct from the central logic of war itself" (p. ...
Article
We introduce a new data set on the strategies and tactics employed by belligerents in 197 internal armed conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2013. The Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) data set provides scholars with a rich new source of information to facilitate investigations of how regimes and their foreign supporters have responded to insurgent threats and the effects of actors’ force employment choices on a wide variety of intra- and postconflict outcomes. In addition to seventeen novel variables that measure the strategies and tactics employed by governments and intervening states, the STAC data set contains independently coded measures of many variables that overlap with existing data sets—a feature that facilitates the replication of existing studies and robustness checks on the results of new studies. We demonstrate the utility of the STAC data with an analysis of the impact of rebel mobilization on the basis of ethnicity on the propensity of governments to employ forced resettlement, civilian protection, civilian welfare projects, and civilian targeting to counter the insurgent threat.
... eTrinquier (1964) que está presente também na prática das Operações da ONU: a ideia de pacificação como controle e tutela militar. Para os autores, um área é considerada pacificada quando está militarmente controlada e os ilegalismos ali existentes estão controlados pelos agentes da contrainsurgência. ...
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The article aims to examine how the disputes for the military control during the peace negotiations and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) occurred in 2005. The main arguments are: the main political actores seek to control the armed forces as part of their strategies; the security policy was determined by the political leadership calculation, based in the internal capacity of influence and in the expectations of the armed conflicts; and that the Security Sector Reform programs were manipulated and used in order to increase power. In this case study, we use qualitative methodology with primary and secondary sources, like the CPA document and the United Nations Mission in Sudan reports, as well as previous specialised discussions.
... Recently, the American historian Caroline Elkins's Pulitzer prize-winning study documented that systematic brutality informed British policy and practice against the Mau Mau revolt, concluding that extreme coercion, not policies of "winning hearts and minds," characterized the counterinsurgency (Elkins 2005). At one level, Kitson was in many respects reiterating what other military thinkers, such as Thompson (1966), Trinquier (1964), and Vann (1965) had stated several years earlier. These were wars "for the people." ...
Chapter
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Theories of nationalism concur that nationalism is a political idea that is historically determined and structured over the longue durée, whether by modernity and industrial order, or the power of the state, or beliefs about ethnicity and culture. Nationalist political mobilizations are generally held to be epiphenomena that, if not quite extraneous to the logic of the metatheories, are considered to be much less important. When Gellner synthesized his ideas about nationalism he employed literary, botanical, and other metaphors to dismiss the idea that nationalism could be an “old, latent, dormant force.” Nationalism, according to Gellner, was the political “crystallisation of units” that were suitable for the conditions of industrial society. Most nationalisms, he argued, were “determined slumberers” who refused to be awakened, indeed, they went “meekly to their doom” in the dustheap of history (Gellner 1983: 47-49). In a famous statement, lifted from Sherlock Holmes (but which is actually a reversal of Holmes's deductive thinking), he asserted that most nationalisms do not project themselves violently: Nevertheless, the clue to the understanding of nationalism is its weakness at least as much as its strength. It was the dog who failed to bark who provided the vital clue for Sherlock Holmes. The numbers of potential nationalisms which failed to bark is far, far larger than those which did, though they have captured all our attention. (Gellner 1983: 43).
... Kiképzésük ne legyen három hónapnál hosszabb, alaprendeltetésük pedig a helyi gerilla befolyás megszüntetése. 28 ...
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David Galula és a felkelés ellenes műveletek elmélete és gyakorlata francia megközelítésben David Galula and the French Approach to the Theory and Practice of Counterinsurgency Absztrakt Jelen tanulmány egy francia katona-David Galula-munkáján keresztül mutatja be az aszimmetrikus, alacsony intenzitású és irreguláris hadviselés főbb sajátos-ságait. A XX. század történelmi példáin keresztül igazolja, hogy a jó állam haté-kony haderőt követel meg és bizonyítja, hogy még ilyen esetekben sem feltétlenül garantált a győzelem. A szerző a francia példán keresztül fogalmazza meg a ka-tonai vezetőképzéssel szemben támasztott újszerű követelmények iránti igényt, indokolja új koncepciók, megoldások és módszerek bevezetésének szükségessé-gét, valamint szorgalmazza a hadműveleti vezetés-irányítás és a haderő-alkalmazás filozófiájában bekövetkező változásokat lekövető további kutatások indítását. Abstract This study shows through the work of a French soldier-David Galula-the main characteristics of asymmetric, low intensity irregular warfare. It proves through the examples of 20th century conflicts that a good state requires efficient military and makes clear that even in this case victory is not guaranteed. The author uses the azonosítószámú, "A jó kormányzást megalapozó köz-szolgálat-fejlesztés" elnevezésű kiemelt projekt keretében működtetett Ludovika Kutatócsoport kereté-ben, a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem felkérésére készült.
Chapter
This chapter is concerned with intelligence and intelligence operations against the Romanian anti-communist partisans. It engages with the organization of intelligence and law enforcement agencies involved in anti-partisan operations, and it includes a section on Soviet involvement in the matter. The core of this chapter is a discussion and analysis of: the use of informers; creation of informant networks; interrogations; the use of torture; infiltration; the role of technology; and the effectiveness of these methods.
Chapter
On January 26, 1998, a newly founded organization, the Project for a New American Century (the Project), wrote an open letter to President Bill Clinton urging him to make the removal of the Baa’th regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq a national security priority. The letter spoke in no uncertain terms about its distrust of the United Nations inspection regime imposed on Iraq after the Second Gulf War and emphasized the threat Saddam’s government would pose to US interests in the Middle East if the regime obtained “weapons of mass destruction.” Only the removal of Saddam as Iraq’s ruler, by unilateral military action if necessary, could insure that this danger could be averted (Project for a New American Century, 2013). Among the signatories were the future Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and a host of other prominent “neo-conservative” former officials and specialists in foreign affairs. 1
Chapter
Traumatization has become a key term for understanding the collective experience of mass violence in the twentieth century. Scholarship on the representation of experiences of state terror since the Shoah conceives the effects of war against civil populations ex post in terms of psychological pathology (see Felman and Laub, 1992; LaCapra, 1994; Caruth, 1995; Rothberg, 2000). Much of what has been conceptualized with reference to the concept of traumatization, however, applies to the psychopolitical goals of regimes, which manipulate masses by means of terror. In this chapter ‘trauma’ can thus be seen as a politically intended, morbidly useful state of mind of populations. Instead of looking exclusively at the psychopatho- logical effects in the form of trauma, I will focus on the spatio-temporal structure of these manipulations and their correlates on the level of narrative representation in testimonial literature. Psychological warfare continues to shape the individual and social imaginary after the actual cessation of state terror: (1) directly through massive distortions of space-time perception, which are not easily overcome but persist for a long time afterwards and (2) indirectly, through the seemingly incredible narrative representations of space-time in testimonies. The mechanism underlying this manipulation of spatio-temporality which deeply infects both perception and representation is thus followed by a loss of subsequent narrative credibility, a core characteristic of witnesses’ experiences after mass violence.
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Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.
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Terms like ‘support’ and ‘collaboration’ are often used interchangeably to denote a loose set of acts or attitudes that benefit non-state armed groups (NSAGs). However, these terms are seldom defined, and the alternatives available to civilians are rarely identified. Moreover, existing approaches overlook that the interaction between civilians and NSAGs is often one between ruler and ruled, which makes obedience and resistance central. This paper proposes to conceptualize the choices available to civilians as forms of cooperation and non-cooperation, offers a typology, and discusses the implications for theory building on civilian and NSAG behavior, and on the functioning of armed social orders.
Book
This book analyses the nationalist rebellion which emerged in Romania following the Second World War. The first two decades after the end of the war were times of rebellion in imperial peripheries. Armed movements, sometimes communist but nearly always nationalist in orientation, rose in opposition to retreating or advancing imperial powers. One such armed revolt took place in Romania, pitting nationalist partisans against a communist government. This book is an analysis of how the authorities crushed this rebellion, set in the context of parallel campaigns fought in Europe and the Third World. It focuses on population control through censorship, propaganda and deportations. It analyses military operations, particularly patrols, checkpoints, ambushes and informed strikes. Intelligence operations are also discussed, with an emphasis on recruiting informants, on interrogation, torture and infiltration. Bullets, brains and barbwire, not “hearts and minds” approaches, crushed internal rebels in post-1945 campaigns. Andrei Miroiu’s research has been published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Perspectives in Politics and Cambridge Review of International Affairs.
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Despite the widespread use of disappearances as a central tool of terror in recent decades, little is known about the emergence of the phenomenon or its underlying rationale. We argue that growing international accountability norms, coupled with the improved quality of reporting human rights abuses, paradoxically reshaped the repressive strategies of certain regimes and pushed them to deploy more clandestine and extrajudicial forms of repression, predominantly disappearances. We also explore the timing of disappearances; when a state decides to deploy a particular instrument of terror can greatly benefit our understanding of why it was used. We show repressive regimes tend to use disappearances in the first period after a coup, taking advantage of the general confusion and opacity to secure strategic benefits and protect the regime from external scrutiny and future accountability. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on human rights and political repression by highlighting an ‘unintended consequence’ of international accountability norms: repressive regimes turn to clandestine crimes.
Chapter
In this study, strategy is taken to be the plan by which a terrorist group seeks to deploy and use its resources with the aim of achieving its political objectives.1 The role of strategic thought in determining the activities of terrorists differs greatly between groups. Since their actions are generally dictated by their own perceptions there are dangers in assuming that terrorists — or other actors in politics — always behave in a way which seems objectively rational in retrospect. In practice, the pressures connected with surviving can distort terrorists’ ability to make rational decisions. However, except where their actions are wholly expressive, most terrorists do try to relate their violent acts to specific objectives.
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Following the humiliating culmination of a politically unpopular war at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French officer corps sought an explanation for the defeat of their technologically superior forces at the hands of a third world insurgency. The conceptual underpinnings of their solution to the problem – the doctrine of la Guerre Révolutionnaire, which has pervaded western characterisation of the war ever since – chimed conveniently with the conclusion of many other scholars studying communist insurgencies in the early Cold War era; that they constituted a ‘different’ kind of war altogether. However, in line with M. L. R. Smith’s work on the subcategorization of war, this essay will critically argue that the 1946-54 Indochina War was neither ‘revolutionary’ – as French theorists contended – nor conventional, as its progression accurately demonstrates the flawed nature of this distinction. Instead, it will conclude that the Indochina War can only be viewed with any validity through the Clausewitzian conceptualisation of war as a chameleon.
Article
Why do the strong lose? Intuitively, stronger violent actors should win in wars against weaker actors. The literature on insurgencies suggests that democracies will do worse than other countries. However, there is little quantitative literature on why states succeed or fail in their efforts against insurgencies, and the key works find that democracy does not matter. We argue that the combined effect of political inclusion and political competition present in inclusive democracies is a key missing component impacting the success or failure of counterinsurgency (COIN). When procedural elements of democracy are combined with political inclusion, countries are less likely to be successful at suppressing insurgencies because normatively they are less willing to be as repressive and ruthless as necessary. We find that inclusion and procedural democracy separately have no impact on COIN success; however, when combined, the impact is significant, large, and negative. Inclusive democracies lose COIN operations more often than their counterparts.
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Chapter 10 provides an analysis of the findings and integrates it with the theory discussed earlier in the book. It also shows the connection between the state-building and the counterinsurgency logic of the programme. Finally, it sheds light on some of the less obvious internal tensions within the Philippine state, between those interested in creating a functioning Weberian bureaucratic state and so-called traditional politicians interested in maintaining the patrimonial character of the state. Though not explicitly stated, the study clearly shows how PAMANA is designed in such a way as to limit the power of traditional politicians as much as possible.
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Thesis
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Former President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq once said, "Proxy wars are necessary to 'keep the pot boiling". Pakistan, with the help of terror organisations and separatists, has ensured that conflict in Jammu and Kashmir becomes a conflict trap for India. Pakistan is in a position to cause relapse of the conflict to deny space for dialogue and reconciliation whenever situation appears to become near normal. It is imperative to understand that gestation period for conflict resolution under such circumstances is long and thus the objective should be to adopt structured approach to achieve enduring peace. Though there may be a debate whether we are winning this war or it has reached a stage of stalemate, but strategy certainly is not failing in its entirety. Institutions of governance and democratic process have not collapsed and the instability has been restricted to Kashmir valley by sustained military operations and administrative initiatives. Though there may be a requirement to reorient and review the overall strategy, but the bottom line is to ensure that the terror organisations are made powerless and denied public and private space. Pulwama attack has displayed how brutal terrorists can be; however, this strategy is likely to bounce back on terror organisations and sooner or later genuine resentment among the masses against the acts of extreme brutality will rise. Emergence of new political wave is a welcome step and may challenge main stream political parties. This could be seen as the rise of youth against the dynastic politics and may bridge the gap between the youth and the State. Overall objective of the state should be to ensure that people feel empowered rather than disempowered.
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