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The Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism
... Por otra parte, la formulación más influyente del liberalismo contemporáneo sostiene de entrada que la virtud central de las instituciones políticas es la justicia (rawls 1999). se ha sostenido, finalmente, que el liberalismo no es más ni menos que un proyecto justificatorio de la coerción, es decir, que su principal objetivo es que las normas que se aplican en una sociedad política plural puedan ser públicamente justificadas (Waldron 1987;rawls 2005;Gaus 2015). en esta sección, sin embargo, identificaremos dos principios rectores alternativos que permiten distinguir entre dos tipos de liberalismo. ...
... las teorías del contrato social, más allá de sus diferencias, apuntan todas a cimentar la legitimidad de las normas e instituciones en el consentimiento, expreso o tácito, voluntario o hipotético, de aquellos sobre los cuales dichas normas e instituciones se aplican, es decir, de los gobernados. este es el fundamento basal del proyecto liberal, según Waldron (1987): que la ciudadanía pueda contar, en principio, con una justificación inteligible del orden social y político, porque dicho orden debe ser entendido y aprobado por el tribunal de la razón individual, y no por apelación a la costumbre o a la comunidad. en este particular sentido, la metodología contractual del primer rawls no se aleja de la exigencia de "razones públicas" del segundo rawls, en la medida que ambos son dispositivos eminentemente justificatorios (scanlon 2003). ...
... justa -en línea con el adN del socialismo, que en círculos académicos tomó el nombre de igualitarismo. Ni devlin representa ld en este caso -sencillamente no es liberal en tanto quiebra con la característica central del liberalismo según Waldron (1987)-ni Cohen representa li, en la medida que no admite la posibilidad de una desigualdad normativamente justa. y así sucesivamente. ...
¿Es el liberalismo una ideología de izquierda o de derecha? En este articulo sostenemos que existe un liberalismo de izquierda (LI) y un liberalismo de derecha (LD). Si bien ambos son tributarios de la tradición liberal, identificamos tres criterios que permiten distinguir entre LI y LD: su aspiración normativa central, su metodología de justificación, y su posición frente a la desigualdad material. En el
primer criterio, distinguimos entre un liberalismo de la tolerancia y un liberalismo de la autonomía; en el segundo, entre un liberalismo evolucionista y un liberalismo constructivista; en el tercero, entre un liberalismo de la voluntariedad y un liberalismo de la reciprocidad. Concluimos que las primeras tres versiones de cada par representan una sensibilidad ideológica de derecha al interior del pensamiento liberal, en tanto legitiman la diferencia de la experiencia social -una vocación centrífuga-, mientras las segundas representan una sensibilidad ideológica de izquierda al interior de la misma tradición, en tanto promueven la integración de los espacios sociales -una vocación centrípeta. Por lo anterior, es razonable que LD encuentre
puntos en común con el pensamiento conservador, mientras LI lo hace respecto del pensamiento socialista. Esta conclusión invalida la discusión entre liberalismos verdaderos y liberalismos impostores, como si el liberalismo fuera necesariamente de derecha o necesariamente de izquierda, invitándonos a pensar en la coexistencia -y tensión- entre dos variantes ideológicas al interior de la misma tradición liberal.
... 65). In the case of capitalism, these ideals are those of Enlightenment liberalism: individualism, freedom, and the "natural" law of property (Hochstrasser, 2000;waldron, 1987). These contrast to those of feudal times, which asserted the "divine right" of monarchs and enshrined the hierarchy of feudal society in religion. ...
... However, in the US the red color symbolizes the conservative party, while instead the blue color symbolizes the left of the two major parties: "red states are those carried by Republicans at the presidential level; blue states are those carried by Democrats" (Levendusky and Pope 2011: 227; see also Rothstein 2017). Thus, blue as the color of openness, peace, tranquility (Mehta and Zhu 2009), has been the color of liberal ideology (Levendusky and Pope 2011), which is associated with change and reform (Lowi 1969) and, not least, freedom and tolerance (e.g., Waldron 1987). The core dimensions of the conservative ideology, on the other hand, are resistance to change and acceptance of inequality (Jost et al. 2003). ...
This chapter acknowledges color metaphors in organization studies, and focuses on one group of color metaphors that may be the most frequently used—the variety of color-coded versions of the collar metaphor, such as blue- and white-collar workers. The chapter is based on an unsystematic literature review, and identifies and discusses a set of fairly common color metaphors that have occurred in both more academic and more practitioner-oriented writings. The authors make efforts to trace how certain colors have been given certain meanings, as they have been used as metaphors in combination with “collar.” The authors give examples of the many different meanings that there are of any single color, discuss the universality of meaning of any particular color, and suggest that caution is exercised by any organizational researcher who wants to include color metaphors in their research.
... The value of individual autonomy is central to many of the debates about multiculturalism, both critical and supportive. For many liberals, individual autonomy is a foundational value of liberal political morality, and so helps set the terms by which a liberal society can also be a multicultural society (Rawls 1971;Nozick 1974;Dworkin 1978;Waldron 1987). At one level, this normative role plays out in relation to the compatibility of minority cultural practices with the value of autonomy. ...
The value of individual autonomy is central to many of the debates about multiculturalism, both critical and supportive. For many liberals, individual autonomy is a foundational value of liberal political morality, and so helps set the terms by which a liberal society can also be a multicultural society. This normative role plays out across three quite distinct sets of issues. First, liberal autonomy is associated with individualism and rationalism and is thus criticized for being fundamentally inhospitable to (many) cultural minorities and their identity. Second, there is debate about the kind of state and political morality that respect for autonomy mandates: a neutral state blind to the particularistic identities of its citizens or, as argued more recently, a multiculturalist state that recognizes a plethora of cultural rights? Third, many specific cultural practices are deemed incompatible with the moral import of autonomy. The chapter discusses these key issues surrounding the value of individual autonomy and the accommodation of cultural minorities in liberal democracies.
... In contemporary political theory, this need for reason-giving as a basic criterion of legitimate authority comes in many different guises (Forst 2007;D. F. Thompson 2008;Waldron 1987). Hence, the value of justification is widely recognized. ...
How should the state justify its coercive rules? Public reason liberalism endorses a public justification requirement: Justifications offered for authoritative regulations must be acceptable to all members of the relevant public. However, as a criterion of legitimacy, the public justification requirement is epistemically unreliable: It prioritizes neither the exclusion of false beliefs nor the inclusion of true beliefs in justifications of political rules. This article presents an epistemic alternative to the public justification requirement. Employing epistemological theories of argumentation, we demonstrate how this approach enables assessing the epistemic quality of justifications of political rules, even when the truth is difficult to establish.
... The theory of liberalism consolidates several principles, and among them, secularism, democracy, pluralism, humanism, religious freedom, justice, and equality are remarkable. Sikhism, as a humanist religion, encompasses all these principles (Waldron, 1987). In order to understand various aspects of liberalism in the light of Sikhism, an elaborate discussion is needed. ...
This study examines the role of the principle of Sikh liberalism in promoting communal harmony in today’s world. Communal harmony has been under threat in almost all countries for decades, and bigotry, distrust, and animosity prevail among the followers of diverse faithbased communities. Individuals need to be whole-hearted, liberal in approach, and tolerant toward the followers of other communities to reduce such inconsistencies in our society. The paper explores that the ideology of Sikh liberalism can be a role model for establishing peace in today’s world of communal violence. This work is a sincere effort to deal with several issues, e.g., humanism, tolerance, fraternity, equality, freedom, secularism, religious pluralism, and accessibility to and honor for contrasting opinions, based on the principle of Sikh liberalism, which are the root of Sikh liberalism. The qualitative research evaluates the all-embracing aspects of Sikhism, where the liberal notion of Guru Granth Sahib and the liberal attitudes of the Sikh Gurus, especially Guru Nanak (1469-1539), the founder of Sikhism, have mainly been highlighted. It discovers the role of Sikhism in promoting communal harmony by analyzing the idea of Sikh liberalism. Thus, the study aims to make the states, governments, and the general people aware of their responsibilities and duties towards promoting communal harmony through comprehending the Sikh approaches to liberalism. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#69-70; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2021 P 189-209
... This is particularly true with regard to AI technologies and algorithmic decision making; algorithms based on machine learning already shape our lives and social interactions in profound ways [3]. Liberal democracies, now, take a certain stance when it comes to social arrangements: "Liberals are committed to a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women, and these commitments generate a requirement that all aspects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual" [117]. Following this perspective, technologies, their development and deployment as part of our social arrangements must also meet these requirements. ...
Due to the extensive progress of research in artificial intelligence (AI) as well as its deployment and application, the public debate on AI systems has also gained momentum in recent years. With the publication of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019), notions of trust and trustworthiness gained particular attention within AI ethics-debates; despite an apparent consensus that AI should be trustworthy, it is less clear what trust and trustworthiness entail in the field of AI. In this paper, I give a detailed overview on the notion of trust employed in AI Ethics Guidelines thus far. Based on that, I assess their overlaps and their omissions from the perspective of practical philosophy. I argue that, currently, AI ethics tends to overload the notion of trustworthiness. It thus runs the risk of becoming a buzzword that cannot be operationalized into a working concept for AI research. What is needed, however, is an approach that is also informed with findings of the research on trust in other fields, for instance, in social sciences and humanities, especially in the field of practical philosophy. This paper is intended as a step in this direction.
This study offers a new model (a five by four matrix) to analyze an imaginary left-right division Israel. By analyzing the historical evolution of the Zionist ideology to four core issues (territory, religion, economy, and the attitude towards non-Jews), the main findings are that there is no real difference between them in any of the issues. In practice, they also behaved similarly, almost identically, in each of these issues. The main conclusion of the article is that in Israel there exists an imaginary rift between the right and the left that serves political parties and produces a social rift.
The Cambridge Companion to Nineteenth-Century American Literature and Politics addresses the political contexts in which nineteenth-century American literature was conceived, consumed, and criticized. Individual chapters examine how US literature from this period engaged with broad political concepts and urgent political issues, such as liberalism, conservatism, radicalism, nationalism, communitarianism, sovereignty, religious liberty, partisanship and factionalism, slavery, segregation, immigration, territorial disputes, voting rights, gendered spheres, and urban/rural tensions. Chapters on literary genres and forms show how poetry, drama, fiction, oratory, and nonfiction participated in political debate. The volume's introduction situates these chapters in relation to two larger disciplines, the history of political thought and literary history. This Companion provides a valuable resource for students and instructors interested in Nineteenth-Century American literature and politics.
'Subsidiarity' is vague and contested, yet popular in scholarship about international law due to its role in the European Union (EU). Which conceptions of subsidiarity are more justifiable, and how might they contribute to international law? A principle of subsidiarity concerns how to establish, allocate, or use authority within a social or legal order, stating a rebuttable presumption for the local. Various historical patterns, practices, principles, and justifications offer different recommendations. Seven normative theories vary in how immunity protecting or person promoting they are. The latter appear more justifiable and withstand criticism often raised against subsidiarity. Some conceptions of person promoting subsidiarity serve as a structuring principle for international law and fullfills several criteria of a general principle of law. It can harmonize domestic and international law but is not sufficient to reduce fragmentation among sectors with different objectives.
Is it possible to do ideology critique without morality? In recent years a small group of theorists has attempted to develop such an account and, in doing so, makes claim to a certain sort of “radical realism” distinguished by the ambition to ground political judgments and prescriptions in nonmoral values, principles, or concepts. This essay presents a twofold critique of this realist ideology critique (RIC) by first offering an internal critique of the approach and then arguing that the very attempt to do political theory generally—and ideology critique more specifically—in a way that abjures morality is misguided. In doing so, I contribute both to current debates around “new” ideology critiques and to contested questions about what it means to do political theory realistically.
This article offers a critical perspective of the discourse of deep engagement that portrays the United States as the world’s necessary or indispensable power. It describes deep engagement as a social narrative that, like literary narratives, has a story, a plot and an argument. This narrative has persisted in a time of waning hegemony because it makes an apparently appealing moral case for American global leadership. Yet deep engagement remains flawed from a strategic perspective and disregards the history of great-power rise and decline. From a strategic perspective, while hegemons describe their leadership in moral terms, their rhetoric is often betrayed by their actions. From a historical perspective, while hegemons regard their own efforts and values as instrumental to their status, their rise can be credited to a wave of economic and political forces the state cannot control.
Over the past two decades the academic literature on global distributive justice has generated a proliferation of positions regarding the question of how to conceive a globally just distribution of goods. One important development within this global justice debate is the emergence and increasing influence of several Pluralist theorists of global justice—including, perhaps most prominently, Fraser, R. Miller, and Risse. This article argues that Pluralists have not yet sufficiently engaged with the difficulty of how their conceptions of global justice could satisfy the publicity condition. This condition requires that the demands of justice must be publicly known to be recognized and fulfilled. This article explains why meeting this condition is especially difficult for the Pluralists. Then, it outlines an Integrated Pluralist position which, by placing special emphasis on global background justice, can meet the publicity condition. This position “integrates” concerns of justice emerging from a plurality of sites of justice. Thereby it follows “Integrationist” approaches to global justice—like those of Caney and Walton—which claim that the contents of justice of a given site of justice must not be determined in isolation from contents of other sites of justice.
Taking animal rights seriously has far-reaching theoretical implications for the justification of illegal political disobedience. Animal rights approaches, the study argues, are in a difficult tension with liberal notions of the legitimate use of coercion. Against this background, the study concludes by asking what responsibilities can be ascribed to a liberal society beyond a narrow perspective of legitimacy. The author argues that the use of animals is to be understood as a possible dramatic evil, which gives rise to a responsibility to reflect seriously and critically on the treatment of animals in the long term.
Contemporary social and political theory is not wholly sufficient for dealing with environmental issues unless it will be more informed by political theories of justice. I present the view that environmental justice can be fruitfully approached from the point of view of contemporary social contract theory, mainly the one inspired by the work of John Rawls. Healthy natural environment is indispensable for many reasons for every human society; however, nature possesses also value going beyond pure instrumentality for human beings. Because humans can have great impact on natural environment in either positive or negative way, this entails duties on their part. Society’s dealings with the environment are regulated by laws and other publicmeasures, which in turn have their deeper justification in general theory of justice of that particular society. The article tries to show that contemporary social contract theory can fruitfully grasp principles of environmental justice, which could lead to more environment sensitive policies and be acceptable from liberal point of view at the same time.Politické myšlení nemůže adekvátně reagovat na environmentální problémy současné společnosti, pokud nebude více pracovat s konceptem environmentální spravedlnosti. V tomto článku se snažím ukázat způsob, jak může být otázka environmentální spravedlnosti uchopena pomocí teorie společenské smlouvy v podání Johna Rawlse. Lidé mají svoji činností významný dopad na životní prostředí, což má za následek nerovnou distribuci environmentálních dober a škod. Proto existují vůči ostatním lidem povinnosti vyplývající ze spravedlnosti vztahující se na environmentální oblast. Environmentální otázky se nicméně musí řešit pomocí závazných společenských pravidel, která mají podobu zákonů vynucovaných státem. Tyto zákony mají své hlubší ospravedlnění právě v určité teorii spravedlnosti, která zakládá jejich legitimitu. Ve článku se snažím ukázat, že pomoci teorie společenské smlouvy lze konstruovat soubor principů environmentální spravedlnosti pro společnost, která se chce stát více odpovědnou vůči životnímu prostředí a zároveň fungovat podle liberálních principů.
Der Beitrag versteht die Debatte um die angemessene Abstraktionshöhe von Gerechtigkeitstheorien als eine Diskussion darüber, ob (und an welcher Stelle) empirische Fakten bei der Konstruktion der Theorie berücksichtigt werden sollten. Aber wie lässt sich die Frage entscheiden, welchen Grad an Realismus beziehungsweise Utopismus eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit haben sollte? Der Beitrag entwickelt hierfür zwei Kriterien: Erstens darf eine Gerechtigkeitstheorie nicht auf unzulässigen Idealisierungen beruhen, das heißt sie darf keine partikularen empirischen Fakten als universell gegebene voraussetzen und so ihren Geltungsbereich auf zu wenige Fälle einschränken. Zweitens darf eine Gerechtigkeitstheorie nicht zu abstrakt werden, indem sie von solchen Fakten abstrahiert, die für die Beschreibung von Gerechtigkeitsproblemen konstitutiv sind. Dieser Vorgang lässt eine Theorie zu stark utopisch werden. Als für Gerechtigkeitsfragen konstitutive empirische Fakten identifiziert der Beitrag, erstens, moralischen Dissens sowie, zweitens, Strukturen sozialer Macht. Als Folge dieser Überlegungen muss Rawls’ Unterscheidung zwischen idealer und nicht-idealer Theorie zugunsten eines kritischen und negativistischen Ansatzes verworfen werden.
The ability of political orders to command respect rather than just compliance is one of the most pervasive themes in political theory (Outhwaite 2009, p. 62). The death of god, in the Hegelian sense, means that legitimacy based on some divine ordained right to rule are no longer valid, and modern states must seek fresh rationales for the legitimacy to rule. This chapters argues that the Weberian schemes of legitimacy do not consider the possibility that a regime may be illegitimate. The thicker liberal concepts of legitimacy, for example, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, however, set the bar too high, and if followed to their logical conclusions, can render all regimes illegitimate. This chapter draws on the writings of Bernard Williams and Jurgen Habermas to arrive at a legitimacy framework based on democratic legitimation and the interchangeability between norms, values and the promise of rewards. This framework makes no normative requirement of a regime except for popular sovereignty, a concept already invoked by almost all modern secular regimes. It is devised to be suitable for the examination of liberal as well as non-liberal orders, and therefore appropriate for the examination of legitimacy of the Chinese state.
This paper explores the relationship between truth and loyalty as it pertains to epistemic issues within contemporary Western politics. One now familiar concern is how an increasing number of people determine their beliefs according to what demonstrating loyalty to their group requires instead of the facts of an independent and objective reality, as a proper concern for truthfulness demands. Whereas “they” base their beliefs on what is required to demonstrate loyalty to their group, “our” beliefs are justified by facts and evidence. Such contrasts pit loyalty and truth as necessarily antagonistic. This paper gives us further reason for thinking that putting loyalty against truthfulness at some very general or conceptual level is deeply misguided. More significantly, it seeks to show that the more helpful contrast to make is between those who are loyal to identities that value truthfulness in such a way that there are no other parts of that identity which are not revisable if they come into conflict with truth, and those who are loyal to identities that subordinate truth to other ends or goals. Acknowledging this allows us to better appreciate various aspects of how the relationship between truth and loyalty is playing out in contemporary politics. Chief among these is how our own commitment to truthfulness is itself embedded in a particular identity, an identity that we not only often fail to acknowledge as such but which necessitates us thinking harder about the ways in which it might itself sustain the dynamics of conflict and contestation, antagonizing those who do not share it and driving them farther away from the truthfulness we extol.
According to the Public Justification Principle, legitimate laws must be justifiable to all reasonable citizens. Proponents of this principle assume that its satisfaction requires speakers to offer justifications that are representable as arguments that feature premises which reasonable listeners would accept. I develop the concept of dark knowledge to show that this assumption is false. Laws are often justified on the basis of premises that many reasonable listeners know, even though they would reject these premises on the basis of the further considerations that speakers implicitly rely on for their support. Accommodating the fact of dark knowledge requires us to consider the civic virtue of speakers to be more important for public justification than the acceptability of their arguments to reasonable citizens. I sketch an alternative conception of public justification that incorporates these results and argue that it provides a rationale for ignoring the otherwise sound contributions of some participants in political deliberation.
This review article analyses the merits and shortcomings of three recent works by Matthew Rose, Peter Turchin, and Krishnan Nayar about the crisis in Western liberal democracies and liberalism. By exploring the intellectual and economic causes of the crisis, these authors are trying to establish a historical model that would explain the current crisis through a comprehensive account of the development of Western societies. In doing so, they identify the detrimental role of the elites and the growing inequalities as the major factor that historically contributes to the demise of liberal values, endangering democratic rule of law. Therefore, the three books are a warning that the demise of the liberal order will bring about the resurgence of right-wing authoritarianism. However, all three authors avoid discussing the nature of liberalism as the dominant ideology in the West. This article presents a criticism of such models, arguing that any discussion of the crisis of liberalism which avoids considerations about liberalism itself and liberal ideologies, necessarily fails to encapsulate the actual experience of the crisis. In addition, these models limit history?s usefulness in interpreting the causes of the crisis and preventing its consequences.
John Rawls was a major twentieth‐century moral and political philosopher. His monumental A Theory of Justice provides a powerful defense of the liberal welfare state and the priority of individual liberty over other values. In Theory Rawls claims that justice is the “first virtue of social institutions,” and attempts to establish principles of distributive justice to govern the workings of society's “basic structure,” its major political, social, and economic institutions. These are the proper focus of distributive justice, because of the decisive influence they exert on people's life prospects. Theory is credited with reviving normative political philosophy among Anglo‐American philosophers and, since its publication, has served as a model for the practice of political philosophy.
Liberal theory is better characterized as a family of concepts, ideals, and commitments than as a single, readily identifiable doctrine. Reflecting both the principle of toleration from which they emerge and the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and autonomy that run through them, liberal theories are inescapably diverse, mutable, and capacious, crystallizing in myriad ways around a foundational set of moral and political principles. It is thus misleading to speak of liberal theory in singular terms; liberal theory is best understood as a shifting network of moral, political, and philosophical concerns and commitments.
En este artículo se argumenta que el concepto de política permite formular una teoría normativa que integre elementos descriptivos, trazar un continuo (una relación) entre el concepto descriptivo y el concepto normativo de la legitimidad si el concepto de política se tiene como primera premisa. la política es un concepto que refiere a la actividad por la que los seres humanos con desacuerdos coexisten en sociedades estables por medio de relaciones de poder que configuran el orden social. la pregunta por la legitimidad del poder político interroga si el poder que estructura las relaciones sociales es legítimo, si tiene autoridad. la respuesta a la pregunta pasa por relacionar la justificación del poder con las creencias de los subordinados que coacciona. en otras palabras, en trazar un continuo entre el concepto descriptivo y el concepto normativo de la legitimidad. en este artículo se presentan tres teorías normativas que contienen elementos descriptivos por su conceptualización de la política.
What kind of education is needed for democracy? How can education respond to the challenges that current democracies face? This unprecedented Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the most important ideas, issues, and thinkers within democratic education. Its thirty chapters are written by leading experts in the field in an accessible format. Its breadth of purpose and depth of analysis will appeal to both researchers and practitioners in education and politics. The Handbook addresses not only the historical roots and philosophical foundations of democratic education, but also engages with contemporary political issues and key challenges to the project of democratic education.
In the United States, police use of force experts often maintain that controversial police shootings where an unarmed person’s hand gesture was interpreted as their “going for a gun” are justifiable. If an officer waits to confirm that a weapon is indeed being pulled from a jacket pocket or waistband, it may be too late to defend against a lethal attack. This article examines police policy norms for self-defense against “uncertain threats” in three contexts: (1) known in-progress violent crimes, (2) interactions with civilians behaving non-aggressively, and (3) interactions with civilians behaving aggressively. It is argued that the context of a known in-progress violent crime gives rise to threat probability-, fairness-, and lesser evil-based reasons for a norm permitting police officers to use lethal force. However, in the contexts of civilians behaving non-aggressively and civilians behaving aggressively, such a norm is not justifiable. In the former case, I introduce two conditions, the Justification condition and the Valuing Civilian Lives condition, which I argue are not presently met. In the latter case, these two conditions again not met; aggression may moreover be excused or justified due to background injustices around race and the criminal justice system.
İnsan haklarının korunması meselesi, evrensellik ve kültürel görelilik teorileri arasında bir gerilime yol açmaktadır. Bu gerilim akademik literatürde bazı hakların öz/çekirdek haklar olarak evrensel olduğu, bazı çevre haklarınsa kültürel göreli olduğu yaklaşımının savunulmasına yol açmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, insan haklarının evrenselliği-kültürel göreliliği arasındaki tartışmanın, öz/çekirdek-çevre haklar kavramsallaştırması üzerinden eleştirel bir incelemesini sunmaktır. Siyasal düşünceler çerçevesinden yapılan bu çalışmanın argümanı öz/çekirdek-çevre haklar kavramsallaştırmasının ve bunun sonucunda oluşan zayıf kültürel göreliliği savunan söylemin; farklılıklara saygı, çokkültürlülük, çoğulculuk ve değer çoğulculuğunun geliştirilmesi için önemli bir söylem olmakla birlikte, insan haklarının evrenselliği iddiasının halen teorik ve normatif olarak mümkün ve değerli olduğudur. Bununla beraber çalışmada, her iki yaklaşımın reel politikte normatif olarak değerli olmayacak şekilde kullanılabileceği de savunulmaktadır.
Recent attempts at making sense of toleration as an ideal of political morality have focused on how liberal democratic institutions generate political arrangements that protect people’s freedom to “live their life as they see fit.” We show how these views rely on a one-dimensional interpretation of the liberal democratic political project. In so doing, they underestimate an important “interactive” dimension. This dimension concerns what it means for liberal democracies to realize toleration as a property inherent to their constitutive political processes. We illustrate this claim with reference to the liberal democratic decision-making process. Such a process realizes toleration as forbearance in itself. It does so because it establishes the participants in the process as political agents who recognize their mutual standing to share the political authority to make collectively binding decisions, despite their grounds for reciprocal objection.
Disinformation and misleading narratives have been the prominent aspects of polluting public debate during the last US presidential elections and the Covid-19 pandemic. This paper attempts to evaluate the problem of freedom of speech through the lens of Ronald Coase’s paradox about the similarities between the «market for goods» and the «market for ideas». After discussing the suitability of the Coasian metaphor, according to which any form of interventionism on one of these spheres will produce outcomes on the other one, it states that this clearly emerges today insomuch online platforms, such as social networks, are becoming accountable for polluting (in terms of externalities) pieces of content shared by users.
At the beginning of the third century, liberalism was the preferred philosophy. It is not easy to define any political party, as with conservatism. Liberal ideology dates back to the end of the seventeenth century when the political turbulence of England's middle civil wars left the nation in a state of great social upheaval. Following this, the nineteenth century is explored, and significant ideas of 'classical' and 'New' liberalism are described. Before the First World War, the limits of British liberalism were already apparent, and its decline was virtually total throughout the interwar period. In light of the demise of Soviet communism in the late 1980s and the subsequent rise of liberal capitalist democracy, we review the rebirth of liberalism. An investigation of some of the current failings of liberalism is conducted, and the authors predict the fate of liberalism.
The past sixty years have seen an expansion of international human rights conventions and supervisory organs, not least in Europe. While these international legal instruments have enlarged their mandate, they have also faced opposition and criticism from political actors at the state level, even in well-functioning democracies. Against the backdrop of such contestations, this book brings together prominent scholars in law, political philosophy and international relations in order to address the legitimacy of international human rights regimes as a theoretically challenging and politically salient case of international authority. It provides a unique and thorough overview of the legitimacy problems involved in the global governance of human rights.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
John Rawls's idea of the original position – arguably the centerpiece of his theory of justice – has proved to have enduring philosophical significance for at least three reasons.
First, it offered a fresh way of thinking about problems of justification and objectivity in political philosophy. At the heart of these difficulties is the need to find an objective point of view from which to deliberate about matters of basic justice. Here “objective” implies “not mired in partiality” and “not biased by one's particular position in the social world.” The original position is a hypothetical contractual situation in which parties who are ignorant about crucial features of themselves (such as how wealthy or talented they are, and what their vision of the best way to live is) are to select the principles of justice to regulate the basic institutions of their society. In selecting those principles, the parties are thought of as entering into an agreement that binds them to honor whichever principles they choose. By specifying that the parties are ignorant of matters that would allow them to favor themselves, Rawls vividly and unforgettably captures a widely shared sense that principles of justice cannot be justified by appealing to morally irrelevant considerations.
The original position is important in the second place because of the many interesting philosophical questions it raises. As soon as Rawls's argument had been fully digested, many philosophers felt that something was amiss with it. Questions abound. How could the fact that I would have agreed to certain principles in a special situation of choice give those principles binding authority over me? Is it true that Rawls's two principles in particular are the most rational choice that could be made in the original position? Are the assumptions needed to get the device off the ground really as weak and untroubling as Rawls seems to have thought?
Finally, the original position is significant because of its evident traction: it has inspired other philosophers to take up alternative positions, to rethink it, and to conceptualize afresh the philosophical problems to which the idea was initially addressed. The vast literature on Rawls's idea – and the use he himself made of it in his subsequent work – are testament to its capacity to inspire further philosophical reflection.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
At the centre of John Rawls's political philosophy is one of the most influential thought experiments of the twentieth century: which principles of justice would a group of individuals choose to regulate their society if they were deprived of any information about themselves that might bias their choice? In this collection of new essays, leading political philosophers examine the ramifications and continued relevance of Rawls's idea. Their chapters explore topics including the place of the original position in rational choice theory, the similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative, the differences between Rawls's model and Scanlon's contractualism, and the role of the original position in the argument between Rawls and other views in political philosophy, including utilitarianism, feminism, and radicalism. This accessible volume will be a valuable resource for undergraduates, as well as advanced students and scholars of philosophy, game theory, economics, and the social and political sciences.
This is the extended (unpublished) version of "Thailand's ideological struggle: Towards the possibility of depolarization". It received funding from the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University (Direk Jayanama Research Center).
In this article I defend a new argument against moralist theories of legitimacy and in favour of realist theories. Moralist theories, I argue, are vulnerable to ideological and wishful thinking because they do not connect the demands of legitimacy with the interests of rulers. Realist theories, however, generally do manage to make this connection. This is because satisfying the usual realist criteria for legitimacy – the creation of a stable political order that transcends brute coercion – is usually necessary for rulers to preserve their rule.
To justify surveillance measures and gain them public support, governments use the promise of security. It is usually claimed that individuals are more willing to have freedom and privacy restricted than waiving a promise of increased security. However, empirical evidence to support this claim has been scarce—especially from a comparative perspective. Focusing on surveillance measures, this paper shows that people do indeed express greater acceptance of restrictions when these are justified by promises of security, being one of the first to examine this across 29 countries on all continents. Based on data from the ISSP, it investigates to which degree the effect of a security-based justification is moderated on the micro and macro level, with surprising results: While the effect does not differ between different levels of government support and political orientation, it differs significantly depending on how liberal-democratic the country is. The effect of the security-justification is very pronounced in liberal democracies, while it is even reversed in rather autocratic countries, meaning that individuals seem to be rather suspicious towards security justifications in non-democratic countries.
En este artículo presento un análisis no-ideal de una serie de problemas teóricos del liberalismo que afectan a los discursos liberales en las prácticas políticas concretas del presente con consecuencias desdemocratizantes, incluyendo su instrumentalización neoconservadora. Usando la actitud de Benjamin Constant hacia la esclavitud como caso de análisis, intento mostrar que hay en el liberalismo una ignorancia voluntaria respecto de injusticias estructurales que es causada en gran medida por su tesis básica de que la opresión fundamental es la que ejercen el Estado y la comunidad política sobre el individuo. La centralidad de esta opresión en la teoría liberal le impide dar un lugar teórico adecuado a las injusticias, dominaciones y opresiones que se ejercen en las relaciones sociales.
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