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Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber

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Terrorism and Political Violence
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Suicide terrorism is the most violent and horrifying form of terrorism in the world today. This kind of terrorism causes many fatalities and can throw an entire nation into a state of panic. We usually attribute this kind of terrorism to altruistic motivation, assuming that bombers are willing to sacrifice themselves for a higher cause. The current study uses the criminological theory of Rational Choice to analyze the motivation of jihadist suicide terrorism. By reviewing the religious, personal, and social incentives, we demonstrate that even those who kill themselves in suicide attacks, which are seemingly examples of irrational or altruistic behavior, do so while considering future, self-gratifying benefits. Since this self-destructive behavior is mostly driven not by altruistic motivation but by the anticipation of costs and benefits, we find that there is no fundamental difference between the perpetrators’ motivations and those of other criminals; both groups are committed to maximizing self-gratifying, beneficial behavior.
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Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist
Suicide Bomber
Simon Perrya & Badi Hasisia
a Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Published online: 09 Dec 2014.
To cite this article: Simon Perry & Badi Hasisi (2015) Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide
Bomber, Terrorism and Political Violence, 27:1, 53-80, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.962991
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.962991
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Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist
Suicide Bomber
SIMON PERRY AND BADI HASISI
Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Suicide terrorism is the most violent and horrifying form of terrorism in the world
today. This kind of terrorism causes many fatalities and can throw an entire nation
into a state of panic. We usually attribute this kind of terrorism to altruistic motiv-
ation, assuming that bombers are willing to sacrifice themselves for a higher cause.
The current study uses the criminological theory of Rational Choice to analyze the
motivation of jihadist suicide terrorism. By reviewing the religious, personal, and
social incentives, we demonstrate that even those who kill themselves in suicide
attacks, which are seemingly examples of irrational or altruistic behavior, do so
while considering future, self-gratifying benefits. Since this self-destructive behavior
is mostly driven not by altruistic motivation but by the anticipation of costs and
benefits, we find that there is no fundamental difference between the perpetrators’
motivations and those of other criminals; both groups are committed to maximizing
self-gratifying, beneficial behavior.
Keywords crime, motivations, Rational Choice Theory, suicide bomber, terror
The 9=11 terror attacks brought the suicide-bombing phenomenon to the world’s
attention. One key question this phenomenon raises is: What drives people to make
this ultimate sacrifice? It is often maintained that individuals willing to make this
self-sacrifice, which they consider to be in their society’s best interest, are driven
by altruism. Based on Emile Durkheim’s
1
typology of suicide behavior, some
scholars argue that suicide bombing is indeed altruistic suicide: a result of an
individual’s extreme integration into a social group which indoctrinates its members
to sacrifice themselves for a cause they believe supersedes personal interests.
2
Another approach considers suicide terrorism to be fatalistic suicide: an
outcome of a person’s inopportune life, brought upon by their being ‘‘too regulated
or choked by oppressive discipline.’’
3
Leenaars maintains that suicide terrorism can
inherently be a byproduct of both altruism and fatalism. In the altruistic collective
dimension, they believe their suicide to be an asset to their society’s goals. The
fatalistic dimension voices individualism, viewing suicide as an escape route from
circumstances of despair.
Dr. Simon Perry is a Professor of Practice with the Institute of Criminology, Faculty
of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Badi Hasisi is Chair of the Institute of
Criminology, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Address correspondence to Simon Perry, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. E-mail: simon.
perry@mail.huji.ac.il
Terrorism and Political Violence, 27:53–80, 2015
Copyright #Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.962991
53
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Alternatively, other scholars argue that suicide terrorist motives should be
viewed through the lens of the Rational Choice Model.
4
A significant number of
these scholars use rational choice to explain the motives of the suicide bombers’
handlers who mastermind, organize, and dispatch the bombers as ‘‘smart bombs.’’
Seeking to increase the attack’s success and consequences, the masterminds select
a high-value target, to allow the maximum number of potential victims.
5
While the above-cited scholars use Rational Choice Theory to explain the
actions of the suicide bombers’ handlers, the masterminds behind suicide terror
attacks (mainly in an attempt to identify interventions to thwart situational oppor-
tunities), the current study emphasizes the Rational Choice model as exclusively
pertaining to the suicide bombers. The study thus focuses on the suicide bombers’
pursuit of self-gratifying rewards for maximization of their benefits.
6
Therefore,
the study concentrates on the motivation of suicide bombers and not on the motives
of their handlers
7
(the goals of the terrorist organization). Yet, to execute their
motives and attain their goals, the handlers promote the suicide bombers’ expected
rewards, reinforcing their motivation.
Unlike any other form of terrorist attack (including ‘‘no-escape’’ or ‘‘sacrificial’’
attacks where the attackers have a slim chance of survival), suicide bombing has an
additional value. As Margalit
8
explains, by their own dramatic act of killing
themselves, bombers become the ultimate victims. In the eyes of their supporters, such
actions bring moral shame upon the innocent victims they murder, as well as upon
their families and society, for their collective deeds provoked the suicide bomber’s
attack. The suicide bombers claim the moral high ground for their declared altruistic
motivation. Mohammed Hafez
9
maintains that in order to understand their
motivation, one must be somewhat empathetic towards suicide bombers.
Rational Choice Theory provides our research with a theoretical framework for
understanding the process in which suicide bombers are in fact victimized; both by
their handlers and by the subculture of Islamic fundamentalism.
Clarke and Newman
10
argue that criminologists only address suicide bombing
sporadically, therefore it is mostly done by those who ‘‘would appeal to politicians
and diplomats and would match the agendas of international agencies.’’
11
These
scholars (mostly from disciplines other than criminology) claim that the targeted
populations and their counterterrorism policies against suicide attacks are respon-
sible for the suicide bomber’s personal motivation. Clarke and Newman claim that
these scholars ‘‘blame the problem’’ on conflicts that demand resolution by political
and diplomatic processes.
12
Therefore, these scholars argue that counterterrorism
methods should concentrate on changing the motivations and not on limiting oppor-
tunities for committing these acts of terror. Professor of International Affairs Mia
Bloom argues
13
that ‘‘the key is to reduce the Palestinian motivations for suicide
bombing rather than their capabilities to carry them out.’’ While we can agree with
the importance to reduce motivations for terrorism in general and for suicide terror-
ism in particular, it is at least as important and more so practical to minimize the
capabilities and opportunities for executing the attacks. In their book Outsmarting
the Terrorists, Clarke and Newman demonstrate what is probably the most promi-
nent application of the ‘‘Rational Choice Theory’’ to terrorism, arguing that:
‘‘Terrorism is a form of crime in all essential respects.’’
14
Following this reasoning,
the position in our article perceives terrorism in general, and suicide bombing in
particular, not as mainly altruistic in nature but as motivated primarily by ego
and hedonism, akin to criminal motivations of ordinary criminals.
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Similar to most applications of ‘‘Rational Choice Theory’’ to crime, Clarke and
Newman focus almost exclusively on thwarting terrorism through situational pre-
vention, as opposed to promoting genuine political processes: ‘‘we must not rely
on changing the hearts and minds of terrorists.’’
15
Criminological Rational Choice
Theory emphasizes the need for counterterrorism methods to deal mainly with the
specific terrorists’ goals=targets, including attention to particular on-the-ground
issues, referred to by Clarke and Newman as the ‘‘four pillars of terrorist opport-
unity’’ (targets, weapons, tools, and facilitating conditions). This article argues that
the self-lethal behavior of the suicide bomber is not driven primarily by altruistic per-
sonal motivation, but by the anticipated costs and benefits, and is not fundamentally
different from the motivations of an ordinary criminal. Therefore, we employ the
perspective of the criminological ‘‘Rational Choice Theory’’: that practical counter-
terrorism should mostly deploy proven situational crime prevention techniques, and
focus less on the realm of domestic and foreign policies.
16
It should be emphasized, however, that political scientists and those of other
academic disciplines do not deny the personal motivations of suicide bombers; rather
they consider such motivations to be marginal contributions. Similarly, the crimino-
logical rational choice perspective does not deny the possible existence of a ‘‘higher
cause,’’ yet only attributes to it a minor contribution in one’s decision to become
a martyr. Additionally, recent works that apply Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) to
terrorism argue that SCP could be used to complement approaches whose root cause
is political. This is done by buying time and wearing down the terrorist group—reducing
the magnitude of terror activity—thus securing the political=diplomatic process.
17
Contrary to altruistic suicide, perceived as non-self-gratifying behavior,
18
we
argue that the suicide bomber’s self-lethal behavior is in fact a product of situational
rational choice—produced by the bomber’s calculated evaluation of the costs and
anticipated rewards. The goal of this article is to describe a Rational Choice Model
that embodies religious, personal, and social rewards, as expected by the suicide
bomber in return for his self-sacrificing behavior, and utilizing the case of
Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab (UFAM) to exhibit this model. There is variation
between different suicide bombers as to the importance of anticipated rewards,
which makes it difficult to generalize. Yet, this article will show that UFAM, similar
to other suicide bombers, anticipated that he would receive a typical set of rewards.
We shall illustrate later that the ‘‘reward system’’ of UFAM is consistent with key
characteristics of the common suicide bomber.
This study will first present a model that describes the socialization and indoc-
trination mechanism that breeds suicide bombers, succeeding to build incentives for
the choices they eventually make. We then apply this model to the case of UFAM.
What we shall show is that both socialization and indoctrination are rational-choice
driven, attempting to convince suicide terrorists to perform their acts—which will
grant them remarkable rewards. The propaganda present in recorded wills, video
testaments, published letters, and other forms of testimony may insinuate suicide
terrorism as motivated by altruistic and unselfish nationalistic=religious reasoning.
Our study, however, will present another underlying level of motivation, beyond that
expressed in the declared propaganda of fundamentalist jihadists. This study argues
that the lethal behavior of suicide bombing is in fact a direct outcome of rational
situational choice. We believe this choice to be based on the bombers’ evaluation
of the anticipated costs on the one hand, and on the product of a dynamic interaction
between their anticipation of religious, personal, and social rewards on the other.
Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber 55
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There are practical limitations to conducting an empirical study on suicide
terrorists; some researchers therefore based their studies on interviewing suicide
bombers before the act, since it is obviously impossible to interview successful
suicide bombers after the act. Circumstances also often prevent scholars from
interviewing bombers immediately after failed attempts; bombers whose attack plots
were thwarted; and spiritual leaders, recruiters, and attack masterminds of suicide
bombers. Therefore, the research approach in this study is based on a case study.
Considering the debate around terrorist motivations (rational choice versus altru-
ism), we will illustrate that even in the case of terrorist activities by suicide bombers,
a series of rational choice-based decisions occurs, wherein the costs and benefits
of actions are weighed. If this is the case among suicide bombers (rational choice
consideration: cost=benefit analysis), then one could argue that similar considerations
should be expected among non-suicidal terrorist attacks. Our case study will focus on
the case of UFAM, ‘‘the underpants bomber’’ who failed in his attempt to detonate
a bomb in a plane over Detroit in 2009.
19
The Criminological Theory of Rational Choice and Its Application to
Terrorism
According to Cornish and Clarke,
20
‘‘Rational Choice Theory’’ is based upon the
assumption that criminals seek profit from their criminal behavior. Such behavior
requires the criminals involved to make decisions and choices. According to this
approach, individuals contemplating criminal behavior use the same decision-
making processes and cognitive strategies as those engaging in non-criminal beha-
vior. Furthermore, according to this approach, there are no differences between
the decision-making processes employed by criminals and those of non-criminals,
nor are there differences between the basic motivations of the two groups.
This approach contradicts the repeated attempts by determinist, positivist crim-
inologists who try to explain delinquency by identifying differences between criminal
and non-criminal groups based upon psychological, biological, sociological, or polit-
ical characteristics. In Rational Choice Theory, the ‘‘rational’’ concept emphasizes
the notion of strategic thinking, and assumes a process whereby information is ana-
lyzed, situations are defined (from a subjective perspective), and opportunities and
alternatives are evaluated—all directed towards achievement of maximum expected
benefits. The concept of ‘‘choice’’ reinforces the position that criminals consider and
make decisions. Persons commit crimes if they expect the benefits of committed
offenses to exceed the benefits they may obtain by investing in alternative feasible
activities (legal or non-legal).
According to ‘‘Rational Choice Theory,’’ criminal behavior is a process in which
the individual subjectively defines a given situation, perceiving possible future bene-
fits to be provided. This approach has a phenomenological dimension, as criminal
behavior largely depends on one’s own subjective definition of ‘‘reality,’’ which is
unique to each individual. No two people experience a situation exactly the same
way, as each one’s unique personal perspective is influenced by one’s individual
background, influenced by such variables as: social groups and effective relationships,
religious beliefs, moral concepts, material deprivation, opportunities, and formal
and informal sanctions. This explains why an individual may choose a delinquent
behavior in a particular situation, yet reject it in another situation. Moreover, it also
explains why two people in a similar situation may make different behavioral
56 S. Perry and B. Hasisi
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choices (criminal or non-criminal). Clarke and Cornish
21
characterize such behavior
as ‘‘limited rationality,’’ since the decision making is less than perfect due to the
imperfect conditions of the process. The decision-making process is not optimal since,
similar to any other person, suicide bombers often act rashly and are affected by
significant others as well as by limited available information and resources. In other
words, suicide bombers’ actions are rational given the constraints and opportunities
available to them.
Jon Elster
22
distinguishes between ‘‘thin’’ and ‘‘broad’’ rationality. The concept
of ‘‘thin’’ rationality is that there is a consistency between the individual’s actions
and his or her beliefs and desires. We argue that the choice to commit an act of terror
in general, and a suicide act of terror in particular, is a rational choice based upon an
individual’s subjective understanding of the situation and anticipated benefits. If the
suicide bombers believe that martyrs are eligible for ‘‘paradise rewards,’’ from their
point of view it is rational to kill themselves in an act of martyrdom. Those outside
of the Islamic fundamentalist system of beliefs can argue there is no rationality in the
belief in the afterlife narrative and in the fulfillment of the desires allegedly satisfied
in paradise. Because the paradise narrative is not based on concrete evidence, it does
not involve a rational judgment (the ‘‘broad’’ rationality). Therefore, an individual’s
rational judgment is not independent of his system of beliefs and not necessarily
evidence based.
The ‘‘Rational Choice Approach’’
23
distinguishes between two levels of analysis
when explaining criminal behavior. The first level constitutes ‘‘criminal involve-
ment’’ (or ‘‘criminality’’ according to Hirschi
24
), including both the analysis of the
fundamental decision to be a criminal as well as the analysis of the choice to engage
in a particular type of criminal activity (e.g., burglary, robbery, suicide bombing).
The second level, ‘‘criminal events’’ (or ‘‘crime’’ according to Hirschi), involves
analysis of the decision-making process specific to a given offense; e.g., exactly
how to execute the burglary=drug deal=suicide bombing attempt. This situational
decision process for performing a specific act of crime is usually shorter and reliant
on information dictated by the immediate circumstances of the situation.
‘‘Rational Choice Theory’’ typically focuses on offenses rather than on offen-
ders. Felson and Clarke
25
make a connection between delinquent behavior and the
opportunity unique to a specific type of offense in its circumstantial context. Since
opportunity plays a central role in creating the offense, they offer ten principles
for ‘‘situational prevention’’ policy.
In Outsmarting the Terrorists, Clarke and Newman focus almost exclusively on
thwarting terrorism through situational prevention, and focus very little on the per-
sonal motivations of terrorists in general, and of suicide bombers in particular. At
one point in the book, Clarke and Newman address the issue of personal motivation.
They briefly argue that great similarities exist between the motivations of ‘‘ordinary’
criminals
26
and those of terrorists; both groups may expect the principal rewards to
include an overall sense of belonging, status, excitement, employment, group
support, and sex.
Unlike most of the writings which deal with the application of ‘‘Rational Choice
Theory’’ to terrorism that mainly focus on the decision making of the handlers and
initiators of suicide terrorism and on the application of situational crime preven-
tion,
27
the current article focuses on the application of ‘‘Rational Choice’’ model
specifically to suicide bombers themselves, who expect religious, personal, and social
rewards for their self-sacrificing behavior.
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The Rational Choice of ‘‘Martyrdom’’: Religious, Personal, and Social
Rewards
Islamic texts, rituals, and symbols concerning jihad and martyrdom have been
referenced by Islamic fundamentalist militants to justify, inspire, and promote sui-
cide operations as well as to entice candidates.
28
The martyrs’ deaths are thus con-
sidered to be in the name of ‘‘the glory of God.’’
29
This form of martyrdom
30
is
perceived to be the fulfillment of a ‘‘divine command,’’ understood by Islamic jihad
organizations to be God’s will.
31
Islamic suicide terrorists are therefore titled shu-
hadaa: martyrs dying in service of Allah, committing an obligatory and sacrificial
act.
32
Rooted in the martyrdom concept, this glory is considered ‘‘the highest level
of jihad’’—highlighting the depths of the martyr’s faith.
33
Palestinian Mufti Sheikh
Ikrimi Sabri praises martyrdom in his sermons at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in
Jerusalem: ‘‘The Muslim loves death and strives for martyrdom.’’
34
In kind, Sheik
‘Ijlin states at the Gaza Mosque: ‘‘We, the Muslims ...each one of us—seekers of
Martyrdom.’’
35
Islamic fundamentalists do not perceive the holy act of martyrdom (Istishad)as
suicide (Intihar) to be forbidden in Islam, as although martyrs die in this world, they
live on in paradise.
36
According to Mahmoud al-Zahar, co-founder of Hamas:
‘‘These are not suicide operations ...these are martyrdom-seeking operations ...the
the highest level of martyrdom.’’
37
Upon reaffirming in a video testament the pledge
of jihad and readiness to die, suicide bombers receive the special honorary status of
‘‘the living martyr.’’
38
This oath transfers the bombers to the mental state of a living
dead, commencing their presence in that world.
39
Jihadists argue that ‘‘he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake
of his religion and his nation’’
40
—namely for altruistic motivation.
41
On the other
hand, the jihadist religious belief in martyrdom also entails meaningful personal
rewards, as the Koran assures that martyrs are alive in the presence of God—who
grants them gifts.
42
In fact, the fundamentalists elaborate extensively on the
meaningful benefits of the suicide bomber, beyond the Koran’s original indication,
describing them in a graphic, colorful manner.
Therefore, in light of the meaningful religious and personal rewards offered
to the martyr by the fundamentalists, widespread attraction and appeal of
martyrdom resonate as the suicide bombers’ primary motivation, overshadow-
ing their altruistic motivation. A fascinating example of such is the suicide
video
43
of al-Saba, Sidique Khan, who performed the London Underground
7=7 bombing. On the one hand, he insists that: ‘‘Our drive and motivation
doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world (paradise) has
to offer. ... This is how our ethical stances are dictated.’’ On the other hand,
he discusses the rewards of Paradise, asking to be granted entrance: ‘‘make duaa
to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and brothers ...and enter us into
gardens of paradise.’’
In the next section we describe (within the rational choice model) the religious,
personal, and social rewards that the suicide bombers expect to attain by virtue of
their self- sacrificial behavior. It is important to emphasize that this article presents
a series of possible rewards for suicide bombers, yet it is clear that this does not mean
that all the rewards are relevant for every suicide bomber. Different rewards can be
attributed to different attackers, and we do not expect every suicide terrorist to
pursue all the rewards.
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Religious Rewards
Eternity in paradise. According to the Islamic jihadist, those willing to kill
themselves in the course of defending religion earn eternal life in the highest gardens
of paradise.
44
By pressing the detonator, the martyr immediately opens the door to
Paradise (jannat al-firdaws).
45
This instant deliverance, the ‘‘reward of heaven,’’ is
enabled by the martyr’s involvement in jihad, or ‘‘holy war’’—also taught as ‘‘God’s
path to paradise.’’
46
The martyr knows that once he reaches heaven, attaining real
immortality and honor (in paradise), God is on his side.
47
When asked how he felt
about being selected for martyrdom, an anonymous captured male terrorist replied:
‘‘It’s as if a very high, impenetrable wall separated you from Paradise or Hell.’
48
Another arrested suicide bomber describes his imaginary entry to paradise: ‘‘We
were floating, swimming, in the feeling that we were about to enter eternity.’’
49
In her last words, Hawa Barayev, who drove into a building housing Russian Special
Forces in Alkhan Kala in 2000, said: ‘‘I know what I am doing; paradise has a price,
and I hope this will be the price for Paradise.’’
50
Promoting the godliness of a suicide mission, the father of Palestinian suicide
bomber Tareq Hamid defines jihad as follows: ‘‘The only thing they need is to reach
Paradise, by means of defense and martyrdom for the sake of Allah.’’
51
Thayer
and Hudson
52
describe how pervasive this belief is among jihadists both in the
Palestinian press and in pre-recorded death announcements of martyrs. They explain
that, ‘‘indeed, there is boasting, desire, expectations and impatient eagerness to take
the short cut and join in one stroke the pleasures of Paradise.’’
53
There is shared sentiment among Islamic fundamentalists that Paradise reserves
exclusive rewards for prophets and martyrs, amounting to the novelty of their being
chosen—even if they pay a price to be selected.
54
Seeing Allah’s face and meeting the Prophet Muhammad. According to this
belief, the martyr continues his life in Paradise, now in the presence of Allah, permit-
ted to see Allah’s face and to meet the Prophet Muhammad, who is quoted as saying:
‘‘the soul of a martyr is carried to Allah in the bosom of the green birds in
Paradise.’’
55
This expectation of experiencing Allah and the Prophet Muhammad
firsthand is so intrinsic to the suicide bomber legacy that some have described it
as their main motivation for participating in a Holy War.
56
The emphasis on this
incentive can be credited to the jihadist organizations’ method of attack preparation;
as a Hamas member explains, ‘‘we focus his attention on Paradise, on being in the
presence of Allah, on meeting the Prophet Muhammad.’’
57
In his farewell letter, a suicide bomber who blew himself up in the Gaza Strip
exemplifies the shahid’s state of mind during the attack: ‘‘I decided to see Allah today
and this meeting is by all means more important than staying alive on this earth.’’
58
This passion for the thrill of meeting Allah was expressed by Hanaadi Jaaradat,
before bombing the ‘‘Maksim’’ restaurant in Haifa (a northern city in Israel) in
2003: ‘‘I believe in all that is written in the Koran and long for the rivers of paradise,
as I yearn to see the holy face of Allah. I long for all of this ever since Allah placed me
in this world.’’
59
In his farewell testimonial video, Ibrahim Sharahna affirms the
martyr’s esteemed reward: ‘‘Every martyr has a place in paradise, next to Allah
and his prophet, Muhammad.’’
60
Washing away past sins, protection from pains of death and Hell. It is believed that
during jihad, the first drop of bloodshed by a martyr washes all of their past sins
Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber 59
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away instantaneously, protecting them from the pains of death.
61
These pains
can include ‘‘the torment of the grave’’ and the ‘‘Great Horror,’’ otherwise known
as the ‘‘Day of Judgment.’’
62
According to a Hamas imam, being spared these
miseries ultimately reassures the martyr that: ‘‘he will not face any reckoning on that
Day of Judgment.’’
63
Another Imam emphasized the virtue of repentance: ‘‘there is
no reason to clean the corpse of the shahid, rather to leave it drenched in blood.
Why? So that the blood will testify in his merit before Allah on the day of resurrec-
tion.’’
64
The martyr is also granted the emotional security of freedom from the ‘‘fear
of hell.’’
65
This is especially meaningful for female suicide bombers, known for their
picturesque imagery of hell; involving thorns, wild fire and people dying—only to be
resurrected for the sole purpose of dying again.
66
72 Black eyed virgins (houris), food, and wine. Islamic jihad spiritual leaders
assert that in heaven, the martyr will be served and then married by seventy-two
houris (the black-eyed virgins of unnatural beauty).
67
Jihadist leaders attest to these
weddings in their sermons and writings. For example, Sheik ‘Ikrimi Sabri, the Mufti
of Jerusalem, describes how lucky the martyr is, since ‘‘the angels usher him to his
wedding in heaven.’’
68
Sheikh Radhwan describes in a sermon that the martyr ‘‘is
given 72 black-eyed women. ...This is one of the miracles of the shahid.’’
69
In an
Al-Qaeda manual found in Mohammad Atta’s suitcase, intended for him to read
prior to the 9=11 attacks, a promise was written: ‘‘You will be soon, with God’s
permission, with your heavenly brides in Heaven. Smile in the face of death. ... Know
that the Heavens have raised their most beautiful decoration for you, and that your
heavenly brides are calling you ...while wearing their most beautiful jewelry.’
70
These beliefs are ingrained into the minds of martyrs during recruitment and at
the outset of attack. Immediately before one martyr set out on a martyrdom mission,
a teacher wished him that the virgins should give him pleasure.
71
Muhammad Abu
Wardeh, a Hamas suicide bomber recruiter, discussed his conversation with a martyr
candidate: ‘‘I described to him how God would compensate the martyr for sacrific-
ing his life for his land. If you become a martyr, God will give you 70 virgins, 70
wives and everlasting happiness ...the dark-eyed houris, chaste as hidden pearls.’’
Islamic spiritual clerics solidify their reward message by bringing statements
from the Koran, describing the virgins: ‘‘beautiful like rubies, with complexions like
diamonds and pearls ...the martyrs and virgins shall delight themselves, lying on
green cushions and beautiful carpets.’’
72
Abu Hamza al-Kuwaiti, before performing
his attack, describes his dream of paradise: ‘‘I saw myself swimming in a river with
other people. The river led to a cave or a tunnel on which it was written: ‘To the
Highest Paradise’ ...when I approached, something was dragging me to the bottom
of the river. It was a beautiful young maiden of paradise. We hugged each other
under water.’’
73
Furthermore, al-Kuwaiti’s friend describes him as giving up the
good life, forfeiting his own scheduled wedding for the virgins of paradise.
74
Jalal,
a 15-year-old bomber captured with an explosive belt, expresses a similar stance:
‘‘I would even sell my parents, the entire world ...for paradise. ... It has the 72 vir-
gins, and God will grant me marriage with 72 virgins.’’
75
Mahdi Abu Malek wrapped
toilet paper around his genitals in expectation for his sexual rewards, when preparing
for his (foiled) attack, as to protect his organs for enjoying the sexual rewards.
76
Hamas celebrates martyrdom through festivities akin to a wedding, publicizing
a death notice in wedding announcement format. Desserts and juices chosen by the
fallen youth (in his will) are served to the hundreds of guests congregating at the
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martyr family’s house.
77
These death announcements are phrased as ‘‘weddings’’
between the martyr and the pure virgins of paradise.
78
Martyrs wholeheartedly believe their spiritual leaders are to grant them unlimi-
ted sex in the afterlife.
79
The promises of such rewards are extremely powerful,
especially in a traditional society that forbids casual relationships with the opposite
gender, and above all premarital sex. An anonymous martyr rejoices about paradise:
‘‘All that is forbidden in this world is permitted in the Garden of Eden. The Garden
of Eden has everything ...72 virgins.’’
80
The martyr’s exclusive rewards are also commonly believed to involve luxurious
food and wine—as emphatically depicted in Hasan-al-Saba’s farewell video
testimony: ‘‘In Paradise there is wine which you can drink without getting drunk.
There is also honey and leben.’’
81
Abu Kim, in his farewell video before committing
his attack, said: ‘‘72 virgins in paradise are waiting for a bachelor, the shahid ...
Everything we dream about is in paradise, food, delicacies ...there shall wait on
them immortal youths ...a cup of purest wine ...with fruits of their own choice
and flesh of fowls that they relish.’’
82
As mentioned above, not all the rewards are
relevant for every suicide bomber. Different rewards can be attributed to different
attackers, as in the case of female suicide bombers.
Guaranteed path to paradise for seventy of the martyr’s beloved ones. The shahids’
benefits are not limited to themselves alone, rather the act of martyrdom also
guarantees the path to paradise, otherwise described as ‘‘a place with God,’’ to
seventy of the martyr’s beloved ones.
83
Furthermore, the martyrdom operation is
said to redeem these 70 family members from the ‘‘grave’s pains.’’
84
This promise
alone can motivate the martyrs’ families to consent to their suicide,
85
explaining
why the martyrs often remind their families of this privilege during their farewells.
86
Martyrs may portray their eventual resurrection as compensation for their present
departure.
87
Hamed Abu Hejleh, who blew himself up in Netanya in 2001, promised:
‘‘If I have fallen short in my duty toward you in this world, I will not fall short
during judgment day. ... Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, has said that
the martyr intercedes (with God) on behalf of seventy of his family members.’’
88
A female prisoner said that on the day she went out to commit the suicide attack,
she felt a euphoric sense of fulfillment, like a bride on her wedding day; she couldn’t
stop thinking about the redemption of her family.
89
Thus, the martyr’s privileged
incentive to choose 70 family members for admittance to Paradise is intrinsic
to the choice to partake in terrorism.
90
The typical martyrs’ attributing motivation for martyrdom to these religious
rewards (based quite clearly on this Paradise scenario), suggests that their prepared-
ness for arrival in Paradise is not a function of pathological thinking, but of religious
socialization—characterized by:
(a) Deep religious feelings: In an interview with John Miller in 1998, Osama bin
Laden himself subscribed to this belief, saying: ‘‘I am one of the servants
of Allah. We do our duty of fighting for the sake of the religion of Allah.
It is also our duty.’’
91
(b) Following Islamic laws: All four Sunni Islamic schools of thought (Hanafi,
Maliki, Shafa’i, and Hanbali) and Shi’i traditions contend that, ‘‘jihad and
martyrdom, while not part of the five Islamic pillars of faith, are among the best
expressions of religious devotion and surest way.’’
92
Islamic fundamentalists
consider jihad and the role of martyrdom as so vital to Islamic laws and
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theology that they are all the more motivated to pursue them, obliged as a
‘‘soldier for Allah’’ to perform terrorist attacks.
93
Hassan Salame, a notorious
Palestinian suicide bomb commander, said: ‘‘the bombers are holy fighters who
carry out one of the more important articles of faith.’’
94
(c) Spending a great deal of time at the mosque: A failed suicide bomber mentions
their spiritual experience in a mosque: ‘‘I spent a month in a mosque. I learned
how important it is to be a shahid. It is the loftiest objective. It’s the biggest and
most holy thing you can do. And then you receive all the rewards in Paradise.’’
95
(d) Becoming a student of Martyrdom: ‘‘Dying in the noblest of all causes, Jihad,
which is an incumbent religious duty.’’
96
As we have seen, martyrs incorporate
religious principles into their farewell testimonies; Ismail al-M’asoubi, who
killed two Israelis in Gaza in 2001, states: ‘‘love for jihad and martyrdom has
come to possess my life, my being, my feelings, my heart ...my heart ached
when I heard the Qur’anic verses.’’
97
This fervent loyalty within the jihadist mindset can also be attributed to the very
young age at which believers are socialized into this martyrdom culture. Many sui-
cide bombers attest to these very elements in their recruitment firsthand. Mohammed
Rezaq, who skyjacked an Egypt Air passenger jet in 1985, describes being socialized
from boyhood ‘‘to be a heroic revolutionary fighting for the Palestinian nation.’’
98
Jihad is often the first word children learned to spell in Taliban religious schools.
As in the following Harakat (Pakistani-based Al-Qaida ally) Oath to Jihad:
‘‘I ...state in the presence of God that I will slaughter infidels my entire life.’’
99
This
early stage of religious indoctrination only further enhances the loyalty that
cultivates within the Jihadist prote
´ge
´.
Personal Rewards
The fundamentalists expertly circulate and publicize propaganda (via the media,
internet, education system, the mosque, etc.)—guaranteeing martyrs significant
personal rewards as well: honor, fame, and glory; redemption from ‘‘sinful
behavior’’; negating negative feelings of depression and helplessness; perception
of empowerment and identity; feeling morally superior; revenge. This upgraded status
is understood as the suicide bomber affirming his ‘‘newborn identity’’ by becoming
amartyr.
100
Honor, fame and glory; Becoming a hero. Becoming a martyr, subject to glorifi-
cation through a special saintly status, is one of the highest personal attainments.
101
Through this heroic sacrifice, the suicide bomber, yearning for individual glory, is
declared a ‘‘living martyr,’’ admired and envied by the community.
102
In this society,
young people are taught from birth that acquisition of honor and avoidance of
shame are the critical motivators of behavior. Any act of retaliation, even one that
has no realistic chance of recompense, can still be interpreted as heroic, nullifying
shame and negating humiliation.
103
Various sects in Islamic fundamentalism promote this link between a suicide
attack and glorified martyrdom. Hamas, for example, uses posters, martyr cards,
video statements, and films to institutionalize and inspire a ‘‘culture of martyrdom.’’
For that reason, many martyrs stress the ‘‘necessity of martyrdom’’ in their video-
taped statements—fulfilling their expectation of gaining the status and respect owed
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to martyrdom.
104
Palestinian national television inserts the virtue of martyrdom
into ‘‘Children’s Club’’—a Sesame Street-like program whose puppet shows, songs,
and Mickey Mouse character present martyrdom as a good and honorable deed,
celebrating violence, singing, ‘‘When I wander into Jerusalem, I will become a suicide
bomber.’’
105
Hizbullah demonstrates their members’ willingness to die for the terror-
ist cause in a ‘‘Martyr of the Month’’ calendar, featuring pictures of fallen zealots—
posted in public spaces, as well as by giving a shroud uniform lining to members
prepared to die.
106
Obeying the guidance of their leaders, many aspiring martyrs pursue this
glorified status and reputation. As expressed by Hafiz Hanif, a 16-year-old Al-Qaeda
recruit in Pakistan: ‘‘There is nothing more to be strived for in this life except joining
the Jihad and becoming a shahid.’’
107
Mohammed Alessa, an arrested jihadist
explains: ‘‘What’s better than sitting back here and working like a dog ...than mov-
ing forward to a life of honor, life of dignity, once Allah... takes your soul upon
that.’’
108
Saliman Arafi states in his farewell testimony, ‘‘I put on the suicide belt
and I felt proud.’’
109
Or, as stated by an anonymous prisoner: ‘‘...martyrdom
attacks which earn the most respect.’’
110
Finally, upon arrival in paradise, the
shahid’s soul ‘‘lives inside the vitals of the green birds of paradise circling around
the throne of honor.’’
111
Suicide bombers personally attest to this incentive of becoming a hero. One
example is Saajid Badat, who backed out of an aircraft bombing. He described his
feeling when listening to an audio tape about people killed while fighting in Bosnia:
‘‘It was almost the glamour factor of it, drawing me in ...’’
112
Or, as phrased by
Abu-Huzaifa before committing a terror attack, ‘‘It’s better to die with pride
than to live without dignity.’’
113
Redemption from ‘‘sinful behavior.’Through suicide bombing, martyrdom
is said to provide a spiritual form of both personal and collective redemption,
a legitimate means to clear one’s name from adulterous or any other forbidden sinful
behavior. Palestinian female suicide bombers have attested to committing or
planning a suicide attack so as to redeem themselves from a sin they had shamefully
committed, such as cheating on their husbands. This was the case with Andalib
Takatka, who blew herself up in a Jerusalem market. Similarly, during her
interrogation, Tahani Khalil confessed that she was en route to commit a suicide
attack—in order to purify her name after being caught cheating on her husband.
114
Terminating negative feelings of depression and helplessness. Martyrdom also
offers a dignified method to terminate negative feelings of depression, helplessness,
and an unfulfilling life. Entering paradise as a martyr therefore appeals as solving
circumstances of despair, rather than resorting to forbidden suicide. In many cases,
performing a suicide attack is an attempt to redeem shame and humiliation, to regain
pride and self-respect. Thus, the motivation behind fatalistic suicide is its sensational
reward: termination of negative feelings—an escape route from hopelessness.
115
Illusion of empowerment and identity. Performing a suicide attack can provide an
illusion of empowerment by overcoming feelings of helplessness, defying the victim
position by overcoming the fear of death.
116
Hammami, an American jihadist,
demonstrates this belief in an Internet forum: ‘‘Where is the desire to do something
amazing? Where is the urge to get up and change yourself ...let yourself fly?’’
117
Extremist ideologies appeal to those who lack control of their own destiny, solving
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their societal estrangement by offering a new identity and purpose with an escape
route to a fantasy world of jihad.
118
Thus, the martyr paradoxically believes that
one desperate act of self-destruction will bring forth self-recreation.
119
From Islamic religious extremism, martyrs derive an ultimate purpose to live
and to die for, trumping their personally lost significance and powerlessness.
120
Islamic fundamentalists contend that although composed of war-like martyrdom,
jihad births ethics and justice:
121
self-sacrifice as per Allah’s will.
122
When chosen
for martyrdom, one is thought to be sacrificing him or herself for the good of the
community,
123
thereby gaining empowerment, exhilaration, and jubilation.
124
This
sensation can explain why martyrs express no personal enmity toward their
victims—perceiving them as mere collateral damage.
125
An anonymous suicide
bomber conveyed the idea in this way: ‘‘I regarded armed actions to be essential ...
it proclaims that I am here, I exist, I am strong, I am in control, I am in the field, I am
on the map ...a major tool for penetrating the public consciousness.’’
126
In their last
will and testaments, suicide bombers frame self-sacrifice as a test of their identity,
courage, and faith.
127
Feeling morally superior. In the context of empowerment and self-identity
as personal awards, it should be mentioned that altruism might be, although not
necessarily, the opposite of self-interest, since people who make large sacrifices for
a defined cause often feel morally superior to people who do not make as big
a sacrifice—even if they avoid admitting it to others.
Revenge. Another powerful appeal of the martyr’s self-sacrifice is revenge—be it
for a collective loss on behalf of the community, or for the death of a loved one.
128
In
fact, some criminologists claim vengeance to be the most common accountable
motive for any terrorist enterprise.
129
Sana Snif, Safaa Jaber, Hala Jaber, and Arin
Ahmad, all of whom were females who failed to complete suicide attack plots, attri-
bute their motivation mostly to revenge. For example, after the suicide attack in
Afula, Israel, performed by Hiba Draagma in 2003, she expressed her desire to
avenge her sister’s arrest for Islamic jihad activity.
130
Such desires to avenge are also
stated more emphatically, as by Salah Abed El Hamid Shaker, whose attack killed 18
Israelis in 1995, stating, ‘‘I am going to take revenge upon the sons of the monkeys
and the pigs.’’
131
In another example, Najibullah Zazi, who failed to detonate bombs
on the New York City Subway system, declared in his martyrdom video that his
attack would be payback for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
132
Accordingly,
attack recruiters often exploit such candidates’ innocence, enthusiasm, personal
distress, and thirst for revenge.
133
According to Pedahzur et al.,
134
martyrdom’s benefits are present in ‘‘altruistic
fatalistic suicide terrorism’’: as a suicidal act allegedly ‘‘stems from a strong religious
conviction in the glorious destiny that awaits the perpetrator in the afterlife, follow-
ing the fulfillment of his mission on earth.’’
135
That is to say that even altruistic
suicide promises a reward in the afterlife.
Social Rewards
The social environment is an intrinsic part of martyrdom culture, emphasizing
virtues of honor, revenge, and the precedence of family over the self. These ideals
legitimize and essentially encourage Istishad behavior, glorifying the martyr.
As part of this process, favoring the terrorist organization’s wishes, individuals
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become influenced to blow themselves up—declaring dedication to the cause.
136
Additionally, the socialization process ultimately offers the martyr substantial
social rewards.
The martyr’s personal social status upgrade. The martyrs’ individual social status
and reputation in the community are significantly upgraded by gaining communal
approval and celebration.
137
Not only are they admired and envied by their peers,
138
their terrorist activities are considered acts of ‘‘ultimate patriotism and heroism.’’
139
An anonymous Fatah militant recalls: ‘‘After recruitment, my social status was
greatly enhanced. I got a lot of respect from my acquaintances, and from the young
people in the village.’’
140
Furthermore, having attained the community-wide status of hero and martyr,
141
every suicide bomber receives extensive and honorable media coverage.
142
This
coverage can be in the form of posters, websites, and public exhibits, for example
in murals at the al-Najah University of Nablus.
143
Alternatively, songs praising
the shahids, having formed a genre called ‘‘revenge songs,’’ are the greatest hits.
So too, martyrs’ actions are mimicked in children’s games.
144
Newly born babies,
streets, and terrorist cells are named after them.
145
Their faces adorn playing cards
and street posters; their recorded testimonies attract huge audiences, and at their
funerals they are celebrated with a fervency that is almost sexual in character—
celebrating their entry into heaven.
146
In other words, the martyrs become the
‘‘the rock stars’’ of young Muslim militants.
147
All of these promotional methods contribute to suicide bombers’ evolution into
‘‘model youth, worthy of emulation.’’
148
Consequently, the martyr’s inspirational
identity, promoted by recruitment posters, enhances motivation for fellow terrorists,
as the cause now appeals to those seeking power, wealth, and ideology—encouraging
them to join as volunteers.
149
Suicide bombers seize the opportunity for personal glory and an admirable place
in history through personification of warrior ethos.
150
Accordingly, the suicide act
brings the community’s endless gratitude for their sacrifice, becoming the subject
of martyrdom pamphlets, sermons, and mosque decorations.
151
More than mere gratitude, the martyrs’ choice to die this heroic death translates
into living on as a heroic legacy that future generations will strive to emulate.
152
This
is enabled by celebration of the suicide operation’s commencement rather than the
deaths brought forth.
It is not solely the glory of becoming a fallen martyr that draws Palestinian
youth to join a terrorist organization; rather a myriad of social incentives, such as
the bond they form with group members.
153
This appeal of social solidarity is
especially worthwhile to jihadist Muslims, as counteracting their emotional reality
of alienation sustains them with camaraderie, commiserating over feelings of
‘‘Muslim victimhood.’’
154
In this kinship, individuals revoke personal beliefs to enjoy
social solidarity.
155
Many Muslims in Europe, for example, utilize terrorist group
alliances as part of their quest for social and emotional support, due to the rejection
and alienation by their local societies.
156
The martyr’s family’s status upgrade. In tandem to the martyr’s individual
rewards, the martyr’s family also undergoes a status upgrade—both socially and
monetarily.
157
This familial social status is enhanced through special recognition
and honor.
158
The family hosts a wedding-like festival at their house, partially
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sponsored by the terror organization, greeting hundreds of guests who arrive
to congratulate them. The mother often ululates and dances joyfully over the honor
given to her by Allah, taking pride in her child’s heroic death.
159
In the martyrdom
video of Um-Suhaim, he stated: ‘‘I have decided to sacrifice myself in the name
of Allah and for the sake of my family.’’
160
When discussing the martyrs’ rewards,
Sheikh Mudeiris validates this martyrdom celebration, describing the shahid
as ‘‘enjoying virtues and the ability to perform miracles, which gives us the right
to congratulate the shahid and his family.’’
161
As one Kashmiri father noted, ‘‘everyone
treats me with more respect now that I have a martyred son ...it encourages more
children to join the jihad ...it raises the spirit of the entire village.’’
162
Familial monetary upgrade. Financial reward can be given to the family by
rebuilding their homes
163
or in direct sums of money, varying from $5,000 when
given for example by Hamas, and up to $10,000 to $25,000, when provided by
Saddam Hussein, or by the ‘‘Martyr’s Fund,’’ endorsed by private Saudi donors.
164
Over time, this amount has grown to $285,000. This money is delivered ceremonially,
presented to a parent or close relative of the fallen bomber.
165
Nada Mahdi, who
arrived at the ceremony carrying her son to collect a $25,000 check as compensation
for her husband Mohammad’s suicide attack, commented, ‘‘I am proud of
him ...May God reward him.’’
166
Ali Assad is one example among at least 60 other
martyrs, such as Muhammad Oumran and Ahmad Youssef, whose families, in
exchange for the martyr’s death, were given new homes adorned with the martyr’s
picture and name.
167
The recruiting terror groups embellish this incentive, reassuring
the suicide bombers that ‘‘their families will be better taken care of in their
absence.’’
168
Alternatively, suicide bombers and their families receive other forms
of material support—such as flour, sugar, clothing, and access to better jobs,
169
health care, and schooling. It is often this familial assistance alone that drives the
suicide bomber to commit an attack.
170
Method
Our assumption has been that the case of suicide terrorism is an anomaly, not rep-
resentative of all fundamentalist terrorism. But if the crime theory of Rational
Choice validly applies to this case (which appears irrational by definition), it may
indeed be applicable to other jihad terrorism cases as well.
The study of suicide terrorists poses empirical limitations; researchers cannot
base their studies on interviewing suicide bombers before the act, and it is obviously
impossible to interview successful suicide bombers retroactively. However, some stu-
dies base their analysis on case studies of failed suicide terrorist attacks. The case
study method is especially useful for the current study, focusing on illustrating
why individuals commit the act of suicide terrorism.
171
This study also attempts to
infer from the specific case of suicide bombing to patterns of terrorism in general.
Previous SCP and terrorism research has tended to use the script approach to
identify how the crime was committed and used this knowledge to devise interven-
tions to remove these opportunities.
172
While this work is valuable, our paper
extends the SCP and terrorism approach by offering deep understanding of the sui-
cide bombers’ pursuit of self-gratifying rewards to maximize their benefits. We
assume that understanding the reward system of suicide bombers can inspire
intervention policy to cope with this phenomenon.
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The research strategy for studying the case of UFAM is to investigate his
real-life context, to identify underlying principles behind what drove him personally
to become a suicide bomber. UFAM’s case offers novel combinations of causative
circumstances, leading to conclusions about UFAM’s specific context alone. Yet,
if rational behavior can be illustrated, particularly among UFAM’s pursuit of
rewards, one can gain insights into other cases of Jihadist terrorism.
One of the authors prepared a memorandum based on a tremendous amount of
material (on behalf of the United States Department of Justice) to provide the court
with information for sentencing.
173
The case study of UFAM is based on this pub-
lished memorandum. The materials include interviews by the FBI agents, statements
submitted to the court by UFAM, and video released by Al Qaeda about UFAM
and the circumstances that encouraged him to try to become a martyr.
174
Through his statements and behavior, rather than by interviewing him directly,
a great deal can be learned about UFAM and what provoked his attempt to blow up
an aircraft. The following section outlines the main supporting elements of the
argument that UFAM fits the profile of the classic martyr as described above,
and that his decision to become a suicide bomber is a product of the same jihadist
reward-incentives kit meant to promote such behavior on a national scale.
The Case Study of Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab (UFAM)
UFAM’s declared reasoning for his attack emphasizes fundamental jihadist propa-
ganda, masking the true rational choice he made—intrinsically based on anticipated
costs, and religious, social, and personal benefits. As in the case of many other
martyrs, UFAM might believe at least some of the jihadist propaganda explaining
his specific attack, yet this is evidently not his only motivation for martyrdom.
For example, in his statement before the court, he claims his attack was an outcome
of the American people being ‘‘guilty of the sin, and Obama should pay for the
crime.’’
175
Contrary to his statement made in court, in his previous FBI debriefing,
176
UFAM claims his mission was not to specifically target the U.S. Rather, he expresses
his readiness to pursue whatever jihad path others directed him to pursue, regardless
of the country or target involved. In fact, UFAM even deems it acceptable to
conduct attacks against a Muslim country that neither practices nor supports
fundamentalist beliefs.
UFAM’s Religious Background and Rewards
As mentioned earlier, the typical religious background of the potential shahid is
characterized by: (a) deep religious feelings, (b) following the Islamic laws, (c) spending
a great deal of time at the mosque, and (d) becoming a student of Shahada (martyrdom).
UFAM personifies all of these characteristics as seen in the following examples:
Deep religious feeling. UFAM is evidently guided by deep religious feelings,
as he wrote to his mother
177
:
Allah knows what is best. ...I ask you for the sake of Allah to let me stay
here and come closer to him. This is ‘‘insha allah’’ (God’s will) what is
best for me spiritually in my worldly affairs and in the hereafter (after this
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life).... Oh mother don’t despair or worry and never lose hope in the
mercy of Allah. Read the speech of Allah and its meanings as much as
you can. May Allah take care of you wherever you are like you took care
of me all my life. May Allah also take care of me wherever I am and I put
my full trust in him. I will be fine wherever I am and nothing will happen
to me except what Allah has written which there is no escape from wher-
ever I may be.... I will come back ‘‘Insha Allah’’ and we will have a
happy reunion by the mercy of Allah and his favor. But not now, sooner
or a little while later.
UFAM espouses Aulaqi’s lectures, which distinguish between the holy act of
martyrdom and suicide;
178
Islam forbids the latter, as previously noted.
UFAM believes that: ‘‘If we are patient and put our trust in Allah then he will
make whatever he has decreed easy for us. And Allah has promised ...hardship ease
will definitely come.’’ In what UFAM believes is his last message to his mother (‘‘my
phone will be disposed after this message’’) he writes: ‘‘Allah guides us and that Allah
saves us from the love of this world and our evil desires.’’ He follows the principle:
‘‘God guides people in ways they don’t always expect. Then when you receive a mess-
age from God it is viewed as religious evidence supporting your commitment.’’
179
‘‘Allah would favor this martyrdom path.’’
180
When the airplane was approaching U.S. territory, UFAM went to the
restroom, washed his face, brushed his teeth, put on cologne, and returned to his
seat, saying his final prayers, and only then did he push the plunger on the device.
181
Through these acts (prior to pushing the plunger), UFAM prepared for martyrdom
by purifying himself—body and soul.
Following the Islamic laws. There is no doubt that UFAM is preoccupied with
following the theological protocol of Islamic fundamentalism. He believes that one
needs to physically travel and participate in jihad to fulfill one’s religious obligation.
UFAM was never given a Fatwah (religious ruling) regarding his decision to commit
jihad. UFAM believes that no Fatwah needs to be issued on that topic,
182
as all
Muslims already know that jihad is authorized. Moreover, he believes a Muslim is
equally as religiously obliged to participate in jihad as he is to fast and to pray.
183
UFAM referred to the religious commandment of donation (which is also one of
the five pillars of Islam) repeatedly: ‘‘It is binding upon everyone to seek knowledge
and to constantly make donations.’’ For example, he donated a few hundred pounds
to an organization that supports families of prisoners in the UK.
184
Spending a great deal of time in the mosque. UFAM reveals to the agents that he
indeed spent a great deal of time at the mosque, attending various mosques
185
wherever he has traveled or resided. UFAM states that at a certain period he began
memorizing the Koran, praying at the mosque, and listening to Aulaqi’s many
lectures on jihad and other Islamic topics.
Becoming a student of Shahada (martyrdom). UFAM makes a point to present
himself as a student of Shahada, while he differentiates between Muslims who are
jihadists and those who are not jihadists, such as Sheik Yassir Qudhi. While at UCL,
UFAM claimed that he did not want to participate in jihad and did not subscribe
at that time to religious philosophy that supported jihad.
186
It was only later, when
UFAM felt that God was guiding him to jihad, that he ‘‘saw the doors open’’ before
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him. In the summer of 2009, UFAM was nearing a two-month break from his course
work in Dubai, and he viewed it as a sign from God that he should take this opport-
unity to travel to Yemen, seek out Aulaqi, and participate in jihad. Later, during the
Ramadan, his conviction became more intense.
187
UFAM’s expressed religious devotion to martyrdom, such as fasting (one of the
five pillars of Islam), convinced others such as Abdul Aziz that UFAM was ready to
become a martyr.
188
Aulaqi suggested that UFAM pray for religious guidance
regarding the right time to schedule the flight, and then to travel when he was ready.
The group had to reach a level of trust that the martyr would perform the mission.
According to UFAM, this matter of trust was delicate. The members of the group
routinely approached this very spiritually, praying for guidance about the indivi-
dual’s reliability, as they did in UFAM’s case. They would pray until they received
a symbolic indication that the selected individual would actually perform the
mission, and only then would they develop the required trust.
189
UFAM argues that he does not believe his family bears religious authority to
dissuade him from his decision to commit martyrdom.
190
This would have required
a command from a powerful religious authority associated with jihad, such as
Aulaqi, to prevent him from completing his mission, as Aulaqi held all the power
to make this decision. UFAM believed he had decided on a path of jihad, and destiny
and=or fate would determine whether martyrdom would be his path.
191
UFAM believes that martyrdom is already assumed to be part of jihad and is
just one of several ways in which a person can participate in jihad.
192
A martyr works
with people he trusts to determine whether that is the appropriate course of jihad for
him. UFAM prayed for guidance from Allah seeking jihad, and he wanted Allah to
make it easy for him.
193
UFAM’s Personal Background and Rewards
Martyr’s reward. Islamic fundamentalist jihadists preach and emphasize
martyrdom’s meaningful, personal rewards in the eternal life, in the highest gardens
of paradise. Interestingly, UFAM mentions this reward briefly when writing to his
mother:
194
‘‘I ask you for the sake of Allah to let me stay here and come closer to
him... what is best for me spiritually in my worldly affairs and in the hereafter [after
this life].... I will come back ...and we will have a happy reunion.’’ Yet UFAM does
not propose these reinforcements as his reasoning for becoming a martyr. This
phenomenon is also characteristic of other martyrs, who believe that revealing their
expectations for rewards belittles their act.
Yet, we maintain that the rewards of martyrdom play a significant part for
UFAM; when he talks about Aulaqi’s possible martyrdom, he stresses his belief that
if Aulaqi were to be killed, he would be entitled to a martyr’s reward. UFAM
explains (again, not in the context of his own martyrdom) that there are different
tiers of reward for martyrdom.
195
For example, UFAM believes that if the accusa-
tions (of soliciting prostitution) against Aulaqi were true, Aulaqi could repent for
these sins—enabling his commitment to jihad to override such transgressions. He
adds that people are imperfect beings who make mistakes.
196
We can therefore infer
that UFAM is both concerned and troubled about accounting before God for his
committed sins—which committing martyrdom can repent for. UFAM explains that
in Allah’s sliding scale of forgiveness, a Muslim’s punishment of hell can be annulled
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at any time. In the Islamic faith, several of the Muslim’s sins can be repented through
displaying religious faith and devotion right before death—as Allah’s mercy
overcomes his anger.
197
UFAM values and lectures on black magic: its origins, preventions, and cures.
From this, his preoccupation (to say the least) with the unknown and the mystical
can be understood. He speaks about jinns (which are frequently mentioned in the
Koran and the Haddith). Jinns are creatures made from fire, which have the proper-
ties of light. UFAM believes that jinns frequently possess people, then use the
possessed to do their work by proxy.
198
Martyrdom guarantees Paradise and there-
fore protects one from such evil forces.
UFAM’s writings to his mother
199
portray his beliefs and expectations regarding
the afterlife: ‘‘May Allah reward you with jannah (paradise), where no soul is
unhappy and have a good life for what you’ve done for me. He is well aware and
never forgets. Amen. May peace, serenity and tranquility of Allah descend on you
always amen.... May Allah make it a successful and happy event for you all, amen.’’
Illusion of empowerment and identity. UFAM tells the investigators that he
hardened himself to be someone who would do whatever was asked of him in
support of the jihad.
200
He quoted a verse from the article ‘‘Constants of Jihad,’’
which states, ‘‘fighting has been prescribed for you but you hate it.’’ UFAM viewed
this statement as parallel to verses from the Koran, suggesting that at times one needs
to participate in bad acts, such as ‘‘fighting to achieve the greater good.’’
201
These
statements are a classic expression of empowerment, a declaration that he is strong
and in control. The fact that he was appointed through a holy command gave him
the power to turn innocent people into ‘‘collateral damage.’’ UFAM, on the day of his
arrest, when asked by a hospital nurse:
202
‘‘About today on the plane, don’t you con-
sider that harming yourself or others?’’ UFAM replied: ‘‘No, that is martyrdom.’’
UFAM claims that he was resolved to kill, believing in the righteousness of the
attack. He perceives himself as a major vessel transforming cruel terror into a sacred
mission. In performing the suicide attack, UFAM could demonstrate control over
his victims and his own destiny, establishing a new identity and purpose for himself.
UFAM told the agents that his motivation was his religious obligation to conduct
jihad, not hatred toward the U.S.
203
Rather, he was prepared to fulfill his mission
of jihad against any enemy.
204
UFAM’s Social Background and Rewards
Glorification, solidarity, and camaraderie. The case of UFAM exemplifies that
jihadist sponsors of suicide bombings use a ‘‘tool box’’ of concepts, myths, symbols,
ceremonies, and rituals—all of which honor and publicize their ‘‘martyrs’’ and their
‘‘heroic’’ sacrifice. As far as his significant social environment is concerned, he is
exposed to a culture that provides militant terror propaganda
205
via the media,
Internet,
206
newsletters,
207
and other interactions at the mosque and elsewhere.
208
UFAM watched propaganda videos
209
intended for the Mujahedeen community, which
glorify martyrs who attacked the secular, corrupt Muslim regimes such as the Yemeni
government. The videos were created as propaganda and to provide justification for
the attack, as well as to portray the capabilities of Al Qaeda in Yemen.
UFAM found social incentive in joining a terrorist organization, such as the
bond to be formed with other group members. He was deeply influenced by a jihadist
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who preached in England and elsewhere, and would meet with him intensively
(as often as three times a week).
210
As with other suicide bombers, UFAM found
great appeal in social solidarity and camaraderie, as he bonded with other
fundamentalists. While residing at Abu Tarak’s residence in Sana, Yemen, UFAM
spoke regularly with Abu Tarak and with three other individuals who visited him
daily, discussing jihad and martyrdom with them.
211
UFAM also discussed the
concept of jihad with Uthmann, who supported Mujahidin worldwide as early
as 2005. UFAM identified with Aulaqi, who frequently spoke of jihad and interacted
with other fighters, and while in Yemen, UFAM met with a man from Al Qaeda who
further deepened his conviction.
212
In this kinship, UFAM forfeited his individual beliefs to enjoy social solidarity and,
by his own admission, was highly influenced by leaders that, as we have seen, dictated
existential decisions for him. Prior to UFAM’s decision to conduct jihad, Sheikh Gumi
was the most influential person in UFAM’s life. Sheikh Aulaqi then replaced Sheikh
Gumi for UFAM, as he then became completely committed to Sheikh Aulaqi.
213
UFAM claims that if he had been doubtful about conducting jihad, he would still have
pursued the martyrdom mission. The only way that UFAM would not have done so
would be if Aulaqi or Abdul Aziz had for some reason directed him against the mis-
sion.
214
UFAM rationalizes that his exhibiting a submissive and dependent personality
constitutes obedience to a religious command—that every Muslim should swear
allegiance to a leader.
215
Manipulated by fundamentalists such as Aulaqi and his
internet lectures, UFAM claims that his main motivation for conducting the martyrdom
mission included his interpretation of Koranic verses
216
and his regular attendance
at prayers, where he met and interacted with fundamentalist Islamists. UFAM was
familiar with all of Aulaqi’s lectures, as they were an important motivator, ultimately lead-
ingUFAMtodecidetoparticipateinjihad. In 2005, he began listening to these lectures
and reading Aulaqi’s writings, motivating him to accept martyrdom as a possibility.
217
UFAM then participated in the ritual of preparing a martyr’s video, after Aulaqi
informed him that he would bring down a plane and that he should prepare a video.
UFAM spent time thinking about the content of his martyr’s video.
218
On about
December 2 or 3, 2009, UFAM made a martyr’s video, with the help of two video
technicians who provided the equipment. They brought a black flag with Islamic
writing for the background, as well as clothing
219
and other props. It took them
approximately 2 or 3 days to film the video.
In terms of his religious and social background, UFAM is a quintessential
example of a martyr. The manipulation of Islamic fundamentalist jihadists offered
UFAM meaningful religious, personal, and social rewards, such as assurance of
eternal life in paradise (with all the related benefits), illusion of empowerment,
identity, glorification, solidarity, and camaraderie.
UFAM claims that the bomb’s failure to explode was mere evidence that it was
not his time to die. Insisting that he had not failed to deploy the device properly, he
claimed rather that the failed mission could be the result of God wanting to purify
him (as he was not ready for martyrdom yet). Since he felt jihad was the right
decision, nothing could have caused him to reconsider.
Discussion and Conclusions
Contrary to some prior research, we argue that suicide bombing is not mostly
motivated by altruism, which favors the goals of one’s group=society over pursuing
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self-gratifying benefits. Rather, suicide bombing is a result of rational situational
choice, based on the decision-making process of evaluating the costs and anticipated
benefits of one’s actions. UFAM, in his own testimony, claims that the decision
to actually pursue jihad and become a martyr is an outcome of a decision-making
process. Only upon completion of this decision-making process,
220
he argues, could
he be certain that martyrdom was the right course of action for him.
Many militant groups structure and package their existing struggle as part of the
Islamic tradition of jihad and martyrdom. This study presents the extensive socializa-
tion and indoctrination mechanisms that promote and breed suicide bombers by
building incentives and utilizing ceremonies and rituals for such choices. To better
understand suicide terrorism as performed by Islamic extremists, we must realize
that whether or not paradise, along with its martyrdom rewards, exists is irrelevant.
Rather, what is imperative is the suicide terrorist’s belief that it exists. Similar
to Pedahzur et al., the findings of this study support the conclusion that: ‘‘social
structure, together with the individual’s subjective point of view, both play a major
role in the realm of suicide terrorism.’’
221
To demonstrate that those involved in terrorism base their behavior on rational
choice, the study aims to show that even those who kill themselves in suicide attacks,
exhibiting seemingly irrational or altruistic behavior, do so while considering future
self-gratifying benefits. It is not mostly altruistic motivation that drives individuals
to make the ultimate sacrifice; rather, the suicide bombers’ self-lethal behavior is
rooted in its anticipated costs and benefits. If this reasoning is true, there is no
fundamental difference between the motivations of suicide bombers and those of other
criminals. Both behaviors are committed to maximizing self-gratifying, beneficial
behavior. Therefore, if one can conclude that there is no motivational difference
between UFAM as a suicide bomber and other individuals as criminals, one might
assume that generally speaking, this motivation can account for that of other suicide
bombers as well; however, this will require further research.
We believe that a better understanding of the motivations of suicide bombers
can help decision-makers devise organizational and conceptual solutions to defuse
the threat of such martyrdom.
Those who differentiate between crime and terrorism heavily base their claim on
a major difference existing between the motivations for crime and those for terror-
ism. Criminals, they argue, are committed to self-gratification, whereas terrorists
seek a higher cause.
222
The present article challenges this approach, joining the grow-
ing body of knowledge which perceives terrorism in general and suicide bombing
in particular to be a crime triggered by egotistical=hedonistic motivations, like that
of ordinary criminals.
223
It is also important to emphasize that we do not deny the
centrality of feelings of anger and frustration in triggering acts of terrorism; it is
reasonable to assume that these negative sentiments are fertile ground for terrorism
and political violence. Yet, these strong sentiments are also common among
wider audiences and are not unique to terrorists. In our opinion, it is explicitly the
martyrdom reward system that encourages terrorists choosing to commit acts of
terror in general, and suicide in particular.
Our study is based especially on a case study of UFAM, and statements of other
individuals engaged in suicide terrorist acts. It is important to emphasize that
this case provided insight into our argument; however, this is not enough to enable
a definitive conclusion. The methodological obstacles posed by this sort of research
(in the area of suicide terrorism) make it challenging to reach a wider sample
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population. Therefore it is important to encourage further studies (including case
studies) to be conducted in this area, so that the ‘‘rational choice’’ perspective of sui-
cide terrorists can be further examined and broader understandings can be reached.
Notes
1. Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1951).
2. Antoon Leenaars and Susanne Wenckstern, ‘‘Altruistic Suicides: Are They the Same
or Different from Other Suicides?,’’ Archives of Suicide Research 8, no. 1 (2004): 131–136;
J. W. Reimer, ‘‘Durkheim’s ‘Heroic Suicide’ in Military Combat,’’ Armed Forces and Society
25, no. 1 (1998): 103–120; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide
Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger, and Leonard
Weinberg, ‘‘Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists,’’
Deviant Behavior 24 (2003): 405–423.
3. Antoon Leenaars, ‘‘Altruistic Suicide: A Few Reflections,’’ Archives of Suicide
Research 8, no. 1 (2004): 1–7. Also, see Pedahzur et al., ‘‘Altruism and Fatalism’’ (note 2 above).
4. Bryan Caplan, ‘‘Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,’’ Public
Choice 128 (2006): 91–107; Ronald Clarke and Graeme Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
5. See also Caplan, ‘‘Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model’’ (note 4
above); also see Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (note 4 above).
6. Ronald Clarke and Derek B. Cornish, ‘‘Rational Choice,’’ in R. Paternoster and
R. Bachman, eds., Explaining Criminals and Crime: Essays in Contemporary Criminology
Theory (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2001), 23–42.
7. The role of handlers is important, maybe as important as the suicide bomber him-
self. In this article we focus on the motivation of the suicide bomber and how it is influenced
by the handlers and the Islamic fundamentalist subculture’s manipulations which promote
their goals by building a reward system.
8. A. Margalit, ‘‘The Suicide Bombers (Israeli=Palestinian Conflict),’’ New York
Review of Books 50, no. 1 (2003): 36–39.
9. Mohammed Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide
Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,’’ Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 29, no. 2 (2006): 165–185.
10. Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (see note 4 above).
11. Ibid., viii.
12. Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (see note 4 above).
13. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia
University, 2005), 39; Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005); See Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making
of Suicide Bombers’’ (note 9 above); see also Pape, Dying to Win (note 4 above).
14. Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (see note 4 above).
15. Ibid., 11.
16. This in turn will affect the general motivation, since successful attacks have an epi-
demiological effect while field attacks have a deterrent effect.
17. Joshua D. Freilich and Graeme R. Newman, eds., Reducing Terrorism Through
Situational Crime Prevention, Crime Prevention Studies (Rockville, MD: National Criminal
Justice Reference Service [NCJRS], 2009), 25.
18. Altruism might not be the opposite of self-interest, since feeling morally superior
empowers one’s sense of self-identity and could be considered a personal reward (see section
entitled ‘‘Feeling Morally Superior’’ under ‘‘Personal Rewards’’).
19. Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, 25, of Kaduna, Nigeria, the so-called ‘‘underwear
bomber,’’ was sentenced to life in prison as a result of his guilty plea to all eight counts of
a federal indictment charging him for his role, on behalf of al-Qaeda, in the attempted
Christmas Day 2009 bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 over Detroit (See Department
of Justice, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Sentenced to Life in Prison for Attempted Bombing of
Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009, February 16, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
February/12-ag-227.html).
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20. Derek B. Cornish and Ronald Clarke, The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice
Perspectives on Offending (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986).
21. Clarke and Cornish, ‘‘Rational Choice’’ (see note 6 above).
22. John Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1–26.
23. Ronald Clarke, ed., Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2nd ed.
(New York: Harrow and Heston, 1997).
24. Travis Hirschi, ‘‘On the Compatibility of Rational Choice and Social Control
Theories of Crime,’’ in D. B. Cornish and R. V. Clarke, eds., The Reasoning Criminal:
Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), 105–117.
25. Marcus Felson and Ronald V. G. Clarke, Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical
Theory for Crime Prevention, Police Research Series, Paper 98 (London: Home Office,
Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 1998).
26. Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (see note 4 above), 5.
27. See also Laura Dugan, Gary LaFree, Alex R. Piquero, ‘‘Testing a Rational Choice
Model of Airline Hijackings,’’ in Paul Kantor et al., eds., Intelligence and Security Informatics
(Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005), 340–361, who used the Rational Choice Theory of crime to
show how the use of metal detectors in American airports reduced airline hijacking
dramatically.
28. Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers’’
(see note 9 above).
29. Debra Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 7.
30. We emphasize that in this article we are referring only to Islamic jihadists and not
other forms of suicide terrorism like LTTE.
31. Ahmed M. Abdul-Khalek, ‘‘Neither Altruistic Suicide, nor Terrorism but Martyrdom:
A Muslim Perspective,’’ Archives of Suicide Research 8, no. 1 (2004): 99–113; Anat Berko, Yuval
Wolf, and Moshe Addad, ‘‘The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal
Terrorism,’’ ICT Papers (2004): 1–17, http://www.ict.org.il/Article/903/The%20Moral%20
Infrastructure%20of%20Chief%20Perpetrators%20of%20Suicidal%20Terrorism; Boaz Ganor,
‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview,’’ ICT Papers (2000): 1–6; Mohammed Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom
Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,’’ Terrorism
and Political Violence 19 (2007): 95–115, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
binladen/who/; Yoram Schweitzer, ‘‘Suicide and the September 11 Attacks,’’ ICT Papers
(2003): 1–9.
32. Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’ (see note 31 above); Bradley Thayer and
Valerie Hudson, ‘‘Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Ter-
rorism,’’ International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 37–62.
33. Jerrold Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of
Contemporary Terrorism,’’ Political Psychology 26, no. 4 (2005): 615–636, 627.
34. Steven Stalinsky, Palestinian Authority Sermons 2000–2003, The Middle East Media
Research Institute, Special Report No. 24 (2003), http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/
0/0/0/1027.htm.
35. Ibid.
36. Scott Atran, ‘‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,’’ The Washington
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 127–147; Berko, Wolf, and Addad, ‘‘The Moral Infrastruc-
ture of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal Terrorism’’ (see note 31 above); Anat Berko and Edna
Erez, ‘‘ ‘Ordinary People’ and ‘Death Work’: Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers
and Victims,’’ Violence and Victims 20, no. 6 (2005): 603–623; see Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism:
An Overview’’ (note 31 above); Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of
Suicide Bombers’’ (see note 9 above); Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31
above).
37. Adam Lankford, ‘‘Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?,’’ Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 4 (2011): 337–366, 340.
38. Peter Warren Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror,’’ in J. J. F. Forest, ed., The
Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006), 105–119; Scott Atran, ‘‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,’’ Science
(New York, N.Y.) 299, no. 5612 (2003): 1534–1539.
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39. Atran, ‘‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 38 above); see also Ariel Merari,
‘‘Suicide Terrorism in the Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’’ (paper presented
at the National Institute of Justice Suicide Terrorism Conference, October, 2004), 25–26;
Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (see note 33 above).
40. Atran, ‘‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 38 above), 1536.
41. Unlike those who commit suicide to fulfill their personal desire to die, as explained
by a Palestinian prisoner, martyrdom ‘‘is not suicide. Suicide is selfish, it is weak, it
is mentally disturbed, this is istishad’’ (A. Silke, ‘‘The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict,
and Terrorism,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 35–46, 43).
42. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above).
43. http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/08/can-infidels-be-innocents
44. Berko, Wolf, and Addad, ‘‘The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal
Terrorism’’ (see note 31 above); Pedahzur et al., ‘‘Altruism and Fatalism’’ (see note 2 above).
45. Nasra Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the Human Bombs,’’ The
New Yorker, November 19, 2001, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/
an-arsenal-of-believers.
46. Berko and Erez, ‘‘ ‘Ordinary People’ and ‘Death Work’: Palestinian Suicide Bombers
as Victimizers and Victims’’ (see note 36 above); Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’
(see note 31 above); Assaf Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada:
Motivations and Organizational Aspects,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003): 65–92.
47. Laurence Miller, ‘‘The Terrorist Mind: I. A Psychological and Political Analysis,’’
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 50, no. 2 (2006): 121–138.
48. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
49. Ibid.
50. Clara Beyler, ‘‘Chronology of Suicide Bombings Carried out by Women,’’
ICT Papers (2003), 1–3.
51. Lankford, ‘‘Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidial?’’ (see note 37 above), 341.
52. Thayer and Hudson, ‘‘Sex and the Shaheed’’ (see note 32 above).
53. Ibid., 42.
54. Beyler, ‘‘Chronology of Suicide Bombings Carried out by Women’’ (see note 50
above); Thayer and Hudson, ‘‘Sex and the Shaheed’’ (see note 32 above).
55. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
56. Arie W. Kruglanski and Agnieszka Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group
Process and Organizational Strategies in Suicide Terrorism,’’ in E. M. Meyersson Milgrom,
ed., Suicide Missions and the Market for Martyrs: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~hannahk/Terrorism_
files/GroupProcess.pdf.
57. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
58. Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’ (see note 31 above), 3.
59. Israeli Security Service (Shabak), Female Involvement in Palestinian Terrorism
[in Hebrew] (Israel: Author, September 2007), 12–18, http://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/
study/Pages/women-terror.aspx?webid=a3db3c16-25d8-423d-98df-eb1b9253ab93.
60. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imx0AnNxUmY
61. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above); Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian
Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (see note 46 above); Singer, ‘‘The New Children
of Terror’’ (see note 38 above); Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above).
62. Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (see note 46
above); Stalinsky, Palestinian Authority Sermons 2000–2003 (see note 34 above); Thayer
and Hudson, ‘‘Sex and the Shaheed’’ (see note 32 above).
63. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
64. http://www.palwatch.org.il/main.aspx?fi=111&fld_id=111&doc_id=4390
65. Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (see note 46
above).
66. Berko and Erez, ‘‘ ‘Ordinary People’ and ‘Death Work’’’ (see note 36 above).
67. Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’ (see note 31 above); Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal
of Believers’’ (see note 45 above); Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above); Hafez,
‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers’’ (see note 9 above);
Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
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68. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above), 111.
69. Stalinsky, Palestinian Authority Sermons 2000–2003 (see note 34 above).
70. Kanan Makiya and Hassan Mneimneh, ‘‘Manual for a ‘Raid,’’’ New York Review of
Books, January 17, 2002, 1–13, 9.
71. Jack Kelley, ‘‘The Sickening World of Suicide Terrorists,’’ USA Today, June 26,
2001, 1.
72. Ibid., 1.
73. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above), 109.
74. Ibid., 105.
75. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZADVmQLEW8
76. Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (see note 46
above).
77. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
78. Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organiza-
tional Strategies in Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above).
79. Kelley, ‘‘The Sickening World of Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 71 above).
80. Berko and Erez, ‘‘ ‘Ordinary People’ and ‘Death Work’’’ (see note 36 above).
81. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3-kY7J3c4c
82. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lS5j-PLy3TU
83. Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organiza-
tional Strategies in Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above), 7–9.
84. A. Kruglanski, X. Chen, M. Dechesne, S. Fishman, and E. Orehek, ‘‘Fully Commit-
ted: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance,’’ Political
Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 331–357.
85. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
86. Stalinsky, Palestinian Authority Sermons 2000–2003 (see note 34 above).
87. Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers’’ (see
note 9 above).
88. Ibid., 8.
89. Berko et al., ‘‘The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal Terrorism’’
(see note 31 above), 18.
90. Israeli Secret Service, Female Involvement in Palestinian Terrorism (see note 59 above).
91. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/
92. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above).
93. Ann Aly and Jason Striegher, ‘‘Examining the Role of Religion in Radicalization to
Violent Islamist Extremism,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35, no. 12 (2012): 849–862; see
also Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (note 46 above); see
also Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (note 33 above).
94. Jerrold Post, ‘‘Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide
Terrorists,’’ Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 381–385, 382.
95. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
96. http://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/jan/12/books.guardianreview5/print
97. Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers’’ (see
note 9 above), 12.
98. Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (see note 33 above), 624.
99. Atran, ‘‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 32), 6.
100. Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organiza-
tional Strategies in Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above).
101. Ibid.
102. Kruglanski et al., ‘‘Fully Committed’’ (see note 84 above).
103. Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (note 46 above);
Richardson, What Terrorists Want (Vienna, Austria: Renner Institute, 2007); see also Singer,
‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
104. Martha Crenshaw, ‘‘Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,’’ Security Stu-
dies 16, no. 1 (January–March 2007): 133–162.
105. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above), 113.
106. Anna Schbley, ‘‘Torn Between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of
Lebanon’s Religious Terrorists,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 23, no. 3 (2010): 175–196.
76 S. Perry and B. Hasisi
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107. Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives: The Existential Attrac-
tions of Terrorism,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011): 963–986, 977.
108. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above), 979.
109. Post, ‘‘Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide
Terrorists’’ (see note 94 above), 382.
110. Laura Trevelyan: ‘‘Shoe-bomber Supergrass Saajid Badat Testifies in US,’’ BBC
News, April 23, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17820810.
111. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above), 8).
112. Trevelyvan, ‘‘Shoe-bomber Supergrass Saajid Badat Testifies in US’’ (see note 110
above).
113. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7XUN3H2hSk&playnext=1&list=PL7C586
018A4EE9C86&feature=results_main.
114. Berko et al., ‘‘The Moral Infrastructure of Chief Perpetrators of Suicidal Terrorism’’
(see note 31 above); Crenshaw, ‘‘Explaining Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 104 above);
Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (note 46 above); Israeli
Secret Service, Female Involvement in Palestinian Terrorism (see note 59 above).
115. Max Abrahams, ‘‘What Terrorists Really Want,’’ International Secuirty 22, no. 4
(2008): 78–105; Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and
Organizational Strategies in Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above); Michael Taarnby,
Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists (Aarhus: Center for Cultural Research, University of
Aarhus, November 27, 2003), 8; Pedahzur et al., ‘‘Altruism and Fatalism’’ (see note 2 above).
116. Don Van Natta, Jr., ‘‘Big Bang Theory; The Terror Industry Fields Its Ultimate
Weapon,’’ The New York Times, August 24, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/24/
weekinreview/big-bang-theory-the-terror-industry-fields-its-ultimate-weapon.html?pagewanted=
all&src=pm.
117. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above), 976; Hassan,
‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
118. Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organiza-
tional Strategies in Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above); Taarnby, ‘‘Profiling Islamic Sui-
cide Terrorists’’ (see note 115 above).
119. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above); Kruglanski and
Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations’’ (see note 56 above).
120. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above).
121. Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers’’
(note 9 above); Thayer and Hudson, ‘‘Sex and the Shaheed’’ (see note 32 above).
122. Merari, Suicide Terror in the Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (see note 39
above).
123. Kruglanski et al., ‘‘Fully Committed’’ (see note 84 above); Singer, ‘‘The New
Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
124. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
125. Nichole Argo, Human Bombs: Rethinking Religion and Terror, MIT Center for
International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, 06-07, April 2006, http://web.
mit.edu/cis/pdf/argo_audit_4.06.pdf.
126. Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (see note 33 above), 623.
127. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above).
128. Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’ (see note 31 above); Mohammed Hafez,
Manufacturing Human Bombs: Strategy, Culture, and Conflict in the Making of Palestinian
Suicide Terrorism (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 2004); Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian
Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (note 46 above); Berko and Erez, ‘‘‘Ordinary People’
and ‘Death Work’’’ (see note 36 above); Richardson, What Terrorists Want (see note 103 above);
Silke, ‘‘The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism’’ (see note 41 above).
129. Richardson, What Terrorists Want (see note 103 above); Pedahzur et al., ‘‘Altruism
and Fatalism’’ (see note 2 above).
130. Israeli Secret Service, Female Involvement in Palestinian Terrorism (see note 59
above).
131. Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’ (see note 31 above), 3.
132. Phil Hirschkorn, ‘‘Najibullah Zazi’s Martyrdom Video,’’ CBS News, April 19, 2012.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/would-be-subway-suicide-bomber-najibullah-zazi-speaks/.
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133. Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above).
134. Pedahzur et al., ‘‘Altruism and Fatalism’’ (see note 2 above).
135. Ibid., 410.
136. Taarnby, ‘‘Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 115 above).
137. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above); Taarnby, ‘‘Profiling
Islamic Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 115 above); Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note
29 above).
138. Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations’’ (see note 56 above).
139. Merari, Suicide Terror in the Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (see note 39
above), 6.
140. Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny, ‘‘The Terrorists in Their Own
Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,’’ Terrorism and Political
Violence 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 171–184.
141. Kruglanski et al., ‘‘Fully Committed’’ (see note 84 above).
142. Argo, ‘‘Human Bombs: Rethinking Religion and Terror’’ (see note 125 above);
Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above).
143. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above).
144. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above); Merari, Suicide Terror
(see note 39 above).
145. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above); Kelley, ‘‘The Sickening
World of Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 71 above).
146. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above); Hafez,
‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above); Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’
(see note 45 above).
147. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above); Kruglanski and
Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organizational Strategies in Suicide
Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above).
148. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above).
149. Kelley, ‘‘The Sickening World of Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 71 above); Dominic
Rohner and Bruno Frey, ‘‘Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists
and the Media,’’ Public Choice 133 (2007): 129–145; Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note
29 above).
150. Cottee and Hayward, ‘‘Terrorist (E) motives’’ (see note 107 above); Kruglanski and
Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organizational Strategies in Suicide
Terrorism’’ (see note 56 above); Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above).
151. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above); Kelley, ‘‘The Sickening
World of Terrorists’’ (see note 71 above).; Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations’’
(see note 56 above); Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (see note 33 above).
152. Hafez, ‘‘Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq’’ (see note 31 above); Kruglanski and Golec,
‘‘Individual Motivations’’ (see note 56 above); Taarnby, ‘‘Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists’’
(see note 115 above).
153. Eli Berman and David Laitin, Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets: Evidence on the
Tactical Use of Suicide Attacks (Paper presented at conference at the University of Chicago,
October 26, 2004); see also Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual Motivations’’ (see note 56
above); Taarnby, ‘‘Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 115 above); Post, ‘‘When
Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (see note 33 above); Arie Kruglanski and S. Fishman, ‘‘The
Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,’’ Terrorism and Political
Violence 18, (2006): 193–215; Kruglanski et al., ‘‘Fully Committed’’ (see note 84 above).
154. Phil Davis and Kim Cragin, Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces
Together (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2009; Argo, ‘‘Human
Bombs’’ (see note 125 above).
155. Berman and Laitin, Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets (see note 153 above).
156. Kruglanski et al., ‘‘Fully Committed’’ (see note 84 above).
157. Caplan, ‘‘Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model’’ (see note 4
above); Ganor, ‘‘Suicide Terrorism: An Overview’’ (see note 31 above); Kelley, ‘‘The Sicken-
ing World of Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 71 above); Kruglanski and Golec, ‘‘Individual
Motivations’’ (see note 56 above); Kruglanski and Fishman, ‘‘The Psychology of Terrorism’’
(see note 153 above); Moghadam, ‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada’’ (see
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note 46 above); Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, ‘‘The Terrorists in Their Own Words’’ (see note
140 above); Post, ‘‘When Hatred is Bred in the Bone’’ (see note 33 above), 623; Schbley, ‘‘Torn
Between God, Family, and Money’’ (see note 106 above); Singer, ‘‘The New Children of
Terror’’ (see note 38 above); Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above).
158. Hafez, ‘‘Rationality, Culture and Structure’’ (see note 9 above); Moghadam,
‘‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism’’ (see note 46 above); Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’
(see note 38 above); Taarnby, ‘‘Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists’’ (see note 115 above);
Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (see note 29 above).
159. Hassan, ‘‘An Arsenal of Believers’’ (see note 45 above); Singer, ‘‘The New Children
of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
160. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OsfXwlqpJI
161. Stalinsky, Palestinian Authority Sermons 2000–2003 (see note 34 above), 2.
162. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above), 113.
163. Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, ‘‘The Terrorists in Their Own Words’’ (see note 140
above).
164. Caplan, ‘‘Terrorism’’ (see note 4 above); Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’
(see note 38 above), 113.
165. John Yang, ‘‘Saddam Rewards Suicide Bombers’ Families,’’ ABC News, January 2,
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129914&page=1.
166. Ibid.
167. Schbley, ‘‘Torn Between God, Family, and Money’’ (see note 106 above).
168. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above), 113.
169. Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
170. Berman and Laitin, Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets (see note 153 above); Hafez,
‘‘Rationality, Culture, Structure’’ (see note 9 above); Schbley, ‘‘Torn Between God, Family,
and Money’’ (see note 106 above); Singer, ‘‘The New Children of Terror’’ (see note 38 above).
171. Contrarily, the quantitative research methods (such as surveys, for example) focus
on describing: ‘‘who,’’ ‘‘what,’’ ‘‘where,’’ ‘‘how many,’’ and ‘‘how much.’’
172. Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (see note 4 above); Freilich and
Newman, Reducing Terrorism (see note 17 above).
173. Simon Perry, Memorandum for the Court: ‘‘The Level of Danger Posed by Umar
Farouk Abdul Mutallab’’ (the Defendant). U. S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION, CASE NO. 2:10-cr-20005, HONOR-
ABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/
documents/umar-farouk-abdul-mutallab-sentence-brief.pdf.
174. References in this memorandum to UFAM’s statements refer to the reports of
interviews during his debriefings, unless otherwise indicated. The data includes materials
from interviews by FBI agents, statements to the court by Mr. Abdul Mutallab, and video
of Mr. Abdul Mutallab released by Al Qaeda about him and the circumstances that encouraged
him to try to commit martyrdom.
175. References in this memorandum to UFAM’s statements refer to the reports of
interviews of his debriefings conducted by the FBI (unless otherwise indicated).
176. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 15, 2010, 2.
177. A copy of a text message sent by UFAM to his family approximately three months
before his mission.
178. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 8, 2010, 10.
179. Ibid.
180. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 29, 2010, 10.
181. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 30, 2010, 11–12; February 12, 2010, 8.
182. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 5, 2010, 4.
183. Ibid., 2.
184. Ibid., 7–8.
185. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on December 25, 2009, 2; February 9, 2010, 8;
February 23, 2010, 2.
186. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 8, 2010, 7.
187. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 31, 2010, 11.
188. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 9, 2009, 5.
189. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 2, 2010, 3.
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190. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 8, 2010, 9.
191. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 9, 2010, 3.
192. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 5, 2010.
193. Ibid., 3, 6.
194. A copy of a text message sent by UFAM to his family approximately three
months before his mission.
195. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on April 16, 2010, 2.
196. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 15, 2010, 3; February 19, 2010, 3.
197. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 5, 2010.
198. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 31, 2010, 7.
199. From a copy of a text message sent by UFAM to his family approximately
three months before his mission.
200. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 31, 2010, 5.
201. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 15, 2010, 1.
202. Julia Longnecker’s interview by the FBI on December 29, 2009, 1–2.
203. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 23, 2010, 4.
204. Once again as explained above (p. 15 of this memorandum), what UFAM said when
interviewed by FBI agents is a direct contradiction of a later statement in court upon the entry
of his guilty plea.
205. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 30, 2010, 6.
206. See note 204 above, 1–2.
207. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 29, 2010.
208. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on December 25, 2009, 2.
209. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 2, 2010, 4.
210. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 31, 2010, 6.
211. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on December 25, 2009.
212. Ibid., 3.
213. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 8, 2010.
214. Ibid.
215. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 9, 2010, 4.
216. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 29, 2010, 10.
217. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 5, 2010, 3.
218. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 29, 2010, 15; February 9, 2010, 7.
219. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on January 29, 2010, 16.
220. UFAM’s debriefing by the FBI on February 15, 2010.
221. Pedahzur et al. (see note 2 above), 420.
222. Clarke and Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (see note 4 above).
223. Consistent with this perspective on the martyr’s cost-benefit calculation, Shughart
(2011 p. 130) argues that: ‘‘an individual’s decision to engage in terrorist activity, alone or
in an organized group, requires a weighing of the probable benefits and costs to himself or
herself personally’’; see W. F. Shughart, II, ‘‘Terrorism in Rational Choice Perspective,’’
in C. J. Coyne and R. L. Mathers, eds., The Handbook on the Political Economy of War
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 126–153.
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... Overlaps have also been identified in terms of spatial and temporal clustering [4][5][6][7] , patterns of recidivism 8 , cycles of violence 4 , target selection 9 and network organization 10 . Importantly, strategies found to be effective in combatting crime also appear effective in combatting terrorism, particularly situational prevention [11][12][13][14][15][16] . ...
... These differences have led some to theorize that terrorists are irrational and therefore undeterrable 44 , mirroring some positions on homicide that view general or marginal deterrence through increasing the costs of offending as unachievable 45 . However, as in the case of homicide 45 , there is evidence that (potential) terrorism offenders engage in rational choice making, weighing potential rewards against potential risks [12][13][14][46][47][48] . Some argue that this is the point at which terrorism and crime are most similar, at least as much as the overlaps between general crimes (for example, ordinary violence) and specialty crimes such as hate crime or gang violence 49 . ...
... Some argue that this is the point at which terrorism and crime are most similar, at least as much as the overlaps between general crimes (for example, ordinary violence) and specialty crimes such as hate crime or gang violence 49 . Evidence for rational choice making in terrorism, like in the case of crime, has been further deduced from how it responds to situational prevention efforts, with findings that increasing the difficulty of successful attacks and increasing apprehension are associated with reductions in terrorism 12,14,15,50 . Additional evidence for this claim can be deduced from the impact of routine activities on incident rates. ...
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... Therefore, the situation forms the context in which an individual engages in rational calculations when deciding whether to commit a specific criminal act (Murray & Topalli, 2014). The term "rational" in rational choice theory centres on the notion of strategic thinking and assumes a process whereby information is analysed, situations are defined (from a subjective perspective), and opportunities and alternatives are evaluated (Perry and Hasisi 2017 ), while the concept of "choice" in the theory reinforces the position criminals consider when making decisions (Perry & Hasisi 2017). In essence, rational choice theory assumes that crime is not a random phenomenon occurring evenly across time and place because it is a product of the interaction between the offender and their situational environment (Guerette et al., 2005). ...
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... The high level of the forest PT attack concentration and its stability over time is explained well by the rational choice perspectives of terror, which find there to be no fundamental differences between the decision-making processes and basic motivations of regular criminals and terrorists (Clarke and Newman 2006;Perry 2020;Perry and Hasisi 2015;Perry et al. 2019). The preferable spatial settings of particular forests increase the probability that they will be chosen as targets. ...
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... This can be seen as a mitigation strategy, whereby death as the consequence of war is downplayed by the idea of heaven and living with the angels. According to Perry and Hasisi (2017), in the Quran it is stated that human beings will exist alongside divine-looking (male and female) companions, but 'jihad' spiritual leaders often imbue this concept with sensuality. They add that the idea of 'martyrs' going to heaven and having the opportunity to wed these maidens has long been 'ingrained into the minds of these so-called ['martyrs'] during recruitment and at the outset of attack' (p. ...
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The sanctity of Acehnese conceptualisation of jihad for the promise of heaven becomes apparent via a heavenly houri called ʻAinulmardiyyah. She is the maiden waiting for her “husbands” in the heaven who fall in the battlefield. This paper discusses the portrayal of ʻAinulmardiyyah(maidens in heaven for a Muslim martyr) in the most celebrated Acehnese text on Islamic holy war, Hikayat Prang Sabi (HPS). The hikayat text is first approached philologically to verify the adaptations that likely have been made. Methods of commentary are employed by comparing the portrayal of the houri in the hikayat and other texts with holy war themes. The texts are then approached semantically to analyse any underlying concepts and standard vocabularies used in text on the female charm. Hence, this guides this paper to formulate a pattern of how portrayal of the houri is used to spur the mujahidin to fight for the dignity of their religion and state. It is found that the endorsement of ʻAinulmardiyyah in the Hikayat Prang Sabi text is subject to Islamic teaching that is transmitted not only through the Qur’an and the sunnah, but also numerous Islamic eschatological texts heralding the holiness of martyrdom in jihad. The promise of the tantalising reward of heaven is also intensified by sociopolitical factors throughout Aceh’s history.
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Suicide bombings require motivated individuals, organizations that foster and channel this motivation, and a cultural milieu that lauds the perpetrator as a hero or martyr. Anat Berko, International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, Hertzliya, Israel, and Edna Erez, Kent State University, Ohio, interviewed seven Palestinian security prisoners serving time in Israel for attempting suicide bombings. Their research, excerpted below, provides valuable insights into the motivation of suicide bombers and the methods of organizations that recruit them.
Chapter
The commonly accepted interpretation is that a religious motive—the desire to please God—is the principal reason why people volunteer for suicide missions. American political scientist Robert A. Pape rejects this view. For him the common thread linking suicide bombers is a political objective— driving out an occupier from one’s homeland, which they see as furthering the common good of their society. In arriving at this theory, Pape relied on the concept of “altruistic suicide,” developed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim in his pioneering work Suicide (1897). These ideas are discussed in Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005), from which the passage below is taken.
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It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the strategic interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be “bloodier” in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.
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This book attempts to shed light on suicide missions and provide answers to the questions we all ask. Are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and unbridled, irrational radicals or is there a logic driving those behind them? Are their motivations religious or has Islam provided a language to express essentially political causes? How can the perpetrators remain so lucidly effective in the face of certain death? And do these disparate attacks have something like a common cause? It focuses on four main instances: the Kamikaze, missions carried out by the Tamil Tigers in the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Lebanese and Palestinian groups in the Middle East, and the al-Qaeda 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For more than two years, the authors have pursued an unprejudiced inquiry, investigating organizers and perpetrators alike of this extraordinary social phenomenon. Close comparisons between a whole range of cases raise challenging further questions: If suicide missions are so effective, why are they not more common? If killing is what matters, why not stick to 'ordinary' violent means? Or, if dying is what matters, why kill in the process?
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In this article, the authors apply the four-phase radicalization model proposed by Silber and Bhatt1 to a case study of Australia's first convicted terrorist, Jack Roche, based on communication with Roche after his incarceration and on a qualitative analysis of his trial. In doing so, they examine the validity of the four-phase model to a case of “home grown” terrorism and dissect the role of religion in the radicalization process. To conclude, the authors find that religion plays a far lesser role in radicalization toward violent extremism than the policy response contends and this has implications for counterterrorism programs that aim to address the drivers of violent extremism.
Book
The authors report on an aggressively interdisciplinary project to survey and integrate the scholarly social-science literature relevant to counterterrorism. They draw on literature from numerous disciplines, both qualitative and quantitative, and then use high-level conceptual models to pull the pieces together. In their monograph, they identify points of agreement and disagreement and point out instances in which disagreements merely reflect difference of research context or perspective. Priorities for further research are suggested and improved ways to frame questions for research and analysis are identified. The questions addressed relate to how terrorism arises, why some individuals become terrorists, how terrorists generate public support, how terrorist organizations make decisions, how terrorism declines, why individuals disengage, and how strategic communications can be more or less effective.