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2006) ‘I-deals: Idiosyncratic Terms in Employment Relationships

October 2006
The Academy of Management Review 31(4):977-993

DOI:10.5465/AMR.2006.22527470

Authors:

Denise M. Rousseau

Carnegie Mellon University

Violet T. Ho

University of Richmond

Idiosyncratic employment arrangements (i-deals) stand to benefit the individual employee as well as his or her employer. However, unless certain conditions apply, coworkers may respond negatively to these arrangements. We distinguish functional i-deals from their dysfunctional counterparts and highlight evidence of i-deals in previous organizational research. We develop propositions specifying both how i-deals are formed and how they impact workers and coworkers. Finally, we outline the implications i-deals have for research and for managing contemporary employment relationships.

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I-DEALS: IDIOSYNCRATIC TERMS IN

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS

DENISE M. ROUSSEAU

Carnegie Mellon University

VIOLET T. HO

Nanyang Technological University

JERALD GREENBERG

The Ohio State University

Idiosyncratic employment arrangements (i-deals) stand to benefit the individual em-

ployee as well as his or her employer. However, unless certain conditions apply,

coworkers may respond negatively to these arrangements. We distinguish functional

i-deals from their dysfunctional counterparts and highlight evidence of i-deals in

previous organizational research. We develop propositions specifying both how i-

deals are formed and how they impact workers and coworkers. Finally, we outline the

implications i-deals have for research and for managing contemporary employment

relationships.

Idiosyncratic employment arrangements are

special terms of employment negotiated be-

tween individual workers and their employers

(present or prospective) that satisfy both parties’

needs. From the valued engineer whose em-

ployer gives him educational leave to spend a

year doing underwater photography, instead of

letting him quit (Hochschild, 1997), to the Amer-

ican professor who talks Fujitsu into hiring him

and moving him to Japan so he can learn how to

manage a plant Japanese-style while sharing

his managerial knowledge with his new col-

leagues (Rousseau, 2005), these idiosyncratic

deals— or, simply, i-deals—are more wide-

spread than commonly acknowledged. More

than wordplay, this term highlights that such

deals are not only idiosyncratic but also in-

tended to be ideal in some way for each party.

Accounts of a few exceptional individuals—

“superstars” or “winners” capable of negotiat-

ing distinctive employment conditions—are not

new. Over the years, some such individuals,

considered “exceptions to the rule,” have capi-

talized on their uniqueness by differentiating

themselves in subtle and not-so-subtle ways

from their more ordinary colleagues (Frank &

Cook, 1995; Rosen, 1981). Famous movie stars

demanding lavish working conditions to match

their lavish salaries immediately come to mind.

In contrast to the employment contracts of stars,

traditional models of employment assume ho-

mogeneity in employment contracts among

workers in the same organizational positions

(e.g., Kleinman, 1997; Mitchell, 1989; Muchinsky,

2003). Yet this is not how many contemporary

organizations operate (Glaser & Hornung, 2004;

Rousseau, 2000, 2001; Rousseau, Ho, & Kim, 2003).

Instead, i-deals are likely to be widespread as

firms and the people who work in them face a

need to innovate in response to change and

complexity (Weick, 1996).

Although i-deals challenge traditional orga-

nizational paradigms for recruiting, motivating,

and retaining valuable workers (Lee, MacDer-

mid, & Buck, 2000), these paradigms often have

been at odds with the reality that individualized

work arrangements have long existed for star

performers, veteran employees, and other val-

ued workers (Ford & Newstrom, 1999; Frank,

1985; Rousseau, 2005). The current salience of

i-deals arises from the increased labor market

pressures firms face (Cappelli, 2000) and from

workers’ heightened expectations for a voice on

matters affecting them at work (Freeman & Rog-

We acknowledge the support of the H. J. Heinz II and

Irving Abramowitz Memorial Professorships. Paul Goodman

and Loic Cadin provided helpful comments on an earlier

draft of this article, and Tai Gyu Kim participated in re-

search leading to its development.

姝Academy of Management Review

2006, Vol. 31, No. 4, 977–994.

977

ers, 1999). Together, these forces make customi-

zation of various aspects of employment more

acceptable—and more widespread—than ever

before (Lawler & Finegold, 2000). Yet because

i-deals are at odds with the traditional assump-

tion that workers in the same positions have the

same employment contract, there is little sys-

tematic knowledge regarding the processes of

their creation (i.e., the who, how, and when of

their negotiation) or the outcomes they yield for

workers and employers (e.g., quality of employ-

ment relationship, retention, and performance).

Moreover, because i-deals create differences

among coworkers in conditions of employment,

failure to recognize and attend to i-deals can

exacerbate the injustice their existence might

engender, eroding trust and cooperation in the

organization (Rousseau, 2005).

Expanding our understanding of i-deals

stands to help both employers and employees

improvise more effectively in the face of dy-

namic individual and organizational needs. By

offering a conceptual analysis of i-deals, this

article promises to be useful in this regard. Spe-

cifically, we address three fundamental issues:

(1) the context of i-deals—that is, when and how

they occur; (2) the content and consequences of

i-deals, both positive and negative, for employ-

ers and workers; and (3) the impact of workers’

i-deals on their coworkers. In so doing, we high-

light the implications of idiosyncratic work ar-

rangements for research on the employment re-

lationship and for managerial practice.

DEFINING I-DEALS

What I-Deals Are

Formally defined, i-deals refer to voluntary,

personalized agreements of a nonstandard na-

ture negotiated between individual employees

and their employers regarding terms that bene-

fit each party. These individualized employment

arrangements differ, to some extent, from those

of the employees’ coworkers. Several distinct

features characterize i-deals and differentiate

them from other forms of person-specific em-

ployment arrangements (e.g., cronyism or favor-

itism), as described below. The principal char-

acteristics of i-deals are as follows:

•Individually negotiated: An i-deal results

when an individual worker negotiates ar-

rangements with an employer or prospec-

tive employer that differ from the corre-

sponding arrangements of the individual’s

coworkers. The market power of certain

workers and the value their employers

place on them position these workers to de-

mand compensation and perquisites signif-

icantly greater than their less favored co-

workers (Bartol & Martin, 1989). Either an

employer or a worker can initiate an i-deal,

and both may shape its actual terms. How-

ever, because employers rather than em-

ployees traditionally set the terms of em-

ployment, we focus on the less well-

understood but important matter of i-deals

initiated by workers.

•Heterogeneous: At least some of the terms of

an i-deal are specially provided to that in-

dividual, differing from conditions created

for other employees in similar positions or

in the same workgroup. This results in within-

group heterogeneity (Klein, Dansereau, &

Hall, 1994) regarding some aspects of the re-

wards and benefits received by workers. This

heterogeneity has many potential meanings.

It can reflect the operation of formal and in-

formal incentives, such as the distribution of

rewards contingent on individual perfor-

mance (e.g., Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford,

1995). It also is a potential source of perceived

inequity and injustice on the part of work-

group members, depending on what they un-

derstand to be the reasons for such differ-

ences (Greenberg, Roberge, Ho, & Rousseau,

2004).

•Benefiting both employer and employee: I-

deals are intended to serve the interests of

both employers and employees. I-deals dif-

fer from other forms of person-specific em-

ployment arrangements, in that they are

predicated on an individual worker’s value

to his or her employer (Rousseau, 2004, 2005).

The successful result of an i-deal is that an

organization attracts, motivates, or retains

the services of a valued employee, who, in

turn, receives desired resources from that

organization. As such, coworkers can view

i-deals as appropriate to the extent that they

endorse the legitimacy of the values on

which these arrangements are based (e.g.,

compensation based on market value, flex-

ibility contingent on strategic advantage for

the firm). In contrast, other person-specific

arrangements, such as the favoritism a boss

displays toward one worker but not others,

cannot be legitimized as having any basis

in shared values.

•Varied in scope: The i-deals individuals en-

joy vary in scope, from a single idiosyncratic

element in a larger standardized employ-

ment package to a completely idiosyncratic

employment arrangement. For example, one

worker with an i-deal might have more flex-

ible hours than his or her peers but other-

978 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

wise share their same pay structure, job du-

ties, and other conditions of employment. In

contrast, another worker might have a

highly customized arrangement in which al-

most all employment terms are specially ne-

gotiated, from pay and hours to duties and

title. Although both employment arrange-

ments have idiosyncratic features, the rela-

tive proportion of idiosyncratic-to-standard-

ized conditions is greater in the case of the

second worker.

A central feature of i-deals is that employees

have a hand in creating or negotiating some

aspect of their employment. I-deals can be ne-

gotiated either prior to employment, which we

refer to as ex ante i-deals, or once on the job,

which we refer to as ex post i-deals. An example

of an ex ante i-deal can be seen in the case of an

attorney who is being recruited by a law firm

while having ailing parents requiring her atten-

tion in another part of the country. To benefit

from her exceptional litigation skills, the firm’s

partners agree in advance to deviate from stan-

dard practice for distributing case loads if she

joins the firm—to assign her cases only in her

preferred location while she cares for her par-

ents. An example of an ex post i-deal can be

seen in the case of the international banker who

is reluctant to take an overseas assignment for

fear it will interfere with her musical training.

Needing her talents elsewhere, the bank agrees

to pay for the special packaging and shipping of

her custom-made grand piano (at several times

the normal allotment to move an expatriate’s

household effects). The negotiations behind

such arrangements may be considered a form of

participation, given that individual workers in-

fluence their personal employment conditions

(Freeman & Rogers, 1999). With this in mind,

i-deals are likely to arise under conditions of

symmetric power, as opposed to the more tradi-

tional asymmetry favoring the employer.

I-deals occur in the context of a broader set of

arrangements characterizing an individual’s

employment. Often, i-deals occur in employ-

ment relationships that provide some employ-

ment terms that are standard to all workers (e.g.,

company-wide benefits) but others that are spe-

cific to occupants of particular positions (e.g.,

professionals, as opposed to unskilled workers).

Being able to negotiate idiosyncratic conditions

is a sign of one’s potential or acceptance as a

valued contributor—someone worthy of special

treatment, akin to the phenomenon of idiosyn-

crasy credits accorded high-status group mem-

bers (Hollander, 1958). Although standardizing

employment conditions (e.g., through wage

structures, bonuses, or benefit plans) is a means

of promoting cooperation and trust (Lazear,

1981), employers also face pressure to attract

highly valued workers by offering special em-

ployment conditions. The result is that some in-

dividuals have more idiosyncratic elements in

their employment arrangements than others, po-

tentially undermining cooperation and trust.

I-deals have the potential to impact how co-

workers assess the fairness of their own treat-

ment relative to the recipient of the i-deal, an

impact that can be positive, neutral, or negative,

depending on the nature of the i-deal and the

process through which it is obtained. For in-

stance, a coworker who bargains for a raise may

be viewed more negatively by colleagues than

one who seeks out a preferred assignment, since

pay differences are generally more salient than

differences in tasks or duties. Moreover, sa-

lience of differential arrangements is amplified,

depending on whether the negotiations are sur-

reptitious or broadly acknowledged (Greenberg

et al., 2004; Rousseau, 2005).

With respect to the array of rewards and ben-

efits individual workers receive, i-deals repre-

sent a form of within-unit heterogeneity (Klein et

al., 1994). This heterogeneity can mean different

things to the employer, to the individual worker,

and to his or her coworkers. From the frame of

reference of an employer who differentiates

among a set of workers, this heterogeneity can

reflect management practices rewarding high

performers (thereby promoting instrumentality

beliefs; Vroom, 1964). To a worker, an i-deal can

signal the value an employer places on him or

her. To coworkers, within-unit heterogeneity re-

garding the nature of rewards and benefits re-

ceived can signal their standing in the eyes of

authority figures and/or the flexibility and sup-

portiveness with which that employer treats its

workers.

Importantly, an i-deal conveys potentially di-

vergent messages to workers, depending on

whether they are its principals or third parties.

For example, a consultant who has negotiated to

be assigned to projects that develop desired

skills may believe his employer to be support-

ive. His coworkers, unaware of why special

projects have been allocated to only one of them,

however, may see the employer as favoring one

2006 979Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg

employee and disadvantaging others. I-deals,

nonetheless, have the potential to be seen as

fair by third parties to the extent that they are

appropriately differentiated from other person-

specific arrangements that are patently unjust

and self-serving (Greenberg et al., 2004; Rous-

seau, 2004).

What I-Deals Are Not: Dysfunctional

Person-Specific Arrangements

I-deals negotiated by workers differ from

other person-specific employment practices in

several ways (see Table 1). One widely recog-

nized form of preferential arrangement is favor-

itism or cronyism, where a firm’s agents (e.g.,

supervisors) favor certain workers over others

based on relational factors (e.g., personal rela-

tions or political ties). Such arrangements are

self-serving from the individual agent’s per-

spective and are not necessarily beneficial to

the firm (Pearce, Branyiczki, & Bigley, 2000;

Rousseau, 2004). In fact, such arrangements may

undermine the legitimacy of the formal organi-

zation by allowing rule-bending and workarounds

to dominate formal rules and agreed-upon proce-

dures. It is doubtful that the organization benefits

from playing favorites, even if the result is having

a lackey willing to do a manager’s bidding. More-

over, these arrangements are predicated on con-

nections rather than individual capabilities that

add value to a company (Clarke, 1999). In contrast,

an i-deal grants a worker some preferred employ-

ment condition(s) while at the same time helping

the employer attract, motivate, and/or retain a

highly valued contributor. Thus, both parties

benefit.

Clearly, however, there is a gray area be-

tween i-deals and favoritism (Rousseau, 2004)

whenever a manager with a special relation-

ship to a worker holds overly positive beliefs

regarding that person’s contribution to the firm,

leading the manager to grant the worker’s re-

quest for an i-deal. Such situations suggest that

firms in which workers’ contributions are more

objectively determined may be better positioned

to grant i-deals while avoiding the appear-

ance— or reality— of favoritism.

Another person-specific employment practice

is an unauthorized arrangement, such as that in

which a worker is permitted, albeit unofficially,

to take resources from his or her employer for

personal use, without permission (Greenberg,

1998; Rousseau, 2004). Such unauthorized ar-

rangements involve unilateral confiscation of

employers’ resources by workers in a manner

that harms employers. Although most acts of

employee theft occur without management’s

knowledge, some managers have been known to

turn a blind eye to petty theft, publicly decrying

it but privately acknowledging (or sometimes

even promoting) its occurrence (Greenberg &

Tomlinson, 2004). That is, an unspoken norm

sometimes develops that theft is tolerated, at

least as long as it is kept within certain param-

eters (Dalton, 1959; Ditton, 1997). Importantly,

such unauthorized arrangements are not i-deals

insofar as they serve the interests of individuals

TABLE 1

I-Deals Compared to Other Person-Specific Employment Arrangements

Feature

Employment Arrangement

I-Deals Favoritism or Cronyism

Unauthorized

Arrangements

Allocation Negotiated by employee Endowment to employee Usurped by employee

Basis Worker’s value to firm

and personal need

Particular relationship Rule breaking

Beneficiary Employee and employer Employee and powerful others

(e.g., managers)

Employee only

Coworker consequences Effects on perceptions

depend on content,

timing, and process

for creating i-deal

Reduces trust and perception

of procedural and outcome

fairness

Reduces legitimacy of

organizational

practices

980 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

but not the firm, undermining the legitimacy of

its formal practices and eroding the trust work-

ers place in it (Pearce, 2001; Rousseau, 2004).

SIGNS OF I-DEALS IN ORGANIZATIONAL

RESEARCH

As an organizational phenomenon, the cre-

ation of i-deals largely has gone unrecognized,

despite signs of worker-negotiated idiosyncratic

arrangements in organizational research. Sev-

eral research areas address heterogeneity in

conditions of employment and, in doing so, pro-

vide evidence that i-deals may have long been a

part of organizational life. These include inves-

tigations of idiosyncratic jobs, leader-member

exchange (LMX), workplace flexibility, and psy-

chological contracts.

Idiosyncratic Jobs

According to Miner (1987), “idiosyncratic jobs”

are those positions in an organization created

for and around specific individuals. For exam-

ple, an employee with an excellent speaking

voice may be given the job of recording person-

alized messages on the company’s telephone

answering equipment. This job capitalizes on

the worker’s unique talent. Research on idiosyn-

cratic jobs informs our discussion by calling at-

tention to organizational factors impacting an

idiosyncratic job’s creation, growth, and de-

mise—forces that may operate on i-deals as

well. First, start-ups and new organizational set-

tings are replete with idiosyncratic jobs, since

initial job incumbents generally have broad op-

portunities to shape their roles and employment

conditions (Levesque, 2001). Second, idiosyn-

cratic jobs tend to die over time as their occu-

pants leave or as pressure for standardization

mounts (Miner, 1987). Third, even highly formal-

ized settings have idiosyncratic jobs whose ini-

tial incumbents possess the set of distinctive

capabilities their firm values (Miner, 1987).

Research on idiosyncratic jobs has interesting

implications for i-deals. The initial occupants of

newly created jobs are better positioned than

later occupants to propose i-deals. By customiz-

ing at least some of a job’s duties and ways

work is performed, original occupants of jobs

tend to have more opportunities to suggest and

bargain for idiosyncratic employment terms

than occupants of jobs with longer histories.

Thus, i-deals that workers propose to their em-

ployers are more likely to be accepted in start-

ups and in newer settings than in more estab-

lished organizational settings, where norms

have developed and where rules and standard

procedures restrict or preclude ad hoc options.

Nonetheless, even highly bureaucratic firms

still can create i-deals for highly valued work-

ers. Over time, however, pressure for standard-

ization and consistency is likely to emerge that

impacts i-deals in two ways. First, it can make

certain i-deals unnecessary, broadly permitting

arrangements to many workers that were once

available only to a few workers who had i-deals.

Second, it can make i-deals more difficult to

create in all but the most exceptional cases by

limiting organizational flexibility and manage-

rial discretion.

LMX

LMX focuses on the relationships between

managers and individual subordinates and the

development of these relationships over time

(Cashman, Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1976;

Graen & Cashman, 1975). This conceptualization

purports that differences in a manager’s treat-

ment of individual workers are due to differing

levels of trust. Some workers form part of a

highly trusted ingroup that has greater latitude

over duties and responsibilities, finding their

manager highly responsive to their needs and

interests. In contrast, other workers, considered

part of the outgroup, are denied this special

treatment. High-LMX workers enjoy more oppor-

tunities for idiosyncratic behavior—and, pre-

sumably, the creation of i-deals—than their low-

LMX counterparts.

Importantly, whether the LMX relationship is

based on an employer’s regard for a particularly

competent worker or merely on a friendship with

a less impressive performer determines whether

these individually distinct arrangements consti-

tute legitimate i-deals or merely preferential

treatment. Nonetheless, having a good relation-

ship with one’s manager or other representative

of one’s employer is likely to make proposing an

i-deal easier. As such, a manager who may have

been reluctant to negotiate an i-deal early in a

relationship with a worker may become open to

the possibility of such an arrangement over

time, to the extent that he or she comes to value

that worker.

2006 981Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg

Workplace Flexibility

Ethnographic studies of workplace flexibility

and work-family balance have described indi-

vidualized arrangements that essentially are

i-deals, without identifying them as such. Hoch-

schild (1997), for example, has demonstrated

that high-status professionals and otherwise

highly valued workers are more successful at

negotiating accommodations addressing their

needs for work-family balance than their less

esteemed counterparts. Interestingly, evidence

also suggests that there may be a drawback to

such arrangements. Workers who negotiate flex-

ible work arrangements often receive substan-

dard evaluations of their performance because

of their nonconforming work practices, particu-

larly when performance is measured subjec-

tively (Perlow, 1997).

Taken together, the Hochschild (1997) and Per-

low (1997) studies pose a dilemma. Although

fast-trackers successfully may negotiate idio-

syncratic arrangements that help balance the

demands of their work and family lives, such

deals subsequently may reduce their perfor-

mance ratings, ultimately diminishing their ca-

reer opportunities. Research on work-family bal-

ance has several implications for i-deals. Over

time, an i-deal can have negative consequences

for the worker who negotiates it, particularly to

the degree that such an arrangement is discrep-

ant from widely held work norms (e.g., negotiat-

ing shorter work days in a firm where advance-

ment requires putting in long hours). In the case

of i-deals negotiated to help juggle the demands

of work and family, for example, a worker who

approaches the work role differently from his or

her peers— be it in terms of hours worked, avail-

ability to clients or colleagues, or other factors—

unintentionally may signal a lack of commit-

ment (cf. Landers, Rebitzer, & Taylor, 1996).

Psychological Contracts

A psychological contract is the specific man-

ner in which each party in an exchange relation-

ship interprets his or her obligations and agree-

ments with the others (Rousseau, 1995).

Psychological contracts may differ among co-

workers doing similar jobs in the same work

unit (e.g., Dabos & Rousseau, 2004a). Although

there may be several possible explanations for

this (e.g., workers were hired at different times

by different managers), the existence of i-deals

may be a factor in within-unit differences in

psychological contracts.

Idiosyncratic terms can form part of an indi-

vidual’s psychological contract, along with fea-

tures that are shared with coworkers (Rousseau,

1995). Some differences in on-the-job behavior

observed among coworkers can arise from idio-

syncratic components in their psychological

contracts, as in the case of workers whose spe-

cial contributions bring them greater status

within a workgroup (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004b).

Furthermore, some particular types of psycho-

logical contracts, known as “balanced con-

tracts,” incorporate beliefs in their ongoing ne-

gotiability as necessitated by changing

organizational environments and individual

needs (Rousseau, 1995). Workers with such con-

tracts have been found to pursue i-deals involv-

ing career development that also enhance their

employability (Rousseau et al., 2003).

CONTEXTS OF I-DEALS

Having considered the nature of i-deals and

their connections to various organizational phe-

nomena, the stage is set for us to address the

contexts within which i-deals arise and their

impact on employees. Some circumstances that

both workers and organizations face can impact

the nature of the bargaining process between

them, as well as the outcomes that follow from

any resultant i-deal. Here we examine three

such circumstances: the strategic value of work-

ers to their organizations, the timing of i-deals,

and the implications of repeated bargaining.

Strategic Value

An i-deal is a form of customization granting

employees conditions that satisfy their personal

needs, values, and preferences. Traditional em-

ployment in the developed world downplays

customization in favor of consistency and stan-

dardization (Pearce, 2001). In recent years, how-

ever, the liberalization of labor laws and the

reduced popularity of unionism (Farber & West-

ern, 2000; Halpern, 2003), coupled with the grow-

ing recognition of human capital’s contribution

to a firm’s competitive advantage (Leana &

Rousseau, 2000), have opened more doors to ne-

gotiating i-deals in lieu of accepting standard-

ized offers. Against the backdrop of fewer preset

982 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

terms of employment, workers who recognize

the value that employers place on them are

well-positioned to assert their preferences ei-

ther overtly, through bargaining, or more coyly,

by hinting at alternative opportunities else-

where (Rousseau, 2005). Greater mobility among

talented people, especially those recognized as

critical to their firm’s competitive position, adds

to their power when bargaining for i-deals

(Frank & Cook, 1995).

A firm’s receptiveness to i-deals reflects its

strategic needs, as when particular segments of

the labor market are targeted that its existing

practices are not geared toward (e.g., young pro-

fessionals, senior citizens, or parents of small

children; Ingram & Simon, 1994; Lee et al., 2000).

Illustrating this, law firms more readily have

been granting requests for exceptional arrange-

ments to female attorneys attempting to balance

their work and family lives than to male attor-

neys who make similar requests (Klein, Berman,

& Dickson, 2000).

Proposition 1: Firms seeking to recruit

or retain valued workers from labor

market segments where their existing

practices make recruitment or reten-

tion difficult are more likely to grant

i-deals that offset those practices than

firms not targeting those workers. Ac-

cordingly, such targeted individuals

are more likely than nontargeted indi-

viduals to be granted i-deals.

Ultimately, repeated use of similar arrange-

ments to recruit and retain workers from these

desirable segments of the labor market may re-

sult in a revision of standard employment terms

in response to demands for equity (Greenberg,

1996), eventually making these new arrange-

ments standard rather than idiosyncratic

(Greenberg et al., 2004). In other words, once-

unique policies are likely to become institution-

alized, if the factors that gave rise to them

continue. This is what occurred in the case of

flextime, which originally was introduced to

meet the needs of women workers but which

subsequently became a standard employment

practice (Ingram & Simon, 1994).

Proposition 2: Over time, firms that

successfully meet their human re-

source needs by offering a particular

type of i-deal to workers from specific

labor market segments eventually

will make such arrangements rou-

tinely available to all workers.

I-deals that are successful from a firm’s perspec-

tive become a source of new work structures and

human resource practices that promote both ad-

aptation to changing environments and legiti-

mation of a firm’s employment practices.

The Timing of I-Deals

As noted earlier, workers negotiate i-deals

with their employers at either of two times—

during the recruitment process (i.e., ex ante)

and/or on the job, after a relationship has been

established (i.e., ex post). (Other idiosyncratic

negotiations, such as those occurring at the end

of employment via termination or retirement,

may be governed by different processes and are

not treated here.) Importantly, however, not all

workers who prefer something nonstandard

seek i-deals. The extent to which someone does

so is likely to depend on that person’s beliefs

regarding the likelihood of a successful negoti-

ation. Belief in one’s ability to negotiate an

i-deal is predicated on perceptions of what is

negotiable, as well as on one’s unique leverage

or bargaining power. Taken together, these re-

flect the strength of one’s own position and the

alternatives available both to oneself and one’s

employer (Thompson, 2001). Beliefs regarding

negotiability also are enhanced whenever work-

ers believe their employers are highly depen-

dent on them. The nature of that dependence can

vary for new recruits and current employees.

To a great extent, labor markets dictate the

dynamics and normative appropriateness of ex

ante i-deals. For example, workers in a “hot”

labor market, where certain skills are in high

demand but short supply, might be expected to

seek and attain more i-deals than those whose

skills are in less demand (Cappelli, 2000). Under

such conditions, information about others’ suc-

cesses in negotiating i-deals is likely to be com-

municated informally and very rapidly, thereby

promoting interest in such arrangements (Belli-

veau, 2000). As qualified applicants clamor to

get in on the good deals, a “gold rush effect” can

occur. This accounts for why i-deals were so

common among employees of dot.com firms in

the late 1990s (Buckman, 2000). Under such cir-

cumstances, workers are unlikely to attribute

2006 983Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg

their firm’s willingness to provide them special

accommodations as an indication of its quality

as an employer or its positive regard for them as

individuals. Rather, workers bargaining ex ante

are likely to attribute receipt of an i-deal as an

indication of their market value.

Although market-based attributions are likely

to predominate among workers with ex ante

i-deals, workers are more likely to attribute their

ex post i-deals to the quality of their relation-

ship with their employer. Ex post arrangements

are more likely to arise in the context of a rela-

tionship between worker and employer wherein

information is exchanged that is not available

among the parties ex ante. Special arrange-

ments that arise then are based on credible in-

formation regarding the value of the person to

the organization (e.g., actual past contributions)

and on particular conditions that the individual

finds valuable (e.g., specific assignments). Ex-

changes made in the context of current employ-

ment are more likely to evoke a relational

schema (Baldwin, 1992) and to involve the par-

ties in commitments that play out over longer

periods of time. As such, ex post i-deals can

enhance each party’s beliefs in the quality of the

employment relationship. In contrast, as argued

above, ex ante i-deals are more likely to be

interpreted as arising from market-based fac-

tors and are less likely to impact beliefs regard-

ing relationship quality.

Proposition 3: Ex post i-deals are more

likely than ex ante i-deals to be per-

ceived as an indication of the quality

of one’s employment relationship.

Insofar as employers may be sensitive to the

threat to collaboration and commitment from in-

creased disparities in visible conditions of em-

ployment (e.g., pay; Cowherd & Levine, 1992), we

expect that they generally will be reluctant to

grant ex ante i-deals to all but those workers

deemed most critical or most in demand. Ex ante

i-deals may be limited severely in settings

where labor practices are highly regulated (e.g.,

government employment) or where societal or

cultural norms make them taboo (e.g., in China

and Singapore ex ante negotiation can be con-

sidered too assertive; Rousseau & Schalk, 2000).

In contrast, once a relationship exists between

workers and managers within a firm, even set-

tings that discourage ex ante bargaining may

promote informal negotiations and accommoda-

tions between individual workers and their em-

ployers. These informal negotiations also serve

to clarify the inevitably incomplete contracts of

long-standing employment (Williamson, 1975).

Workers are inclined to negotiate employment

terms ex post rather than ex ante for several

reasons. First, in contrast to preemployment ne-

gotiations, workers and employers who negoti-

ate terms post hire may share a great deal of

knowledge about one another’s interests and

may already exchange a broad array of re-

sources. Ex post i-deals, thus, can occur more

readily because of the more credible signals an

employer possesses regarding a worker’s value

than existed prior to employment (Lazear, 1981).

Second, the greater comfort level workers enjoy

in making special requests of an employer with

whom they now have a relationship also makes

i-deals more likely to occur ex post than ex ante

(Rousseau, 2005). Third, insofar as granting an

i-deal may be considered a way of rewarding a

worker who proposes it, employers in long-

standing relationships may consent to i-deals

as a means of acknowledging loyalty and of

rewarding contributions based on an extended

track record (Lazear, 1981; Ritter & Taylor, 2000).

Fourth, workers who have formed a relationship

with their employers can use their insider

knowledge to capitalize on opportunities to pro-

pose i-deals. Current employees can propose

i-deals in response to employer-initiated cir-

cumstances that give them leverage (Rousseau,

2005). Incumbent workers who otherwise are re-

luctant to propose i-deals may use the opening

of a new position or a tough-to-fill vacancy to

negotiate an i-deal. These ex post i-deals result

from workers’ use of insider knowledge to sug-

gest conditions that employers otherwise may

be reluctant to grant.

Proposition 4: Other things being

equal, workers are more likely to ne-

gotiate ex post i-deals than ex ante

i-deals.

Repeated Bargaining

Thus far, our discussion of i-deals has focused

on discrete arrangements made on single occa-

sions. However, during lengthy employment

with a firm, a particular worker may repeatedly

negotiate a variety of idiosyncratic features as

his or her personal needs and organizational

984 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

contributions change over time. Although many

of these successive i-deals may reflect ongoing

adjustments in cycles of inducement and contri-

bution, in some cases attempts to create i-deals

may reflect a worker’s efforts to up the ante—to

get more from his or her employer. Repeated

bargaining differs from the cycles of reciprocity

workers and employers engage in over time,

because repeated bargaining focuses on in-

creasing levels of the same resources—particu-

larly pay—without a reciprocal increase in the

worker’s contributions to the firm.

Such repeated bargaining potentially can

change the meaning of the i-deal over time. Al-

though initial i-deals are likely to be offered and

interpreted as special, parties may come to in-

terpret subsequent i-deals differently, espe-

cially when they are habitual. Diminishing mar-

ginal returns can result for both principals as

each subsequent deal becomes less special.

Moreover, individuals who repeatedly propose

i-deals risk damaging their personal reputa-

tions (Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, &

Treadway, 2003), threatening to create the im-

pression that they are “players” motivated pri-

marily by the thrill of “gaming the system.” Or-

ganizations also may be unwilling to make

i-deals based on the same resources with the

same individuals repeatedly, for fear of being

manipulated, being seen as practicing favorit-

ism or acting capriciously, or creating dissatis-

faction among other employees.

Proposition 5: Concerns about creat-

ing negative impressions will discour-

age workers from proposing ex post

i-deals regarding the same resources

repeatedly over time. Moreover, con-

cerns about negative impressions will

discourage employers from accepting

ex post i-deals regarding the same re-

sources for the same workers repeat-

edly over time.

The potential for negative impressions is

likely to be lower in employment relationships

infused with market ideologies (e.g., among

computer programmers with unique skills) but

higher in those in which professional or commu-

nal ideologies prevail (e.g., among doctors work-

ing in a teaching hospital; Thompson & Bunder-

son, 2003). The very process of negotiation can

make salient the economic and transactional

aspects of the employer-employee exchange,

which, although highlighted in market ideolo-

gies, typically are downplayed in communal re-

lationships. Thus, we might expect a physician

in a health care setting to be reluctant to nego-

tiate ex post i-deals regarding pay repeatedly,

insofar as attention to economic issues may run

counter to the ideologies of caregiving and com-

munal relations that are supposed to take pre-

cedence in his or her employment relationship.

THE CONTENT OF I-DEALS

The specific terms or the content of i-deals

provides insight into the exchange relations be-

tween the employees and employers involved.

I-deals may contain many diverse resources

that workers value—from pay and travel ex-

penses to mentoring, development, and per-

sonal support—and the nature of these re-

sources may influence how workers experience

i-deals (Rousseau et al., 2003; Rousseau & Kim,

2003). To understand the content of i-deals, Foa

and Foa’s (1975) classification of resource cate-

gories is useful. Specifically, they propose that

six types of resources—money, goods, services,

information, status, and love—may be classified

along two dimensions—the degree to which the

resources are concrete (tangible) versus abstract

(conveyed through verbal and paralinguistic be-

haviors), and the degree to which they are par-

ticularistic (their meaning and value depending

on their source and context) versus universal

(having common meaning and value across

sources and contexts).

Typically, exchanging particularistic re-

sources requires a personal relationship be-

tween giver and receiver. Particularistic re-

sources include bestowing special status (e.g.,

recognition), services that benefit another’s

well-being (e.g., development, mentoring), and

love expressed via concern and socioemotional

support (e.g., support and flexibility in response

to a family crisis). Although goods or money can

be exchanged between parties who do not know

one another, typically, personal relationships

are the basis for particularistic resource ex-

changes. Parties generally are familiar with or

have information about one another in the case

of status or services, and they trust one another

in the case of love and related forms of socio-

emotional support. In contrast, concrete re-

sources (particularly ones with clear monetary

value, such as pay and material goods) are

2006 985Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg

readily exchanged with limited interaction and

virtually no relationship between the parties.

This conceptualization of resources sheds light

on the dynamics underlying i-deals.

Firms seeking to attract, motivate, and retain

valued workers find it difficult to compete if

wages are the only dimension they use to bar-

gain with and motivate employees. Broadening

the employment package—what Bloom and

Milkovich (1996) have termed the compensation

bundle—to include nonmonetary and particu-

laristic resources, as well as concrete, monetary

resources, enhances an employer’s ability to re-

cruit, motivate, and retain talent. Particularistic

resources constitute part of an invisible wage

structure, providing informal ways organiza-

tions can compensate workers. This can range

from higher-quality employee-supervisor rela-

tions and greater job scope (Graen & Scandura,

1987) to the overlooking of odd or deviant behav-

ior on the part of otherwise high performers

(Frank, 1985; Greenberg & Scott, 1996). Particu-

laristic resources lack fixed metrics, making

their exchange difficult to standardize or to gov-

ern by rules. As such, employers and managers

may find it easier to offer particularistic i-deals

than concrete ones, especially those involving

pay and benefits.

The timing of an idiosyncratic negotiation

may affect the perspective from which each

party views the exchange. Different relational

schemas may be primed by the point in the

employment relationship at which negotiation

occurs (Baldwin, 1992). An ex ante i-deal occur-

ring while the worker is a job applicant is likely

to evoke the schema of a market transaction,

particularly in view of the types of resources

commonly bargained for in the job market (e.g.,

pay, promotion opportunities, or stock options).

In contrast, an ex post i-deal is likely to evoke

the schema of socioemotional exchange, partic-

ularly if the resources bargained for include

forms of personal or emotional support.

Relational schemas themselves are inter-

twined with the types of resources for which

bargaining occurs. Those resources that would

signal a high-quality employment relationship,

such as development and mentoring, might be

more difficult to bargain for prior to joining a

firm than after one already is onboard. There are

two reasons for this. First, the employee does not

have the type of contextual knowledge regard-

ing the firm that eases negotiating over partic-

ularistic conditions. Second, ex ante bargaining

is likely to be shaped by information accessible

in the external market. Thus, whereas informa-

tion about salary and benefits may be shared

readily among job seekers and employers, more

particularistic resources are difficult for them to

identify, let alone to compare.

Proposition 6: Ex ante i-deals are more

likely to be based on concrete and uni-

versal resources than on particularis-

tic and abstract resources.

In contrast, there is more opportunity to obtain

particularistic and abstract resources via ex

post negotiations than ex ante negotiations.

This is particularly likely when particularistic

and abstract resources are used to recognize

high-performing workers without creating more

overt differences in the outcomes coworkers re-

ceive. Such i-deals may account for a common

finding in compensation research: relative to

their marginal productivity, firms tend to under-

pay high performers and overpay low perform-

ers (Frank, 1985; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).

Proposition 7: Ex post i-deals are more

likely to be based on particularistic

and abstract resources than on con-

crete and universal resources.

Receipt of special accommodations regarding

preferred assignments and development activi-

ties is positively related to recipients’ beliefs in

a mutual commitment regarding development

and support between themselves and their em-

ployers (Rousseau et al., 2003). Exchanging such

resources necessitates an investment of time

and effort on the part of both parties, which can

enhance each one’s beliefs regarding the qual-

ity of the relationship. Resource exchanges that

promote interaction over time can deepen both

the investments and obligations each party re-

ciprocates with the other.

In contrast, accommodations regarding pay

and equipment, which can be provided with

minimal interaction, have no consistent effect

on the perceived employment relationship

(Rousseau et al., 2003). As indicated in Proposi-

tion 6, monetary (i.e., concrete and universal)

arrangements are likely to be made prior to em-

ployment in an organization—that is, when suc-

cessful negotiation of one’s preferences is likely

to be attributed to market value rather than to a

special quality of the employer. Basing i-deals

986 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

on market factors is likely not only at the time of

hire but also post hire, when workers bargain for

salary increases. A salary increase is more

likely to be justified by market-related reasons

than are accommodations supporting an indi-

vidual’s personal growth.

Whereas market-based attributions predomi-

nate among workers with ex ante i-deals and

among workers with monetary-based i-deals re-

gardless of timing, we expect that workers will

attribute their ex post nonmonetary (i.e., partic-

ularistic and abstract) i-deals to the quality of

their employment relationships.

Proposition 8: Ex post nonmonetary i-

deals are more strongly and positively

related to workers’ beliefs regarding

the quality of their employment rela-

tionship than are ex post monetary i-

deals.

Although some workers who successfully bar-

gain for a pay increase might believe their em-

ployers value them highly, we expect workers to

be less consistent in their interpretation of mon-

etary i-deals than particularistic i-deals. Mone-

tary i-deals can arise in arm’s length employ-

ment arrangements, as well as in highly

relational ones, whereas particularistic i-deals

require a relationship (e.g., McLean Parks &

smith, 1998). How workers respond to monetary

i-deals, therefore, will depend on the nature of

their broader arrangements with their employ-

ers.

Employers may enter into i-deals as a means

of courting subsequent reciprocity. A reverber-

ating network of obligations can arise as i-deals

cultivate mutual support. Workers may interpret

i-deals variously, as signals of a good relation-

ship with an employer or as indicators of how

much individual power they wield. Interpreta-

tions are likely to depend on the i-deal’s content,

which reflects workers’ and employers’ motives

for creating the i-deal in the first place.

COWORKERS’ RESPONSES TO I-DEALS

Thus far, we have focused on arrangements

between an employee and his or her employer.

However, this ignores another key stakeholder—

the worker’s coworkers. Because coworkers are

likely to observe and form judgments about

i-deals, it is important to consider their assess-

ment of and reaction to those i-deals they learn

about. Comparisons between oneself and one’s

coworkers are likely to be made especially sa-

lient by i-deals, given that, by definition, the

terms of their employment differ. (Should co-

workers attempt to match the terms of another’s

i-deal, that arrangement is no longer idiosyn-

cratic. Subsequent matching arrangements are

motivated by different factors, such as perceived

equity, and we address these elsewhere [Green-

berg et al., 2004].)

Insofar as a worker and an employer have

agreed to an i-deal, these parties are inclined to

perceive it as fair. However, an i-deal’s non-

standard nature can lead other involved parties,

such as coworkers, to question its fairness

(Greenberg et al., 2004). In other words, cowork-

ers are likely to have different reactions to i-

deals than the principals themselves. As in any

social exchange, observers are likely to have

different perspectives than actors because they

are not likely to be privy to the same information

(Jones & Nisbett, 1972). When an employee with

an i-deal and his or her employer are the only

parties to know the exact terms of employment,

others are likely to learn about these in an in-

complete and inaccurate manner, such as

through rumor and innuendo. Moreover, others

are inclined to judge these arrangements as un-

fair if the arrangements were made in secret,

raising suspicion that there is something to

hide. Also, because they often are unfamiliar

with the exact nature of the agreement, cowork-

ers are not in a good position to judge its ulti-

mate fairness.

Nonetheless, it is not inevitable that cowork-

ers will judge others’ i-deals as unfair. We out-

line some key considerations in assessing the

fairness of i-deals. These are important in that

repeated complaints about the unfairness of i-

deals ultimately may lead to their prohibition,

thereby denying employers and employees a

potential benefit and source of flexibility.

Opportunity for Choice: Do Others Have the

Same Options?

I-deals are likely to be perceived as fair by

third parties to the extent that these individuals

believe they have opportunities to make similar

arrangements themselves. This is the case, for

example, when using cafeteria-style pay plans

(Barringer & Milkovich, 1998), a mechanism for

creating customized employment terms. How-

2006 987Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg

ever, because of their standard nature, cafeteria-

style pay plans cannot be considered

i-deals.

The fairness of i-deals may be difficult to es-

tablish in the eyes of interested third parties. For

example, if John learns that his colleague, Mary,

negotiated an i-deal that provides greater flex-

ibility in work assignments, he may feel unfairly

treated to the extent that he values such flexi-

bility and believes he too deserves it. Such feel-

ings may be reduced if John believes he also

could receive identical treatment by asking for

it. This would be the case, for example, if John

perceived that his employer held him in high

regard and was willing to offer him an equally

desirable arrangement if he asked for it. Oppor-

tunities for comparable treatment, however,

need not imply that the coworker believes he or

she currently deserves an i-deal. For example,

ex post i-deals may be given to veteran employ-

ees who have paid their dues (Ford & Newstrom,

1999). Knowing that the same advantages will

accrue when an individual achieves veteran

status promotes the belief that he or she too can

enjoy comparable opportunities.

Proposition 9: A coworker’s perceived

fairness of another’s i-deal will be pos-

itively related to the degree to which

he or she believes it is possible to at-

tain equally desirable outcomes.

Legitimate conditions for ex ante i-deals may

differ from those for ex post i-deals. Market fac-

tors tend to be legitimate considerations in ex

ante negotiations, and coworkers may accept

differences in employment conditions generated

by labor market factors at the time a higher-paid

colleague was hired (as in the case of salary

compression; Brown & Woodbury, 1998). How-

ever, reliance on market factors to negotiate an

ex post i-deal is more likely to generate adverse

reactions on the part of coworkers, particularly

those inclined to see themselves as making

comparable contributions. Employers, however,

tend to treat mobile workers more generously

than their equally competent but nonmobile

peers (Rusbelt, Campbell, & Price, 1990; Rusbelt,

Lowery, Hubbarb, & Maravankin, 1988)—a prac-

tice that may generate outrage. We expect that

coworkers will react more positively when mar-

ket factors motivate an i-deal their employer

grants to a new hire than when used to justify

special accommodations to a current employee.

Proposition 10: Coworkers are likely to

believe that market factors are a more

legitimate basis for creating ex ante

i-deals than for creating ex post

i-deals.

Does Anyone Gain or Lose?

One person’s special treatment can create

costs for others, particularly when the parties

are interdependent. In zero-sum situations,

where resources are constrained, coworkers are

more likely to experience a loss whenever a

peer receives an i-deal. Time off for one person,

for example, may result in more work for others.

A worker who gets a raise because she received

an outside offer reduces the pool of money avail-

able to grant raises to her peers. Negative con-

sequences from i-deals in resource-constrained

situations are amplified by the well-established

tendency for people to be more sensitive to

losses than to gains (Kahneman & Tversky,

1979).

A person receiving an i-deal can engender a

more positive response from colleagues by tak-

ing steps to minimize any adverse impact. Such

an individual may need to manage relations

with colleagues so as to enhance their percep-

tions of fairness. This likely will involve offering

an acceptable explanation to peers as to why

this arrangement was warranted. Ostensible

steps may be taken to help coworkers who have

been harmed in some way because of extra

work or other demands necessitated by one’s

i-deal, perhaps by helping and doing favors for

coworkers or making oneself available by

phone if needed—that is, engaging in acts of

OCB-I (Williams & Anderson, 1991). These efforts

reflect enlightened self-interest, particularly

where workers with i-deals are interdependent

with others.

Recipients of i-deals who effectively manage

relations with coworkers tend to downplay dif-

ferences in their treatment so as to avoid rein-

forcing an impression of nonconformity (Clark,

1998). For example, if their arrangements allow

them to not work on Thursdays, they may say

that they are “out of the office on Thursday,”

instead of stating that they “don’t work that

day.” The symbolic benefits associated with

such a gesture may be considerable.

It is important to note that, on some occasions,

coworkers may gain from a peer’s i-deal. For

988 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

example, faculty members who plead with a

dean to match the outside offer received by a

high-status colleague may do so to protect the

status of their department. In local hierarchies,

status may be a thing of considerable value

(Frank, 1985). Although being at the bottom of a

hierarchy has negative consequences, even

lower-status members of a prestigious unit may

benefit from its standing, making them support-

ive of i-deals that protect it.

Proposition 11: I-deals resulting in

benefits for coworkers are more likely

to be accepted as fair than those that

result in no such benefits. Coworkers

will perceive another’s i-deal as less

fair when it results in costs to them-

selves than when the i-deal is cost

neutral.

IMPLICATIONS OF I-DEALS

Viewing employment relations through the

lens of i-deals reveals both essential dynamics

and subtle nuances in relations among their

parties: the worker and employer (the deal’s

principals) and coworkers. These have impor-

tant implications for both research and practice.

Research Implications

The i-deal framework described here indi-

cates that considerable insight into the dynam-

ics of the employment relationship can be

gained by framing it as an exchange wherein

individual workers can shape its terms. More-

over, it is an exchange among three parties,

where a primary exchange between a worker

and his or her employer has implications for the

relations that worker’s coworkers have with the

employer and the worker. Our conceptualization

of i-deals points the way toward balancing the

interests of worker, employer, and coworkers to

provide both flexibility and fairness.

Organizations display less standardization in

the employment exchange than is widely pre-

sumed. Individual workers introduce more vari-

ation in the resources they exchange with their

employers than scholars and practitioners have

appreciated to date. In so doing, these employ-

ees are not only impacting the classic cycle of

inducements and contributions to enhance their

own gratification but are also serving as a

source of innovation in personnel policy. I-deals

and the conditions under which they arise can

inform how personnel policies originate in orga-

nizations and the conditions promoting their re-

vision. Even ostensibly standard practices can

constitute a growth medium for i-deals. I-deals

can provide insight into organizational routines

used to execute such personnel actions as trans-

fers and promotions.

Far from being rigid, many organizational

routines are influenced by the managers and

workers who participate in them (Feldman &

Pentland, 2003). Current employees can negoti-

ate i-deals under various conditions, as a re-

ward for completing a major project or as an

incentive to accept a transfer or new responsi-

bilities (Rousseau, 2005). The impact of organi-

zational policies and the routines that support

them can vary from firm to firm and from man-

ager to manager, to the extent that i-deals are

involved in their execution. Whether workers

are able to shape the execution of a routine via

i-deals can yield strikingly distinct conse-

quences from seemingly comparable personnel

actions.

An employer’s role in i-deals is complicated,

since, with the exception of all but the simplest

cases (e.g., start-up firms with one founder/

manager), employers are not unitary entities.

Potentially, employers are represented by mul-

tiple agents, managers, HR staff, and by formal

organizational procedures for personnel deci-

sions. Research is needed into why employers

and their agents agree to i-deals in the first

place, as well as why they don’t. The employer’s

HR infrastructure, including compensation, and

development practices are likely to play a large

role in shaping the forms i-deals take, how co-

workers respond to them, and whether such ar-

rangements are negotiated at all. In particular,

the co-occurrence of other personnel practices,

such as credible performance indicators or

openness regarding compensation, is likely to

be pertinent to how i-deals are viewed by all

parties.

We also need to understand how the scope

and variation of an organization’s i-deals are

determined by the degree to which workers al-

ready obtain resources through their firm’s stan-

dard reward practices. In the case of a generous

employer who offers a full plate of benefits and

developmental opportunities, we might expect

i-deals to be somewhat unusual or limited in

2006 989Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg

scope— but perhaps greeted with more accep-

tance. In contrast to the vigilance and suspicion

of employees who expect to get little unless they

strike a deal, the generous employer is likely

create a climate of trust and fairness (Colquitt,

Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Ehrhart, 2004). Research is

needed on how such organizational factors im-

pact workers’ responses to their own i-deals and

those of others.

Coworkers play multiple roles in i-deals. They

can influence a peer’s i-deal negotiation when

either the peer or employer attempts to antici-

pate the coworkers’ reactions. In effect, i-deals

can be bargained for in the shadow of cowork-

ers, who are more likely to judge as fair those

negotiations that attend to their interests than

those that don’t. Coworkers are also, in some

cases, key enablers of i-deals. One person’s spe-

cial employment conditions can lead another to

adjust his or her performance to pick up slack or

to provide coordination made necessary by non-

standard arrangements. The assistance cowork-

ers provide might be construed as citizenship

behavior where the target is the organization

(i.e., OCB-O), but, as noted earlier, it often is

provided to assist a fellow worker (i.e., OCB-I;

Williams & Anderson, 1991). Along with any sac-

rifices i-deals might exact from coworkers, from

more work to lower raises, coworkers may antic-

ipate reciprocity for their support for (or toler-

ance of) another’s i-deal. In this regard, cowork-

ers are themselves prospective i-dealers whose

beliefs about their likelihood of success can in-

fluence perceptions of fairness as well as their

relationships with employer and i-dealing col-

league(s) alike (Greenberg et al., 2004).

The conceptualization of i-deals developed

here suggests that within-group heterogeneity

in work experiences and reward allocations is

neither merely noise from individual differences

in perception nor the effect of workers’ pet rela-

tionships with their bosses. Systematic pro-

cesses are at work whereby heterogeneity

arises through ways in which individual work-

ers and employers craft their relationship. Yet

scholars largely have overlooked the matter of

differences among coworkers with respect to the

terms of their employment. For example, LMX

researchers have neglected to investigate the

impact of high-LMX relations between a man-

ager and one subordinate on that person’s peers

(for a review, see Schriescheim, Castro, &

Cogliser, 1999). Likewise, research on organiza-

tional justice (for a review, see Colquitt & Green-

berg, 2003) largely focuses on forces of consis-

tency, equity, and equality while downplaying

heterogeneity in the value and meanings indi-

viduals within a group associate with the differ-

ent resources they receive. Research that ad-

dresses this balance of interests must consider

the three parties simultaneously.

Toward this end, we advocate more contextu-

alized research designs that assess the employ-

ment exchange from the perspective of each in-

dividual worker in a work unit with respect to

his or her relationship with both employer and

coworkers. Individual-level assessments should

measure an individual’s beliefs regarding his or

her own exchange relationship and related

judgments regarding each coworker in a given

setting. The format used in network research is

useful in this regard, wherein individuals report

their judgments regarding relationships with all

unit members listed in a questionnaire (e.g., Da-

bos & Rousseau, 2004b). Designs that assess the

perspectives of workgroup members and their

employers with respect to the resources ex-

changed, capturing the exchange from the van-

tage point of each dyad (i.e., worker-employer,

worker-coworker), can be used to examine the

main effects from employer- and employee-level

factors, as well as the interaction effects from

each employee’s position relative to others in

the workgroup. Analytic tools such as the WABA

approach (e.g., Schriescheim, 1995) provide one

means for evaluating effects of within-group

heterogeneity, while network analytic tech-

niques can be used to test effects at the dyadic

level (Krackhardt, 1988).

Temporal factors play a role in the impact of

i-deals not only in terms of whether the arrange-

ments made are ex ante or ex post but also in

terms of the period of time over which their

effects are evaluated. For example, as we noted

earlier, i-deals that initially meet an individual

worker’s needs can have negative conse-

quences over time if the worker’s nonconformity

leads to subsequently reduced performance

evaluations. In contrast, an i-deal that promotes

a worker’s opportunities for career development

might enhance his or her subsequent perfor-

mance and promotability. Not only are the con-

sequences of i-deals likely to vary over time, but

their implications for employer, worker, and co-

workers can vary, depending on the point in the

990 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

cycle of inducements and contributions at which

an assessment is made.

I-deals also have their dark sides, such as

when the balance among the interests of these

three parties is neglected. Yet scholars have

much to learn from investigating circumstances

where within-group heterogeneity in resource

exchanges and employment conditions is seen

as legitimate and in which workers, employers,

and coworkers experience positive outcomes. In

any case, however, these practices cannot be

fully understood until we examine their impli-

cations for the three focal parties to an individ-

ual’s employment relationship.

Practical Implications

A wise personnel manager once advised,

“Make no compensation decisions you wouldn’t

post on the employee bulletin board.” I-deals

are most likely to result in a sense of fairness to

the extent that they are communicated openly

(Greenberg et al., 2004). It is likely that manag-

ers will be more willing to publicly acknowl-

edge i-deals that are based on values widely

shared in the organization (e.g., contribution, se-

rious personal need, opportunity for innovation;

Rousseau, 2005). Employers should be wary of

granting i-deals for which the underlying values

are not clear or credible, such as may occur

when i-deals concerned with pay are created

with the same workers repeatedly. When i-deals

are prompted by circumstances raising privacy

concerns (e.g., illness), employers need to de-

velop repertoires for communicating appropri-

ately to avoid misinterpretation.

In closing, we caution that i-deals do not sub-

stitute for well-thought-out HR management

systems where standardized practices address

the concerns workers share. Nonetheless, the

flexibility that i-deals provide is a necessary

response to individual differences and chang-

ing circumstances. New firms, of course, often

lack such infrastructures, making i-deals useful

mechanisms for attracting, motivating, and re-

taining workers—at least to the extent that em-

ployers focus attention on learning how to man-

age i-deals effectively. Even for firms with

elaborate personnel systems, the needs of all

workers and employers cannot be determined a

priori, making the opportunity to create i-deals

advantageous. I-deals provide a basis from

which employers can identify potentially useful

innovations in HR practice— but, of course, only

to the degree that they allow organizational

learning to occur by freely sharing information

about past i-deals. Employees and employers

stand to benefit by looking at i-deals as experi-

ments, which, if successful, can be more broadly

applied. Scholarly research can aid this effort by

examining i-deals as a three-party process, bal-

ancing several sets of interests simultaneously.

We hope this article inspires such efforts.

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994 OctoberAcademy of Management Review

When Do Idiosyncratic Deals Promote Creativity?—Application of Data Processing in Enterprise Management

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Chapter

Apr 2022

Recognizing societal and organizational trends toward individualization of work ( Rousseau, D. M. (2005). I-deals: Idiosyncratic deals employees bargain for themselves. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.) coined the term idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) to describe personalized work arrangements negotiated by employees to fulfill their unique needs unmet by their employer’s standard offerings. Since then, this area has received considerable attention from research and practice alike. We believe i-deals are “ideal” for addressing the changing needs and preferences of employees, employers, and the wider society in the post-pandemic era. Core aspects of i-deals are expounded by leading scholars in the preceding 12 chapters of this book. The book provides a comprehensive review and critique of i-deals literature from multiple perspectives. The discussion begins with an examination of motivations and outcomes of i-deal seekers and grantors. Particular attention is given to issues of fairness during negotiation and implementation of i-deals in workgroups wherein the recipients’ co-workers observe and react to the differentiated work arrangements. Recommendations are made for best practices for institutionalizing i-deals as a global strategic human resource management device. In this concluding chapter, we reflect on these insights, identify gaps in i-deals research, and suggest avenues for future research.

Personal reputation in organizations

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2003

Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status

Article

Oct 1986

Impact of employee mobility and employee performance on the allocation of rewards under conditions of constraint.

Article

Apr 1988

We advanced and tested a multiple-motive model of resource allocation. In this model we identified importance instrumental, social-emotional, and group maintenance goals, and asserted that rational managers will sometimes allocate reduced rewards to employees with constrained mobility. Consistent with predictions, managers allocated greater salary funds to more deserving employees: those with high competence and dedication. However, allocations also differed as a function of employee mobility. This effect was strongest among competent employees, whose membership was most desirable. Furthermore, the tendency to allocate lesser rewards to low-mobility employees was particularly pronounced under conditions of low reward availability and low labor availability. These effects were not mediated by changes in perceptions of the competence of low-mobility employees. These findings are discussed as a form of rational selective exploitation: The rational manager's need to attend to employee mobility, particularly under conditions of reward or labor constraint, may erode equity.

The actor and observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior

Article

Jan 1971

Personal reputation in organizations

Article

Jan 2003

Human Resource Management, Gaining a Competitive Advantage

Article

Jun 2007

Lalita Singh

The cognitive geometry of employee theft: Negotiating "the line" between taking and stealing

Article

Jan 1998

J. Greenberg

Organizational justice: A fair assessment of the state of the literature

Article

Fairness in idiosyncratic work arrangements: Justice as an i-deal

Article

Jan 2004
Res Person Hum Resour Manag

In response to demands and opportunities of the labor market, contemporary employers and employees voluntarily are entering into highly customized agreements regarding nonstandard employment terms. We refer to such idiosyncratic deals as "i-deals," acknowledging that these arrangements are intended to benefit all parties. Examples of i-deals include an employee with highly coveted skills who is compensated more generously than other employees doing comparable work, and an employee who is granted atypically flexible working hours to accommodate certain personal life demands. The nonstandard nature of i-deals is likely to prompt questions about the fairness of the arrangement among three principal stakeholders - employees who receive the i-deal, managers with whom the i-deal is negotiated, and the co-workers of these employees and managers. We analyze issues of fairness that arise in the relationships among all three pairings of these stakeholders through the lenses of four established forms of organizational justice - distributive justice, procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and informational justice. Our discussion sheds light on previously unexplored nuances of i-deals and identifies several neglected theoretical issues of organizational justice. In addition to highlighting these conceptual advances, we also discuss methods by which the fairness of i-deals can be promoted.

Psychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements.

Article

Mar 1998
ADMIN SCI QUART

2006) ‘I-deals: Idiosyncratic Terms in Employment Relationships

Abstract

Recommendations

Trajectories of attitudinal and behavioral reactions in the aftermath of psychological contract breach and violation

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Evidence-based Management

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