Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change

Abstract

Climate change is likely to have profound economic consequences for Egypt. This study evaluates the potential economic impacts resulting from changes in water supplies, agriculture, air quality, heat stress, and tourism. Other sensitive sectors, including water pollution, energy consumption, and biodiversity, were not assessed. Sea level rise threatens agricultural land and property in the Nile Delta. Higher temperatures can reduce agricultural production, a situation that can be made worse with lower water supplies. As a result, unemployment and food prices may increase, risking increased malnutrition. Human health in Cairo could be adversely affected by increased particulate matter and heat stress, potentially leading to thousands of deaths valued at tens of billions of Egyptian pounds per year. Annual tourist revenues are estimated to decrease as well. Total economic losses for the sectors mentioned above are estimated to reach ~200 to 350 billion Egyptian pounds (EGP; US $36-64 billion), which is equivalent to 2-6% of future gross domestic product.

Full text

CLIMATE RESEARCH
Clim Res
Vol. 62: 59– 70, 2014
doi: 10.3354/cr01257 Published online December 2
1. INTRODUCTION
As Egypt’s Second National Communication (SNC)
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) states, ‘Egypt is one of the
most vulnerable countries to the potential impacts
and risks of climate change’ (EEAA 2010, p. 69). The
reasons are numerous, starting with the potential
effects on the Nile River, which supplies the vast
majority of Egypt’s water supply: a reduction in aver-
age flow of the Nile could seriously threaten Egypt’s
water supplies and the well-being of its citizens, of
which 97% live along the river or in the Nile Delta. In
addition to this impact on water resources, valuable
lands in the Nile Delta face the threat of inundation
from sea level rise (SLR). Agricultural production is
also at risk from the direct effects of climate change:
higher temperatures could lower crop yields, and a
de crease in water supplies could reduce the avail-
ability of water for irrigation. In addition, climate
© Inter-Research 2014 · www.int-res.com*Corresponding author: jsmith@stratusconsulting.com
Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change
Joel B. Smith1,*, Bruce A. McCarl2, Paul Kirshen3, Russell Jones1,
Leland Deck1,12, Mohamed A. Abdrabo4, Mohamed Borhan5, Akram El-Ganzori6,
Mohamed El-Shamy7, Mohamed Hassan7, Ibrahim El-Shinnawy8, Mohamed Abrabou9,
Mosaad Kotb Hassanein9, Mona El-Agizy10, Mohamed Bayoumi11, Riina Hynninen11
1Stratus Consulting, 1881 Ninth Street, Suite 201, Boulder, Colorado 80302, USA
2Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843-1342, USA
3University of New Hampshire, 83 Main Street, Durham, New Hampshire 03824, USA
4Alexandria Research Center for Adaptation to Climate Change (ARCA), Institute of Graduate Studies and Research,
Alexandria University, Alexandria, Egypt
5Adaptation of the Nile Delta to Climatic Changes Project, Alexandria, Egypt
6Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Cairo, Egypt
7Planning Center, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Cairo, Egypt
8Coastal Research Institute, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Cairo, Egypt
9Agricultural Research Center, Ministry of Agriculture & Land Reclamation, Giza, Egypt
10Climate Change Risk Management Programme in Egypt, Cairo, Egypt
11United Nations Development Programme, Cairo, Egypt
12Present address: US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA
ABSTRACT: Climate change is likely to have profound economic consequences for Egypt. This
study evaluates the potential economic impacts resulting from changes in water supplies, agricul-
ture, air quality, heat stress, and tourism. Other sensitive sectors, including water pollution,
energy consumption, and biodiversity, were not assessed. Sea level rise threatens agricultural
land and property in the Nile Delta. Higher temperatures can reduce agricultural production, a
situation that can be made worse with lower water supplies. As a result, unemployment and food
prices may increase, risking increased malnutrition. Human health in Cairo could be adversely
affected by increased particulate matter and heat stress, potentially leading to thousands of deaths
valued at tens of billions of Egyptian pounds per year. Annual tourist revenues are estimated to
decrease as well. Total economic losses for the sectors mentioned above are estimated to reach
~200 to 350 billion Egyptian pounds (EGP; US $36−64 billion), which is equivalent to 2−6% of
future gross domestic product.
KEY WORDS: Climate change · Egypt · Economy
Resale or republication not permitted without written consent of the publisher

Clim Res 62: 59– 70, 2014
change could worsen Egypt’s already severe air pol-
lution and increase heat stress. The combination of
higher temperatures and SLR could lead to reduced
tourism by making the climate less inviting and
threatening ecological tourist attractions, such as
coral reefs. Note, it could also create damages in
other sectors.
A key rationale for conducting this assessment is
that even preceding the 2011 Revolution, climate
change received limited attention in natural resource
policy discussions in Egypt. Since the start of the Rev-
olution, the country has been consumed with sorting
out its short-term political future. Yet, climate change
remains as a potentially significant threat to Egypt’s
long-term economic health. This study at tempts to
raise the profile of climate change by estimating the
potential economic risks the country faces from it.
1.1. Previous studies
Hotter and drier conditions are projected for much
of Egypt. Christensen et al. (2007) concluded that
Mediterranean Africa is likely to become warmer and
drier, but that East Africa, the source of the Nile, is
likely to get wetter. Funk et al. (2008), however, found
that March through May precipitation in East Africa
decreased by ~15% since about 1980, and question
whether precipitation in East Africa will indeed in-
crease with further climate change. Thus it is possible
that flow in the Nile could decrease in the future.
Egypt has been the subject of climate change
impact studies for more than 2 decades. Milliman et
al. (1989) and El-Raey (1997) assessed the vulnerabil-
ity of coastal resources to SLR, while Strzepek et al.
(1995, 2001) examined the vulnerability of agriculture
to changes in climate and water supply, and coastal
resources to changes in climate and sea level. The po-
tential for significant changes in the flow of the Nile
are reflected in various studies: Conway & Hulme
(1996) estimated that flow in the Blue Nile in 2025
could change within the range of a 15% increase to a
9% decrease. Strzepek et al. (2001) estimated that by
2020, the flow could decrease by 10 to 50%. More re-
cently, Elshamy et al. (2009) used bias-corrected sta-
tistical downscaling of 17 general circulation models
(GCMs) to estimate an average 15% reduction in flow
of the Blue Nile by the end of the century, and a range
of change from a 60% decrease to a 45% increase.
To our knowledge, no study to date has attempted
to estimate the economic impact of climate change on
a number of key sectors in the Egyptian economy.
This study covers more sectors than have been
assessed in a single study before. It is nevertheless-
not comprehensive, and did not include such im -
portant sensitive sectors as energy, water quality,
fisheries, and biodiversity. Note that Robinson et al.
(2012) used a dynamic computable general equilib-
rium model of Ethiopia, and estimated that climate
change would reduce that country’s gross domestic
product (GDP) by ~6 to 10% by the 2040s — a per-
centage impact on Ethiopian GDP that is higher than
the impact on Egyptian GDP estimated in this study.
1.2. Objectives
The literature on climate change in Egypt has
tended to focus on SLR, water resources, and conse-
quences for agriculture. Impacts of climate change
on health and tourism have not been assessed, nor
have the implications for the Egyptian economy. This
study estimates the potential impacts of climate
change on Egypt’s economy in 2030 and 2060 by
examining the consequences of changes in water
supply, agriculture production, value of property in
the Nile Delta, increases in air pollution and heat
stress, and consequences of changes in climate and
coral reef health on tourism.
2. METHODS
The structure of the study is displayed in Fig. 1 and
described below.
2.1. Socioeconomic scenarios
We developed 2 sets of socioeconomic scenarios to
encompass a wide range of potential development
paths: a low population and high-income growth
scenario, which is referred to as ‘low-pop,’ and a high
population and low-income growth scenario, which
is referred to as ‘high-pop.’ Population scenarios
were based on the SNC (EEAA 2010) projections for
2030, World Bank (2008) population projections for
2050, and extrapolation to 2060. The low-pop scenario
assumes that population stabilizes by mid-century,
whereas the high-pop scenario assumes no decrease
in present fertility rates. Egypt’s population through
2010 was 82 million and was increasing by 2.3% yr−1
(EEAA 2010). The high- and low-pop projections are
displayed in Table 1.
The low-pop scenario assumes that real per capita
income increases by ~3.8% yr−1, consistent with the
60

Smith et al.: Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change
A1 emissions scenario from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; Naki´cenovi ´c et al.
2000). The high-pop scenario uses the A2 IPCC
assumption that real per capita income increases by
2.2% yr−1. We used published IPCC projections for
the African and Latin American regions for the A1
and A2 scenarios (Naki´cenovi ´c et al. 2000). The total
GDP and GDP per capita income assumptions are
shown in Table 2.
2.2. Climate change scenarios
The scenarios are from Elshamy et al.
(2009), who used the A1B emissions sce-
nario (IPCC) to estimate Blue Nile flow.
Weselected 3GCMsfrom Els hamyetal.
(2009) that presented the highest, low-
est, and intermediate flow levels across
the model results. The average change
estimated across the 17 models in Els -
hamy et al. (2009) is a small decrease in
flow. The scenarios are (1) large de -
crease in flow: Canadian Centre for Cli-
mate Modeling and Analysis (Canada;
CGCM63); (2) small decrease in flow:
Max Planck Institute for Meteoro logy
(Germany; ECHAM); (3) increase in
flow: National Institute for Environmental Studies
Medium Resolution (Japan; MIROC-M).
We used the ‘SimCLIM’ tool (CLIMsystems 2011) to
develop estimates of changes in temperature and
precipitation for Cairo and the High Aswan Dam
(HAD) due to climate change (Table 3).
The SLR scenarios were developed by the Coastal
Research Institute (CoRI) of the Ministry of Water Re -
sources and Industry (Elshinnawy 2008). Elshinnawy
(2008) used current SLR trends and estimates of ac -
ce lerated eustatic SLR from the IPCC (2007). Elshin-
nawy (2008) estimated re lative SLR, which includes
subsidence in the Nile Delta (Elshinnawy 2008; see
also Stanley 1990, Hassaan & Abdra bo 2013), for 3
sites on the Mediterranean in 2025, 2050, and 2075;
we used the 2025 estimate for 2030 be cause the 2
periods are close in time. We used the 2075 estimate
for 2060 be cause SLR may be much higher than esti-
mated by the IPCC (2007) (e.g. Oppenheimer et al.
2007, Natio nal Research Council 2012). SLR scenar-
ios are displayed in Table 4.
2.3. Water resources
We used Elshamy et al. (2009) as the basis for esti-
mates of change in Nile River flow. Because the Blue
Nile contributes 60% of the Nile’s flow at Dongola
(near the inlet of the reservoir of the HAD), we as -
sumed the percentage change in flow at the HAD
would be the same as the percentage change in Blue
Nile flow. The reasoning behind this approach is
reinforced by Beyene et al. (2010, their Tables 10 &
11), who show that under a range of GCMs and Spe-
cial Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), the per-
cent changes in mean annual flow at the HAD are,
61
2009 2030 2060
Low-pop 80 104 113
high-pop 80 117 162
Table 1. Low (low-pop) and high (high-pop) population
assumptions for current population (2009) and population
scenarios for 2030 and 2060. Data are millions of people
2009 2030 2060
GDP in million EGP
Low-pop 990 212 2993208 9298 978
high-pop 990 212 2287 141 5907 201
GDP in million USD
Low-pop 178 417 539 317 1 675491
high-pop 178 417 412 097 1064361
GDP/capita in EGP
Low-pop 12 378 28 781 82 292
high-pop 12 378 19 548 36 464
GDP/capita in USD
Low-pop 2 250 5 233 14 962
high-pop 2 250 3 554 6 630
Table 2. Projections of gross domestic product (GDP) and
GDP per capita. EGP: Egyptian pounds; USD: United States
dollars
Population scenarios
Second National
Communication, UN
Socioeconomic
scenarios
IPCC A1 A2
Climate change scenarios
CGCM, ECHAM,
MIROC-M
Inundation
of delta
Crop yields
Runoff
in Nile
Value of
inundated delta
Water
resources
Human health
Air qu alit y Tou ri sm
Agriculture
Impacts on
Egyptian ec onomy
Human health
Heat stress
Fig. 1. Study structure

Clim Res 62: 59– 70, 2014
for the most part, only slightly greater than the
changes in the Blue Nile discharge.
We estimated change in flow in 2030 and 2060 by
linearly interpolating between the Elshamy et al.
(2009) estimate of change in runoff from the 1961−
1990 period to the 2081−2100 period. Any reductions
in Nile River flow were assumed to be allocated
among nations in the Nile River Basin based on the
portion of water they currently withdraw (Okidi
1990). We did not account for changes in water with-
drawals upstream from Egypt. We as sumed the 1959
treaty between Egypt and Sudan regarding river
yield reductions remains in effect because of the cur-
rent political deadlock regarding the development of
a basin-wide agreement on water allocation.
Since the majority of the groundwater is not re -
charged and the recharge is limited in any case, we
assume that under climate change, with declining
rainfall in most GCM scenarios and higher tempera-
tures, the only available groundwater source is the
Nubian fossil water with 1 billion m−3 (BCM) yr−1. We
also assume the use of local effective rainfall when
the water supply is no longer viable.
The estimate for municipal and industrial (M&I)
de mand for water was based on a report by the Min-
istry of Water Resources & Irrigation (Egypt) (MWRI
2005), and assumed that consumption would in -
crease with population. We also assumed that cli-
mate change increases M&I use of water by 2.5%
above increases for population, regardless of the cli-
mate change scenario, based on a study done in a
somewhat comparable climate in the San Antonio
area of Texas, USA (Chen et al. 2001). We assume the
present instream need of 13.1 BCM yr−1 remains the
same. Demand should actually increase to maintain
the water quality and ecological health of the Nile
River under the higher temperatures and generally
poorer water quality under climate change, and the
possible need to maintain higher flows in the Delta
due to higher sea levels.
2.4. Coastal resources
Elshinnawy (2008) estimated the effects of differ-
ent SLR scenarios on the east, central, and west Delta
regions, assuming scenarios of both protection and
no protection of vulnerable areas. We overlaid
Elshin nawy’s (2008) estimates of SLR with property
and agriculture datasets in a geographic information
system to estimate the amount of agricultural land
and housing that could be inundated by SLR.
The potential loss of housing value was estimated
by using data on population size, number of housing
units, and current prices of housing units and agricul-
tural land in 5 governorates on the Nile Delta: Dami-
etta, Dakahlia, Kafr El Sheikh, Behaira, and Alexan-
dria. Field work was then done to collect data on the
number of housing units and the land values, as well
as to supplement government data. While the num-
ber of housing units was assumed not to change — a
very conservative assumption given the scenarios
used in this study of increased population and the
potential for expanded housing in the vulnerable
areas — the housing values were assumed to in -
crease at the same rate as per capita income in the
socioeconomic scenarios for Egypt.1
62
2030 2060
CGCM63 ECHAM MIROC-M CGCM63 ECHAM MIROC-M
Annual temperature (°C) 0.9 0.9 1.0 2.0 1.9 2.2
Temperature Nov−Apr (°C) 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.9 1.8 2.0
Temperature May−Oct (°C) 0.9 0.9 1.1 2.1 2.0 2.4
Annual precipitation change (%) −4 0 −5 −10 0 −10
Precipitation change Nov−Apr (%) −5 −12 −11 −10 −26 −25
Precipitation change May−Oct (%) −4 18 6 −9 41 13
Table 3. Estimated change in temperature and precipitation for Cairo from 3 climate models
City SLR scenario 2030 2060
Port Said Low 13.25 39.75
Middle 18.12 64.3
High 27.9 109.6
Al-Burullus Low 5.75 16.25
Middle 8.75 32.25
High 14.75 60.3
Alexandria Low 4.0 12.0
Middle 7.0 27.0
High 13.0 55.0
Table 4. Sea level rise (SLR; in cm) scenarios for Egypt used
in this study relative to 2000

Smith et al.: Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change 63
2.5. Agriculture
The agriculture analysis considered demand
growth, water availability change, crop yields, live-
stock yields, SLR land loss, pesticide costs, and tech-
nical progress (see McCarl et al. 2013). Population
projections were used to estimate change in demand
for food and the supply of farm labor. The change in
Nile River flow was used to estimate change in avail-
ability of water for irrigation, and the estimate of Nile
Delta inundation was used to estimate loss of agricul-
tural land.
Estimates of changes in crop yields were taken
from the Egypt SNC (EEAA 2010) and were adjusted
to be consistent with the climate change scenarios in
this analysis. They were based on expert judgment
regarding similarity of temperature and precipitation
conditions. A proxy crop approach was used to ex -
tend climate sensitivities to crops for which data
were not available.
The agriculture analysis used a partial equilibrium
model of the agriculture sector of the Egyptian econ-
omy. That model was originally developed by Kutcher
(1980), extended by McCarl et al. (1989), and updated
by Mohamed (2001) to include Nile water flow, return
flows, groundwater use, and M&I diversions, and
then updated with data supplied by Egypt’s Ministry
of Agriculture. Data in the model have been updated
with 2010 yields and prices. The model incorporated
a network flow structure that depicted upstream to
downstream flow, canal flow, conveyance loss, agri-
cultural and municipal diversion, consumptive use,
return flow into drains and the main river, groundwa-
ter infiltration, and escape to the sea.
Two scenarios were used that assumed the pres-
ence of technological improvements in crop yields
(based on NAREEEAB 2011, and discussions with the
Ministry of Agriculture). (1) A slow scenario was
developed that assumed increases of 1% yr−1 in
yields of all but one crop through 2060, with berseem
yields in creasing by 2.1% yr−1. (2) The faster-change
scenario assumed the rate of increase in yield of
all crops to be 2.1% yr−1 based on projections by
NAREEEAB (2011). Imports were assumed to in crease
to up to 5 times current levels.
2.6. Human health: air pollution
We did not directly estimate changes in air quality
in Egypt, but conducted a sensitivity analysis of the
effects of climate change on air quality and human
health in Cairo. World Bank (2002) data on air pollu-
tion levels and consequent mortality and morbidity
rates were used. The World Health Organization
(WHO) standard for PM2.5 (particulate matter < 2.5 µm)
is 10 µg m−3 (annual mean; WHO 2006) and measure-
ments of air quality in Cairo in 2002 found levels 8 to
10 times above this standard (World Bank 2002). We
developed high and low estimates of pollution effects
on health based on Katsouyanni et al. (1996), the
Health Effects Institute (2004), and WHO (2005). Age-
specific mortality rates from WHO (2011) for Egypt in
2009 were used. The population of Greater Cairo (in-
cluding surrounding governorates) was assumed to
increase at the same rate as the national population.
Because no studies of climate change and air pollu-
tion in Egypt have been conducted to date, we
assumed that modeled climate changes in PM for
Phoenix, Arizona would give an indication of poten-
tial changes in the air quality of Cairo. PM2.5 levels in
Phoenix are substantially lower than those in Cairo
under current conditions, however, so the impacts of
climate change in Cairo may be larger than we esti-
mated. Tagaris et al. (2009, 2010) estimated that by
2080, increases in PM2.5 concentrations in Phoenix
will range from 0.3 to 0.7 µg m−3. Because Cairo will
likely still have higher PM concentrations than
Phoenix, we assumed that by 2030 the Greater Cairo
area may have a PM2.5 increase of 0.5 µg m−3, and by
2060, an increase of 1.0 µg m−3. Unless substantial re -
ductions are made in air pollution levels in Cairo, the
impacts of climate change could be greater than
what was assumed here.
We estimated the monetary value of health effects
under the assumption that about 10 yr of per capita
income would be lost for each death. Hospital admis-
sions were valued at 2.6% of GDP per capita (USEPA
2010). We also used the value of a statistical life (VSL)
in the US based on USEPA (2010), and lowered it by
the ratio of Egyptian:US per capita income.
2.7. Human health: heat stress
Kalkstein & Tan (1995) estimated increases in
summer time daily mortality in Cairo under climate
change scenarios. They reported that mortality rate
was at 4.45/100 000 persons, and a 2° and 4°C rise in
temperature increased the rate to 10.23 and 19.32,
1The assumption that the percentage increase in housing
value is the same as the percentage increase in per capita
income is based on analysis of the increase in per capita in-
come in the US compared to the increase in mortgage
spending from 1985 to 2005. Income before taxes increased
234%, while spending on mortgages increased 240% (US
Census Bureau 2011). A change in mortgages is not only a
function of the price of homes, but also of the interest rate.

Clim Res 62: 59– 70, 2014
respectively. Their estimates of the increases in heat
stress mortality from climate change appear to be
similar to a more recent study on heat stress and cli-
mate change by Takahashi et al. (2007). We assumed
that maximum temperatures increase at the same
rate as average temperatures, and assumed no
increase in the use of air conditioning. The assumed
increase in per capita income, however, will likely
result in an increased use of air conditioning. Thus
these results may overestimate heat stress mortality.
2.8. Tourism
By examining recent trends, we estimated tourism
levels in 2030 under the assumption of no change in
climate. We developed a high future tourism level
scenario based on extrapolation of the 2004−2008
trend, and a low future tourism scenario based on
extrapolation from the 2004−2010 trend. The scenar-
ios are shown in Table 5. Bigano et al. (2007) pro-
jected that tourism revenues under the A1B SRES
scenario (Naki´cenovi ´c et al. 2000) in Egypt will de -
crease 8.4% in 2030 and 19.7% by 2060, relative to
1990. We applied the percentage losses from climate
change to the estimated levels of tourism revenues in
Egypt to estimate impacts of climate change.
Because coral reefs are a significant attraction in
the area, we estimated change in recreational expen-
ditures related to coral reefs in the Red Sea. Based on
Cantin et al. (2010), we estimated that 20 to 35% of
coral reefs in the Red Sea would be decimated by
2030 (assuming a linear increase in coral reef loss
since 1990), and that 50 to 80% of coral reefs would
be lost by 2060. Cesar (2003) reported that recre-
ational expenditures on Red Sea coral were $472 mil-
lion in 2000, and we assumed the same level of ex -
penditures in 2004. We also allowed for increases in
coral recreation expenditures in proportion to the
projected increases in tourism revenues.
2.9. Limitations of the study
This study used a number of independent studies
as the basis for estimated impacts of climate change
on Egypt. Although those studies employed varying
assumptions about climate change scenarios and
socioeconomic conditions, we believe the numerical
results, which should be interpreted with caution,
indicate the potential order of magnitude of the eco-
nomic effects of climate change in Egypt.
Note that climate change could cause economic
impacts other than those addressed here, such as
other forms of air and water pollution; SLR impacts
on cities; adverse impacts of lower water flows,
higher water temperatures, and SLR on fisheries; and
loss of biodiversity.
This study did not quantify the potential effect of
adaptations in reducing economic losses to the Egypt-
ian economy. Certainly there will be at least some in-
vestments in adaptation, and thus our estimates may
be greater than the net impact of climate change on
Egypt once adaptation investments are made. On the
other hand, it is not clear where the financing for
adaptation investments will come from.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Water resources
Projected change in mean annual flow into the
HAD is shown in Table 6. The estimated changes in
flow are large in both the wetter and drier directions.
The results are of a similar magnitude as those esti-
mated by Strzepek et al. (1995, 2001), but are of a
larger magnitude than those estimated by Beyene et
al. (2010).
64
Year Revenue
2004 34 804
2005 39 633
2006 44 732
2007 56 799
2008 66 572
2009 59 400
2010 (estimated) 69850
Extrapolations High Low
2030 242413 189430
2060 484517 367844
Table 5. Recorded and estimated tourism revenues for
Egypt. Unit: million Egyptian pounds
Nile flow (GCM) Egypt 2030 2060
allocation
2000
Increased flow (MIROC-medium) 55.5 63.1 70.6
Small decrease in flow (ECHAM) 55.5 52.3 49.1
Large decrease in flow (CGCM63) 55.5 45.5 35.6
Table 6. Projected change in mean annual water flow
into the High Aswan Dam. Unit: billion m3. GCM: general
circulation model

Smith et al.: Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change
3.2. Coastal resources
Fig. 2 displays land areas in the Nile Delta that
would be inundated under the high SLR scenario, as -
suming no additional protection. Table 7 displays the
estimated loss of low-lying agricultural lands in the
northern Nile Delta for the middle and high SLR sce-
narios. The loss of agricultural land under the low
scenario was not calculated.
Table 8 presents the current value of housing units
and roads at risk from SLR. Assuming there is no
additional protection from SLR, losses would be
between ~1 and 7 billion Egyptian pounds (EGP) per
year in 2030 and between 2 and 16 billion EGP yr−1
in 2060. The analysis did not evaluate the costs of
protecting low-lying coastal areas from SLR.
3.3. Agriculture
Changes in per-hectare crop yields and irrigation
water requirements are displayed in Table 9. Per-
hectare yields are projected to decrease for all crops
included in the analysis, except cotton which has
increased yields, while water needs for all crops are
projected to increase.
Table 10 presents estimated impacts on agriculture
in Egypt for 2030 and 2060, assuming the high-pop
scenario and high climate change. We project re -
duced production and higher prices. Production is
65
Fig. 2. Area in the Nile Delta at risk of inundation from high
sea level rise (SLR) in 2060. High unprotected: high SLR
scenario and no protection
SLR scenario Northeast Delta North Middle Delta West Delta Total Delta
km2 % km2 % km2 % km2 %
High
Protected
2030 11.4 0.7 13.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 24.8 0.2
2060 25.8 1.8 137.2 2.7 15.0 0.3 178 1.6
Unprotected
2030 379.3 25.7 84.3 1.6 6.0 0.1 469.6 4.2
2060 774.3 52.7 523.9 10.4 625.6 13.2 1923.8 17.1
Middle
Protected
2030 2.6 0.0 7.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.1
2060 4.8 0.4 31.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 36 0.3
Unprotected
2030 2.6 0.0 7.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.1
2060 449.3 30.6 129.5 2.5 10.6 0.2 589.4 5.2
Table 7. Estimated percentage loss of low-lying protected and unprotected agricultural lands in the northern Nile Delta. SLR:
sea level rise
SLR Housing units Roads Total
scenario 2030 2060 2030 2060 2030 2060
Low 16.4 17.5 2.2 2.3 18.6 19.7
Middle 17.5 22.2 2.4 2.6 19.9 24.8
High 18.0 65.6 2.4 8.0 20.4 73.5
Adjusted for increase in per capita income (high-pop)
Low 25.9 51.4 3.5 6.7 29.3 58.2
Middle 27.7 65.4 3.7 7.7 31.4 73.1
High 28.4 193.2 3.8 23.5 32.2 216.7
Adjusted for increase in per capita income (low-pop)
Low 38.1 116.0 5.1 15.2 43.2 131.3
Middle 40.8 147.6 5.5 17.4 46.3 165.0
High 41.8 436.0 5.6 53.0 47.4 489.0
Annual High-pop Low-pop
impacts
Low 1.0 1.9 1.4 4.4
Middle 1.0 2.4 1.5 5.5
High 1.1 7.2 1.6 16.3
Table 8. Current value of lost housing units and roads. Unit:
billion Egyptian pounds. SLR: sea level rise

Clim Res 62: 59– 70, 2014
66
2030 A1 2030 B1 2060 A1 2060 B1
Crop Season Yield Water Yield Water Yield Water Yield Water
demand demand demand demand
Berseem (long) Winter −8.4 3.3 −8.4 3.12 −15.2 6.6 −15.2 5.2
Berseem (short) Winter −8.4 3.3 −8.4 3.12 −15.2 6.6 −15.2 5.2
Citrus Annual −8.4 3.3 −8.4 3.12 −15.2 6.6 −15.2 5.2
Cotton Summer 10.2 3.6 10.2 2.64 19.8 7.2 19.8 4.58
Maize Summer −8.4 3.3 −8.4 3.12 −15.2 6.6 −15.2 5.2
Nili −8.4 3.3 −8.4 3.12 −15.2 6.6 −15.2 5.2
Onion Summer −0.96 4.32 −0.96 3 −1.53 7.84 −1.53 5
Winter −0.96 4.32 −0.96 3 −1.53 7.84 −1.53 5
Rice Summer −6.6 3.3 −6.6 3.12 −11 6.6 −11 5.2
Rice (short season) Nili −6.6 3.3 −6.6 3.12 −11 6.6 −11 5.2
Sugar beets Winter −0.96 4.32 −0.96 3 −1.53 7.84 −1.53 5
Wheat Winter −9 3.6 −9 2.64 −19.2 7.2 −19.2 4.58
Table 9. Estimated change (%) in crop yield and water use for selected Egyptian crops under A1 and B1 scenarios. Nili: season
when the Nile River floods
No climate change Climate change (Nile flow) scenarios
(Nile flow: 55 BCM) Low High Low Increased
decreased flowa decreased flowb decreased flowc flowd
(Unprotected) (Unprotected) (Protected) (Unprotected)
2030
Production 211 billion EGP −11 −17 −11 −4
Agriculture consumption −6 −8 −6 −3
by consumers
Agriculture GDP 211.4 billion EGP 17.9 23.1 18.4 9.7
Consumer prices +26 +38 +24 +13
Agriculture water use 33.6 BCM −5.9 −18.3 −6.7 13.9
Agriculture land use 8.1 million ha −3.6 −9.7 −1.0 −5.9
Agriculture labor hours 2.7 billion −3.9 −5.7 −3.6 5.8
Consumer surplus 1248 billion EGP −55 −65 −54 −27
Producer surplus 106 billion EGP 29 37 29 13
Total welfare 1354 billion EGP −25 −26 −25 −14
(consumer and producer surplus)
2060
Production 374 billion EGP −27 −47 −26 −8
Agriculture consumption −15 −30 −15 −5
by consumers
Agriculture GDP 374 billion EGP 15.6 9.0 16.8 13.8
Consumer prices 41 68 41 16
Agriculture water use 31.4 BCM −14.9 −51.4 −14.8 35.5
Agriculture land use 7.2 million ha −10.2 −24.9 −10.0 0
Agriculture labor hours 3.2 billion −20.1 −39.2 −19.2 3.1
Consumer surplus 1602 billion EGP −181 −293 −183 −71
Producer surplus 238 billion EGP 62 45 66 32
Total welfare 1845 billion EGP −112 −234 −110 −38
(consumer and producer surplus)
Flow in BCM: a2030: 52.5; 2060: 49. b2030: 45.5; 2060: 35. c2030: 52.5; 2060: 49. d2030: 62.5; 2060: 71
Table 10. Estimated impacts on Egyptian agriculture in 2030 and 2060 assuming the high population scenario and high (A1)
climate change. SLR: sea level rise; EGP: Egyptian pounds; BCM: billion cubic meters; ‘Unprotected/Protected’: protection
from sea level rise

Smith et al.: Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change
estimated to decrease even when flow in the Nile is
estimated to increase, largely because of decreased
crop yields. Reductions in water supplies further sub-
stantially decrease agricultural production. Protec-
tion of low-lying agricultural areas in the Nile Delta
from SLR has a negligible effect on output. Although
not displayed here, the low-pop scenario reduces the
magnitude of climate change impacts.
Reduced agricultural output would lead to lower
employment and consumption, and would raise
prices. Agriculture GDP would rise by 5 to 11% by
2060 because higher commodity prices would offset
the effects of decreased production. The lower con-
sumption of food could result in increased malnutri-
tion and possibly social unrest, with total welfare (a
measure of well-being) reduced by 2 to 13%, prima-
rily because consumers would have to spend more
for food and divert income from other consumption
and investment (as discussed in Hertel et al. 2010).
The non-agricultural populace in Egypt would be
worse off than under no climate change because of
reduced production and the higher prices of food.
Although there would be increases in farm income,
the rural population would also face higher food
bills. Egypt would be worse off overall than it would
otherwise be, because of the decrease in agricultural
production.
The agriculture industry currently employs almost
9 million people in Egypt (CIA 2012). Assuming no
change in employment, more than 1.8 million jobs
could be at risk by 2060.
3.4. Human health: air pollution
Table 11 presents the estimated increases in mor-
tality from increased air pollution in Greater Cairo for
a 0.5 µg m−3 increase in PM2.5 in 2030 and a 1 µg m−3
increase in 2060. We estimate more deaths in the
high-pop scenario than in the low-pop scenario.
Using assumed increases in per capita income, we
estimated the future VSL in Egypt to be 3.8 to 5.0 mil-
lion EGP in 2030 (high-pop to low-pop), and 6.2 to
15.0 million EGP by 2060 (high-pop to low-pop).
Table 12 presents the estimated value of increased
mortality from air pollution health effects in Egypt.
The equivalent value of the increase in mortality
from higher PM2.5 levels is estimated to be tens of bil-
lions of EGP per year by 2060. The low-pop scenario
has higher values than the high-pop scenario be -
cause the VSL is estimated to be much higher under
the low-pop (high GDP per capita) compared to the
high-pop (low GDP per capita) scenario.
3.5. Human health: heat stress
The estimated increases in heat stress mortality
from higher temperatures in Greater Cairo are pre-
sented in Table 13. These estimates do not account
for the likely increased use of air conditioning in
Cairo enabled by the higher per capita income. That
would in all likelihood reduce the number of cases
of heat stress. These estimates of climate change
impacts are therefore likely to be high.
We combined the estimated increase in annual
mortality from heat stress with the increased VSL
described above (see Table 13). As with the air pollu-
tion estimates, the welfare losses in the low-pop sce-
nario are higher than in the high-pop scenario due to
a higher VSL in the former case. That difference out-
weighs the higher estimated number of deaths in the
high-pop scenario.
67
Greater Cairo population (millions) Change in no. of deaths
Low-pop High-pop PM2.5 −low estimate (adult only) PM2.5 −high estimate (adult only)
Low-pop High-pop Low-pop High-pop
2010 19.7 19.7 501 1140 501 1140
2030 25.5 28.8 649 1477 733 1667
2060 27.8 39.9 708 1610 1015 2308
Table 11. Estimated population and changes in deaths from a 0.5 µg m−3 (2030) to a 1 µg m−3 (2060) change in sub-2.5 µm par-
ticulate matter (PM2.5) levels in Greater Cairo, for a high (high-pop) and low population (low-pop) scenario
2030 2060
Low-pop 3226−7341 10 651−24 220
High-pop 2475−5628 6254−14 221
Table 12. Estimated economic value of increased mortality
from air pollution in Greater Cairo using value of a statistical
life, for a low and high population scenario. Unit: million
Egyptian pounds

Clim Res 62: 59– 70, 2014
3.6. Tourism
The estimated reduction in tourism revenues
resulting from reduction in tourism travel based on
Bigano et al. (2007) is displayed in Table 14.
Because climate change is projected to harm coral
reefs in the Red Sea, tourism could be directly af -
fected, as many tourists come
to Egypt to dive or snorkel
near the reefs. The coral reefs
are estimated to be reduced
by 20 to 80% by 2060.
Table 14 lists the potential re -
ductions in recreation expen-
ditures re lated to coral reefs in
2030 and 2060.
We combine losses from in -
creases in temperature with
losses of coral reef. It is possi-
ble, however, that combining
these 2 estimates could result
in some double-counting. The to tal revenue losses to
tourism are listed in Table 14.
Tourism activity can be very difficult to predict,
especially 50 yr into the future. The amount of dis-
posable income available, the relative attractiveness
of various tourist sites, and travel and resort costs
decades from now are all uncertain. Because of this
and the uncertainty about how climate change will
affect tourism, the results should be interpreted with
caution.
3.7. Combined impacts
Table 15 displays estimated economic impacts in
2030 and 2060 on selected sectors, and Fig. 3 displays
economic im pacts in 2030 and 2060, assuming low
reduction in Nile flow, a high population socioeco-
nomic scenario, unprotected coastal areas, and high
SLR. In both time periods, agriculture is projected to
have the largest economic losses, with tourism com-
ing in second. By 2030, the level of economic impact
differs little across scenarios, suggesting that future
68
2030 2060
CGCM63 ECHAM MIROC-M CGCM63 ECHAM MIROC-M
Mortality (no. of individuals)
Low-pop 662 662 736 1662 1579 1924
High-pop 722 722 802 2302 2187 2665
Welfare loss (million EGP)
Low-pop 3291 3291 3657 24 999 23749 28 937
High-pop 2437 2437 2708 14 186 13476 16 420
Table 13. Estimated increase in annual mortality, and annual welfare loss, from in-
creased heat stress in Greater Cairo under 3 climate models, for a low- and high
population (pop) scenario
Low High
Reduction in annual tourism revenues
2030 14735 18856
2060 67103 88386
Reduction in coral reef recreation expenditure
2030 3312 4530
2060 14510 17626
Annual total tourism losses
2030 18047 23386
2060 81613 106012
Table 14. Estimated effect of climate change on reduction in
annual tourism revenues (Low and High tourism scenarios),
coral reef recreation expenditures (coral decimation — Low:
20– 50%; High: 35– 80%), and total annual losses in tourism.
Unit: million Egyptian pounds
2030 2060
Scenario 1 2 3 1 2 3
Welfare loss in agriculture 26 25 20 234 112 41
Annual coastal property losses (excluding agriculture) 1 1 2 7 7 16
Value of deaths from air pollution (using VSL) 3−6 3−6 3−7 6−14 6−14 11−24
Value of deaths from heat stress (using VSL) 2−3 2−3 3 14 14 24
Reduction in annual tourism revenues 18 18 23 82 82 106
Total of selected impacts 50−54 49−53 51−55 343−351 221−229 198−211
Percent of GDP 2.2−2.4 2.2−2.4 1.6−1.8 5.9−6.0 3.8−3.9 2.1−2.2
Table 15. Estimated economic losses from climate change in selected Egypt sectors. Units: billion Egyptian pounds. Scenario 1:
high population, low GDP, large decrease in Nile flow, and high sea level rise (SLR) with no protection. Scenario 2: High pop-
ulation, low GDP, small decrease in Nile flow, and high SLR with no protection. Scenario 3: Low population, high GDP, small
decrease in Nile flow, and high SLR with no protection. VSL: value of a statistical life

Smith et al.: Egypt’s economic vulnerability to climate change
emissions make little difference in just a few de -
cades. By 2060, the level of losses differs substan-
tially by scenario. The scenario with the largest esti-
mated losses combines high population growth with
a large decrease in Nile flow. Lower population and a
lower reduction in Nile flow reduces losses by almost
half. Nonetheless, the results suggest that up to
2−6% of Egypt’s GDP could be at risk from climate
change.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Climate change could have significant adverse
economic impacts in Egypt. The country is heavily
dependent on the Nile River, which may decrease in
flow. Egypt has a large amount of low-lying coastal
lands that are highly populated and agriculturally
productive. These lands are highly vulnerable to cli-
mate change-induced SLR. Agriculture is highly vul-
nerable since it is highly dependent on Nile water
and is also susceptible to temperature increases.
Egypt faces risks from a combination of decreased
food production and associated high food prices,
which could increase malnutrition and unemploy-
ment. There could also be increased risks to human
health from higher levels of air pollution and heat
stress. In addition, Egypt’s economically important
tourism sector could be adversely affected by climate
change. The potential total damages across all of
these vulnerabilities could be as high as 6% of GDP.
With climate change already happening and likely to
accelerate, adaptation to these and other impacts of
climate change needs to be strongly considered.
Acknowledgements. This study was im plemented under the
UN Climate Change Risk Management Programme funded
by the UN Millennium Development Fund and the Finnish
Government. The authors are also grateful for the collabora-
tion, assistance, and support offered by the Egyptian Gov-
ernment, who provided in sight, data, analysis, and guidance
throughout the project. Neither L.D.’s contribution to this
work, nor anything in this paper, represents the views of the
US Environmental Protection Agency.
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Editorial responsibility: Hans-Martin Füssel,
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Submitted: September 25, 2013; Accepted: July 29, 2014
Proofs received from author(s): November 7, 2014
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