Content uploaded by Richard Cincotta
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Richard Cincotta on Mar 22, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
The Age-structural Maturity Thesis: The Impact of the Youth Bulge on the Advent and Stability of Liberal Democracy
... U demografiji se ovaj pojam najčešće definiše kao disproporcionalno veliki broj mladih u starosnoj grupi od 15-29 godina u odnosu na starije stanovništvo i decu u okviru starosne strukture stanovništva najčešće kroz indeksaciju udela te grupe u radno sposobnom stanovništvu 15-64. Dominantna grupa čiji demografski značaj opada može preduzimati različite oblike kolektivnih akcija kako bi sačuvala svoje pozicije i to kroz nametanje autokratskih elemenata u oblicima vladavine najčešće kako bi se ograničila izborna prava drugih demografski rastućih grupa (Cincotta & Doces, 2011). ...
... Grafik 1. Stope prirodnog kretanja u Turskoj 1950-2020(Izvor: UN, 2022 Tursko društvo je do relativno skoro karakterisala i vrlo mlada starosna struktura, odnosno visok koeficijent Youth Bulge (tabela 2), koji predstavlja odnos kohorte od 15 do 29 godina prema radno sposobnoj populaciji od 15 do 64 godine starosti (Cincotta & Doces, 2011). Disproporcionalno veliki udeo mladih, uz visoki stepen urbanizacije, koji omogućava njihovo lakše povezivanje u svrhu kolektivne akcije, praćen generacijskim pritiskom i ekonomski lošom situacijom u društvu sa nerazvijenošću demokratskih institucija, i visokim stepenom socijalnih nejednakosti može dovesti do političke mobilizacije (Cincotta & Doces, 2011). ...
... Grafik 1. Stope prirodnog kretanja u Turskoj 1950-2020(Izvor: UN, 2022 Tursko društvo je do relativno skoro karakterisala i vrlo mlada starosna struktura, odnosno visok koeficijent Youth Bulge (tabela 2), koji predstavlja odnos kohorte od 15 do 29 godina prema radno sposobnoj populaciji od 15 do 64 godine starosti (Cincotta & Doces, 2011). Disproporcionalno veliki udeo mladih, uz visoki stepen urbanizacije, koji omogućava njihovo lakše povezivanje u svrhu kolektivne akcije, praćen generacijskim pritiskom i ekonomski lošom situacijom u društvu sa nerazvijenošću demokratskih institucija, i visokim stepenom socijalnih nejednakosti može dovesti do političke mobilizacije (Cincotta & Doces, 2011). Problem nezaposlenosti mladih rešavan je 1960-ih godina i sporazumima o iseljavanju radne snage potpisanim sa više zemalja Zapadne Evrope koji je udario temelje stvaranja brojne turske dijaspore. ...
The process of the formation of ethnic identities in Turkey was fairly intricate with the influence of migrations, conflicts and newly adopted ideologies. The differential demographic development between the three main ethnclass groups in the country was one of the main reasons that led to political and social tensions causing political and social crises in Turkish society. While the fertility of the secular part of society was in the process of constant stagnation after World War II, the more traditional part of society experienced a demographic growth that was accompanied by mass migrations to large cities and political mobilization of the economically neglected newly formed urban and young population, which led to electoral homogenization and social divisions in Turkish society. Fertility among ethnic Turks converged at the commencement of the XXI century, but the demographic transition has stalled among the Kurdish population due to economic underdevelopment, female illiteracy and the survival of traditional institutions of patriarchy. While at the given period, the total fertility rate (TFR) of ethnic Turks fell to 1.88, in the Kurdish provinces, it was still over 4, although in 2020 it fell to around 3. Turkey went through one of the fastest processes of the society modernization with a fast urbanization and education of the population in the last two decades, where the share of the population living in cities surpassed 80% and as one of the highest in Europe was followed by a further decline in fertility, an increase in secularity among youth and with new forms of political mobilization. Also, Turkey is facing one of the biggest refugee crises in the world with around 4 million refugees, mostly from Syria.
... Recent research has shown a strong link between population aging and the ability of states to transition to, and maintain, democratic governance. The relationship holds even when controlling for income per capita (Cincotta and Doces 2011;Dyson 2012;Weber 2013;Wilson and Dyson 2017). Cincotta (2016) has shown that if we examine the relationship between median age and Freedom House scores, countries that had a median age of 25 or less in 2017 had only a 25% chance of being rated "free" in 2018. ...
... For those countries with median age 36 and higher, the probability of being "free" rises to over 90%. Moreover, analyses of countries transitioning to democracy and falling out of democracy find that the further along a country is in the demographic transition to low fertility and slower population growth, the higher the odds of becoming a democracy and the lower the odds of democratic decline (Cincotta and Doces 2011;Wilson and Dyson 2017). ...
The world is in the midst of a demographic recession. This counters what should be a long-term trend toward greater democracy. Recent research has shown that progress toward stable democracy is strongly associated with progress in the demographic transition. Since most of the world is rapidly dropping in fertility as more countries complete this transition, democracy should be spreading. However, a resurgence of anxiety, nationalism, and support for strong-man governance is associated with sudden waves of immigration from unfamiliar sources. Because certain parts of the world—mainly Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East—still have very young and rapidly growing populations who suffer from poor economic prospects, adverse climate change, and bad governance, those regions are sending waves of migrants seeking asylum to Europe and the United States, raising anxieties that undermine liberal democratic governance. Global democracy is thus being tugged in opposing directions by current demographic trends. Improving governance in poorer countries to cope with the negative impact of climate change and to create better economic prospects, as well as efforts to reduce fertility, are essential to diminish the surges of migrants and restore the impetus toward democracy that should prevail in mature societies.
... The study population comprised all natives in Sironko and Bulambuli who had ever been diagnosed positive for cancer or had experienced cancer patient(s) in their family history. The target population was Lumasaba-speaking residents above 25 years and above and were selected because they were considered mature and responsible and so, could be able to give reliable data on the topic under investigation [12]. ...
... Political demography, an area 'under-attended by demographic science' until recently (Teitelbaum 2015), emerged as a consequence of two powerful demographic processes-the ageing of populations and the generation of age bulges-and how these might drive conservative political movements in the case of the former and more revolutionary movements such as the Arab Spring in the case of the latter (Cincotta and Doces 2012;Urdal 2012). The emphasis in population studies has again been on S34 Ronald Skeldon shifting patterns of fertility, although the 2015 flows of refugees to Europe turned attention towards immigration (see e.g. ...
This paper examines the position of migration in population studies, focusing on the period 1996–2021. It considers the reasons why migration remains problematic for demographers, but also how approaches to migration have changed over the last 25 years. While it has arguably become more important to both demography and population studies because of the transition to low fertility and mortality, migration has metamorphosed into a complex field in its own right, almost independently from changes in demography. Both internal and international migration form the subject of this examination and four main themes are pursued: data and measurement; theories and approaches; migration and development; and migration and political demography. The papers published in the journal Population Studies are used to provide a mirror through which to view these changes over the last 25 years. This paper concludes by looking at likely future directions in migration studies, demography, and population studies.
... Such societies become increasingly uncomfortable under the strong hand of an autocrat, preferring to allow the marketplace and their own choices to determine their lives. Cincotta (2017; see also Cincotta and Doces 2011) has found that almost 80 percent of societies with median age over 35 are democracies, usually as a result of a transition by major reform or revolutions occurring sometime after the society's median age passed 25. Since 1980, the Soviet Union, most of Eastern Europe, Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine are examples of countries where more mature populations have rebelled against authoritarian rule. ...
... It is well known indeed that in developing and underdeveloped countries, fertility rates in rural areas are much higher than those in urban areas. This is probably the reasons why a growth of population in this data set-probably due to higher fertility in rural areas-tend to decrease the probability of transition to democracy (Cincotta, 2008;Cincotta & Doces, 2012;Lutz, Cuaresima, & Abbasi-Shavasi, 2010;Wilson & Dyson, 2017). It's worth noticing that in model 3 of Table 4 our index of human capital HC becomes not significant after the introduction of the variable related to the fraction of urban population. ...
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of income inequality on the probability of democratization, in a panel of 51 transition countries during the period 1960-2008. Using a conditional fixed effect logit estimation, we find robust results suggesting that income inequality (measured by the Gini index of household's income inequality) has an inverse--U shaped relation with the probability of transition from autarchy to democracy. We show that there is a turning point at a level of household's income inequality equal to a Gini index of 40. When income inequality is below 40, then probability of transition is positively related to inequality, but when inequality is higher, a subsequent increase in inequality decreases the probability of democratization. This is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson's theory that shows how transitions are likeliest at moderate levels of inequality while autocracy is likelier at the lowest and highest levels of inequality.
Conventional literature associates large youth cohort size (YCS) with increased risk of political violence in countries with such demographic profiles. Key questions which remain unanswered, however, are whether YCS is also associated with young people’s proclivities toward more peaceful forms of protests, and whether structural socioeconomic conditions influence such a relationship? Using multilevel binary logistic regression techniques on pooled individual level data for 51 democratic countries purposively sampled from World Values Survey Waves 3 to 6, and country level data from World Bank, and UN Population Division, I show that YCS demonstrates a positive relationship with young people’s participation in peaceful demonstrations. This relationship is, however, moderated by structural factors such as education and unemployment, which end up reducing young people’s likelihood of participation. I argue that resource limitation, as predicted by the Civic Voluntarism Model, better explains the relationship between YCS and individual youth protest behavior in democratic societies, more than socioeconomic grievance, as suggested by grievance theory. An important implication of this finding is that participation in elite-challenging behaviors such as peaceful protests, can be expected to be more common among young people in affluent democratic societies, than their peers elsewhere in the democratic world.
Background
Globally, cancer is one of the leading cause of morbidity and mortality and most cancers are due to infections and so, are preventable. Studies have shown that cancer prevention has been possible through intensified healthcare education but such information is poorly documented in Elgon sub-region. Therefore, our study was aimed at assessing cancer indigenous knowledge among natives in Elgon sub-region.
Method
Mixed methods research design were adopted. A total of 73 participants, selected through snowball sampling technique were involved. Data collection was done through pretested questionnaires. MedCalc version, 20.008 was used for data analysis and results were presented in tables and figures.
Result
Majority of the study participants were males (58%), aged between 46 – 55 years (58%), Ugandans (90%) and married (67%). Most of them had inadequate knowledge about cancer (p<0.05) and highlighted sores that slightly heal at any body parts as well as blood in faeces as putative predictors of cancer infection (p<0.005). A total of nine cancer types were documented and cervical was the most prevalent (p<0.0001). Smoking was the most pronounced cancer associated risk factor (p<0.0001) and avoiding smoking was perceived as the major prevention option (p<0.0001). No cancer treatment options in cancer treatment cited in this area (p<0.172).
Conclusion
The natives had limited knowledge and poor perception of cancer due low literacy level. Therefore, there is need to intensify on cancer health education programs through the word of mouths and radio talk shows. The plant medicinal plant used in cancer treatment needs to be documented.
Deepening democratization in Brazil has coincided with sustained flows of domestic migration, which raises an important question of whether migration deepens or depresses democratic development in migrant-sending regions. Whereas earlier perspectives have viewed migration as a political “brain drain,” we contend that out-migration can generate resources that promote democratic processes back home. We investigate the role of migration in two aspects of democratization: electoral participation and competition. The analyses are based on spatial panel data models of mayoral election results across all municipalities between 1996 and 2012. The results show that migration increases electoral participation and competition in migrant-sending localities in Brazil. This study also identifies the sociopolitical context that conditions the impact of migration: the effect is most often present in the context of rural-urban migration and is more pronounced in sending localities with less democratic political structures. Moreover, using spatial network models, we find evidence for the transmission of political remittances from migration destination municipalities to origin municipalities. The present study extends the research on the migration-development nexus to the political arena, thus demonstrating the value of integrating demographic processes into explanations of political change.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.