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Fierce, Fair and Unfair
Christa Wichterich - June 2008
Fierce, Fair and Unfair Competition
The EU–China Trade Race and its Gender Implications
Author: Christa Wichterich
Produced by: WIDE,
Rue de la science 10
1000 Brussels
Copyrights©2008 WIDE
Any parts of this publication may be reproduced without permission for educational and non-profit purposes if the
source is acknowledged. WIDE would appreciate a copy of the text in which the document is used or cited.
1. Competition in a Multipolar World...........................................................................................2
1.1. China’s WTO Accession – Landmark in EU–China trade relations...............................6
1.2. Another Great Leap, Flying Geese and a Tide that Does not Lift all Boats.................6
1.3. Global Europe and Competitiveness First..........................................................................9
1.4. Development Assistance and Sustainability ..................................................................12
1.5. End of the Honeymoon?......................................................................................................14
2. Chinese Transformation and its Gender Implications.........................................................17
2.1. The Rediscovery of Gender Differences in the Market Economy ..............................19
2.2. Open Door Policies and the Making of Classes and Gender.......................................21
2.3. Discrimination against Women – Global Patterns, Local Practice.............................24
3. Social Standards and The Labour Regime in Manufacturing ...........................................28
3.1. The Case of Textiles and Clothing.....................................................................................29
3.2. Social Unrest and Disharmony..........................................................................................31
4. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................34
WIDE is a European network of non-governmental development organizations, gen-
der specialist and women’s rights activists. Since 1995 one of WIDE’s core work areas
has been the gender–development–trade nexus. In the recent past it has focused on
the new generation of bilateral free trade and economic partnership agreements
launched by the European Union (EU). As outlined in the European Commission trade
Global Europe: Competing in the World
from October 2006, the EU is target-
ing large but still protected markets with these ‘competitiveness-driven’ treaties.
China tops the list of potential partners.
This report on the EU–China partnership and co-operation relations comes in a series
of political analysis of EU trade agreements with countries in the South from a gen-
der perspective. Its focus is on the trade and investment agreement rather than on
the human rights and political dialogue. It is part of an awareness-raising and advo-
cacy project on EU trade and investment policies which 1) aims to disseminate infor-
mation about the ongoing negotiations and the complex political, economic and
social dynamics on the ground, 2) tries to enhance understanding of the gender impli-
cations of trade liberalization and EU trade policies, and 3) attempts to influence trade
relations in such a way that they are consistent with social and gender justice,
women’s rights, environmental sustainability and other development objectives.
China remains to a large extent a blind spot in the gendered analysis of neoliberal
globalization. Only a few in-depth studies on women workers in export production
have been published recently. In particular, the service sector and care economies
are unknown territories which are, however, being increasingly affected by transna-
tional trade regimes. News about resistance to the restructuring of the economy and
its high social and environmental costs are hushed up. Rather than attempting to pro-
vide comprehensive information, this paper tries to hint at areas for further network-
ing of civil society organizations and gender research.
WIDE hopes that this report will contribute to a constructive dialogue between civil
society organizations and policymakers in the EU. Even more, WIDE’s advocacy work
for gender equality and global social justice vis-à-vis the EU’s trade and development
policies has a role to play in exploring opportunities to exchange knowledge, build
civil society alliances and network with China. Based on common concerns and com-
mon values, transnational democratic spaces have to be opened for voices and
resistance which link gender justice and global economic justice.
This is the revised and updated version of a paper written at the beginning of 2007.
The author wishes to thank Lanyan Chen, Anja Franck, Klaus Fritsche, Dorothy
Guerrero and Marzia Rezzin for their helpful comments on the draft.
Barbara Specht/WIDE
1. Competition in a Multipolar World
For China, hosting the 2008 Olympic Games is another milestone to establish itself as
a full member of the international community and as a global power. The first mile-
stone was its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
China has emerged as a global player and powerhouse on the international trade
map; however, it is increasingly depicted as a giant economic monster. As the world’s
workshop, the country has become one of the main sites for transnational corporate
investment and one of the main exporters of manufactured goods. Its growth rates
stun its competitors; its weight in global trade scares its trade partners. Its hunger for
natural resources and raw materials has set off a global commodity boom at a high
cost for the environment. From a European point of view, its astonishing impact on
each and every sector and region of the world economy is perceived at the same time
as an economic growth model and as a threat to jobs, wealth and welfare in the EU.
Various perspectives attempt to mitigate between the two polarized perspectives on
China: the ‘human-rights-first’ perspective and the ‘economy-first’ perspective.
Against the Sino-euphoria in the past decade, the human rights violations in Tibet
have caused a new Sinophobia in the West. Additionally, anxiety is spreading that
globalization could turn into a Sinosation of the world economy.
However, the fact that during its transformation from a state-led to a market-oriented
economy China could lift millions of people out of extreme poverty is still considered
to be a showcase for trade liberalization and export-led growth benefiting the poor.
However, it is increasingly striking that the social and ecological costs of the
Manchester-capitalist accumulation system are skyrocketing, the exploitation of
human and natural resources is alarming, and social disparities are growing.
Against the backdrop of this ambivalences, the 9th EU–China
Summit in September 2006 in Helsinki decided to launch negoti-
ations on a bilateral Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
(PCA). It should be a comprehensive framework for the current-
ly three-pillared EU–China relations: 1) political dialogue (includ-
ing human rights dialogue), 2) economic, sectoral and trade rela-
tions, 3) development co-operation. It is part of the overall strat-
egy of the EU to strive for dialogue instead of confrontation, and
to formalize and legalize its relations with China and make up
ground on its main competitors, the US and Japan. However, the
centre piece of the PCA will be an update of the 1985 Trade and Economic Co-opera-
tion Agreement. It will build on two EU documents published in October 2006:
EU–China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities and the accompanying policy
“Europe must get China
right, as a threat, an
opportunity and a
prospective partner.
Peter Mandelson,
paper, EU–China trade and investment: Competition and Partnership. The overall tone
of both these documents mirrors mixed feelings of admiration and respect on the one
hand, anxiety and worry on the other. Their first and foremost objective is to improve
and balance trade relations by further opening up China’s markets, and by adjusting
the Chinese economy to the international standards and legal requirements of the
Against the background of China’s transformation into a market economy, its reckless
growth path and social polarization, this paper explores the gender implications of the
Chinese trade race and EU’s push for sweeping liberalization. While these processes
were initiated by the Chinese Government’s ‘open door’ policies, since China’s WTO
accession they are increasingly driven by a complex interaction between domestic
policies, foreign trade and investment policies, and corporate interests.
1.1. China’s WTO Accession – Landmark in EU–China trade relations
The landmark event in China’s trade relations was its accession to the WTO. After 15
years of negotiations, China became a WTO member on 11 December 2001. The EU
welcomed China’s accession for three main reasons:
The multilateral trading system of the WTO could not be complete and universal
without China;
WTO accession would make the economic liberalization in China irreversible as it
“has to abide by the rules of the game” and to strengthen the rule of the law; and
China should “ensure a level playing field for our industry” (Beseler, 2002:5).1
The negotiations followed a dual-track strategy of bilateral negotiations with China’s
largest trading partners and multilateral negotiations. The bilateral EU–China agree-
ment on WTO, signed in May 2000, was a waypost in the accession process. EU’s
interest focused:
in the service sector on insurance, banking, distribution and telecommunications
(the EU is the world leader in the mobile phone sector and covers 90% of the
Chinese market);
in manufacturing on motor vehicles, machinery and chemicals; and
in agriculture on wine, spirits, butter and pasta, as well as on sanitary and phy-
tosanitary measures.
Before the WTO accession, the percentage of European-owned companies in China
Hans-Friedrich Beseler, former Director-General of Trade of the European Commission, served as Chief
of the China Negotiating Team until May 2000.
was only 14 per cent of all foreign-funded companies. China’s attractiveness for EU-
based companies mainly consists of a) the extended low-cost assembly line or – as
Deutsche Bank says –
“Fierce global competition is literally forcing international pro-
ducers to exploit China’s low wage costs”
and b) the Chinese market of potentially 1.3
billion consumers or
“WTO membership now enables foreign companies to benefit
from China’s vast appetite for foreign products”
(Deutsche Bank Research, 2004).
Foreign investors are allowed to take their profits out of the country.
China’s interest in continuous foreign investment is threefold:
expansion of its export production and access to foreign markets;
import of know-how and technology (in particular from EU-based corporations);
job opportunities for its surplus, low-skilled or retrenched labour.
China’s WTO commitments secured better access for EU firms, a more attractive and
‘predictable’ environment for investments by EU companies, and a reduction of import
tariffs. It agreed to open key service sectors such as insurance, banking and telecom-
munications, which earlier were completely closed to foreign companies, in a
sequenced reform until 2007. However, China insisted on some steadfast principles:
joint venture requirements of 51 per cent in the mobile phone sector and 50 per cent
for life insurance and for car production. A big controversy between the EU, USA and
China arose around the only exemption made: for the US life insurance company AIG
which was established in Shanghai with full foreign ownership and branching rights.
Due to massive pressure exerted by the EU, two European insurance companies,
Allianz (Germany) and Axa (France) were allowed to remain 51 per cent foreign
owned (Matoo, 2002).
As the accession agreement gives China the status of a developing country, it is
allowed longer transition periods for implementing its liberalization commitments. On
the other hand, countries where a rapid increase in Chinese imports causes a threat
to domestic industries and labour markets can use special safeguards and apply uni-
lateral restraints on Chinese imports until 2008 or even up to 2013 – a clause which
has already been used by the USA and the EU after the termination of the textile
agreement in 2005. Additionally, WTO member countries have the option of anti-
dumping investigations and charges until 2016 in case they feel that cheap Chinese
imports constitute dumping (Li, 2002).
China complied quickly with its commitments to cut tariffs from an average of 15.3 per
cent in 2001 to 9.9 per cent in 2006, and passed more than 3000 legal provisions and
regulations to protect foreign investment and business. The average agricultural tar-
iff worldwide stands at 62 per cent, yet China reduced its tariffs on agricultural prod-
ucts to 15.2 per cent in 2006. No other WTO member has ever made such drastic cuts
in such a short period of time. Five years after its accession, WTO Director, Pascal
Lamy, gave China’s performance and structural reforms an ‘A+’. However, the USA
and the EU complained about non-compliance with regard to intellectual property
rights and ongoing product piracy, about “unfair discrimination in favour of Chinese
business” and barriers to market access in the service sector, in particular financial
services (
World Bank News
, 12 December 2006; Third World Network, 2007).
Additionally, the EU and the USA argue that the weak value of the Yuan has given
China an unfair advantage on the world market, making its goods extremely inexpen-
sive. Even after China revalued its currency in 2005, the EU and the USA repeatedly
pressurized China to further appreciate the Yuan to curtail Chinese exports and allow
for more imports. For these reasons the EU still refuses to recognize China as an open
market and to grant market economy status.
The EU supported the social and economic reform in China, in particular the imple-
mentation of its WTO commitments with trade-related co-operation projects which
complement more than 20 bilateral sectoral dialogues, from space technology to edu-
cation, from enterprise regulation to environmental problems. The main purpose is to
“explore new areas of common interest”, exchange of know-how and “pave the way
for business and other operators by eliminating potential regulatory obstacles”.2This
indicates a shift in the co-operation programme away from traditional development
projects toward sectoral interventions with strong training, institution building and
research components, for example round tables with business involvement in the
Financial Services Project (European Commission, 2003). Capacity building on trade
policy issues was supported with EURO 15 million for the period 2004–2009.
1.2. Another Great Leap, Flying Geese and a Tide that Does not Lift all Boats
The WTO accession gave another boost to foreign direct investments, merchandise
trade and growth rates in China. It intensified the ‘flying geese model’ of capital and
investment: China is at the receiving end of a fast relocation of labour-intensive indus-
tries, mainly from other cheap-labour countries, as well as capital-intensive indus-
tries from the North.
At the same time, WTO accession promoted a two-pronged competition with China
on the global market: a race to the bottom and a race to the top (Guan, 2003:214f). To
Financing for co-operation with China under the Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006 was put into action
through the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and amounted to EURO 250 million.
http://ec.europe.en/external_relations/china/intro/sect.htm (16.4.08)
remain competitive with other cheap-labour economies, China strives for minimal pro-
duction costs by keeping the wages for labour-intensive work low, by externalizing
social and ecological costs and by increasing productivity (Chan, 2003). Low-priced
export goods and an economy of scale make for a race to the bottom – a stiff price
competition on the world market. This translates into a pressure on wages in other
countries, in cheap-labour countries as well as in highly industrialized countries.
Simultaneously, China wants to climb up the value chain. Its interest in importing
technology and know-how is to catch up with the technologically advanced
economies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, and with the knowledge soci-
eties in the West. It wants to gain ground in higher segments of the market and to
upgrade industries. This leads to the much-lamented product piracy and violation of
intellectual property rights and to mounting investment in high-tech sectors to make
for a technological take-off. China’s spending on research and development is grow-
ing even faster than its economy. Its investment in higher education results in more
than four million graduates annually. The rapid expansion of the research and devel-
opment sector opens up opportunities for a third wave of offshoring after labour-
intensive and capital-intensive production: in future high-skilled knowledge produc-
tion could be outsourced to China as well.
Already in 2004, China became the world champion in receiving foreign direct invest-
ments. The massive increase in investment and expansion of industrial capacities
resulted in an overheating of the economy with overcapacities and overproduction in
a number of sectors. To correct the world-beating pace, the Government tried sever-
al times to control and limit investments and balance it with domestic consumption
structure. It raised interest rates, supports domestic demands by consumer credits
and raises wages in the new middle class, However, domestic and foreign strategies
of investment reinforce each other in their obsession with fast accumulation rather
than sustainability.
Additionally, the Government heavily promotes out-
ward investment. Increasing requirements for raw
materials and energy make Chinese companies ‘go
global’ for overseas direct investment and look for
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Increased
imports of raw material, oil and food items pushed
prices on the world market to new peaks. The major-
ity of China’s Outward Direct Investment (ODI) flows
to Hong Kong, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Japan
and South Korea. However, it is Chinese investment in Africa that attracts most
European attention, because the EU feels that it loses hegemony in access to
resource-rich regions, while the spread of western values, democracy and human
rights is undermined by China’s sudden outreach. Particularly since the China–Africa
“There is only one thing more
frightening than China’s exponen-
tial growth. It is that growth sud-
denly stalling or crashing.”
Peter Mandelson,
London, 15 April 2008
Summit held in Beijing in 2006, the Washington consensus of structural adjustment,
trade liberalization and ‘good governance’ finds itself in an unprecedented competi-
tion with the Beijing consensus of state capitalism and political non-intervention.
In 2006 EU–China trade reached EURO 257 billion, with trade in goods growing by
more than 150 per cent between 2000 and 2006. In 2008 China is expected to overtake
Germany as the world champion in exports. Services are the fastest growing sector
in China. After the WTO accession, the EU asked China in a number of General
Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS) requests to “improve” the commitments made
in 12 service sectors, in particular to eliminate restrictions on foreign entry, owner-
ship (joint ventures) and national treatment, particularly in retail, finance and insur-
ance, and telecommunications. In the service sector, EU exports to China expanded
sixfold between 1994 and 2004 (European Commission, 2006a:5), and the EU had a sur-
plus of EURO 1.7 billion in trade in services with China in 2006.
The most striking figures in recent EU–China trade relations, however, are the fast-
growing trade deficit of the EU and the changes in investment. While European
investment in China decreased, Chinese investment in the EU jumped fivefold.
EU China
Trading partners 1) USA 1) EU
2) China 2) USA
3) Russia 3) Japan
Trade balance(2007) EU’s trade deficit with China: 170 bn
China’s trade surplus with the EU: 130.5 bn
Imports/Exports EU exports to China: EU imports from China
2001: 30.5 bn 2001: 81.6 bn
2006: 63 bn 2006: 191 bn
Main exports EU’s main exports to China China’s main exports to the EU
1) non-electrical machinery 1) PC parts, mobile phones,
2) cars and aircraft 2) textiles and clothing
3) chemical products
Export in services 2003: 6.7 bn
2006: 12.3 bn 2006: 10.6 bn
Investment 2005: 5.9 bn 2005: 441 m
2006: 3.7 bn 2006: 2.13 bn
Source: Eurostat,
Despite the Chinese leadership’s claim to have a “socialist” market economy, inten-
sified liberalization after WTO accession and the phenomenal growth rates resulted
in a more unequal distribution. The wealth gap is widening. Geographical, develop-
ment and income disparities are growing. In 2004, the average per capita income in
Beijing rose by 12.6 per cent, while the standard of living in the countryside fell by 6
per cent (
World Bank News
, 22 February 2005). Between 2001 and 2003 the real
income of the poorest 10 per cent of the population declined by 2.4 per cent, while the
richest 10 per cent enjoyed a 16 per cent increase (
Financial Times
, 22 November
2006). The educational sector shows the same divide: while higher education
increased significantly, it did so at the cost of basic public education in the country-
side. Adult illiteracy increased between 2000 and 2005 from 87 to 115 million people
(Wen, 2007). These findings give a blow to the neoliberal myth that liberalization is a
win-win game and the assumption made by the Chinese Government that “a rising
tide lifts all boats”. Wen concludes that “too much growth, too little development” is
the reality behind China’s economic miracle.
The 11th Five-Year Plan,3proclaimed at the end of 2005, is a response to the growing
disparities and contradictions along this development path and to the social discon-
tent articulated annually in nearly 90,000 local protests and demonstrations by vari-
ous disadvantaged groups all over the country. The five-year programme hoisted the
banner of a “harmonious society” to ease the social tensions. It set out an ambitious
roadmap to expand Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by moving up the value-adding
chain and advancing the service sector, and at the same time to spread wealth more
evenly, stress development in rural areas and the West of the country, create more
jobs and social security, and curtail pollution and energy waste.
However, the Government did not increase social investment, but promoted a market-
oriented reform of the health and educational sector. Public spending on both sectors
as a percentage of GDP is below the world average. High costs and privatization are
barriers for poor households to access medical services and advanced education
(Wen, 2007). These mechanisms contribute to the growing gap between rich and
poor, urban and rural.
To balance the growing disparities between the prosperous coastal strip and the
underdeveloped western and north-eastern regions, the Government tries to redirect
domestic and foreign investments, in particular labour-intensive manufacturing to
inland areas and relatively smaller cities, leaving higher-value-added activities like
research, management, finance, insurance and design in the big cities.
To distance itself form the concept of ‘planned economy’, the leadership called the Five-Year Plan this
time a “programme”.
1.3. Global Europe and Competitiveness First
When the multilateral negotiations of the Doha Development Round at the WTO came
to a stalemate, in October 2006 the EU launched a new trade strategy
Global Europe:
competing in the world
. It calls China a key area of action to safeguard the EU’s exter-
nal competitiveness. China had already earlier embarked on “exploring the route” of
bilateral und regional free trade agreements (FTAs) (Zhang, 2006:422).4
The starting point for an intensification of trade relations is the assumption that “the
EU and China benefit from globalisation and share common interests in its success…
Europe and China can do more to promote their own interests together than they will
ever achieve apart” (European Commission, 2006b:5). At the 9th EU–China Summit in
September 2006 in Helsinki, leaders agreed to launch negotiations on a bilateral
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA). In June 2007 the EU–China Joint
Committee agreed on the terms of reference and announced the start of substantive
negotiations of the new framework agreement. It will encompass the full scope of
bilateral relations, including an update of the 1985 Trade and Economic Co-operation
Agreement (TECA) and an enhanced co-operation in political and cultural matters;
however, it is also vital to achieve broader social and environmental policy aims. It
will build on the two EU documents published in October 2006:
EU–China: Closer part-
ners, growing responsibilities
and the accompanying policy paper on
EU–China trade
and investment: Competition and Partnership
. China published only a single policy
paper on its relations with the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).
EU Policy Papers on its relations with China and agreements
1985 1998 2000 2001 2003 2006
Trade and Communication: Bilateral Future Policy Paper: Communication:
Economic Building a EU–China Steps for A maturing EU–China: Closer
Co-operation Comprehensive agreement a more partnership responsibilities +
Agreement Partnership on WTO Effective Policy paper on
(TECA) EU Policy trade and
Competition and
As a “prelude to China’s FTA campaign” at the end of 2004, China and ASEAN signed a letter of inten-
tion to form a free trade area within ten years. Presently, nine treaties are under negotiation, involving
27 countries and regions including Chile, Pakistan, Australia, South Africa, the Gulf states etc.
Additionally, China is interested in trade agreements with Russia and North Korea (Zhang 2006:422;
TSAI 2007b:15).
Global Europe
strategy marks a double shift in EU trade policies: 1) complemen-
tary to the multilateral negotiations the EU indulges in a new generation of bilateral
FTAs, and 2) it promotes a clear-cut competition paradigm subordinating and redefin-
ing the development paradigm. For the sake of its ‘competitiveness-first’ goal the EU
plans to aggressively advance issues which cannot be advanced in multilateral talks.
Its priority is to gain a foothold in the emerging markets and the so-called “new areas
of growth”, such as services, investment, government procurement, and intellectual
property rights. Services are called “the cornerstone of the EU economy…an area of
European comparative advantage with the greatest potential for growth in EU
exports.” The EU’s focus is on dismantling non-tariff barriers and domestic regulation.
Additionally, it aims to ensure the necessary supply of natural resources and “ener-
gy security”.
In compliance with the
Global Europe
strategy, the 2006 communication with China on
trade and investment puts “competition” first, while in
earlier policy papers on the EU–China relationship “co-
operation” and “partnership” were the leitmotif. Now, the
EU’s main concern is China’s growing competitiveness on
“unfair terms”, which in the EU’s perception prevents “a
genuinely reciprocal trading relationship” and distorts
trade. Thus, “fair” and “unfair” have become new key
Additionally, it raises concerns about the sustainability of China’s development path
because of the wealth disparities, “social, regional and gender imbalances”, and the
enormous environmental costs. As the EU considers China’s disregard for social and
environmental standards as unfair competition, its co-operation programme is set out
to support domestic reform, to promote corporate social responsibility, ensure ener-
gy supply and combat climate change. Offering advice and assistance with regard to
social and environmental problems implies a kind of social and green superiority on
the EU side.
However, the EU’s core interest is to “seek tougher protection of the legal rights of EU
companies” and “assist EU companies on the ground” (European Commission,
It assumes that China increases “unjustifiable non-tariff barriers”, and European
exporters and investors face “unreasonable” sanitary and health requirements as
well as non-uniform application of laws.
It demands adequate protection of intellectual property rights because they are
crucial to the exercise of Europe’s comparative advantage, and seeks to “end the
forced technology transfers for European investors”.
“Europe has to accept fierce
competition. China has to
ensure it is fair competition.”
Peter Mandelson
Strasbourg, 24.10.06
It complains that many procurement markets remain closed to European business.
It blames Chinese domestic regulations and policies of discriminating foreign oper-
ators, “imposing local content requirements …and unfairly aiding local industries”.
It opposes investment restrictions in key industries such as automobiles, petro-
chemicals and steel as well as in telecoms and financial services.
It realizes that China has become a fierce competitor in the world market for natu-
ral resources and energy while it restricts access of foreign exporters to its own
natural resources.
In case trade frictions cannot be resolved through dialogue the EU threatens to use
trade defence measures to protect its interests.
It proposes that further dialogue should include decent work and social and envi-
ronmental standards “by adopting European norms, eco-technologies and stan-
dards of corporate social responsibility”.
A Study on the Future Opportunities and Challenges in EU–China Trade and
Investment Relations 2006–2010
, called the ‘Competitiveness Study’, suggests that EU
business can draw on important competitive strengths in higher-value-added activi-
ties, in particular research and development, design, marketing, servicing, manage-
ment, superior quality of goods and services, and financial strength (European
Commission, 2007a). The study recommends EU business and investment to focus on:
China’s accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement;
the retail sector: sourcing products from China for EU markets and foreign expan-
sion into the Chinese retail market;
tradable goods: focusing on gaining share in higher-end markets;
the machinery sector: energy-efficient machines, power generators and renew-
able-energy-related equipment;
chemicals and petrochemicals, including environmentally-friendly materials;
information and communications technology equipment: competition on IT design
rather than manufacturing of commodities;
financial services: opportunities despite ongoing restrictions; and
the construction sector, which is the largest in the world.
The two EU policy papers and the study on trade and investment relations with China
are very much a brain child of the
Global Europe
strategy, and focus as much on non-
tariff barriers, WTO-plus issues, new growth areas and reciprocity as it is done in the
EU mandate to negotiate bilateral FTAs, for example with India, ASEAN and South
Korea. In this context, the forthcoming PCA with China has to be seen as a crucial
part of the EU trade offensive.
1.4. Development Assistance and Sustainability
Compared to trade and investment policies, development assistance has lost its sig-
nificance. Official development assistance (ODA) was peanuts – EURO 300–400 mil-
lion per year – compared to EU foreign direct investment in China which hit a high of
EURO 5.9 billion in 2005 and fell to EURO 3.7 billion in 2006. The main motivation by the
EU to continue ODA to China is to support China’s transition to a market economy and
sustainable development, and make it a strategic partner on a wide range of policy
It is noteworthy that in 2006 an external evaluation of the EU’s co-operation pro-
gramme with China was critical of a lack of systematic integration of considerations
on poverty reduction and climate change, and a lack of feedback from the projects
into policy dialogues (European Commission, 2007b:Annex 3.10).
Country Strategy Paper
2007–2013 depicts China as a country with dramatic
poverty reduction and a significant contribution to the achievement of the global
Millennium Development Goal targets. While China itself is emerging as a significant
donor, in particular in Africa and Asia, the EU still considers it as a developing coun-
try with large income and regional disparities, vulnerable groups and massive envi-
ronmental degradation. As a low- or middle-income country it is eligible for ODA.
However, unlike traditional ODA recipients, politically and economically it has
become a global player on the world stage.
Compared to foreign direct investment and due to the scale of the country, the ODA
provided by the EU – indicative funding is EURO 224 million for seven years – has only
a very limited impact. The objectives can be best achieved through close co-opera-
tion between donors and EU member states, and a focus on influencing Chinese poli-
cies in three priority areas:
1. support for China’s reform by sectoral dialogues and trainings;
2. support in China’s efforts to address global concerns over the environment,
energy and climate change; and
3. support for China’s human resources development.
Under the first priority, development assistance is designed as a flanking measure to
economic and trade co-operation. Policy dialogues will be held on trade co-opera-
tion, civil aviation, financial services and social protection, sectors “where EU expe-
rience can provide added value”. The programme aims at further development of
China’s legal and regulatory framework, including legal protection for foreign compa-
nies, of intellectual property and technology. Through this form of aid for trade, the EU
strives to advance the process of legalization of economic and trade relations in
China. The goal is – as the
Multiannual Indicative Programme
for 2007–2010 5outlines
– a strong “rules for trade” framework. China should become a “responsible” global
player and increase involvement of civil society. “Gender, social and environmental
issues” and good governance should be addressed as cross-cutting issues.
Additionally, the programme on social protection aims to “strengthen social provision
in order to minimise the social side-effects of economic reform, and contribute to
poverty alleviation” (European Commission, 2007c:7).
Inception Report to the Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment
explores the
potential to address common economic, environmental and social challenges in the
context of trade in the future (EU–China Trade SIA, 2007a). It suggests that EU busi-
ness should capitalize on its “green competitiveness”, and identifies competitive
advantages for EU business in the area of energy and resource-efficient machinery
and production, renewable-energy-related equipment, sustainable land management
and biodiversity protection, environmental services and environmental friendly tech-
nologies, organic food, and eco-tourism. Of the ten sectors covered by the report –
from machinery and electronics to forestry – social implications are mentioned for the
textiles sector only, because of the extensive lay-offs in the sector.
Global Analysis Report
of the
Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment
the “baseline context for the PCA negotiations” (EU–China Trade SIA, 2007b). It ques-
tions the economic, social and environment sustainability of the Chinese growth
model. Observing that the social gap is widening it speaks of a “two-speed China” in
terms of urban and rural growth, income and social security, which comes along with
demographic imbalances due to gender and age distribution. According to the report
the environmental unsustainability of its energy- and resource-intensive development
shows in the fact that China is the world’s largest producer of municipal solid waste,
the biggest contributor to global warming and faces alarming shortages of water and
other resources. The report denounces the economic sustainability of the rapid
investment-driven growth at the expense of human welfareand the growing trade
imbalances, including that between China and the EU.
Global Analysis Report
perceives the PCA as an opportunity to address some of
these imbalances in a bilateral framework. As priority trade-related areas for the PCA
it identifies eight issues from trade in services to capital movements, and suggests
five sectors – from banking to environmental goods and services – for further in-
depth analysis related to sustainability. This report is the first of a series of “stake-
holder-focused” reports for the EU–China Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment. It
Indicative funding for the four years is EURO 128 million.
is seen as an opportunity for stakeholders both in China and the EU to dialogue and
to provide input into the negotiations. Representatives of governments and business
– but no NGOs or trade unions – participated in the stakeholder consultation in
Brussels in November 2007, while in February 2008 at the consultation in Beijing rep-
resentatives of UN organizations and international NGOs, research institutes and
business were present.
1.5. End of the Honeymoon?
The study
Future Opportunities and Challenges
calculated that in 2004 European
exporters of goods lost export opportunities worth EURO 12.4 billion as a direct result
of non-tariff barriers. In services the estimated loss accounted for EURO 8.9 billion.
The study points at a certain “reform fatigue” in China and to a high level of “local
patriotism” meaning that local administration and party cadres are keen to continu-
ously forge industrial development and growth at any environmental and social costs,
often disregarding WTO commitments, legal provisions and domestic regulations
At the 10th China–EU Summit at the end of November 2007 in Beijing, the tone of the
communication had changed considerably. The honeymoon after the WTO accession
was declared to be over. Due to the EU’s falling investments and a growing trade
deficit, EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, com-
plained about “growing frustration” at Beijing’s failure to
crack down on the abuse of intellectual property rights
and to dismantle regulatory barriers and investment
restrictions for EU companies, as well as at state subsi-
dies to Chinese exporters. A number of scandals con-
cerning harmful and toxic product ingredients from toys
to toothpaste had once again shaken the credibility of
Chinese producers to meet quality standards. While EU
investments earlier contributed to overproduction in key
sectors and ignored the risks of overheating of the economy, the EU now asks China
to curb overcapacities and to ensure sustainability.
Mandelson suggested abandoning the earlier conciliatory tactics toward Beijing,
align more closely with the USA in its more assertive policy and use trade law to hit
back at China (
International Herald Tribune
, 6 November 2007). The European
Commission calculated that European business loses an estimated EURO 55 million
per day in trade opportunities because China maintains investment and ownership
caps in many sectors such as banking, construction and telecommunications. It cited
“China failed to respond to a policy
of co-operation and dialogue…
To some extent, the Chinese jugger-
naut is out of control.”
Peter Mandelson,
November 2007
the telecom sector as an example of the protectionist culture: of 22,000 telecom
licenses China granted since 2001, only ten went to foreign companies (European
Commission, 22 February 2008).
However, a heated debate divided the EU corporate sector between producers and
importers. Companies that produce, for example, textiles, bulbs or natural stone in
European countries fear Chinese competition, while retailers and traders who import
from China benefit from the low production costs. Orgalime, the lobby group for the
European engineering industry, estimates that in the EU only 250,000 jobs depend on
steel making, however, seven million jobs rely on imported steel. It is expected that in
future the lobby of the importers will be stronger than that of the producers. This is an
indicator for the restructuring of the European economy, a shift of focus from produc-
tion to services, and for a growing dependency on the Chinese economy. The fierce
rhetoric about concerns over unfairness of competition and sustainability covers up
the still huge profits made by EU business with China.
The 10th China–EU Summit decided to establish a High Level Economic and Trade
Mechanism to rebalance trade relations and overcome the tensions. This mechanism
was launched in April 2008 in Beijing after the Chinese Government announced its
readiness to talk to the exiled Tibetan Government.
Two other heated debates about China’s authoritarian and undemocratic role have
raised temperatures in the European Parliament and EU member states. The China
Development Bank set up a China–Africa Development Fund, launched with $1 billion
to finance Chinese investment and operation in Africa in the sectors of infrastructure,
housing, water conservation and industrial parks. The fund will be expanded to $3 bil-
lion in the second phase and eventually to $5 billion. Beside its continued engage-
ment in Sudan for oil, China supports the undemocratic government of Zimbabwe with
investment in large projects and supply of weapons.
A report on “China’s policies and its effects in Africa” was drafted for the European
Parliament which accuses China of utilizing the lack of capacities and domestic
industries in African countries for a ruthless exploitation of Africa’s natural
resources. Despite a warning that Europeans should not pretend to be the “better”
colonialists and capitalists, the moral overtone of the report is quite hypocritical,
based on the fear that the EU will lose its privileged access to resources in Africa, and
that China will get access to the EU market through Africa. For example, without men-
tioning the adverse effect of EU second-hand clothes on local textile industries in
Africa or the devastating impact of cheap agricultural imports from the EU on African
agriculture, the report blames China for destroying local industries by a “textile tsuna-
mi”.6As a way out of the fierce competition on the African continent, DG Development
proposed a trialogue between the EU, China and Africa on “peace, stability and sus-
tainable development in Africa.”
Contrary to this criticism, African leaders praise China’s investors’ role in improving
infrastructure and stimulating economic growth and play off Chinese and European
investors and donors against each other. Abdoulaye Wade, president of Senegal,
stated that “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted than the slow and
sometimes patronising post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organi-
sations and non-governmental organisations” (
Financial Times
, 23 January 2008).
In March 2008, the EU reacted even more strongly to the human rights violation in
Tibet after the demonstrations by monks against the oppression of Tibetan culture and
religion and by young unemployed people against their exclusion from the new pros-
perity in China. China-bashing and Sinophobia reached a new peak. China rejected
the EU’s criticism once again as intervention into internal affairs and national sover-
eignty and as “dehumiliation”.
EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson has been keen to calm down the China-bashing
on economic and human rights grounds and the calls for a new protectionism. He
suggests avoiding direct political confrontation, as he wishes to continue sitting at
the negotiating table and still promotes the approach of ‘change through trade’ – con-
trary to other voices in the European Parliament and member states which assert that
human rights should not be subordinated to economic interests.
[accessed 27 November 2007] and the announcement of the public consultation;
see Guerrero/Manji 2008.
2. Chinese Transformation and its Gender Implications
Liberalization started in China in the agricultural sector by permitting individual pro-
duction and sale to farmers. Unlike the ‘shock therapy’-style economic reform in the
former Soviet Union, liberalization was gradually extended to other economic sectors
on an experimental basis as a kind of locally confined trial-and-error project, which
would be discontinued or revised if it failed and quickly expanded if successful. The
success story of export production started 1980 with the establishment of four Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) in the Pearl River Delta and by granting foreign investment a
legal status. From 1984 onwards, China was ambitious in expanding its export produc-
tion in SEZs, and scaling up its industrialization and technological development. To
attract more investment, foreign companies were provided with preferential tax treat-
ment, freedom to import inputs and the right to retain foreign exchange.
Investments in labour-intensive manufacturing and assembly were the engine behind
China’s integration into the world market. In 1993, 82 per cent of foreign investors list-
ed cheap labour as the main incentive for investing in China, 56 per cent mentioned
tax concessions and 50 per cent access to the Chinese market (Asia Monitor
Resource Center (AMRC), 1998:206). Export industries are highly gender-segmented
economic areas. As in free trade zones in other countries of the global South, in
labour-intensive sectors preference was given to women because of stereotypes
such as ‘nimble’ fingers, patience and abilities to concentrate for long hours. Soon it
was apparent that hard-working women – mostly young docile migrants from the
countryside – were a comparative advantage which attracted foreign investment.
The female-labour-directed investments and the feminized export industrialization, in
particular in clothing, textiles, shoes, toys and electronics, contributed substantially
to the amazingly high growth rates of 9 per cent per annum (Seguino, 2000).
At the same time, as part of the economic reform state-owned enterprises were dis-
mantled and state-owned property privatized. The collapse of the state sector caused
a massive gendered process of retrenchment: women, who had represented 40 per
cent of the labour force of state enterprises, made up 60 per cent of the up to 40 mil-
lion people retrenched in the past 15 years. They received fewer opportunities for
training and re-employment than men, which resulted in the unknown phenomenon of
unemployment. According to the World Bank, there is ample evidence of a feminiza-
tion of poverty (World Bank, 2002:6).7
Chinese economic statistics and data on employment are inconsistent and seldom gender-disaggre-
gated. This holds very much true for poverty indicators. The official Chinese poverty line is 25 cents
income per day, far below the UN-drawn poverty line of US$1 per day.
Those tendencies of gender differentiation in the economy and discrimination against
women indicated a backlash against the socialist era
of gender equality. Based on Mao’s saying that “what-
ever a comrade can do, a female comrade can do as
well”, policies and laws were aimed at giving women
a higher status. With the integration of women into the
– the labour collectives – the collectivization
of reproductive work in the
(cooking, child
care, health care, recreation etc.) and its rigid popula-
tion control, the Socialist Party aimed at breaking up
the old gender division of labour and the Confucian patriarchal gender relations.
Gender roles were desexualized by a uniform dress code and hair style which actu-
ally implied a masculinization of women’s roles.
However, the gender egalitarianism forced by the state and the party remained high-
ly contradictory. Women’s emancipation was equated largely to economic activity
and was promoted for the sake of socialism and the
nation. Women’s nearly systematic exclusion from
political leadership was an indicator that the gen-
dered power relations had not really changed.
Participation of women in state-owned industries
was high but still asymmetrical.
Women’s battalions in steel production, mining and
ship construction were set up, but no men were
obliged to work in the kindergardens of the
Similarly, the target of equal pay and equal recogni-
tion for all kind of work was not fully met. Most of the
care work in private households was done by
women, with a particular care role assigned to
grandmothers who after retirement at the age of 50 were expected to take care of the
grandchild(ren) so that the mother was able to continue working in the
The still ongoing dismantling of the state-owned sector means that the retrenched
workers not only lose their job and (small) income but, more importantly, also a com-
plex system of social security and basic facilities from housing to health care.
Liberalization, privatization and market competition did open new chances and liber-
ties in the emerging labour markets but did not substitute the old ‘iron rice bowl’
regime of social provisions.
At the same time, the growing sex ratio at birth indicates that the transformation of
the economy and society did not change the prevailing preference given to sons, par-
“It is an ironic and embarrassing
situation if, along with economic
growth, gender equality were to
Huang/Zhan, 2005
“The imperative of competition
increasingly takes precedence over
the protection of equality rights…
State affirmative action policies
have receded while traditional gen-
der stereotypes and values have re-
emerged, including increasing gen-
der discrimination in the labor
The World Bank, 2002:14
ticularly in the countryside. In the past decade, the ratio of newborn boys to girls rose
by 10 per cent to 118 boys for every 100 girls, in some provinces however to 130:100.
The millions of “missing women” – as Nobel laureate Amartya Sen called the phe-
nomenon – indicates that the one-child policy has even reinforced the preference
given to males, although the Government launched a ‘care for girls’ campaign and
vowed to take tough measures to control sex tests of foetuses and femicide (Xinhua,
22 January 2007). On the other hand, in urban areas the one-child family makes par-
ents spend a lot for education of girls as well as boys.
2.1. The Rediscovery of Gender Differences in the Market Economy
In the transformation process a re-invention of gender differences emerged as the
labour markets became segregated and hierarchically
organized according to a new valuation of work
(Lau/Liu/Zhang, 1999). When retrenched from bankrupt
state-owned enterprises, women were often sent into
early retirement with “women go home” slogans.
When retrained, they were re-educated to be ready for
informal employment and trained in ‘female’ skills such
as domestic labour. The majority of women are thus
placed at the bottom end of the value chain and once
again in care work.
The core workers in export manufacturing are young
migrants from rural areas, dagongmei (‘working girls’),
whose remittances back home help millions of rural
households to survive at the subsistence level. Despite
the new job opportunities in export industries, the rate
of female employment in urban areas went down from
76.3 per cent to 63.7 per cent between 1990 and 2000 (Lipinsky, 2006:220). Liu Jieyu
concludes that “the cost of restructuring has fallen upon women disproportionately”
(Liu, 2007).
Between 1990 and 1997 the gender wage gap increased by 5 per cent in the country-
side and by 7 per cent in the cities. According to UNDP it presently stands at 64:100
(UNDP, 2007/8). Ageism – discrimination based on age – in the labour market is much
stronger for women than for men, so the employment rate of women is falling rapidly
after the age of 40.
Due to the collapse of the danwei system and the privatization of public services, care
“The femaleness of the workers had
to be reinvented and regulated…
Capitalist production in Shenzhen
relies on gender as a basic con-
stituent in developing a new system
of work-place hierarchy. The rural
women were imagined to be more
obedient, tolerant and conforming
to the factory regime.”
Pun 1999:14,18
Pun Ngai, a Hong Kong-based
scholar worked in an electronic
assembly line in the feminized
export region of Shenzhen.
work is relocated to private households and ‘naturally’ becomes a female task. With
a child, the work–life balance is once again an individual problem. In the new urban
consumer class, the institution of the domestic worker – taboo in the socialist era –
is revitalized. This form of informal and invisible employment, in particular of migrant
and elderly women, in the private service sector has spread fast. At least one-third of
urban private households employ a domestic worker.
These developments caused the fall of China’s Gender Development Index: in 1994,
UNDP ranked China 74; in 2003 it had fallen to rank 83 (Beijing Today, 17 September
2004).8They resulted in an increasing refeminization of women’s role in society, a
resexualization of gender roles and a kind of rediscovery of gender differences. While
the Chinese leadership claims to agree to principles of gender equality and equal
opportunities, its top priorities are economic competitiveness and growth. For the
sake of an increase in productivity, policymakers neglect proactive policies to pre-
vent wage and workplace discrimination against women and to enforce women’s
The beauty economy and the case of Western cosmetics
In the 1990s, when gender differences were re-emphasized, new standards and
images of femininity penetrated China, increasingly influenced by Western norms
and models. Beauty industries were established from hairdressers to fashion
magazines, from fitness parlours to plastic surgery, from a wedding industry to
Miss contests. The beauty service sector is an expanding area for female
employment, in particular self-employment, and attracts young women in partic-
ular. It employs an estimated 16 million of the country’s labour force and is one of
the most profitable and successful economic sectors.
The WTO accession led to the opening of the cosmetics market along with the
spread of advertising and aggressive marketing. Imports of Western cosmetics
grew fast, and the advertisement industry likewise. Apart from Japanese cosmet-
ics, Western products such as L’Oréal and Oil of Olaz began to dominate the mar-
ket. Transnational corporations from the West strongly influenced the promotion
of this new consumer culture and lifestyle, along with the shaping of new con-
cepts of femininity and new gender regimes in the transition to a capitalist mar-
ket order. (Hopkins, 2007; Xu/Feiner, 2007)
Imitation of whiteness and westerness makes for the transnationalisation of
From 2004 onwards the rank went up once again.
beauty and feminity, alongside the transnational expansion of the respective mar-
kets and accumulation regimes. The commodification of beauty facilitates eco-
nomic reform and the growth of highly competitive markets. In their recruitment
strategies, service companies openly discriminate women upon age and appear-
ance, and re-enforce the new norms in the employment market.
2.2. Open Door Policies and the Making of Classes and Gender
It has become a common believe that trade liberalization and foreign direct invest-
ment have a positive effect on women’s employment and income in countries where
unskilled labour is available in abundance. It holds true for China’s entry into the glob-
al economy with labour-intensive manufacturing that cheap and docile female labour
constituted a competitive advantage. Most of them were migrants from poor rural
households who subsidized their families with their meagre income. In many rural
households up to 50 per cent of the annual monetary income is transferred from
‘peasant workers’ – males mainly in construction work, females mainly in export pro-
duction – in the cities to the countryside.
In the recent past, more technology was introduced and more capital-intensive fac-
tories and high-skilled, knowledge-based industries were set up in the prosperous
coastal strip to upgrade production. This resulted in a new composition of the labour
force and the creation of new social classes. While the proportion of female workers
in manufacturing decreased from up to 80 to 60 per cent, a new class of formal work-
ers or labour aristocracy – for example in the foreign-invested car industries, a high-
skilled elite in the IT sector, engineers, managers, developers and researchers, and
corporate executives – emerged, with the majority being male.
Foreign-invested firms pay higher salaries than state-owned and private domestic
companies. However, the gender wage gap is largest in the most liberalized sector
(foreign-invested enterprises) and smallest in the least liberalized sector (state-
owned enterprises) (Maurer-Fazio/Hughes, 2002). Surveys done in foreign-invested
companies, such as Nokia, revealed that working conditions in the factories were
better than in local firms, but the foreign owners also took advantage of lax law
enforcement in China and violated Chinese labour law regarding overtime hours,
social insurance and democratically elected trade unions (AMRC, 29 October 2007).
Foreign-invested companies quickly aim at higher productivity and technological dif-
fusion, which increase the demand for skilled labour. As gender is highly correlated
with skills, women are segregated in less capital-intensive production, while men
benefit more from jobs and higher wages for skilled labour in foreign-invested com-
panies. This led to a marked increase in wage discrimination against women in low-
skilled employment in export-oriented industries during the past decade
(Braunstein/Brenner, 2007). The persistent industrial segregation by gender contra-
dicts the neoclassical assumption that the gender wage discrimination would
decrease on the road towards trade liberalization and growth.
Chinese and EU trade ambitions still converge in a strong interest to reduce produc-
tion costs for the sake of capital accumulation and stimulation of growth. Presently,
with dirty manufacturing being dislocated from the SEZs near the coast and invest-
ments redirected to the Chinese hinterland, a new territory for labour-intensive export
production is opened up. Once again, cheap female labour is targeted for a competi-
tive advantage, partly for labour-intensive production in textiles, garments and toys or
the more capital- and technology-intensive manufacturing of mobile phones, TVs,
PCs, and household equipment.
This progressive penetration of China’s rural inland by the capitalist market economy
and foreign investment is a reaction to a shortage of labour in the Pearl River Delta
since 2003. Wages of workers on the assembly line had not been substantially
increased for 15 years, while living costs in the coastal cities skyrocketed and wages
of skilled labour had multiplied to EURO 500 (Wen, 2005). Non-payment of the minimum
wage of less than EURO 50 per month, long working hours and often unpaid overtime,
police harassment of migrants, sweatshop conditions with a high risk of accidents
and occupational health hazards, and cramped dormitory accommodation caused 10
to 15 per cent of the migrant labourers to stay back in the countryside after the new
year’s holiday each year (World Bank News, 26 August 2004; The Economist, 13
March 2008). Thus, migrant workers voted with their feet against the miserable qual-
ity of jobs and the indecent work and wages.
The Government reacted by increasing wages, by giving migrant workers access to
the new social security system for the first time and by shifting factories and invest-
ments to the hinterland. In 2007, 10 to 20 per cent of the 70,000 shoe factories in the
Pearl River Delta closed down. Most of the business went into poorer interior regions
(The Economist, 13 March 2008). There labour is abundant and docile, mostly young
girls from villages, and production costs – wages, land, energy, and water – less than
half, meaning that a woman at the assembly line would earn only EURO 35 per month.
This salary would not help her to cross the UN-drawn poverty line of US$1 per day
(Chan/Gu, 2006).
The new leap of liberalization is thus to a great extent another phase of female-based
growth strategy and makes once again for the construction of a new working class in
the latest Chinese and global division of labour. Export production and foreign invest-
ment may create new jobs for women; however, at the same time they create a new
class of ‘working poor’. Against the common focus on the quantity of jobs created by
an export- and investment- oriented development path, feminist critique questions
the quality of these jobs and the sustainability of this employment (Staveren, 2007; Lee
1998, 2007a, Pun 2005).
The share of agriculture in labour is still 42 per cent; however, its share of the GDP fell
to 11 per cent. Imports of cheap agricultural products, such as subsidized cotton,
wheat, soybean and cooking oil from the USA, under the WTO agreement resulted in
an estimated loss of 720,000 jobs in the poorest regions of the country in 2005. After
the accession to WTO the producer price of sugar decreased by 35 per cent due to
annual imports of 1.6 million tons of sugar. The sugar price on the world market
ranges below the Chinese producer price because of the EU’s high subsidies (Oxfam,
2003). Since grains are increasingly imported and outcompete local land-intensive
crop production, the traditional plots for grain give way to horticulture for exports and
greenhouses, where most of the work is done by women (Financial Times, 9
December 2005).
Already in the 1990s, due to emigration by males, a feminization of agricultural labour
took place (UNDP et al., 2003:60). Women concentrate in crop production and poultry;
men in fishery, forestry and agricultural services. Contrary to this gendered division
of labour, the distribution of land lease was gender discriminatory, meaning families
with sons received larger allocations than those with daughters. Even after the more
gender-just land redistribution in 2001, the land rights of
women who marry into the husband’s village and work
on ‘his’ land are not clear.
The job losses in agriculture due to import liberalization
are much higher than the current job creation capaci-
ties in agriculture through export production.
Therefore, in the countryside, local governments com-
pete for investment, ready to intensify the race to the
bottom and neglect legal regulations and social provi-
The emergence of labour markets and the export pro-
duction show that in China nowadays gender plays a
significant role in the making of new labour regimes and in the “politics of making and
unmaking of classes” (Lee, 2005:6; Dai, 2003).
“China, in the 90s of the 20th cen-
tury, began to undergo a drastic
process of class differentiation, while
its social institutions were restruc-
turing and the intervention of the
globalisation process in Chinese
society was deepening. Women have
undoubtedly been chosen to be the
social group to be sacrificed in this
Dai Jinhua, 2003:138
2.3. Discrimination against Women – Global Patterns, Local Practice
In the intensified process of ‘structural adjustment’ to a market economy, some glob-
al patterns of gender inequalities and discrimination against women in the labour
market occurred in Chinese society that can be attributed to the neoliberal restruc-
turing of economies all over the world:
informalization of employment, as well as self-employment or one-woman entre-
feminized labour-intensive export production;
a gender gap in wages and social security, in particular pensions; and
a feminized care network of paid and unpaid work (Jin, 2002:13).
These global patterns are framed by the neoliberal slogan of ‘self-responsibility’. The
Chinese version of this framework are the ‘four selves’ propagated by the All-China
Women’s Federation: self-respect, self-confidence, self-reliance, and self-improve-
ment. The package aims at re-educating women and teaching them that they cannot
rely any more on the Socialist Party or state to take care of their well-being from the
cradle to the grave. With slogans like “Be a self-empowering and self-reliant
retrenched person” (Dai, 2003:148), they are trained to strive for economic independ-
ence and entrepreneurship. The ideology of ‘self-responsibility’ makes them attribute
success or failure to themselves rather than to the economic and social conditions
(Zhang, 1995:39). The majority of the women workers who faced redundancy in the
transition process found some new work, albeit mostly informal, self-employed and
low paying (Liu, 2007).
On the one hand “well-paid jobs show a lack of female personnel, while positions
with comparatively low income display a high proportion of women” (Government’s
2002 report on Population and Labour, quoted in: Jin, 2002:12). Female graduates com-
plain about a recruitment discrimination they face which seems to reflect a global
pattern of corporate hiring policies: even with better degrees than male students,
young women face more problems in getting a job.9On the other hand, some of the
‘socialist achievements’ with regard to gender equality in the economy are translat-
ed into the following facts and figures:
the rate of female economic activity of 69.2 per cent is still higher than in most
European countries;10
Employers fear a loss of working time with young women workers, not only because of pregnancy and
delivery (this would happen only once due to the one-child norm), but additionally it is normal for a
young married woman to have several abortions per year because abortion is often the only available
form of birth control in China.
10 In 2005, the average rate of female employment stood at 56 per cent in the 27 EU countries. See:
European Commission (2007) Report on Equality between Women and Men, Brussels.
more women get education in so-called male skills and employment in so-called
male professions compared to most Western countries; and
more women than in most Western countries are in leading positions. According to
the Chinese federation of female entrepreneurs, women manage 40 per cent of pri-
vate companies. In foreign corporations, such as in financial services, high-skilled
young women enjoy good employment opportunities.
Women encounter new job opportunities in the expanding service sector, however,
again particularly in informal employment. Already in 2003, in urban areas irregular
employment accounted for more jobs than traditional formal employment (Ghose,
2005:27). Besides the growing sector of casual and precarious employment in private
households, according to official statistics, women are strongly represented in the
following service sectors:
2003 Health Catering Tourism Education Financial
Percentage of 58 % 55.5 % 47.5 % 46.1 % 37.8 %
female employment
The case of financial services11
Countervailing trends prevail in financial services. While the state-owned banks
lay off hundred of thousands of employees all over the country, the private insur-
ance sector is fast expanding and employs one million sales agents who walk
from door to door. More women than men are engaged in insurance sales.
Domestic and highly localized insurers recruit a majority of laid-off female work-
ers in their forties as sales agents because of their communication skills and their
credibility due to their ‘housewife’ look, which sells well outside the big cities. In
China, sales agents are categorized as self-employed, meaning they are deprived
of benefits such as pensions and medical insurance. They work part-time and on
commission, and can subcontract agents to work under them. Young women and,
in particular, young men tend to join joint venture and foreign insurers, such as
the German-invested, high-profile Allianz-Dazhong.
The earnings of sales agents are below average. They are told that their income
depends on their working hours, on individual self-discipline and work motiva-
This paragraph is based on own research done on the insurance sector, in particular the domestic
insurer Ping An and the foreign-invested company Allianz-Dazhong in 2004 and on Cheris Shung-ching
Chan (2007).
tion. Many women claim that they find it difficult to “make money out of friends’
pockets”. The training they receive at foreign-invested companies aims at ration-
alizing their sales techniques, using Western labour logic and marketing atti-
tudes. However, because of small earnings and psychological stress, the
turnover is high in insurance sales forces. The agents with the best sales per-
formance are those who adjusted to the new market discipline, work around the
clock and are unemotional and aggressive in exploiting personal relationships in
financial transactions.
The new social security system covers the formal sector in urban areas only. It dis-
advantages women, because women are likely to work informally and as self-
employed, earn lower wages and retire earlier than men. In 2003, of the 250 million
formally employed urban workers only 60 per cent were covered by a pension system,
only 43 per cent by a health scheme and only 17 per cent by accident insurance. A
survey by UNDP et al. found a considerable gender gap in social security of 12–22 per
cent fewer women being insured than men. The health care reforms have significant-
ly worsened women’s access to health care, and the rising costs reinforced gender
inequities in access to basic services, closely linked to socio-economic inequalities
(Chen/Standing 2007).
This adds on to women’s vulnerability and their risk of
old age poverty (UNDP et al., 2003:84, 88, 192f). It is only
since 2006 that migrant workers – because of the local
registration, the
system12 – have been allowed to
participate in the social security system at their place
of work. However, it is still difficult for migrants to get
access to public health care in the cities or to public
schools. They often have no choice but to go to costly
private clinics. This is a heavy burden on women for
whom abortion is the prevailing method of birth control.13
Many young migrant women are interested in staying in urban areas and getting an
“Welfare based on employment
rather than on universal citizen-
ship… means that women are more
likely than men to fall through the
cracks of a social safety net.”
Lee Ching Kwan, 2005:9
The hukou system is a registration at the place of residence, which gives citizens a right to live, work
and to social security only at his/her place of original residence. It was established in 1958 to prevent
rural–urban migration and progressively relaxed from 1984 onwards but has not been abolished.
Presently an estimated 150–200 million people with a rural hukou migrated to cities for work.
13 The pill is not made available largely in China. Frequent abortions are the prevailing form of family plan-
ning in China, putting a heavy burden on women’s health. A lot of advertising for private clinics is to be
found in the SEZs. The price for an abortion is around EURO 50 – a month’s salary for a migrant work-
er on the assembly line.
by marrying an urban man. To return permanently to the countryside
would mostly mean marrying into another village.
The disparities between rural women, migrant workers, domestic workers, high-
skilled students and women in management positions are growing, not only in terms
of income but also in terms of identity and subjectivity. A study from the end of the
1990s revealed the rural per capita income is one-seventh of migrant workers’ earn-
ings in foreign-invested firms, while at the same time migrant women workers’ annu-
al earnings are half the annual income of urban women (Berik/Dong/Summerfield,
Women from the urban class of the newly rich and super-rich are proud of not need-
ing to work. This is partly an ideological reaction to the work they were ‘forced’ to by
the State in the socialist era – a reaction to be found in many post-socialist societies.
Additionally, both men and women from ethnic minorities experienced larger declines
in the labour force than Han14 (Maurer-Fazio/Hughes/Zhang, 2007). All these tenden-
cies reinforce social differentiation among women.
Han Chinese are the ethnic majority group constituting 91.5 per cent of the population. The Chinese
constitution prohibits discrimination against minorities, and the Government uses preferential policies
and measures to prevent discrimination against ethnic minorities, for example in its population policies,
education, and hiring.
The Just-in-Time Work Regime in the SEZs
Most of the migrant workers do not have a labour contract and are not covered by any social
insurance. Although Chinese labour laws stipulate that overtime must be limited to a maxi-
mum of 36 hours per month, an average working day lasts 12 to 14 hours, seven days a week.
Just-in-time availability of the workers is ensured by accommodation in crowded dormitories
close to the factories. Thus, the dormitories are part of the authoritarian labour regime.
Overtime payments and the piece rate system are not transparent to the workers. However,
since the minimum wage is very low, workers are keen to do overtime to earn more. Migrant
workers are unable to send money home if they do not do overtime. Thus, low wages create
a dependency on overtime. Overtime work is a constituent of the just-in-time regime of prod-
uct delivery.
When Mattel reduced its orders from Chinese factories after the scandal about toxic and
dangerous toys, the workers only worked a few hours per day without knowing why, and
were desperately waiting for more work to do.
Workers get fined for mistakes and for giving ‘wrong’ answers to factory auditors. After a few
years of over-intensive labour, most of the migrant workers leave the factories, suffering
from burn-out and health hazards.
(Chan, 2006; Au/Nan/Zhang, 2007)
3. Social Standards and The Labour Regime
in Manufacturing
With regard to social standards and labour rights, both sides – China and the EU –
manoeuvred themselves into contradictions. In its official communication with China
and the two policy papers the EU argues in a normative way, meaning that only if envi-
ronmental, social and safety standards are enforced, will competition be considered
fair. It complains about the growing wealth gap and regional disparities in China as
well as social and gender imbalances. It asks for “close international co-operation”
on issues of energy, environment and climate change as well as on “international
social standards” such as corporate social responsibility, decent work and social
security. EU corporations are encouraged to take up a model role by “adopting
European norms, eco-technologies and standards of corporate social responsibility
in their operations in China” (European Commission, 2006a,b).
However, when it came to improving the existing labour laws in China, EU-based cor-
porations were very reluctant to agree. The new labour contract law stresses written
contracts, an open-ended contract after two fixed-term contracts, and compensation
in case of redundancy. It still does not ensure freedom to organize nor a right to strike.
In 2006, a public debate on the draft law was encouraged, and US- and EU-based
transnational corporations joined the debate. The EU Chamber of Commerce, repre-
senting 1100 EU-based companies in China, acknowledged that the law stems from
labour laws in Europe. Based on experience in European countries, the Chamber of
Commerce felt, however, that the law tends to “over-regulate the employment relation-
ships”. It proposed more flexibility “to apply to various business situations”. In particu-
lar in the service sector it favours operation on a flexible schedule to reduce costs. This
should apply to lay-offs in the same way, so that companies would be able “to preserve
their business interests”. It was revealing that the then president of the EU Chamber of
Commerce, Janssens de Varebeke, gave a warning in a letter to the People’s Congress,
saying that rising costs of production might force foreign enterprises to rethink new
investments in China (Global Labor Strategies, 2006). US and EU companies threatened
to relocate production to Vietnam and other low-cost Asian countries.
European Employers’ Federations, for example German companies, oppose the intro-
duction of an international norm for social accountability, called ISO 26000, by the
International Organization for Standardization in Geneva because they are unwilling
or unable to make sure that in the whole production and supply chain social and eco-
logical standards are observed, such as freedom to join independent trade unions,
collective wage bargaining etc.
Before the new labour law came into force in China at the beginning of 2008, many
enterprises, domestic as well as foreign-invested, tried to circumvent it. A negative
example was set by Huawei, China’s largest producer of telecom equipment. It asked
7000 of its long-term employees to resign voluntarily, receive compensation and then
apply anew for a job so that they would be classified as ‘new’ employees.
All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) is in charge with enforcing the law.
However, being the only legally recognized trade union and a prolonged arm of the
party, its crucial task is to harmonize relationships between management and labour
and not to represent genuine workers’ interests vis-à-vis the employers
(Taylor/Chang/Li, 2003). In the industrial sector the Government urges firms with more
than 25 employees to accept a representative of the ACFTU and instructs state-
owned enterprises to “fulfil social responsibilities”. Any labour activism outside of the
ACFTU faces brutal repression.
With new instructions on Corporate Social Responsibility and the new labour law, the
Chinese Government reacted to the many protests and strikes all over the country.
Annually, around 90,000 ‘incidents of public order disturbances’ were reported offi-
cially. Immediate causes for public protests are the corruption of officials in the coun-
tryside or of corporate management, unpaid wages or pensions, mass retrenchments
or evictions due to dam construction or development projects, and health hazards
because of frequent accidents or use of toxic materials in industries, mining and con-
struction work. However, the state’s role remains contradictory between the protec-
tion of people’s rights and the strict control over them, in particular in terms of labour
regulation and social reproduction, for the sake of productivity, growth and social sta-
bility (Lee, 2007b).
Monitoring in Chinese subcontracting factories which supply to transnational corpo-
rations revealed that in many cases enterprise managers were planted as represen-
tatives of the trade union, that double book-keeping was common, and workers got
fake pay slips which showed correct remuneration of overtime. They were instructed
to give incorrect answers when auditors turned up in the company to monitor codes
of conducts which are widespread among foreign corporations and part of their mar-
keting policies. The suppliers were willing to offend against the codes for the sake of
just-in-time production requirements, and local governments are deliberately reluc-
tant to supervise and get bonuses from prosperous enterprises in return. (
, 21 April 2005).
3.1. The Case of Textiles and Clothing
On 1 January 2005, the end of the 30-year-old Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) lifted all
quotas on imports of textile and apparel products for countries of the South to the rich
markets of the North. However, according to the MFA, until 2008 countries could apply
‘safeguard quotas’ which restrict the annual growth of Chinese imports to 7.5 per cent
to limit the competition for domestic production. When those safeguard quotas are
eliminated, China is likely to produce more than half of the world’s textiles and gar-
ments, and the estimated 15 million jobs in the Chinese textile sector will increase by
3.8 million (UNDP et al., 2003:205).
The textile sector is a showpiece of how the strategies of European retailers of buy-
ing and selling determine the working conditions in the factories and sweatshops in
cheap-labour countries. The old system of a winter and a summer collection in shops
has made way to a system of placing orders according to customer demand. If a
product sells well, retailers place more orders – so-called ‘efficient consumer
response’. The lead time is short and makes overtime, night shifts and subcontracting
necessary. Retailers advance the international price race to the bottom by methods
of ‘online reverse auction’, which allows bidders to underbid each other online.
Additionally, the ‘flying geese model’ of investment and China’s competitive advan-
tage have strong ramifications for the global labour markets, and on investment and
trade in many countries of the South and the North. While the first phase of offshoring
in the 1970s led to the closure of textile industries in Europe and to the retrenchment
of millions of female workers, the fast shift of subcontracts in manufacturing to China
has resulted lately in a de-industrialization and a defeminization of the labour force in
other export-oriented countries of the South. At the beginning of 2005, according to
the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF), 25,000
jobs were lost each in Cambodia and Sri Lanka. For the sake of competitiveness in
Bangladesh the 72-hour week was legalized (
The comparative advantage of China in the textile and clothing sector is complex.
Apart from the complete product cycle, modern technology, and recent improve-
ments in quality, it consists of cheap hard-working female labour, increased produc-
tivity and enormous economies of scale. Hourly wages of Chinese textile workers are
higher than those of their counterparts in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam, India and
Pakistan; however, in China the piece rates are lower because the Chinese workers
are more productive15 (Ferenschild/Wick, 2004:24). Although a code of conduct was
introduced by the Government in the textile and clothing sector in 2005 and signed by
170 Chinese companies and two major foreign investors, workers in the sector point
out that they did not experience any substantial improvement regarding work condi-
tions and wages.
In 2005 China’s textile exports to the EU and the USA increased by 50 per cent, while
In 2002, Chinese seamstresses earned only 28 to 45% of the hourly wage of those in Latin-American
prices declined by 30 to 50 per cent. Both intensified their complaints about trade dis-
tortion, plant closures and job losses in their countries, and their questioning of the
grim working conditions on the shop floor in China. In 2005, increased imports from
China were said to put 165,000 jobs in the EU at risk. In August 2005, millions of pairs
of trousers and sweaters piled up at EU customs and were not allowed to get to the
shops which had ordered them. The European Commission became trapped in a par-
adox situation between European textile producers, particularly in southern European
countries, who are outcompeted by the cheap Chinese imports, and European retail
companies, in particular from northern European countries who order and import
clothing produced in China. After China agreed to observe the protectionist safeguard
clause vis-a-vis the EU and to restrain its imports until 2008, the goods which were
stuck at the borders were allowed inside. The EU demands better access to the
Chinese market for the European textile industries which do not compete in mass pro-
duction but which moved up the value chain by investing anew in technology and
All through this trade war, China was called in Europe the biggest winner of the MFA
phase-out. However, the Chinese perception is different: with regard to employment
the prevailing feature in the country is retrenchment from state-owned textile enter-
prises and a high rate of unemployment. The official news agency Xinhua complains
about a “new quota era” and “protectionism” imposed by the EU and USA and more
generally about an increasingly “hostile trade environment” for Chinese companies
(Xinhua, 11 December 2006). The Hong Kong-based
Globalisation Monitor
rightly hints
at the fact that foreign companies directly benefit from the Chinese expansion of
exports because they account for one-quarter of all export earnings from textile prod-
ucts. Exporters of textile machinery gained a lot from the Chinese ambition to upgrade
production: Germany’s exports of textile machinery, in particular spinning machinery,
hit a peak of EURO 1 billion in 2006. Taking a socially more differentiating look at the
wins and losses, it appears that companies – Chinese, EU and other foreign investors
– are “winners, while workers are losers, albeit to different degrees under different
time frames” (Au, 2006).
3.2. Social Unrest and Disharmony
In the recent past, SEZ workers started to make a difference. A new labour activism
built up, mostly in the Pearl River Delta after the much-lamented labour shortage
occurred. Still, the protests against appalling working conditions and despotic facto-
The European Commission negotiated with China a double-checking surveillance system for 2008
which monitors textile imports before they leave China.
ry regimes are localized and spontaneous, rather than organized across factories and
based on class consciousness. However, they not only increase in number, but they
get more radical and become increasingly public (Chan, 2008). Workers block high-
ways to attract public and media interest, they confront police outside the factory,
and they write petitions to the local administration. It is obvious that workers have
gained in terms of confidence, bargaining power and awareness of their rights.
Women workers have already come to the conclusion: “Big strike – big improvement;
small strike – small improvement; no strike – no improvement”, meaning it is worth
struggling for one’s rights. Apart from the collective struggles against despotic facto-
ry regimes and frequent accidents, individuals go to court using the law as a tool in
their struggles (Au/Nan/Zhang, 2007). Often, solidarity is constructed in the context of
ethnic, provincial and language identity in the dormitories (Lee, 1998; Pun, 2005).
Since the inflation rate, particularly of food items, went up in summer 2007 – an
unknown phenomenon in China – protests against wage arrears, non-payment of
minimum wages and overtime became more frequent. Eighteen thousand workers of
the German-funded firm FRIWO, a subcontractor for Nokia, demonstrated in the
streets of Shenzhen for better payment. Apart from wages and compensation, health
is an important entry point for mobilization.
However, although new labour activist groups that are based outside the factories
are not allowed to register as trade unions, some have registered as a cultural NGO
or as a co-operative. They face a lot of repression in their daily support to the labour-
ers. The Chinese leadership reacts increasingly nervously about networking between
factories and co-ordination on a regional and national level. News about resistance
to the restructuring of the economy and its high social and environmental costs are
hushed up. Activists are detained in camps, and there are regular crackdowns on
their offices and their websites (Chan, 2008).
Chinese Working Women Network (CWWN) started its empowerment work
with women workers in Shenzhen after a fire in a Zhili toy factory killed more
than 80 workers, all but two women, in 1996. It runs a hotline on health and safe-
ty issues and trains women on occupational health and legal rights. It provides
a cultural space, trains and sets up workers’ committees in the industries to
monitor codes of conducts, promote corporate social responsibility and articu-
late labour rights. It set up collective purchasing networks in dormitories and a
shop which provides for the needs of migrant women.
In 2005 it joined a campaign for a living wage initiated by the Bangkok-based
Committee for Asian Women (see in nine Asian countries.
Additionally, a new type of advocacy group is slowly emerging – mostly initiated by
environmental and development-oriented groups – that works on global players and
international policies, such as the China WTO network and a working group on the
international financial institutions.
Transnational solidarity is not getting easier, as workers in different countries are
made each others’ enemies and seem to steal each others’ jobs. In most countries,
trade unions’ struggles
against the downward pressure on wages, standards and jobs have become futile.
However, new forms of organizing labour and women’s empowerment are explored,
different from the conventional trade unionist model. Increasingly, links with transna-
tional networks are developing. One example is the co-operation with the Clean
Clothes Campaign in Europe, which addresses transnational corporations to make
sure that codes of conduct are adhered to all through the production and supply
chain. Another example is the transcontinental NGO network, Make it fair, which
wants to cover the whole production and disposal chain of the IT industries
( The campaign ‘Play Fair 2008’ raises concerns over core labour
standards in the production chain of licensed products for the Olympics. In the EU, a
number of NGOs started to challenge their governments about procurement of prod-
ucts from China, from computers to natural stones and uniforms. While targeting EU
actors in particular, the civil society organizations involved must avoid joining the
stereotyped China-bashing in the Western media as a voracious dragon and rather
try to engage with new civil society forces in China.
4. Conclusions
After exploring the topical trade and investment policies between the EU and China
and their gender-specific effects on the ‘socialist’ market economy in China, a key
question remains: whether the EU’s concerns about economic, social and environ-
mental sustainability included in the policy documents can change development in
China for the better. How powerful and effective is the concept of ‘change through
trade’ on social, regional and gender inequalities, or regarding environmental degra-
dation, resource exploitation and energy waste?
The European Commission faces a broad range of battlefields while aiming to secure
competitiveness of European business in the global economy: it wants to ensure
access for EU companies and investors to the Chinese market, it wants to control and
restrict the growing flood of imports of goods manufactured or assembled in China, it
wants to compete with China in Africa regarding resource exploitation, and it has to
balance the countervailing interests within European business, in particular between
producers and traders. Contradictions are striking between the political rhetoric
about social and environmental concerns and the reality of EU business in China,
which is first and foremost governed by its interest in legally protected expansion and
profit making. The EU trade and investment policies apply double standards. On the
one hand, they attempt to protect EU business and its very interest in efficiency and
profitability by the rule of law in China, disregarding the adverse social and environ-
mental effects of this corporate-driven growth path. On the other hand, they delegate
the responsibility for sustainable economic growth, social standards and climate pro-
tection to the Chinese Government, and appeal to its ‘fairness’. Due to the competi-
tive advantage of EU companies in environmentally friendly and resource-saving
technology, it seems to be possible to link economic interests to environmental con-
cerns. However, regarding issues of social, gender and regional inequality, EU trade
and investment policies do not have any answers to give.
The second part of this paper explored how China’s ‘open–door’ policies implied a
rediscovery of gender differences and used gender as a constituent in the establish-
ment of new labour regimes and as a significant marker in the creation of new social
classes in the post-communist era. After China’s WTO accession these processes are
increasingly driven by a complex interaction between domestic policies, and foreign
trade and investment policies. The long-standing claim of socialist policies for gender
equality became subordinated to the imperative of fast economic growth. Presently,
the Chinese leadership is torn apart between its prevailing interest in economic
growth and wealth, spreading social unrest by groups who are marginalized or
excluded from welfare, and the pressure exerted by the USA and the EU.
Civil society organizations concerned about development issues, social justice and
gender equality increasingly challenge the EU’s and China’s trade race by a dual
strategy of engagement. They question EU trade and investment policies focusing on
competitiveness and ensuring the corporate rights of European business in China,
and they highlight their contribution to growth and development dynamics which are
unequal, unsustainable and unjust. At the same time, they broaden opportunities and
create space to exchange knowledge, build civil society alliances and network with
people in China.
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China's economic reforms since the late 1970s have brought about an unprecedented surge in internal rural to urban migration. Most transnational corporations in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Europe, and their subcontractors, recruit millions of peasant migrants, in particular unmarried and young women, to work in export-led Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Limited educational opportunities, especially for females, the lack of village employment prospects, and low prices for agricultural prod
This study opens a critical perspective on the slow death of socialism and the rebirth of capitalism in the world's most dynamic and populous country. Based on remarkable fieldwork and extensive interviews in Chinese textile, apparel, machinery, and household appliance factories, Against the Law finds a rising tide of labor unrest mostly hidden from the world's attention. Providing a broad political and economic analysis of this labor struggle together with fine-grained ethnographic detail, the book portrays the Chinese working class as workers' stories unfold in bankrupt state factories and global sweatshops, in crowded dormitories and remote villages, at street protests as well as in quiet disenchantment with the corrupt officialdom and the fledgling legal system.
Preface PART I: DECENTRALIZED LEGAL AUTHORITARIANISM 1. Chinese Workers' Contentious Transition from State Socialism 2. Stalled Reform: Between Social Contract and Legal Contract PART II: RUSTBELT: PROTESTS OF DESPERATION 3. The Unmaking of Mao's Working Class in the Rustbelt 4. Life after Danwei: Surviving Enterprise Collapse PART III: SUNBELT: PROTESTS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 5. The Making of New Labor in the Sunbelt 6. Dagong as a Way of Life PART IV: CONCLUSION 7. Chinese Labor Politics in Comparative Perspective Methodological Appendix: Fieldwork in Two Provinces Notes Bibliography Index
Looks at two Chinese labor sites - hong Kong and Shenzhen. two different work expereicnes; different ways thte job is gendered. Winner Outstanding book Award for ASA.
In this paper, we explore the effects of differences in labor market institutions and the degree of market liberalization on the size and composition of gender wages gaps in China's urban labor markets. We use enterprise-ownership type, enterprise age, and workers' methods of finding employment as proxies for the extent of market liberalization. We find both the size of the wage gaps and the proportion of the gap left unexplained by differences in observed characteristics largest in the most liberalized joint-venture sector and smallest in the least liberalized state sector. We next investigate the effects of differences in the wage structure on the gender wage gaps. We find that differences in the wage structure, in general, and the degree of wage dispersion, in particular, are extremely important in accounting for the larger wage gaps in the joint-venture and collective sectors relative to the state-owned sector. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 709–731. Department of Economics, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine 04240. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: Numbers: J16, J31, J71, O15, O53, P23.
Compilation of articles focusing on the “gendered division of labor.” Presents initiatives that address the concerns of women, including how those concerns should be integrated into the work of the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC).